ML20072A657
| ML20072A657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1983 |
| From: | Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT |
| To: | Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HQ:S:83:189, NUDOCS 8301240093 | |
| Download: ML20072A657 (4) | |
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't Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 HQ:S:83:189 JAN 2 01983 Mr. Paul S. Check, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Check:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INERTED CELLS IN THE REACTOR SERVICE BUILDING The enclosure provides additional infonnation on the inerted cells in the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant reactor service building. This information will be added to the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report in a future amendment.
Any questions regarding the information provided or further activities can be addressed to Mr. A. Meller (FTS 626-6355) or Mr. D. Florek (FTS 626-6188) of the Oak Ridge Pro. ject Office staff.
Sincerely, b at V
John R. Longenecker Acting' Director, Office of Breeder Demonstration Projects Office of Nuclear Energy Enclosure cc: Service List Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution g
i 8301240093 830120
~
PDR ADOCK 05000537 A
i ENCLOSURE 1
e.
f All these cells have Engineered Saf ety Feature (ESF) steel liners and have the i
siructural capability to accommodate hot sodium spills (see Section 3A.8).
The inner cell system is designed to maintain the structural integrity following any of the postulated accidents and prevent sodium concrete react!on under DBA sodium /NaK spill conditions. h e. M k Se.dion 3 A.4 )
j in the CRBRP, in addition to the inner ells inside containment, there are i
bh inerted celIs inside the RSB.
These ineried celIs have the similar f unctional design requirements as described above f or the Inner cells, although the accidents postulated for the design evaluations are of course different.
The above is based upon preliminary accident analysis as provided in Section 15.7 of thi s PSAR.
3A.1.2 Deslan Bases i
The design basis accidents used for evaluation of the f unctional capability of the inner cell system have been identified in Section 3A.1.1 above.
The inner cell system is required to have the following f unctional capability during normal plant operation or accident conditions as described below.
1)
Cet Is which contain primary sodium wIlI have a nitrogen inerted airosphere to mitigate the effects of sodium spills.
2)
Cells which contain primary sodium will have a steel liner to conserve nitrogen.
3)
Those celIs wlih Iarge sodlum inventories (the Reactor Cavity, PHTS Cells, and the Overflow & Primary Sodium Storage Tank Coll) will have steel liners capable of retaining a large sodium spill where a potential sodium spill could accumulate.
4)
Each inerted cell will be structurally capable of withstanding the' postulated accident conditions re ulting from sodium and NaK spills.
l The preliminary design conditions vf the inner cells are presented in Table 3.8-2.
These accident considerations are further discussed in Section 15.6.
L 5)
Each inerted cell will be designed for an anticipated leak rate of 0.36% vol/ day at 2.5 inct.es of water.
For a discussion of design bases see Section 3.8-B.3'.
i l
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3 A.1 -2 Amend. 64 Jan. 1982
[
-Y
ENCLOSURE e
'3 The RSB Is a reinforced concrete, and with the exception of the radweste area
$1 is designed as a seismic Category 1, tornado hardened structure above and below grade level at El. 815 ft.
The RSB structure, in addition, houses an airlock, cranes, a f reight elevator, and a railroad track that allows railroad cars to 39 be brought directly into the building.
The airlock,13 '4" in internal diameter, is provided between the RSB and the 39 RC8.
The elevation of the airlock is adjusted to provide a 8-ft. wide by 8-ft.
61 high passage between the operating floor of the RSB (El. 816 ft.) and the RC8.
The minimun clear space between the doors of the airlock is 20 ft.
A 125 ton capacity bridge crane is provided in the RSB. The hook on the crane 61 will have a clearance of 42 ft. above the operating floor.
39 A hardened railroad door 18'0" x 22'0" is provided between the RSB and the Radwaste Building (RWB). This door is designed to withstand tornado generated 61 missiles.
Personnel access and egress is provided in the RSB structure from all levels, via four staircases and one elevatcr.
The elevator and one of the staircases 61 are located in the southwest corner, the other three staircases are located in the northwest, southwest and northeast corners, respectively, as shown in the general arrangement drawings in Section 1.2.
Corridors are extensively 61 provided throughout the building for rapid egress.
Leakage of radioactive gas from the various systems within the RSC will be e
restricted by utilizing commercially available seals to Ilmit, ur, der normal
(
1 operating conditions, the dose rate within the RSB due to radioactive gas
. leakage below 10% of the zoning criteria, as established in Table 12.1-1.
Additionally the RSB Internal pressure is maintained at negative 1/4" W.G. to restrict the release of radioactive contaminants to the atmosphere.
The fcundation for the west end of the Radweste Area is at grade elevation and is founded on compacted structural backfil l. The Radwaste Area structure is designed to meet the requirements of the Standard Building Code.
In addition the structure below grade as well as the Solid Radweste Area above grade are 61 designed as rei nf orced concrete structure.
The upper part of Radwaste Area, the steel framed structure is designed to 61 cnsure that the adjacent seismic Category I structure of Reactor Service Area 291 is not damaged nor its safety functions compromised during an SSE.
The RSB has been designed as Seismic Category I consistent with its safety function. The sections in this report dealing with the various systems located 39 in the RSS (see Table 3A.4-1) present their individua seismic category rcquirements.
29l The R5B codiM Se*'d M ie d d be O f
3d sale Gdde ashe 4e & ine4J celk A fAe Adr cs&&vsd kh) (see PsML sedh 3A.(). Tab (< sAA-3
(
lish h 4he. InedO cell 5 t'v' DC RSE.
3A.4-2 Amend. 61 Sept. 1981
s TABLE 3A.4-3 Enclosure INERTED CELL DESIGNATION LIST REACTOR SERVICE BUILDING STRUCTURAL UPSET FLOOR RADIATION ZONEli)
DESIGN PRESS.
DES. TEMP.
NORMAL EQUIPMENT CELL NO.
TITLE ELEVATION OPERATION
$}iUTDOWN (PSIC)
(RFi llI ATHOS.121 CONTAINED 331 EVST Third Loop IHX 798'-6" IV III 12 150 N
EVST Backup Na Cell Cooler 331A EVST Third Loop 798'-6" IV III 12 150 N
Piping Pipeway 337 EVST Cell 759'-4" V
IV 12 150 N
Ex-Vessel Storage Tank 351C Pipeway 770'-0" IV III 12 150 N
Piping 351D Pipeway 770'-0" IV III 12 150 N
Piping 351A Main EVS Cooling 775'-0" IV III 12 150 N
Piping Sys. Pipeway 351B Main EVS Cooling 775'-0=
IV III 12 150 N
Piping Sys. Pipeway 357 EVS Cooling Loop B 779'-0" IV III 12 150 N
EVST Na Cooler Cell Pump 357A Cooling Loop B 798'-6" IV III 12 150 N
Piping Pipeway 357B Cooling Loop B 798'-6" IV III 12 150 N
Piping Pipeway 360 EVS Cooling Loop A 779'-0" IV III 12 150 N
EVST Na Cooler &
Cell Pump 360A EVS Cooling Loop A 798'-6" IV III 12 150 N
Piping Pipeway 361 EVS Na Cold Trap 779'-0" IV IV 12 150 N
EVS Cold Trap &
Cell Economizer 386 EVS SSP Cell 779'-0" IV III 12 150 N
Ex-Vessel Na SHPLG Pkg.
387 PTI cell 765'-0" IV III 12 150 N
PTI Notes: 1) For definition of Radiation Zones see Table 12.3-1.
- 2) N= Nitrogen
- 3) Liner Design Temperature