ML20071P018

First Interim Significant Const Deficiency 83 Re Heat Tracing Design Electrical Interference Identified During Hot Functional Testing.Corrective Action Ongoing.Completion Expected by 830815.Next Rept by 830826

ML20071P018
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	05/24/1983
From:	Drummond F LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3183-188, W3I83-0188, W3I83-188, NUDOCS 8306070317
Download: ML20071P018 (3)

Text

F LOUISIANA f 24a octAnONOe s1nter POWE R & LiG H T/ P O BOX 6008 . NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 . (504; 366-2345

$uS$IrsNU May 24,1983 W3I83-0188 Q-3-A35.07.83 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV lJ

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 g0 n N3 ll Arlington, Texas 76012 g &J %

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 i Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 83

" Heat Tracing Design Deficiencies Identified During Hot Functional Testing" First Interim Report

REFERENCE:

Telecon dated April 27, 1983 from M. A. Livesay to C. Oberg

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 83, " Heat Tracing Design Deficiencies Identified During Hot Functional Testing." This item was previously identified as PRD 115.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, W"

F. J. Drummond Project Support Manager - Nuclear FJD/ MAL:keh cc: 1) Director 3) Mr. E. L. Blake Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

2) Director 4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 8306070317 830524 DR ADOCK 05000382 PDR g: -] ]

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INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 83

" HEAT TRACING DESIGN DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). The report describes

" electrical _ interference" deficiencies with the safety related heat trace

'A' and 'B' panels. This problem is considered reportable under the re-quirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge it has not been reported pursuant to 10CFR21.

' DESCRIPTION During prerequisite testing of the boric acid system heat tracing, electrical interference on temperature sensing thermocouple extension cables was found to cause premature operation of over-temperature cutouts and alarms. These

-circuits are utilized to control the temperature of the boric acid system and prevent precipitation during normal operation.

SAFETY IMPLICATION Failure or misoperation of the boric acid heat tracing could cause precipitation of boric acid and prevent proper operation of the boron injection system there-by impairing safe shutdown.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Engineering evaluation has determined that electrical interference may be re-duced by the addition of filters and revised termination schemes. Implementation of corrective action is ongoing with rework completion and retesting expected by August 15, 1983.

An update or Final Report will be submitted to the USNRC on or before August 26, 1983.

. j i

l INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 83

" HEAT TRACING DESIGN DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). The report describes

" electrical interference" deficiencies with the safety related heat trace

'A' and 'B' panels. This problem is considered reportable under the re-quirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge it has not been reported pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION During prerequisite testing of the boric acid system heat tracing, electrical interference on temperature sensing thermocouple extension cables was found to cause premature operation of over-temperature cutouts and alarms. These circuits are utilized to control the temperature of the boric acid system and prevent precipitation during normal operation.

SAFETY IMPLICATION Failure or misoperation of the boric acid heat tracing could cause precipitation of boric acid and prevent proper operation of the boron injection system there-by impairing safe shutdown.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Engineering evaluation has determined that electrical interference may be re-duced by the addition of filters and revised termination schemes. Implementation of corrective action is ongoing with rework c3mpletion and retesting expected by August 15, 1983.

An update or Final Report will be submitced to the USNRC on or before August 26, 1983.