ML20071L788

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Special Rept:On 940721,transient Rod Failed to Fully Insert.Caused by Bolt on Control Rod Drive Hooked on Nearby Wire Which Prevented Full Travel.Wire Rerouted & Properly Secured
ML20071L788
Person / Time
Site: Pennsylvania State University
Issue date: 07/26/1994
From: Shirley D
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV., UNIVERSITY PARK, PA
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9408030260
Download: ML20071L788 (1)


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PEMSTATE 2L q na.ia 4. shirn3 Semor Vase h. sident f.w Rwmii ue renn#ama sue t:mscrsny 207 Old Mam and Dean of the Oraduate ihoW l'msersity Park, PA 1MU2-1$03 July 26,1994 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Rcx>m Washington, DC 20555 Re: Report of Incident at the Penn State Breazeale Reactor License Number R-2, Docket Number 50-05 On the morning of July 21,1994, the reactor was being checked out following a power outage caused by an electrical stomi the previous evening. As part of the checkout procedure, the transient control rod was scram tested. Technical Specification 3.2.6 requires as a limiting condition for operation that rods scram in less than one second. The transient rod did not fully insert and thereby failed the test. Technical Specification 1.1.33.b defines operation in violation of a limiting condition for operation a reponable occurrence which must be reported in accordance with Specification 6.6.2.a.(3). While it is not clear that a degraded condition existed during operation it is being reported for information purposes.

Immediately following the failure to fully scram the transient rod was inspected. It was found that a bolt on the control rod drive had hooked on a nearby wire which prevented full travel. The wire was re-routed and properly secured. Subsequent testing venfied proper operat'on of the control rod. The control rods had been successfully scram tested on June 26,1994. Maintenance since that time, some as late as the day prior to the incident, had the potential to move the wire in question. IIad the condition persisted during operation, the wire would very likely have been pulled during normal transient rod motion, suggesting that the condition did not exist for an extended thne.

In addition to correcting the situation, staff personnel have been briefed on the incident, the patential consequences, the root cause, and the need for care in routing wires to prevent recurrence.

Sincerely yours, David A. Shirley Senior Vice President for Research and Dean of the Graduate School pc: Region 1 Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 DAS/ld14085.94 [

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