ML20071C304

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-280/82-34 & 50-281/82-34.Corrective Actions: Operations Dept Instructed on Potential of Tank Filling Overpressurization & Filling Methods to Prevent Problem
ML20071C304
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 02/02/1983
From: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20071C294 List:
References
041, 41, NUDOCS 8303010655
Download: ML20071C304 (2)


Text

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VIROINIA' ELECTRIC AND PowEn COMPANY Rs5InoNn, VIRGINIA 23261 W.L.Si m ar

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Vacs Panasomwr Neca.uAn Oramasson, February 2, 1983 Mr. James P. O'Reilly.

Serial No. 041 Regional Administrator N0/RMT:acm Region II Decket Nos. 50-280 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 50-281 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have-reviewed your letter of January 12, 1983 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station between November 1 and' November 30, 1982 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos.

50-280/82-34 and 50-281/82-34. Our response to the specific infraction is attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports.

Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power - Company has no objection to these inspection reports 'ceing made a matter of public disclosure.

The information contained in the attached pages is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Very truly yours, O

ldu W. L. Stewart At ta ch.nent cc:

Mr. Steven Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing 8303010655 830218 PDR ADOCK 05000280 0

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Attachment Page 1 Serial No. 041 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/82-34 AND 50-281/82-34 NRC COMMENT:

10 -CFR 50.59 requires that the licensee shall maintain records of changes to the facility as described in the final safety analysis report (FSAR).

These records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that. the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to the -above, records, including a written safety evaluation, were neither generated nor maintained when a change to the facility, as described in the FSAR,' was made. Two inch diameter clear tygon tubing was installed on the component cooling water (CCW) system surge tank in parallel with the level indicators. On November 9, 1982, the tygon tubing blew off the surge tank and released radioactive gases into the auxiliary building. The gas flowed to the ventilation vent effluent stack,.where the activity was measured as being some 30% of the Technical Specification 3.11.B.1 limit.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.)

RESPONSE

(1) ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION:

The violation is correct as stated.

(2) REASONS FOR VIOLATION:

This event was discovered and notification made to the NRC by the Licensee.

The release did not violate Technical Specification.

The temporary level column was installed by Operations Department at an unknown time.

The time was most probably many years ago in order to provide an independent. indication of level for a specific evolution. At that time no Jumper Log entry was made.

As the improved procedural controls were developed and because of the physical location of the temporary tubing we failed to register the jumper.

(3) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED:

The hose blew off as the tank was being refilled with its vent closed.

This was necessary due to the higher than normal activity in the component cooling water system. The potential overpressure stress on the tank has been evaluated and shows its design pressure was not exceeded.

The hose

. as permanently removed.

The Operations Department was w

instructed on the potential of tank filling overpressurization and filling methods to protect against overpressurization. The proper use of the Jumper Log was reemphasized. Subsequent tank filling evolutions have been successful.

(4) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

No additional steps are necessary.

(5) THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

'iance has been achieved.

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da a'4 UNITED STATES 9

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NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COMMISSION o

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..r 101 MARIETTA ST N.W SUITE 3100 k'.% *... /

8 ATLANTA. GEoAGIAies-Jc FEB 18 l Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN:

Mr. W. L. Stewart, Vice President Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23262 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/82-34 AND 50-281/82-34 Thank you for your letter of February 2,1983, informing us of steps you have taken to correct the violation concerning activities under NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 brought to your attention in our letter of January 12, 1982.

We will examine your correc+,1ve actions and plans during subsequent inspections.

We appreciate your cooperation with us.

Sincerely,

, $ '",I i

R. C. Lewis, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs cc:

J. H. Ferguson, Executive Vice President-Power J. L. Wilson, Station Manager P. G. Godwin, Director l

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x.4 VInOINIA ELucTnIc Axn POwsn COMPANY RIcuxoNo,VImOINIA 20261 W. L. Srnwust Vacs Pasesomwr xces== o.amus...

February 2, 1983 Mr. James'P. O'Reilly Serial No. 041 Regional Administrator N0/RMT:acm Region II Docket Nos. 50-280 U. S. Nuclear Regtilatory Commission 50-281 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia -J303 DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have reviewed your letter of January 12, 1983 in reference to the inspection condtteted at Surry Power Station between November 1 and November 30, 1982 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos.

50-280/82-34 and 50-281/82-34. Our response to the specific infraction is attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports.

Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.

The information contained in the attached pages is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Very truly yours, i

e

~

W. L. Stewart Attachment cc:

Mr. Steven Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing

i Att chmrint Pcg2 1 Serial No. 041 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/82-34 AND 50-281/82-34 NRC COMMENT:

10 CFR 50.59 requires that the licensee shall maintain records of changes to the facility as described in the final safety analysis report (FSAR).

These records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not invclve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to the above, records, including a written safety evaluation, were neither generated nor maintained when a change to the facility, as described in the FSAR, was made.

Two inch diameter clear tygon tubing was installed on the component cooling water (CCW) system surge tank in parallel with the level indicators. On November 9, 1982, the tygon tubing blew off the surge tank and releascc radioactive gases into the auxiliary building.

The gas flowed to the ventilation vent effluent stack, where the activity was measured as being some 30% of the Technical Specification 3.11.B.1 limit.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.)

RESPONSE

(1) ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION:

The violation is correct as stated.

(2)

REASONC FOR' VIOLATION:

This event was discovered and notification made to the NRC by the Licensee.

The release did not violate Technical Specification.

The temporary level column was installed by Operations Department at an unknown time.

The time was most probably many years ago in order to provide an independent indication of level for a specific evolution.

At that time no Jumper Log entry was made.

As the improved procedural controls were developed and because of the physical Ictation of the temporary tubing we failed to register the jumper.

(?) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED:

The hose blew off as the tank was being refilled with its vent closed.

This was necessary due to the higher than normal activity in the component cooling water system. The potential overpressure stress on the tank has been evaluated and shows its design pressure was not exceeded.

The hose was permanently removed.

The Operations Department was instructed on the potential of tank filling overpressurization and filling methods to protect against overpressurization. The proper use of the Jumper Log was reemphasized.

Subsequent tank filling evolutions have been successful.

(4) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL bE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

No additional steps are necessary.

(5) THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

Full compliance has been achieved.

...