ML20070T329
| ML20070T329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1983 |
| From: | Stamiris B STAMIRIS, B. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070T331 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302080306 | |
| Download: ML20070T329 (13) | |
Text
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January 30, 1983 Dear Sirt I am writing to you about Consumers Power Company's Hidland nuclear plant in the hopes that something can be done about the unjust and unsafe events which are about to shape the future of Michigan. As an intervenor in the NRC's current soil r,ettlement hearings, I have spent three years studying this plant intensely and learning the strengths and weaknesses of our federal regulatory system.
I have come to believe that we have what could' be a very effective system of regulations, but unfortunately these regulations are not enforced. As a result the Midland nuclear plant has come to epitomize what can go wrong when safety stan-dards are compromised in the face of time and financiat pressures:
--Billion dollar cost overruns due to negligent construction and manage-ment are passed on to ratepayers.
--Exemptions from design and safety standards are allowed due to finan-cial hardship.
--Reactor vessel installation is allowed despite knotn ilefects that threaten its integrity and operating capacity.
--Significant design deficiencies affect 4 out of 5 major safety systems.
--Unprecedented corrective modifications are allowed to compensate for faulty foundations and cracked reactor vessel anchor bolts.
--Ient, thy legal proceedings grind on at taxpayer expense long after the questions they purport to conJider have been decided.
The time and financial pressures facing this plant are themselves unique due to the Dow Steam Contract and the ten year delay. Touted as the nations only nuc-lear cogeneration facility, this plant is designed to produce steam for Dow as well as electricity. And if the plant is not complete by the end of 1984, Dow can back out of its contractual obligation.
But the plant is not truly a cogeneration facility because it does not make use of waste heat in an energy efficient sense. In fact, the use of almost half the Unit I capacity for Dow Steam instead of electrical production, accounts for the relatively low megawatt output for a twin unit plant of this size (500 W Unit I, 852 W Unit II).
What is more, should Unit I fail to operate for its intended lifespan, a likely occurrance due to its defective core weld,L we would receive only 393 W electri-IIhe NRC estimates that Unit I can operate 9-15 years before it is subject to pressurized thermal shock (potential cracking of the irradiated vessel), p.
5-19, C-10 S.E.R.
Eb.3 8302080306 830130 PDR ADOCK 05000329 A
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Page 2 January 30, 1983 city for our $4 billion investment. For the Dow Contract requires that should Unit I fail U production.$ nit II would take up the Dow steam obligation ahead of its electrical Aside from these contingencies, Consumers own estimates that it will cost about
$3 billion to decommission the plant at the end of i'ts 35 year life,3 make the economic future bleak for ratepayers even if the plant operates as intended.
These economic difficulties are compounded by the Michigan Public Service Commission policies intended to protect the public. For according to MPSC policy, Consumers cannot pass the plants construction costs on to the public until the plant operates.
Under these circumstances, Consumers has pushed ahead at any cost, and despite a drop in electrical demand, to save their investment at our expense.
Furthermore Consumers has no incentive to build the plant carefully if they can simply pass the cost of their mistakes on to the public in the end.
But dect-sions to overlook safety problem indicators or install faulty equipment can hardly be considered mistakes, making these cost and safety liabilities all the more unfair to ratepayers.
The quality assurance and construction errors which have plagued this plant for the last ten years, are the root of the economic as well as the safety problems facing the plant today.
This is nowhere more clearly seen than in the recent action by Standard and Poors which downgraded Consumers investment rating due to the long delays and cost overruns at the Midland plant.4 And once again Consumers promises to pass the resultant cost increases on to the ratepayers.
The NRC is charged with protecting the public health and safety, the MPSC is charged with protecting our pocket books. Both agencies contend that the choice to proceed with the nuclear plant has been undertaken at Consumers own risk.
But neither agency is willing or able to objectively overlook billion dollar sunk costs in the end, and as a result public protection is lost.
Please give careful consideration to the important cost and safety issues I raise.
I have worked dil11 gently in the NRC hearing process in the hope of increas-ing the safety of this troubled plant.
But at this point, I am at a loss as I see my continued efforts unable to make a difference. The hearing has become an exercise in futility.
i So I now seek the attention of leaders with the conscience, convictions, and ability to take the steps necessary to change these unsafe and unjust practices.
I urge you to take whatever action you deem appropriate to get some answers and
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direct needed attention to this nuclear plant about to be licensed, s
210-25-82 CPC discovery response, attached.
3 82 CPC discovery response, attached.
9 4 83 article attached.
1
Page 3 January 30, 1983 In this eleventh hour dilemma, the people of Michigan are largely unaware of the magnitude of the safety and economic burden they are about to inherit. Nor are they aware of negligence which caused it.
So you probably won't hear a public out-cry, but we do need your help and we need it now.
Earnestly, bd.A LW Lb J Barbara Stamiris 5795 North River Road Freeland, MI 48623 517-695-5604 Please do not hesitat 2 to contact me for further documentation or questions.
On February 8,1983 the NRC has scheduled an important public meeting at the Quality Inn,1815 Saginaw Road, Midland. The M 8.% ession will focus on Consumers new " construction completion plan" and a 7:30 p.m. session is open for public com-ment. Please consider coming or sending a representative to this meeting.
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October 25, 1982 fgygg p Mrs Barbara Stamiris 5795 North River Road
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Freeland, MI 48623 Dear Mrs Stamiris Attached are' responses to Interrogatories recently submitted by you in your
" Motion to Comp 61".
The Response to resubmitted Question 18 notes-that no analyses of the cost / benefit of a premature loss. of Unit I exists because the Company regards such a loss as a highly improbable event.
In my opinion, the Company is not legally required to conduct such an analysis in order to satisfy a discovery request.
Very truly yours
{$46%
/$5 E Brunner'
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Revised Question No 18 Explain the effects of a postulated Unit I failure and shortened life i
expectancy of Unit 1 in terms of electrical production and the selected costs and benefits of Midland Plant Operation.
Response
t We do not anticipate a postulated Unit I failure.
In the unlikely event of the necessity of shutting down Unit 1, Unit 2 is expected to be used to produce both electricity and steam.
Based on the steam flow requirement at design conditions for Unit 2, this unit would be able to produce only 393 MW of electricity as opposed to 852 MW with Unit 1 in operation.
The Company has
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not developed a cost / benefit analysis based on this scenario because we regard
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Istter%>cte 3 A Wing ConSU Me!5 OWnjpfjajion(O}cS September 20, 1982 Qnd naudecommisStony
- esyypges, b SIOIUC decomin't.SSN CQW
- uld nou> be aboat p h y;) lion.
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Mrs Barbara Stamicis 5795 N River Road Rte 3 Freeland, MI 48623 Dear Mrs Stamicis Attached hereto are Consumers Power Company's Response to Stamiris Interrogatories dated August'30, 1982.
In addition, please note the following:
7 q.6 o Sum of the Present Worth (PW) of the projected production cost savings at 11.51% discount rate for 34 years (in 1984 $)
= $8,600 million o Decommissioning costs (in 1984 $)
=$
235 million o Escalated decommissioning cost at 7.5% per year escalation rate for 34 years
= $2,748 million o Present Worth (PW) of the decommissioning cost at 11.51% discount rate (in 1984 $)
=$
68 million
%, PW of the Decommissioning Cost 68
= 0.8%*
=
Sum of the PW of Production Cost Savings 8,600
= Less than 1%
- All costs are based on the parameters as of 1980.-MeSe have LEen TBV[ Sed upward in /z/8g cPC.htudy 12.
The projected operational life expectancy for both Midland Units 1 and 2 is 40 calendar years. Typically, all plant design fi)arameters are based @e amac< Rad @reagatina Rigae
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MIDLAND NUCLEAR C0 GENERATION PLANT J
(MIDLAND PLANT UNITS 1 & 2)
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DECOMMISSIONING STUDY l
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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The general overall conclusion of the Task Force is that decommissioning of Midland Nuclear Cogeneration Plant (MNCP) is technically feasible and can be L
accomplished without excessive environmental impact or personal radiation exposure for an estimated total cost of $310 million in 1982 dollars.
Although a specific estimate of $310 million is cited in the report, due to the nature of this estimate and the techniques used in developing the costs, the Task Force members believe that it is appropriate to establish a range of g
costs. Hence, whereas $310 million is the most reasonable estimated cost to
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decommission the MNCP, the task could be accomplished for a total cost of $300 million to_$350 million. The Company currently favors th'e~IiMmpf reoiovar/ ~
j dismantlement method of decommissioning as opposed to the other available
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options, such as mothballing with delayed dismantlement or entombment.
Current regulations allow the actual method of decommissioning to be deter-mined at the time that permanent shutdown of a facility is being considered.
Planning activities for decommissioning were estimated to require two years of effort prior to final shutdown of the Plant, followed by four years of actual decommissioning work effort, which includes dismantling, shipping and disposal.
This Task Force was formed at this time for several reasons. Atomic Safety Licensing Board hearings on issuance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Operating License for the MNCP are scheduled to begin in early 1983.
f The Task Force report could support testimony on decommissioning costs in these hearings if necessary. Additionally, it is anticipated that the i,
Michigan Public Service Commission will be holding public hearings sometime in 1983 on a rate case which considers costs for the MNCP. Again, the Task Force report could support testimony on decommissioning costs for this rate case hearing if necessary. Most importantly, a new estimate of decommissioning costs is needed in order to assure the estimate is maintained consistent with f,
current industry experience.
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Prepared by
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Midland Decommissioning Task Force Consumers Power Company Jackson, Michigan December 1982 The $f/O filjon is in 1982 dothrg. Thit becom!L 4e
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..s,e... most y. c.ptmue cons,u, ten of ~ m.h.. e ae b, -s B ANSENG - ther of Ihe maten's top hond Midland plant. mtisch s ell prodm e a lesIreoty hacher seed. "The most important thuig is b
llut liegte Anderson an assistant state alter that Censunwrs Power is not of Intesament rating service.s P'rsday down, grad,ed C.onsueners ne.y gene.ral who spectahre,s in uldely regu,lation. grade any longer And th.at is, Pe.fr c. b
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- f. e..a,s M gei espensive for the company le conhnue construc-wovId be af fecled because of a decibson last year money tion projects encludmg the controversaal Mediand by the Mirhigan Supreme Court "They sidt have access to money - but they Nuc, lear P,ower Plani,,em... mmus,.....
plus." dropsCensumers from the het of corpor a gt,y;,;c~,rg;;,p,g,,aa,= de.not have,the sam,e broad access they have 1,e,.t ng cli.ge.
ba,,e.,eus, i.eu d espert ~, ma, have i.
tions that Standard and Poors regards as pru N hiidland plant uhde the court eleclined to lighten up on ther capd at Dudget dent envestments for fenancial sanddulions. take (Dat action. at did direct the 34echegan Pub-The Canaums-rs slatement enoled that the other closmg off an important source of buyers for '
- '*"I***#'*I*I ana3ec band rahng company. Mandy's latenser he coE" *m*e7s# *','*" ',*'Ee'safecUtt ngT*t! c"o"rtres. has not dropped the ratma of Consum-C'"e'"r*e"a s'n**m"d*
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- "d* **d a e nsiany spnanman said w h
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the Pbant mpany as receeved me anderetten that sumers said in a statement that et assiemes the necedy'sie rencerned cost everruns and contruction delats at its Mid-A quh h P5C asialvses. based en rough risesses.
troen sny kamstedge, we haven't heard any-land hurtear Power Plant shout sts ability to pay ett long term bonds Screated concerns suggesis that the downgradmg means that Can-thmg from Moodv s askmg to even talk to es and P to an enternational anvester serene that sumers wdl have to pay higher enterest rates to ahnut our situMion/* saH1 Make Koschik of savestors - probably 4 to a 6 percent on top of Connemers assues ratings en the riskiness of corporate and mhat they mould opterwene pay en anaerest "The have impact of thes decessen en that when goveranteM bonds The end resun. accordang to an analysts by the That woesid mean an estra 81 melhon en the we market securHrs. the enterest rate is gong to Michigan Pubhc Servre femm6ssion, could be siisu mdien worth of hands thecompany planned be slightly higlie r than if our raies had re.
te nwe sa tw3 maanned that et mas obviously. they anterest an encrease of atmut 5 cents a month en the in addden. said 5toger P' F sscher head of the average res6dentsal user's electrie bdl The cem-PSC's effre of widnv sperations. Cennumers Conhnued trem Page A t as robust as comparable utdpra, aditmg to blag budd the Midland plant in late 1937 construrteen dard and Pont s concern regarding rate Irf at, mas espected le te compacted en 197s er t975, et rates are passed en tecustomers." said Nonchik ment by Ihe Michig a n Publ.c 5ers scel a cont es s3w mdleen
~The Conwmers sisirment said ' 51anaars and Commissaan " the statement said l The last official figures given by the company Poors has mdealed they based their decision en
( called for completwn late thes year of part of the their concerns ever lhe cow level et tvie Midland f Moschek added This signals agasa sometnma plant and the rest en Isoe The estimated cost d plant and the uncertameses trie company may He se twen ir)ms en convey puhfrty for some 5319 hditon face en introductag the plant into the rate basedhme. and Ihat a the fut that we need adequate hos(hek sand the cornpany is reworking theme before the M rhigan Pubite service 0emmission ' rate reiser frem the P$C '
him addttion. the company's earn 6mgs are not (When Consumers announced 11 planned to-figures t'tehty analysts say further delays and en higher construthen costa are enpected
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. Barbara Stamiris Intervenor 5795 North River Road 50-329, 50-330, OM-OL Freeland, MI 48623 Proceedings 517-695-5604 January 30, 1983 1983 MIDIAND PLANT OVERVIEW The Midland nuclear plant is unique in the nation for many reasons. It is the nations only dual purpose nuclear facility in that it is designed to produce steam for the Dow Chemical Co. as well as electricity for Michigan. At an expected cost of $4 billioni for only 1352 MW electricity, this plant will easily be the most expensive and perhaps the worst built plant in the nation. And its current soll settlement problems require remedial fixes unprecedented in any construction, let alone at a nuclear plant.
Not surprisingly the cost-delay, construction quality, and Dow contract fac-tors are closely interrelated. A lack of quality assurance (QA) controls have led to design and construction deficiencies which raise the cost while lowering the safety of the plant. And the obligation to provide steam to Dow by the end of 1984 has been a tremendous pressure contributing to Consumer's tendency to cut corners on safety.
But these attempts to save time or money in the first place have ended up costing more in the end as most clearly seen in the soil settlement problems facing the plant today.
l Situated in a floodplain (and closer than usual to a population center) in i
l order to be near its steam customer Dow, the plant site had to be built up with i
35 feet of fill soils. A quality assurance breakdown involving the placement of these soils led to the construction of a nuclear plant on a faulty foundation.
Today, all the plant's major safety buildings have been affected by differ-i ential settlement, overstress, and cracking.2 In an attempt to restore their integ-ICPC cost update is due by March 1983 frrm 1981's $3.4 billion.
h Men 3%meshde 2Auxilliary Bldg., Dicsel Generator Bldg., Service Water Structure, Borated Water Storage Tanks, and Piping and Conduit entering Reactors.
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rity, these structures must be reinforced by highly complex underpinning, support, and surcharge operations costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Vital underground piping has already experienced up to 20 inches of excess settlement, and must be monitored over the life of the plant in an attempt to detect further damage and stress. And a system of permanent dewatering wells must operate over plant life to maintain the foundation soils in an unsaturated condition (NRC's S.E.R. Supple-ment II).
To expect ratepayers to have to pay for these tremendously expensive correc-tive actions is intolerable, especially since Consumers actually knew of the soils deficiencies before beginning construction of new safety structures on these soils.
In 1977 the Administration Building foundation settled excessively and Consumers own follow up audit (F 77-32) revealed extensive sitewide soils deficiencies.3 This information was withheld from the NRC and ignored by Consumer's themselves in their press to continue plant construction in 1978 On December 6,1979, the NRC issued an Order calling for a suspension of soil related construction activities because of a quality assurance breakdown, false statements, and inadequate renedial plans involving soils. According to the Order, soils work was to be suspended "until the related safety issues are resolved."
But in a catch-22 situation the Order was worded in such a way that if a hearing was requested, its conditions could not go into effect unless and until the hearing Notsurprisingly,Consumersrequestedahearingtochallhbgethe so concluded.
Order. Therefore, as the soils hearing has dragged on for three years due to the emergence of serious new problems, so has the very soils work it sought to suspend.4 Another major reason for the ineffectiveness of the hecring and the succession of QA problens over the years at this plant is the failure of the NRC to vigilantly 3CPC 3-15-82 proposed findings, P. 221-222 attached.
43-5-80 Gallagher memo attached.
3 enforce its own regulations. The NRC pattern of leniance in the face of repeated 5
abuse of regulatory trust and standards has reduced the quality of the hearing and of the plant itself.
The soil settlement hearings began in 1981 with a "QA Stipulation" designed to avoid litigation of the QA breakdown.6 This agreement exchanged an admission of past QA deficiencies on the part of Consumers for the favorable testimony of the NRC giving thier " reasonable assurance" that QA improvement was on its way.
By the spring of 1982, the h3C allowed the soils construction work to resume and at once a series of significant new QA problems arose. So the NRC had to reopen the QA hearings to reconsider their earlier " reasonable assurance" testi-mony.
On October 29, 1982, the NRC submitted that revised testimony. Despite harsh criticism of Consumer's QA by NRC staff members and the Resident NRC Inspector, Director Keppler once again concluded that Consumers should be given yet another chance to proceed with the soils remedial work.7 Less than one month after the submission of the revised NRC testimony, even further QA problems surfaced in an NRC inspection, causing the NRC to announce in November 1982 that Director Keppler's October testimony would have to be reconsidered once again.8 These new problems involved QA, design and construction deficiencies of such proportions that over 1000 plant workers had to be laid off in December.9 A series of closed NRC/ Consumers meetings are expected to culminate soon in a major enforcement action by the NRC.
But the NRC inspection report and information detail-ing the latest problems is being withheld from the public as the private negotia-tions continue with Consumers on how to proceed.
5 82 Spessard memo, 8-24-82 Landsman memo, attached.
4 66-5-81 Stipulation, attached.
711-9-82 article attached.
812-7-82 article attached.
912-3-82 article attached.
4 In the midst of these escalating QA failures, one would expect an aggressive regulatory response.
But what happened instead appeared to take even some NRC people by surprise. The NRC responded to the latest QA violations not with punish-ment but with a reward.
On December 9,1982, the NRC gave their long awaited approval for actual underpinning excavations to begin.10 In so doing, the NRC blatantly placed Consumer's pre 1 sing time and financial considerations ahead of public health and safety considerations. For this under-pinning operation, scheduled to take a year and a half to complete, had to begin by 1983 in order to meet the December 1984 plant completion deadline.
The excava-tion operation under safety structures represents the point of no return with the soils remeaial work.ll And this decisive act of approval was made contrary to all previous NRC commitments that the underpinning work could not begin without "resolu-tion of matters related to implementation of the quality assurance program."
This final NRC action is in keeping with the initial NRC action in the soil settlement proceeding.
Since the Order suspending the soils work couldn't go into effect until the end of the hearing, the Board opened the hearing by asking "whether any halt in planned or ongoing construction activities would be appropriate pending resolution of the soils settlement question."
But the Boards " concern about the adequacy of potential safety i6 pact" of ongoing soils work was completely reversed by the NRC. The NRC answered instead that certain soils work needed to go forward to protect Consumers construction sche-dule.12 So testifying, the NRC proceeded to grant concurrance for the installation of twelve dewatering wells and other remedial work, and has continued to do so through the course of the hearing.
The Board has condoned, and even encouraged the NRC 1012-10-82 article attached.
119-27-82 article attached.
127-7-81 NRC (Hood) testimony, attached.
5 to proceed in this manner placing financial considerations ahead of safety, and letting the NRC staff decide the very issues the Board was established to resolve.
So at this point, the soil settlement hearings have become an academic exer-cise at best. In the most absurd paradox of all, we are about to begin QA hearings i
in April that seek to determine the adequacy of quality assurance implementation i
for the soils remedial work, some six months after the work in question has already f
s gone forward.
By this time the quality assurance issues which are the essence of this proceeding will have been reconsidered, sidestepped, and delayed to the point that their resolution is totally meaningless. I have no choice now but to conclude I
that what we are facing at Midland is worse than no regulation at all, and that is the pretense of regulation.
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In 1973, an appeal Board wrote, "We gave serious consideration to revoking the construction perndts.
..We did not do so because... we had the solemn assur-ances of the Applicant that all those prior deficiencies were being rectified."
They went on to say, "the assurances which we had received from the Applicant were 5
4 false and that, in point of fact, Consumers and Bechtel still have not manifested both an ability and a willingness to take the steps necessary to insure proper QA activities."
The applicability of these very words in 1983 is sadly ironic. Perhaps Consu-
~ mers cannot be expected to place public health and safety ahead of cost and schedule considerations when their very survival depends on timely plant completion, but we can and should expect more from the NRC.
By the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC is charged with protecting the public health and safety "first, last and always" not the pocket books of electric utility investors. We deserve no less.
v
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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-329-OM CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
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50-330-OM
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50-329-OL (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2 )
50-330-OL CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S SUPPLEMENTAL a
h 'Ig 6
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5
5' esd Vz%,>2 329.
Further, this additional evidence concerning Audit F-77-32 does not demonstrate that Consumers Power management acted unreasonably in evaluating the Administra-tion Building grade beam failure.
Hindsight confirms that evidence existed in 1977, which if given different weight, would have revealed the plant-wide soils conditions in time
-222-to have prevented the problems which now confront us.
What we cannot say is that the conclusion that the beam failure was an isolated incident was imprudent and unreasonable in 1977 or an indication of poor management attitude.
Audit F-77-32 concerned itself with only a limited aspect of soils 1
l P acement.
While its results demonstrated a problem with the documentation of past soils tests, they did not unambig-uously reveal actual field testing problems.
On the other
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