ML20070E539
| ML20070E539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070E535 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9407150183 | |
| Download: ML20070E539 (3) | |
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i UNITED STATES j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
\\.....f WASWNGTON, D.C. 20555-000 SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42' WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION j
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-482 f
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated February 24, 1994, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the licensee). requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to facility Operating License No. NPF-42) for the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
The proposed changes would revise Technical Specification i
3.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations, to allow the use of temporary alternate closure methods for the emergency personnel escape lock'and-containment wall penetrations, during alterat kns of the core or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
Wolf Creek Generating Station Technical Specification 3.9.4 currently ' requires that a minimum of one door in each airlock be closed and that each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere be isolated or capable of being isolated by an automatic isolation
'l valve. -The technical specification lists specific acceptable isolation-devices as-closed isolation valves, blind. flanges, closed manual valves, or operable automatic isolation valves.
These requirements are applicable during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.
' Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires:that primary containment integrity be maintained in Mode 1, Power Operation, through Mode 4,' Hot Shutdown.
During a refueling outage, various activities must be completed inside the containment and sometimes require the routing of temporary. hoses or cables through the airlocks or' penetrations.
The current requirements of Technical Soecification 3.9,4 limit these. activities'to portions of-the outage in which 1
there are no core alterations or fuel movements being performed. LThese limitations result in a significant loss of flexibility in planning outageL activities.
The licensee is-proposing to allow the use of' temporary closure devices to isolate penetrations used for routing of temporary equipment.
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3.0 EVALUATION The requirements for containment building penetrations during core alterations or fuel movement are intended to limit the radiological consequences of a fuel handline accident.
The existing technical specification lists specific equipment which provides a suitable barrier to the release of radioactive material However, the design of the isolation equipment is based primarily cn the mitigation of design basis accidents during power operation.
Given that a fuel handling accident is unlikely to result in pressurization of the containment the closure of potential release paths by other means would also limit the consequences of such accidents to below the criteria given in Section 15.7 of the Standard Review Plan.
This position was adopted by the staf f in NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications; Westinghouse Plants, September 1992.
Acceptable containment penetration closure methods in the Straard 'achnical Specifications include valves, blind flanges or equivalent dur ng cree alterations or fuel movement.
The iitenstm has proposed to allow temporary closure devices instead of ele. sing an airlock door and allow approved functional equivalent closure me...t.
u.nainment penetrations in lieu of closed valves or blind a n g e.
~ne :amporary devices would be fabricated to the specific requirements associated with the activities being performed during the core aitu at.uns ut fuel movements.
The devices would be designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and utilized in accordance with established procedures.
The protea 2 would ensure that the temporary device provided adequate closure
+o maintain the applicability of the licensing basis analysis concerning fuel 1 c l Je:ild.
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The statf finds that the proposed change provid'es an effective means of preventing the release of radioactive material following a fuel handling accident.
Licensing basis analyses related to the potential consequences of design basis accidents remain valid and demonstrate that regulatory requirements are satisfied.
The staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Kansas State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted aret as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in thr amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any ef fluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 17610). Accordingly, the amendment
meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: W. D. Reckley Date:
July 7, 1994 l
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