ML20070D201
| ML20070D201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1991 |
| From: | Gina Davis BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 91-018, 91-18, PT-068, PT-082, PT-68, PT-82, NUDOCS 9102280148 | |
| Download: ML20070D201 (10) | |
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00$ TON EDi$ON FHgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hdi Road Plymouth, Massachusetts o2360 February 21, 1991 George W. Davis BECo Ltr. #91-018 senior Vice President - Nucleat U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 i
License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293_
+
CORRECTION TO OCTOBER 4. 1990 BOSTON EDISON COMPANY RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR PILGRIM STATION i
On October 4, 1990, Boston Edison Company submitted a response to an NRC request for information on offsite emergency planning (BECo Ltr. 90.119 as amended by BECo Ltr.-90-133, November 29, 1990).- Recently, Boston Edison conducted an analysis of mobilization times of the Massachusetts National Guard to staff the Hellesley reception center and of-the arrival time of the general public at Hellesley. A copy of that analysis-is attached.
As a result of our analysis, Boston Edison has determined that Item Tr-70 at p. 11-9B of our October 4, 1990 response contains an inaccurate statement.
In Item Tr-70, Boston Edison stated that "(t]he_first evacuees-arriving at Hellesley would occur at approximately five to six hours after the evacuation had been announced to the public." Based upon the attached memorandum, we anticipate that the first evacuees would arrive at Hellesley_within the first 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 hours after the EBS evacuation order.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call _ me or Ron Varley.at (508) 747-9464.
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/fwu G. H. Davis i
E0F3650 l
Attachment cc: Mr. Hilliam T. Russell Associate Director-for Inspection and Technical Assessment OfficeLof Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 9'102280148 910221
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0 U.S', Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 21, 1991 Page Two cc (Continued)
Dr. Thomas Hurley Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 1
Mr. Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Steven A. Varga, Director DivisionofReactorProjects-I/III Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Robert A. Erickson Chief. Emergency Preparedness Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Hashington, D.C. 20555 l
Hr. R. Eaton, Project Manager i
Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mail Stop 1401 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi;sion I White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville HD 20852 Mr. John Macdonald Senior NRC Resident Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hill Road j
Plymouth, HA 02360 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road Kinc of Prussia, PA 19406 Hr. Richard Strome Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency J. H. McCormack Post Office i
& Court House l
Boston, MA 02109
OFFICE HEMORANDUH Boston Edison Company R.J.Markovichffs To: R. A. Varley From:
Record Type A4.08 Date: February 15, 1991 Dept. Doc. EP91-116 k
Non-Safety Related
Subject:
Timely Mobilization of the Massachusetts National Guard to Staff Helleslev Distribution:
1.
Introduction This memorandum summarizes Boston Edison's analysis of the ability of the Hassachusetts National Guard (HNG) to staff the monitoring and decontamination station (HDS) at the Hellesley reception center in a timely manner.
The HNG performs monitoring, and if necessary, decontamination of evacuees at the Hellesley reception center.
As discussed below, the MNG can staff the HDS at Hellesley in a timely manner.
There are two basic components in the analysis: (1) the estimated time it will take the HNG and Massachusetts Department of Public Horks (HDPH) to staff and activate the HDS at the reception center; and (2) the estimated time it will take for evacuees to arrive at the reception center facility.
Each of these is discussed below. A timeline is also provided which graphically portrays the anticipated sequence of events leading up to full facility staffing.
EP91-il6 i
.Page 2 Before summarizing the analysis, it should be noted that the most l
critical element of the emergency response effort is to assure that persns are promptly evacuated from the EPZ (if that is the applicable protective action directive).
It should also be noted that while the analysis summarized below focuses on the ability to timely staff the HDS at Hellesley and process evacuees in the first several hours of an evacuation, the applicable FEMA criterion addresses the capability to i-monitor 20 percent of the evacuating population in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l There is no criterion of which we are aware which governs the number of' persons to be processed during the first few hours of an emergency.-
i II.
Estimated Time of Arr' val of the Massachusetts National Guard at Hellesley and Activat' on of the Monitorina and Decontamination Station at the Facility The MNG is-part of the emergency response team assigned to the Hellesley reception center.
The MNG performs monitoring, and if necessary, l'
i decontamination of evacuees reporting to Hellesley, (See "Hellesley Reception Center, IP-05 (Draf t-4, December 19, 1990)).
Applicable Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP procedures call for the MNG to be notified and mobilize early on in an emergency at the l
Alert level and to prepare the MDS at Hellesley at the-Site' Area Emergency.il (See "Hellesley Reception Center", IP-05 (Draft-4, December 19, 1990)).
This. ensures that in most emergencies, the MNG l:
l il Pursuant to MNG procedures, theLMNG does not activate until the Governor L
declares a state of emergency.
The analysis contained in this--
memorandum does not quantify the time needed to obtain~ aiGovernor's; declaration.
That process may add some additional: time to the-mobilization sequence. However,-based on: discussions with MCOA, we-understand that-in the event of an-immediate General Emergency at' Pilgrim, action would be promptly initiated to establish a state of emergency..
l-EP91-116 f
Page 3 j
l would t,e prepared to monitor, and if necessary, decontaminate evacuees well in advance of any protective action directive to the general public to evacuate the Pilgrim EPZ.
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In the unlikely event of an immediate General Emergency, the Hassachusetts Department of Public Horks staff located at the Hellesley-facility is responsible for setting up the Hellesley facility prior to the arrival of the HNG.
(See " Reception Center Setup", IP-17 (Draft-3.-
February 1, 1990)).
Initial set-up of the HDS at the Hellesley facility takes approximately 30 minutes.
This entails wheeling at least one portal monitor about 200 feet from storage to its set-up location.
This also includes gathering a few hand held monitors used for monitoring vehicles, and placing a number of traffic cones outside the facility.
Complete set-up of the HDS at-the facility including set-up of:
monitoring and decontamination areas, 2 portal monitors, and traffic-areas should take approximately one hour. -Complete set-up'of'all aspects of the Hellesley reception center should take approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
If set-up of the Hellesley facility is cal 16d-for.during working hours, set-up can begin almost immediately upon the DPH staff-being notified, because the DPH staff is_ located at:Hellesley.
(See "HCDA Operations-Office IP-03 (Draf t-07. January 21, 1991)).
During off-hours, the l
HDPH dispatcher is notified by HCDA at about.the same time the MNG is l
notified.
(See "HCDA-Security Guard" IP-07_(Draft-06,_ December 10, 1990)).
The HDPH dispatcher _ then _ notifies the HDPH staff via telephones' and pagers to report-to Hellesley, (See "Hellesley Reception Csnter RERP".Section II.F.4_(Draft-2,- January 17, 1991)).
Based on-
EP91-116
.Page 4 conversations with the HDPH Emergency Response Coordinator. HDPH staff response time to Hellesley would be minimal because most of the HDPH staff live in the vicinity of Hellesley.
In addition, the HDPH staff has received training in set-up of the facility, registration of evacuees, and in basic monitoring operations.
Based upon recent conversations between Colonel Gavigan (HNG) and members of my staff, in-the very unlikely scenario where an immediate General Emergency is declared at Pilgrim, the HNG can have at least 10 people at Hellesley within about one hour of notification.UI Hithin about two hours, the HNG can have at least 20 personnel-at Hellesley and within about three hours of notification, 40 HNG personnel can be at Hellesley.
Finally, within about four hours of notification, the full complement of HNG personnel (48) assigned to perform the monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees at Hellesley (one shift) will be at the facility. According to MCDA, it has been their understanding, as well, that the HNG will be able to promptly mobilize (i.e., to make personnel available in less than 4 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).
Only 6 to a persons are needed to perform the initial monitoring of evacuees and vehicles, including-2 vehicle monitors and a recorder, 1 portal monitor operator, and 1 initial personnel monitor and_ a recorder.
Basic monitoring and decontamination of evacuees can be handled by 18 to 20 people.
The 18 to 20. people include: 2 portal-Ml Boston Edison's October 4 _1990 letter to the NRC.(Item Tr-70 at p.
11-98) generally states-that an advance (HNG) party could be at.
Hellesley in one to four hours, with remaining personnel arriving at intervals up to six_to twelve hours." Those estimates have since been-r refined. While we understand that it-may be the HNG's general policy or practice to respond-to emergency situations in about 4 - 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, our discussions, as mentioned above, indicate the_ ability to more promptly mobilize to support RERP-related activities.
l-cP91-116
' age 5 monitor operators, 2 initial personnel monitors, 1 personnel recorder, 6 j
vehicle monitors,1 vehicle recorder, 4 secondary personnel monitors, and 2 personnel decontamination assistants, and 2 vehicle decontamination assistants.
Therefore, even at the earliest stages of a fast-breaking event in which an immediate General Emergency is declared, sufficient MNG personnel would be available to begin monitoring operations.
(e.g., one hour after notification).
Furthermore, DPH personnel located at Hellesley or
'T nearby would conduct facility set-up and this should not be a limiting factor in promptly initiating reception center operations, Finally, in 1
all but the most unlikely scenarios, facility staffing and preparation will occur well prior to the declaration-of a General-Emergency.
III. Estimated Arrival Times of Evacuees i
As indicated in the attached table,:in the unlikely event of an-immediate General Emergency and the protective action directive is a rapid evacuation,.the earliest that'any evacuees would be expected to arriveatHellesleyisapproximatelyone.hourandthirtyminu'tes'"l af ter an evacuation-of the EPZ is ordered.= This hocs a quick departure from the EPZ, clothes packed, family gathered and. car gassed.-
lInBostonEdison's-October 4,.1990LettertotheNRC(ItemTr-70atp.
11-98), Boston Edison stated that the first evacuees would-arrive at-Hellesley about five to six hours after the public was notified to evacuate.
The statement that the first: evacuees would arr.ive:at:
Hellesley-in about five to six hours--is inaccurate. More detailed analysis results in-a better estimate of about one-hour-and thirty minutes as discussed in this memorandum.
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I V.' Comoarison of HNG and General Public Arrival Times at Helleslev i
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In the unlikely event of an immediate General Emergency, the HNG would l
receive notification from HCDA approximately 15 minutes before the general public receives the EBS message to evacuate.
(See "HCDA i
Operations Officer", IP-03 (Draft-07, January 21,1991); "HCDA Security Guard", IP-07 (Draft-06, December 10, 1990). Approximately 10 personnel l
from the HNG should arrive at Hellesley about 45 minutes before any evacuees arrive.
These 10 members of the HNG could begin monitoring of any early arriving evacuees.
Additionally, approximately 15 minutes after the first evacuees have arrived at Hellesley, a basic monitoring j
and decontamination crew consisting of 18'to 20 members of the HNG would l
have arrived at Hellesley.
This crew could adequately monitor and begin to decontaminate the initial evacuees arriving at Hellesley, finally.-
in the event of an immediate General Emergency, the Hellesley facility -
l would be fully staffed by the HNG four hours.after notification.
V.
Contiusion In the unlikely event of.an immediate General Emergency at Pilgrim, the Hellesley Reception Center would be-set-up-in a' timely manner _by the DPH staff. Any early arriving evacuees-at Hellesley could be monitored..
l and if necessary, decontaminated by the HNG in a timely fashion.
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Addi;;onally, as' portrayed.in the attached timeline:
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EP91-116 Page 7 l
i Approximately 10 personnel from the MNG will arrive at Hellesley 45 l
i minutes before the first evacuees arrive. Upon the MNG's arrival, the DPH staff should have completed initial set-up of the monitoring equipment at Hellesley.
These 10 members of the HNG-could begin monitoring any early arriving evacuees.
1 Approximately fifteen minutes before the first evacuees have arrived at Hellesley, the full-complement of MDS equipment should be in place.
A basic monitoring and decontamination crew consisting of 18-20 members of the HNG would be operational at Hellesley within about fifteen minutes after the first evacuees arrive.
This crew could adequately monitor and begin to decontaminate the initial evacuees-arriving at Hellesley.
Finally, in the event of-an immediate General Emergency, the HDS at i
Nellesley would be fully staffed by the HNG four hours after notification.
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/jlm-EOF 2829
.TLEI Cumulative Number of General Public Arriving at Wellesley Reception Center Prior to fullfacilityStaffHobilization1l Elapsed Time (Hrs.)
Cumulative from Order to Evacuate Number of Arrivals l
- 30 0
1:00 0
1:30 to 2:30 0 to 513 2:30 to 3:30 513 to 1289 3:30to4:00'"I 1289 to 1950 l
1l This table is based on an analysis of the arrival times of the general public at Hellesley conducted by KLD Associates Inc.
11l Number of arrivals is based on summer weekend, midday conditions.
"*lFullcomplementofMNG(48)havearrived.
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MOBILIZATION OF MNG TO STAFF WELLESLEY*
GE State / Towns MDPH concurs (Off-hours)
First 10 MNG declared notified of with PAR decision.
PAD MDPW staff arrive. Initial at GE and utility MNG & MDPW EBS begins to monitoring set-up PNPS PAR by DNN notified
arrive mmp!ste Ak A N
) k A k
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.h l
0 0.25 V
o.5 0.75 1
1.25 1.5 Troop D notifies MDPH of utility PAR 1
Wellesley First 10 more MNG MDS set-up Evacuees have arrived complete arrive (20 total)
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I a
o I
dB
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l 1.75 2
2.25 2.5 2.75 3
3.25 1
20 more MNG Full have arrived complement (40 total) of MNG (48)
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A T
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I 3.5 3.75 4
4.25 4.5
- All times are approximate.
- Time needed to obtain Govemor's State of Emergency Declaration not quantified.