ML20069N420
| ML20069N420 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1982 |
| From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069N299 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8212020401 | |
| Download: ML20069N420 (7) | |
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BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS:
Nunzio J. Palla'dino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky John P. Ahearne CORRECTED C0pY Thomas M. Roberts James I. Asselstine In the Matter of EETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY I)ocket No. 50-289 SP (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating
( estart)
Station, Unit No. 1)
AAMODT RESPONSE TO COMMENTS OF PUBLIC AND PARTIES NOVEMBER 9.1982 IN HARRISBURG I.
Comments of the Public.
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After reading each comment, we view them in total as the vote of a jury whD:h has carefully followed the course of the restart proceeding. " They noted the major deficiencies at T8I:
incompetent ~
~
and untrustworthy management, unprepared operators and the poor physical condition of the plant.
Considering the potential for a serious accident with such a combination, the public then turned to the emergency
- plans and found them impossible to ace'omplish.
Thr. jury voted, in'
. excess of 90%, against restart of TMI - 1.
The public has not been fooled by the labored arguments of the Board in defense of the 1icensee.
They aie~~ suspicious of promises to do better, They know that " symbolic" fines will not result.n a-competent and trustworthy management.
They know that establishing criteria for instructors should have been accomplished over three years ago.
Yne majority of the comments or the public were sufficient reward for our in$tervention of over three years.
Even the presentation of Eay Thylor* on behalf of the Pennsylvania Farmers Association demanded that "the equipment and materials used in Unit 1 reactor meet the highest standards, and that employees in. charge of operating the reactor be carefully tested and evaluated for competence and experience befo;e approval is given for restart."
(Tr. 82)
+ supporting, restart 8212020401 821130 i
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of ?FA, Newpher, who informsd us that Ms. Thylor's presantation wa's ~
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her own idea, but, cinco it did not counter PFA policy, she was allowed to present it on behalf of the organization.
Members of PFA, some years ago prior to the TMI-2 accident, voted statewide by at least 51%
in favor of safe nuclear power generation.
Mr. Newpher stated that he simply trusted that the government would not approve the operation of TMI-1 if it would adversely affect the farmers."
He was unaware of any j
emergency plans for farmers; he was of the opinion that farmers would not be interested in such plans and would, in any event, remain to take care of thejr animals.
Mr. Newpher's innocence was disturbing, however, we are gratified that we were able to bring members of the TMI-1 area agricultural community into the restart proceeding.
These witnesses had experienced the TMI-2 accident and expressed many reserva-tions concerning the plans for farmers as well as the restart of TMI-1.
In sum, all public commentators are asking you to assure that TMI-1 can be safely operated.
In view of the state of the TMI training program, the incompetency and crookedness of GPU Nuclear management, and the physical condition of the TMI-1 plant, you cannot do that by December 10, the date set for your decision.
We read the public opinion as 100% against a decision to restart at the present time.
The jury has spoken.
II.
Concerning the Comments of the Parties.
1 We disscree concerning the effect of observance of witness demeanor on the Stecial Master's Decision. Tr. 102, 148 TMIA believes that the divergence between the Board's and the Special Master's decisions was due to the Special Master's advantage in being present at the hearing to observe the demeanor of the witne sse s.
(Tr. 102)
The Special Master did note the demeanor of several witnesses, however he never depended on these observations as evidenc'e in drawing his conclusions.
As an example, consider the Special Master's decision concerning Michael Ross which the Board dotpletely overturned.
~ Ihe Special Master depended on YY's testimony (SMR** c142), the testimony of others (Id. #143), Ross's failure to deny YY's testimony (Cd. #144), incredible testimony of Ross (Id. $146-47,149), and logical deduction based on the above (Id. #150-51), in which the relative dezesser of the witnesses was simply noted, in passing (Id. #15~1,11nes
- Special Ma ster's Report
Ty, tup), s Usrtop4f aumbncacom Er. Recs intentionally kept the proctor away in order to aid the candidatas."
(Id. #152)
Tnen, in addition to the evidence referenced above, the Special Master examined twelve changes to the answer keys to find evidence if any were unfairly broadened.
(Id. #1M-175) 2here were many more changes than just these twelve; changes in the ' key for the "B" set of examinations were not considered at all.
The twelve chqnges were presented as examples.
(Id. #153, 176)
The Special, Master found evidence that the " good faith" cf the' reviewers (Ross, etc.)
was at issue on two questions.
(Id. #177)
In the case.of one of the changes, the Special Vaster showed how th'e reviewers misrepresented the training program; in the case of the other change, the reviewers were virtually the only candidates who stood to gain from the change.
(Id. #177)
The Board, in ' discussing ~this evidence (July PID #2212-2224),
misstated that the Special Master's conclusion was based solelv on these two questions and failed to acknowledge that these were only The Board accord-examples from a limited investigation of the matter.
ed the matter no significance, however the Special Master considered the two instances to be examples which confirmed other evidence (YY's testimony, Ross' incredible testimony, etc.)
The Special Master looked at the evidence as a whole whereas the Board looked only to explain away each piece.
The Board failed to be objective; the Special Master was objective.
In that objectivity, the Special Master considered all evidence; including the credibility of the testimony; concerning this evaluai; ion of testimony, observance of demeanor was, in a few cases, a small part.
The NRC's assertion that "the Special Master looked at that (deceanc:
almost to the exclusion of some of the direct evidence on some of the issues, and that is where the licensing Board carefully evaluated the direct evidence onthe issues" (Tr. 148) is totally without basis in fact.
- In studying the Board's discussion, it should be noted Foo'te te 1 that the Board could not " find from:this record which answer is corree "
(F2220); "Tne candidates were about evenly split on including boric
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"between acid in their answers." (#2221); and there was a difference the chemistry lectures 'in training... and actual plant practice" (F2222 '
Row can an objective Board have concluded in the face of this and other evidehce that "Although we are concerned about weaknesses in
- the quality of ins.truction, and have imposed conditions directed to that concern, we have not found that the instructors have failed to instruct.
Nor have we found that the students failed to learn." (F245 0,
2, b(# d108FT'E C U TI L U D I A J > F.
- w wwua*
findines wore consistent with tho Licensing Board's decision.
1r. 146 Che NRC Staff never conceded that the blatantly. pimilar answers of G and H cust be due to cheating.
The Staff recommended no action ibout the VV-0 false certification.
The Staff were not suspectful of the 36 word identical answers of GG, MM and W, nor of Operator U providing The Board acknot edred all these cases of cheating, identi-l an answer.
e<.6 dv +ke Snecini Ma s ter.
Staff's attorney, Mr. Goldberg even referred on one occasion during the Reopened Proceeding to the " alleged" cheating of Operators O and W who had already confessed to cheating extensively on the NRC exam and an independentf audit.
The Staff did not find, as the Board did, that Mr. Shipman was probably not truthful under oath, or that the Licensee lacked competence in managing its investigation, or that Licensee's attorney (Wilson) was
" naive", that licensee management was accountable for the " loose" adsinistration of training and testing, or negligent for failing to foster respect for examinations, or that^the TMI training instructors' competence and attitude were questionable, or that quality assurance concepts were needed in the training program.
The Staff did not find, as the Board did, that licensee management had been negligent in their certification of operators, or that training canagement (Newton', Long) misrepresented testing procedures under oath,ar.d that the integrity of Licensee's training program failed because of improper management.
The Staff did not find, as the Board did, that the NRC examination process is neither independent nor external of Licensee's training program, and, thus, cannot measure the adequacy of Licensee's program, or that there are problems with the substantive content of the exams, I
an'd that the validity of the exam is questionable.
c Ihe references for the Board's findings referenced above are in i
A A F.0D T COIGGNTS, August 20, 1982, pages 8 - 13.
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It is our opinion that the Staff was useless in protecting the public interest both in the main and reopened hearing in the areas Of ohr contentions.
l ile believe that the Commission should find out why. the Staff failed to find what the Board found(due tothe Special ljaster).
We
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fcund the actions of the Staff in the Reopened Proceeding to be Sc: ally preposterous in view of their responsibility to protect the
rwmse.
an investigation of the managsment of. the Staff's participation in the Roopsned Proceeding and the manegomsnt of the Office of Inspection and Inforcement.
( See Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1982, #111-168)-
We believe that the NRC's definition of what constitutes
" cheating" should be investigated. Mr. Goldberg's explanation in response to Commissioner Gilinsky's question (Tr. 160) was,...
as characterized by the questioner, arDalling.
We;are becoming quite tertain, that what Mr. Aamodt described as a " gut feeling" (Tr. 122) and what we termed a " haunting suspicion" (Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1982 #1684 159-168) may very well be true:
168. (Ye)cannot help but develop the haunting suspicion that the NRC. investigations were pur-posefully limited both in scope and depth be-cause full exposure of the extent of cheating at TMI would have shown a situation where the
" team" concept was applied to all examinations, even NRC licensing examinations, that this pervasive cheating had been: supported by manage-ment from the beginning of operation at TMI, and that this kind of cheating was commonplace throughout the nuclear industry for years, and that NRC condoned it.
3.
We disarree with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 's implied assertion that distribution of a Dublic information brochure, not sub.iected to the scrutiny of the Darties, trevides adeouate emergency Dlanning for the farmers.
ir. 133 4.
We disagree with Licensee's (Ross) assertion that thev have e ntrotriate staffing levels. that all overators have been (or will be) examined by NRC using revised procedures, tha t necessarv Drograms are in place to Drovide comnetent oDerators.
tha t simulator training has been increased. _ that examinations are administered on the simulator to test emergency resDonse, and tha t oDerator attitude and morale have imDroved and are good and high.
Tr. 19-22)
Concerning Staffing Levels:
Where is the evidence? Numbers on charts do not indicate experience or training.
TMI-1 operators left in droves during 1981, a large number after the revelation of cheating.
Before this attrition, NRC found that TMI-1 had barely enough operators.
Now, evidently, trainees have been recruited and are being shunted through
' training' and NRC testing.
What about experience with -the TMI-1 reactor?
Ross testified tha t he w6uld like senior operators 'with-5 years of experience and R0s with 4 years experience at TMI-1.
(Aamodt Findin,gs, O
kech4, 1982,h341;Tr.24,231)
What ara NRC's raviood procaduran?
Thera was no evidcnco of cuch procedures for examination of licensed operators produced in either hearing.
What are necessary programs claimed now to be in place? Are we sure that they are adequate to provide competent operators as claimed?
If they were necessary, why weren't they in place beforehand?
IConcerning simulatdr training:
The amount of simulator training described is precisely what has been in effect according to licensee's own testimony in the main hearing., How can this be an increase?
The fact of the matter is that the' " week" is actually 20 houri on bands canipulation of the simulator.
The examinations at the simulator' to test emergency response was an: idea strongly rejected by both the licensee and Board.
(August 27 FID #543-548)
What certainty is there that licensee has '.
undertaken such testing seriously?
Concerning Operators' attitudes and morale:
.The licensee offered such testimony in the main hearing, and the Board ruled thah thie issue was satisfactorily resolved.
(Id. #267)
Af ter the Reopeded Hearing, the Board felt that the issue' of operator attitude had not
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'been resolved.
(July 27 PID #2058)
What brought about the change?
There has been no evidence, other than Ross' word, nor any opportunity to question Ross.
Tne comments by Ross are totally without evidentidry basie. ' Can the Commission use such self-serving comments ih making their decision?
s J
We disagree with Arnold's comments which e sse9t 'tha t controls 5.
to urotect the integrity of me. examinations were uut in Dlace.
Ir. 24 e
In May, 1982 Radiation Worker Permit tests were found, with thsir g
answer keys, lying on open shelve's in the training area.
Two reports were =ade to upper-management an'd finally a report to onsite NRC personne ;
before the situation was corrected.
This is' the subject of a motion, September 1, 1982, before the Appeal Board.
s Novetter 29, 1982 Re ectfully c
- mitted,
> Hfc Omdf
- ' 4/ ) kJ
>i Marjog V. Kamodt I
e.
Samuel J. Chilk Robart Adler, Esq.
Secretary of the Commission 505 Executive Houso U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2357 Wa shington, D. C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Docketing and Service Secti:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Oc:
Washington, D. C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner
-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Jane'Iee Washinston, D. C. 20555 R. D. 3, Box 3521 Etters, PA 17319 John F. Ahearne, Commissioner U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Louise Bradford Washington, D. C. 20555
$hf{ Green Street Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner.
Harrisburg, PA 17102
.i -
U. E. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon & Weiss James I. Asselstine, Commissioner 1725 Eye Street, NW, Suite 506 Washington, D. C. 20006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gary L. Milho111n, Esq.
i Atomic Safety & Licensing Board ington' h
Ivan W. Smith, Administrative Judge U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety &; Licensing Board Phnel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
- 20555 1
Gary J. Edles, Chairman s
Atomic Safety & licensing Appeal Board s
l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Wa shington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety & licensing AppeEl Board Panel l
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 4
Jack "Goldberg, Etg. Joseph Gray, Esq.
l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D. C. 20555
- George F.
Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Iotts & Trowbridge j
1500 M Street, NW f
Washington, D. C. 20036
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