ML20069K606

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Provides Justification for Decision to Replace Control Power Transformers in 480-volt Emergency Motor Control Ctrs Rather than Fusing Secondary Side of Transformers.Change Conforms w/10CFR50,App R.Change Scheduled for June 1983
ML20069K606
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 04/18/1983
From: Carey J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To: Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GL-81-12, TAC-51572, NUDOCS 8304260417
Download: ML20069K606 (3)


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relephone (412) 3934000 Nuclear f?. vision P.O. doe 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 N

April 18,1983 s

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Director of Nt,iclear Reactor Regulation United States t elear Regulatm y Commission Attn:

Mr. Steven A. Varga^, Cliief Operating R'eactors ". ranch No. I h

Division of Licensing n

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Washingtpn. DC 20555 u

Reference:

' Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1

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Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 s

t Appe,0 ix R to 10 CFR 50 d

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Centlemen:

Duquesne Light Company's Fire Protection Appendix R Review Report was submitted June 30, 1982. As part of the associated circuit analysis review, Section 3.2.1.3 of the Report stated that we would fuse the secondary side of each control power transformer (CPT) in our 480 volt

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Emergency Motuy, Control Centers (MCC's) to preclude a possible ignition

. source fron,a secwad,sry short circuit. Upon further investigation, DLC s

i hEs _ decided to repl' ace the existing CPT's with new CPT's of an encapsulated

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design which does not have,an ignition potential. We believe this method i is better than adding fuses *for the following reasons:

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1..gIntroducing fuses into the circuit wcald have added another 3

device into the system which is susceptible to possible f ailuro and,, if inadvertant failure occurred, would disable the co!ntrol iurte[ tion.

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The new CPT'siuf tLe encapsulated type are readily available,

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meet [1 EEL 323 eidironmental qualificaticns, and would not have the 'gnition po,tential f rom a secondary short circuit.

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If fusisl'qdy to be ed, they would require environmentally qualified' fuse holdsts which are not readily available.

Therefore, this chaffge does not affect our intent to comply with respect to associated circuits as defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, f

  • "' sSection III.G.2, and clarified by Generic Letter 81-12..The schedule lO O k) f or clange-out. of s the CPT's in the 480V Emergency MCC's is during our thirdcrefueling outage, which is tentatively scheduled for June, 1983.

83042604 d 830418 PDR ADOCK 05000334 F

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lj q A-Bxv;r Valley P wer Ststi::n, Unit Ns.1 4

D;ckat No. 50-334, Liesnan No./DPR-66 Appendix 'R to 10 CFR 50 Page 2 f e had documented in our October 28, 1982 letter, a description of our W

alternate shutdown procedures which were revised based on our discussions with your review staff on Oc tober 14,.1982.

The original draft procedures, which were documented in Chapter 7 of our Appendix R submittal report, were determined to be " repair procedures" and unsatisfactory for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions since they involved lif ting leads, i:tstalling jumpers 'and/or. removing. inaccessible fuses. Our letter of 5

Dec'embe r 10, 1982 do'cumented our intention to finalize the alternate shd down procedures' in conjuntion with the-installation of our proposed f

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Backdp Indicating Panel (BIP) since it is an integral part of the pro-

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. cedures. The schedule for the BIP, which is defined as equipment required to provide " dedicated shutdown capability" per 10 CFR 50.48, is 30 months from NRC approval date (i.e., July,1985 and in conjuction with an extended I

outage te perform required loop tie-in's, testing, etc.).

As a result of the new alternate shutdown procedure, additional g

areas of the plant will be utilized to achieve safe shutdown, therefore,

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d:sergency lighting (per Section III.J) will be required for these areas:

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East Cable Vault (CV-2) and adjacent stairwell (S-2); Elev. 735.

This is the, area where the Backup Indicating Panel will be located.

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Main Steam Valve Room and the access route through stairwell (S-2) and the Motor Control Center Room (Elev. 756). This is the area where the Operator will manually control steam pressure and steam generator level at.the Residual Heat Release Valve (HCV-MS-104) and s

observe the local steam header pressure indication.

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Main Feedwater Regulatirig Valve Room area (Elev. 762, Service I

Bldg.). Access will be via stairwell (S-2) up to Elev. 767, out the exit door onto the roof top, traversing the PCA shop roof-top to' the. door leading to the Feedwater Regulating Valve Room.

The roof to'p area has sufficient lighting via the security peri-meter lighting (security diesel power backup). The bypass valves around the Main-Feedwater Regulating Valves in this area will be manually operated for feedwater operation.

Since the additional emergency lighting units would be required in conjunction with the alternate shutdown procedures, the schedule for implementation will be consistent with the proposed BIP and the procedures.

Pleaec contact us if additional information or clarification is necessary.

Very truly yours, J.

. Carey Vice President, Nuclear J

B*cvsr Vallcy P:ver Staticn, Unit Ns.1 Docket Ho. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R to 10 CFR 50

' Page'3 Enclosures cc:

Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station

-Shippingport, PA 15077 U. S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission c/o Document Managment Branch Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn:

J. M. Allen, Acting Regional Adataistrator Region 1-631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Licensing Attn:

D. G. Eisenhut, Director Washington, DC 20555 b

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