ML20069H005

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First Interim Deficiency Rept Re Significant Const Deficiency 63, Procurement of Spare/Replacement Parts. Further Info Detailing Investigation & Evaluating Questionable Purchase Orders Will Be Provided by 830418
ML20069H005
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/08/1982
From: Maurin L
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3I82-0061, W3I82-61, NUDOCS 8210190345
Download: ML20069H005 (3)


Text

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.e l_DUISIANA

,42 OctAnoNoe S1nect POWER & L1GHT P O BOX 6008

  • NEW ORLEANS. tOUISiANA 70174. tL34) 366-2345 l

$iEONEsYE L. V. MAURIN Vice President October 8, 1982 Nuclear Operations W3I82-0061 Q-3-A35.07.63 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texa.s 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency Report No. 63

" Procurement of Spare / Replacement Parts" First Interim Report

REFERENCE:

Telecon - W. A. Cross (LP&L) to G. Madsen (NRC) on September 8, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the interim report on Significant Construction Deficiency No. 63,

" Procurement of Spare / Replacement Parts".

This item was originally identified as PRD #87.

Very truly yours, Lt$

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L. V. Maurin LVM/ MAL:keh cc:

1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Washington, D. C.

20555 C 8210190345 821008

~l I- : PDR ADOCK 05000382 CS PDR

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[L ImzRIx REmRr or SIGIFICANT CDNSTRUCTION DEFICIcXY. 63 "PROCURDENT OF SPARE /REPINEENT PARTS" INTBODLL7IN:

This report is subnitted in accordance with the require,ents of 10CFR50.55(e).

. ISe problan as presently identified is the apparent lack of documentaticn of appropriate technical and quality requiraaents for safety-related spare and replaceaent parts that have been received ansite. This problen is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge this problan has not been identified to the USNTC in accordance with the requirsaents of 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION:

LP&L onsite Operations Quality Assurance personnel have identified progrannatic deficiencies with respect to the procurenent of spare and replacement parts.

It is believed that as many as 300 purchase orders for safety-related spare and replacement parts tray be affected. Scme of these spare and replacement parts which may lack sufficient documentation of technical and quality requirenents and/or proper receipt inspection may have been installed in safety-related systens without documentation as to their installed location. Should the present information and indications be confimed during further investigation, this deficiency will represent a failure to fully ccaply with applicable portions of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criteria II, IV, VII, VIII, and XV.

SAFEIY IMPLICATIONS:

The use of spare and replacanent parts with indeteminate qualifications is unacceptable in safety-related systems ard omponents. Failure of these spare or replacanent parts may result in systen failures adversely affecting safe

-plant operation.

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00RRECTET A'_ TION:

LP&L has invited six (6) engineering consulting organizations to present

.<g information regarding their capabilities and experience relative to L

evaluating the extent to which the spare parts difficulty ray emprcraise safe plant operations. LP&L may select one consultant to assist in its own perfonnance of a detailed investigation and evaluation of gaestionable purchase orders which will identify deficiencies in safety-related itens and provide a reua. ended disposition for each iten. This effort is scheduled to be empleted by March 31, 1983, providing sufficient time to inplenent wrrective action and ensure the qualification of safety-related t

systers prior to ccmencing fuel load. Further infornaticn on this detailed investigation and evaluation will be supplied to the NRC by April 18, 1983.

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