ML20069G566

Forwards Changes to FSAR Text & Draft Responses to Questions Resulting from 830309-10 Meetings W/Power Sys Branch. Response to Question 430.75 Will Be Provided by End of Apr 1983

ML20069G566
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	03/24/1983
From:	Bradley E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8303280035
Download: ML20069G566 (95)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:* s s PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 FDW A RD G. B AU E R, J R. vece russionne (215)841-4000 ano ennemak counsuL EUGENE J. BR ADLEY assoceaTa samanaL counset DONALD ELANKEN March 24, 1983 CtUDOLPH A. CHILLEMI E. C. KI R K H A LL T. H. M AH ER CO RN ELL ?AUL AUERBACH assistant esNsRab COUNsub EDW ARD J. CULLEN, J R. THOM AS H. MILLER. J R. IR EN E A. McKENN A assistant COUNsuL Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Request for Information frczn the Pcuer Systens Branch Beference: Meeting with the Power Systen Branch Reviewer, E. 'Itmlinson, and Philadelphia Electric Campany on March 9-10, 1983

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The attached documents are draft question response changes and draft text changes to the FSAR resulting frtxn the discussion with Mr. E. 'Italinson at the referenced meeting. Please note that ccuplete changes to the response to question 430.75 are not provided at this time and will be made available at the end of April,1983. These changes will be formally incorporated into the FSAR revision scheduled for April, 1983. Sincerely, O, / Eug e J. radlcy See Attached Service List hf O O p A

I cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure) Judge Richard F. Cole (w/o enclosure) Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure) Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. (w/o enclosure) Ann P. Ilodgdon (w/o enclosure) Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/o enclosure) Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/o enclosure) Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure) Judith A. Dorsey, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Charles W. Elliott, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Mr. Alan J. Nogee (w/o enclosure) Robert W. Adler, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/o enclosure) Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (w/o enclosure) Mr. Steven P. IIershey (w/o enclosure) James M. Neill, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Donald S. Bronstein, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Mr. Joseph 11. White, III (w/o enclosure) Dr. Judith 11. Johnsrud (w/o enclosure) Walter W. Cohen, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Robert J. Sugarman, Esq. (w/o enclosure) Rodney D. Johnson (w/o enclosure) Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure) Docket and Service Section (w/o enclosure)

o l h LGS FSAR 00ESTION 430.9 (Section 8.1) In FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.2 you state that the suitability of each diesel generator was confirmed by qualification testing which was oenerally in conformance with IEEE-323-1971. This is an i ambiguous statement. Amend your FSAR to provide detailed information on what qualification testing was conducted and provide justification for any exception taken to the above requirements. Additionally expand your discussion on conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.9 to demonstrate that its requirements and the requirements of ICSB-2 and IEEE 387-1977 are met as pertains to the 300 consecutive start tests.

RESPONSE

Qualification testing is discussed in Secbions 3.10 and 3.11. Section 8.1.6.1.2 has been changed to state that the suitability of each diesel generator was confirmed by qualification testing in compliance with NUREG-0588 for Category II equipment. An Environmental Qualification Report that will provide information on the qualification testing performed will be provided in October 1983. Limerick diesel generators are not required to pass a 300 consecutive start qualification test for the following reasons: a. IEEE 387-1977, which mandates a 300 start test, is not i applicable to Limerick because the purchase specification was issued to Colt prior to the implementation date of the standard (July 1975 vs. June 1977) b. The trial use version of IEEE 387, issued in 1972 and committed to for Limerick in Section 8.1.6.2, did not mandate a 300 start test. Limerick conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 0 c. (3/71), which requires only that "The suitability of each diesel generator... be confirmed by prototype qualification test data and preoperational tests." Revision 2, which specificially endorses IEEE 387-1977, is applicable only to plants that received a construction permit after December 1979. This is indicated in Section 1.8. t 430.9-1 Rev. 16, 01/83

GW D h h gg' y LGS FSAR d. Standard Review Plan 8.3.1 states that diesel generator qualification testing programs are acceptable if they i satisfy Position 5 of Regulatory Guides 1.5 and 1.9. Neither of the applicable revisions of these accuments require a 300 start prototype test. The 12-cylinder model 38-TD8-1/8 Colt diesel engine employed at Limerick was qualified to a 100 start test conducted in 1968. This model engine has been used in the following plants that have received Operating Licenses: Robinson 2 Prairie Island 1 &2 Vermont Yankee Three Mi'le Island 1 & 2 Calvert Clifts 1 & 2 Crystal River 3 E.I. Hatch 1 & 2 Duane Arnold North Anna 1 & 2 Millstone 1 & 2 Farley 1 & 2 Arkansas Nuclear One, 2 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 Fermi 2 N Branch Technical Position ICSB-2 (PSB) Revision 1, and Paragraph 6.3 of IEEE 387-1977, both of which require a 300 start test, specifically state'that the qualification testing procedures delineated therein are only applicable to diesel generators of a type or size not previously qualified for nuclear plant service. As evidenced by the above, the Limerick units have been qualified and demonstrated to be rgliable in nuclear service; therefore, adequate justification exists not to pursue a 300 start test. Yf p cthoT M u 5 b k 04 g % E en d d & & iv d d l & is, c3 h l u a P ** hiIbN O Man u tattu re r : Eclo i t P"f b Mc le I Nc. : TG E DT ( 5/N 7co ccq 8t-Re) bearlw brat hc) Tgt : G ing IE f y }- d l I a h u a {t % Sr& Dri f Prco (7 400RL GMEDWh Rafinj ; Mb 2. kVA 2MO kki klcn % cu$ Rev. 12, 10/82 430.9-2

-m l / 5 L_ / O u u - t LGS FSAR W ~ ~' ' ' ' OUESTION 430.36 (Section 8.2.2) Section 8.2.2.1 of the FSAR discuss grid stability. Your-discussion and grid stability analysis is not complete. Provide a revised load flow and stability analysis that also covers the following: (Ref. SRP 8.2) 1. Loss of largest generating station 2. Loss of largest load 3. Loss of most critical transmission line or right of way if insufficient clearance exist between lines or transmission towers.

RESPONSE

Revised transient stability analyses have been completed. These analyses addressed the following three events: a. Loss of the largest generating station, i.e., loss of Peach Bottom Units 2 & 3 b. Loss of the largest load, i.e., loss of Lukens Steel plant in Coatesville, Pa. c. Loss of most critical right-of-way, i.e., a three-phase fault on the four transmission lines on the 130-30 r ig h t-of-way. 1. 130-30 line, 138kV 2. 220-62 line, 230 kV 3. 5030 line, 500 kV 4. 5031 line, 500 kV The transmission system remained stable for all three cases with either one or both Limerick units in service. The loss of both Peach Bottom units was the worst case af fecting system frequency. A minimum system frequency of 59.95 Hz occured 0.35 seconds after the trips and it ran out to 0.48 seconds. During this transient, the Limerick units will experience a minimum frequency 59.89 Hz. This is well within the design capabilities of all Limerick electrical equipment. '-24 0 ( b ) /14 430.60-1 nev. 1,, . -r o 2 a

nl6\\ ~ DRAVY LGS FSAR C) 00ESTION 430.47 (Section 8.3) The availability on demand of an emergency diesel generator is dependent upon, among other things, the proper functioning of its controls and monitoring instrumentation. This equipment is generally panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has occurred at some operating plants from vibration-induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive instrumentation is not made to withstand and function accurately for prolonged periods under continuous vibrational stresses normally encountered with internal combustion engines. Operation of sensitive instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy and control signal output. 2herefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be "directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring instrumentation should be installed on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a vibration free floor area. If the floor is not vibration free, the panel shall be equipped with vibration e"7, mounts. ty Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or provide justification for noncompliance. . RESPONSE Section 8.3.1.1.4 has been changed to provide the requested information. The diesel generators do not generate harmful torsional vibrations when operating at any speed from 0 to 115% of rated speed. f m- ' sh r% ~ A U 430.47-1 Rev. /82

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,-QUESTION 4 3 0. 4 8 (Section 8.3) Provide a detailed discussion (or plan) of the level of training proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the numker and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant operations and aaintenance groups to assist when needed. In your discussion identify the amount and kind of training that will be received by each of the above categories and the type of ongoing training program planned to assure optimum availability of the emergency generators. Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance personnel associated with emergency diesel generators.

RESPONSE

For conducting all diesel operations and operational maintenance, Limerick will use only plant operators (PO), with the exception of control room operations conducted by control operators (CO) and assistant control operators (ACO). There will be no t operators dedicated to diesel operations to the exclusion of { other responsibilities. The aforementioned operators will be trained in appropriate diesel generator operations as part of the f normal qualification program for these positions. The number of available POs will be the shift complement of two supplemented by , overtime as required. The level of education and experience is defined by the PO position. Most, if not all, of the initial POs g I will be simulator certified, and many may be RO licensed. Qualification programs for the PO position have not yet been I developed but are expected to be similar to programs now in use / at Peach Bottom. Philadelphia Electric Company uses a centralized maintenance concept. Maintenance personnel assigned to Limerick are supplemented when needed (for personnel or for particular' areas ( of expertise) by the centralized group. In addition, maintenance f engineers assigned to the centralized group are available. This concept permits the system-wide experience and training of the { l centralized personnel to be applied at Limerick. 430.48-1 i l l t 1 l L

O e e ' DRAFT ,d i LGS FSAR Maintenance personnel are not dedicated to particular equipment k# Maintenance supervision is responsible for the assignment ) items. ( of personnel in the required crafts who are capable of performing The PECo Maintenance Division provides a an identified task. variety of craft training classes to ensure the availability of 4 If contractor personnel should be used qualified craftsmen. l under PEco supervision, such personnel would be members of the building trades crafts. Maintenance activities will be supervised by personnel who are appropriately qualified by experience or training for the work being performed. Maintenance Division personnel will have benefited from experience obtained as a result of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station diesel generator maintenance activities utilizing approved maintenance procedures, technical expertise of manuf acturer's service and the representatives. This experience should provide competency equivalent to that provided by vender training programs. i ,..__w .-r---

f~, ~. R O AF"i'd LYubMe LGS FffAR ~ - - ~ ~ OUESTION 430.60 (Section 9.5.2) Identify all working stations on the plant site where it may be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown. Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident conditions.

RESPONSE

Maximum dB levels have not been established for the remote shutdown locations. The adequacy of the communications system will ba verified during the startup test phase when ambient noise is at its normal operating level. All remote shutdown locations which may be used to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a Control Room evacuation are identified in Table 9.5-13. Any locations which may be subsequently identi-fled will be added to this table. >- 24 0 ( b )/14 430-60

V. O R. Gl9 L u.. t m. TABLE 9.5-13 REMOTE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCATIONS INTENSITIES OF ILLUMINATION EMERGENCY LOCATION NORMAL AC DC Area 8, El. 289 Panels C201 30 10 3 Area 8, El 200 Pnl. OAC562 20 5 0.5 Area 8, El 239 4kV Switchgear 30 10 3 Area 8. El 304 Pnl. OAC101 20 5 0.5 D/G Bldg, El 217 Panels C514 30 10 3 Various Locations Hand-Operated Valves 10 Hand-Held Lanterns Access paths to the above areas are providad with at least 1/2 ft, candle of emergency lighting. l i>-240(b)/14 430.61-1

~ \\ t_v a CL ul d _.. _ _,. ~ ~ - - - LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.61 (Section 9.5.2) Describe the performance requirements and tests that the above c onsite working stations communication systems will be required to pass in order to be assured that ef fective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown panel is possible under all conditions.

RESPONSE

During the startup test program when operating ambient noise levels are present, communications between each remote operating location and the control room or remote shutdown room will be tested. At least one communications system of the PABX,-PA, or In-Plant Radio System described in Section 9.5.2 will be proven to be adequate for communicating with these remote areas. l l l l l = 1 '- 2 4 0 ( b )/14 430.61-1 RBBC'53I~3'_ /92 l i

~ n-pO QG7 c c- ~ u-( ~ ~ LGS FSAR 9.5.1.4.2 Operational Testing and Inspection The fire pumps and associated equipment such as batteries, water supply, and fuel systems are periodically tested or inspected in accordance with the Technical Specifications (refer to Chapter 16). The Technical Specifications define periodic test or inspection requirements to ensure operability of the fire suppression system. 9.5.1.5 Personnel Oualification and Training The training program for plant personnel and the fire brigade in regard to fire fighting activities will be implemented in accor-dance with the Fire Protection Program and applicable require-ments of the Technical Specifications. 9.5.2 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS The communication systems include internal (intra-plant) and external (out-of-plant) systems and provide convenient, effec-tive operational communications between various plant structures and locations and with points outside the station. 9.5.2.1 Design Bases Various communication systems are provided in the plant to ensure reliable communication during plant startup, operation, shutdown, maintenance, and emergency conditions. The design bases of these systems are: a. Voice communication between various plant structures and locations is provided with the following characteristics: 1. Satisfactory voice communication in areas of extreme noise 2. Three separate communication system with simultaneous conversation possible on each systen without inter-ference. b. Voice communication to points outside the station is provided by a dial telephone system and by a back-up radio system. c. An evacuation and alarm system is provided to warn personnel of emergency conditions. P-240(b)/14 9.5-19 L

rsm AF" ' b) ;. c.L u. L b "~ ' ~ LGS FSAR d. The communication systems are designed to be operable loss of offsite power. e. All communication components are non-safety-related seismic Category II components. These components, c when located in safety-related areas, are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA require-ments as described in Section 3.2. The criteria for this selective basis and the design basis for seismic Category IIA supports are described in Section 3.2. 9.5.2.2

System Description

The plant communication systems consists of the intra-plant public address (PA) system, the private automatic branch exchange (PABX) telephone system, the intra-plant maintenance telephone system, the evacuation alarm and river warning system, and the In-Plant Radio Sys tem. Descriptions of these systems are given in the following sections. The plant communication systems are illustrated in riser diagram form in Figures 9.5.-2 through 9.5-7. 9.5.2.2.1 Intra-Plant Public Address (PA) System The PA system is a 6-channel system permitting simultaneous usage of a page line and five party lines for intra-plant use. Loudspeakers powered by individual amplifiers are located through-out the plant with muting facilities provided where required. The PA system is provided with a telephone line matching network for operation of the page channel by the PABX system described in Section 9.5.2.2.2. The PA system is powered from the Division IV diesel bus to provide continous operation under all plant operating conditions. 9.5.2.2.2 Private Automatic Branch Exchange Telephone System (PABX) The priva te automa tic branch exchange telephone system (PABX) equipment and cabling is supplied and installed by the telephone compa ny. The telephones are located throughout the plant. The power for this system is supplied from the Division I diesel bus. G 9.f'.3.3.4 Intra-Plant Maintenance Telephone System The intra-plant maintenance telephone system is part of the PABX system consisting of telephone jacks. Portable PABX (dial-type) telephones may be connected to the maintenance telephone jacks. P-240(b)/14 9.5-20

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- ~ o LGS FSAR 9.5.2.2.5 In-Plant Radio System Emergency communications within the plant can be maintained af ter the loss of the PA and PABX systems through the In-Plant Radio System. This system consists of distributed antennas throughout the plant with a centralized rebroadcast transmitter. Low power walkie-talkies with approximately one watt output are used with this system. The low power of the radios assures that they will not interfere with low level control and instrument circuits. The distributed antenna system will allow radio communications from any location whithin the plant to any other location to within a five mile radius of the plant. The walkie-talkies are battery powered and the distributed antenna system is powered from a source of power diverse from the PA and PABX s systems. 9.5.2.3 Safety Evalution The canmunication systems are not safety-related and are classi-fled as non-Class IE. When components of the communication systems are located within seismic Category I structures, these components are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA requirements described in Section 3.2. The basis for providing Category IIA supports is to prevent the communica-tion equipment from falling on safety-related equipment and impairing its ability to perform safe shutdown functions during a seismic event. The systems described above are conventional and have a history of successful operation at similar existing plants. System design considerations include diversity and operational reliability. Physical and electrical separation is provided between primary and backup systems to minimize the possibility of a single occurrence af fecting more than one system. The communication systems have adequate flexibility to keep plant personnel informed of plant operational status at all times. If one handset station of the PA system is damaged or inaccessible or if extreme background noise prevents its use, multiple handset locations at each plant elevation provide easy access to an alternate handset of the PA system. Failure of a single PABX telephone does not affect the balance of the PABX telephone system. If failure of the central exchange or some other such failure makes the complete system inope rable, the public address system is used as backup in-plant communication. '2d P-240(b)/14 9.5.-)d' l L

lcp p M '[ u c; u- _,... ~ LGS FSAR The public address system is powered from a Class IE 440V motor control center through a 480V-120V transformer and a 3-phase, 120V distribution panel. The t' ansformer and panel are seismic r Category I and feed only the PA system and fire alarm system which are non-Class IE. The cabling for these systems is routed in independent and separate conduits and no other systems' cables are routed in these conduits. For this reason and reasons of plant safety, this panel remains connected to the Class IE bus during a LOCA. The Class IE 440V motor control center is powered by the Division IV Class lE 440V load center. The Class IE 440V motor control center and load center are part of the Class 1E ac power system (Section 8.3.1.1.2). Failures of the fire alarm or PA systems will not affect the Class 1E bus because of the use of overcurrent protection devices and isolation transformers. The PABX telephone system is powered by a non-Class IS power source which can be connected to the Division I diesel generator. Failure of any or all of its components will not affect any nuclear safety-related equipment. During the loss of both of fsite power and the diesel generator associated with Division IV bus, communication is maintained by the PABX telephone system. It is not necessary for plant personnel in safety-related areas of the plant to communicate ~ with the control room in ord.r to achieve a safe, cold shutdown of the plant following a design basis seismic event. The failure of any non-seismic communications systems will not adversely affect safe shutdown capability. 9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The communications system will be tested by a preoperational tes t (1-P-99. 3 ). Systems described above are conventional and have a history of successful operation at similar existing plants. These systems will be in routine use and maintenance, and this will ensure their availability. Also, they will be used extensively during the preoperational and startup phases. Any deficiencies will become readily o apparent and will be corrected. The power sources, for the private automatic branch exchange telephone system and Class lE bus for the public address system, are tested separately via the preoperational and startup test program. 9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEM The plant lighting system provides illumination levels required for safe performance of plant operation, security, shutdown, and maintenance duties. Dmergency de lighting is providing in essen-tial areas for the safety of personnel during an ac power failure. -240(b)/14 9.5-22

i p m.n r" ~~ l L-J- L LL. LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.62 (Section 9.5.2) Consider the design basis seismic event with coincident failure of all non-seismic equipment and components. Demonstrate that there will be effective intra plant communications with all safety related areas to attain a safe, cold plant shutdown following the seismic event.

RESPONSE

Section 9.5.2.3 has been changed to provide the requested information. Following a design basis seismic event with coincident failure of all non-seismic equipment and components, Limerick will attain a safe, cold plant shutdown from the main control room without the use of intra-plant communication because all actions required under this scenario are taken in the Control Room. i l I P-240(b)/14 430.62-1 o -Pe '??, t2712 1

M emf W {[ "j a .u LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.63 (Section 9.5.2) Provide a discussion on how ef fective plant to of fsite communica-tions will be available following the design basis seismic event. e

RESPONSE

Limerick has two independent of fsite communications systems. The primary system consists of both the PABX telephone system (Section 9.5.2.2.2) and dedicated telephone lines to specific offsite locations (Emergency Plan Section 7.2.6.) The PABX is powered from the Division I diesel generator so that it will continue to operate after loss of offsite power. It is not designed to remain operational af ter the design basis seismic event. If the PABX fails, it can be bypassed and approximately sixty phone extensions in the plant can be connected to the PECo microwave communications network. This will allow these extension to be directly connected to the Bell of Pa. system. The backup offsite communications system consists of a radio system that provides communication between the control room and Philadelphia Electric Company Philadelphia Headquarters as well as other generating stations. Radio capability is also provided between the control room and the Montgomery County Office of Emergency Preparedness (Emergency Plan Section 7.2.4 ) The radio transmitters are powered from a diverse power source than that which powers the PABX. The radio equipment is not designed to withstand the design basis seismic event. The physical and electrical independence of the two systems provides a high degree of assurance that a design basis seismic event would not cause the loss of of fsite communications. 1 P-240(b)/l4 430.63-1 " Ray d 2 D t[L82

m m, n, & r-le i $ U' CL uD i?.L LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.64 (Section 9.5.2) In FSAR Section 9.5.2.3, you state that the public address system is powered from a Class lE 440V motor control center. Expand your FSAR to include a discussion of the Class lE bus that powers the motor control center, and how communications will be maintained assuming a failure of the diesel generator associated with that bus, assuming a loss of offsite power.

RESPONSE

If the Division 4 diesel generator fails with a loss of of fsite power, the PA system will Le inoperable. In this situation, the PABX and the inplant radio system will remain operational as they are fed from diverse power sources. At least one of these remaining systems will provide adequate communications between all remote operating stations. 8 l l l l l l>-240(b)/14 430-64-1 RRV.1.13,71-1/82

-- - -- ] e- ,e j._. LGS FSAR QUESTION 430.65 (Section 9.5.3) Identify the vital areas and hazardous area where emergency lighting is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. Tabulate the lighting system provided in your design to accomodate those areas so identified.

RESPONSE

l All remote emergency operating locations are shown in Table 9.5-13. Two separate emergency lighting systems are provided in each of these areas. The AC emergency lighting is supplied from four diesel generators as described in Section 9.5.3.2.2. If the AC emergency lighting system in these areas fails, the DC emergency lighting system will provide lighting levels suf ficient to perform the emergency shutdown functions. AC and DC emergency lighting is also provided to maintain adequate lighting levels for access to and agress from all of the above areas. l i l l l' \\ l l -240(b)/14 430.65-1 Rev. 13, 11/82

r-r--: r-, ~ % st-q. 95.3.2.t. R-sipE-L .~ LGS FSAR immediately to the 125V dc non-Class lE station battery source. The 125V de non-Class lE station battery source will provide power to the emergency ac-dc lighting system for one hour. All emergency ac-dc lighting fixture are incandescent type. Emergency lighting is remote structures and areas where the above de source is not available consists of battery-powered self-contained units. Emergency de lighting fixtures and illuminated exit signs are located in the control room, stairways, and along exit routes from each floor throughout the plant. Table 9.5-12 identifies the illumination intensities for the vital and hazardous areas where emergency lighting is provided for normal plant operation and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. The table provides both the normal and emergency operating conditions for these areas. These illumination levels conform to the IES Lighting Handbook recommended levels. Column 4 of Table 9.5-12 shows the 125V i de power-supplied lighting illumination intensity levels that are maintained in the control room and other areas of the plant between of offsite power and availability of onsite power. Table 9.5-13 identifies the areas where remote actions are required to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a control room fire, Auxiliary Equipment Room fire, or a failure of the remote shutdown system. The lighting levels provided at these locations is shown. The emergency ac/dc lighting system provides approximately 10 to 20 percent of the total lighting of the plant. The percen-tage of emergency lighting fed from each division of Class lE power is as follows:

a. Division I

= 6% b. Division II = 32%

c. Division III = 12%

d. Division IV

= 50% The emergency lighting load is not divided equally among the four diesel generators due to plant untilization. Emergency lighting, both ac and de, has been provided for all areas shown in Table 9.5-13. In these areas, the loss of the diesel generator would leave the dc-supplied power system to provide lighting for the remote operations required in those areas as well as access to those areas. >-240(b)/14 9.5-26

r-m p P ~3 s 5 L./ b i.i t - L LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.65 (Section 9.5.3) Identify the vital areas and hazardous area where emergency lighting is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. Tabulate the lighting system provided in your design to accomodate those areas so identified.

RESPONSE

All remote emergency operating locations are shown in Table 9.5-13. Two separate emergency lighting systems are provided in each of these areas. The AC emergency lighting is supplied from four diesel generators as described in Section 9.5.3.2.2. If the AC emergency lighting system in these areas fails, the DC emergency lighting system will provide lighting levels sufficient to perform the emergency shutdown functions. AC and DC emergency lighting is also provided to maintain adequate lighting levels for access to and agress from all of the above areas. l l r -240(b)/14 430.65-1 RevrrI37111/R2

L m. ' ~ ~ ~ ' S Psn OUESTION 430.66 (Section 9.5.3) Expand your FSAR to include a discussion of illumination levels in the vital and hazardous areas previously identified. Provide a tabulation of illumination levels in these areas under both normal and emergency operating conditions and show that these levels conform to the IES Lighting Handbook recommended levels.

RESPONSE

Tables 9.5-12 and 9.5-13 have been added and Section 9.5.3.2.2 has been changed to provide the requested information. All lighting levels meet or exceed those recommended in the IES handbook. -240(b)/14 430.66-1 Re. ::, 44/82

b L. t.

1.,

L ~ LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.67 (Section 9.5.3) Provide the following information for emergency lighting system: 1. What percentage of the total lighting provided is designated as emergency lighting. 2. Identify the source of lE power to the emergency lighting

system, i.e., Train A, B, C or D.

If emergency lighting power is obtained from more than one train, give the percentage of emergency lighting power from each. In the la tter case, state whether your design is consistent for all vital and hazardous areas, and what effect the loss of a single power train would have on emergency ilumination levels.

RESPONSE

Table 9.5-12 has been added and Section 9.5.3.2.2 has been changed to include the requested information. The effects of the loss of one division of emergency lighting on any of the remote shutdown locations is discussed in the response to question 4 30.6 5. l l 7 >- 2 4 0 ( b )/14 430.67-1 REV. 13, 14732

p.m n r r~: = ,/ 1 ... ' _ C-O Lm. -,.. - LGS FSAR QUESTION 430.68 (Section 9.5.3) Consider a design basis seismic event coincident with loss of offsite power and failure of all non-seismic equipment /compo-nents. Under these conditions, discuss how minimum lighting levels will be maintained in the control room until such time as the emergency diesel generators have come on line and emergency ac lighting has been restored. Using the same conditions, state whether lighting would be required in any other part of the plant for the time intervals between loss of of fsite power and availability of onsite power.

RESPONSE

During a design basis seismic event coincident with loss of offsite power and failure of all non-seismic equipment /compo-nents, the control room lighting will be maintained by hand held battery-powered lanterns. No operator action is required in any other areas of the plant under this scenario, t l l l l l '-240(b)/14 430.68-1 -Kev. I J r i le'0 2 - 1 1

.w.. I l LGS FSAR OUEST10N 430.72 (Section 9.5.4) f Describe your design provisions made to protect the ~ l N

RESPONSE

48 I qto Of The fill and vent lines have a minimum extension above ground. The vent line for each tank is backed up by a separate vacuum reliefvalve/linedmakingtheprobabilityoflossofbothlines are available for use in the unlikely event of dama very low. Cross connections are also'provided in the tank) fuel oil supply and return lines to each diesel to allow any tornado missiles. diesel to be suppiled from any storage tank (Figure 9 would not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. kk' A' fill *r ved lau shme Al w ldle, W Se31ge,,e,,for'8' l if k As n empe Aga H'agN, make se 0 opstor ul,, s would be w.4 avaddle.,2): Valvesk C llow,sy w-}=\\oIA wmJd be else

1010A, w

l 9.5 - IDAsh M. A & pp w.vfd 6e sbled A a wI weold 6 *p *l. &go k k u ( n jsre B bke W of.y M sm M/ pgos % 4. m l.1 p m p fo & lle.) ld relaen lke bisel all le 4ke'B' ndel i s cb M4.2 4Ae duf / i 1.//, s # v e # Ke fall % over&w Me wou fa l.y e b k. A sil & 4 L. u s. I w % no s k al,ge ma,p e, rf.v <md suffkles+ hl.il % yproxu%dely ne hour f fall load meldes. lesa,dk f he pLs w%e lhe kw lowl dem. eper 'IStefeye j L Rev. 12, 10/82 430.72-1 "r

i QUESTION 430.74 (Section 9.5.4) Expand your FSAR Section 9.5.4.5 to include a discussion of the testing and calibration which will be used to assure a highly reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarm system. Also discuss any system interlocks provided.

RESPONSE

Section 9.5.4.5 has been changed to include a reference to the g[' testing and maintenance that will be used to ensure a highly ) reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarm system ( (calibration is a subactivity of testing and maintenance). A discussion of the system interlocks has also been added. The diesel generator f uel oil storage system will undergo periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Limerick Technical Specifi cations written using Section 4.8.1.1.2 of NUREG - 0123 "S ta nd ard Technical Specifi cations for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4 )" as a guide. In addition to the Technical Specifi cation Surveillance Testing program, a comprehensive instrumentation maintenance program will be perforr.ed in conjunction with the diesel generation ins pecti on / overhaul. This program will be based on the recommendations of the equipment vendor and operational experience. t l t 430.74-1 b Re M 3 N /82

DRAF-- LGS TSAR \\ J {~; DUESTicN 430.75 (Sections 3.2, 9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, 9.5.8) a D[esel generator auxiliary systems piping and components are crassified in the FSAR text and Table 3.2.1 as conforming ~ to ASME Section III Class 3, ANSI B31.1, or manufacturer's standard. It is not entirely clear where the respective classifications begin or end. In any event, this is not acceptable. We require the entire diesel generator auxiliary systems to be designed to ASME Section III Class 3, or Quality Group C, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. Revise your FSAR accordingly. Also, - provide the industry standards that were used in the design, manufacture, and inspection of the diesel engine mounted piping and components. Revise the a quality group changes occur. ppropriate P& ids to show where

RESPONSE

f The diesel generator auxiliary systems are the following: l a. Fuel oil system (Figure 9.5-8) l b. Cooling water system which includes the jacket water (! cooling loop and the air cooler coolant loop (Figure 9.5-9) c. Starting system (Figure 9.5-10) l d. Lubrication system (Figure 9.5-11) l Combustion air intake and exhaust system (Figure 9.5-12) l l e. ~ Piping and equipment 'in these systems is provided in accordance with ASME Section III Class 3, ANSI B31.1, and manufacturer's standards as indicated on the above referenced figures,edW Table

3. 2-1, 4-wl $%2;,, 7.2.2_, d.

l All piping a'nd equipment has been designed to withstand seismic accelerations and operating loads, regardless of design code.. ? The manufacturer has developed a highly reliable engine piping l,. system over the 44 years that the design of this basic engine has l been in use. l >The design code used for each piping seismic segment or component ! meets or exceeds the commitment made in the Limerick PSAR,

AppendE A_and Figure _A.2 L l

J. o - m

.? LGS FSAR 5 [-[% %E ( Regarding systems important for reactor shutdown, as a. discussed in paragraph C.1.b (Quality Group B) of the guide, the control rod drive (CRD) system hydraulic control units (HCU) are classified as "special equipment" by GE because the codes and standards of a quality group are not strictly applicable to the HCUs. A detailed discussion is given in the notes of Table 3.2-1. b. The Quality Group B classification may terminate on some steam system connected piping at the first valve capable of remote manual closure, rather than at a normally, or automatically, closed valve. Additionally, Quality Group B is applied only to piping 2-1/2 inches in diameter and larger, similar to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29 for application of the seismic Category I classification. c. The normal spent fuel pool cooling system is primarily f Quality Group D. However, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, backup cooling and makeup sources are provided. These sources are at least Quality Group C, as are the connecting portions of the normal cooling system. d. The standby diesel generator pipig is designed as shown I in Fiaures 9.5-9 thrnunh 9.5-12JSRhe control structure l tiled w&ter system is designed to Quality Group D standards; however, it was subjected to full quality assurance requirements (0-listed), and was designed to seismic Category I criteria. e Instrument tubing downstream of the containment isolation valve of instrument lines connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary is Quality Group D for instruments that are " passive" (i.e., do not actuate safety systems), rather than Quality Group B or C as pj5/EZT aiscussed in Paragraphs 1.e and 2.c of the guide. This is based on considerations given in Regulatory hkG# Guide 1.11 for instrument lines penetrating containment %(J5: g and having two restriction devices. 1 >\\h95% Structures, systems, anu components wnv== safety-functions require conformAnce to the applicable quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, are summarized in Table 3.2-1 under the heading, "Q-List." Quality assurance during construction is discussed in PSAR Appendix D. The quality l{. Chapter 17. l ~ assurance program during the operational phase is described in ./ 3.2-5 Rev. 17, 02/83 l 1 /

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/ ( <aa s-* -h h.. s p,u u u % _ 4 wi.. r HSXEWCOMPONELG [ 40 3 g 9 VI DlISEL _GENEMIQE_SYSTFli toel oil day tanks and jacket w ai. w r mgoumicn ta6 2. Diesel generators

3. @ nks, "iesel Icel sts oye 4.

mo i exchangers, iauket water M6 inM eil, mir Ocetes cuplant 5.

riiteto and attainers, luuw vil- &mri fn p 1 M1 ey6Luu.o' C C bCubut .U e. n a a. 6.wwayuso ~ 8. cwnro W 3. CveIluy 3 CKet water heaFer 8- /A> --10._nrain + ark. dirty f uel vil-fGVP r 1 1. Piping ana valves, fuel oli system f ve.bie-. 12.- h p:.ng and valves, diesel lubricat16n ' wil SYStS? 'On 2nd Of f Chit C pgieH 0

13. -Fivius and valven, dies 1 stTrting h a air syistem Irom receiver M f7t&gg 9, A

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- - - - - - -x =*m.r-c i ren i me i n,, -ina .nh ei4 -atorags t.h: 21 T ss. ~,. uvuseso-23 _Bipimrarra valves, water + ' ~14 - CrankJ;aRe M ""Stien ?Y9t T*.

• 4*ctors, Qil+s. m;($.._,..,[, h,,

sepa h andNi nics;; breathers ~ , s.u.

1pt.a. c; e...r

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y LGF FSAF p (Page 8 of 38) g TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) QUALITY l SOURCE GROUP PRINCIPAL OF LOCA-CLASSI-CODES AND SEISMIC Q-i g!AR SUPPLY TION FICATION STANDAPDS CATEGORY LIST 52I193 __Ll]!_ _L2]! -[31!___ __L4J!___ L5]!___ Li 1* 203MENIS l g5.4,9.5.5, i 65.6, 9.5.7 ? O II4-3 I Y [ e ' _] l l P G C IEEE-387 I Y [ 47 1 l r 0 TTT-3 I Y [99] "71 1 F 0 0 III - 3.' T 7 { ;7 ], l Ar.ma C -~ g Y [ v 7 ] --- l h o / T f "Ar eAv ._.___._ _ & 'ra7 L l Ta I I F I; + Y [47] 1 l f I 3 g- - --N f STD 1 P d I l I La 7h l G B31.1/MF [ 47 ] I I ,0 l S II /B31.;1/ I Y {47 1 l P G M D 6 II 3/ I ter [ 47] I P G MF S I l i B31 1/MF STD I/ IIA -n,,j a G I Y [22] I 7 G,0 MF D I Y f471 ] ? G, ')P q O 'JP 1 2, C IEEE-323, I Y (11], [12] P G,CS 344, 279 " tm ~ h if - -- [*ii ,P' 7 p -T'~]W 73 g 7 l p I ~. -LagKT l C. A - I _ _ Y._.- -{-19 M] I rP" _4 l c MF STD 'M cil P G l l .4.1.1 P CS D VIII-1/ I Y J Rev. 17, 02/83 i

,1 b ' r r e-g; C J a a .[ 1 u h h __e. _._-_) W b H T q+ 4 w~C sj_ 4 e J d 4 hfi _h f H s on nn ~ 5 24 5 V V U V V ( p e Of" g O _o 1 = 2-p <l (A et (\\ B s _t Q j M M V M ~\\ c., [ T I v n r m 4 m k k Y i N d y ~;f O u 't ~ M { x + G1 1 1 GC ~ 4 v ~ n w W _d c* '^. I-Mu o t-2 s z ~h _b ~? E y = -t mp h' i .9 hQ M '$ 5 ] k d i W Q N / l-

lr.g r-n n.~g;,, s 5b& LGS FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) (Page 38 of 38) g [37]The final survey and measurement of the as-built emergency spillway are conducted under the applicable po'rtions of the quality assurance program to ensure that the geometry and riprap gradation satisfy design requirements. [38]A complete description of the codes and standards, seismic l category, and 0-list status of piping and instrumentation within the spray pond is shown on Figure 9.2-3. [39] Design codes and standards are under consideration and will l be added to this table when finalized. [40] Specific components that comprise parts of major components with the same design criteria are generally not listed. For example, transformers are a part of load centers or switchgear, and valve operators are a part of motor operated valves. g41]Racewaysystemsincludeconduit, cable trays, and their supports. Raceway firestops and seals are not 0-listed. However, quality control provisions commensurate with Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 are applied to the raceway firestops and seals. i [42] Inverters do not supply power to safety related loads. The Class IE battery loads are discussed in Section 8.3.2.1.1.4. l [43] Primary, backup and fault current protection devices are subcomponents of switchgear,.Ioad centers, motor control centers and distribution panels, which are Q-listed as shown in items X.A, X.B and X.C. s [44] Cast iron exhaust piping beyond the roof penetration is not 0-listed. [45] Equipment is qualified in accordance with the conformance statements made in Section 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 in reference to IEEE-279 paragraph 4.4 and IEEE-323. [46] Primary containment gas sample lines from the sample taps to and including the outboard containment isolation valves are seismic Category I. Liquid sample lines from the RHR system are seismic Category I up to and including the second system I isolation valves. The sample line from the jet pump instrument system is seismic Category I to the PASS isolation valveli. [47] Delineation of applicable codes or standards,and seismic category is shown in Figures 9.5-8 through 9.5-12. 7Le bar,3 -{se elassdN8tm.- & whSE1C %ck K e pe t ag GMa\\ C 2* fM w {ech 3,g2, Rev. 17, 02/83 I I

Ye,g h* LGS FSAR p -a

0N #

( ' ~ ~ OUESTION 430.83 (Section 9.5.4) Figure 9.5.8 shows the fuel fill lines, tank vent lines with flame arrestor, and the vacuum / air release valve and line for all fuel oil storage tanks to be non-seismic. Consider a design basis seismic event and the resultant failure of these lines. Show how failure of these lines will not result in blocking of the vent lines to the storage tanks, will not preclude refueling the tanks as required, and will still prevent entry of deliterious materials into the storage tanks. Revise your FSAR accordingly. , {g ( %pk, h CliM Figure 9.5-8 1as been changed to indicate that the tank vent lines with fl ame arrestor, the vacuum / air release valve, and the gy.. fill line for all fuel oil storage tanks are seismic Category IIAJ They are therefore not expected to crimp when subjected to seismic loads. Alternate vent and fill paths (e.g., manhole of the tank) are available for use in the unlikely event of damage by a seismic event. Cross connections are also provided in the fuel oil supply and return lines to each diesel to allow any diesel to be supplied from any fuel oil storage tank (Figure 9.5-8). Credible fill or vent line damage due to a l seismic event would not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. l 1 l l l k l 430.83-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l

s.d pways U -r3 ,e

p g

LGS FSAR .m/ j's/rMc _ B ,b) OUESTION 430.89 (Section 9.5.5) Revise Tables 9.5-5 and 9.5-6 to include the design margin allowed in the stated capability of the jacket water and air cooler coolant loop heat exchangers. Indicate the measures to preclude long-term corrosion and organic fouling in the diesel engine cooling water system that would degrade system cooling performance, and the compatability of any corrosion inhibitors or antifreeze compounds used with the materials of the system. the engine

• i '

Indicate if the water chemistry is in conforman &ce wi JU,71e use e manufacturers recommendations. J, d */"^h b 3espewse k d

• W "M'a3 t (* gre,a h",u.k EsW inlef bMW@W82g]J

A M "' +.tecA Wh 4 N.J sik in WA .w -,a, u a a,e aw. Tables 9.5-5 and 9.5-6 have been changed to indicate the fouling factor on which the jacket water and air cooler coolant loop heat exchanger duties are based,g To preclude long-term corrosion and f organic fouling in the diesel engine cooling system system, demineralized water is used along with a sodium nitrite solution such as Betz coreseal K-9. 'ar well as #e ESW *alef Jeryn bgms Ge %as ked mL _.3 erg, i The treated cooling water will be ghtly alkaline (pH 8.0 to 9.5), as recommended by the engin manufacturer. This compound has been demonstrated to be compa le with all materials used in the coolant loops. Antifreeze compounds will not be used in the jacket water and air cooler coolant loops due to the potential for degraded heat exchanger performance. In lieu of antifreeze,. j t e.--- u. w .-'---p.=e-* - * * - - * - + ~ * * * * * * * - * - " " ' " " * * * " .,,..---.w., -e

• -m-*.e

---

=-----~.=e=

--=e

• --e

-*~ m e.,. m _#a.-e..+w. epi,- -e -e- .h

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1. YA A

M A A-/a __s 1 _d6t i u _ 2wu l -f,L Mf %4 _c - Q .p+ 4 L1 3 i rusw+ a p /

i TABLE 9.5-5

• (

DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET WATER COOLING LOOP DESIGN PARAMETERS EXPANSION TANK Ouantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Capacity, each 80 gallons Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3 ENGINE-DRIVEN WATER PUMP Ouantity I per diesel (4 total) Type Centrifugal Capacity, each 800 gpm Head 46 psi Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard MOTOR-DRIVEN CIRCULATION PUMP Ouan'tity 1 per diesel (4 total) Centrifugal Type Capacity, each 40 gpm Head 6.5 psi Motor power rating 1 hp Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER Ouantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Shell and tube Duty, each(2) 3,365,000 Btu /hr Shell design Fluid Treated water Flow rate 500 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Tube design ~ Fluid (Je$n inleS b Emergencyservicewater(Io).5'F) Flow rate 700 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3 & Commonwealth of Pennsylvania STANDBY JACKET COOLANT HEATER Ouantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Immersion, electric Rating 15 kW Design code requirements ASME IV p (2) Based on a fouling factor of 0.0025 ( -Revr-47 r-42/8 3^

2 LGS FSAR DRAFT .c TABLE 9.5-6 ) DIESEL-GENERATOR AIR COOLER COOLANT LOOP DESIGN PARAMETERS l AIR COOLER Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type. Shell and tube Shell design Fluid Treated water Flow rate 400 gpm Design pressure 30 psi Design temperature 3000F Tube design Fluid Air Flow rate 15,000 cfm Design pressure 30 psi Design. temperature 3000F Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard ENGINE-DRIVEN AIR COOLER WATER PUMP Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) l ( Type Centrifugal Capacity, each 400 gpm Head 35 psi Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard I AIR COOLER COOLANT HEAT EXCHANGER Ouantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Shell and tube Duty, each(2) 2,909,000 Btu /hr }' Shell design Fluid Treated water Flow rate 400 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Tube design l Fluid (My IaM M Emergency service water (.M*F) i Flow rate 700 gpm l Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 300er Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3, & Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (*) Based on a fouling factor of 0.0025 } l( e

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OUESTIGN 430.90 (Section 9.5.5) .:s I

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A Po s., sensors Expand your discussion of the instrumentation, c and alarms provided for monitoring of the diesel engine cooling water system and describe their function. Discuss the testing necessary to maintain and assure a highly reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarm system, and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure, level, and flow (where applicable) sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe what operator actions are required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine. Discuss the systems interlocks provided. Include the air cooler coolant loop in your discussion.

RESPONSE

m c Sections 9 .5.2.1 and 9.5.5.5 have been changed to expand the discuss n of the instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarms provi d for monitoring of the diesel engine cooling water syst.. When an alarm is received, the operator will investigate and r M The diesel en .e cooling water system will undergo periodic s eilla nce testing to demonstrate diesel ge ne rator n accordance with the Limerick Technical Speci fications written using Section 4.8.1.1.2 of NUREG - 0123 Standard Technical Speci fi cations for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)" as a guide. In addition to the Technical Specification Surveillance Testing program, a comprehensive instrumentation maintenance program will be performed in conjunction with the diesel generation inspection / overhaul. This program will be based on the recommendations of the equipment vendor and operational experience. 430.90-1

I g5 \\ k LGS FSAR \\ DUESTION 430.91 (Section 9.5.5) Describe the provisions made in the design of the diesel engine cooling water system to assure that all components and piping are filled with water.

RESPONSE

Section 9.5.5.2.1 has been changed to provide the requested information. l I + N 430.91-1 1tev---1NO/B 2

o h h b3) LG5 FSAR d. An automatic thermostatic control valve e. A shell and tube heat exchanger to dissipate the heat N from the jacket water (shell side) to ESW (tube side) f. Alarms, trips, indicators, valves, and piping The jacket water cooling loop component design parameters are given in Table 9.5-5. The jacket water cooling system is designed to completely fill without special venting provisions. Initial system fill ar;d any N3 (h subsequent refills will be done in accordance with the diesel generator operation and maintenance manual. To ensure that all components and piping are maintained full of water, an expansion \\ tank is connected to the pump suction piping. The expansion tank j also serves the air cooler coolant loop. The exparsim -fank ootkt ec a t h is totdul appsh4tQ O' above the fop of k diesd Q<. k The engine-driven jacket water pump discharges the cooling water.( through the engine passages and the engine jacket header, and delivers it to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve. 3 This valve directs the flow through or around the jacket water heat exchanger and back to the pump suction. Short-circuiting via the keep-warm system (described below) will be minimized by ) the line sizing of the keep-warm system (1-1/2 inches) compared ( to the main loop (5 inches). During engine shutdown periods, a centrifugal circulation pump, \\ driven by a 1 hp ac motor, is designed to circulate the jacket 5 coolant at a rate of 40 gpm through the 15 kW electric heater, 3 the engine-driven pump, the jacket coolant piping, and the q cylinder liner jackets. A branch line is provided to supply heated coolant to the air cooler coolant loop to keep it warm as ) an aid to. quick starting. The circulation pump runs continuously whenever the engine is &' s shut down and maintains adequate water flow for keep-warm \\ conditions when the engine is not operating. Under the control } of the coolant heater th'ermostat, the heater cycles to maintain p . the keep-warm temperature of the coolant between 110 and 120*F. N A relief valve, set at 40 psi, is provided in the. coolant s discharge line from the heater to protect the heater if the ) coolant flow is blocked and the heater fails to shut off { automatically. A low coolant temperature alarm switch, set at 900F decreasing, is provided in the coolant discharge line from ( ys]o 9.5-39 6

. k/ ' 7' DRAFT = " ^ " OUESTION 430.92 (Se,ction 9.5.5) The diesel generators are required to start automatically on loss of all offsite power and in the event of a LOCA. The diesel generator sets should be capable of operation at less than full load for extended periods without degradation of performance of reliability. Should a LOCA occur with availability of offsite power, discuss the design provisions and other parameters that have been considered in the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unloaded (on standby) for extended periods without degradation of engine performance or reliability. Expand your PSAR/FSAR to include and explicitly define the capability of your design with regard to this requirement. 1 In your response, discuss the length of time the diesel engine can operate unloaded, and discuss your procedures for subsequent loading of the diesel generators to " blow out" accumulated carbon deposits. Show that these procedures ace in conformance.with manufacturer's recommendatioas and good operating practice. Confirm that these procedures will be implemented prior to plant startup. ,e

RESPONSE

Section 8.3.1.1.3 has been changed to provide the requested information. The detailed operating procedures for manually i loading the diesel generator to either test the unit or to 'N " blow out" any accumulated carbon deposits have been based on ') the manufacturer's operation and maintenance manual and ( supplementary recommendations. The review cycle for the \\ procedure included review by two persons with prior operating \\ experience who were licensed at thi SRO level. Prior to ) system turnover to PECo, those procedures will be implemented. ~~~ 430.92-1 Rev. 13, 11/82 i

LGS FSAR [,.% M P p ( 6 N'$ "i h g := m a e 8.3.1.1.3 Standby Power Supply J 4 The standby power supply for each division consists of one diesel-generator set complete with accessories and fuel storage and transfer systems. Each diesel-generator is connected to only one 4 kV Class 1E bus and is interlocked to prevent parallel operation during loss of offsite power. The four Class 1E buses .for each reactor unit are operated as separate buses (split bus system) and are not synchronized. Each diesel-generator set is operated independently (from the other sets) and is disconnected from the utility power system, except during tests. Each unit has four channels of standby power supply and four load divisions. The operation of three out of four channels of the standby power supply is adequate to satisfy minimum Class 1E load demand caused by a LOCA or loss of offsite power sources. A i detailed discussion of the load demand on each diesel, which includes load characteristics, load sequencing, bus assignments, etc, is covered in Section 8.3.1.1.3.6. ? The diesel-generators are capable of supplying power to the loads necessary to shut down and cool down the associated unit safely. Each diesel-generator is rated at 2850 kW for continuous operation and at 3135 kW for two hours of short-time operation in any 24-hour period. The diesel-generators are selected so that their ratings satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9, as discussed in Section 8.1.6.2. In addition, the diesel generators are capable of operating for extended periods of time at either low load or unloaded in the case of a LOCA occurring with the availability of offsite power. For extended periods of low load operation, the diesel generators are operated at 50 ' percent load or greater for at least one hour for every 12-hour l ' period that the diesel generators are operated at loads of less than 30 percent. This prevents possible accumulation of combustion and lu ne oil products in the exhaust system. If a l LOCA should occur and offsite power is available, the diesel i generators would start automatically and run unloaded. After the offsite power gri d, reactor parameters, and support systems have been stabilized, the unloaded diesel generators would be manually l stopped and returned to standby. Even though the diesel generators would not be expected to run in this condition for an extended period o f time, the capability to manually load the diesel generators to remove possible combustion and lube oil products from the exhaust system is provided. The following sect'ons discuss the functional aspects of the diesel-generator. h vrnvv[0t17t#3 WW k .} % &~Iaa g 5 9 *~+ M - 8.3-15 Rev. 13, 11/82 /

l l LGS TSAR P,' & ~7-Lv..__di_~auYd OUESTION 430.94 (Section 9.5.5) l ~. s You* state in Section 9.5.5.2 each diesel engine cooling water system is provided with an expansion tank to provide for system expansion. In addition to the items mentioned, the expansion tank is to provide for minor system leaks at pump shafts seals, valve stems and other components, and to maintain required NPSH on the system circulating pump. Provide the size of the expansion tank and location. Demonstrate by analysis that the expansion tank size will be adequate to maintain required pump - j NPSH and make up water for seven days continuous operation of the diesel engine at full rated load without makeup, or provide a i ) seismic Category I, safety Class 3 make up water supply to the l exsansion tank. l

RESPONSE

i e The expansion tank is located at El. 235 ft-1 in., and has a volume of 80 gallons. The diesel generator is located at El. 217 ft. The difference in level between the expansion tank and the pump suction provides a positive static suction head for the pump. The pump has a rotary mechanical seal to prevent ~ excessive leakage of water along the pump shaft. Normal maintenance of valves and system components in accordance with Section 17.2A.2.5 will ensure that-leakage rates will be kept below the amount requiring tank makeup within a 7-day period. Operational experience has shown that this is not a problem for the.model of diesel generajpr used at Limerick. \\ l _ u so

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.,e.., s .. - ; 3.r.. v v. -n --t ". In the FSAR,' y' si state that the air coinpressors operate from 225 o to PSI to 250 PSI, and that the air receivers have sufficient capacity for 5 engine crank cycles of 10 seconds, each. It is not clear, however, how the entire air start systems operates, and how 5 eaual crank cycles of 10 seconds duration can be obtained from the system described in the FSAR and on Figures 9.5-8 and 9.5-10. Therefore, expand your ESAR to include a detailed discussion of a typical. engine start cycle. Describe the function of all components in the system, including the engine mounted components and piping, and give the sequence of operation. Provide the engine manufacturer's air start design pressure, and state what' measured parameters constitute a successful engine crank cycle, i.e., RPM after 10 seconds, total number of revolutions, etc. State whether=the air receiver capacity is calculated at 225 PSI or 250 PSI, and provide %,, calculattens supporting system capacity btsed on 5 crank cycles per receiver. Revise the P& ids to reflect the expanded FSAR text. R E S P O N_ _S E (-) Sections 9.5.6.2 and 9.5.6.3 and Figure 9.5-10 have been changed to provide the requested information. Tests have been performed to demonstrate the air receiver capacity in lieu of calculations. na. fast esses art. avalMk. &c WRC f*Wiew. l' .y.. ~ ' .s . i..'. 9 :w'p,-Q..9 s.k;.;4f g:Q ' w : b +,: a ^.-; Q g ; &.- M p-!:, psp <m e =.y-q - + ..,:,:::4 ,j,:p. ;.:.:.w,- k, : :a..a,:. ::.@m.,... r-.: ?.. - y;>...q.+ .y 5.. .,.l ..). W.. y -h :,.. ;-.. L ;-' -' M : 4 * ~' L('...'.. ""...':~~>-%-** . d '.. ,. f.4 @*7'i;. Q. ~ ? 'i.. u. F. ~ 4: 5p '.; l f f K C.m,.' ' g %~ ~ 'f. ; )_ -g qf, $ h;- L."' .e n w.w 2 .w s,.~ :m.y4-a..: e. , m..- ' Y. h. W.;:h b...:;%.i ? .Qihlt: & M.% f W.% % M 'd::.: f5Q.*5l $C:.& Q:J. k.y R 7 ..Y *, ?;& ff.jf .$f. = ' .M.,...l. kb]':,b f -q.s. m. m...g..s, y,,:y t.ry u.,,.;.;;;3 m.t.-.., n .s 4 6, .y . s... .. c..r. ..,i.* n%- s. s .g 'e 'a s,? a.a ~. s y * 'e d.

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DRAFT LGS FSAR 1 The filter is sized to ensure continuous full-flow operation for a minimum of 175 hours, using disposable cellulose cartridges. The filter elements are designed to remove particles down to 25-micron size and to absorb water. The filter is provided with a differential pressure indicator and a pressure switch that initiates an alarm on high differential pressure across the filter. A manual bypass is provided. l The lubricating oil cooler is a shell-and-tube heat exchanger l with a removable tube bundle.and floating head design. The tube may be cleaned without removing any piping. The strainer is a dual element type sized to ensure continuous l full flow operation. i l All pumps are of the positive displacement type. The engine.- driven pump has sufficient capacity to provide all lubricating mil requirements under full load operating conditions. The ac diotor-driven prelube pump, fed from a Class 1E 480V bus, will lubricate all wearing parts prior to a manual start. The j. circulating pump circulates lube oil from the sump through.the l electric immersion heater and back to the sump. l ( s The immersion heater is provided to maintain the lube oil temperature at a preset value during standby periods. The lube oil makeup tank is of the vertical construction type and . of sufficient capacity to supply lube oil for at least 179 hours of continuous diesel generator operation. During diesel generator operations, the lubrication system operates automatically, excluding the makeup and storage provisions. The engine-driven lube oil pump takes suction from j the diesel generator sump and delivers the oil through the filter to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve that directs the oil through or around the oil cooler. The oil then flows through a full-flow strainer and back to the engine passages. I h td b ful#)' @ h 6 TOfL. A %-Sh c7

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= tt; dier-1 n=a-rster ir r rritted te rierA. On emergency diesel generator start, the prelube pump does not operate because it is not required and would delay the diesel engine start. Periodic testing of the diesel generators will ensure that sufficient oil film is present to allow an automatic i Rev. 17, 02/93 9.5-50 [

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4 DBAET " " ' ' ^ " ~J 00ESTION 430.114 (Section 9.5.8) The diesel engine exhaust piping shown on Figure 1.2-36 is not in concurrence with the description in Section 9.5.8. Figure 1.2-36 shows a 45 degree fitting at the end exhaust piping, while the text discusses an elbow at the same location. Revise your FSAR to resolve this inconsistency. Also, expand your FSAR discussion to show how the presence of water, dust, ice, or snow in the exhaust system would be detected and what provisions will be made for removal of same.

RESPONSE

Section 9.5.8.3 and Figure 1.2-36 have been changed to provide the requested information. ( 1 l l l 430.114-1 Rev. 13, 11/82

/ ~ r![- LGS FSAR Because of the above described configuration and because the specific gravity of the exhaust gases leaving the exhaust duct is approximately one-third of the standard air specific gravity, exhaust gas contamination of air at the enclosure intake opening will be negligible irrespective of outdoor ambient temperature, wind speed, or direction. The exhaust duct extension, beyond the diesel generator enclosure roof, further improves exhaust gas dispersion. This extension is considered non-safeguard in that .it is not required to meet the system design requirements, and in that its failure will not interfere with the exhaust duct gas flow and consequently the performance of the diesel generator. If the cast iron exhaust pipe were broken by tornado or turbine missiles, small pieces of metal might drop into the exhaust duct, but would not reach the turbocharger because of the duct l arrangement and the presence of the exhaust silencer. Large pieces of metal or the entire cast iron pipe might fall on the enclosure roof but would have no destructive effect because the roof is designed to withstand tornado and turbine missiles. For the low probability event of the cast iron pipe breaking off, the vertical discharge velocity and low specific gravity of the exhaust ensure that recirculation would not be a problem. The engine silencers are provided with drains for elimination of water resulting from condensation or being blown in by the wind. Any dust that might accumulate will be blown out by the exhaust gases during periodic testing. j y b s ns d ll be of W f yah% % Se oped"' The engine silencers are provided with drains for removal of condensation that might collect at this point.P Any dust that might accumulate in the exhaust piping will be blown out by the exhaust gases during periodic testing. The engine is not equipped with alarm or shutdown sensors for abnormal conditions in the intake and exhaust systems because the engines are designed to operate under all specified operating conditions. 9.5.8.4 Tests and Inspections The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. Operability of the combustion air intake and exhaust system is checked during the periodic testing of the diesel generator system. Rev. 17, 02/93 9.5-58

~ ~l g}., - ~'- - DRAFT mS,S- ~.~ b ~~' OUESTION 430.116. (Section 9.5.8)- In Section 9.5.8.3 of your FSAR, you state that "the air intake j and exhaust gas openings are designed to prevent contamination of the diesel's intake air by exhaust products." Expand your FSAR discussion of this particular design to support the conclusion that contamination will be prevented. Show that the effects of adverse environmental conditions will not cause exhaust gas to recirculate and contaminate the air intakes and effect engine performance.

RESPONSE

g 3. 5 11 Sections 9.5.8.2 and 9.5.8.3 have been changed to provide the fg requested information f 6 F

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'C 5 s' y 1-e OTHE R INFORM ATeON SHOWN MAY,, ' ' ' ~;,: ?, t h :... y ,,,%_te -l l' _ '^ ~ ' y -~'greyTj.' ',. MT BE CURRENT wlTH RESPECT., '; - .. -j ~ 5 vtw TO DR AWINGS WHICH GOVERN v' g;g' ] "'. e coNsT PuCTION.] { 4 S pg.,.- t s ..m.,.,. .g u, ~ .O t.iMERICK GENER ATING STATION f, ~ ?-. UNITS 1 AND 2 4 ),.. FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT - ~

1. -

,i GENERAL ARRANGEMENT, f DIESEL GENERATOR k ENCLOSURE UNITS 1 AND 2, SECTIONS. FIGURE 1.2 36 R EV.12,10/ 82

I , p rm n P i, n; Lj u LO u --- a' ~= LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.118 (Section 9.5.8) Experience at some operating plants has shown that diesel engines have failed to start due to accumulation of dust and other deliterious material on electrical equipment associated with starting of the diesel generators (e.g., auxiliary relay contacts, controls switches - etc.). Describe the provisions that have been made in your diesel generator building design, electrical starting system, and combustion air and ventilation air intake design (s) to preclude this condition to assure availability of the diesel generator on demand. Also describe under normal plant operation what procedure (s) will be used to minimized accumulation of dust in the diesel generator rcon; specifically address concrete dust control. In your response also ecnsider the condition when Unit 1 is in operation and Unit 2 is under construction (abnormal generaion of dust).

RESPONSE

Section 9.4.6.2 has been changed to provide the requested information on dust control in the D/G building. The local control boards for the diesel generators contain control switches, auxiliary relays and electrical equipment associated with the generator system. All electrical contacts are enclosed. All auxiliary relays have dust covers and all control switches have internal contact surfaces. The local control panel is constructed of steel with continous-ly welded seams. All doors are gasketed and latched. The doors are louvered to allow ventilation of internally generated heat. The electrical relay and tenminal box is totally enclosed and has a gasketed cover. All relays have dust covers. The race way entrances to all electrical enclosures are sealed to prevent the entrance of dust or water, thus preventing the accumulation of dust on electrical control components. >-240(b)/14 430.118-1 -Rev. A a, -i'h4B1

U,9h@T u.. c : uu 6 m. ...m LGS FSAR QUESTION 430.119 (Section9.5.8) Refer to the previous question. Expand your discussion of dust control to include the motor control center and other electrical equipment in the diesel generator room. Show that an accumulation of dust dirt not cause failures of any emergency diesel generator support equipment.

RESPONSE

The motor control centers in each diesel generator cell are NEMA type 12 and are rain tight. All raceway entrances are sealed to preclude the entrance of dust or water. These design features prevent the entrance of dust into the MCC's. All other electrical components associated with the D/G in these rooms are protected against dust as described in the response to Question 430.118. b e r l 1 -240(b)/14 430.119-1 or. 10, 11/&2

LGS FSAR e (,, OUESTION 430.121 (Section 9.5.8) Provide an enlarged P&lD for the emergency diesel engine combustion air intake & exhaust system. On the drawing, clearly indicate all piping, all instrumentation and controls, all components, engine interfaces, building penetrations, quality group classifications for all piping and components, and any locations where quality group classifications change. \\.

RESPONSE

Figure 9.5-12 ar.d Table 3.2-1 have been changed to provide the l requested information. j I I r. ~g 430.121-1 Rev. 17, 02/83

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2 I

= g ._y ~ DIESEL GENERATOR COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND .' EXHAUST SYSTEM. s ......t6 e i FIGURE 9.512 REV.17,02/83 i \\ > Y,b R.ELAT:D 'T O Q - l p o. M

~ s. DRAFT LGS FSAR (' OUESTION 430.122 (Section 9.5.8) Refer to Figure 1.2-1. There are two fuel storage tanks and one lube oil storage tank in close proximity to both Unit 1 and 2 diesel generator building, and on the same side as the combustion air intakes. Consider a fire in one or more of these storage tanks. Show how you will prevent products of combustion from entering the diesel generator combustion air intakes and causing degraded emergency diesel performance, or even failure. Revise your FSAR accordingly.

RESPONSE

Section 9.5.8.3 has been changed to provide the requested information. l l k 430.122-1 Rev. 12, 10/82

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est/ nava e enlesure i 3;f t } j CJher U air btia ke. The probability of a fire outside the diesel generator enclosure concurrent with a lo'ss of offsite power that would cause products of combustion to ul the diesel air intake is extremely low. A spontaneous main urbine tri wg'gdnotresultfromthisexte'rnal fire. A fire in of the 6T.. lube oil storage tanks outside the enclosure would immediately be alarmed in the control room and would be extinguished by a manually activated foam i injection system provided with each tank.f The area is protected by a tire hydrant system. Normal local winds would carry combustion products away from the diesel generator intakes as shown in the wind rose in EROL Figures 2.3.2-1. through 2.3.2-3. Evaluation of the combustion air intake and exhaust system with respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR sections as indicated: f a. Protection from wind and tornado effects 3.3 3.4// \\ b. Flood protection c. Missile protection 3.5 d. Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping 3.6 e. Environmental design 3.11 f. Fire protection 9.5.1 The air intake opening of the diesel generator enclosure and the outlet of the exhaust duct are designed to prevent recirculation of exhaust products and contamination of the diesel intake air. The combustion air intake is located at the diesel generator enclosure air intake plenum. The screened air intake opening of the enclosure is located on the upper part'of the south wall and is protected from rain, ice, and snow by a roof overhang (Figure 1.2-36). The exhaust duct is terminated above the roof with a 6-foot piece of egst iron pipe, an elbow, and a 3 foot section cut at a 45 degree angle for protection from rain, ice, and snow. This elbow is 18 feet higher than the enclosure air intake opening. 9.5-57 Rev. 17, 02/93

e LGS FSAR o DRAFT ) OUESTION 430.123 (Section 9.5.8) Consider r-loss of offsite power with associated reactor trip and cooldown. One emergency diesel engine fails to start, and during operation of the remaining three there is a subsequent exhaust line break on one of the diesels in the area where the exhaust line passes through the air intake space. Show that the operation of the affected emergency diesel will not be impaired by exhaust gas contamination such that the capability for safe shutdown is not compromised. Revise your FSAR accordingly.

RESPONSE

The proposed scenario is an Anticipated Operational Transient, followed by an independent single failure, followed by an independent passive failure of a seismic Category I, 0-listed pipe. ? This event combination exceeds the Limerick design basis and NUREG-0800 sections 15.0, 15.2.6.II.4 and 15.2.6.11.6, which only (- requires consideration of the initiating event combined with the worst single failure. i ~ % ekost-hk; Jti k ;wp as ox a' ) [ 430.123-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l /

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f ( LGS FSAR the master trip. They provide backup protection if the intercept valves or the normal control devices fail. 10.2.2.4 Extraction System Check Valves The energy contained in the extraction and feedwater heater system can be of sufficient magnitude to cause overspeed of the turbine-generator following an electrical load rejection or turbine trip. Check valves are installed where necessary to prevent high-energy steam from entering the turbine under these conditions. The extraction system check valves are shown in Figure 10.2-1. The check valves limit the amount of energy flashing back into the turbine so that the turbine speed increase is held below the maximum value. Power-assisted closure check valves are provided for heaters 3, 4, and 6. Heater 2 is provided with folding disc f check valves. Heater 1 has no provision for preventing ,. flashbacks into the turbine, since the distance to the turbine is short and internal energy is low. Heater 5 has no provision for preventing flashbacks into the crossaround piping, since the crossaround/ moisture separator system provides adequate capacity to protect the turbine. The power-assisted check valves have an air piston that acts in opposition to a spring to keep the valve wide open during normal / operation. On turbine trip, the extraction relay dump valve closes, venting the air from the piston actuators and thus allowing the springs to assist in closing the check valves. A suurnr,c 01a Mats or rar E HC 10.2.2.5 System Operation S YJ7sn u Fav*o /* F sans /0. 2 J 4xo f A O sca Don unn fo n rar n,gewr

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"""" # "# ~ " '# b J 10.2.2.5.1 Control System i \\ The turbine-generator control syste is a GE Mark I . dg electrohydraulic control (EHC) system. The speed control unit h \\ produces the speed / acceleration error signal that is determin'ed by comparing the desired speed from the reference speed circuit, with the actual speed of the turbine for steady-state conditions. For step changes in speed, an acceleration reference circuit takes over to either accelerate or decelerate the turbine at a selected rate to the new speed. There is no limit to the deceleration. The speed / acceleration error signal is combined with the load requirements on the load control unit to provide the flow signal to the control valves. 10.2-5 Rev. 13 11/82 .,.:- 7s

DRAFT "" ^" Assuming an electrical load increase due to a system frequency dip with steady steam input to the turbine, the turbine speed decreases. In Figure 10.2-7, two speed sensors SSPU-1 and SSPU-2 pick up the change in speed. This signal is compared with the speed reference at the speed summing amplifiers, and its derivative is compared with the acceleration reference at the acceleration summing amplifier in each of two low value gates sA;3 oua atti. The resulting outputs are gated together and the controlling signal (SCU) feeds into the load control unit for the control and intercept valves. In Figure 10.2-8, the signal SCO from the speed control unit (Figure 10.2-7) is compared with the load reference, which is remote manually set, and inputted to the control and intercept valve amplifiers ~(A'^ .od A;;h. These amplifiers provide the position signals for the flow control units of the respective valves which are the final controlling units of the control and int'ercept valves. A typical valve flow control unit is shown in l Figure 10.2-10. f. Because of the importance of overspeed protection, the speed l control signal has two independent redundant channels. Two independent pulse signals are obtained from magnetic pickups located over a gear-toothed wheel on the turbine shaft. Loss of both speed signals trips the turbine (Section 10.2.2.6). 10.2.2.5.2 Emergency Trip System Functions The emergency trip system trips the unit closing all valves on the following signals and therefore shuts down the turbine: a. Turbine approximately 10% above rated speed (on overspeed, the tripping is performed by the mechanical trip valve) b. Turbine approximately 12% above rated speed while Q testing the overspeed trip device \\s c. Vacuum decreases to less than a preselected value l d. Excessive thrust bearing wear l N e. Prolonged loss of generator stator coolant at loads in ~ excess of a predetermined value f. Remote manual trip on the control panel g ":v. 16, Gi/63 10.2-6 l

LGS FSAR g g. Loss of hydraulic fluid supply pressure (loss of emergency trip system fluid pressure automatically closes the turbine valves and then energizes the master trip relay to prevent a false restart) h. Low lubrication oil pressure i. Loss of both speed signals j. Loss of both primary and secondary EHC power supplies k. Operation of the manual mechanical trip at front standard l 1. High level in moisture separators ? m. High reactor water level n. Power load unbalance o. Exhaust hood high temperature l p. Excessive vibration l 9 da ou. /% en ' ec-om r. Geaur.a Bna w n c To prevent spurious tripping due to single component failure, duplicated or triplicated trip sensing devices are provided and are wired to form a two-out-of-three or a two-out-of-two tripping logic. Therefore, a signal from a single sensing element does -not trip the turbine-generator. However, the turbine trips if a malfunction is monitored simultaneously by at least two sensing ( elements. 10.2.2.6 Overspeed Protection \\ For speeds above 100 percent rated speed, the speed control \\ system would fully close the turbine control valves by the time that 107 percent of rated speed is reached and the CIVs would be fully closed by the time that 109 percent of rated speed is reached. l 10.2-7 WEev. ' 6, D i/53-i i

1 ( LGS FSAR To protect the turbine-generator against overspeed due to failure of the speed control system, two trip devices are provided, either of which when initiated closes the main stop valves, control valves, and combined intermediate valves, thus shutting down the turbine. These two trip devices are as follows: a. A mechanical overspeed trip that is initiated if the turbine speed reaches approximately 10% above rated speed i b. An electrical overspeed trip that serves as a backup to the i mechanical trip and is initiated at aooroximately 12% above l rated l { Qt%nt1014Swerfor& The mechanical overspeed trip device 6s an unbalanced ring I, mounted on the turbine

• shaft *and held concentric with it by a spring,10% above rated)

When the turbine speed reaches the trip ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

• speed (

the centrifugal force acting on the ring overcomes the tension of the spring and the ring snaps'to an eccentric position. In doing this it strikes the trip finger, which operates the mechanical trip valve. This is a three-way 1 valve that feeds. hydraulic fluid (1600 psi) to the lockout valve and, when tripped, blocks the hydraulic fluid supply system and removes the emergency trip system pressure, which causes the main stop valves, control valves, and combined intermediate valves to' close. Failure of the hydraulic portion of this trip results in a stop valve closure. The electrical overspeed trip receives its signal from a 112% l speed trip relay (VC 5840) (Figure 10.2-4) operated by the signal sensed by p magnetic pickup from a toothed wheel on the turbine i / snart and fed to a power amplifier and megacycle circuit whose l / output is a de voltagesproportional to speed (Figure 10.2-5). muMH0Hh AH The signal from the speed trip relay energizes the master trip relay XKT1000 (Figure 10.2-5) which then energizes the mechanical trip solenoid MTS and de-energizes the master trip solenoid valves MTSV-A and MTSV-B. Either one of these actions will trip the turbine, i.e., close the stop, control, and combined intercept valves. Q i RJ. 10, G1/03-10.2-8 i J

LGS FSAR decreases. In Figure 10.2-7, r ;iaa e '- two speed sensors SSPU-1 and SSPU-2 pick up the change in speed. This signal is compared with the speed reference at the speed summing q amplifiers, and its derivative is compared with the acceleration reference at the acceleration summing amplifier in each of the two low valve gates 1A;;.nl A;';. The resulting outputs are l gated together and the controlling signal (SCU) feeds into the i load control unit for the control and intercept valves. In Figure 10.2-8, the signal SCU from the speed control unit (Figure 10.2-7) is compared with the load reference, which is remote manually set, and inputted to the control and intercept valve amplifiers (A4e.nd A;;i. These amplifiers provide the position signals for the flow control units of the respective valves which are the final controlling units of the control and l intercept valves. A typical valve flow control unit is shown in Figure 10.2-I The recirculation flow control signal is the speed signal minus the speed reference 'Tigur; ';.0 01. This is amplified in the auto-load following unit (71vo. 10.2-;07 and fed into the reactor recirculation system flow controller. This is the end point of the turbine-generator system control of load following. i The above analysis is based on a generator load increase. A similar discussion also applies to load decrease. The same effect can be obtained if, instead of a change in electrical load, a load reference change is made by the operator because a recirculation flow error signal is achievable in either case. 10.2.3 TURBINE DISC INTEGRITY l 10.2.3.1 Material Selection Turbine wheels and rotors for turbines operating with light water reactors are made f rom vacuum melted or vacuum degassed Ni-Cr-Mo-V alloy steel by processes that minimize flaw occurrence and provide adequate fracture toughness. Tramp elements are controlled to the lowest practicable concentrations consistent with good scrap selection and melting practices and consistent with obtaining adequate initial and long-life fracture toughness for the environment in which the parts operate. The turbine wheel and rotor materials have the lowest fracture appearance transition temperatures (FATTs) and highest Charpy V-notch energies obtainable, on a consistent basis from water quenched Ni-Cr-Mo-V raterial at the sizes and strength levels used. Since (( Rev. ?3, 11/R2 10.2-10

/ L35 FSAR 3 l TArLE 10.2-2 i f I TUR BI NE OVEPSPEED PROTEC'IION ~ ACTUATING DEVI DEVICE DESCRI PTION/ FUNCTION TRIP SETTIN3 I h'I EF KEDI AT E ',*;$^.~c*w 9rsao leurn c cesno Ononea itu * ~~a an,r s es.o

e..,e s,,,

) f t Q J N sW T ft. $ y 5 7t es,5) Cy (.w<0 8Y #07 L eno Oous'*~ U" ' ' e a, it eres Cseeo fn en an he> S'*" C: I a. nco av t% VW' nor re o $n= 0 Coa r ** * - re Overspeed Unbalanced ring, concentric 110% of Mechanical Mer Trip with sha f t, eccentric on cated speed Linkage va] overspeed - = - - Close mech. trip valve and remove electro-hyd control oil press Backup Toothed wheel u.agnetic pick-up 112% of Master Trip Her Ovorspeed speed sensor, electronic rated speed Relay so: &i Trip signal amplifier So] (K ) i Close mech. trip valve and master trip solenoid valves; remove electro-hyd control oil press 40% Unbalanced Power / Gen current & steam Load pressure transducers, Unbalance electronic ccuparators G control logics I Energize CV fast closing r solenoids & rerove electro-hyd control oil press from 3 the CVs.

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E LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.140 (S2ction 10.4.4) In Section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field inspection but not the frequency and extent of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine bypass system. Provide this information in the FSAR.

RESPONSE

Section 10.4.4 has been changed to include the requested information. The turbine bypass system will undergo periodic s ur ve illa nce testing in accordance with the Limerick Technical Speci fi cations wri tten using Section 4. 7.10 of NUREG - 0123 " Standard Technical Speci fications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)" as a guide. 430.140-1 __-}}