ML20067D629
| ML20067D629 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1982 |
| From: | Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT |
| To: | Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HQ:S:82:151, NUDOCS 8212210055 | |
| Download: ML20067D629 (11) | |
Text
,
A Department of Energy l
Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 HQ:S:82:151 DEC 2 01982 Mr. Paul S. Check, Director CRBR Program Office r
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Check:
INSTRUMENTATION (CHAPTER 7) WORKING MEETINGS - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION References :
1)
J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
Subject:
Meeting Summary for Instrumentation (Chapter 7) Working Meeting, September 21 and 22,1982, dated September 24, 1982 2)
J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
Subject:
Meeting Summary for Instrumentation (Chapter 7) Working Meeting, November 18 and 19,1982, dated November 29, 1982 contains the additional information requested during the subject meetings for which response dates of December 17, 1982, were projected. The amended Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) pages will be incorporated into a future PSAR revision.
Item 54 from the September 21 and 22,1982, Chapter 7 meeting (November Item 4)
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is the last Chapter 7 item requiring a response.
It will be provided by December 22, 1982.
t-provides two pages that were inadvertently left out of the December 6,1982, submittal of Chapter 7 information. These pages belong to the llam 32 response.
Any questions regarding the information provided or further activities can be addressed to Mr. R. Rosecky (FTS 626-6149) or Mr. A. Meller (FTS 626-6355) of the Project Office Oak Ridge staff.
Sincerely, m K A, Aw gc>ol O
John R. Longenec er 5
Acting Director Office of 8212210055 821220 Breeder Demonstration Projects j yO PDR ADOCK 05000 3 Office of Nuclear Energy 2 Enclosures cc: Service List Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution l
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Enclosure I Instrumentation and Control (Chapter 7) September 21 and 22, and November 18 and 19 Working Meetings Action Items due to NRC December 10, 1982 SeptemberItem(NovemberItem) 6 42(10) 54 (4)*
- Item not complete at this time; expected submittal date is December 22.
L P
SEPTEMBER ITEM 6 NRC CONCERN:
Provide a discussion of Regulatory Guides in Section 7.1 RESOLUTION:
Section 7.1 has been revised to indicate those Regulatory Guides which are applicable to safety related I&C systems described in Chapter 7 Those sections which discuss the application of specific regulatory guides are identified in Section T.1.
E'
Attcchm3nt to LEM-82-108 Protiction system instrument channels are functionally tested by varying the magnitude of the test signal through the trip point to verify that the comparator trips, then readjusting its magnitude to reset the compa-rator. After this functional test is completed, the test signal is removed from the instrument channel, and the instrument channel operation 57] is restored. Calibration checks to assure that the protection system channel meets its performance reauirements will be accomplished at periodic intervals during regularly scheduled shutdowns. Actuated equip-ment will, in general, be testable on line.
In cases where this is not practical (for example, a control rod cannot be dropped during operation without scraming the reactor), the recommendations of EICSB 22 will be j
met.
16 I
.9 Confomance to Regulatory Guide 1.47 " Bypassed and InoperaC atus Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Sys%erf!i" I
Administ procedures for indicat a bypass or inoperable status of portions of the tection sys r supporting systems will be supplemented by a system that ly indicates at a system level the bypass or deliberately in rability of the Protection System, systems actuated or con ed by the Pr ion System, or supporting systems that must perable for the Protect o related systems to
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perform thei ety related functions. An indicatio ach bypass or
'g delibe y induced inoperability will be displayed in the 1 room i
cordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47. -
7.1.2..lr6 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.53 "Acolication of the Sinole Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems" Any single fsilure within the protection system will not prevent proper protection action at the system level when required. The Plant Protection System is periodically tested so that failures are detected.
Test schemes will be designed to duplicate as closely as possible the operation being tested.
Design precautions include two independent, redun-dant diverse shutdown systems, each capable of shutting down the reactor; physical independence between redundant channels; rnd physical barriers utilized fcr separation between redundant channels. The use of fire retardant materials in construction, fire retardant cable and wire insu-lation jackets, and physical separation between redundant circuits is relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a fire.
7.1.2.1{ Conforrance to Regulatory Guide 1.62 " Manual Initiation of l0 Protective functions" The Plant Protection System will provide for manual actuation of each protective action at the system level. The manual initiation of a protective action will result in a Protection System response identical to automatic actuation of the same protective action.
For example, manual
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trip buttons permit operator initiation of reactor scram and containment isolation. The amount of equipment comon to both manual and automatic initiation is minimized.
Manual initiation of protection actions is designed manual; o; completion once initiated.r comon portions of protective subsystems will prev to go to No single failure within automatic.
57 tiation of a protective system action by manual or automatic means.
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Amend. 57 9 m----
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Attachm2nt to LEM-82-108 2.12 Reculaterv culde 1.ao aount If tention of class 1E rautament for Nuclear Power Plantsa IEEE Standa 323-1974 will be applied to the safety related Instr tation and control eq nt as Indicated In Section 7.1.2.5.
This gulos further r mends the use of a source to at is equivalent to one based on the f ailure all saf ety related e ont designed to prevent or mitigate the condition f which the sour tem is derived. The purpose of qualification Is to assure the se rolsted equipment wili perf arm under the environmental conditions ch it will be subjected.
It is highly inconsistent to require th ua Ication of equipment to radiation Ievels which could not be rea even as asult of compiete f allure of the very equipment being quali d.
As such, Reg tory Guide 1.89 source term requirement will not b mposed on the safety-re d Instrtsnentation and controf systems an ponents.
Radiation a ronments to be considered in quellfying safety-ted instrume tion and control systems and components wilI be determ cons!
Ing the source term during and/or af ter the applicable design s, the spatial location, shielding and equipment, av 4
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7.1.2,[H l
I & E Information Nottee 79-22 "0ualification of Control Systems"
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Safety system design f eatures wil I be included to mitigate any mal functions of
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non-saf ety grade control equipment which occur as a result of high energy line breaks, such that the of facts of such mal functions wil I not cause control system f ailures to complicate any event beyond the PSAR analysis.
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l 7.1-6a Amend. 71
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?At :h.w.; ;~ :n: 0: 10:
TABLE 7.1-2
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LIST OF REGULATORY GUIDES APPLICABLE TO SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 1.6 Independance Between Redundant Power Sources and their Dis-
- f2'h r a(as discussed in Sections 8.3.1.2 andM tributit n Systems
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i.n 1.12 Instrumentation for Eart uakes T. Ami: -- gaeav=*ourr91a n t s-Age 4c s teh d ntr4e4-4atiiEs ge 1.22 Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions 1.28, Quality As'surance Program Requirements (Design and Construction) 1.29 Seismic De:1gn Classification 1.30 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and 1e ic Equipment l'~
a' terr Nd
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ctric $sYems Dor Nuclear Powerhc.IOCriteria fo '
1.32
.r/t'n; S;Ji:n M,
f C1.40 Qualification Tests of Continuous Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment of Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Safety Systems (e.5 clircuvud Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Bypassed and Inoperable Status 1.47 M fv & 7.f.1t) 1.53 Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems 1.62 Manual Initiation of Protective Actions 1.63 Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.64 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Des.ign of Nuclear j
Power Plants o
1.73 Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants 1.75 Physical Independence of Electric System 1.7S control Room Habitability Du. ring Chemical Release (as discussed in Section 6.3).
1.89 Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants
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(as discussed in Section '. '.2.t).
Q 3.ll 7.1-8 JuMtsr-
N'Ja -itT (Insert to Table 7.1-2) 1.97 Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions during and Following an Accident (as discussed in Section 7.5.11) 1.100 Se'ismic Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants 1.105 Instrument Setpoints 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems 1.133 Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors (as discussed in Section 7.5.13) b G
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NOVEMBER ITEM 10. SODIUM FREEZE PROTECTION NRC CONCERN:
Describe design criteria for the Trace Heating System. Describe the electrical separation between the control and monitoring for the Trace Heating Systems. Describe seismic criteria also. Describe alarms.
(Include Cover Gas Equalization Lines EVST, Control Rod Drive Lines, Overflow Heat Exchangers Impurity Monitoring Systems and Vessel Support Area).
RESOLUTION:
Section 9.4 has been revised in J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check letter (numberHQ:S:82:148) dated December 20, 1982, to provide more detail about the Trace Heating System, electrical separation require-ments, seismic criteria (Seismic II) and alarms and controls.
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Additional information for Item 32 of the December 6 submittal.
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