ML20067A098
| ML20067A098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1982 |
| From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8212010195 | |
| Download: ML20067A098 (7) | |
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UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION 3EFORE TEE COMMISSIONERS:
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Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky
,82 El 30 P4;I7 John F. Ahearne Thomas M. Roberts James X. A sselstine 3.,
y &p,';}[j In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Docket No. 50-289 SP (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating-(Restart)
Station, Unit No. 1)
'AAMODT RESPONSE TO COMMENTS OF PUBLIC AND PARTIES NOVEMBER 9.1982 IN HARRISBURG I.
Comments of the Public.
Af ter reading each comment, we view them in total as the vote of a jury which has carefully followed the course of the restart proceeding.
Tncy noted -the major deficiencies at TMI:~ Incompetent
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and untrustworthy management, unprepared operators and the poor physical condition of the plant.
Considering the potential for a serious accident with such a combination, the public then turned to the emergency plans and found them impossible to ac~c~omplish.
The jury voted, in excess of 90%, against restart of TMI - 1.
Tne public has not been fooled by the labored arguments of the Board in defense of the licensee.
They are suspicious of promises to' do better, They know that " symbolic" fines will not result in a-competent and trustworthy management.
They know that establishing criteria for instructors should have been accomplished over three years ago.
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The majority of the comments of the public were sufficient reward for our in'tervention of over three years.
Even the presentation of Eay Taylor on behalf of the Pennsylvania Farmers A ssociation demanded that "the equipment'and materials used in Unit 1 reactor meet the highest standards, and that employees in charge of operating the reactor be carefully tested and evaluated for competence and experience before approval is given for restart." - (p. 82) 8212010195 821129 PDR ADOCK 05000289 C
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Concerning Ms. Taylor's r: marks, we checked with the Director of PFA, Newpher, who informed us that Ms. Taylor's presentation was her own idea, but, since it did not counter PFA policy, she was allowed to present it on behalf of the organization.
Members of PEA, some years ago prior to the TMI-2 accident, voted statewide by at least 51%
in favo'r of safe nu. clear power generation.
Mr. Newpher. stated that he simply trusted ?that the government would not approve the operation of ~ ~ ~ ~
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TMI-1 if it would adversely affect the farmers.,He was unaware of any emergency plans for farmers; he was of the opinion that farmers would not be interested in such plans and would, in any event, remain to take care of their animals.
Mr. Newpher's innocence was disturbing, however, we are gratified that we were able to bring members of the TMI-1 area agricultural community into the restart proceeding.
These witnesses had experienced the TMI-2 accident and expressed many reserva-tions concerning the plans for farmers as well as the restart of TMI-1.
In sum, all public commentators are asking you to assure that TMI-1 can be safely operated.
In view of the state of the'TMI training. program, the incompetency and crookedness of.GPU Nuclear
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management, and the phyaical condition of the TMI-1 plant, you cannot do that by December 10, the date set for your decision.
We read the public opinion as 100% against a decision to restart at the present time.
The jury has spoken.
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l II.
Concerning the Comments of the Parties.
1.
We disagree concerning the effect of observance of demeanor on the Suecial Master's Decision.
TMIA believes that the divergence between the Board's and the Special Master's decisions was due to the Special Master's advantage in being present at the hearing to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.
(p. 102)
The Special Master did note the demeanor of several witnesses, however he never decended on these observa tions as evidence in drawing his conclusions.
A s an example, consider the Special Master's decision concerning Michael Ross which the Board completely overturned.
The Special Master depended on YY's testimony (SMR #142), the testimony of others (Id. #143), Ross's failure to deny YY's testimony (Id. #144), incredible t,estimony of Ross (Id. #146-7; 149, and logical deduction based on the above (Id. #.150-1), in which the relative demeanor of the witnesses was simply noted, in passing (Id. 151, lin'es m
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4 17,18.), in stating emchaticallys. "The donclusion must b2 that Mr. Ross intentionally kept the proctor away in order to aid the candida te s. "
(Id. #152)
Tnen, in addition to the eridence
- referenced above, the Special F. aster examined-twelve ' changes to the answer keys to find evidence if
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any we're unfaiNy~ broadened.
(Id. #153 - 175)
There were many more
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changes than just these twelve; changes in the key for the "B" set of examinations were not considered at all.
The ' twelve changes were presented simply as examples.
(IH. #153) 176)
Tne Special Master found evidence that the " good faith" of the reviewers was at issue on two questions.
(Id. # 177)
In the case of one of the changes, the Special Master showed how the reviewers misrepresented the training program; in the case of the other change, the reviewers were virtually the only candidates who stood to gain from the change.
(Id. #177)
The Board, in discussing this evidence (July 27 PID #2212-2224),
misstated _thati,the Special Maste5's conclusion of ' bad faith' on the part of the reviewers was based solelv on these two examples, or that they were examples.1 The two examples fit with the other evidence (YY's testimony, Ros's's incredible testimony, etc.).
The Special Master looked at the evidence as a whole whereas the Board looked only to explain away each piece.
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Tne Board failed to be objective; the Special Master was objective.
In that objectivity, the Special Master considered all evidence; demeanor was, in a few cases, a small part.
The NRC's assertion that "the Special Master looked at that (demeanor almost to the exclucion of some of the direct evidence on some of the issues, and that is where the licensing Board carefully evaluated the direct evidence onthe issues" (Tr. 148) is totally without basis in fact.
Fo o tr ^ te 1 - In studying the Board's discussion,. it should be noted tha t the Board could not " find from this record which answer is correct" (52220); "The candidates were about evenly split on including boric a cid in their answers." (#2221); and there was a difference "between the chemistry lectures in training... and actual plant practice" (F2222).
How can an objective Board have concluded in the face of this and other evidence that "Although we are concerned about weaknesses in the quality of instruction, and have imposed conditions directed to that concern, we have not found that the instructors have failed to instruct.
Nor have we found that the students failed to learn." (52450)
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t!e disarren concerning NRC Staff's a ssartion that their findings wara consistant with thn Licensing Board's decision.
Tr. 146 The NRC Staff never conceded that the blatantly. similar answers of G and H must be due to cheating.
The Staff recommendsd no action shout the VV-O false certificatio,n.
The Staff were not suspectful of the "36' word identiial' answers of GG, MM and W, nor of Operator U providing an answer.
The Board acknowledged all these cases of cheating, identi-
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fiad by the Special Ma ster.
Staff's attorney, Mr. Goldberg even referred on one occasion during the Reopened Proceeding to the " alleged" cheating of Operators 0 and W who had already confessed to cheating extensively on the NRC exam and an independent audit.
,The Staff did not find, as the Board did, thaO Mr. Shipman was probably not truthful under oath, or that the Licensee lacked competence in managing its investigation, or that licensee's attorney (Wilson) was
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" naive", that licensee management was accountable for the " loose" administration of training and testing, or negligent for failing to foster respect for examinations,.or that^the TMI training instructors' competence and attitude were questionable, or that quality assurance concepts were needed in the training program.
The Staff did not find, as the Board did, that licensee management had been negligent in their certification of operators, or that training l
management (Newton', Long) misrepresented testing procedures under oath,and that the integrity of Licensee's training program failed because of improper management.
The Staff did not find, as the Board did, that the NRC examinati'on process is neither independent nor external of Licensee's training program, and, thus, cannot measure the adequacy of Licensee's programr or that there are problems with the substantive content of the exams, and that the validity of the exam is questionable.
The references for the Board's findings referenced above are in I A MODT COMMENTS, August 20, 1982, pages 8 - 13.
It is our opinion that the Staff was useless in protecting the public interest both in the main and reopened hearing in the areas of our contentions.
We believe that the Commission should find out why the Staff
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failed to find what the Board found (due tothe Special Master).
We found the actions of the Staff in the Reopened Proceeding to be totally preposterous in view of their responsibility to protect the l
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public.
As indicated in our commento (Id. #3b), we urgsd you to ordor an investigation of the managamsnt of. the Staff's participation in the Reopened Proceeding and the management of the Offics of Inspection and Enforcement.
( See Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1982, #111-168)
We believe that the NRC's definition of what constitutes
" cheating" should be investigated..Mr. Goldberg's explanation in response to Comdisskoner Gilinsky's question (Tr.160) was, as characterized by the questioner, aDDalling.
We;.are becoming quite certain,that what Mr. Inmodt described as a " gut feeling" (Tr. 122) and what we termed a " haunting suspicion" (Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1982 #168; 159-168) may very well be true:
168. (Ye)cannot help but develop the haunting suspicion that the NRC. investigations were pur-posefully limited both in scope and depth be-cause. full exposure of the extent of cheating at TMI would have shown a situation where the
" team" concept was applied to all examinations, even NRC licensing examinations, that this pervasive cheating had been: supported by manage-ment from the beginning of operation at TMI, and that this kind.of cheating was commonplace throughsut the nuclear industry for years, and that NRC condoned it.
3.
We disagree-with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's imulf ed assertion that distribution of a Dublic information brochure, not subjected to the scrutinv of the Darties, urovides adequate emergency planning for the farmers.
Tr. 133 i
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4.
We disagree with Licensee's (Ross) assertion that they have 1
a Duropria te s taffing levels, that all oDerators have been (or will be) examined by NRC usine revised Drocedures, tha t necessary Drocrams are in Blace to Drovide competent oDerators, tha t simulator training has been increased._tha t examinations are administered on the simula tor to test emergency resDonse, and tha t oDerator attitude and morale have imDroved and are good and hich.
ir. 19-22)
Concerning Staffing Levels:
Where is the evidence? Numbers on charts do not indicate experience or training.
TMI-1 operators lef t s
in droves during 1981, a large number after the revelation of cheating.
Eefore this a ttrition, NRC found that TMI-1 had ba' rely enough operators.
"ow, evidently, trainees have been recruited and are being shunted through
' training' and NRC testing.
What about experience with the TMI-1 reactor?
Ross testified that he would like senior operators with 5 years of experience and R0s with 4 years experience at TMI-1.
(Aamodt Findings, 1
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F.a nh 4, 1982, #341)
Wha t are NRC's revised procedures?
There was no evidence of such procedures for examination of licensed operators produced in either hearing.
Wha t are ne.cessary. programs claimed now to be in place? Are ke sure that thtfy ie adequate to provide competent operators as claimed?
a If they were necessary, why weren't they in place beforehand?
Concerning simulator training:
'Ihe amount of simulator training described is precisely what has been in effect according to licensee's own testimony in the main hearing.
How can this be an increase?
The fact of the matter is that the " week" is actually 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on hands manipulation of the simulator.
The examinations at the simula. tor to test emergency response was an: idea strongly rejected by both the licensee and Board.
(August 2.7 PID #543-548)
Wriat certainty is there that Licensee has.
undertaken such testing seriously?
Concerning Operators' attitudes and morale:
.'The Licensee offered such testimony in the main hearing, and the Board ruled that this issue was satisfactorily resolved.
(Id. #267)
Af ter the Reopened Hearing, the Board felt that the issue of operator attitude had not been resolved.
(July 27 FID #
)
What brought about the change?
There has been no evidence, other than Ross's word, nor any (opportunity to question Ross.
Th6 comments by Ross are totally without evidentiary basis.
Can the Commission use such self-serving comments in making their decisio'n?
5.
We disagree with Arnold's comments which assert that controls l
to Dro te c t the intestrity of the examinations were Dut in Dlace.
Tr. 24 l
In F.ay, 1982 Radiation Worker Permit tests were found, with th61r answer keys, lyin5 on open shelves in the training area.
Two reports were =ade to upper-management and finally a. report to onsite NRC personnel before the situation was corrected.
This is the subject of a motion, September 1, 1982, before the Appeal Board.
4 November 29, 1982 Red ectfully su mitted,
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SERVICE LIST
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Samuel J. Chilk Robert Adler, Esq.
Secretary of the Commission 505 Executive House U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2357 Washington, D. C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Docketing and Service Section
. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D."C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioa Washington, D. C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner U. S. Nuclear hegulatory Commission Ms. Jane lee Washington, D. C. 20555 R. D. 3, Box 3521
. Etters, EA 17319 John F. Ahearne, Commissioner U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U. E. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 James K. Asselstine, Commissioner U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Ivan W. Smith, Administrative Judge A tomic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety &;1icensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
- 20555 Gary J. Edles, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board s
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C. 20555 A tomic Safety & Licensing A ppehl Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Joseph Gray, Esq..
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory ' Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20036
.