Methane Explosion Evaluation for Overpressure & Missile Effects at Safety-Related StructuresML20066H728 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Midland |
---|
Issue date: |
10/31/1982 |
---|
From: |
Fallin M NUS CORP. |
---|
To: |
|
---|
Shared Package |
---|
ML20066H714 |
List: |
---|
References |
---|
NUS-4235, NUDOCS 8211230339 |
Download: ML20066H728 (11) |
|
|
---|
Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20203N4171986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 2 to Tdi Owners Group App Ii:Generic Maint Matrix & Justifications ML20100B6361985-01-21021 January 1985 Rept on Welding Allegations ML20091K9701984-05-25025 May 1984 Request for Exemption from Branch Technical Position BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 for Control Panels C43 & C44 ML20084M0241984-04-27027 April 1984 Const Implementation Overview,Weekly Rept 46,840423-27 ML20084L9381984-04-19019 April 1984 Main Control Room Fire Analysis & Evaluation for C31 Control Panel ML20083P8971984-04-17017 April 1984 Midland Independent Design Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept,Number 11 for Mar 1984 ML20087H9031984-03-16016 March 1984 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept Number 10 for Feb 1984 ML20081C3731984-02-29029 February 1984 Seismic Margin Review,Miscellaneous Subsystems & Components ML20084F9061984-02-24024 February 1984 Const Implementation Overview,Weekly Rept Number 37, for 840220-24 ML20084F9261984-02-17017 February 1984 Const Implementation Overview,Weekly Rept Number 36, for 840210-17 ML20080M7381984-02-15015 February 1984 Independent Design & Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept 9 for Jan 1984 ML20084F8941984-02-10010 February 1984 Const Implementation Overview,Weekly Rept Number 35, for 840206-10 ML20086M2541984-02-0909 February 1984 Balance-Of-Plant Class 1,2 & 3 Piping,Pipe Supports & Valves, Vol IX to Seismic Margin Review ML20084F8391984-02-0303 February 1984 Const Implementation Overview,Weekly Rept Number 34, for 840130-0203 ML20083G8741984-01-0404 January 1984 Structural Evaluation of Midland Diesel Generator Bldg: Assessment of Structural Performance Capability & Serviceability as Potentially Affected by Settlement Induced Cracking ML20083G5871984-01-0404 January 1984 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program: Structural Evaluation of Diesel Generator Bldg ML20079E6641983-12-31031 December 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program, Monthly Status Rept 8 for Dec 1983 ML20083D9831983-12-0909 December 1983 Auxiliary Bldg Crack Mapping Evaluations for Grillage 8 Initial Jacking & Rejacking ML20083C6631983-11-30030 November 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification (Idcv) Program, Monthly Status Rept 7 for Nov 1983 ML20081J2801983-10-31031 October 1983 Evaluation of Change & Nonconformance Documents,Independent Assessment of Underpinning ML20082A9691983-10-31031 October 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program, Monthly Status Rept 6 for Oct 1983 ML20085L1141983-10-17017 October 1983 Fifth Monthly Status Rept for Independent Design & Const Verification Program for Sept 1983 ML20082G4971983-09-20020 September 1983 Midland Summary Rept ML20080E7881983-08-31031 August 1983 Vol IV to Seismic Margin Review:Svc Water Pump Structure Margin Evaluation ML20076C1621983-08-16016 August 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program, Monthly Status Rept 3 for Jul 1983 ML20077A7081983-07-31031 July 1983 Rev 3 to NSSS Equipment & Piping, Vol Viii to Seismic Margin Review ML20077H9721983-07-25025 July 1983 Rev 3 to Diesel Generator Bldg, Vol V to Seismic Margin Review ML20076N2391983-07-15015 July 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program, Monthly Status Rept 2 for 830528-830630 ML20024D0181983-06-30030 June 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept 2, Second Monthly Status Rept for 830528-0630 ML20085D8091983-06-30030 June 1983 Seismic Margin Review,Vol Iii,Auxiliary Bldg ML20072H4981983-06-30030 June 1983 Reclassification of Flued Head Fittings at Midland Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20076G0631983-06-0202 June 1983 Rev 2 to Midland Energy Ctr Spatial Sys Interaction Program/Seismic Mgjec Project Quality Plan ML20071M3581983-05-27027 May 1983 Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept 1, Covering Period from Project Inception Through 830527 ML20072E5851983-05-27027 May 1983 Independent Design & Const Verification Program,Monthly Status Rept No 1,Period Inception Through 830527 ML20072M2281983-05-18018 May 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 34, for 830508-14 ML20072M2121983-05-10010 May 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 33, for 830501-07 ML20072M2051983-05-0505 May 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 32, for 830424-30 ML20076N2791983-04-30030 April 1983 Revised Visual Insp of Cracks in Containments Near Anchorages in Rooms 110 & 116 ML20023C6841983-04-30030 April 1983 Vol 5 of Seismic Margin Review:Diesel Generator Bldg. ML20023B9021983-04-29029 April 1983 Addendum to 41st ALAB-106 Quarterly Rept,Apr-June 1983. ML20072M1891983-04-27027 April 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 31, for 830417-23 ML20072M1771983-04-21021 April 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 30, for 830410-16 ML20072M1691983-04-15015 April 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 29, for 830403-09 ML20072M1521983-04-0707 April 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 28, for 830327-0402 ML20083D3531983-04-0101 April 1983 Proposal for Third-Party Const Implementation Overview, Midland Nuclear Cogeneration Plant ML20072M1461983-04-0101 April 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 27, for 830320-26 ML20073D6441983-03-31031 March 1983 Control Room Design Review Final Rept ML20073B9291983-03-31031 March 1983 Quarterly Rept, for Apr-June 1983 ML20073C6111983-03-31031 March 1983 Seismic Margin Review,Midland Energy Ctr Project,Vol II: Reactor Containment Bldg ML20072M1341983-03-23023 March 1983 Independent Assessment of Auxiliary Bldg Underpinning Weekly Rept 26, for 830313-19 1986-04-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20058L8721992-12-31031 December 1992 1992 Annual Rept,Cpc ML20126D7211992-12-16016 December 1992 Potential Part 21 Rept Re Actual Performance of Rosemount Supplied Bailey Bq Differential Pressure Transmitters Differing from Rosemount Original Spec.Bailey Controls Encl.Evaluation Not Yet Performed ML20246N1221988-12-31031 December 1988 CMS Energy 1988 Annual Rept ML20154J4101988-05-12012 May 1988 Addendum 1 to Supplemental Part 21 Rept 145 Re Potential Problem w/F-573-156 Pressure Sensor/Lube Oil Trip.Initially Reported on 880429.Addl 1-1/8-inch Diameter W/Deep Counterbone in Pressure Head Added to Activate Valve ML20153B6191988-04-29029 April 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsr or Dsrv Standby Diesel Generators Supplied to Utils.Recommends Return of Subj Components in Onsite Warehouse Storage & Suggests Surveillance of Devices Already Installed ML20196J3801987-12-31031 December 1987 CMS Energy Corp 1987 Annual Rept ML20215G2441987-06-16016 June 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Load Sequencing Equipment Supplied in Aug 1977 During Scheduled Testing.Caused by Open Electrical Connection on One Crimp Lug.Since 1978,insulated Lugs Used on All Equipment ML20216E4721987-05-28028 May 1987 Part 21 Rept 140 Re Potential Defect in Air Pressure Regulators Mfg by Bellofram.Dripwell Gasket May Fail Due to Mismachining of Gasket Seating Surface Causing Loss of Control Air & Starting Air Pressure ML20207R9041986-12-31031 December 1986 CPC 1986 Annual Rept ML20214A0951986-11-14014 November 1986 Insp & Evaluation Re Adequacy of Stabilization Plan,In Response to Util 860701 Request for Withdrawal of Applications to Extend CP & Util Motions Seeking Withdrawal of OL Application ML20215G6801986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20215G5351986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20205F6141986-08-13013 August 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Connecting Rod Bolts for Dsrv Engines.Listed Procedures Recommended for Next Connecting Rod Insp, Including Replacement of Bolts Due to Cracked Threads & Large Grooves & Galls in Threads ML20206U0591986-07-0202 July 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv Standby Diesel Generators,Involving Problem W/Fastening of Engine Connecting Rod Assembly Which Could Result in Engine Nonavailability.Procedure Will Be Issued by 860718 ML20197H2581986-05-0808 May 1986 Part 21 Rept 135 Re Defect W/Lube Oil Sump Tank Foot Valve of Standby Diesel Generator.Caused by Extrusion of Liner Matl Due to Overpressurization.Corrective Actions Being Developed.List of Affected Sites Modified ML20203N4171986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 2 to Tdi Owners Group App Ii:Generic Maint Matrix & Justifications ML20205N6811986-04-14014 April 1986 Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept 86-03 Re Consolidated Pipe & Valve Supply,Inc Certified Matl Test Repts.Initially Reported on 860321.Six raised-face Orifice Flanges Statused & Segregated Per QA Procedures ML20205N7381986-04-14014 April 1986 Interim Deficiency & Part 21 Rept 86-02 1 Re Elastomer Liner in Clear Flow Co Foot Valves Used in Lube Oil Sump Tanks of Tdi Diesel Generators.Initially Reported on 860321. Action Will Not Be Pursued Unless Facility Reactivated ML20140H5991986-03-24024 March 1986 Second Interim Deficiency Rept 86-01 Re Error in Bechtel Computer Analysis Program.Initially Reported on 860121.No Corrective Actions Will Be Pursued & No Further Repts Will Be Submitted Unless Project Reactivated ML20154N3431986-03-10010 March 1986 Initial Part 21 Rept 135 Re Potential Problem W/Lube Oil Sump Tank Foot Valve of Dsrv Standby Diesel Generator for Facilities.Cause Not Determined.Recommends Utils Inspect Condition of Foot Valve Liners & Notify Tdi of Findings ML20153F5391986-02-14014 February 1986 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Error in Bechtel Computer Analysis Program ME101.Initially Reported on 860121.No Corrective Actions or Further Repts Will Be Submitted Until Project Reactivated ML20137N6101986-01-10010 January 1986 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept 85-08 Re Isolated Failures of Betts Spring Co Intake & Exhaust Valve Springs Reported by Tdi.Initially Reported on 851218.Corrective Actions Will Be Pursued If Units Reactivated ML20141N8361985-12-31031 December 1985 CPC 1985 Annual Rept ML20138M3891985-12-12012 December 1985 Topical Rept Evaluation of Rev 1 to BAW-1847, Leak Before Break Evaluation of Margins Against Full Break for Rcs.... Rept Presents Acceptable Justification to Eliminate Dynamic Effects of Large Ruptures in Piping ML20198C4981985-11-0606 November 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Dsr or Dsrv Standby Diesel Generator Intake & Exhaust Valve Springs Mfg by Betts Spring Co.Users Recommended to Inspect Engines for Broken Springs & Identify Original Mfg ML20138B9531985-10-0909 October 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Larger than Anticipated Util Movement Where Freezewall Crossed safety-related Utils at Monitoring Pits 1,2,3 & 4.Initially Reported on 850917.No Action Will Be Taken ML20138C3111985-10-0808 October 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Limitorque motor-operated Butterfly Valves Not Opening Electrically After Closed Manually.Initially Reported on 850912.No Corrective Actions Will Be Taken Unless Facility Reactivated ML20138C3251985-10-0808 October 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Loose Set Screws on Anchor Darling Swing Check Valves & Disc Nut Pin Problems Causing Inoperability.Initially Reported on 850912.No Further Corrective Action Will Be Taken Unless Facility Reactivated ML20132B0261985-09-0303 September 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility of Engine Ingestion of Unwelded Part in American Air Filter Standby Diesel Generator Intake Silencer.Immediate Hold Should Be Placed on Diesel Engines/Intake Silencers Not Yet in Svc ML20132D3191985-07-10010 July 1985 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Rupture During Testing by Wj Woolley Co of Inflatable Seal,Mfg by Presray Corp,Used in Personnel Air Locks in Reactor Containment Sys.Initially Reported on 850614 ML20129G0601985-04-26026 April 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Potential for Cracking of Check Valves in on-engine Mounted Starting Air Piping of Tdi Diesel Generators.Initially Reported on 850401.Cause Not Determined.No Corrective Actions.Related Correspondence ML20112J3951985-03-22022 March 1985 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Gulf & Western MSIV Actuator Latch Roller Bearing.Matter Will Not Be Pursued Unless Plants Reactivated ML20100B6361985-01-21021 January 1985 Rept on Welding Allegations ML20114D3571984-12-21021 December 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Soils Borings.Initially Reported on 841121.No Corrective Actions Necessary Due to Present Project Shutdown ML20100K9791984-11-27027 November 1984 Part 21 & Interim Deficiency Rept Re Ruskin Mfg Co Interlocking Blade Fire Dampers.Initially Reported on 841121.Corrective Action Will Not Be Pursued & No Further Repts Will Be Made Unless Plant Reactivated ML20100D9841984-11-21021 November 1984 Deficiency Rept Re Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Boring Logs.Util Response to Dow Chemical Co 841113 Request for Admissions Encl ML20100E4451984-11-15015 November 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Cardinal Industrial Products Corp Spare Studs Received W/O Ultrasonic Exam.Initially Reported on 841010.Corrective Actions Will Not Be Pursued Unless Midland Reactivated ML20100E2621984-11-15015 November 1984 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Rosemount 1153 Series B Transmitters Potentially Leaking.Initially Reported on 841010.Four Units Shipped to Facilities.Corrective Actions Will Not Be Pursued ML20100E2371984-11-15015 November 1984 Interim Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Tdi Fuel Control Level Cap Screws.Initially Reported on 841010.No Corrective Actions Will Be Pursued & No Further Repts on Subj Made Unless Midland Reactivated ML20099E3531984-11-0909 November 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Small Bore Piping Anchor Design. Initially Reported on 840816.Listed Corrective Actions Will Not Be Pursued & No Further Repts Will Be Made Unless Facilities Reactivated ML20093C3211984-10-0101 October 1984 Rev 0 to QA Program Plan for Shutdown Phase ML20093H3961984-08-0202 August 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Seismic Qualification of Power Supplies for Eccas & Ni/Rps Equipment.Initially Reported on 840705.No Activity Being Currently Pursued.No Further Repts Will Be Made Unless Facilities Reactivated ML20093H8521984-08-0202 August 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Field Installation of Itt Grinnell Struts & Extension Pieces.Initially Reported on 840705.No Activity Being Currently Pursued.No Further Repts Will Be Made Unless Facilities Reactivated ML20096A7781984-07-27027 July 1984 Final Deficiency Rept Re Defective Capstan Springs in Pacific Scientific Mechanical Shock Arrestors.Initially Reported on 840106.W/o Description of Investigation & Corrective Actions.Related Correspondence ML20093H8111984-07-27027 July 1984 Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Capstan Springs in Mechanical Shock Arrestors Supplied by Pacific Scientific. All Suspect Shock Arrestor Capstan Springs Will Be Inspected for Cracks & Defective Springs Replaced ML20093H8871984-07-20020 July 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Reactor Coolant Pump Seals & Seal Covers.Initially Reported on 840622.No Activity Currently Being Pursued.No Further Repts Will Be Made Unless Facilities Reactivated ML20090G2141984-07-18018 July 1984 Idcvp:Control Room HVAC Sys Performance Requirements, Draft Topical Rept ML20093H4751984-07-17017 July 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Core Flood Line Piping Supports in Reactor Pressure Vessel Connection Supplied by Bechtel. Overstressing Could Occur in Pipe Supports.No Commitment Made for Further Repts ML20096A2951984-07-11011 July 1984 Final Deficiency Rept Re Concrete Embedment Design Using Shear Lugs Located Outside Compression Zone.Initially Reported on 821203.Use of Shear Lugs Outside Compression Zone Is Proper Design Technique.Related Correspondence ML20093G7891984-07-11011 July 1984 Final Deficiency Rept Re Concrete Embedment Design Using Shear Lugs Located Outside Compression Zone.No Corrective Action Required.Not Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e) 1992-12-31
[Table view] |
Text
APPENDIX A Methane Explosion Evaluation for Overpressure and Missile Effects at 3afety-Related Structures 8211230339 821116 PDR ADOCK 05000329 A PDR
E
[
NUS-4235 MIDLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION METHANE EXPLOSION EVALUATION FOR OVERPRESSURE AND MISSILE EFFECTS AT SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES Prepared for Consumers Power Company By M. R. Fallin October 1982 Approved: bh 7 S. J. Nathan, Manager a Radiological Analysis Department Consulting Division NUS CORPORATION
[ 910 Clopper Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878
I I
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section and Title Page No.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM AND 1 APPROACH
3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF METHOD OF ANALYSIS 2 4.0 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 7
5.0 CONCLUSION
S 8
6.0 REFERENCES
8 I
I I
I I
lI
- I
,I I
!I ii NUS CORPC AATION l .
L
~
1.0 INTRODUCTION
~
The natural gas pipeline which is present in the immediate vicinity of the Midland Nuclear Power Station presents a concern in the event of its rupture. The Condensate Return Pumphouse and Mechanic Shop locations and ventilation system
[ designs are such that a buildup of the natural gas could result within these buildings if a pipeline rupture were to
~
occur. Although unconfined natural gas is not considered to be an explosive hazard, w' thin the confines of a building, an I explosive hazard may exist. An analysis was performed postu-lating that such an explosion did take place subsequent to the rupture of the natural gas pipeline and the resultant buildup of natural gas within the Pumphouse and the Mechanic Shop.
The purpose of the analysis was to confirm that there is no hazard to any of the safety-related structures due to the generation of overpressure or missiles from an explosion in I either buillding.
2.0 TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM AND APPROACH The magnitude of the postulated explosion is determined by equating the energy generated by the combustion of a given volume of gas to the mass of TNT that would release the same energy upon explosion. To do this, a volume of gas had to be determined. Since natural gas is over ninety percent methane I (Reference 1) , the gas trapped in the Condensate Return Pumphouse and the Mechanic Shop was considered to be all methane. From Reference 2, the mix concentration of methane in air that results in the highest overpressure if it is exploded, is the stoichiometric mixture of 9.5 percent by volume. Knowing the volume of the two structures, the gas 1
NLJS CORPOAATION
l I volume is easily obtained. Because the volume of the Mechanic Shop is greater than the volume of the Condensate Return Pumphouse (67,000 cubic feet vs. 30,000 cubic feet, as l
indicated on Reference 3), a postulated Mechanic Shop i
explosion was evaluated since it would produce the larger l
explosion of the two buildings. With the gas volume determined, the equivalent TNT mass and the resultant overpressure from the explosion of that volume at any given distance from the explosion center can also be determined.
The missile hazards evaluation was performed utilizing the same missilte used in the Midland FSAR (Reference 2) for the tornado missile analysis. These missiles are a 12 f t x 12 in x 4 in wooden plank, a 1 inch diameter steel rod, three feet in length, a 4000 lb automobile and a 13.5 inch diameter utility pole, thirty-five feet in length. Knowing the explosive yield and the aerodynamic characteristics of the missiles, the dynamic impulse imparted to the missile by the kinetic energy of the exploded gas and accelerated air is used to determine the initial missile velocity. The trajectory of the missiles is then determined.
3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF METHOD OF ANALYSIS As described in the previous section, the first step was to equate the energy released by the combustion of the methane to an eq9ivalent mass of TNT. This was accomplished using the following equation.
I 1= m...ae o.e),A /500Kca1,1e-1NTm I
I 2
NUS COAPO AATION
I I
where Wf = equivalent mass of TNT (lbm)
Q = maximum quantity of vapor (ft )
- = density of gas (g/ft ) - taken from Reference 1 I AH A = molecular weight (g/ mole) c = heat of combustion (Kcal/ mole) -
taken from Reference 5 E = yield of explosion (assumed to be 20% on an energy basis - maximum expected TNT equivalency for gas in symmetrical geometry from Reference 6)
Once the equivalent TNT mass has been determined, the para-meter 2, called the scaled distance, is calculated by the I equation:
Z =R!A i where Z = scaled distance (ft/lb, )
R A = distance between point of detonation and the location I of interest (ft)
W1 = equivalent mass of TNT (lbm}
In this case, the value of Rg is the distance from the Mechanic Shop to the closest safety-related structure which is
' the closer of the two Borated Water Storage Tanks to the Mechanic Shop. From Reference 3, this distance is about 575 I feet.
In determining the peak incident and peak reflected over-pressures at the Borated Water Storage Tank, a hemispherical I
I 3 I "'" " " " ^ * "
1 explosion propagation was assumed, as opposed to a spherical propagation, since higher overpressures were realized with the hemispherical propagation assumption. For hemispherical explosion propagation and for the calculated scaled distance, Z, the peak incident and reflected overpressures are read from Figure 4-12 of Reference 7. Due to the distance of the I Borated Water Storage Tank from the explosion center, the peak incident overpressure is less than 1.0 psig and is, therefore, off the scale of Figure 4-12. The peak incident overpressure can be determined, however, by solving the following equation taken from paragraph 3.50 of Reference 8.
p = 2p (7Pg +4p)/ (7Pg +p) r where I p = peak reflected overpressure, (psig) r p = peak incident overpressure, (psig)
P g
= atmospheric pressure, (14.7 psia)
I For the missile hazards analysis, spherical explosion propa-gation is conservatively assumed. The building (Mechanic I Shop) is assumed to be a sphere of radius 25.20 feet which is equivalent to the given volume of 67,000 f t . A hemispherical explosion propagation assumption at the same radius would produce greater initial velocities; however, a hemisphere of 3
the equivalent 67,000 ft volume would have a radius of 31.74 l
feet. Since the missiles are assumed to be generated from the surface of the equivalent sphere or hemisphere, assuming a hemispherical explosion propagation with a radius of 31.74 feet results in less conservative initial missile velocities than the spherical propagation case. Also, the dynamic impulse calculation is for a spherical charge configuration.
4 NUS COAPORATION I
l
I explosion propagation was assumed, as opposed to a spherical propagation, since higher overpressures were realized with the hemispherical propagation assumption. For hemispherical explosion propagation and for the calculated scaled distance, Z, the peak incident and reflected overpressures are read from j
Figure 4-12 of Reference 7. Due to the distance of the Borated Water Storage Tank from the explosion center, the peak incident overpressure is less than 1.0 psig and is, therefore, off the scale of Figure 4-12. The peak incident overpressure can be determined, however, by solving the following equation taken from paragraph 3.50 of Reference 8.
1 p = 2p (7Pg +4p)/ (7Pg +p) r where p = peak reflected overpressure, (psig) r p = peak incident overpressure, (psig)
Pg = atmospheric pressure, (14.7 psia)
For the missile hazards analysis, spherical explosion propa-gation is conservatively assumed. The building (Mechanic I Shop) is assumed to be a sphere of radius 25.20 feet which is 3
A hemispherical equivalent to the given volume of 67,000 ft .
explosion propagation assumption at the same radius would produce greater initial velocities; however, a hemisphere of 3
the equivalent 67,000 ft volume would have a radius of 31.74 feet. Since the missiles are assumed to be generated from the surface of the equivalent sphere or hemisphere, assuming a hemispherical explosion propagation with a radius of 31.74 feet results in less conservative initial missile velocities than the spherical propagation case. Also, the dynamic impulse calculation is for a spherical charge configuration.
I 4
p __
I I The missile hazards evaluation begins with the determination of the positive dynamic impulse created at the boundary of the equivalent sphere from the postulated explosion. From Reference 9, the following equation is taken.
2 (n. # /2) dr l
I I+"
=J where l
n = reduced density = p/ a g, (dimensionless)
$ = reduced velocity = V/Cg, (dimensionles s)
= reduced time = Cg t/a , (dimensionless) a= reduced yield = (E g
/P ) ! , (ft) g Eg = energy yield of explosion, (ft-lb g)
Pg = atmospheric pressure, (14.7 psi)
I pg C
=
=
atmospheric density, (1.293 Kg/m )
sonic velocity, (1086 ft/sec) 3 o
I+ = dimensionless impulse parameter which is a function of the parameter A A = reduced radius = R/a , (dimensionless)
R= radius of the sphere Substituting the above expressions into the equation you get the following relationship.
Cg. a (p.V2 /2)dt = I D I[ og =
The above integral is k-own as the positive dynamic impulse, I D, and is the impulse imparted to a missile by the kinetic energy of the exploded gas and accelerated air. The dimen-sionless impulse parameter, I+, is taken from Figure 26 of u
Reference 9.
I I 5 NLS COAPOAATION
I once the positive dynamic impulse is calculated, the initial velocity of the missile can be calculated from the following equation taken from Reference 10.
Vg /9 g = l-e-R, where R = (gc ' ID)/IO* g) and V g= initial missile velocity, (ft/sec) 7 = gas particle velocity (taken from Figure 4-5 of g
Reference 6), (ft/sec) 2 g
c = gravitational constant, (32.17 lb,-ft/lb -sec g )
I D
= positive dynamic impulse, (1bg -sec/ft2)
- = ballistic coef ficient = m/ (CD ' AI ' (lb ,/ft2) m = missile mass, (lb ,)
I C D
= missile drag coefficient, (dimensionless)
A = missile presented cross-sectional area, (ft )
I This expression gives the initial velocity generated as an integral over the total duration of the gas and air movement past the missile. Making the appropriate substitutions, the equation now becomes the following.
V g=9 g 1-exp - (g ' I
The missile presented cross-sectional areas, A, and the missile drag coefficients,- C D, are selected such that the greatest cross-sectional areas and, therefore, the greatest drag coefficients are utilized for the calculation. This results in the greatest possible initial velocity.
Having established the initial velocity for each of the missiles, the NUS computec code NUSTRAJ is used to determine I
I 6 NUS COAPOAATION
I .
I the maximum distances that the missiles will travel. For the purposes of this portion of the analysis, the missiles are assumed to reorient themselves to the lowest cross-sectional I area and drag coefficient during flight in order to attain It is also assumed their maximum possible flight distance.
that the dynamic impulse serves only to induce an initial velocity and does not cause any of the missiles to break up; i.e., they survive the explosion intact.
4.0 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS -
The peak reflected overpressure at the closer of the two Borated Water Storage Tanks to the Mechanic Shop is 1.3 psig. -
The peak incident overpressure at the same storage tank is 0.64 psig.
The maximum velocities attained by t.he missiles as a result of the explosion are as follows:
o 12 ft wooden plank - 92.84 ft/sec o 3 ft steel rod - 15.57 ft/sec o 4000 lb automobile - 12.77 ft/sec o 35 ft utility pole - 13.17 ft/sec I The maximum distances traveled by the missiles from the Mechanic Shop are as follows:
o 12 ft wooden plank - 254 ft o 3 ft steel rod - 7.5 ft o 4000 lb automobile - 5.1 ft o 35 ft utility pole - 5.4 ft I
I 7 NUS CO APOAATION t
I I
5.0 CONCLUSION
S Based on the results of the analysis, it is concluded that there is no hazard p resented to any of the safety-related structures by an explcsion in either the Condensate Pumphouse or the Mechanic Shop based on the following points:
o The 0.64 psig peak incident and 1.3 psig peak reflected overpressures, which were calculated to occur at the closest safety-related structure to the Mechanic Shop after the postulated explosion, are below the peak incident and peak reflected over-I pressure criteria found in NRC Regulatory Guides 1.91 and 1.76, respectively. The explosion would, therefore, cause no darage to any of the safety-related structures.
o The closest safety-related structure to the Mechanic Shop is about 575 feet away and the maximum distance traveled by any missile is 254 feet; there-fore, there would be no missile hazard to any of the safety-related structures. -
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Lab Report from E. L. Rice to R. T. Sarrine, " Natural Gas Analysis Report", August 27, 1982.
- 2. Nagy, John, Earl C. Seiler, John W. Conn, Harry C.
Verakis, " Explosion Development in Vessels ," Keport of Investigations 7507, U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1969.
I I 8 NUS CO APOAATION
I 3.
I Marked-up, to-scale, unnumbered entitled " Trailer Layout", provided by client.
Midland blueprint, Last updated 12/16/81.
- 4. Midland 1 & 2 FSAR, Volume 10, Section 3.5.
I 5. Matheson Unabridged Gas Data Book - Methane, Matheson Gas Products, 1974.
- 6. Eichler, T. V. and H. S. Napadensky, H.S., " Accidental Vapor Phase Explosions on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants," Final Report J6405, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, Illinois, April 1977.
- 7. " Structures to Resist the Effects of Accident Explosions", TMS-1300/NAVFAC P-397/AFM 88-22, Departments I of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, June 1969.
- 8. Glasstone, S., Ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, United States Atomic Energy Commission, February 1964.
- 9. Brode, H. L., "A Calculation of the Blast Wave from a Spherical Charge of TNT", P-975 (AD605113), The Rand I Corporation, May 1958.
- 10. TRW Systems Group, Transit RTG Final Safety Analysis Report, Volume II, " Accident Model Documentation",
TRW ( A) -114 64 -0 4 9 2, 1971.
I I
9 NUS COAPORATION
'+.y -vam,' ev er %r e
l 4
~ ~
~
x
,C P-1 z w.e--- . %1n w i.f , , . . n #,
v ?, 2 '._[ f ['*' Y / A j - l a -g{
_z_.__
g; . _ ._. _. _ _ _
t L
}
. 4 4
'I I , ,P t,
i I , s
- - m ,. , _ . .. _ ._ _ _. 2
.I
, ud I
s s
'.s _
i e
I I. hA Halliburton Company