ML20066E924

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Resident Insp Repts 50-317/90-29 & 50-318/90-29.Corrective Actions: Nuclear Security Force Member Posted at Affected Turnstile to Verifiy That Personnel Possess Protected Area Badge
ML20066E924
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  
Issue date: 01/18/1991
From: Schwartz G
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9101220398
Download: ML20066E924 (4)


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DALTIMORE CAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER. P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE MARYLAND 21?O3 January 18,1991 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 7

ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk

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SUltJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant E

Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. D317 & $0-318 Reply to Notice of Violation NRC Resident inspection Report Nos. 50 317/90 29 and 50-318S0-29 (October 21,1990, to November 24,1990) p REI'ERENCES:

(a) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l_

Letter from Jtmes C. Linville to George C. Creel Dated: December 18,1990, Gentlemen:

_ Reference (a) forwarded Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region i Notice of Violation based on NRC Resident Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/90 29 and 50-318/%29, dated December 18,1990.The violation involved an individual being permitted access to the Protected Area, by a Nuclear Security Force hiember, through the Security Processing Building without being issued a Protected Area Badge.

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's (BG&E's) response to the Notice of Violation is provided in an enclosure to this letter.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be p' eased to discuss them with you.

m-VeryTruly Yours, D

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r G. Dowell Schwartz, Jr.

Vice President GeneralServices Disision

Enclosures:

(1) Response to Notice of Violation (NRC Resident inspection Report Nos.50-317S0-29 and 50 318fD29) cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire

[ JG h R. A. Capra, NRC IO D. G. htcDonald, J r., NRC

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R. P lleibelfl'. N. Pritchett C, P. Johnson C. C. Lawrence, Ill/A, R. Thornton W. A.Thornton/E, I. Baurercis/M C. Ga>Tilas R. B. Pond, Jr/S. R. Buxbaum, Jr.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Response to Notice of Violation NRC Resident Inspection Report Nos,50 317/90 29 and 50 318/90 29 1.

Description and Cause of the Event

- At 4:10 p.m., October 22,1990, a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission inspector, et.tered the Protected Area at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant without a Protected Area badge.

Shortly before the event, the inspector completed processing in the Security Screenir.g Unit for unescorted access to the Protected Area.

The laspector entered the Security Processing Building and, being unfamiliar with entrance procedures since he was a newinspector and new to the site, did not stop at the badgiag counter, but proceeded directly to the search equipment and was processed. The turnstiler., which are normally activated by a card key, were malfunctioning and in a " free wheeling" mode at the time. Observing other personnel hold identification to the Secondary Alarm Sta-tion window, the lnspector displayed either his NRC credentiais or Site ldentification Badge to the Nuclear Security Systems Operator, who was controlling final access. The operator allowed the Inspector to enter the Protected Area.

Upon arrival at the NRC offices, another NRC Inspector noticed that the Inspector was not displaying a Protected Area badge. When it was verified the Inspector had not obtained his Protected Area badge, Security was notified. At 4:15 p.nt a Senior Nuclear Security Officer escorted the Inspector out of the Protected Area.The Inspector then obtained his Protected Area badge and reentered the Protected Area, The causes of the event were: personnel error on the part of the Nuclear Security Systems Operator, who mis-took the displayed identification for a Protected Area badge; and, inadequate site specific orientation of the NRC Inspector. A contributing factor was the malfunctioning turnstiles which, because normally card key activation is required to gain access, would have prevented the event.

II, Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved The turnstiles were repaired on October 23,1990, and placed back in service.

The Nuclear Security Systems Operator received immediate remedial training from the Security Training and

- Education Unit. Appropriate administrative action has been taken against the Nuclear SecuritySystems Operator.

Security Management met with all Security shifts to discuss the event, including preventive and compensatory measures to be taken to avoid recurrence.

III. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations The Security Training and Education Unit is developing a speciallesson plan concerning this and other recent events. The training will be given in Nuclear Security Training's initial and requalification training programs for all Nuclear Security Personnel. Initial and requalification training programs will be completed by July 1,1991.

Compensatory measures for malfunctioning turnstiles now include postir g a Nuclear Security Force Member at the affected turnstile to verify that personnel possess a Protected Area Badge prior to access.

Site Specific Training, a special program for Nuclear Regulatory Commission personnel, will be revised to in4 clude more detailin the Protected Area entry process. In addition, more emphasis will be placed on the Protected Area entry process security requirements during initial and requalification General Orientation Training (GOT) for plant personnel with, or pending, anescorted access.

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4 ENCLOSURE (1)

(Continued)

Response to Notice of Violation NRC Resident Inspec:lon Report Nos.50 317/90 29 and 50 318/90 29 IV.

Date When Full Compliance Will He Achieved The 11altimore Gas and Electric Company has been in full compliance with its Security plans and procedures since 4:15 p.m. on October 22,1990, the date of the event.

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