Text

Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1982
	ML20066D283
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	10/08/1982
From:	Caba E; TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20066D236	List: ML20066D234; ML20066D283;
References
	NUDOCS 8211110264
	Download: ML20066D283 (8)
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AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL .

DOCKET NO. 50-346 Davis-Besse Unit 1 WIT DATE October 8, 1982 COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000. Ext.

196 MONTH September, 1982 ,

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net) (Mwe. Net) 1 0 663-37 0

2 18 665 3 8 665 -

9 ,

4 165 701 20 5

261 779 21 6 270 784 22 7

306 784

- 23 8 305 -

24 776 9 297 778

25 10 282 776 26 11 307 27 541 12 308 598 28 13 304 765 29 14 308 767 30 15 473 ---

33 16 665 ,

INSTRUCTIONS On this format. list the average daily unit power levelin MWe Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77 )

8211110264 821008 PDR ADOCK 05000346 R PDR

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OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. 50-346 _

DATE Uctober 6, 1982 COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, OPERATING STATUS Ext. 196

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1 Notes

2. Re' porting Period: soneomker. 1982 .

3. Licensed Thermal Pr,wer (MWt): 2772 ,

4. Namep!ste Rating (Gross PlWe): 925

5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

9. Power Level To Which Restricted,If Any (Net MWe):

10. Reasons For Restrictions,If Any: .

This Month Yr to-Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 720 6.551 *36,552

13. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical 720 2,485.9 18,715.9

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 3,334.7

14. Hours Generator On-Line 659.2 2,366.6 17.616.8

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours _ _ _ .

1.1 1.1 1,732.5

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 1 122,547 4,763,625 39,885,150 .

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) ' _1_J91 1,574,085 13,256,336

18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) __

,1,267 1,465,360 12,362,645

19. Unit Service Factor 91.6 36.1 48.2

20. Unit Availability Factor . . . . .

91.7 16.1 52.9

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) _. 54.2 25.6 38.7

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 52.3 24.7 37.3

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate _ _ _ 0 0 22.4

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Ne.st 6 Months (Typ ht< . ad Duration of Eacht:

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period.Estir,r d D.u a artup:

26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achiesed INITIA L CRITICA LITY _.

INITIAL ELECTRICITY _ _ _

COMMERCIAL OPERATION ___

(9/77 )

t DOCKET NO. 50-346 UNITS!!UTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1 DATE Octnher R. 10R2

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COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba REPORT MON 111 September, 1982 (419) 259-2374 TELEPIIONE

-, ,{g 'h .E Licensee Eg h. Cause & Corrective

, No. Date g Eg .5 2s& Event p mu 9 Action to F-35 & j ij:, g Report a j] Prevent Recurrence-6 4 82 03 13 S 59.7 C 4 NA NA NA Unit outage which began on March 13, 1982 was completed on September 3 1982 when the unit was placed on line.

5 82 09 03 S 1.1 B NA ~ NA NA NA Turbine overspeed trip test. ,

i 6 82 09 27 F 0.0 A 5 NA RB CRDRVE Control Rod Group _7. started.insertinn

_for no apparent reason. The rod mo-

. tion was found to be due to an in-ternal failure in the command module in the Control Rod Drive System.

, See Operational Summary for further details.

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I 3- 4 F: Forced Reason: Method: Exhibit'C Instructions S: Schedu!cd A Equipment Failure (Er. plain) 1-Manual for Preparation of Data B. Maintenance of Test 2-Manual Scram. Entry Sheets for Licensee C. Refueling

.__ J. Automatic Scram. _ ___ Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-D. Regulatory Restriction , 4-Continuation from Previ- 0161)

E. Operator Training & License Examination .-ous Month F Administrative 3

, 5-Load Reduction Exhibit I Same Source

. G-Operational Estor (Explain) 9-Other (Explain)

(9/77) Il-Other (lixplain) .

OPERATIONAL

SUMMARY

SEPTEMBER, 1982 Zero Power Physics Testing began at 0317 hours0.00367 days 0.0881 hours 5.241402e-4 weeks 1.206185e-4 months on August 29, 1982, and the reac-tor was deborated to criticality at 1405 hours0.0163 days 0.39 hours 0.00232 weeks 5.346025e-4 months on August 29, 1982. Physics test-ing was completed at 1650 hours0.0191 days 0.458 hours 0.00273 weeks 6.27825e-4 months on September 2, 1982.

9/3/82 At 1144 hours0.0132 days 0.318 hours 0.00189 weeks 4.35292e-4 months on September 3, 1982, the turbine generator was syn-chronized. The turbine overspeed trip test was successfully per-formed, and the turbine generator was brought on line at 1858 hours0.0215 days 0.516 hours 0.00307 weeks 7.06969e-4 months on September 3, 1982.

9/4/82 - Reactor power was slowly increased to 40 percent of full power which 9/14/82 was attained on September 4, 1982. Physics testing at the 40 per-cent power level was completed at 2030. hours on September 14, 1982.

9/14/82 - Power escalation continued until 2300 hours0.0266 days 0.639 hours 0.0038 weeks 8.7515e-4 months on Stotember 15, 1982, 9/18/82 when 75 percent of full rower was attained. The reactor power level was maintained at 75 percent until the completion of physics testing which occurred at 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months on September 18, 1982.

9/20/82 - At 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months on September 20, 1982, reactor power was increased at 9/27/82 a steady rate to 86% which was reached at 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months on September 21, 1982. Reactor power was maintained at approximately 86 percent until 1440 hours0.0167 days 0.4 hours 0.00238 weeks 5.4792e-4 months on September 27, 1982 when the plant experienced a power transient (and dropped to approximately 20 percent of full power) due to a failure of a module in the Control Rod Drive System. The transient was terminated when an I&C Technician. removed the failed module, and the plant was restored to normal operation after the failed module card was replaced.

9/27/82 - Reactor power was increased steadily to approximately 86 percent and 9/30/82 remained at that level for the remainder of the month.

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REFUELING INFORMATION September, 1982 D$TE:

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: September 3. 1983

3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: October 29. 1983 4.

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Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specifi-cation will change these be? or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general, If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configura-tion been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

The reload report for cycle 3 was approved by the NRC on July 28, 1982.

5.

Scheduled See mation. date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting infor-response to No. 4 above 6.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplice, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

i Nnno identified to date l

t 7.

The pool.number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage (u) 177 (b) 92 - Spent Fuel Assemblies 8.

The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any in-crease in number of licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in fuel assemblies.

Present 735 Increase size by 0 (zero)

9. Thu pro.)ected datu of thu last fuel pool assisming the present licensedrefueling that can be discharged to the spent enpacity.

Date: Spring'92dassuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

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. COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS FCR NO: 80-244 SYSTEM: Contrcl Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HV&AC) l COMPONENT: N/A CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR)80-244 was imple-mented to separate the air header for the normal ventilation isolation valves as outlined in BT-11076. Installation of additional solenoid valves was l sdggested in order to allow air to bleed faster. Also, removal of restrictive orifice valves at pneumatic actuators was presented with connectors and nipples replacing them.

4 REASON FOR CHANGE: kesponse times for the Control Room ventilation system isola-tion valves is not within time limits as required by Technical Specifications, i

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-244 provides for the addition of solenoid valves to the air lines in the Control Room normal ventilation system. The valves are being added to allow for faster bleed-off time which in turn decreases their-response time. The installation will.be done similar to that of the existing system which includes Class lE electrical equipment and seismic Class 1 installa-tion. The testing accomplished under FCR 80-244 has demonstrated that the res-l ponse time required for these valves will be met. This change does not constitute l an unreviewed safety question. -

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FCR NO: 80-225 SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water and Service Water COMPONENT: SW 1395 and SW 1399 interlocks CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: The proposed change is represented by the deletion of the auto closure for SW 1395 and SW 1399 from Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump motor breakers. '

REASON FOR CHANGE: This Facility Change Request calls for deleting the auto closure of valves SW 1399 and SW 1395 from CCW pump motor breakers. In the present system, if CCW pump 1 (3) was running, valve SW 1395 will automatically go closed. Similarly if CCW pump 2-(3).was running, valve SW 1395 will automa- _

tically go closed. These valves govern the_ flow of_ Service Water (SW) to,the _

Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) system. Thus when both trains of CCW system are in operation, SW to TPCW is isolated.- During normal operation, only one CCW pump functions; however, another CCW pump'must often be placed in service for CCW, Decay Heat, High Pressure Injection, Diesel Generators and Makeup Pump testing. When the second CCW pump is placed in service (especially in warm weather or at times when circulating water temperature is high), the circulating water cannot adequately cool the TPCW system. This may cause upsets in generator hydrogen, turbine oil temperature and varicus other areas. Furthertore, when the loop 2 of the Circulating Water System is out of operation, no method of cooling TPCW system exists except for the SW system. Also, during startup or shutdown of the plant, one CCW pump supplies the decay heat cooler, while the other pump supplies nonessential equipment such as reactor coolant pumps. This Facility Change Request allows the usage of SW to supply the TPCW system under the aforesaid conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION The subject valves are automatically closed by Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS)' Incident Level 2 and on low pressure for SW pump headers. Pressure switches isolate the valves when SW header pressure is below 50 psig, providing .

pump runout protection for SW p' umps. Thus, with the CCW pump ~ interlock to these valves eliminated, the SW pumps are still adequately protected against runout.

i By removal of CCW pump interlock, valves SW 1395 and SW 1399 can be opened when l two CCW pumps are in operation (assuming no.SFAS actuation and normal SW header i

pressure). This Facility Change Request also provides for administrative control

! to prevent opening SW 1399 and SW 1395 to preserve system redundancy and channel l separation of the SW system. The SW system also supplies water to the Contain-I ment Air Coolers, CCW heat exchangers and Control Room emergency condensing units.

Since these valves are isolated on SFAS Incident Level 2, adequate capacity will

! still be available during a loss of coolant accident.

Pursuant to the above, the changes provided by this Facility Change Request do j not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS FCR NO: 79-093 SYSTEM: Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HV&AC)

COMPONENT: SI9-1,2 CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR)79-093 was implemented to' change the location of the Control Room humidifers.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Air coming out of the humidifers was condensing upon contact with the main stream of air. This was causing moisture to form on the side of the ductwork, which then ran into the Control Room isolation dampers HV5301A,B and HV5311A,B. As a result, the paint on the dampers blistered allowing rust to form, thereby preventing the dampers from seating properly in a closed position.

These dampers are a part of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System which must be operable in Modes 1-4 according to Technical Specifications. This event was reported in License Event Report NP-33-79-62.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification relocates the Control Room HV&AC humidifiers inlet connections on the main duct to a point downstream of the isolation dampers.l Tying of the supply and exhaust ductwork (non-Q) to.the "Q" portion of the Control Room normal ventilation system ductwork will not have any adverse impact. An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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ML20066D283

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