ML20065C324
| ML20065C324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1982 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Arkansas Power & Light Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065C327 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-51-A-067 NUDOCS 8209230334 | |
| Download: ML20065C324 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- . [g.,neg'o, UNITED ETATES y*, 'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION S.. W .E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20E55 WR i f ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET.NO. 50-313 ARKANSAS NUCLE R ONE - UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 67 License No. DPR-51 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Arkansas Power and Light Company (the li'censee) dated April 29, 1982, as supplemented May 10, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in confomity with the application. l the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of 1 the Comissi,on; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without enda.ngering the health and safety of the public, and (11) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon i defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CPR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements-have been satisfied. 8209230334 820830 PDR ADOCK 05000313 P pyg
2-2. Accordirgly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license ~ amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DpR-51 is hereby amended to read as follows: Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices i A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 67, are i hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the' Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION of JohR F.-Stolz, Chief / OpfratingReactorsBranch#4 tvision of Licensing -
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications l Date of Issuance: Augus t 30, 1982 i 1
- 49. eum 4
S m-
ATTACHMENT TO LICE'iSE AMENDMENT NO. 67 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 51 00"CKET tiO. 50-313 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. 9 9b 11 12 13 14 14a 14b i 15 l l ..--o, p__ y-w
Usang a local qualaty limit of 22 percent at the poant of minimum DNBR as a basas for curve 3 of Figure 2.1 3 is a consefvat ive ers terion even though the quality at the exit is higher than the quality at the point of minimum OhBR. The DNBr. as calculated by the BAW-2 cora elation continually increases f rom point of minimus. 340R, so that the exit DNBR is always h2gher and is a function of the pressure. The magnitude of the rod bow penalty applied to each fuel cycle is equal to or greater than the necessary burnup-dependent DNBR rod bow penalty for the applicable cycle minus a credit of 1% for the flow area reduction f actor used in the hot channel analycis. All plant operating limits are presently based on an original me4 hod (3) of calculating rod bowing penalties that are more conservat'ive than those that would be obtained with new approved procedures (4). For the current cycle of operation, this sub-rogation results in a DNBR margin in excess of 3.8%, which is partially used to of fset the reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing. The maximum thermal power for three pump operation is 88.92 percent due' to a power level trip produced by the flux-flow ratio (74.7 percent flow x 1.054 = 78.73 percent power) plus the maximum calibration and instrumentation error. The maximum thermal power for other reactor coolant pump conditions is produced in a similar manner. For each curve of Figure 2.1-3, a pres sure-temp,erature point above and to the left of the curve would result in a ONBR greater than 1.3 or a local quality at the point of minimum DNBR less than 22 percent for that particular reactor cool ant pump situation. Curves 1 & 2 of Figure 2.1-3 are the most restrictive because any pressure / temperature point above and to the left of this curve will be above and to the left of the other curve. RIFE RENCES (1) Correlation of Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurated Water, 8AW-10000A, May, 1976. (2) FS AR, Sect s on 3. 2. 3.1.1.c (3) D. F. Ross and D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) memorandum to D. B. Vassallo and K. R. Goller (NRC) on " Interim Safety Evaluation Report on the Effects of Fuel Rod Bowing on Thermal Margin Calculations for Light Water Reactors" dated December 8,1976. (4) L. S. Rubenstein (NRC) letter to J. H. Taylor (B&W) on " Evaluation of Interim Procedure for Calculating DNBR Reduction Due to Rod Bow" dated October 18, 1979. I i i Amendment No.JM)r,g AZ,67 9
UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION -- 120 ~ (-26.88,112) (22.4,112) ~' ~ ACCEPTABLE 1 4 PUMP ( 45,100) OPERATION - -- 100 (38,100) (-26.88.88.92) (22.4,88.92) -- 90 88.92 2 ACCEPTABLE ' -- 80 UP -45,76.92) (38,76.92) OPERAT D -- 70 ( 26.88,62.22) (22.4,62.22) 62.22 - 60 3 (-45,50.22) / ACCEPTABLE -- 50 (38,50.22) 2,3 & 4 PUMP OPERATION -- 40 -- 30 -- 20 -- 10 i 1 I I T f 1 I I -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 l Reactor Power imoalance, 5 l CURVE REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (GPM) 1 374,880 2 280,035 3 184,441 CORE PROTECTION SAFETY LIMITS Fi gu re 2.1-2 - 9b - \\ Amendment No. E, 27, 37, J7, 32, 67
2.3 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS, PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION Apolicability Applies to instruments monitoring reactor power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, rector coolant outlet temperature, flow, number of pumps in operation, and high reactor building pressure. Objective To provide automatic protection action to prevent any combination of process variables from exceeding a safety limit. Specification 2.3.1 The reactor protection system trip setting limits and the permissible bypasses for the instrument channels shall be as stated in Table 2.3-1 and Figure 2.3-2. Bases The reactor protection system consists of four instrument channels to monitor each of several selected plant conditions which will cause a reactor trip if any one of these conditions deviates from a preselected operating range to the degree that a safet9 limit may be reached. The trip setting limits for protection system instrumentation are listed in Table 2.3-1. The safety analysis has been based on these protection system instrumentation trip setpoints plus calibration and instrumentation errors. Nuclear Overpower A reactor trip at high power level (neutron flux) is provided to prevent damage to the fuel cladding from reactivity excursions too rapid to be detected by pressure and temperature measurements. During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 104.9 percent of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip setpoints due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 112%, which is the value used in the safety analysis. A. Overpower Trip Based on Flow and Imbalance The power level trip setpoint produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant-flow accident from high power. Analysis has demonstrated that the specified power-to-flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a icw flow condition exist due to any electrical malfunction. 11 Amendment No. U, 4, 67
The power level trip setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1 are as follows:
- 1. ' Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 105.4 percent and reactor flow rate 100 percent or flow rate is 94.88 percent and power level is 100 percent.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 78.73 percent and reactor flow rate is 74.7 percent or flow rate is 71.16 percent and power level is 75 percent. I 3. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 51.85 percent and reactor flow rate is 49.2 percent or flow rate is 46.49 percent and the powar level is 49.0 percent. The flux / flow ratios account for the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors and the maximu:a variation from the average value of the RC flow signal in such a manner that the reactor protective system receives a conservative indication of the RC flow. No penalty in reactor coolant flow through the core was taken for an open core vent valve because of the core vent valve surveillance program during each refueling outage. For safety analysis calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level were used. The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent I reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are i either power peaking kW/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in top half of core minus power in bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio so that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip associated with reactor power-to-reactor power imbalance boundaries by 1.054 percent for a 1 percent flow reduction. B. Pump Monitors In conjunction with the power imbalance / flow trip, the pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNBR from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant Amendment No. 27, 37. D. 52.67
pump (s). The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation., C. RCS Pressurn During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure trip setpoint is reached before the nucleaf overpower trip setpoint. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1 for high RCS pressure (2300 psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any designtransient.(q) The low pressure (l'800 psig) and variable low pressure (11.75 T - 5103) trip setpoints shown in Figure 2.3-1 have beenest3NishedtomaintaintheDNBratiogreaterthanor equal to 1.3 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction.(2,3) Due to the calibration and' instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip value of (11.75 T - 5143). out D. Coolant Outlet Temperature Thehighreactorcoolantoutlettemperaturetripsettinglimitl (618F) shown in Figure 2.3-1 has been established to prevent excessive core coolant temperatures in the operating range. Due to calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a trip setpoint of 620F. E. Reactor Buildins Pressure The high reactor building pressure trip setting limit (4 psig) provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of a steam line failure in the reactor building or a loss-of-coolant accident, even in the absence of a low reactor coolant system pressure trip. F. Shutdown Bypass In order to provide for control rod drive tests, zero power physics testing, and startup procedures, there is provision for bypassing certain segments of the reactor protection system. The reactor protection system segments that can be bypassed are shown in Table 2.3-1. Two conditions are imposed when the bypass is used: 1. A nuclear overpowrtrip setpoint of 55.0 percent of rated power is automatically imposed during reactor shutdown. 2. A high reactor coolant system pressure trip setpoint of 1720 psig is automatically imposed. l 13 Amendment No. 2, U, Q, 67
The purpose of the 1720 psig high pressure trip setpoint is to prevent normal operation with part of the reactor protection system bypassed. This high pressure trip setpoint is lower than the normal low pressure trip setpoint so that the reactor must be tripped before the bypass is initiated. The overpower trip setpoint of 55.0 prevents any significant reactor power from being produced when performing the physics tests. Sufficient natural circulation (5) would be available to remove 5.0 percent of rated power if none of the reactor coolant pumps were operating. References (1) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.3 (2) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.2 (3) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.7 (4) FSAR, Section 11.1.2.8 (5) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.6 1 l l l Amendmant No. 67 14
a 2500 P = 2300 PSIG ~ T = 618*F 2300 ? 5 ACCEPTABLE E OPERATION i l 2100 i a- ~, P = (11. 75 Tout 5103)PSIG Ef 1900 i a j g UNACCEPTABLE l g OPERATION t l P = 1800 PSIG 1700 1500 560 580 600 620 640 660 Reactor Outlet Temperature, *F 1 PROTECTIVE SYSTEM MAXIMUM l ALLOWABLE SETPOINT Figure 2 3-1 1 - 14a - Amendment No. U, 49, 57
THERMAL POWER LEVEL, 5 UNACCEPTABLE . 120 OPERATION 61.1 5.4) (8.105.4) M; = 0.7833 105.4 100 ACCEPTABLE (-30,91.3) 4 PUv" .. 90 (24.91.1) OPERATION (-1278.73) - 80 8,78.73) 78.73 _ 70 ACCEPTABLE (-30,64.63) 3 & 4 PUMP (24,64.43) OPERATION 60 ( 12.51.85) (8,51.85) 51.85 -- 50 ACCEPTABLE (-30,37.75) 2,3 & 4 40 - (24 37 55) l PUMP OPERATION -- 30 l - - 20 Z R O = -- 10 n u u n m E, ~ ,= i i e 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Power imoalance, 5 PROTECTIVE SYSTEM MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SETPOINTS Figure 2.3-2 - 14b - Amendment No. 5, 27, 77, #3, E2, 67
Table 2.3-1 Reactor Pratecticn System Trip Setting Liidits Four RC Pumps Three RC Pumps On2 RC Pump Op2 rating Operating (Nominal Operating (Nominal in each loop (Nominal k Operating Power Operating Power Operating Power Shutdown 100%) 75%) 49%) _8ypgss .l k Nuclear power, % of 104.9 104.9 104.9 5.0" 3 rated, max 5 Nuclear power based 1.054 times flow minus 1.054 times flow minus 1.05a times flow minus Bypassed b on flow and imbal-reduction due to imbal-reduction due to imbal-reduction due to imbal-P ance, % of rated, ance(s). ance(s). ance(s). m max. Bypassed Nuclear power based NA NA 55 onpumpmonitprs,% of rated; max a liigh RC system 2300 2300 2300 1720 v, P pressure, psig, max. Bypassed Low RC system 1800 1800 1800 pressure, psig, min. d d d M Variable low RC 11.75 T -5103 11.75 T -5103 11.75 T -5103 Bypassed out out out system pressure, psig, min. RC temp, F, max 618 618 618 '618 liigh reactor bldg. 4(18.7 psia) 4(18.7 psia) 4(18.7 psia) 4(18.7 psia) pressure, psig, max. aAutomatically set when other segments of the RPS (as specified) are bypassed. bReactor coolant system flow. cThe pump monitors also produce a trip on (a) loss of two RC pumps in one RC loop, and (b) loss of one or two RC pumps during~two pump operation. dI is given inidegrees Fahrenheit (F). out =}}