ML20064M960
| ML20064M960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1983 |
| From: | Kalivianakis N COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NJK-83-48, NUDOCS 8302150691 | |
| Download: ML20064M960 (3) | |
Text
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'N Commonw:alth Edison O
) 22710 206 Avenue North Quad Citi:s Nuclorr P:wer Stati:n O
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Cordova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241
'y NJK-83-48 February 3, 1983 Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Case:
Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experi-ments completed during the month of January,1983, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30.
A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.
Very truly yours, i
l COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION ff ad N. J. Kalivianakis Station Superintendent bb l
Enclosu re cc:
T. J. Rausch l
s 0302150691 830203 M@'
n PDR ADOCK 0U000254 R
_ _. -.. - _ _ _ -. -.. - _.. _ - _ _. _ - _. - - _ _ _, _.... -. _ _ -. _ - _ - - _... _ _ -. ~... _ _ _ _. _ _.,
a SPECIAL TEST l-66 On January 27, 1983, Special Test 1-66 was completed. This test was performed to provide an added indication of proper connection of TIP
. machine number 3 on Unit one following maintenance.
Summary of Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or mal function of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report was not increased because all rod movements will be performed using Station approved procedures for scram timing.
Power will be maintained between 20% and 30% core rated thermal power. Thus, there are no additionai safety implications from a rod drop accident or rod withdrawal error than discussed in the FSAR.
I 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the rod _ maneuvers will be performed at normal operating conditions but at reduced power.
All rod movements will be perforned using existing Station approved procedures.
3 The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because all rod movements will be' performed using approved operating procedures and within Technical Specifications, thus no Technical Specification safety margins are i
reduced.
SPECIAL TEST l-67 On January 27, 1983, Special Test 1-67 was completed. This test was performed to determine the effects of various feedwater pump combinations on calculated feedwater flow while holding Reactor power constant.
The amount of leakage through the idle feedwater pump for each combination was also determined.
l l
Summary of Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accicent, or mal function of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the performance of this test will not affect the feedwater heating function.
l 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the availability of feedwater to the Reactor vessel will be sufficient to maintain proper vessel level.
3 The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifica-tion is not reduced because feedwater pump availability is not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.
RPS Bus Protective Relays M-4-1-81-19 Description Redundant Class lE protective relays have been installed between the RPS power supplies (MG Sets 8, MCC 15-2) and the RPS but The NRC postulated that with the existing relays in the RPS bus, an earthquake could simultaneously cause degradation of the RPS supply and inhibit the relays from tripping the RPS.
Installed as part of this modification are two Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) on each RPS supply, connected in series to provide redundancy. They will trip RPS on overvoltage, undervoltage, and under-frequency.
Evaluation The new protective relays reduce the probability of the RPS malfunctioning due to degraded power supply. Tripping of the RPS on out-of-specification supply is ensured by these relays.
Included in the modification are shield plates around the RPS MG Sets to prevent them f rom damaging nearby Class IE equipnent.
Anchorage of Safety Related Electrical Equipnent M-4-2-80-22 Description This modification installed additional bracing and tack welds on safety related buses and MCCs. This anchorage ensured these pieces of equipnent would not tip over. This modification was a result of recommendations from the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Evaluation The additional bracing will improve the availability of the equipnent by preventing it f rom tipping over.
None of the bracing affected the operability of the buses or MCCs.