ML20064C365

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Forwards Markups for LCO 3.3.1.4,incorporating Amend 34 of SSAR
ML20064C365
Person / Time
Site: 05200001
Issue date: 03/04/1994
From: Tang C
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Poslusny C, Reinhart M
NRC
References
NUDOCS 9403090337
Download: ML20064C365 (8)


Text

ft:R 04 '94 12:48PM G E fifCLEAR BLDG J

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t%R04 '94 12:49Pt1 G E tLCLEAP DL.DG J P.2/8 zsA61oo Rev. 3 ESF Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.1.4 Tabte 3.3.1.4 1 (Pape 5 of 5)

EsF Actuntfon Instetauntation Appa1 casts PG ES OR QTHER SPECIPit.D Rit&likED APPLICABLE $URVE!LLANCE Ftriction C0kDITIONS CHApuf!5 All10ms REQUIREMEWT$ ALLCMABLE VALUE 12.b RCIC !sstation Device 1,2,3 1 per D

GR 3.3.1.4.2 NA Actuation.

actuatg 3R 3.3.1.4.3 device SR 3.3.1.4.4 12.c RCic Manual 1so!stion 1,2,3 2 per 3, 7 sa 3.3.1.4.3 NA Ini t te t t art.

division #

$R 3.3.1.4.4 ER 3.3.1.4.7 12.6 ucac Turtnne Exneust 1,2,3 2 per En 3.3.1.4.1 t t 1 kg/caZ Diaphreyn Pressu*e High division *I SR 3.3.1.4.3 I

set 3.3.1.4.4 sR 3.3.1.4.6

13. Renator Vater Oteemo Isolation Actuation.

13.e cw system isolation 1, 2, 3, 2 per 8, C

$R 3.3.1.4.3 NA Initiation.

(i) division (b)

$R 3.3.1.4.4 13.b CUW 16otation Device 1, 2, 3, 1 per D

$R 3.3.1.4.2 MA Attwelen.

(I) sctutted 3R j.3.1.4.3 g g,(c)

$R 3.3.1.4.4 13.c cuw Iwtetion on RC 1, 4, 5 1 per $LC E

SR 3.3.1.4.4 NA initiation p (s) 14 Erutcow) Cooling System

" o#,'W'yfo n Isolation Actuation.

14.a CD Cooling system 2, 3, III 2 pr 3, C SR 3.3.1.4.3 NA 1 solation Initiation, divisionNI

$R 3.3.1.4.4 14.b SD Cooling Isolation 2, 3, (I) 1 per D

st 3.3.1.4.2 NA Device Actuation.

actuated SR 3.3.1.4.3 devica(8)

SA 33144

-,n (a) These are SEhSOA CitAWEL functions.

(b) These see LoCIC CMNNEL f uwtlew.

(c) These are CUTPUT CntMEL Functions.

(d) These are manual initiation chame! functions.

2 (e) With reactor pressure greater tnan 10.5 kg/cm.

2 (f) With reactor pressure greater than 3.5 kg/cm,

(g) When associated subsysteun are earptred to t= opere.bte.

(n) When associated Diesel Cererator is regaired to be OPERAB.E per Lco 3.8.2 "AC sources - stuitdoun" (i) During CORE ALTERATION $ ard operations ulth the potential fcr draining the reactor vessel.

(j) curing roovement of irradiated fuel asserbtles in the seconcary contairmer t.

ABWR TS

't. 3 -38 Ammx=nt33 a

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t%R 04 '94 12249Pt1 G E fOCLEAR BLDG J P.3/8 umco aw. 3 ESF ActuJ.ibn Instrumentation B 3.3.1.4

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BASE 5 BACKCROUND switches for containment isolation, one each in division I,

( Continued )

II, and Ill. Ea:h of these switches has two contacts with one contact routed to one of the associated redundant SLO pairs and the other contact routed to the other SLV.

i Together, tnese switches cause closure of all isolation valves, except for RCI Any two of the switches will isn1_ ate all isolatabl paths, except for RCIC RCIC manual f isolation is provided by two independent switches in L.

divisions I and II. The RCIC manual isolation switch logic p#g' is as described for containment isolation.

Y Manual ECCS injection initiation for RCIC, LPFL A, B, & C, HpCF B, and ESF support features are implemented as describad for containment isolation. HpCF C manual initiation uses hardwired signals that bypass the EMS and the SSLC LOGIC CHANNELS. ADS manual initiation uses two switches in each ADS division. Each switch has one contact that is routed to one of member of the SLU pair associated with ADS. Both switches in one division must be pressed to open the ADS valves. The ADS manual inhibit for ATWS mitigation has one switch in eacn ADS division. Each switch has two contacts which are connected to the SLU pair associated with ADS in the division.

Most of the SLNSOR CHANNELS required to initiate protective action are covered in LCO 3.3.1.1, "SSLC Sensor Instrumentation". This LCO covers the Manual initiation channels, LOGIC CHANNELS, OUTPUT CHANNFLS, and those SENSOR CHANNELS not addressed in LCO 3.3.1.1. The SENSOR CHANNELS, except those from the NHS. that are routed directly to the SLUR ere covered by this LC0 since the SLUs are part of the LOGIC CHANNEL.

CHANNEL DEFINITIONS The channel structura for the channel types covered by this LCO are depicted in Figures B 3.3.1.4-1 through B 3.3.1.4-4.

The channel structure in these Figures is similar with the basic structure as shown in Figure B 3.3.1.4-1. The channel characteristic: shown in Figure D 3.3.1.4-1 are:

Each of the redundant SLU patr> 15 considered to be a separate LOGIC CHANNEL.

The separate contacts from a single switch operator are shown as separate manual initiation channels.

(continued)

A8WR TS B 3.3-130 Awowns s3

t1AR 04 94 12:50Pt1 G E tOCLEAR BLDG J P.4/8 A

2346100 Rev. 3 ESF Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.1.4

]

BASES APPLICABLE 5.e. 7.c. 9.c.

ESF Man _qal Initiation.

SAFETY ANALYSIS, LCO, and The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals APPLICABILITY into the appropriate ESF feature logic to provide manual

( Continued )

initiation capability that is redundant to the automatic initiation SENSOR CHANNELS. There is one push button for each of the ESF features with manual initiation capability.

The manual initiation data is acquired by the SLU pair that controls the ESF feature.

The ESF Hanual Initiation Function are not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the ABWR SSAR.

However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ESF as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since it is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the manual initiation switches. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE when the associated ESF feature is required to be OPERABLE.

6.a Standby Gas Treatment Svitem Initiation, The Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) systems removes radioactive gasses from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA;.and -

-when the-wel effgar treat =t sy+te::: is m ubic te '

---Meint+itr-centefnment &ctivity levek "itH

pee 4f444-hmMr. The OPERABILITY of the SGTS is implicitly assumed in m

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plant offsite dose calculations.

The SGTS system is initiated o[n high drywellkressure, low level 3, Reactor (uilding grea Mgh tadiation; or (uel bandling grea radiation. This LOGIC CHANNEL Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, during CORE Al.TERATIONS, during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment since these are the MODES and other conditions where the SGTS is required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

ABWR TS B 3.3-120 A.c o.nt 33

t%R 04 '94 12:50Pt1 G E NUCLEAR DLDG J zu6too hv. 3 ESF Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.1.4 BASES APPLICABLE lat,_ Pator Ruilriinc Coolina Water / Service Water SAFETY ANALYSIS, _ Initiation.

LCO, and APPLICABILITY This function is included to provide confidence that the

( Continued )

HVAC nooded to support ESF syster.s is within the design basis. The initiation occurs on high drywell pressure, low level 1, or 6.9 KV errergency bus nonitors. This function is not explicitly assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the ABWR SSAR. These signals, or suppression pool high temperature, also initiate shedding of non-essential loads.

This LOGIC CHANNEL Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, & 3 and in H0DE 4 and 5 when the DGs are comhw5 Nile {$es eg required to be OPERABLE.

,as y

6.a.ContainmentAtnoSDhericMeditorinoSystemInitiation.

The Containment Atmospheric Moni ring (CAM) system provides kAj h

indications of the activity levelsin the containment s

bgg 9d' following a toCA.4The CAM system is automatically started on g

S fg#g.fg.f a high drywell pressure or low level 1 signal. Two CAM C

4e systems are provided, one in division 1 and one in division f

II. The OPERABILITY of the CAM is not assumad in any ABWR d

t SSAR transient or accident analysis.

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The LAN automatic start LOGIC CHANNEL function must be n'd,;Ug, J

OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2 & 3 since these are the MODES where the CAM system is required to be operable.

s 1.a. Suppression Pool roolina Initiation.

do m a +: <

Suppression pool coolin s included to provide confidence that containment overpr sure will not occur. Therefore this Function is autor3ttically initiated on high suppres,sion pool temperature, Ttf suppression pool cooling initiation is MM e Mep'thn

/ he u s"S+ 1TE O f t he c'm'gy.-4the--eente no~n.

naar

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eimant a*e hot 4 WWy ;6

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ne. 544g cmay;5 ht we ab,.ss""e gym + t w oign i, peuora ; S f.y w

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The suppression pool cooling LOGIC CHANNEL Function must be t

OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, & 3 since these are the MODES where 0

suppression pool cooling is required to be OPERABLE.

Y&

(continued)

ABWR TS B 3.3-122 A=nennt 33

W e4 '94 12:51PM G E tOCLEAR BLM2 J P.6/8

,as m oo aav. 3 ESF Actuatioi) Jnstrumentation B 3.3.1.4 BASES APPLICABLE 10.a. 13.a and 14.a isolation initiation.

m SAFETY ANALYSIS, LCO. and These functinns are the LOGIC CHANNELS that send initiation APPLICABILITY data to the OUTPUT CHANNELS for the various isolation

( Continued )

valvas. There are two LOGIC CHANNELS in each division that contains isolation initiation. The channels provide actuation signals for each of the isolation valves in the same division. The sensor Functions for each of the isolation valves are as described in LCO 3.3.1.1, "5SLC Sensor Instrumentation".

Two LOGIC CHANNELS (dual redundant Slus) must be OPERABLE in cach division with isolation capability when the associated isolation Function is required to be OPERABLE. See LCO 3.3.1.1, "SSLC Sensor Instrurrentation* for the basis and the divisions associated with each isolation function. A LOGIC CllANNEL is OPERABLE when it is capable of generating initiation data and transmitting it to the associated OUTPUT CHANNELS.

10.c & LO. d. Drywell Suma Drain Line LCW/HCW Radiation-High The drywell drain lines to the radwaste system are monitored fcrnighradiatioqusingonedetector_ineachofthedrain 46 y lines. High activity in the drain lines could result in excessive radioactivity in the radwaste collection tanks.

o 3 Y If the hijn activity flow continues without isolation, d.p9 oftsite dose limits may be reached. This Function also

\\N provides a diverse indication of primary coolant activity.

Credit for these Functions is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the ABWR RSAR. However, the Function is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The detectors are connected to the PRRN system which sends a trip signal to the division I SLU pair. The Allowable value is selectad to be consistent with primary coolant activity limits. One channel of each of the Functions is required to he OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, " Primary Containment."

1

'l l

(continued)

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ABWR TS B 3.3-122 wt 33 l

MAR 04 '94 12:52Pf1 G E t(UCLEAR BLDG J P.7/8 n u m nev. 3 ESF Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.1.4 i

e BASES APPLICABLE

.d. 2.e. 3.d. 5.L 6.b.

7.b_. 8.b.

9 h.

10,b. 11.b. 12.b.

SAFETY ANALYSIS, 3.b.

and 14.b.

ESF and Isolation Device Actuation.

LCO, and (continued)

APPLICABILITY (Continued) going to the state needed to perform the protective action and recovering to the normal state.

13.c.

CUW isolation on SLC Initiatio_n isolation of the CUW System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the CUW System (Reference 4). SLC System initiation signals originate from the two SLC pump start signals.

The SLC pump A start signal is connected to a division 1 SLU pair and the pump B signal to a division II SLU pair. The data is shar d between division via suitable isolators.

CW isolation c curs when either pump is j"{[e3, 3

L L c.

There is no Allowable Value associated with this function since it is discrete data based on the state of the SLC System operation detector.

one hqeel ger $LC dM$ ion c

A chaneau (one from cact ;=p' of the SLC Initiation Function are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES I and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LC0 3.1.7).

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS, Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that onco a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems,

. components, or variables orpressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continua to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable ESF and isolation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for multiple inoperable divisions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable ESF or isolation channel.

(continued)

ABWR TS B 3.3-126 Amen *=nt 33

MAR 04 '94 12:52PM G E NJCLEAR BLDG J P.8/8-z3:4100 a v. 3 ESF Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.1.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2

( Continued )

This Condition is provided to assure that appropriate action is taken for inoperable OUTPUT CHANNELS or an inoperable HPCF C manual initiation channel, An inoperable OUTPtIT CHANNEL makes the associated device (punp, valve, etc.)

unable to perform its protective action. A failure in the HPCF C manual channel causes a loss of its system level nanual initiation capability.

Required Action 0.1 restores the actuation capability for the devices that cannot be actuated as a result of the fdilure. Action D.2 provides an alternate to D.1 for the devices listed in a note in the LCO. Actuating the associateo device is equivalent to the channel performing its intended Function and will place the associated device in the contiguration needed to perform its protective action. Actuating the associated device cannot be perforud if it would result in unacceptable plant operation or plant status.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time for Action 0.1 provides some amount of time to restore automatic or manual actuation before additional Recuired Actions ara imposed. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time for Action D.2 provides some amount of time for the operator to determina if the associated device can be actuated.

Action D.1 applies to all OUTPUT CHANNELS, except ADS. ADS is not included because of the nature of the redundancy uses in the ADS systems. Action D.2 applies to the isolation valves that can be closed without disrupting plant operation or jeopardizing plant safety.

E.1 and F.2 This Condition addresses SENSOR CliANNEL failures for isolation SENSOR CHANNEL Functions that have.ea4y one oMo s

channels. For these Functions a failure in the 5th50R CHANNEL causes loss of automatic initiation.

Ho L or + wever, h4 68 5 h*i manual initiation is still available.

4 e /,$.'

heu m e t/t.

Action E.1 requires restoration of the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. Action E.2 provides an alternate of (continued)

ABWR TS B 3.3-129 annum nt 33