ML20064C268
| ML20064C268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1982 |
| From: | Wuller G ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064C273 | List: |
| References | |
| U-0590, U-590, NUDOCS 8301040362 | |
| Download: ML20064C268 (49) | |
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/LL/NOIS POWER COMPANY '
g f9f_ (1,_g9yg 500 SOUTH 27TH STREET, DECATUR, ILLINOIS 62525 ' December 29,1982 Mr. A. Schwencer , Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re ference : NRC Letter, C. O. Thomas to G. Wuller, IP, dated September 22, 1982, " Questions Relating to Degraded Core Hydrogen Control and the Emergency Plan Dose Assessment Report System" Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-461
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
In response to the referenced letter, we are enclosing i the answers to the 20 questions relating to the Degraded Core Hydrogen Control sytem. These questions will be in- ) cluded as part of the next FSAR amendment. Please contact us if you have any questions regarding this matter. Sincerely,
/NY G. E. Wuller Supervisor-Licensing Nuclear Station Engineering l
! JHS/lt ec: H. Abelson, NRC Clinton Project Manager H. H. Livermore, NRC Resident Inspector Q()()! v Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1 t 8301040362 821229 i PDR ADOCK 05000461 J F PDR I L __
Question 1 Provide a detailed description of the Hydrogen Ignition System (HIS) and its power supplies ; include the total number of igniters, the number of circuit breakers, and a simplified l electrical system schematic showing all the above items and any l other maj or component.
Response
The Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) which consists of 114 igniter assemblies distributed throughout the containment and 1 drywell, is designed to ignite hydrogen in the unlikely occurrence t of an event which results in the generation of excessive quanti-ties of hydrogen from a large(75%) metal-water reaction in the reactor pressure vessel. The HIS is designed to burn hydrogen at low concentrations, thereby maintaining the concentration of hydrogen below its detonable limit and preventing containment overpressure failure. The potential for significant pocketing of hydrogen will be precluded by: (a. Utilization of distributed ignition sources;
- b. Simultaneous operation of containment sprays :
- c. Mixing caused by turbulence resulting from localized burns.
The HIS is designed with suitable redundance such that no single active component failure, including power supplies will prevent functioning of the system. The HIS is designed as a safety
- grade system capable of operating for a minimum of 168 hours after initiation in an accident condition.
l Igniter Assembly i i The igniter assemblies used in the HIS are divided into two components:
- a. The igniter enclosure which partially encloses the igniter and contains the terminal block, transformer and associated electrical wiring and;
- b. The junction box which contains the cable termination.
The assembly is depicted in Figure 1-1. The approximate weight of each assembly is 30 pounds. A hooded spray shield is provided for protection against the containment sprays. The igniter enclosure, junction box, and spray shield are constructed of stainless steel. The enclosure is 1/8" thick, the junction box is 14 gauge. Gasketing material and sealant is provided to ensure leaktightness of the igniter enclosure and junction box. Access to the enclosure interior is through a removable plate on one side. 4 4
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Question 1 (cont' d) The igniter chosen for the HIS is a General Motors AC Division Model 7G glow plug, which is identical to those used at the Sequoyah and McGuire nuclear plants. See Figure 1-2. The transformer is a Dongan Model 52-20-472Q. (200 VA for 120 VAC, 60 Hz ('10%), primary and multiple secondary taps at 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 18 VAC). The igniter assembly is manufactured by Power Systems Division of Morrison Knudsen. Power Supply The hydrogen igniters are powered off of 120 VAC, 60 Hz, class IE power panels. These power panels receive their power from class IE, 15 KVA transformers, rated 480/208-120 VAC, 60 Hz, 30, with grounded neutrals. Each transformer is fed from a class IE MCC breaker, on a class IE bus powered from one of the standby diesel generators. The one hundred fourteen igniters are divided into two equal groups, une group in Division I and one group in Division II. Each group is powered from separate power panel breakers through separate contactors. The power panel breakers are normally closed, so that the igniters can be energized by simply operating j the control switches located in the control room. There are
- two control switches in the control room, one for Division I and one for Division II. See Figure 1-3.
~ 120 VAC power from the power panels through the contactors is brought into containment through penetrations and brought to junction boxes, where power is distributed to the individual igniters. The connections between the igniter assembly power leads and the field cable will be bolted lug-to-lug connections , covered with heat shrink. This connection is made inside the junction box attached to the igniter enclosure. A grounding stud is provided on each igniter assembly for the attachment of a field group strap. J 1
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Question 2 Provide the following igniter information: a) Vendor; b) Model; c) Qualification Program; and d) Design Criteria.
Response
The response to parts a, b, and c is provided in response to Question 1. The response to part d is located in Appendix A,
" Design Criteria for llydrogen Ignitor System".
i Question 3 Provide a detailed description of the preoperational surveillance and periodic testing programs of the HIS. i a) How will the system be tested? Specifically, what indicates that a particular igniter is or is not functioning properly? b) Specify the frequency of testing. c) Are hydrogen detectors to be used as part of the HIS? If so, please specify the types of detectors, number, location of sampling ports ; system response time, and testing format and frequency.
Response
1.a & b) Tests and inspection
- 1. Preoperational Testing The HIS will be preoperationally tested to ensure correct functioning of all controls, instrumentation, wiring, transformers and igniters and to provide baseline data for subsequent surveillance testing and maintenance.
The test will include energizing one of the two divisions of igniters from the control room and verifying that all igniters powered from the associated panel are functional. The identical procedure will be followed for the remaining igniters powered rJf the other division. Functional testing of the HIS will include, as a minimum, measuring and recording the following: a) Surface temperature of each igniter to verify that it is operating at or above 17000F. b) Total current being drawn through one breaker when all igniters powered by that breaker are operating. This procedure will be repeated for the remaining breaker of the division being tested.
- 2. Periodic Testing and Surveillance At specified intervals during normal plant operation ,
each of the two power divisions will be energized and the current being drawn by the igniters fed by one breaker will be measured and recorded. This procedure will be repeated for each of six breakers. The data for each breaker will be compared to the
i Question 3 (cont' d) data obtained in the preoperational test of this system. If the current readings from the periodic test vary significantly from those obtained during the preopera-tional test (perhaps indicating the failure of one or more igniters), further investigations would be performed. In addition to the above procedure, during plant operation, the igniter assemblies , power distribution panels , instrumentation, and associated wiring can be visually inspected (outside the drywell) at any time. During each refueling period, igniter assemblies will'be tested to verify operability if a current check give questionnable results. The test procedure will be similar to the pre-operational test procedure discussed in Section 1 above. Pertinent portions of the above testing procedure and acceptance criteria will be incorporated into the CPS Technical Specifications. l.c) The hydrogen detectors utilized at CPS are not intended to be a portion of the HIS or its operation. However this system can be used to detect hydrogen in the drywell and containment for degrade core condition. Use of these detectors will be as intended and described in the CPS FSAR Section 7.5.1.4.2 and will be capable of providing the operator with a s tatus of the containment atmosphere. I
Question 4 l Describe the glow plug igniter selection program; i.e., I how will actual igniters be selected for installation in the assemblies.
Response
The Clinton Power Station Hydrogen Igniter System is still l being designed. However, a preliminary procedure for the pre-
! conditioning of the igniters has been developed.
The procedure calls for ten igniters connected in series to be preconditioned at one time. The procedure sequenced is as follows:
- 1) Apply 30 VAC to the igniters for 2 hours (3 VAC per d
igniter). ! 2) Increase voltage to 60 VAC and maintain for 2 hours (6 VAC per igniter) .
- 3) Increase voltage to 90 VAC and maintain for 2 hours (9 VAC per igniter) .
- 4) Increase voltage to 120 VAC and maintain for 2 hours (12 VAC per igniter) .
The voltage and the amperage will be checked for each igniter every %-hour and the data will be compared against the AC volts vs . amps curve shown in Figure 4-1. (This curve was derived from previous vendor shop tests) . Should the measured data deviate by more than 5% from the curve, the igniter will be rejected. At the final reading for each applied voltage, the ignitor surface temperature will be checked. Igniters which do not operate at a minimum temperature of 17000F when supplied with ! 12 VAC will be rejected. At the conclusion of preconditioning, the igniters will l be visually inspected for any sign of deformation.
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i i Question 5 i Provide construction drawings for several " typical" igniter i mounts in the wetwell and containment regions. Also, provide a complete list of the approximate elevation, aximuthal and i radial coordinates for each igniter in containment, and the corresponding elevation coordinate of the nearest ceiling (include the make-up of the nearest ceiling, i.e., open, solid, grated) . J Indicate whether all enclosed regions of the containment are j served by redundant igniters.
Response
The construction drawings for igniter mounts will not be i available until the igniter locations have been finalized. Table 5-1 and Figures 5-1 through 5-8 indicate the preliminary locations of the igniters. Table 5-1 also indicates that all compartments are served by redundant igniters. i
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Calc. No. 3C10-0282-002 Revision: O Page: 10 TABLE 5-1 Project No. 6114-30 HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS Radial Dimensio'ns' , to . Center _. . Igniter Division Igniter line',of - 4 Figure Number Number Azimuth Elevation Contaillment/ Number Comments i~ (A) Below Grating @ E]. 767'-10" // , ., , 106 2 34* 765'-6" / ~2 4 f '9 "-[ / 5-3 In drywell 107 1 90 7 6 5 '-6" ij 24 ' -9" 5-3 In drywell 108 2 150 765'-6"/'- .24'-9"' 5-3 In drywell 109 1 210 765'-6"2 ' 24'-9" 5-3 In drywell 110 2 270 7 6 5 ' - 6 '! . 2 4 ' - 9 " 5-3 In drywell 111 1 326 765'-6;" -24'-9" 5-3 In drywell (B) Refueling Platform [s~.:: 7, s, , . 114 1 315' 29'-0" 5-6 On refueling platform 8 2 9 ', L 3 ",.}.. . s .. (C) Below Drywell Ceiling
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Pager 11 ; ; Project No. 6114-30 TABLE 5-1 (Cont 'd) ,. IIYDROGEN IGNITInt LOCATIONS
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Radial - Dimensions , to Center- m. Igniter Division Igniter Elevation line of Containment j 7JEigureNumber Comments y , Number Number Azimuth
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(D) Below IICU Floor, Above Suppression Pool [ _ _' 'i {y [ , 124 1 31 753'-0" 46'iO'"~. > 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, E l '. ~755'-C 125 2 74 750'-0" l40'-0"~- i, 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, El. 755'-0 126 1 118" 753'-0" 40'-0"l 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, El. 755'-0 127 2 154 753'-0" ~40'-0" 5-8 Containment, below HCU floor, El. 755'-0 129 1 190a 750'-0" 4 0 ' '- 0 ". / 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, El. 7 55 '-0 130 2 225o 750'-0" .-- 4 0 ' - 0 " 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, El. 755'-0 131 1 260 750'-0" *
'4 0 '-0" ; 5-8 Containment, below IICU floor, El. 755'-0 132 2 304 750'-0" . 4 0 ' - 0 '!
5-8 icontainment, below IICU floor, El. 755'-0 333 1 348o 748'-6" , 40'-0", 5-8 Containment, below HCU floor, El. 755'-0
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(E) Steam Tunnel'and Bclow Floor 0 El. 778[2h' .j
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336 2 35* 776'-6" -. 50'-8" 5-4 Below Grating @ El. 778'-0" 137 1 60 776'-6" L__ 50'-8" 5-4 Below Grating 0 El. 778'-0" 138 2 90' 774'-0" f ,
~50'-8" 5-4 Below Slab 0 El. 778'-0" 139 1 120" 776'-6" 50'-8" 5-4 Below Grating @ El. 778'-0" 140 2 350 776'-6" / '50'-8" 5-4 Below Grating 0 El. 778'-0" 141 1 130 768'-0" r~ ] 59'-0"
- 5-4 Adjacent to Fuel Transfer Tube Arci 5-4 142 2 205" 777'-0" k,.. '50'- ,
Below nefueling Pool wall 776'-6" r d C50I8" 5-4 143 1 240' 8" Below Grating 0 El. 778'-0" 144 2 270' 776'-6" "' M ._.59'-0" 5-4 Below Grating 0 El. 778'-0" 145 1 300* 7 7 4 ' - 0 " 'r
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'Below Concrete Floor 0 El. 778'-O' 146 2' 325' 776'-6" w --:50'-8" 5-4 Below Grating @ El. 778'-0" 147 1 350* 784'-0" Y 50'-8" 5-4 ,
In steam tunnel 148 2 10* 784'-0" 50'-8" 5-4 ! In steam tunnel 6 e
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Calc. No. 3C10-0282-002 Revision O Page: 12 TABLE 5- 1(Cont 'd ) Project No. 6114-30 , llYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS Radiale, Dimensions cct'o Cente'r-Jniter Division Igniter lin'c-of 3 Figure amber Number Azimuth Elevation Containment Number Comments (F) Subcompartments in Containment \".q', ( r ,'r., s ..- - . 149 1 252 786'-0" 4~1 ' ;'0" 7i \ 5 -4 Door of RWCU Backwash Tank Room 150 2 290 786'-0" 4 7 ',2- 0 " '~~ - T 5 -4 Top of RWCU Dackwash Tank Room 151 1 300 784'-6" 4 7 '- 0"' - 5 -4 Top of Filter Danineralizer Eccic. Pump Rocm 152 2 315b 784'-6" 4 7 '. - 0 "' ' 5-4 Top of Filter Danincralizer Recic. Pump Roan 153 1 300 811'-0" 2 8 '- 6" - 5-5 Pipe Tunnel, adjacent to F/D IIolding Pump lbcm ,154 2 260 798'-0" 50'-9".. 5-5 Pipe Tunnel, below Filter /Deain. Vescel Rocm
- 155 1 345 '
796'-9" 44'-6"- 5-4 valve room below RWCU Ileat Exchanger r156 157 2 1
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15 796'-9" 796'-9" 57'-0( - 5 -4 T, valve r.com below RNCU IIcat Exchanger valve room below RWCU lleat Exchanger 4 4 ' - 6 " -l . 54 . 158 2 15 796'-9" 57'-0" ; 4 ' , valve room below RWCU lleat Exchanger
- 159 1 160* 777'-0" 42'-0" ., ' 5 -3 ~ q Pocket below fuel transfer tube i160 1 245 811'-0" 26.'-8" \- . 5-5' e', , Pipe Tunnel, adjacent to F/D IIolding Pump Rocm 161 2 285* 798'-0" 50'-9" . ( ;5-5 '\ Below floor of F/D vessel Room s
( ,. -{'\ G) Below Floor at El. 603'-3" ' 162 2 21 802'-P 55'-0" '5-5 'IAbove Suppression Pool, below grating 163 1 48 802'-0" ' 55'-0" 5-5 /Above Suppression Pool, below grating 164 i 2 72o 802 '0" 50'-8" 41 55- - 'Ab've o suppression Pool, below grating 165 1 96 .802'-0", 50'-8"'
- 166 2 120 802'-O' 50'-8" 5-5-O' f Abode suppression Pool, below grating.'Ab6 167 1 144 802'-0" 50'-8" '5-5(#
5-5 j 'Abdve below grating 168 2 168 802'-0" 60'-8" 5-5 t',,
-Above,suppression suppression Pool Pool,, below grating 169 1 192, 802'-0" 60'-8" 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below grating
<170 2 210 795'-6" 50'-8" 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below concrete ,171- 1 238* 795'-6" 50'-8" 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below concreto 172 2 260 802'-0" 60'-0" - 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below grating 173 1 285 802'-0" 60'-0" 5 -5 Above Suppression Pool, below grating 174 2 309* 802'-0" 50'-8" 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below grating 175 1 325 802'-0" 50'-8" 5-5 Above Suppression Pool, below grating -
Calc. No. 3 C10- 02 0.!- 002 Revision O Page: 13 TABLE 5-1(Cont'd) Project No. 6114-30 IlYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS Radial Dimensions ~
' , to Center-gniter Division Igniter s line of Figure
. umber Number Azimuth Elevation -Containment Number Comments (!!) Subcompartments in Containment [] [ 176 1 350* 823'-0" (,/-44'-6" 5-5 Ceiling of rc.n-regenerative IIcat Exchanger Ibam 177 2 350 823'-0"
- ,57 6 -0" 5-5 Ceiling of Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger Prem
-178 1 10 823'-0" \. \.4 4 ' ? 6" 5-5 Ceiling of Non-regenerative IIcat Exclunger Poon l179 2 10 ' ' 823'-0" -57'-0" 1 5-5 Ceiling of Non-regenerative Heat Exclunger Pcan i180 1 260 823'-0" 47'-0" s 5-5 Ceiling of Filter /Dcmineralizer Rocm l ] 81 2 260 823'-0" 5 0 ' -- 9 " 5-5 Ceillurj of Filter /Danineralizer Room
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!182 1 275 ., 823'-0" 47'-0" Ceiling of Fil ter/Demineralizer Room t183 2 285 ' 823'-0" 5 0 ' - 9 '.' - 5-5 Ceiling of Filter /Deminc- lizer Room 184 1 260 812'-0" 34'-6" 5-5' Filter /Demineralizer Holding Pump Room 185 1 260 825'-0" 29'-6" , 5-5 Filter /Demineralizer Valve Eoaa 186 2 285 812'-0" 34'-6"" 5-5 i Filter /Demineralizer llolding. Pump Room 187 2 300 822'-0"- 2 8 ,' - 6"
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I) Below Grating at Refueling Floor \, , - 566; l 188 2 25 . '8 2 6 '-6" ' 55'-0" Adjacent to refueling pool 189 1 49 826'-6" 35'-0" 5-6' '. Adjacent to refueling pool 190 2 90* 826'-6" 38'-5"' 5-6 ' Adjacent to refueling pool 191 i 1 120* 826'-6" 2 8 ' - 6" 5-6 ,'.. Adjacent to refueling pool ' 192 2 150 826'-6" ' 55'-0"' 5-6 \' Adjapent to refueling pool 193 1 . 170* 826'-6" 58'-6" 5-6 / Adjacent to refueling pool-194 2 194* 826'-6" 60'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool . 195 1 210 826'-6" 50'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool 196 2 . 236. 826'-6" . 30'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool 197 1~ 250 826'-6" 52'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool 198 2 280 826'-6" , 60'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool 199 1 304 826'-6" 55'-0" .
*5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool 200 2 328 826'-6" 48'-0" 5-6 Adjacent to refueling pool D
Calc. No. 3010-02H2-002
- Revision: O Page: 14 TABLE S-1 (Cont'd) Project No. 6114 30 IlYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS Radial Dimensions 1 to Center- .s l
!nitor Division Igniter line of .- ' Figure imber Number Azimuth Elevation Containment. Number Comments Bottom of Polar Crane Support ) (J) t [, . .. 60'-0".T
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201 1 28 848' 5-7 on containment wall 202 2 56 848' 60'LO 't i . 5-7 on containment wall 203 1 84 ' 548' 60'-0" 'l 5-7 on containment wall 204 2 1126 848' 6 0 ' -- 0 " -- A 5-7 on containment wall 205 1 140 848' 60'40" 5-7 on containment wall 206 2 168 848' 6 0.' - 0 " ~] 5-7 on containment wall 207 1 196 > 848' 60-0". c 5-7 on containment wa'll 208 2 224 848' 60'-0"- 5-7 on containment wall 209 1 252 848' 60f-0" ^ 5-7 on conthinment wall 210 2 280 848' -0" l 5-7 on containment wall 211 1 308 848' 60'I-0" 60 *5-7 on containment wall 212 2 336 848' 6 0 ' -- 0 "~ ~ 15-7 on containment wall 112 0 848' 6 0 '.2 0 " - - ,5-7 on containment wall 1 i; j .' (K) Containment Dome - Botton) of Spray Ring IIeader' Sypport 113 2 0 899'-6" 46'p6" ..5-7 Attached to lower rirg lieader, containment dane 213 1 36 899'-6" 4 6 ' - 6." : !5-7 Attachad to lower ring header, containment done 214 - 2 72 899'-6" 4 6 ' - 6." '5-7 Attached to lower ring header, containment done 215 1 108 899'-6" 4 6 ' - 6 " ' - - ~5 - 7 Attached to lower ring header, containment dane 216 2 . 144 899'-6" 46'16" ,; J -7 Attached to lower ring header, contairrnent dane 180* 899'-6" 6 ~' -7 Attached to lower ring header, containuent done '217 218 1 2 216 899'-6" 46'7 46'-6" "' f~., -7 Attached 'to lower ring header, containment dane 219 1 252, 899'-6" 46',6" -~~_' .
-7 AttacInt to lowdr ring header, containment done 220 ,2 288 899'-6" 4 6 ' - 6 ~ ~ ,.'.'$ _ 7 Attached to lower ring header, contairrnent dane 221 1 324 899'-6" 46'-6" 57 Attachul to lower ring header, contairrnent dane 222 2 120 920'-9" 15'-6" 5-7 Attacin1 to uiner rity lxnler, contairuent daae 223 1 240 920'-9" 15'-6" 5-7 Attachul to upter rity huxier, cont alinent dono 224 2 360 920'-9" 15'-6" 5-7 Attacial to upter ring header, conte.iim:nt dare 9
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; Question-6 For each floor within the containment annular region and the drywell, please provide information on the cross-sectional-flow area and identify the various gratings,-solid regions, or equipment blockage.
Response
Table 1 gives a. breakdown of the open and blocked areas of the different elevations in the containment annulus region. l The Open column includes open areas in floor grating (assuming ! an 83% open area) . The. blocked column takes into consideration the floor beams and plates plus the non-open area of the grating. From the table it is seen that th the most restrictive with a 1866.6 ft.g 755'-0" open area. elevation is Table 6-1 Elevation Blocked
- Open**
737'-0" 1050 f t2 6125 ft2 755'-0" 5308.4 1866.6
- 778'-0" 4632.5 2542.5 i
803'-3" 4765.6 2409.4 1 i 828'-3" 4926.9 2248.1 4
*- Includes blockages by structural beams
** Assumes 83% open area for grating i
1 i I
Question 7 Discuss the design adequacy of the igniter assembly to withstand poolswell events and the drywell negative pressure response.
Response
The design of the wetwell igniters is such that no igniters are located below elevation 751'-0" which is more than 19'-6" above the normal pool water level. These igniters have been purposely located above the bulk swell zone as defined by GESSAR II to avoid loading due to poolswell impact and drag. The design of the drywell igniters is such that no igniters are located below elevation 765'-6" which is 24'-9" above the top of the weir wall. These igniters have been purposely located to avoid the impact and drag loads resulting from a drywell negative pressure response. Per GESSAR II load definitions, the maximum weir swell height is 14 feet above the top of the weir wall. Hence, the drywell igniters are located with a margin of over 10 feet above the maximum weir swell zone.
Question 8 Please provide full size (Size E) sectional drawings of the containment and identify the location of each igniter, its electrical division, and location of vacuum breaker lines and purge compressor lines.
Response
See the response for question #5 for the drawings locating each igniter and its electrical division. The location of the vacuum breaker lines are illustrated in Figure 8-1. CPS does not have purge compressors but rather hydrogen compressors which take suction from the drywell and exhaust into the suppression pool.
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~
f Question 9 Discuss the consideration of local impingement of break spray on the igniter assembly.
Response
! The location criterion for igniters in open areas of the i drywell and containment requires that a maximum distance between igniters of different electrical divisions be thirty (30) feet. If it is conservatively assumed that direct jet impingement from a high energy line break incapacitates a i given igniter, functionability of the HIS is maintained if the closest igniter from the other electrical division is not l. incapacitated by the same jet.
- Assessment of jet impingement effects on the HIS may be l most directly accomplished by determining the jet spreading i characteristics from breaks in the largest high energy lines
- in the igniter proximity. Considering both circumferential l and longitudinal pipe breaks (per Reference 1) , a distance l larger than the drywell diameter was required to produce
, a jet width comparable to the divisional separation require-ment of the igniters , and therefore only one division would be affected by the jet. Large high energy lines, such as the main steam and
, feedwater lines in the containment have guard pipes , and impingement effects from these lines were not considred.
. Hence, consideration of local impingement of break j spray on the igniter assembly does not jeopardize operation
- of the Hydrogen Igniter System.
I l Reference 4
- 1. ANSI /ANS-58.2-1980, "American National S tandard
- Design Basis for Protection of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture", Appendix C.
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4 Question 10 Evaluate whether the sheet flow into the wetwell impinges on any igniters.
Response
Sheet flow is purely a boundary layer phenomena; such occurrence is primarily due to spray accumulation on the wet-well walls and projecting slabs. Since no igniters are attached to the wetwell and containment open area walls there can be no sheet-flow impingement resulting from wetwell wall spray accumulation. Impingement from water overflowing projecting slabs would be a possibility if and only if an igniter was located directly below the slab edge. However, no igniters are located in this position. Most igniters in the wetwell are located below 7 beams which support the grating floors. These igniters are shielded from the sheet-flow by the I-beam itself. The remaining few wetwell igniters are located below the center of slabs , which automatically shield the igniter from the sheet-flow. Hence , wetwell igniters are not impinged upon by the sheet-flow phenomena.
i Question 11 Discuss the effect of submergence on igniter performance. For those igniters which will continue to be necessary, describe the testing which will be performed to assure igniter performance before , during and after being subjected to submergence conditions ,
Response
None of the igniters will be submerged because CPS does not have any igniters located in the pool swell region. How-ever, the igniter assemblies located in the vicinity of the suppression pool shall be capable of operating during and af ter exposure to the suppression pool water as a result of pool swell and weir swell. 1
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Ques tion 12 Consider the actuation criteria of safety systems in-cluding operator action: a) Under what conditions are the sprays activated? b) How long after the sprays are actuated does the spray system attain full flow rate? c) When during an emergency situation would the HIS be activated? d) What role, if any, would the hydrogen recombiner play with respect to the HIS? e) What are the emergency procedure criteria for post accident containment purge / vent?
Response
a) The containment spray is initiated automatically after 10 minutes of a LOCA signal if containment pressure exceeds 9 psig. b) The spray system will reach full flow rate in 42 seconds after the sprays are activated. The 42 seconds is the time after the actuation of the RHR pump, assuming that "alve alignment has been previously completed. c) The HIS would be manually activated when the water level falls to the top of active fuel. d) The hydrogen recombiners would play a supportive role in the consumption of hydrogen. The recombiners are, however, not included in the analysis as this effect could be minimal. In any event, recombiners could be utilized for end-of-event application for j remaining hydrogen not consumed in the expected burn l if there is sufficient oxygen remaining. e) The emergency procedure criteria for containment purge / vent is presently being resolved.
, Question 13 1
- Regarding the containment atmosphere mixing mechanisms:
a) Describe the flow rate of the ventilation system in j the containment /wetwell regions .
- I f b) What are the elevations and radial positions of the spray rings.
c) Which spray ring operates when a single RHR loop is operating, and what is the flow rate under such conditions? Does the spray water contain chemical additives? d) Describe any sprays , fans or other systems that could move air in the annular wetwell region, and estimate the air velocities in the regions due to these systems.
Response
a) In the containment /wetwell region there is no forced circulation. The only mixing mechanisms are due to natural circulation, pool dynamics during a LOCA, and containment spray operation. b) The response to this item is given in subsection 6.5.2 and Figures 6.2-118 and 6.2-119 of the CPS FSAR. c) RHR Loop A supplies the spray rings shown on Figure ] 6.2-118 and RHR Loop B supplies the spray rings shown i on figure 6.2-119 of the CPS FSAR. As stated in Table 3' 6.2-2 the design flow rate to the containment spray system is 3800 gpm/ loop. The water supply contains no chemical additives, d) As described in a) above, there is no forced circulation ~ l in the wetwell region; however, the combustible gas control system (hydrogen compressors) will introduce 200 cfm per compressor (two total) to the wetwell region. Also, containment spray operation will move air in the wetwell region. ,i i
l 1 Question 14
- Briefly explain the workings of the "drywell purge system" including purge compressors and vacuum breakers. Estimate flow rates from the system during an accident. Describe the operation of the Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) during hydrogen burns (including a discussion of the logic for the
; purge compressors and vacuum breakers) .
Response
Clinton Power Station's CGCS system consists of two, redundant, 200 cfm compressors which take suction from the drywell and discharge to the containment. Its purpose is to reduce the post-LOCA drywell hydrogen concentration by mixing the drywell and containment atmospheres. The discharge piping from the compressors enter below the suppression pool water level to condense any steam, entrap radio-active particles and nuclides, and maintain water seal between containment and drywell. The drywell vacuum breakers allow containment atmosphere to enter the drywell; however, the differential must be greater then 0.2 psid, where the valves start to open, and the valves are full open at 0.5 psid. Also, included in the CGCS system are two hydrogen recombiners, (outside containment) which take suction from the containment and recombine hydrogen and oxygen to prevent a combustible concentration in the containment. The recombiners would be placed manually into operation before drogen concentration exceeds 3% post-LOCA and isolated above hy/. 6 hydrogen concentration. The hydrogen compressors are started manually before 3% concentration is reached, but there are not cirteria for turning them off. l
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Question 15 In Mark III containments, the sprays are not made up of dedicated components but share pumps with other subsystems intended to deliver water cool to the core. A basic postulate of degraded core accidents is that cooling water to the core is unavailable (e.g. , cooling pumps unavailable) . It appears inconsistent to assume that components of a ccre cooling system would be available to provide containment spray flow. Therefore, provide justification for the assumption that sprays are available.
Response
The containment spray system share pumps with other sub-system of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) loops A & B. The RHR system is required to have suitable redundancy per 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criteria 34 & 35 and by CPS-FSAR Sect. 6.3.3. Each of these redundant loops satisfy the single failure criteria as mentioned in the above appendix. There-fore, each of the two containment spray systems (A&B) is governed by the same criteria as their respective connecting loops. Hence, the containment spray design is adequate and is in accordance with 10CFR50. In addition, a postulated failure of the LPCI "A" & "B" loop to pump water into the core does not necessarily mean these two systems are not available for operating the contain-ment sprays. The failure could be due to particular control valves or check valves, instrument failure or operator error. The NRC proposed rule of December 23, 1981 stated "It is proposed that boiling water reactor (BWR) facilities with Mark III type containments...., for which construction permits were issued prior to March 28, 1979, be required to install hydrogen control systems capable of accommodating an amount of hydrogen equivalent to that generated from the reaction of 75% of the fuel cladding (surrounding the active fuel region) with water, without the loss of containment integrity". This implies that I all water makeup system fail to deliver water to the core. However, this proposed rule does not postulate failure for all functions of the RHR and ECCS systems. Eleven (11) major system f ailures were postulated to reach the necessary condition of a degraded core, where hydrogen would need to burn in containment by igniters.
i 1 Question 15 (cont' d) The failed systems are listed below: (see figures 15-1 & 15-2) Makeup water systems for the core: Feedwater LPCS HPCS LPCI (loop A, B & C) RCIC Condensate Booster CRD Oth ers : Turbine Trip Stuck open safety relief valve These postulated failures are based on "BWR/6 Mark III Hydrogen Control Owner's Group, Report on Hydrogen Control, Accident Scenarios, Hydrogen Generation Rates and Equipment Requirements", by The General Electric Co. dated July, 1982 for the most probable hydrogen generation event. These eleven (11) simultaneous failures are far in i excess of 10CFR50.46 requirements and the single failure criteria. In our opinion, 10CFR50 recognized that there should be some limits in postulating major system failure. Therefore, IPC feels justified in assuming that each of LPCI-containment spray subsystems will operate the sprays when needed. i J i
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L AT LOW PRESSUREI J Rated Capacities - Lev Pressure Systems LPCS 6000 GFM (1 purp) LFCI 19,500 GFM (3 pumps) Condensate Ecoster 30,500 GFP ( 3 pumps) High Pressure Systems with Increated Capacity at Lower Pressure HFCS 6000 GFM (1 pump) CED 3h0 GFM (2 pu ps) Figure 15-2 Typical 238 EWE /6 Lev Pressure Water Dell' er/ Scurces.
Question 16 The discussion heretofore provided to justify the appli-cablity of the HCOG CLASIX-3 sensitivity study for the Clinton plant is insufficient. Therefore, provide the following plant-specific CLASIX-3 containment transient analysis. (1) SRV Base Case Transient
Response
The purpose of the CLASIX-3 analysis is to investigate the response of a reactor plant containment to a degraded core
- condition and the subsequent ignition and deflagration of the hydrogen released to the containment. This response is pri-marily measured by the pressure and temperature transients occuring in the drywell, wetwell and containment compartments.
The CLASIX-3 sensitivity analysis (Reference 1) was prepared utilizing Grand Gulf design parameters and submitted to eliminate duplication of effort for each applicant in the HCOG to conduct a major series of studies on this generic licensing concern (Reference 2) . In order to justify the applicability of the CLASIX-3 sensitivity study for the Clinton plant, an assessment of significant differences between Clinton (CPS) / Grand Gulf (GG) containment design values and other pertinent CLASIX-3 input has been performed. These differences along with the results of the CLASIX-3 sensitivity study have been combined assuming linear influence coefficients which are independent for each design parameter to extrapolate from GG containment response conditions to CPS specific conditions for the SORV event. Appendix D of Reference 3 contains a comparison of CPS design values with GG design values used in the CLASIX-3 analysis. This comparison along with comparisons of passive heat sinks and MARCH reactor coolant and hydrogen mass and energy release rates adequately define the basis for the assessment. Of these plant parameters those exhibiting significant impact on contain-ment response include: (1) wetwell volume (2) initial containment temperature (3) mass / energy release rates (4) containment spray flow
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; Passive heat sinks, as it turns out contribute little to the j sensitivity analysis, and were therefore not included. is (1) wetwell volume _
i CPS has roughly a 10% larger wetwell vdlume. . Investigation .. of the sensitivity study case SA15 results indicates that doubling the wetwell volume increases the peak temperature and pressure in any compartment by no more than 9.1% and - 4.7% respectively. Hence a 10% wetwell voluma" increase ,,'3l3
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would result in es timated increases of only '0.i91% and a / 0.47%inpeaktemperatureandpressure,respectively./' ST
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(2) initial containment temperature ,- [ , The CPS containment temperature is la'rger thahl GG initially. The CLASIX-3 base case evaluated specific heats at room , y temperature. Sensitivity case SA14 evaluated specific. heat at a representative compartment temperature averased; i; over a typical wetwell burn. Hence, SA14 is interpreted as a sensitivity to compartment temperature, The results of this case indicate that peak temperature and pressure' - decrease by 2.2% and 1.1% respectively when specific heat , is evaluated at an estimated 96 F higher average ,temperatpre. Hence, a 420F containment temperature increase results in decreases of 1.0% and 0.5% in peak temperature and pressure , respectively. , j (3) macs / energy release rates A comparison of CPS /GG steam and hydrogen release rates for the Stuck Open Relief Valve (SORV) MARCH case indicates that the CPS mass and energy releases are consistently i less than those of GG. In particular the hydrog:n release rate is estimated to be about 16% le'ss than those of GG J and the total amount of hydrogen generated is only 78% of x
- GG. Hence, less hydrogen is available 'for buring in CPS
- 4 at the defined termination of the hydrogen generati6n ,t :
) event. . t Sensitivity case sal considers exactly half of the base case release rates as determined by the MARCH code. A 50% decrease in release rates has the'following effects: a) drywell: Temperature remains very low throughout the transient. Pressu,re behaves nearly the same except the final spike is appreciably smaller. b) containment: Temperature, in general, is about 8% lower than the base case. Pressure, in general, is about 13% lower than , the base case. . c) wetwell: The initial temperature spike is slightly higher, however the re-k
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- Ouestion 16 (cont'd)' _
V .
, c) continued ' maining spikes average about 7%
ts s lower than the base case. Pressure
. in general, is about 14% lower.
1 Hence, it is judged that a 16% decrease in hydrogen and steam release rates results in generically lower contain-ment response parameters. From this it is conservatively estimated that a 40% decrease in release rates (based en hydrogen release) result in essentially no change in drywell conditions,. containment decreases of 2.6% and 4.3% in temperature and pressure, and wetwell decreases of 2.'3% and 4.7% in temperature and pressure, respectively.
. ?
~It should be noted that sensitivity case SA1, assumes
'that the same mnount. of hydrogen is produced as in the brie case. The CPS FRRCH ren predicts only about 78%
~ '
, lof the hydrogen inventory that GG has. Since hydrogen
, burning is the cause of the high containment response
- conditions, CPS's lower hydrogen inventory represents i a, margin of conservatism present in the above estimates
. based on sensitivity case SA2.
(4) containment' spray The GG containme'nt spray flow rate is roughly 50% higher than that of CPS. Sensitivity case SA8 evaluates the effect of doubling the spray flow rate. Doubling the spray flow rate has the following effects per evaluation of the sensitivity study: a) drywell: Temperature doesn't change appreciably throughout the transient, but final spike
- is about 12% lower. Pressure doesn' t change appreciably
. throughout the transient, but final spike
- is about 16% lower.
b) containment: Temperature is roughly 10% lower
~
except the final spike
- is about g 42% lower.
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+ Pressure is roughly 10% lower except g
the final spike
- is about 23% lower.
c) wetwell: Temperature is roughly 30% lower throughout the burns. Pressure is roughly 12% lower except the final spike
- is about 24% lower.
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Question 16 (cont'd) (4) continued Based on the general behavior of the sensitivity results rather than individual parameter peaks, it is judged that a 50% increase in spray flow yields essentially no change in drywell conditions, a 5% decrease in containment condi-tions and finally,15% and 6% decreases in wetwell tempera-ture and pressure, respectively. In order to determine the overall affect of all four parameters on containment response, each percentage is converted to a f actor which when multiplied by the base case response transient would yield a new transient which approximates that parameter's effect. The product of all four factors indicates the cumulative effect of the four parameters. These rer 4ts are tabulated in Table 16-1. Conclusions From the results of this analysis, it can be seen that based on the most important sensitivity parameters the cumula-tive pressure factors for the SORV base case are all less than or equal to unity except in the wetwell where the factor is 1.01. This represents only a 1% increase which is judged insignificant and certainly bounded by the degree of accuracy to which the analysis was performed. Hence, from a pressure standpoint the integrity of the CPS containment structure and internals is not jeopardized and the CPS containment response is bounded by the sensitivity study base case. From a temperature standpoint the drywell cumulative factor is less than unity. The containment and wetwell factor exceed unity by 2% and 12% respectively. However, no credit has been taken for CPS's lower predicted hydrogen inventory. Since less hydrogen is available to burn, less combustion energy is released to the compartments. It is judged that the lower hydrogen inventory offsets the wetwell temperature f actor such that all three compartments are bounded by the sensitivity base case. Furthermore, temperature effects impact only on equipment survivability which is being handled as a separate issue.
*The whichfinal doesspike not in the base exist case in the .is a fore ca sensitivity 9e.dcontainment burn
__ _ - ... .-- _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .-_-__=_ . - i Question 16 (cont'd) i References
! 1. "CLASIX-3 Containment Response Sensitivity Analysis i for the MP&L Grand Gulf Nuclear Station", Report No. OPS-37A15, December 1981.
i i
- 2. Letter from J. D. Richardson (Hydrogen Control Owners Group) to H. R. Denton (NRC) entitled " Hydrogen Control
{ Owners Group BUR-6 Mark III Containment Sensitivity Study for Hydrogen Generation Event", HGN-001, January 15, 1982. j 3. Clinton Power Station Preliminary Report on the Hydrogen Ignition System, October 16, 1981. I t J ( I i l
TABLE 16-1 SENSITIVITY PARAMETER FACTOR Wetwell Containment Release Containment Spray Cumulative Volume Initial Temperature Rates Flow Rate Factor Temperature Drywell 1.003 .990 1.0 1.0 0.99 Wetwell 1.009 .990 .977 1.15 1.12 Containment 1.009 .990 .974 1.05 1.02 Pressure Drywell 1.004 .995 1.0 1.0 1.00 Wetwell 1.004 .995 .953 1.06 1.01 Containment 1.005 .995 .957 1.05 1.00 Factor = Response Extrapolated Per CPS Parameters Response Based on GG SQRV Base Case
Question 17 Identify the most severe pool dynamic load conditions in the wetwell when considering the effect of hydrogen com-bustion in the drywell. Discuss the effects of the pool dynamic loads on the containment structures and the essential equipmcat within the zone of influence. Also, evaluate in a similar manner the most severe drywell negative differential pressure transient and the pool dynamic loads created within the drywell.
Response
The results presented in Appendix D of the CPS Hydrogen Ignition System report (1) show that Case 4 produces the most severe dif ferential pressures for pool dynamic load conditions for hydrogen combustion in either the drywell or wetwell. Case 4 is the long term extension of Case 1 which assesses a small break accident in the drywell. The limiting nature of this scenario is further demonstrated by the sensitivity study (2) submitted as part of the Mark III Hydrogen Control Owners Group program. For hydrogen burns in the drywell the differential pressure (drywell pressure minus wetwell pressure) is positive and could produce a pool swell transient in the wetwell. The differential pressure conservatively calculated for hydrogen burn is bounded by the differential pressure which would produce the design basis pool swell loads. Additionally, for hydrogen burns in the wet-well the differential pressure is negative and could produce a " weir swell" transient. Reverse vent flow and weir swell are part of the Clinton Station design basis . The decign basis differential pressure used to define these loads is equal to or greater than the differential pressure produced by wetwell hydrogen burns. Since the dif ferential pressures produced by hydrogen burns in the drywell or wetwell are bounded by LOCA induced differential pressures, the pool dynamic load conditions defined for LOCA events will be the most severe. Pool dynamic loads for LOCA have been included in the plant design. Refqrences:
- 1. Clinton Power Station, Preliminary Report on the Hydrogen Ignition System, October 16, 1981.
- 2. Clasix-3 Containment Responses Sensitivity Analysis Report No. OPS-37A15, December, 1981.
Question 18 Are there any accident sequences that might lead to the introduction of hydrogen and steam directly into the containment without having passed through the suppression pool?
Response
There are no accident sequences which could lead to signifi-cant introduction of hydrogen and steam directly into containment without first passing through the suppression pool. Virtually all reactor coolant pressure boundary pipes of a size which would result in containment overpressurization that pass through the containment are provided with guard pipes that vent to the drywell. The exceptions are as follows:
- 1. LPCI
- 2. LPCS
- 3. HPCS
- 4. RWCU (return line only)
The LPCI, CPCS and HPCS lines have a check valve inboard of the drywell penetration that will prevent blowdown to the contain-ment. The major components of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) are located within the containment. The system suction line penetrating the drywell has a guard pipe venting back to the drywell area. However, the RWCU return piping is not provided with a guardpipe. The ungarded portion of the RWCU system contains break detection and isolation systems that limit to acceptable values, the amount of fluid blowdown to the containment. As noted in FSAR, the RWCU system will be automatically isolated after detection of the leak by either differential subcompartmental pressures or unbalanced flow in the RWCU system. Small unisolatable instrument lines may also discharge primary system coolant directly to the containment. However each instrument line contains a %-inch diameter flow restriction orifice to limit the containment pressure increase to values well below the design pressure. This accident is discussed in Chapter 15 of CPS FSAR.
Question 19 Provide an evaluation of the potential and consequences of flame acceleration in the various containment regions including consideration of circumstances leading to transition to deto-nation.
Response
Flame acceleration leading to a transition to detonation requires the presence of highly accelerated flames and detonable concentrations of hydrogen in the presence of air. The siinul-taneous occurrence of these conditions in the Clinton Power Station containment is extremely remote and concomittantly so is transition to detonation. Specific design considerations included in the Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) and general containment design combine to preclude transition to detonation. The HIS will function to burn the hydrogen and prevent the formation of detonable hydrogen concentrations. The widely dispersed and redundant configuration of igniters prevents formation of hydrogen concentrations of significant geometric extent. Additionally, the majority of the containment volume consists of large open spaces. Based upon the available relevant test data in the open literature such geometric configurations are not conducive to transition to detonation.
J Question #20 Provide an analysis of the concomitant effects of the largest conceivable containment detonation which could occur. Demonstrate that the effects of such an event could be safely accommodated by structures and essential equipment. Also, provide an estimate of the limiting size of a cloud of detonable gas with regard to the structural capability of the containment shell and the drywell.
Response
This is essentially the same question that we responded to in i memorandum #U-0457; G. E. Wuller to J. R. Miller (NRC) dated April 13,1982 (see attachment) . Since submitting this memo, IPC has evaluated a draft of the Sandia National Lab report (NUREG/CR-2530), the many papers presented at the Second Internatonal Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Light Water Reactor Safety, Co. - sponsored by NRC/EPRI at Albuquerque, New Mexico on October 3 - 7, 1982 and other industry publications. From these evaluations, it is still IPC's opinion that the Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) will prevent both general and localized detonations. IPC is continuing to fund a hydrogen burn test program through EPRI as a member of the Hydrogen Control Owners Group (HCOG). We believe these tests, (when completed), will support IPC's contention. i i l i l
)
i
"' , . ~
' U-0457
- e. ILLIND/S PDit'ER COA / PAN Y N88-82(04-13)-o
\ , , , , 500 SOUTH 27TH STREET. DECATUR. ILLINOIS 62525 i- April 13, 1982 Mr. James R. Miller, Chief Standardization & Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Miller:
Reference:
Illinois Power letter 1/20/82, U-0403 G.E. Wuller, IP to James R. Miller, NRC, regarding Degraded-Core Hydrogen Control Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-461 Subsequent to conversations between J.H. Shepard of IP and C.P. Tan and C.G. Tinkler of the NRC on March 30 and 31, 1982, please find the attached response to Question #6 of the series ( of questions associated with confirmatory issue #6, Containment Ultimate Strength Analyses. It is believed that this response will close out this issue. Please let us hear if you have any questions on this material. Sincerely, p ,r
. G.E. hfWuller Lv . i Supervisor-Licensinc; Nuclear Station Engineering GEW/clh cc: J.H. 'Jilliams , :!RC Clinton Proj ect :!anager H.H Livermore, : RC Resident Inspector 9.R. Butler NRC CSB N.C. ChoksKi. MRC SE3 C.P Tan, ' RC SEB C.G. Tinkler, NRC CSB Illinois Dept. of ::uclear Safety bec: J. D. Geier H. 3. Pernins E. W. Kant J. H. Shepard / C" ' heeler C
H ', ::. Sroka (S&L) Fl. 23 Lt[_J M %d*Ydiff Y'ff' g. 11 . .itt (S&L) 29D33
~
z, ' . Question 16
, Even though an overall explosion in the containment is
( very unlikely because of the hydrogen control measures em-ployed, localized hydrogen detonation is still possible and should be considered. Provide an evaluation of the effects of localized det,onation on the containment structure and its penetrations. Resoonse The Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) is designed to prevent significant accumulation of detonable hydrogen mixtures. In order to prevent pocketing, large numbers of igniters are installed throughout the drywell and containment. These igniters burn hydrogen as it becomes flammable at hydrogen-air mixtures of 4-127,. This range of mixtures is well below the concentrations required for detonation. Localized pocketing of hydrogen is minimized by the design of the HIS. This design ensures that igniters are located in such a manner as to prevent significant areas of unignited hydrogen. The design criteria states that the inniters are spaced 30 feet or less apart with redundant electrical oower supolies. Even if oniv one igniter system is o'perable the maximum distance'between igniters will not exceed 60 feet. All subcompartments contain at least two igniters each serviced by a separate division of power. There are approximately 90 igniters in the system which are equally divided between the two power sources. Igniters will be positioned in the wetwell approximately 19.5 feet above the normal high water level to keep them from being affected by the pool swells, yet close enough to the pool to assure immediate hydrogen burning. Each of the two igniter system circuits is connected to a Class lE power source. The igniters will be manually turned on if the reactor water level drops to the top of the active fuel. This ensures that HIS *iill be operating long before hydrogen could be released from a postulated degraded core condition. Recent testing demonstrated adecuate mixing of hydrogen in the containment and drywell. This is described in the EP9I/ Ice Condenser test report titled, " Hydrogen :iixin and Districution in Containment Atmospheres," December 1981. by J. J. Wilder (TVA), F. G. Hudson (Duke Power), and K. K. Shiu (American Electric Powe'r). The report indicates that hydrogen mixes very well at the anticipated hydrogen flow rate. For examole at 13 minutes after hydronen rele.ase the maximum variatidn between the sampiina pdints'was only
- 25. These testa clearly indicate that licht casses like hjdro: yen mi:. very weil 'inside of volumes similar to reactor centainments.
l Appendix A Design Criteria for Hydrogen Ignitor System
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