ML20064B073

Environmental Assessment of the Thermal Neutron Activitation Explosive Detection System for Concourse Use at U.S. Airports

ML20064B073
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/31/1990
From:	Clint Jones NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
References
NUREG-1396, NUDOCS 9010090050
Download: ML20064B073 (160)

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NUREG-13% ~ Environmental Assessment of the Thermal Neutron Activation Explosive Detection System for Concourse Use at U.S. Airports s;Z $ ftd4*; %"" " C. G. Jones Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Omce of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 p '~% \\ h

y i i to Abstract 'this document is an environmental assessment of a sys-direct exposure of the public to scattered or leakage ra-tem designed to detect the presence of explosives in diation from the source and to induced radioactivity in checked airline baggage or cargo. 'Ihc system is meant to baggage items. Under normal operation and the most be instalicd at the concourse or lobby ticketing areas of likely acciden' scenarios, the environmental impacts that U.S. commercial airports and uses a scaled radioactive would be created by the proposed licensing action would source of californium-252 to irradiate baggage items, not be significant. 'ihe major impact of the use of this system arises from iii ' NUliGG-1396

Contents iii Abstract.................................................................................... 1 1 I n t rod u c t ion.............................................................................. 1.1 Backgrou nd.................. 4............................. ......s................. 1 1 1.2 Description of the Proposed Action...................................................... 1.3 Previous Environmental Assessments and Supporting Documents............................ 2 3 2 Need for t he Proposed Action.............................................................. 5 3 Explosive Detection System Model EDS-3C................................................... 5 3.1 Description of the Concourse System.................................................... 8 3.2 Properties of Californiu m-252.......................................................... 8 . 3.3 : Sa fe ty Feat u r es....................................................................... 4 Enviro n m e n t al I n t e rfaces.................................................................. '11 11 4.1 Syst e m l oca t ions..................................................................... 4.1.1 lichind the Check.I n Cou nter.................................................... 12 4.1.2 in Front of the Check.In Count er................................................. 12 4.1.3 Pa c.Ch eck.I n Arca.............................................................. 13 4.1.4 C u r bs id e Ar e a................................................................. 14 15 4.2 D e m og ra phy......................................................................... 16 4.3 So u rce Tra nsport.................................................................... 17 4.4 Scismology........................................................................... 5 Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action............................................... 19 19 51 M e t h od ol ory......................................................................... 19 5.1.1 Itegulations and Dose Criteria...... 19 5.1.2 Ex posu re Pa t hways............................................................. 20 5.2 Con st r uction i m pac t s,................................................................. 20 5.2.1 S it e It cqu ire m e n t s.............................................................. 5.2.2 LandUse..................................................................... 21 21 5.3 N onoperat ion al i m pact s................................................................ 21 5.3.1 Transportat ion................................................................. 5.3.2 System Installation and Sou rce Transfer............................................ 21 5.3.3 Itadiation Exposure During Maintenance........................................... 22 22 5.4 Operational and Itadiological Impacts.................................................... 5.4.1 N e ut ron Dose Conto u rs......................................................... 22 24 5.4.2 Itadiation Ex posu re of Workers................................................... 30 5.4.3 Itadiation Exposu re of Passengers................................................ 5.4.3.1 Behind the Check.In Cou nter............................................ 32 5.4.3.2 In Front of the Check in Counte r......................................... 32 33 5.4.3.3 Pre Check.In Arca.................................................... 5.4.3.4 C u rbsi d e Area........................................................ 34 5.4.4 Effects of Irradiation on Baggage Contents........................................ 34 l 5.4.4.1 Con su m abl e i t e ms...................................................... 35 36 5.4.4.2 Nonconsumabic items................................................ NUREG-1396 v

5.4.5 Su mmary of Coll ective Doses..................................................... 37 6 Effect s of Accid e n ts....................................................................... 39 6.1 So u rce-Transfe r Axid e nt s.............................................................. 39 6.2 Transportation Accidents............................................................... 39 6.3 O pe ra t ional Accide n t s................................................................. 42 7 D e co m m ission in g.......................................................................... 43 8 Al t e rna t ive s.............................................................................. 45 8.1 At t rib u t e s for E val ua tion............................................................... 45 8.2 Identification and Assessment of Alternatives............................................. 45 8.2.1 NoAction..................................................................... 46 8.2.2 H a n d S e a rc h................................................................... 46 8.2.3 'IN A Syst em in llamp Ar ea...................................................... 46 8.2.4 TN A Syst em in Concou rse Area.................................................. 47 8.2.5 TNA System With Enhanced Itadiation Protection................................... 47 8.3 Summary............................................................................ 48 9 S u m m a ry a nd Co ncl u sio n s.................................................................. 51 9.1 Summary of Environmental Im pacts..................................................... 51 9.2 !! asis for Finding of No Significant impact................................................ 51 10 I t e fe r e n ces............................................................................... 53 Appendices A Installation and Itadiation Safety Operating Procedures for EDS-3C 11 Tables in English System of Units Corresponding to Tables in Sections 5 and 6 C Dose llate and Fluence information for EDS-3C . D National Institute of Standards and Technology llepori on TNA System t 1q,.gures 3.1 1.cngthwise section of F *)S-3C.............................................................. 5 3.2 Cross-section of ED S-3 C at so u rce.......................................................... 6 3.3 Pe rspect ive view of EDS-3 C................................................................ 6 3.4 D im e n sio ns of E DS -3 C.................................................................... 7 3.5 Schematic for additional shielding for EDS-3C................................................ 7 3.6 Tamper. indicating paper seal 9 4.1 TN A explosive detection system with XENIS and diverter....................................... 11 4.2 llehind the check.in counter-pmposed setup for United Airlines at San Francisco I nt emational Ai rport.............................................. 12 NUREG-1396 vi

4.3 In front of check. in cou nter................................................................ 13 4.4 Pt c.ch eck. in ar ea......................................................................... 14 4.5 Curtu nde check in......................................................................... 15 4.6 Harrier system to protect TNA operating personnel, passengers, and others from intrusion by motenzed veh icl e s...................................................................... 1.6 5.1 Proposed EDS-3C at Dulles International Airport............................................. 21 5.2 EDS-3C source transport cask.............................................................. 22 5.3 Placement of cask for source transfer....................................................... 23 5.4 EDS-3 C shipping cask dose rat es............................................................ 24 5.5 'IN A system for lobby installation with isodose contours........................................ 24 5.6 Total dose equivalent rat es around EDS-3C.................................................. 28 6.1 1sodose contours for source wedged at interface of cask and EDS-3C............................. 39 Tables 5.1 Potential activation products (for slow neutrons) of baggage contents containing 1 kg (2.2.lb) tnasses of various elements...................................................... 25 5.2 Potential activation products (for fast neutrons) of baggage contents containing 1 kg (2.2.lb) masses of various elements...................................................... 27 5 3 Major activation products of baggage contents containing 1 kg (2.2 lb) masses of va no u s e l e m e n t s.......................................................................... 29 5.4 Calculated beta dose to the skin from a 3.7x104 Bq/cm' source................................... 30 5.5 Elemental composition of the contents of an aluminum suitcase................................. 31 5.6 Gamma dose rates from EDS 3C acthation of the contents of an aluminum suitcase................ 31 5.7 Committed effective dose equivalent from daily intakes of c!cments I hour after E D S.3 C rci e e n in g........................................................................ 36 5.8 Age de endence of sodium intake and dose conversion factors (specific activity of 8.1x10 Bqlg)........................................................................... 36 5.9 Summary of collective doses from all reenarios..............................................., 38 5.10 Summaty of annual individual hses from all scenarios......................................... 38 6.1 Maximum potential dose ec,ahalent rates from one 150.pg Cf.252 source following a sevC rC accid e n t a nd fire.................................................................... 40 6.2 Offsite concentrations [at 50 m (54 yd)} of airborne releases for various fractions of Cf.252........... 40 6.3 Annual inhalation dose to the nearest individual 50 m (54 yd) away from postulated Cf.2 5 2 accid e n t........................................................................... 41 6.4 Offsite concentrations [at 300 m (328 yd)] of airborne releases for various fractions of Cf.252......... 41 6.5 Annual inhalation dose to the nearest individual 300 m (328 yd) away from postulated Cf. 2 5 2 a ccid e n t........................................................................... 41 vil NUREO-1396

s I

1 ) j, ' 7.1 Major constituents of concrete and long-term activation products................................. 43 t ~ 8.1 ~ Construction costs for curbaide and indoor EDS-3C installations................................. 48 t. 't l' - 8.2 Value impact summary for airline explosive detection alternatives................................ 49 i + 'I l' f1-) !I i [;. f., i .4, 6 -i 4 Is 'T I I i ) I .i '1 l .) i .? i. 'i ? i f 1. i I i NUREG-1396 ' vili t +

i 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

tional airports. SAIC developed Model EDS-2, which was originally designed as a one of a kind prototype. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) became in. into the current production system (Model EDS-3), volved in developing an efficient explosive detection sys-which optimizes radiation levcis, cost, bulk, weight, and tem in the mid-1960s. Development efforts were initially complexity.1his system, licensed for ramp use in based on various technologies including vapor detection August 1989, uses less than half the amount of califor-by olfactory (e.g., canines) and instrumental (chromatog. niurn-252 (Cf-252) and only one-quarter the radiation raphy) means, x ray radiography, and several nuc! car shielding than did the original prototype, methods Although several of these technologies ap-peared promising, none of the early efforts yielded satis. The findings of the NRC erwironmental assessments factory results. associated with these two models were summarized and published in the Federal Register (54 FR 33636) on As a result of a rash of hijacking incidents in the early August 15,1989 (NRC,1989). The NRC concluded that 1970s, Congress recognized the need to increase the over, the environmental effects of normal use of the TNA all security of the U.S. airspace and airport system. In the system in baggage. M cargo-handling ramp areas would Anti llijacking Act of 1974, Public law 93-366 FAA was be insignificant. assigned the responsibility for research and development in aviation security. In the late 1970s and 1980s, FAA 1,2 nescription of the Proposed Action sponsored several programs to develop and demonstrate a prototype explosive detection system using thermal fly letter dated August 22,1989, FAA (the licensce) sub-neutron activation (INA) analysis.The initial attempts at mitted a proposed amendment to its existing NRC IJ-developing prototype systems showed that explosive de-cense No. 29-13141-05 to operate n 1NA cxplosive de-tection using 1NA analysis was technically feasible, but tection system for routine screening of checked baggage scanning times were too long for practical application $. in the lobby or concourse areas of international airports. For concourse installations, additional shiciding is added In Septernber 1985, FAA awarded Science Applications onto the sides of the EDS-3 near the source, underneath International Corporation (S AIC) a contract to develop a the outer pancis (see Section 3.1).'Ihis new 1NA system second generation, improved 1NA explosive detection has been designated as EDS-3C and has been issued system (EDS) that could screen a larger number of bags Certificate of Registration CA-590 D-118-S (Califortua and, in general, was more suitable for the operational Department of Ilealth Services,1990). It is estimated that screening of baggage (SAIC,1988). Since 1985, one dem* these systems (or their equivalent) will be installed at onstration prototype and six other smaller production more than 200 major airports in the next 5 years and will models have been, or are in the process of being, built for be used to screen luggage on international flights (U.S. FAA.To test the explosive detection capabilitics of these Department of Transportation,1989). The term " con-models, simulated explosives whose elemental composl* course arca" refers to the area that is used in conjunction tion and shape and, therefore, system response were simi-with passenger ticketing and baggage check in operations lar to those of actual explosives specified by FAA were and is usually located in the main terminal area. The used. 'Ihese simulated explosives have been validated by proposed action involves the following: tests in the laboratory by comparing them with actual explosives (SAIC,1988). Tests of the latest production (1) Modification of existing concourse areas (or con-model, EDS-3, showed Ihat the system could clear all but struction of new ones) to allow installation of an 3 to 5 percent of the bags that did not contain explosives. EDS-3C. If existing concourse space is insufficient, this could include additional construction of struc-In 1988, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Com-tural supports or the rebuilding of the ticketing mission or NRC) began assessing the environmental ef-areas for operation of the system. fects of installing and operating the prototype TNA sys-(2) Installation of one Cf-252 source in an EDS-3C, tem (Model EDS-2) at the ramp level of an airport. This containing 150 micrograms ( g) [80 millicuries included assessmg scenanos for possible mternal expo-(mci)). This includes transportation of the source sure of both workers and passengers, possible exposure of w thin a shielded cask to the EDS-3C from outside passengers or other members of the public who may con-the m.rport, sume irradiated food items packed in luggage, anticipated radiation doses, possible exposure resulting from mal. Since most systems will be placed in existing airport facili-functions of the'IN A system,and several types of plausi-ties, each site will differ in terms of site-specific consid-ble accidents. In February 1989, the NRC issued a license crations, such as distances from the ticket counters to the to FAA to use the prototype on the ramp level of interna-EDS-3C, occupancy statistics in the airport, number of 1 NUREG-1396

l introduction passengers, waiting time for tickets and boarding passes, Engineering laboratory (INEL) assessed for the NRC and vehicular traffic. For this assessment, actual design the emironmental effects of the EDS-2 in the " Environ. and construction information from six international air-mental Assessment for Explosive Detection Systems Us-ports in this country was used to create a "model airport" ing Thermal Neutron Activation for Airline Baggage in-for calculating radiation dose and estimating the effect of spection"(INE1.1988). On August 15,1989, the NRC possibic accident scenarios. staff published a Finding of No Significant Impact in the federalRegister ($4 FR 33636), which provided the evalu-1.3 Previous Environmental ation and summary of the erwironmental effects of using the EDS-3 at the ramp levels of airports (NRC,1989). Assessments and Supporting Finally, SAIC submitted to the NRC an emironmental Documents report related to the proposed EDS-3C for concourse installation in October 1989 and a revised report in re-Several environmental documents have been prepared sponse to NRC questions in December 1989 (SAIC, that are specific for the previous FAA license application 1989). For further technical details with respect to presi-for SAIC Models EDS-2 and EDS-3. FAA submitted an ous assessments, see the documents that are contained in environmental report in support of the first prototype Docket Number 030-30885 at NRC's Region 1 Public device in February 1988 and a revised report for public Document Room,475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, release in June 1988. In September 1988, Idaho National Pennsylvania 19406. I i NUREG-1396 2 l rr - ~,

i 2 NEED FOR Tile PROPOSED ACTION 'the need for improved baggage security persists. Since check in area, and (4) at a curbside kication near the 1985, more than 425 lives have been lost, several aircraft concourse level. have been destroyed, and international commerce has been disrupted.'the nature of the security threat today is Even though the EDS-3 is curret ti; licensed for use at far different from (and far more dangerous than) that in the ramp level of airports where baggage is sorted for the early 1970s when sercening of passengers and luggage loading aboard plancs and has been sb.)wn to have a high first began. Previously, the primary threat was hijacking. sensitivity for detecting explosives in baggage, there has Currently, it is sabotage by international terrorists seek-been some difficulty in resolving false positive ("nui-ing to influence the behavior of governments through acts sanec" or " false") alarms on a small percentage of all bags of violence against commercial aviation (U.S. Ilouse of inspected. 'lhese alarms are presumed to be real until Representatives,1989). they arc proven to be falsc.Various methods are used for resolving the problem of false alarms, but the method Although the first six'INA systems are owned and oper-currently used is to open and hand scarch the bag, which ated by FAA, the subsequent widespread use of these (under FAA regulations) must be donc in the presence of systems would be by the airline carricts rather than FAA. the passenger. At John F. Kennedy (JFK) International On September 5,1989 FAA published a final rule that Airport, where the EDS-3 has been in operation since would require, by amendment under Section 108.25 of September 1989, the only way to do this is by paging and Title 14 of the Code ofFederalRegulations (14 CFR), that locating the passenger in the termmal, havmg the passen. each airline carrier use an explosive detection system that has been approved by tbc FAA Administrator to screen ger come to the *INA area, and hand inspecting the lug-checked baggage on international flights (see U.S. Dc. gage in question. At JFK Airport,it uns taken up to l hout partment of Transportation,1989). So far, the only explo, to kicate a passenger and resolve the alarm problem. At sive detection systems that have been approved are Sci. many proposed airport sites, the only practical way to ence Applications Internationni Corporation (SAIC) screen luggage for explosives is to locate the system so Models EDS-3 and EDS-3C. Once this rule is enforced, that it is near the arca where the baggage is checked in (at an estimated 200 to 400 TNA systems will have to be the concourse level) so that the passenger is immediately licensed in both this country and abroad. FAA, in its availabic to give his or her consent to open bags that cause continuing program to colltet operating data in various an alarm. This environmental assessment addresses the airport environments, has requested the NRC to evaluate expected environmental effects associated with the pro-the 'INA system in one of four possible areas on the posed operation of and the construction that might be concourse level of airports:(1)behind the check in pre-necessary for SAIC Model EDS-3C at concourse loca-counter, (2) in front of the check in counter, (3) at a tions of international airports in the United States. 3 NURl!G-1396

3 EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEM MODEL EDS-3C 3.1 Description of the Concourse then cast into place. Sheet metal panels, not shown on the g,3gg section drawings, cover the entire system for cosmetic y purposes. Model EDS-3C is shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Daggage b loaded onto a conveyor, passes over one source contain-ne TNA systern consists of three major pieces of equip-ing 150 pg(80 mci)of californium 252(Cf 252), and then ment: the diverter, the XENIS (x ray enhanced neutron leaves the system at the opposite end.The Cf 252 doubly inspection system), and the EDS-3C. nc EDS-3C is the c ncapsulated scaled source is located inside a moderated only piece that is too heavy to be placed directly on the e ssembly containing heavy metal panels to shield against floor without supplemental structural support.The over-the direct gamma rays from the source.The principle of all area needed for the installation of the EDS-3C, the operation is based on the property of nuclei of elements diverter, and the XENIS is approximately 41 m2 (438 fte), in baggage absorbing the moderated neutrons and emit-ting gamma rays with energies characteristic of a particu-ne1NA system consists of three modular sections with a lar element, such as nitrogen, which is a major constit uent oss weight of 12,700 kg (28,000 lb) to facilitate transpor-of all common,cxplosives. By usmg many detectors and tation. The end sections weigh 2,720 kg (6,000 lb) cach, requirmg data m short time slices, the system is able t are supported on four legs, and impose a uniform load of generate an image of the nitrogen distribution.nc high-17 kilopascals (kPa)[353 pounds per square foot (psf)] on n,ttrogen density allows the system to distinguish explo-the floor area below the unit. The center section weighs sty s from benign high nitrogen materials like wool or 7,260 kg (16,000 lb), is supported on eight legs, and im-poses a uniform load of approximately 22.4 kPa (467 psi) on the floor area below the system. Rese three sections Figure 3.? shows the EDS-3C completely assembled with are secured together at each installation site before the the exterior panels. The mechanical structure is made of source is inserted. Figure 3.4 shows the dimensions of iluminum channels and beams welded together, with a Model EDS-3C. For concourse installations, additional welded on outer shellof 5 mm(3/16 in.) aluminum. Alu-shleiding is added on the sides of the system near the minum was chosen because oi ns lowinteraction rate with source, underneath the outer panels (Figure 3.5), his neutrons and therefore minor production of activation model (EDS-3C) has additional shielding consisting of gamma rays, as compared with other choices such as steel, plates of lead [0.64 cm (1/4 in.) thick) and polyethylene The structure is filled with moderators of low atomic [approximately 2.5-cm (1 in.) thick). nese plates occupy number (mainly paraffin laaded with boric acid) and is hollow spaces in the outer panels, which are made of Radiation Shielding Detectors ' MM/ /.gMB p,'O d / Shielding m o q Doors Cf-252 Source baggage ' N In ,m Modorating Assembly Rad.ation Shiekting Figure 3.1 Lengthwise section of IIDS-3C 5 NUREG-1396

i I l 3 Model EDS-3C 1, j t.Nm l 1 Gamma Detectors ~ = I a.oo.oo ss=os i Outer Shot NN tasm .// E: Cf452 Neutron Source Source 1raneser Tube "j i j M . e an l / x comme m Fletracted SourIPosition Pb Gamma Shielding Figure 3.2 Cross section of EDS-3C at source J l 1 1 { N l i Y Y / / ,\\ / \\ x N b Figure 3.3 Perspective view of EDS-3C NUltl!G-1396 6 l

3 ModelEDS-3C i d, 7 l 2.24m 1Dm J i o iP Plan Yew J \\_ 7 N o ci-2s2 source i l 1.75m 4 132m L!J Deveson Figure 3A Dimensions of EDS-3C r ., p-gia GMWK1 It,#ie!L Y$'kb .5&b g? m.m. l g,,.....i r i..x.n..;.i l- .i I L Figure 3.5 Schematic for additional shielding for EDS-3C. Shaded areas show location of added shielding, 7 NUREO-1396 i

3 Model EDS-3C 14 gauge steel. This shiciding significantly reduces the 3.3 Safety Features exterior dose rate. Downward shielding has also been added in the moderating assembly.'lhe spaces above and The following safety features have been incorporated in bclow the ends of the baggage cavity contain detector the concourse version of the EDS-3 (i.e., EDS-3C): clectronics, the system computer, electronics cooling equipment, electric distribution components, conveyor e lhe outer shield doors are key locked when the belt motors, and pulleys. EDS-3C is unattended. Three pivoted pancis of borated polyethylene,and lead at .Ihc outer shield doors are interlocked so that if the cach end of the stem attenuate the radiation cmatted from cither end o the EDS-3C(see Figurc 3.1).The end system opuntor removes the computer system key pancls are 10 cm (4 in.) thick and swing about vertical axes before locking the shicided 600:5, an alarm is s unded, with return springs. The four inner pancis hang from a horizontal pivot point with a cam spring arrangement in case of a baggage jam, the source can be with-e that allows them to be pushed up casily by the baggage. lf the spring mechanism were to fail, it would fall in the drawn man Jally to a retracted position, allowing re-closed position because of the weight of the panels. Indi-trieval of luggage stuck in the cavity while the radia-vidual position sensors for each panel are coupled to an tion fields are lower. indicator light on the main panel to show that the doors 1hc source is always confined within several layers are closing when there is no baggage. of shielding, and a locked panel covers the Teleflex 3.2 Properties of Californium-252 A tamper-indicating seal is used (see Figure 3.6) to Californium 252 (Cf 252) decays by both alpha emission show if tampering has been attempted. and spontaneous fission and has an effective half life of 2.646 years. The dominant decay mechanism is alpha e A baggage activation monitor checks all baggage decay, and the alpha emission rate is about 32 t,mes that passing through thc1NA system for excessive radia-i forspontaneousfission. A1 pgsampleofCf 252willemit tion levels. This monitor is equipped with both audi-1.97x107 alpha particles and undergo 6.14x105 spontane-b!c and visible indicators. The sensitivity is adjusted ous fissions per second (Knoll,1979).The neutron energy to a level that will ensure that any bag that has a sur-spectrum peaks at about 1.0 megaclectronvolt (hicV), face dose rate of more than 5 Sv/hr (0.5 mrem /hr) tithough a significant r. umber of neutrons have energies will trigger the monitor, ts high as 8 or w hicV. Cf-252 cmits 2.34x1052 neutrons per second per gram and 1.3x1053 photons per second per gram of natcrial, exclusive of internal conversion x rays. A permanent "Itadioactive hiatcrial" sign with iso-No beta r sdiation has been reported from the decay proc-tope identification and dated source strenEth is lo-ess. "Ihc bett, radiation associated with the equilibrium cated at the locked panels that cover the source cable. fission products during spontaneous fission is easily ab-sorbed and does not contribute significantly to dose rates Caution signs indicating a high radiation area are o (E.1. du Pont de Nemours and Company,1971), placed at the entrance and exit of the system. A The neutron fluence rate at 1 m(3.3 ft)for 1 gof Cf 252is " Caution-Itadioactive biaterials" sign is placed on 1.9x10' neutrons / cm2 s, the absorbed dose rate in tissue top of the system. is 2.84 grays (Gy)/hr (284 rad /hr), and the dose equivalent Additional shiciding barriers are used in any instal-is 24 sicverts (Sv)/hr (2400 rem /hr). lation where the public might otherwise be exposed I?or the EDS-3C, a 150-pg doubly encapsulated, scaled to the radiation field from the exit and entrance of neutron source (Frontier Technology hiodel 100 series or the TN A system. ' Amersham hiodel CVN.CY6)is used (California Depart-ment of Ilealth Services,1989). The source is n.cchani-A sign will be prominently displayed informing pas-e cally attached to the end of a Teleflex cable and is held by sengers that their luggage will be screened with a o locking compound. The cable is approximately 5 mm new type of detection system to detect the presence (3/15 in.)in diameter, and the source adapter is 9 mm of plastic explosives. Passengers will be advised to (3/8 in.)in diameter.The source can be withdrawn manu-re" needed items from their luggage before &lly to a retracted position, which lowers radiation levels 1. 9 ; screening. Passengers will not have access in the baggage cavity to allow rou'.ine in cavity mainte-to . ige contents once the luggage has gone nance or to release a baggage jam. througn the !!DS-3C and has been banded with NUlti!O-1396 8

3 Model EDS-3C f-- \\

= ----.__

e < ENTRANCE = EXIT d j g a)' PAPER SEAL-LOCK SOURCE ACCESS PANEL 15533) b) m__% Fig (ure 3.6 Tamper indicating paper seal. a) Placement,(b) full size sample t tamper resistant security tape. In addition, hand-tamper indicating seal by the operator during han-outs will be available for those members of the pub-dling of the source or by actual or attempted l lic who request more information. tampering. A special shielded cask designed to reduce external e In addition, severalinternal safety features have been radiation fields during transfer is used to move the added', source to or from the EDS-3C. o Environmental monitors are used to monitor possi-o A log book is used to record all routine maintenance, transfer of the source, retraction of the source, ble radiation doses in the area. opening of computer and high voltage access doors, One ion chamber gamma ray survey meter and one personnel entering the baggage passageway (includ-e ing duration), baggage jams (including reasons for neutron rem meter will be kept at each site for use jams), inspections, emergencies, and breakage of by the TNA operators. .t f i 9 NUREG-1396

l 4 ENVIRONMENTALINTERFACES Figure 4.1 shows the TN A system attached to an x ray 4.1 System 14Catl0nS inspection system labeled "XENIS"(x ray enhanced neu-tron inspection system). 'The 'INA system consists of a In lobby (concourse) installations, the TNA system is standard commercial baggage and cargo inspection sys-proposed to be installed at or near the ticket counter of aatem cou led to an image processmg computer. X ray mternational airline, or at a terminal's curbside check-m image in onnation is combmed with the nitrogen distribu-area. For cach of the scenarios, an airline baggage han-tion image informat, ion from the EDS-3C in a separate dier will feed the baggage into the system. As cach bag computer, which cortclates the information so that a deci. leaves the system, the computer will identify each bag sion can be made regarding the presence or absence of a with a " clear" or " alarm" signal from the'INA system. In bomb (SAIC,1989). This combination of technology has case of an alarm, the bag will be passed through the cut the false positive rate m approumately half. XE,NIS EDS-3C again. If the bag still alarms, the bag will be also produces a combmed tmage that can assist a tramed removed to a secure arca and will be opened by the security operator in resolving many of the remammg security attendant with the consent of the passenger, if alarms, thus further reducmg the number of passengers the passenger does no.t consent, he or she will not be whose bags must be opened. the use of XENIS adds alIowed to boatd the airplanc. about $150,000 to the total cost of the installation, as well as requires additional space. The desirability of lobby installation stems from the FAA The following four locations for lobby installations are requirement to have the pavenger present when his or evaluated in this assessment: her luggage is hand scarched. In the ramp installation, as explained earlier, there is no convenient way to contact (1) Ikhind the check in counter the passenger when a piece of luggage causes the TNA system to alarm, perhaps 30 minutes or more after initial (2) In front of the check.in counter check in. Current methods used to locate these passen-(3) Pre check in area gets at J FK International Airport have taken on the aver-age approximately 1 hour. (4) Curbside area l 18m oespeble w itm. I_ 43m Elm W h um exnosuc octcenow sysitu f' Q ..{NIS SYSTW exrt smwo vat - g1,c,c gg ,,q- - 1 I E l N / outsta necturn twtu nsm $ N*E., ,op vicw CLEARANCE Pt AlWETER I \\ / tm 'u'* M* l \\ l U N I wauniuunuiuniiirr><]"u ' uutn&r"/i""'ii'""/"'" un rJot \\iEW Figure 4.1 TN A explosive detection system with XENIS and diverter 1i NUltliG-1396

4 Environmeltal12 ten. ices 4.1.1 Behind the Check in Counter 4.1.2 In Front of the Check In Counter in this scenario, thc 1NA system would be placed behind This scenario is similar to the one described in Section the counter (probably behind airline personnel) where 4.1.1. cxcept that the entrance to the EDS-3C would be the passengers check their baggage and get their airline in the public area in front of the check in counter (Figure tickets. Figure 4.2 shows one proposed setup for United 4.3), while the crit of the EDS-3C would be behind the Airlines at San Francisco In:Naational Airport. While ticket counter. Passengers would hand their luggage to a the passenger's passport, ticket, and seat assignment 'IN, Airline attendant who would place it on the conveyor were being checked, the baggage would be placed on a belt entering the TNA rystem. The passengers would conveyor belt, which has two 90' turns, and enter the then wait in line at the check in counter, check to make 1NA system. lf thc 1NA system air-ned, the passenger sure that their bags had passed the TNA check, and be would be asked to step to the end or the counter where issued boarding passes. If a piece of luggage did not clear the intpection striion is located to have the baggage the TNA system, the, passenger would be available to opened.The passenger would not receive a boarding pass witness a hand inspection at a nearby inspection counter, until the baggage had been cleared. For international check in,which takes approximately 5 minutes per person Members of the public could stand immedi1stely next to at the counter, one 1NA system could service about the 1NA system un! css a barrier was crecMd, which 30 check in positions. would increase the 1NA system's already ccmsiderable size. A variation of this approach would be to have the body of the TNA system behind the counter with only the entrance in front of the counter; this probably would bc This scenario, in some respects, is similar to that for the more difficult and expensive to integrate into an existing ramp EDS-3, which has been in operation at JFK Inter-

airport, national Airport since September 1989. Passengers would still not be permitted to be next to the machine, but An advantage of this scenario over the one described in would, however, be able to view the EDS-3C from the Section 4.1.1 would be that two airlines with adjacent ticket counter, ticket counters could both use the TNA system to screen Passenger Check-in Area t

[ IC8P"** ,e *p n gf 'f ,r-%s TNA c o o / o o o O O o e g ei Figure 4.2 lichind the check in counter-proposed setup for United Airlines at San Francisco international Airport (* indicates location of an agent) NUltliG-1396 12

l:. 0 4 Environmentallnterfaces l AIR TERMINAL ENTRANCE L DACCACC bI / \\ f I TNA N / CHECK.m CH(CHaN k [ ] [- )[ }[ } [ }[ )I ){ ) l ~ fE"We%E* Figure 4.3 In front of.acck in counter . l luggage. In this case, two airlines could share the respon-station near the exit, perhaps at a table placed there for. sibility and cost of operating the 'INA system. Although that purpose In addition, other members of the general j two airlines could also. share the 'INA system as illus-public or airline employees might come close to the TNA ' trated in Figure 4.2, it would be much more difficult.. system as they walked about the terminal. 1 4-1.3 Pre-Check In Area An advantage of this scenario is that many airlines could j use this one system for screening international luggage, y In this scenario, the EDS-3C would be placed in an open Passengers typically must arrive several hours before area near the terminal entrance and check in locations their scheduled flight is to depart, therefore allowing (Figure 4.4). When the luggage was cleared by the TNA plenty of time to have their checked luggage screened. If . system, the attendant at the exit would band it with passengers allowed enough time for this screening proc-tamper resistant security tape and return it to the passen-ess at the beginning of Iheir travel plans, there most ger,flhe passenger would then take it to the check in probably would be no significant scheduling delays. 1 . counter of the appropriate airline, where it would bc . ci.ecked.in for delivery to the aircraft. Several disadvantages are also foreseen in regard to this scenario. Since the passengers would have access to their

Fassenger;: whose bags were being inspected would come luggage immediately after TNA screening, they would be j

Lto the entrance of the TN A system, walk alongside as the cxposed to the potentially radioactive contents for a time bags were goiag through, and wait at the exit of the sys-depending on the scheduled departure. If a flight was tem, llags resulting in an alarm would be opened at a cancelled after a passenger's luggage was scaaned by a = 13 NUlmG-1396 t k ^h

o1 4 ; EnvironmentalInterfaces AIR TERutNAL [NTRANCE DAGGAGC IN -( / h TNA N \\ BAGcAcE 001 l pm = l I w to I l w I - 1 =cacal TICKET ANo CHECK-IN CoVNitRS i i Figure 4.4 Pre-check-in area = TNA system,' the passenger would have the slightly. way construction would be used in these installations I activated luggage for a longer period than during any of (Figure 4.6). The passengers wculd still hand their lug- .j the other scenarios. This additional dose has been calcu. gage to an airline baggage handler (" sky-cap"), wait for J lated and is assessed in Section 5.4.3.3. the clear signal from the TN A computer, and then receive l their claim checks after the luggage left the system. In case of an alarmed bag, the passenger would be available 4.1.4 Curbside Area to witness a hand inspection, if necessary, o For this installation, the TNA system would be placed Pessengers would come within several feet of the 'INA 1 along the departure curb of an airport, similar to where system when they delivered their bags and, depending on curbside check-in for domestic flights is now permitted. the design of the installation, might walk alongsidc the J . Because the TN A system could be located in an area that system (as discussed in Section 4.1.3) to the exit. Alterna-would not be sheltered from the elements, it would have tively, they might wait for a clear signal near the inspec-to be enclosed within' a small building (as is currently tion station. Other members of the public might also pass i down with the IMS-3 at JFK International Airport). In near the system, but probably fewer than those in the .j addition, this enclosure would have to be protected from pre. check-in scenario. i vehicular traffic in the area adjacent to the system. Figure j '4.5 illustrates the type of bar* ' and setup that would be The TN A system is affected by temperature and humidity required for this option. Vehlue barriers and Jersey walls inmuchthesamewayas anyother electronic equipment (concrete median barriers) similar to those used in high-might be. Internal thermal design considerations have 3 i LNUltliG-1396 14 ./ [i

4 4 Enviro 0mentalInterfaces ' 1 _e PAESENGER PASSENGER DROP OFT Dh0P OFF 20NE 20NE r man g aC91EENB00 5 8.T.) E a-d ExrT EXff DONOT DO NOT ENTRANCE ENTEM ENTRANCE ENTER r ~~~~ W W TcnaNAL statDwo Figure 4.5 Curbside check in resulted in the specification of ac circuits, fans, ducting, who may be at the airport, as well as employees who work ? and thermostatically controlled heaters (SAIC,1989). at the airport but who do not normally frequent the main Rapid changes in temperature (such as a stream of sub-ticketing area of the airport, zero air directly into the scanning chamber) could result in some damage of the detector or temporary malfunction The population density in the vicinity of the EDS-3C at of the computer equipment. A small building, such as the concourse installations of airports will vary with location. i one built for the EDS-3 at JFK International Airport, However, the number of passevers whose baggage is would be suitable for protecting both the operating per-screened by conventional x ray cybipment is known.'Itc j sonneland the EDS-3C from the elements. As in the case following list shows the number of people screened annu-of any construction, buildings will have to be in compll-ally at eight major international airports in the United - ance with local building codes and any other regulatory States (see SAIC,1988): requirements.- t i Airport People screened San Francisco 22.6 million 1'lhere are two types of workers who could have contact JFK 14.9 million

with the EDS-3C

those who would work directly with the

. EDS-3C (such as the operators and baggage handlers) s Angeles 89.7 milh.on a

and those whose duties wouki bring them infrequently Chicago-O' Hare 69.8 million

~ . near the EDS-3C (such as airline ticketing agents, super. Miami 12.7 million visory personnel, and baggage cart drivers). DM 3D dlim ' Forpurposesof thisdocument,thepublicisdef' edasall Dallas.Ft. Worth 70.4 million m those who are not workers as defined abov.:. This includes Dulles 6.6 million -all passengers and those members of the general public 15 NUREG-1396

I ,4 Environmentallnterfaces 'I-Barrier system to be two phased. Phase one would consist of a '- deficcting shield such as is used to separhic opposed lanes of traffic. In cross section.. r i / Phase two would be fluid-filled, collapsible barrels such as are used to absorb the impact of a motor vehicle. Doth these syv tems are currently in common use on California highways. Curb i / + e Phase one banier /,,, y EDS enclosure Phase two barrier i i Figure 4.6 Ilarrier system to protect TNA operating personnel, passengers, and others from intrusion by motorized vehicles 2 ~'the number of domestic and international yassengers operations of U.S. certified route air carriers enplane. enplaning in the United States during the yee,1985 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,1989). From 1987 statistics, through 1987 has continued to increase, as she e oclow we can estimate the number of passengers in an average . (U.S. Bureau of the Census,1989); airport to be: i' l 448.913.700 departing passengers = 16,032.600 passengers /yr Number in millions - 28 large hubs Percent The average number of passengers on a daily basis would ' Passengers 1985 1986 1987-Increase be approximately 44,000 (16,032,600/365).' Although only. a small fraction of these passengers would be going on d Domestic 357 394 .416 ~14.2 international travel, many of these passengers could pass - International 25 25 31 19.4 near the EDS-3C. The' radiological impacts of the EDS-3C located on the concourse level of airports are discussed in Section 5.4. If these trends' continue at this rate, an estimated 1 - 38 million international passengers could travel in 1990. 4.3 Source Transport The number of passengers traveling through each airport The average distance from the supplier of Cf-252 sources daily can be estimated by dividing the total number of (located in Ohio) to various airport locations is approxi-passengers departing by the number of large airport mately 1900 km (1200 mi). Because Cf-252 has an effec- " hubs." A large hub is one at which at least 1 percent of tive half life of 2.646 years, periodic replacement of the the total revenue passengers using all services and all source is necessary to maintain the deeired neutron NUltl!G-1396 16 = =

4 EmironmentalInterfaces fluence in the EDS-3C chamber cavity. On the basis of 4,4 SejSm0 logy the estimated frequency of replacing one Cf-252 source annually, one truck shipment per EDS-3C would be ex. Several of the airports that would be stated for a TNA pected on local and interstate highways cach year. Since system are located in earthquake areas. The most likely local roadways Eoing to and from cach airport are cur. effect of an carthquake on the EDS-3C would be the rently heavily traveled by cargo and industrial traffic, an shiftmg i the three major sectio,ns of the TNA system slightly apart, which could result m gaps in the system's additional truck shipment Pcryear due to EDS 3C opera-shiciding. To prevent this, each jomt is tied together by tion is not expected to be noticeable in existing traffic on four joining plates attached by six large bolts. A TNA local roads leading to the interstate highways. Since the system was assembled and operating at SAIC's Santa - estimated operationallifetime of the TNA systems is 15 Clara, Califorma, facility during the October 17, 1989, years, a total of 15 shipments is enticipated for each sys-Loma Pricta carthquake, which measured 7.1 on the tem.Estimatesof transportationaccidentsinvohingship-Richter scale. No effects on the TNA system were ob-ments of radioactive material are discussed in Section 6. served, and the integrity of the source was maintained. 17 NURiiG-1396

5 ENVIRONMENTALIMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 5.1 Methodology The dose equhalent (H) from external exposure from sources of ionizing radiation depends on the absorbed dose (D), the effective quality factor (Q), and other modi. 5.1.1 Regulations and Dose Criter.ia fying factors (N) that may be specifict The NRC promulgates regulations and establishes stan-dards for protection against radiation arising out of activi. H = DxQxN ties conducted under licenses issued by the Commission. where These requirements as set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulatiom (10 CFR), Part 20, state:

1. is in units of sicvert (or rem)

Persons engaged in [ licensed) activi-D is in units of gray (or rad) ties...should, m addition to complym, g with the requirements set forth in this part, N is the product of any other modifying factors . make every reasonable effort to maintam radiation exposures, and releases of radio-The quality factor allows for the effect of higher energy active effluents to unrestricted arcas, as' low deposition along particle tracks produced by various ra-as is reasonably achievable. The term "as diation types such as neutrons, alpha particles, x rays, or low as is reasonably achievable" means as gamma rays, in ICRP Publication 21, a value of 2.3 is low as is reasonably achievable taking into given for Q for thermal neutrons. In 1985, the ICRP, and account the state of technology, and the in 1987, the National Council of Radiation Protection and economics of improvements in relation to Measurements (NCRP Report 91) recommended that benefits to the public health and safety, and the quality factor for neutrons be increased by a factor of othcr societal and socioeconomic consid-2 as an interim measure pending full revie~ F enort 40 of crations, and in relation to the utilization of the International Commission on Radiological Units atomic energy in the public interest. (ICRU) indicates that an increase by a factor of 2.5 is justified for neutrons, but states that further review is Currently,10 CFR Part 20 is being revised and will incor-appropriate. porate the most recent guidance from the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). This Because the EDS-3C is expected to be deployed at U.S. new guidance incorporates derived limits for intakes of carriers at airport locations worldwide, several interna-radionuclides that have been developed using updated tional regulatory agencies that have adopted a neutron metabolic and dosimetric models (ICRP Publications 23, quality factor of 20 will use this environmental assess-28, and 30). Radiation doses calculated in this environ-ment as a reference for licensing this system at airports. mental assessment reflect the new ICRP guidance per. Consequently, although the current NRC policy is to use taining to external and internal dosimetry, a neutron quality factor of 10, in this assessment a quality factor of 20 is used for both international agreement and Maximum allowed values of radiation dose that may be added conservatism. received by workers in restricted areas (EDS-3C opera-tors and assistants in this case) and those in unrestricted 5.1.2 Exposure Pathways areas (other non TNA workers, passengers, and mem-bers of the public)are provided by the NRC in the current Individuals who may receive radiation exposures due to 10 CFR Part 20: normal operations are divided into two major categories: EDS-3Cworkersandmembersof thegeneralpublic The Restricted areas mSv/yr (rem /yr) personnel assigned to operate the EDS-3C will be spe-cifically trained for TNA system operations. These per. Whole body; head and trunk; active sonnel will consist of the operator and other technical blood-forming organs; lens of assistants, such as baggage handlers and trained security cycs; or gonads 50 (5) specialists. Training for the TN A operators will consist of llands and forearms; feet and ankles 750 (75) lectures and courses in radiation physics, radiation safety, biological effects of radiation, instrumentation, radiation Skin of whole body 300 (30) control, and operating procedures during normal and ac-Unrestricted areas cident conditions. Each TN A operator will have to pass a radiation safety examination covering all of these items. \\\\, hole body (current regulations) 5(0.5) Other TN A workers will load and unload the bags on and Whole body (proposed regulations) 1(0.1) off the EDS-3C.These workers will be supervised by a 19 NUREG-1396

= .J' T5 limironmentalImpacts n g^ l flNA operator and will receive a more basic radiation J documents addressing public access control, security, ar-safety training course that is commensurate with their chitectural, mechanical, and electrical requirements of h limited duties.'Ihis type of training is consistent with the the project (Peacock,1989). Once the conceptual design training specified by 10 CFR Part 19, " Notices, Instruc-package has been completed, it should be submitted to . tions, and Reports to Workers: Inspections." Each indi-the owner, the primary user (the airline carrier), and the vidual who enters a restricted area under such circum. airport authority for initial review and approval, if the stances that he or she receives, or is likely to receive, a conceptual design is approved, the final design docu. dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent of the ments and contract can be drawn up.These documents values specified in 10 Cl R 20.101(a) will be required to should include drawings, specifications, cost estimates, wear personnel dosimeters llecause the only personnel and structural calculations showing the method of distrib-that might receive a quarterly dose in excess of 25 percent uting the load and/or reinforcing the floor structure. will be the EDS-3C operators, they will be the only'INA employees required to wear personnel dosimetry (neu-5.2.1 Site Requirernents tron and gamma). 'Ihc 'INA operator will be the only authorized user who may manipulate the source, perform lobby or concourse'IN A systems can be placed at various the passage maintenance, and extract jammed baggage. locations, as discussed in Section 4.1. large, open ticket-ing areas on the ground level of an airport are desirable Non/INA workers, passengers, and members of the for concourse use of the EDS-3C because of the consid-public could be exposed to the low levels of radiation that crably reduced cost of installation. Because present air-might exist around the "INA system. There are three port facilities have not been planned for a system aslarge major exposure pathways to the public: exposure of or as heavy as the EDS-3C, finding a suitable location in persons on the concourse level near the EDS-3C, direct an existing airport may be difficult. Most installations will radiation exposure of passengers to bela or gamma ficids require significant floor-loading studies before a site is j . from luggage that has been through the EDS-3C, or selected and, in some cases, may even require building a [ internal dose to passengers or other members of the facility specifically constructed for the system (curbside - public who consume a food or other irradiated item that scenario). I was contained in the reclaimed luggage. Each of these 3 exposure scenarios is evaluated in detailin Section 5.4.3. In addition to the requirements above, the surface under the system must be horizontal and level to within about l 5.2 Construction Impacts 6 mm (1/4 in.) so that the system's modular components l can fit together and align properly. Additional space must .The EDS-3C site area will be designed and modified so as also be provided near the EDS-3C to store the cask and to mimmize construction impacts. All airport construc' the additional radiological instrumentation that would be uon activities to accommodate the system will comply necessary in case of an emergency, with Federal, State, and local regulations governing i hcalth and safety during construction, as will all opera-For installations at existing facilities, it may be necessary tions m connection with the transportation, storage, and to build up the surface with cement grout to ensure that use of radioactive material. %ork will bc monitored by the cask will roll casily and align with the source-loading the airport authority at cach site location, who, m most 1 p sitions. cases, also will be the governing authority issuing the initial construction permit. Transportation of the baggage from the EDS-3C to the A structural engineering study will be required to ensure baggage holding area for loading onto aircraft also must j that the weight of the EDS-3C can be accommodated be provided for. This may require additional space for q safely on the concourse level of airports. Airport passen. baggage carts near the EDS-3C or near the ticket ger departure and arrival areas are generally built to a counter. There also must be a 2-m (6.6-ft) clearance on much higher live load rating than the elevated floors the side of the EDS-3C where the source is inserted for within the airport terminal. Ilowever, because the access to the source cask. elevated-floor structure of airport terminals varies be-cause of substantial differences in design, the structural if the EDS-3C is located over an occupied area,it may be requirements could change significantly from airport to necessary to add neutron and gamma ray shiciding, cither airport.The exceptionally heavy k)ading of the EDS-3C between the EDS-3C and the floor or to the ceiling combined with the requirement to place these systems on underneath. The shielding shall be sufficient enough to the concourse levels of airports creates the greatest vari-bring the dose rates to less than 1 Sv/hr (0.1 mrem /hr) f able in the design of an installation, on the ceiling of the level below the EDS-3C. If a load distribution platform is incorporated into the <*csign of Using the information from the structural engineer-the concourse installation, then this shiciding.aould be ing study, a design team should develop conceptual incorporated into it. NUlWG-1396 20 y d

L ei 5 EnvironmentalImpacts I i I 5.2.2 Land Use ferred from the cask (see Figurc 5.2) to the system. Radia- ) tion exposure to individuals could occur during transport At the proposed Dulles International Airport site, the of the Cf 252 source and during its installation or opera-TNA system will be installed at the United Airlines inter-tion at the airpott. b national ticket counter. As shown in Figure 5.1, the XENIS and the EDS-3C are at right angles to one an-4 other in order to " fit" the EDS-3C into an existing ticket Average estimated radimion doses to the truck drivers, counter area. A nearby utility room will serve as a storage who might spend 24 hours at a distance of 2 m (6.6 ft) from . facility for the cask and the associated survey equipment the cask, are about 0.16 mSv (16 mrem) per driver per needed for the EDS-3C. delivery. Transportation regulations under 10 CFR 71.50(3)(d) effectively restrict the radiation dose to 0.02 mSv/hr (2 mrem /hr)in any normally occupied parts Additional construction needed at the United Airlines of the vehicle. In addition, there can be no loading or international ticket counter will affect nearby passenger unloading operations between the beginning and the end traffic patterns to some degree because of its close prox. of the transportation. Assuming that there are two drivers imity to the security area. It is anticipated that essential per truck and that the used source is returned yearly to rigging equipment such as air dollies or forklifts could be the manufacturer, yearly refacement of the source is moved into the terminal building during a week night or expected to result in a collective dose to the drivers of on a weekend when traffic is at a minimum, if all the 6x10 d person Sv(6x10 2 person-rem)perTNA system.lf necessary requirements have been met and construction the average distance from the cask to the driver was has been completed, the moving pacess should take no increased to 3 m (9.8 ft), the expected collective dose more than 2 to 3 days. would decrease to 2.8x10 4 person Sv (2.8x10 2 person. rem). The dose to an individual member of the public j during transportation of the source from the rnanufac-5.3 Nonoperational Impacts 5.3.1 Transportation 5.3.2 System Installation and Source Transfer The components of the EDS-3C will be shipped individu-ally and will be assembled at the location where the sys-The source transport cask (see Figure 5.2)is constructed 'i tem will be used. No radiation exposure to workers or to of steel, welded togetner, and filled with a composite j members of the public will result from either the ship-neutron and gamma ray shield of water-extended polyes-l ment or assembly of the system because the radiation ter with lead surrounding the source position. It is a source will not have been installed in the system. The DOT-7 A cask certified by the U.S. Dept.rtment of Trans. Cf 252 source will be shipped in one shielded cask. Fol-portation that is 0.75 m (2.5 ft)in diameter and 0.84 m lowing assembly of the EDS-3C, the source will be trans-(2.75 ft)long. l l sccunrry ~ g X41AY WAftlNG AREA I BAc wcu. scAtes JCL a )L * "" $% )Q_w.r J)mes C A F L Figure 5.1 Proposed EDS-3C at Dulles international Airport 21 NUREG-1396 1

c - 5 'EnvironmentalImpacts. ] ~ g ]O j i sE[ ,, %"**' T 1 \\ <m ' * **N 0 I \\ EaN g j casm - ~ = - /- jt-A n r o u c o.s4m, M VEW FRONT VIEW 7 Figure 5.2 EDS-3C source transport cask To transfer the source from the cask to thc' system, n. operators must get inside the EDS-3C to perform main. I special platform has been manufactured that helps guide tenance, the source will be placed in a retracted position. 1 the source into the EDS-3C (Figure 5,3). A polyethylene in this position, the source will be surrounded by a mod-I . adapter with a conical hole fits into a recess in the end of crator and a 25.4-mm (1-in.)lcad gamma radiation shield. + the cask and is bolted onto the system for transfer. The ' The radiation dose to EDS-3C operators from clearing a cask is then rolled onto the platform and locked into baggage jam is expected to be less than 0.05 mSv position against the side of the EDS-3C, which engages (5 mrem). Experience with the EDS-3 at JFK Interna-the adapter with the cask recess. The source is transferred tional Airport indicates that baggage jams are rare and tc the EDS-3C by pushing the Teleflex cable into the the vast majority of these jams can be cleared without sy em untilit stops. After the source isin the system and , entering the cavity. In the past 6 months of operation at . the cask and transfer adapter are removed, a flexible JFK International Airport, it has not been necessary to plastic tube is inserted over the cable and clamped into enter the passageway to dislodge jammed luggage. place. Its inner diameter is slightly greater than the di-l ameter of the cable but less than the diameter of the Major maintenance work, such as repairing a broken con-I source. Atitslongestlength,itjust reachesthe" retracted veyor, replacing Nal(11) detectors, or repairing interior-l' source position" and thus serves as a stop to prevent the cavity materials, requires partial disassembly of the TNA-L source from being retracted too far. See Appendix A for system. For these types of repairs, the Cf 252 source will l further details associated with the installation of and the be removed from the system and will be placed in its radiation safety operating procedures for the EDS-3C. shipping and storage cask. Once the source is removed from the system, radiation exposure during maintenance The expected radiation doses outside a shipping cask work will be minimal, loaded with a 150 pg source of Cf 252 are shown in Figure 5.4.The nearest point that a member of the public could 5A Operational and Radiological get to the cask dun,ng source transfer would be approxi- . mately 3 m (10 ft), which would correspond to a dose rate Impacts of less than 10 Sv/hr (1 mrem /hr). 5,4.1 Neutron Dose Contours 533 Radiation Exposure During The thermal neutron flux inside the shicided TN A system wasm ppedusin8smallhelium 3(He-3)detectorswitha Maintenance small (0.2-g) Cf 252 source substituted for the normal When the EDS-3C is in the operating mode, the source 150- g source. Flux maps were measured and then cor-will reside in a bismuth gamma ray shield and will be rected for actual source strength. The detectors were surrounded by a neutron moderator and absorber. If the calibrated against activation foils using the American NUREG-1396 22

..}, -ff 5 EnvironmentalImpacts. h eXTEft0R CMM REMMO FROM EDS Pom toVReE TRANSPER ass sNLAmosuam % V-2 E W \\. m s \\ sowcs "namY A A \\\\\\ W \\. \\ \\ f Mua i l / /) %% Y % \\ ,m$ ) O/ \\- AoAmRsuN ,ouRc _ c b). Figure 5.3 Placement of cask for source transfer. (a) Overall view, (b) detail view of source transfer ring and source transfer adapter . Society for Testing and Materials method (ASTM,1989), the calculated activation rates f am Erdtmann's Neutron ' The low-energy epithermal flux was measured in some of Activation Tables. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the potential the same map locations using a radmium foil wrapped activation products, activities, and dose rates fo baggage lic 3 detector;it was nominally 3 percent of the thermal contents containing 1 kg (2.2 lb) masses of van us ele-value (see SAIC,1989). The thermal flux peak was about ments. Only reactions that produced initial-ac.ivities - 8x104 neutrons /cm2 s for the 150-pg source.The fluence greater than 0.001 becquerel (Bq) (2.7x10.a uC ) per. impinging on a item as it travels through the center cavity gram of element are shown. The value of 0.001 Bq. g was at 15 cm (6 in.) per second was determined by integrating chosen because that is the amount of induced radir.activ-the mapped flux; it was calculated to be 4.5x105 neutrons / ity equal to one. hundredth of that entained naturally m cm2. The fast neutron fluence was estimated by calculat-food (see Section 5.4.4). y ing the uncollided flux and integrating along the path of the item being scanned; it was calculated to be 2.5x105 neutrons /cm2 A cursory glance at these tables shows that the vast major-ity of isotopes are rare carths and elements unlikely to be

• The neutron fluence calculated with the source in the found in suitcases except in trace quantities. After only a operating position provides the basis for estimating the 30-second delay, the largest remaining isotopes are integrated neutron flux to which the baggage would be Sc-46m, V 52, In-116m(1), and Hf-179m,with an average exposed.The measured fluence values were used in esti-dose rate of 0.18 Sv/hr(18 rem /hr). All tables listing mating the activation products in baggage contents using activity, dose rates, and total committed doses are in the l

23 NUREG-1396 l h, 5

5; PnvironmentalImpacts i EDS-3C operations because of possible neutron activa- ', g tion of items in baggage or from the small radiation field N \\ in the area they occupy. Workers may be exposed to ,/

1. b N

radiation via four different pathways: cxposure during s f-s / / N normal operation to leakage radiation from the Cf 252 \\ \\ ./ /- source in the immediate area of the EDS-3C, direct ra. I I I mout diation exposure to beta or gamma fields from luggage M l' d) g g that has been through the EDS-3C, exposure of security i T screeners resulting from hand inspection of " suspect" } f irradiated luggage, and exposure during the transfer of \\\\ / / DOSE RATE g the source to or from a shippmg cask. / f g N / WWN www s g I,- / - @ 65 30 The direct radiation fields around the EDS-3C have been -- Ns measured. Figurc 5.6 shows that the total dose rates (neu-N ' -@ ' - 9,, tron plus gamma) in the area occupied during baggage @ so 40 loading and unloading are all less than 3 Sv/hr @ 18 10 (0.3 mrem /hr) at any distance 30 cm (1 ft) from the sys- @ 30 20 tem. At distances greater than i m (3.3 ft), the total dose @6 5 rates are all less than 0.9 Sv/hr (0.09 mrem /hr). As an @ so 40 estimate, the average dose rates from each end at 30 cm and 100 cm (1 ft and 3.3 ft) were calculated to be 0.6 and - g 0.45 Sv/hr (0.06 and 0.045 mrem /hr), respectively. As a @ 75 40 result, the average dose rate for personnel would be @u u 0.5 Sv/hr (0.05 mrem /hr). O O OO If the EDS-3C is configured as shown in Figure 4.1, only one baggage handler would be near the 'INA system END VIEW Nces: to pSWhr a 1mromMt Figure 5.4 EDS-3C shipping cask dose rates International System of Units (SI) (i.e., gray, sicvert, and - becquercl)(ICRU Report 33). For corresponding tables i using the English system of units (i.e., rad, rem, and microcuric), see Appendix B. Figure 5.5 shows the isodose contours (with loading and unloading platforms) that are based on dose rate measurements. Additional ose rate and fluence information can be found in Appen-go, Q t j o.s ps pos w.ve -mm TNA mm E s-3c It should be noted that 1 sicvert (Sv), the SI unit for dose, \\ is equal to 100 rem (R), the English unit. In addition, the ~ os Msvw - po3 becquerel (Hg) is equal to 1 disintegration per second, and 1 microcuric ( Ci)is equal to 3.7x104 Bq. Activation foils provided and analyzed by the National - Institute of Standards and Technology (formerly the Na. .tional Bureau of Standards) were used to measure the baggage passage neutron flux in the prototype TNA sys-tem, Model EDS-2. The results (see Appendix D) were consistent with the determination of the thermal neutron 1 - fluence calculations in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. b I I 1 I f I 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 5.4.2 Radiation Exposure of Workers mim Workers such as operators, baggage handlers, and trained Figure 5.5 TNA system for bbby installation with j security screeners may be exposed to radiation from isodose contours NUREG-1396 24 1 i

5 EmironmentalImpacts Table 5.1 Potential activation products (for slow neutrons *) of baggage contents containing 1 kg (2.2-Ib) masses of various elements 0.5-min delay

10. min delay 60-min delay

- Dose rate Dose rate Dose rate Half life Gamma Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Product Bq!pg (min) (MeV/Ilq) (Bq!g) @ 30 cm) (Bq'g) - @ 30 cms (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) - H3 8.42E-10 6.49E + 06 3.79E-11 3.79E-11 3.79E-11 N-16 3.50E-03 1.19E-01 4.60E + 00 8.56E-06 639E-08 8.05E-30 6.01E-32 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 O 19 3.51E-03 4.48E-01 1.04E + 00 7.29E-05 1.23E-07 3.02E-11 5.10E-14 7.77E-45 131E-47 ' F 20 - 1.97E + 02 1.83E-01 1.64E + 00 1.33E + 00 3.55E-03 3.17E-16 8.44E-19 1.86E-98 0.00E+ 00 - Nc-23 2.43B + 01 6.20E-01 1.45E-01 6.25E-01 1.47E-04 1.53E-05 3.60E-09 8.19E-30 1.92E-33 Na-24. 1.80E + 00 8.80E + 02 4.12E + 00 8.10E-02 5.41E-04 8.04E-02 537E-04 7.73E-02 5.16E-04. Mg-27 1.29E + 00 9.46E + 00 9.14E-01 5.60E-02 8.29E-05 2.79E-02 4.14E-05 7.16E-04 1.06E-06 - Al-28 2.72E + 02 2.24E + 00 1.78B + 00 1.05E + 01 3.03E-02 5.55E 1.60E-03 1.06E-07 3.07E-10 Cl-38 . 5.55E + 00 3.72E + 01 1.49E + 00 2.47E-01 5.98E-04 2.07E-01 5.01E-04 8.17E-02 1.97E-04 Ar 41 1.06E + 01 1.10E + 02 1.28B + 00 4.75E-01 9.87E-04 4.48E-01 930E-04 3.27E-01 6.78E-04 Sc-46m 4.73B + 04 3.12E-01 1.42E-01 7.01E + 02 1.61E-01 4.81E-07 1.11E-10 2.82E-55 6.49E-59 Ti-51 3.57E+ 00 5.76E + 00 3.50E-01 1.51E-01 8.59E-05 4.82E-02 2.74E-05 1.18E-04 6.68B-08 % 52 1.79E + 03 3.75E + 00 1.43E + 00 734E + 01 1.70E-01 1.27B + 0! 2.94E-02 1.23E-03 2.86E-06 Cr 55 3.22E + 00 3.56E + 00 6.57E-04 131B-01 1.40E-07 2.07E-02 2.20E 08 1.23E-06 1.31E-12 Mn-56 1.11E + 02 1.55E + 02 1.70E + 00 4.98E + 00 137E-02 4.78E + 00 132E-02 3.82E + 00 1.05E-02 Co 60m 2.33E + 03 1.05E + 00 1.23E-03 7.54E + 01 1.50E-04 1.43E-01 2.84E-07 6.65E-16 1.33E-21 Ni-63 7.64E + 00 1.51E + 02 5.63E-01 3.43E-01 3.13E-04 3.28E-01 3.00E-04 2.61B-01. 2.38E = Cu-64 4.58E + 00 7.64E + 02 1.95E-01 2.06E-01 6.51E-05 2.04E-01 6.46 8-05 1.95E-01 6.17E-05 Cu-66 1.47E + 02 5.10E + 00 9.56E-02 6.18E + 00 9.58E-N 1.70E + 00 2.64E-04 1.90E-03 2.95E-07 Zn-69 3.69E + 00 5.70E + 01 4.78E-06 1.65E-01 1.28E-09 1.47E-01 1.14E-09 8.01E-02 6.21E-10 On-70 5.43E + 01 2.11E + 01 5.55E-03 2.40E + 00 2.16E-05 1.76E + 00 1.58E-05 3.41E-01 3.06E-06 Ga 72 ' 2.59E + 00 8.46E + 02 2.03E + 00 1.17E-01 3.84E-04 1.16E-01 3.81E 1.11E-01 3.65E-04 Oc-75m 6388 + 0! 8.15E-01 5.59E-02 1.88E + 00 1.70E-04 5.82E-04 5.28E-08 2.00E-22 1.81E-26 Oc75 1.05E + 00 8 28E + 01 3,18E-02 4.71E-02 2.43E-06 4.35E-02 2.24E-06 2.86E-02 1.47E-06 Oc-77m 9.05E-01 8.84E-01 631E-02 2.75E-02 2.82E-06 1.60E-05 1.64E-09 1.52E-22 1.56E-26 As-76 3.26E + 00 1.58E + 03. 337E-01 1.47E-01 8.02E-05 1.46E-01 7.98E-05 1.43E-01 7.81E-05 Se-77m 5.69E + 03 2.90E-01 9.63E-02 7.75E + 01 1.21E-02 1.07E-08 1.67E-12 138E-60 2.15E-64 Se 79m 2.15E + 01 3.91E + 00 9.57E-03 8.85E-01 137E-05 1.64E-01 2.55E-06 2.33E-05 3.61E-10 Sc-81 133E + 01 1.85 E + 01 1.44E-02 5.87E-01 137B-05 4.12E-01 9.61E-06 632E-02 1.48E-06 Sc-83 3.45E + 00 2.25E + 01 1.27E + 00 1.53E-01 3.15E-04 1.14E-01 2.35E-M 2.45E-02 5.04E-05 Br 80m 5.48B + 00 2.65E + 02 2.41E-02 2.46E-01 9.62E-06 2.40E-01 9.39E-06 2.11E-01 8.24E-06 Br-80 2.91E + 02 1.77E+01 7.00E-02 1.28E A 01 1.46E-03 8.85E + 00 1.00E-03 1.25E + 00 1.42E-N Br-82m 2.31E + 02 6.10E + 00 4.22E-04 9.82E + 00 6.72E-06 3.34E + 00 2.28E-06 1.14E-02 7.79E-09 ' Kr-81m 3.77E + 02 2.22E-01 1.27E-01 3.56E + 00 7.34E-04 4.70E-13 9.69E-17 7.72E-81 1.59E-84 Kr 83m 1.74E + 01 1.12E + 02 2.26E-03 7.81E-01 2.86E-06 736E-01 2.70E-06 5.40E-01 1.98E-06 Rb-86m 4.20E + 01 1.02E + 00 5.46E-01 135E + 00 1.19E-03 2.12E-03 1.87E-06 3.74E-18 331E-21 h 88 2.05E + 00 1.78E + 01 637E-01 9.05E-02 935E-05 6.25E-02 6.46E-05 8.92E-03 9.22E-06 %90m 4.16E + 00 1.91E + 02 630E 1.87E-01 1.91E-04 1.81E-01 1.84E-04 1.51E-01 1.54E-N Nb-94m 3.80E + 01 6.26E + 00 1.17E-02 1.62E + 00 3.07E-05 5.65E-01 1.07E-05 2.23E-03 4.23E-08 Mo-101 135E + 00 1.46E + 01 1.51E + 00 5.93E-02 1.45E-04 3.78E-02 9.25E-05 3.52E-03 8.62E-06 Rh-104m ' 3.60E + 03 435E + 00 3.48E-02 1.50E + 02 8.44E-03 3.29E + 01 1.86E-03 1.14E-02 6.45E-07 Rh-104 ~ 1.54E+ 04 7.05E-01 1.11E-02 4.24E + 02 7.63E-03 3.73E -02 6.71E-07 1.68E-23 3.03E-28 N-107m 8.42E + 00 3.558-01 1.52E-01 1.43E-01 3.52E-05 1.26E-09 3.11E-13 5.14E-52 1.27E-55 N-109m 9.12E t 00 4.69E + 00 1.14E-01 3.81E-01 7.0$E-05 936E-02 1.73E-05 5.79E-05 1.07E-08 N-109 - 337E + 00 8.08E + 02 1.24E-02 1.52E-01 3.05E-06 1.50E-01 3.02E-06 1.44E-01 2.90E-06 Ag-108 5.09E+ 03 2.41E + 00 2.94E-02 1.98E + 02 9.46E-03 1.29E + 01 6.16E-04 736E-06 3.51E-10 Ag-110 8.31E + 04 4.10E-01 2.96E-02 1.61E + 03 7.71E-02 1.71E-04 8.19E-09 338E-41 1.62E-45 In-114 9.43E + 01 1.20E + 00 2.21E-03 3.18E + 00 1.14E-05 132E-02 4.72E-08 3.80E-15 1.36E-20 In-ll6m(2) 1.26E + 06 3.63E-02 8.20E-02 4.06E + 00 539E-04 6.96E-79 9.26E-83 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 in-ll6m(l) 1.29E + 03 5.42E + 01 2.47E + 00 5.77E + 01 231E-01 5.11E + 01 2.05E-01 2.70E + 01 1.08E-01 See footnotes at end of table. 25 NUREG-1396

i 5 13nvironmental Impacts Table 5.1 (continued) 0.5 min delay

10. min delay -

60-min delay Dose rate Dose rate Dose rate ' flalf-life Gamma Activity ( Sv/hr/kg - Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Product Bq/pg (min) 01eV/Ilq) (lig'g) @ 30 cm) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) (Bq'g) @ 30 cm) In 116 136E+ 04 237E-01 1.55E-02 1.42E + 02 3.57E-03 1.22 & l0 3.08E-15 3.92E-74 9.84 E-79 Sn-125m 1.09E + 00 9.52E + 00 3.29E-01 4.72E-02 2.52E-05 237E-02 1.26E-05 6.22E-04 332E-07 Sb422m 7.0SE + 00 4.21E + 00 5 96E42 ' 2.93E-01 2.84E-05 6.14E-02 5.94E-06 1.64E-05 1.58E-09 Sb-124m 8.42E + 00 1.55E + 00 3.48E-01 3.03E-01 1.71E-04 4.33E-03 2.45E-06 8.48E-13 4.78E-16 Te-131 2.08E+ 00 2.50E + 01 3.54B-01 F23E-02 530E-05 7.09E-02 4.07E-05 1.77E-02 1.02E-05 1128' 2.00E + 02 2.50E + 01 8.75E-02 8.88E + 00 1.26E-03 6.82E + 00 9.6SE-04 ' 1.71E + 00 2.42E-04 Xe-125m 1.70E + 01 9.50E-01 1.11E-01 531E-01 9.56E-05 5.20E-04 9.35E-08 7.50E-20 135E-23 Xe-137 1.99E + 00 3.84E + 00 1.50E-01 8.18E-02 1.99E-05 1.47E-02 3.58E-06 1.78E 4.32E-10 Cs-134m 9.28E + 00 1.74E-02 2.34E-02 9.38E-10 3.56E-14 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Da-136m. 131E + 03 5.13E-03 1.92E+ 00, 2.73E-24 8.51E-31 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Da-139' 1.55E + 00 833E + 01 4.18E-02 6.95E-02 4.71E-06 6.42E-02 435E-06 4.23E-02 2.87E-06 La-140 1.OE + 00 2.41E + 03 2.32E + 00 8.64E-02 3.25E-04 8.62E-02 3.24E-04 8.49E-02 3.19E-04 Pr 142 3.43E + 00 1.15E + 03 5.8'E-02 1.54E-01 1.46E-05 1.53E-01 't.45E-05 1.49E-01 1.41E-05 Nd-151 3.52B + 00 1.24E + 01 1.698-01 1.54E-01 4.22E-05 9.06E-02 2.48E-05 5.54B-03 1.52E-06 Sm 153 1.19E + 01 2.79E + 03 5.35E-02 5.35E-01 4.65E-05 534E-01 4.63E-05 5.28E-01 4.58E-05 - Sm-155 2.81E + 01 2.22E + 01 8.24E-02 1.24E + 00 1.66E-04 9.25E-01 1.24E-04 1.94E-01 2.60E-05 Eu 152m(2) 9.21E+00 9.60E + 01 738E-02 4.13E-01 4.94E-05 3.86E-01 4.61E-05 296501 3.22E-05 Eu-152m(l) 132E+03 5.58E + 02 2.41E-01 5.94B + 01 2323-02 5.87E + 01 2.29E-02 5.51E + 01 2.15E-02 Gd-161 2.19E + 01 3.70E+ 00 - 3.09E-01 8.97E-01 4.50E-04 1.51E-01 7.59E-05 130E-05 6.50E-09 Dy-165m 1.64E + 05 126E + 00 1.09E-02 5.61E+ 03 9.91E-02 3.02E + 01 5.33E-N 3.44E-11 6.0SE-16 Dy 165 8.69E+ 02 - 1.41E+02 1.28E-02 3.90E + 01 8.10E-04 3.72E + 01 7.73E-04 2.91E + 01 6.NE-04 Ik> 166 1.988 + 01 1.61E + 03 2.75E-02 8.91E-01 3.978-05 8.87E-01 3.96E-05 8.6SE-01 3.87B Er 167m 4.79E+ 04 3.78E-02 9.71E-02 2.25E-01 3.55E-05 5.16E-77 8.13E-81 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Yb-175 139E + 00 6.03E + 03 3.00E-02 6.25E-02 3.135-06 6.25E-02 3.13E-06 6.21E-02 3.11E-M Yb-177 1.13E + 00 1.14E + 02 1.22E-01 5.07E-02 1.00E 4.79E-02 9.47E-06 3.53E-02 6.99E-06 1x 176m 4.78E + 01 2.21E + 02 1.82E-02 2.15E + 00 6.34E-05 2.0SE + 00 6.15E-05 1.78E + 00 5.26E-05 Lu l?7 2.22E + 00 9.66E + 03 3.02E-02 9.99E-02 4.89E-06 9.98E-02 4.89E-06 9.95E-02 4.87E-06 lif 178m 1.10E + 03 7.17E-02 9.77E-01 3.94E-01 6.25E-04 5.23E-41 8.29E-44 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Isl.179m 2.46E + 04 3.12E-01 2.87E-01 3.65E + 02 1.70E-01 2.50E-07 1.16E-10 1.47E-55 6.82E-59 - W 187 3.47E + 00 1.43E + 03 431E-01 1.56E-01 1.09E-04 1.555-01 1.09E-04 1.52501 1.06E-04 Re-186 ' 3.62E + 00 5.44 U 03 1.80E-02 1.63E-01 4.75E-06 1.63E-01 4.75E-06 1.62E-01 ' 4.72E-06 Re-188m 2.18E + 01 1.86E + 01 7.96E-02 9.63E-01 1.24E-04 6.76E-01 8.72E-05 1.05E-01 135E-05 i Re-188 1.85E + 01 1.02E + 03 4.78E-02 8.32E-01 6.45E-05 8.278-01 6.41E-05 7.99E-01 6.20E-05. Os-191m 1.198 + 00 7.80E + 02 6.51E-03 5.35E-02 5.65E-07 5,31E-02 5.60E-07 5.08E-02 536E-07 Ir 192m 3.12E + 04 1.40E + 00 2.47E-N 1.10E + 03 4.39E-N 9.95E + 00 3.98E-06 ' 1.77E-10 7.10E-17 Ir194 2.73E + 01 1.16E + 03 5.12E-02 1.23E + 00 1.02E-N 1.22E + 00 1.01E-04 1.29E + 00 9.84E-05 Pt-199m 3.83E + 00 2.40E-01 3.42E-01 4.07E-02 2.26E-05 4.97E-14 2.76E-17 9.88E-77 5.48E-80 Pt199 3.89E + 00 3.08E + 01 1.07E-01 1.73E-01 3.00E-05 1.40E-01 2.43E-05 4.54E-02 7.87E-06 Au 198 1.18E + 01 3.88E + 03 4.03E-01 5.31E-01 3.47E-N 530E-01' 3.46E-N 5.25E-01 3.43E-N lig205 2.03E + 00 5.20E + 00 4.80E-03 8.55E-02 6.65E-07 2.41E-02 ' 1.88E-07 3.0S & 05 239E-10 Th-233 - 1.19E + 02 2.23E + 01 1.08E-02 5.27E + 00 9.23E-05 3.92E + 00 6.87E-05 830E-01 1.45E-05 U-239 1.01E4 02 2.35E + 01 5.21E-02 4.48E + 00

3. ;3E-M 3.38 E + 00 2.86E-N 7.75E-01 6.54E-05

' Integrated thermal fluence in EDS 3C = 4.50h+ 05 neutrons /cm'. Note: 8.428 R.42x10M etc. l .NURiiG-1396 26

i TLble 5.2 Petential activation products (for fast n'eutrons+) of baggage contents containing 14g(2.2.C) masses of various elements ( 0 5-min delay 10-min delay 60-min delay l Dose rate Di,se rate Dese rate . Target Reac-Ifalf-life Gamma Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Activity (gSv/hr/kg Activity - ( Sv/hr/kg - isotope tion *

• Product Bq/pg (min)

(MeV/Bq) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) - Be-9 n.a He-6 L27E+ 03 134E-02 C-12 n.2n C-11 L18E-08 2.03E + 01 LO2E + 00 2.90E-09 4.80E-12 2.10E-09 3.47E-12 3.80E-10 6.29E-13 N-14 n.2n N-13 1.49E 03 9.%E + 00 LO2E+ 00 3.60E-04 5.95E-07 L86E-04 3.07E-07 5.73E-06 9.4SE-09 l O-16 n.p N-16 L74E-03 L19E-01 4E6E+ 00 237E-05 L86E-07 122E-29 L75E-31 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 O-18 n.a C-15 7.98E-03 4.10E-02 3.62E + 00 426E-07 230E-09 7.83E-77 4.59E-79 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 F-19 n.p O-19 1.09E + 00 4.52E-01 LO4E + 00 L27E-01 2.14E-04 5.98E-08 1.01E-10 3.05E-41 5.14E-44 ' F-19 n,a N-16 232E+ 01 1.19E-01 4.86E + 00 3.15E-01 2.49E03 2.97E-25 234E-27 0.00E+ 00 0.00E+ 00 Ne-20 n.p F-20 L28E01 L83E-01 633E-01 4.82E-03 4.95E-06 L15E-18 L18E-21 0.00E + 00 0.00E+ 00 Ne-22 n.a 0-19 3.92E-03 4.52E-01 LO4E + 00 4.55E-os 7.68E-07 2.15E-10 3.63E-13 L10E-43 1.85E-46 Na-23 n.p Ne-23 7.18E-01 6.27E-01 439E-01 1.03E-01 735E-05 2.84E-06 2.02E-09 184E-30 102E-33 Na-23 na F-20 1.21E + 00 L83E-01 L63E+ 00 4.55E-02 120E-GS LO8E-17 186E-20 0.00E + 00 - 0.00E + 00 Mg-25 n.p Na-25 L67E-02 1.00E + 00 3.93E-01 2.95E03 L88E-06. 4.0SE-06 2.60E-09 3.65E-21 233E-24 Mg-26 n.p Na-26 6.82E-03 1.67E-02 1.81E+ 00 1.66E-12 4.88E-15 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 00nE+ 00 Al-27 n.p Mg-27 LO9E-01 9.45E+ 00 8.93E-01 163E-02 3.80E-05 131E-02 L90E-05 335E04 4.84E-07 Si-28 n.p Al-78 6.51E-01 2.25E + 00 L78E+ 00 L40E-01 4.03E-04 7.48E-03 116E-05 L53E-09 4.43E-12 Si-29 n.p Al-29 1.0GE + 00 6.52E + 00 238E+ 00 237E-01 9.15E04 8.64E-02 333E-04 4.25E-04 L64E-06 P-31 n.p Si-31 5.14E-02 L57E+ 02 8.66E-04 128E 1E0E-08 123E-02 L73E-08 926E-03 138E-08 P-31 n.a Al-28 1.90E-01 2.25E + 00 L78E+ 00 4.07E-02 L18E-04 2.18E-03 630E-06 4.4SE-10 L29E-12 O S-34 n.p P-34 184E-02 2.07E-01 3.19E-01 8.63E-04 4.46E-07 133E-17 6.87E-21 167E 138E-93 Cl-37 n.a P-34 h9E-01 2.07E-01 3.19E-01 L26E-02 6.52E-06 1.94E-16 LODE-19 3.90E-89 2.02E-92 Ar-40 n.a S-37 3.77E-03 5.06E + 00 2.79E+ 00 8.80E-04 3.98E-06 2.40E04 1.08E-06 2345-07 L15E-09 I. Ca-40 n.2n Ca-39 J '.30E-03 L45E-02 1.02E+ 00 5.02 5-14 831E-17 0.00E + 00 0.00E+ 00 0.00E+ 00 0.00E + 00 V-51 n.p Ti-51 106E-02 5.76E+ 00 338E01 4.85E-03 2E2E-06 L55E-03 8.98507 3.77E06 2.19E-09 Cr-52 n.p V-52 3.25E-02 3.76E + 00 1.43E+ 00 7.41E-03 L72E-05 L29E-03 2.98E-06 L2SE-07 2.97E-10 Cr-53 n.p V-53 3.60E-03 L55E + 00 LO4E+ 00 7.20E-04 1.21E-06 LO3E-05 L74E-08 ' 2.01E-15 3.40E-18 Mn-55 n.p Cr-55 LO7E-02 336E + 00 6.57E-04 2.43E-03 2.59E-09 3.82E-04 4.07E-10 2.26E-08 141E-14 Mn-55 n.a V-52 3.70E-03 3.76E + 00 . L44E + 00 8.44E-04 L97E-06 L46E-04 3.42E-07 146E-08 3.40E-11 Ni40 n,p Co-60m ' 6.23E-03 LO5E + 01 5.85E-02 L51E-03 L43E-07 8.05E-04 7.64E-08 2 97E-05 2.82E-09 Zn44 n.p Cu44 2.11E-03 7.64E-02 1E9E-01 5.66E-06 L73E-09 2.13E-43 633E-47 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Zn-66 n.p Cu46 3.59E-03 5.10E + 00 935E-02. 839E-04 1.27E-07 231E-04 3.50Ec3 2.58E-07 3.92E-11 Ga-69 n.a Cu-66 7E6E-63 5.10E + 00 935E-02 L84E-03 2.78E-07 5.05E-04 7.66E-08 5.66E-07 838E-11 Se-77 n.n Se-77m 1.63E + 01 1.92E-01 9.70E-02 L24E+ 00 L96E-04 2.01E-10 3.16E-14 SE6E-62 9.22E-66 Br-79 n.2n Br-78 1.03E-03 6.40E + 00 LO3E + 00 2.44E-04 4.07E-0. 8.72E-05 L46E-07 3.88E-07 6.49E-10 c.a Y-89 n,n Y-89m 3.75E + 01 2.62E-01 9.01E-01 250E+ 00 3.65E-03 3.05E-11 4.46E-14 L12E-68 L63E-71 m Ru-100 n.p Tc-100 2.20E-03 2.67E-01 6.75E-02 L50E-04 1.64E-08 2.94E-15 3.22E-19 L28E-71 L40E-75 3 Rh-103 n.a Tc-100 3.97E + 00 2.67E-01 6.75E-02 2.71E-01 2.97E-05 53CE-12 5.81E-16 231E-68 233E-72

P Rh-103 n.n Rh-103m 6.43E-01 5.61E + 01 L69E-03 L60E-01 438E-07 L42E-01 3.89E-07 7.66E-02 2.10E-07 8

Cd-112 n.2n Cd-111m 3.69E-02 4.87E + 01 237E-01 9.16E-03 426E-06 8.00E-03 3.72E-06 3.93E-03 1.83E-06 g 2 In-115 n,n In-115m 4.04E-02 2.70E-02 L65E-01 2.70E-08 7.22E-12 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 b g Ba-137 n,n Ba-137m 5.00E-01 235E+ 00 5.99E01 LO9E-01 LO6E-04 8.25E-03 8.02506 LO4E-08 LOIE-11 e, h Pr-141 n 2n Pr-140 1.25E-02 339E + 00 5.05E-02 2.82E-03 231E-07 4.05E-04 331E-08 L47E-08 1.21E-12 g u

• Fast neutron fluence in EDS-3C = 2.5E+ 05 neutrons /cm2 y

"n = neutron. a = alpha, p = proton. g G Note-1.27E+03 = L27x105etc.

6, ') ? i EnvironmentalImpacts ? ---g w 7 a-= 06 4 = 04 0 06 3y. ] Ca 0$ 16 t9 08 - i ' [0 53 . [] BAGGAGE IN - b) ~ z I I } 04 [ C 1R 26 06 05 03 06 06 08 04 04 09 08 04 u i 1 t ~ ~ Note: 1pSv/hr = 0.1 mrem /hr Figure 5.6 Total dose equivalent rates around EDS-3C ( Sv/hr) when loading luggage onto the conveyor belt. %e other tive dose of 6x10 3 person-Sv willbe used as a conserva. baggage handler would be at the exit of the diverter, more tive estimate of expected radiation dose. The EDS-3C,

than 6.m (20 ft) away. In this scenario (call it Option A),

which will be used for lobby installations, is similar to the q only one baggage handler would be in a potential radia-EDS-3, which is used for ramp installations, in terms of tion field of 0.5 pSv/hr (0.05 mrem /hr). Because it is potential radiation exposure to 'INA operators.'As de-assumed that the EDS-3C will-be-in operation for scribed in SAIC's 1988 environmental report, the annual 16 hours a day, this option requires 1three full time. exposure to 1N A operators was calculated by estimating - l equivalent personnel per operating unit (three 40-hr/wk the dose from both routine [1.2 mSv/yr (120 mrem /yr)] 3 shifts). For the proposed scenario at Dulles International and source-transfer [0.8 mSv/yr (80 mrem /yr)] opera-i Airport (call it Option B), however, the EDS-3C and the tions.The total exposure to an operator for each EDS-3C XENIS are at right angles to each other. In this case, both would be 2 mSv/yr (200 mrem /yr). For six full-time-baggage handlers could be in radiation areas of 0.5 pSv/hr equivalent operators, the collective dose for each system (0.05 mrem /hr). This option requires six full time-would be 0.012 person-Sv/yr (1.2 person remlyr). i equivalent personnel per operating unit (three 40-hr/wk shifts). He total dose to workers from hand searching the lug-cage does not depend on the choice of EDS-3C installa-The estimated annual dose to a baggage handler would be tion scenario. If the TNA system alarms, the baggage s must be hand searched.This usually will take place imme-0.5 Sv/hr x 40 hr/wk x 50 wk/yr = 1000 Sv diately after the bag leaves the system! allowing only = I mSv/yr(100 mrem /yr) - perhaps 15 seconds for activation products to decay.The security attendant conducting the search could get an 4 For Option B the estimated annual dose to baggage han-additional dose from activation products, and because diers would be 6x10 3 person-Sv (6x10J person. rem) there is hand contact during the scarch, exposure to beta 1 (6 baggage handlers x 1 mSv/yr); for Option Ait would be (and gamma) radiation may be possibic. '3x10 3 person Sv (3x10J person rem) (3 baggage han-l: diers x 1 mSv/yr) for each EDS-3C. For each of the Direct exposure rates from irradiated luggage are shown scenarios proposed in Section 4.1, the calculated collec-in Table 5.3.This is for an exposure 30 cm (1 ft) away from o I: NUREG-1396 28

$ EnvironmentalImpacts. Table 5.3 Major activation products of baggage contents containing 1.kg (2.2 lb) masses of various elements 0.5-min delay 10-min delay 60 min delay - Dose rate Dose rate Dose rate llatf life Gamma Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Activity (pSv/hr/kg Activity ( Sv/hr/kg Product Bq/gg (min) (Mev/Bq) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) (Bq/g) @ 30 cm) F-20 1.97E+ 02 1.83E-01 1.64E + 00 1.33E + 00 3.55E-03 3.17E-16 8.44E-19 1.86E-98 0.00E + 00 Na-24 1.80E + 00 8.80E + 02 4.12E + 00 8.10E-02 5.41E-04 8.04E-02 5.37E-04 7.73E-02 5.16E-04 Al-28 ' 2.72E + 02 2.24E + 00 1.78B+ 00 - 1.05E+ 01 3.03E-02 5.55E-01 160E-03 1.06E-07 3.07E-10 K 42 2.39B-01 7.42E + 02 2.73E + 02 1.07E-02 4.76E-03 1.07E-02 4.72E-03 1.02E-02 4.50E Sc-46m 4.73E + 04 3.12E41 1.42E-01 7.01E + 02 1.61E-01 4.81E-07 1.11E-10 2.82E-55 6.49E-59 V 52 1.798 + 03 3.75E + 00 1.43B + 00 7.34E + 01 1.70E-01 1.27E + 01 2.94E-02 1.23E-03 2.86B-06 Mn-56 ' 1.11E + 02 1.55E + 02 1.70E + 00 4.98E + 00 1.37E-02 4.78E + 00 1.32E-02 3.82E + 00 1.05E-02 . Sc-77m 5.69E + 03 2.90E-01 9.63E-02 7.75B + 01 1.21E-02 1.07E-08 1.67E-12 1.38E-60 2.15E-64 Br-80 2.91E + 02 1.77E + 01 7.00E-02 1.28E + 01 1.46E-03 8.85E + 00 1.00E-03 1.25E + 00 1.42E-04 Rb-86m 4.20E+ 01 1.02E + 00 5.46E-01 1.35E + 00 1.19E-03 2.12E-03 1.87E-06 3.74E-18 3.31E-21 Rh-104m 3.60E+ 03 4.35E + 00 3.48E-02 1.50E + 02 8.44E-03 3.29E + 01 1.86E-03 1.14E-02 6.45E-07 Rh-104 1.54E + 04 7.0$E-01 1.11E-02 4.24E + 02 7.63E-03 3.73E-02 6.71E-07 1.68E-23 3.03E-28 Ag-108 5.09E + 03 2.41E + 00 2.94E-02 1.98E + 02 9.46E-03 1.29E + 01 6.16E-04 7.36E-06 3.51E-10 Ag-110 8.31E + 04 4.10E-01 2.96E-02 1.61E + 03 7.71E-02 1.71E-04 8.19E-09 3.38E-41 1.62E-45 In-116m(1) 1.29E+ 03 5.42E + 0! 2.47B + 00 5.778 + 01 2.31E-01 5.11E + 01 2.05E-01 2.70E + 01 1.08E-01 In-116 1.36E + 04 2.37E-01 1.55E-02 1.42E + 02 3.57E-03 1.22E-10 3.08E-15 3.92E-74 9.84E-79 .1-128 2.00E + O2 2.50E + 01 8.75E-02 8.88E + 00 1.26E-03 6.28E + 00 9.68E-04 1.71E + 00 2.42E-04 Eu-152m(1) 1.32E+ 03 5.588 + 02 2.41E-01 5.94E + 01 2.32E-02 5.87E + 01 2.29E-02 5.51E + 01 2.15B-02 Dy-165m 1.64E + 05 1.26E + 00 1.09E-02 5.61E + 03 9.91E-02 3.02E + 01 5.33E-04 3.44E-11 6.08E-16 ' Hf-179m 2.46E + 04 3.12E-01 2.87E-01 3.65E + 02 1.70E-01 2.50E-07 1.16E-10 1.47E-55 6.828-59 Total 1.03E + 00 2.82E-01 1.45E 01 Note: 1.97E+ 02 = 1.97xtDa ie, c e The skin of the hand is in contact with a 10-cm (4 in.) I kg (2.21b) of irradiated material that has decayed 0.5,10, and 60 minutes after leaving the EDS-3C. %c elements disk of aluminum for 60 seconds during the hand listed (taken from Tables 5.1 and 5.2) are those whose scarch. initial activitics are greater than 1 Bq/g of irradiated ma-e The entire suitcase frame is aluminum. terial 1 second after leaving the EDS-3C. Initially, approximately 10 percent (220,000) of the Table 5.3 shows the elements that produce the largest 2.2 million bags pc year will require a hand scarch, activation products after passing through the EDS-3C. - Although aluminum is not the element with the greatest The computer code VARSKIN was used for calculating activation, studies by Westinghouse have shown that it is beta dose from skin contamination. Because of the limita. the most predominant one found in luggage (Westing-tions of VARSKIN, the smallest value that could be used l house,1986). Therefore, calculations presented in this to determine the beta skin dose for security screeners was environmental assessment for skin dose have been based 3.7x104 Bq/cm2 (1 Ci/cm2). Table 5.4 shows that the on the dose from aluminum. It should be noted that dose rate for a 3.7x104 Bq/cm2 source is 1.64x102 Sv/hr because of the short range for the beta particles in tissue, (0.164 rem /hr). Because the aluminum suitcase only rep-l a relatively small area of tissue can be considered to be an resents a source activity of 4.8 Bq/cm2 (1.3x10 4 pCi/cm2), infinite plane for dose calculation purposes.This dose is the dose to both hands from a 60-second scarch of an due to beta particles in a thin layer of activity equal to that aluminum suitcase is 2.1 Sv (0.021 mrem). Because the generated by activation in two half thicknesses, which is International Commission on Radiological Protection has 4.8 Bq/cm2 (1.3x10 4 Ci/cm2). Allbeta particles emitted assigned a weighting factor for skin of 0.01, the collective below two half thicknesses are self-absorbed in the alumi-cffective dose equivalent for this assumption is 4.5x10 4 num and therefore do not contribute to the dose. person-Sv/yr (4.5x10 2 person-rem /yr) for each system. This dose is shared among the three security personnel (one per shift) who conduct the scarches. The passenger The following assumptions were made: presenting the bag must be present during the physical 29 NUREG-1396

~ .5 EnvironmentalImpacts i Table 5.4 Calculated beta dose to the skin from a search, but may not participate directly in the scarch.The 3.7x104 Bq/cm2 source carrier shall retain control of the bag being scarched, and the passenger may neither insert nor remove items from Deta dose (Sv) it, n a es of At points The corresponding gamma ray dose was estimated by. .l skin at the on the skin assummg that the suitcase would have the elemental Variable basal layer basallayer composition shown in Table 5.5 (Westinghouse,1986). The weight of aluminum was increased to 4.5 kg (9.9 lb) 1 Radius (cm)/ area (cm2) [from Westinghouse (1986)] to obtain a realistic gamma l 0.5462/1.000 0.0016 d se fr m an all aluminum suitcase. Table 5.6 gives the activity and dose rates at 30 cm (1 ft). Cicarly aluminum 6.14164/119.3869 0.0011 dominates the dose rate. A floriwnfaldistance (cm) Initiall the alarmed bag rate could be as high as 10 per. cent of,the 2.2 million bags scarched, or approximate 0.0000 0.0016 3.8354 0.0015 220,000 bags per year. Assuming that the average search 4.0214 0.0010 takes 1 minute, a conservative estimate of the corre-sponding collective dose for each EDS-3C is 5.0x10 4 4.1913 ~ 0.0016 person-Sv/yr (5.0x102 person remlyr)(220,000 bags /yr x 4.3449 0.0016 1 min / bag x 1 hr/60 min x 1.38x10 7 Sv/hr). Even if it is 0.0015 assumed that in the worst case, the suitcase contained I kg 4.4824 (2.2 lb) of every element listed in Table 5.3, the corre-4.6037 0.0015 sponding collective dose (at a 30-cm distance) would be r 4.7089 0.0015 alxiut 3.8x10 8 person Sv/yr (3.8x101 person rem /yr) for 4.7978 0'0015 cach system. These doses are shared among the three individuals as stated above.The total dose from both beta 4.8706 0.0015 and gamma radiation to each security screener is - 4.9272 0.0014 0.32 mSv/yr (32 mrem /yr). The collective dose to this 4.9677 0.0012 group of individuals is 9.5x10 4 person Sv/yr (9.5x103 E*" * # 4.9919 0.0009 Sm 0.0008 5,4.3 Radiation Exposure of Passengers-5.0081 0.0006 Passengers and other members of the public may be ex-5.0323 0.0004 posed to radiation from EDS-3C operations because of 5.0728 0.0003 possible neutron activation of items in their baggage or 0.0002 because the device produces a small radiation field in the - 5.1294 area they occupy. As stated carher, passengers may be 5.2022-0.0001 exposed to radiation via three different pathways: expo-5.2911 0.0001 sure of persons on the concourse level near the EDS-3C, 5.3963 0.0000 direct radiation exposure of passengers to beta or gamma ,l-ficids from luggage that has been through the EDS-3C, 5.5176 0.0000 or internal dose to passengers or other members of the 5.6551-0.0000 public who consume a food or other irradiated item that 5.8087 0.0000 was contained in the reclaimed luggage. 5.9786 0.0000 in Sections 5.4.3.1 through 5.4.3.4, each of the concourse 6.1646 0.0000 scenarios proposed in this assessment is evaluated. Typi-cally, the passengers will deliver their luggage to an at ten-Note. 'lhe doses were calculated using VARSKIN MOD 1: dant or baggage handler at the entrance of the EDS-3C. Dise source with radius = 5.u000 cm The attendant will place the luggage onto the conveyor. Skin thicknen = 0.0070 cm belt, which will feed it into the EDS-3C/'he baggage will Sou7a:dionuclide = Al then pass onto a roller platfo oranother conveyor belt Avera e beta energy = 1.240 MeV from which it will be taken o' oy another baggage atten. NrceItre$h +t Ikg/cm, n some casm, k pmp d damusy an irradiation time - 60 s theirluggage once it has been checked by the EDS-3Ct in All cell damage occurs in an area with a radius of 6.165 cm. Other scenarios, they may have to carry their luggage to a NUlt!!G-1396 30 1

5 EmironmentalImpacts Table 5.5 Elemental composition of the contents t.f an alumir.um sulicase (quantitles in grams) Cloth. Toilet. Tooth. - Sulti Element ing. Shoes ries paste Shaver Shampoo Paper case - Total 34.0 141.0 254.0 830.5' Hydrogen -- 307.0 55.0 , 23.0 16.5 Carbon ~ 2546.0 490.0 145.0 10.6 2.2 194.0 1006.0 1307.0 5700.8 7.0 662.0-Nitrogen. 483.0 145.0 27.0 Oxygen 1054.0 218.0 32.0 107.3 73.0 1124.0 1163.0 3771.3 0.3 ~ 0.3 = Sodium - 6.5 9.8 3.3 Manganese Silicon 0.9 1.8 2.7 Phosphorous 0.1 15.2 0.2 15.4 = Sulfur 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7 448.0 89.6 537.6 Iron Cr,!cium 19.6 19.6 Aluminum

• 4540.0 4540.0 1

oAll data are from Westinghouse (1986) report, except the weight fiom aluminum (this amount was increased to reflect an all-aluminum suitcase). l Table 5.6 Gamma dose rates from EDS.3C activation of the contents J of an aluminum sulicase Element Sulicase Gamma Gamma dose j mass activity ( Sv/hr/kg rate @ 30 cm Element (g) (Bq) @ 30 cm) ( Sv/hr) i Hydrogen 830.5 Carbon 5700.8 5.18E-09 Nitrogen 662.0 8.88E-05 Oxygen 3771.3 4.07E-01 Sodium 0.3 2.29E-02 5.41E-04 1.62E-07 g Manganesc 9.8. 4.81E + 01 1.37E-02 1.34E-04 Silicon 2.7 1.30E-03 Phosphorous 15.4 7.40E-09 Sulfur 0.7 Iron 537.6 Calcium 19.6 Aluminum 4540.0 4.74E + 04 3.03E-02 1.38E-01 l Total 1.38E-01 Note: 5.18U 5.18x10

• ctc.

different ticket counter and wait in line for some time material for neutron shielding and heavy metal for before receiving their tickets. A complete summary of gamma ray absorption. They will be sufficiently thick to '

collective doses for each scenario is presented in Sec-reduce the penetrating radiation field to less than 1 Sv/ i ' tion 5.4.5. hr (0.1 mrem /hr) when the EDS-3C is running at peak Additional vertical shiciding barriers will be placed at capacity. For installations that could be accessible to the either end of the EDS-3C to furtherlower the radiation public, an exit housing for the conveyor belt with an exposure to members of the publicand non.TNA person. opening for loading and unloading luggage will be net. These barriers will be constructed of hydrogenous installed. 31 NUREG-1396 s a

5 EnvironmentalImpacts Population distribution data on the number of interna. 50 wklyr).These ticket personnel may be 2 m (6.6 ft) from tional passengers enplaning at JFK International Airport the EDS-3C, which would have a radiation area of about were used to estimate the downward dose to passer.gers 0.3 pSv/hr (0.03 mrem /hr). In addition, the ticket agents located under the EDS-3C. At this very busy terminal, will have to tag the luggage with a baggage claim check. 9,010,570 international passengers boarded an airplane Assuming an 8 hour shift for each ticket agent, the esti-in 1988 (Ryge,1990). Statistics for 1987 (statistics for 1988 mated dose to a ticket agent from nearby TNA system were not available at the time of this writing) show that operations would be 0.6 mSv/yr (60 mrem /yr). The total 2.2x107 passengers (on domestic and int ernational flights) collective dose for the ticket agents would be 0.03 person. flew out of New York (U.S. Ilureau of the Census,1989). Sv/yr (3 person rem /yr). llecause it is not reasonable to assume that all domestic and international flight passengers would either pass by if non passenger airport visitors and other airport pm the counter where the EDS-3C was located or pass un. sonnel amount to 100 percent of the passenger popuL derneath the EDS-3C, it was assumed that only the inter. tion density, then it can be assumed that 9.0x10e non-national flight passengers (about 40 percent of the total passengers could pass by the airline counter where the passengers at JFK Airport) would be in the vicinity of the EDS-3C was located. EDS-3C, if non passenger airport visitors and other air-port personnel amount to 100 percent of the passenger ,lhe estimated distance from the EDS-3C to nearby population density, and only a small fraction (10 percent) members of the pubhe is about 10 m (33 ft).The potential pass underneath the EDS-3C on their way to claim their radiation exposure from the EDS-3C at this distance is less than lx10 2 Sv/hr (1 rem /hr). Ilecause the dose luggage, the total number of people affected by the scc-nario would be 9.0x105. from nMaral background radiation is approximately 0.1 Sv/hr (10 prem/hr), the dose to passengers walkmg In many cases, the baggage claim area is in the main by thc EDS-3C (about 2 to 3 minutes)woula be less than terminal directly beneath the airline ticket counters. At one tenth the dose from natural background radiation. San Francisco and Gatwick (London, England)'nterna-Potential radiation exposure to tional Airports, the average distance from the r ilevel operators [6)* 1.2x10 2 person-Sv to the basement level (where the baggage reclaim areas are located)is 4.25 m (14 ft), and the concrete flooring Potential radiation exposure to between these two levels is approximately 20 cm (8 in.) baggage handlers [6]' 6.0x10 3 person-Sv thick. The dose rate decreases rapidly with increasing Potential radiation exposure to horizontal distance from the center of the TNA system ticket agents [45)* 3.0x10 2 person Sv because of the inverse square law (see Figure 5.6). As-Potential radiation ex sure to suming that the dose rate m, the area directly underneath security screeners [3] 9.5x10A person-Sv the TNA system is i Sv/hr (0.1 mrem /hr) and that pas-sengers only stay 15 minutes in the baggage reclaim area, Radiation exposure to the the dose rate is 0.3 Sv/hr (0.03 mrem /hr). The total passengers [1.1x108]' 0 person-Sv collective dose to this group of people passing under-Radiation exposure to nearby neath the EDS-3C is estimated to be members of the public [9.0x108]* O person-Sv 0.3 Sv/hr x 0.25 hr x 9xitP passengers x IM Sv/pSv Total for the behind-the check- = 6Ex1M pctson Sv/yr in-counter scenario 4.9x10 2 person-Sv 5.4.3.1 Ilchind the Check.In Counter 5.4.3.2 In Front of the Check.In Counter in this scenario, the EDS-3C will be placed behind the in this scenario, the entrance of the TNA system will be counter where passengers check their baggage, as they placed in a public area in front of the check-in counter, currently do for international flights, llecause the bags and the exit will be placed behim the counter. The will be placed onto the conveyor belt leading to the passenger will approach the system and wait in line until EDS-3C, the passenger will not be close to the TNA the luggage is loaded onto the conveyor belt. Members of l system and will not receive any additional dose. Ilecause the public could stand next to the TNA system unless a the bag will not be returned to the passenger afterinspec-barrier was erected, which would increase the system's ' tion, there will be no dose from this pathway, already considerable size. Ilecause the luggage will not be returned to the passenger after inspection, the passenger At the proposed site at the Dulles United Airlines inter-will not be exposed to any radiation from his or her lug. national ticket counter, as many as 15 stations are avail-gage. An average dose rate of 0.3 Sv/hr(0.03 mrem /hr) able for ticket agents. Ilecause these stations must be Q%'j'jfj',"l"hbIcNcNa"f! open for 16 hours a day,7 days a week, this would require $0 full-time equwalent personnel (three 40-hr/wk shifts, fected NUREG-1396 32

5 Environmentalimpacts is assumed for a duration of 2 minutes (the time required ger walks reasonably close to the system, he or she will to scan the bags of 10 passengers with 2 bags) while the experience an average dose rate of 1 Sv/hr (0.1 mrem / passenger waits in line. This amounts to a 1.0x10 2 Sv hr) for 60 seconds (26 seconds while the bag passes (I rem) dose per passenger or 1.1x102 person Sv through the system plus some extra delay).This amounts (1.1 person rem) for an estimated 1.1 million passengers to a dose of 1.7x10 2 Sv (1.7 rem) per passenger or per year. At Dulles Airport, approximately 430 interna-0.018 person Sv (1.8 person rem) for an estimated tional passengers per day fly on United Airlines (Hall, 1.1 million passengers a year. Once the luggage is cleared 1990). On the basis of these actual numbers, the total by the EDS-3C, the attendant at the exit will band it with dose estimated at Dulles for this scenario is 1.6x10 8 tamper resistant security tape and return it to the passen-person Sv/yr (0.16 person-rem /yr).This dose component ger. The passenger will then carry the luggage to the applies to all concourse scenarios except the one dis-check-in counter, where it will be checked in for delivery cussed in Section 5.4.3.1 (behind the check in counter). to the aircraft. The estimated distance from the EDS-3C to nearby he amount of time that the passenger will carry the members of the publicis about 4 m (13 ft).The potential slightly radioactive bag will vary significantly, if for any radiation exposure from the EDS-3C at this distance is reason the airline were to cancel a scheduled flight, the 7.5x10 2 Sv/hr (7.5 rem /hr). Because the average dose passenger would be with the luggage indefinitely. His from natural background radiation is 1x102 Sv/hr would be the worst-case scenario for this option.The total (I rem /ht), the dose to passengers walking by the dose rate from all the elements listed in Table 5.3 is EDS-3C would be less than that fron. background radia-1 Sv/hr (0.1 mrem /hr) 30 seconds af ter EDS-3C screen-tion, or about 1.2x10 3 Sy (1.2x101 rem). This dose is ing. After a 10 minute decay, however, the dose rate only a small fraction of the permissible limit of 5 mSv/yr decreases 100.28 Sv/hr (0.028 mrem /hr). Assuming that (500 mrem /yr). 1.1 million passengers would have to carry two bags each from the EDS-3C to the international ticket counter If it is assumed that members of the public are near this (about 5 minutes) and wait in line 15 minutes to get to an system for about 1 minute, the estimated annual collec-airline ticket agent (0.28 Sv/hr could be used as the tive dose to this group is 1.1x10J person Sv (1.1 person-average dose rate), the estimated total collective dose rem). annually to this group of passengers would be Potential radiation exposure to 0.28 Sv/hr x 2.2x10" bags x 0.3 hr x 103 Sv/ Sv operators [6]' 1.2x10 2 person Sv = 1.8xto.' person-Sv/yr Potential radiation exposure to baggage handlers [6}' 6.0x10 3 person-Sv The total dose to each passenger from this scenario would be 1.8x101 Sv/yr (18.5 rem /yr). He collective dose Potential radiation exposure to would be 2.0x101 person Sv/yr (20 person rem /yr). ticket agents [45]* 3.0x10 2 person Sv Potential radiation expsure to Because personnel at the ticket counter at many airlines security screeners [3] 9.5x103 person Sv will have to tag the slightly radioactive luggage with baggage claim checks and subsequently place the luggage [Nxb] 1.1x10 2 person-Sv on the conveyor belt to be transferred to the airplane, r ge personnel also wdl receive a small additional dose. If Radiation exposure to nearby 20 airlines have international ticket counters that are members of the public [9.0x108]' l.1x10 2 person Sv cach staffed with 10 ticket agents, the total number of full time equivalentpersonnelneededannuallywouldbe Total for the m. front of check-appreximately 600. If ticket agents receive the luggage in counter scenano 7.1x102 person Sv 10 minutes after EDS-3C screening, the dose rate out-side the luggage would be 0.28 Sv/hr (0.028 mrcm/hr). 5.4.3.3 Pre Check.In Area Assuming it takes a ticket agent 1 minute to tag two bags

In this scenario, the EDS-3C will be placed between the ssenger,me annuap to caMck agent m ea terminal entrance and the ticket check-in counters (sec Figure 4.4). Passengers will hand their luggage to an at-6 tendant, who will place it on the EDS-3C conveyor belt.

2.2x10 bags /vr The passengers will then walk along the length of the 600 incket asentslyr system as the luggage is scanned. Assuming that a passen- 'The numbers in brackets refer to the number of full time-equivalent The total collective dose to the ticket personnel would be x en. passengers,or nearby members of the pubhc that coukt be af. j 33 NUREG-1396

i ' 5 EnvironmentalImpacts ' Passengers, their entourages, and non TNA personnel tirne equhtlent personnel (three 40-hr/wk shifts,50 wk/ who also may need to walk by the EDS-3C could receive yr). These sky-caps will have to tag the luggage with a some radiation dose. lf non-passengerairport visitors and baggage claim check. Assuming it takes a sky cap 1 min-other airport personnel amourt to 100 percent of the ute to tag two bags from cach passenEct, that each bag. passenger population density, and assuming that cach contains all the elements listed in Table 5.3, and that the passenger stays 2 minutes near the EDS-3C at a distance luggage contents have decayed only 30 seconds, the esti-of 3 m (10 ft)[ radiation dose at this distance is 0.2 Sv/hr mated annual dose to cach sky cap would be 0.25 mSv/yr (0.02 mrem /hr)], the total collective dose would be (25 mrem /yr): 8 0.2 Sv/hr x 2 min x 1 hr/60 min x 10> Svi Sv x 9.0x10s 2.22x10 bags /yr 0.1 Sv/hr g = 6.0x10 8 perwn/Sy 15 sky-caps bag if the time for cach passenger and accompanying visitor were to increase to 5 minutes, the estimated total eclice-tive dose would be 0.15 person-Sv (15 person-rem). The total collective dose to this group of workers would be 3.8x10 3 person-Sv/yr (3.8x101 person rem /yr). p r$t rs [ 1.2x10 2 person Sv Other members of the public might pass near the system, but much fewer than m the pre check-in area scenario Potential radiation exposure to (Section 5.4.3.3). If the assumption is made that 10 per-baggage handlers [6]* 6.0x104 person Sv cent of the public (non-passengers) might walk near the Potential radiation exposure to EDS-3C on their way to the terminal, then the collective ticket agents [600]* 1.0x102 person-Sv dose to this group would be 6.0x10 3 person Sv (0.6 person rem)(0.1 x 6.0x103 person Sv). Potential radiation ex security screeners [3]psure to 9.5x10 4 person-Sv Potential radiation exposuic to operators [6]' l.2x102 person Sv Radiation ex sure to the passengers [.1x108]' 2.0x10 5 person Sv Potential radiation exposure to sky-caps [15]' 3.8x10 3 person Sv Radiation ex iosure to near members of he public[9.0x OS]* 6.0x102 person Sv Potential radiation exposure to ticket agents [600]' 0 person-Sv Total for the pre-check-in-arca Potential radiation expsure to scenario 2.9x10J person-Sv security screeners [3] 9.5x10 4 person Sv 5.4.3.4 Curbside Area Rad!ation exposure t.o the passengers [1.1x10e) 5.5x102 person-Sv in the last scenario, the EDS-3C will be placed along the Radiation sure to nearb departure curb outside the main airport terminal. The members of he pubhc [9.0x 05], 6.0x104 person-Sv passengers will hand their luggage to an attendant and wait for it to be cleared in order to receive a claim check. TMfoW Mshe Depending on the specific setup, the passenger might scenario 7.8x102 person-Sv walk alongside the sysicm to the exit. An average dose 1 rate of 03 pSv/hr (0.03 mrem /hr)is assumed for a dura-5.4.4 Effects ofIrradiation on Baggage tion of 10 minutes. Passengers wdl have to wait longer Contents l near the EDS-3C than in the in front of-tbe check-in. counter scenario because they will have to wait for the Food, medical supplies, and other consumable iternt are baggage claim check. This amounts to a dose of subjected daily to radiation exposures, without protective 5.0x102 pSv (5 rem) for each passenger or 5.5x102 measures, above those which they would receive person Sv (5.5 person rem) for an estimated 1.1 million normally. This occurs while the items arc in transit on passengers a year. airline flights to the desired destination. Neutron and gamma ray exposure rates have been measured for aver. At many intended curbside locations, three to five sky-age flight paths. A 5 hour transcontinental or transatlan-caps may be available for ticketing checked-in luggage. tic flight at 12 km (7.5 mi) and at mid latitudes would llecause the sky-cap stations could be open for 16 hours a result in an absorbed dose of 15 micrograys ( Gy) day,7 days a week, this would require as many as 15 full-(1.5 mrad) or a dose equiva'a' of 25 Sv (2.5 mrem) to 'De numben in brackets refer to the number of full time equivalent

• The numben in brackets refer to the number of full-time-equivalent worken, panengen,or nearby members of the pubhc that could be al-worken. passengers,or nearby members of the public that couk" i

fected. Iceted. NUREG-1396 34

5 EnvironmentalImpacts the whole body (NCRF Report 94). An extreme case system. About 90 percent of the committed effective dose - would be a 10 hour polar flight, for example, from Cali-equhalent of the 2.3x103 Sv(2.3x10 5 mrcm)would be fornia to Europe, in which case long flight times and due to ingestion of sodium and chlorine. In principle, a higher cosmic-ray intensities at high latitudes would re-passenger could open his or her luggage after a pre-sult in an absorbed dose of 50 nGy (5 mrad) or 100- Sv check in inspection, take an item or two out of the check-(10-mrem) dose equivalent. It should be noted, however, in luggage to consume either at the airport or later on the that frequent flyers and most crew members may receive airplane. Persons consuming salt pills or highly salted annual dose equivalents of about 1 mSv (100 mrem), foods after their luggage had been screened by the while some crew members may receive c,ose equivalents EDS-3C could receive most of the radiation dose shown that are several times higher (see NCRP Report 94). in Table 5.7. Passage through theTN A system would expose medicine, Assuming 5 percent of the 1.1 million international pas-lotion, drugs, or other items in a suitcase to a slow neutron sengers whose luggage is screened by the EDS-3C carry fluence of 4.5x105 neutrons /cm2 if the item were located salt tablets or snacks (such as peanuts or salami) in their at the peak flux.This neutron exposure is less than that luggage and subsequently eat these items (wit'lin 30 sec-experienced from cosmic rays in Denver each year, which onds after screening), the collective dose to this group of results in a dose equivalent rate of 0.5 mSv/yr (50 mrem / passengers would be 1.3x10 5 person.Sv/yr (1.3x10 8 yr)(see NCRP Report 94). person-rem /yr). In ICRP Publication 23, a normal range of sodium (Na) intake for adults is indicated to be 2.8 to 5.4.4.1 Consumable items 7.8 g/ day (0.l to 0.3 o2/ day). In Japanese adults however, intakes as high as 27 g (0.95 oz) have been reported. The Passengers may also carry' consumable items (including effective dose equivalent from a sodium intake of 27 g food)in their luggage. Small amounts of naturally occur. would be 8.6x103 Sv (8.6x10 5 mrem), ring radionuclides already exist in the food that we cat. For exampic, potassium-40 (K 40)isa naturallyoccurring Both the daily intake and the dose conversion factor radioactive isotope that is contained in essentially all the change with age. Table 5.8 shows both parameters for - food that we cat. it has an abundance (found in nature) of four diffetent age groups for which dose conversion 0.0117 percent, a radioactive half-life of 1.25x10S years, factors were available (NUREG-0172) The results show. and a high energy gamma ray as well. Since K-40 has a that children receive a dose from Na-24 that is about specific activity of 838 picoeuries per gram of potassium 60 percent greater than that estimated for adults, in and peanuts, for example, contain 0.674 percent potas-an extreme case, a child with a 12 g/ day (0.4 oz/ day) sium,1 g (0.035 oz)of peanuts contains 0.209 Bq of K 40 sodium intake could receive a dose of 1.5x103 Sv (National institute of Standards and Technology,1989). It (1.5x10 5 mrem) from that intake, seems reasonable to consider an amount of induced ra-dioactivity equal to one-hundredth of that contained naturally in a single peanut to be negligible. It is for this Because of the large amount of K-40 in the, body [140 g reason that Tables 5.1 and 5.2 only include induced radio-(4.9 z)in " reference man"), K 40 is the prmcipal natu-rally occurnng source of internal radiation (ICRP Publi. activity greater that 0.001 I q/g (see Section 5.4.1). Only cation 23). Potassium enters th body mainly through four radioactively induced elements-rhodium (Rh), in-foodstuffs at the rate of about 2.3 g/ day (0.09 oz/ day) or dium (In), curopium (Eu), and dysprosium (Dy) (four 28.3 kBq/yr (NCRP Report 94). For adults, the whole-relatively rare elements)-would exceed the amount of - natural radioactivity in a 142-g (5-oz) bag of peanuts body dose conversion factor is 5.0x10 3 Sv/Bq (18.5 mrem / Ci); therefore, the yearly dose from food-10 minutes after they left the TNA system. stuffs is 0.14 mSv/yr (14.1 mrem /yr)(see ICRP Publica-Table 5.7 shows the dailyintakes of the elements that are en und r ta lic r1 ariat on i e the principal contributors to the dose that would be re-composition have little effect on the body content or on ceived and the dose estimates for each element under the the radiation dose received (NUREG-0172). For exam- . assumed conditions. The mean daily intakes o! v triaus plc, the maximum potential dose from consumption of - clements shown m, this table were obtamed from ICRP 10 g (0.35 oz) of potassium that was in luggage that was ' Publication 23 and apply to the " reference man" concept screened every week for 1 year by the EDS-3C would be in radiation protection. The effective dose equivalents were calculated using dose conversion factors from ICRP Publication 30, which reflects the ICRP-based system of 10 g/ day x 1 day /wk x 52 wk/yr x 3t Ik;/g x 5x10 = Sv/Ik] = 81 Sv/yr (8.1 mrem /yr) dose limitation and the latest metabolic models and dosimet ric parameters.nc table shows that salt (sodium) is the principal source of radiation exposure from con-This is only 57 percent of the yearly dose received from sumption of food that has passed through the TNA foodstuffs. Thus, the conservative assumption of taking 35 NUREG-1396

i $ EnvironmentalImpacts Table 5.7 Committed effective dose equivalent from daily intakes of elements I hour after l'.DS 3C screening Weighted Committed effective dose Mean committed llecquerellgram of element equivalent from 1 day's intake daily Induced dose Target intake - radio-equivalent 0.5 min delay

• 10-min delay
• 0.5 min delay 10-min delay nuclide (g) nuclide (Sv/Inq)

(Bq/g) (liq /g) ( Sv) ( Sv) Na-23 4.40E + 00 Na-24 3.87E-10 8.10E.02 8.03E-02 1.38E-04 1.37E-04 P-31 1.40E + 00 P-32 2.08E-09 1.60E-03 1.60E-03 4.65E-06 4.65E-06 Cl-37 5.20E + 00 Cl-38 5.40E-11 2.4SE-01 2.07E-01 6.95E-05 5.82E-05 K-41 3.30E + 00 K-42 2.97E-10 1.0SE-02 1.07E-02 1.06E-05 1.04E-05 Mn-55 3.70E Mn-56 2.52E-10 5.00E+ 00 4.77E + 00 4.66E-06 4.45E-06 Cu-63 3.50E-03 Cu-64 1.16E-10 2.06E-01 2.04E-01 8.37E-08 8.29E-08 As-75 1.00E-03 As 76 1.28E-09 1.47E-01 1.46E-01 1.88E-07 1.87E-07 l Dr 79 7.50E-03 ' Br-80m 6.23E-11 2.46E-01 2.40E-01 1.15E-07 1.12E-07 ,I .Br 79 7.50E-03 Ilr-80 1.50E-11 1.28E + 01 8.84E + 00 1.44E-06 9.95E-07 Total 2.29E-04 2.16E-04

• 1' rom Table 5.1.

'l - Note: 4.4013+ 00 = 4.40x10' etc. Table 5.8 Age dependence of sodium Intake and dose conversion factors (specific activity of 8.1x10A liq /g) sod um

intake, Whole body dose con.

Product ofI x DCF l 3 version factor, DCF* /nSv g.\\. / mrem gs Category (age) (g/ day) ( Sv/ liq) (mrem / Ci) (114 day) ( Ci. day) / Infant (0.5 yr) 0.5 2.7E-03 10 1.4E-03 5.0 Child (5 yr) 2.0 1.6E-03 5.8 3.2E-03 11.6 ) Teenager (15 yr) 3.6 6.2E-04 2.3 2.2E-03 8.3 i Adult (> 20 yr) 4.4 4.6E-04 1.7 2.0E-03 7.5 'ICRP Publiention 30. Note: 2.78-03 = 2.7x10 8 etc. Source: NUIEG-0172. potassium (10 g) 30 seconds after it leaves the TNA sys-indicates that the amount of manganese is generally less tem 52 times a year would not contribute significantly to than 5 percent. Typical items likely to contain these ele-the total radiation dose. ments are jewelry, clock alarms, travel irons, electric ra-zors, hair dryers, portable radios, and nail files. 5.4.4.2 Nonconsumable items Gold is more likely to be found in larger quantities than Neutron activation of the elementsin clothing (hydrogen, manganese or indium. Gold alloys used for jewelry and a carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen) does not lead to significant other objects have a gold content of 50 to 70 percent ^ amounts of residual activity in suitcases, as indicated in (Hodgman et al.,1960). Catalogs show that most common Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Of the most highly activated isotopes gold jewelry such as necklaces, carrings, and rings have a after a 10 minute decay listed in Table 5.3 (vanadium, gold content ranging from about 10 g to 50 g (0.3 oz to manganese, indium, and europium), only indium and to a 1.8 oz). Since the price of gold is currently about $15 a lesser extent manganese are found in common objects. gram ($420 an ounce), one would expect that very expen-Indium, according to the Handbook of Chemistry and Phys-sive jewelry would be either worn or stored in carry-on ics, is principally used in alloys for jewelry and in dental luggage or purses by passengers. Ilowever, in an extreme alloys (Hodgman et al.,1960). Manganese is used primar-case, someone could conceivably place, for example,40 g ily in copper, iron, and nickel alloys. A survey of alloys (1.4 oz) of gold jewelry in his or her checked baggage. The NURI!G-1396 36

5 EnvironmentalImpacts l product radionuclide, gold-198, has a half-life of 2.7 dayst both sensiometric performance and granularity were un-therefore, nearly all the induced radioactivity would still changed from those of control samples. The tests and be present when the owner claimed the luggage. results are discussed by Beckett and Schneider (1987). The total beta particle dose at a depth of 0.007 cm 5.4.5 Summary of Collective Doses (2.8x10 3 in.) beneath the skin directly under the jewelry is estiranted to be about 23 Oy (2.3 mrad)if thejewelryis in the previous discussions in Section 5.4, the collective worn continuously for approximately 10 days after the - dose from various pathways was derived. The collective luggage is claimed (Sherbini,1990) The gamma dose doses to workers and security screeners do not depend on adds approximately 2 Sy (0.2 mrem); therefore, the total the choice of TNA system installation scenario. %c total dose is 25 Sy (2.5 mrem). If the ICRP weighting factor doses to passengers from the actiwition of consumable for skin is used (0.01), the total effective dose equivalent items and apparel are greatest for the pre-check-in sce-for this assumed exposure scenario is about 0.25 Sv nario, because passengers (or members of the public) may (0.025 mrem). If 1 percent of the passengers carry gold have access to checked luggage immediately after it jewelry in their luggage and then wear it indefinitely, leaves the TNA system. The downward contribution to the effective dose equivalent is 2.8x10 3 person Sv/yr the floor below the TN A system may apply to all scenar-(0.28 person. rem /yr). This dose is well below the public ios, and the maximum case is assumed. exposure limits recommended by ICRP, The direct dose to other persons applies in varying de-Potential doses due to a malfunction of the TNA system grees to all but the first scenario (behind the check in (such as a conveyor belt breakdown, a power failure, or a counter).The scenario showing the largest collective dose baggage jam) could be larger because of a longer neutron is the pre check-in area scenario, irrndiation time. The potential effective dose equivalent from wearing gold jewelry for 10 days following EDS-3C Tables 5.9 and 5.10 summarize the annual collective and screening could be as high as 10 Sv (1 mrem). Experi-individual doses for each of the four scenarios described ence with ramp installation at JFK International Airport in this section. The doses for all the individuals involved has shown that these irradiations are rare, usually less (operators, baggage handlers, ticket counter personnel, than one per month of operation. If this scenario occurs security screeners, passengers, and members of the pub-once cach month, the resulting collective effective dose s :) are within the 10 CFR Part 20 limits for individuals in equivalent is 1.2x103 person-Sv/yr (1.2x10 2 person. rem / restricted and unrestricted areas. Table 5.10 shows that yi). the annual dose from natural background radiation is 3 mSv/yr (300 mrem /yr), which is more than the dose Existing F:deral guidance and laboratory data both pro-from any one of the scenarios presented (NCRP Report vide assurance that neutron ir radiation of luggage as pro-94). posed will not cause deleterious effects. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved neutron irra. The collective doses were calculated for several scenarios diation of food using Cf 252 sources to determine its involving a single EDS-3C installed and operated in four moisture content. Such irradiation is permitted for different ways at an airport if several of these systems absorbed doses of up to 2 mGy (200 mrad) (21 CFR were installed in an airport, the doses would be controlled Part 179). by the exposure scenario (see Section 5.4.3.3)in which the passenger hands the luggage to a TNA attendant for The effect of the system on photographic film, including screening, walks along the system (in the area of highest . both movie film and high speed film,is undetectable un-exposure rate), and retrieves the luggage at the exit of the der normal conditions. This was determined by testing system. Because the passenger would presumably check several types of film that had been passed once and sev-the luggage through a single system, it is highly probabic cral times through the original ptotype system, EDS-2 that the passenger checking in luggage would not be in - (lleckett and Schneider,1987), whieraontained 340 pg of the vicinity of more than one system.Therefore, the col-Cf-252. The film showed no effects tom the radiation lective and maximum doses in an airport using multiple exposure to the EDS-2 when subjected b 50 times the systems in parallel probably would not exceed the results standard dose. When compared with contml samples, of the analysis in this section. 37 NUREG-1396

m f 15 EnvironmentalImpacts Table 5.9 Summary of collective doses from all scenarios Scenario Behind the in front of i counter the counter Pre. check.In Curbside Radiation exposure (person Sv)_ (person.Sv) (person.Sv)- (person.Sv) Workers Operators 1.2E-02 1.2E-02 ' 1.2E-02 1.2E-02 11aggage handlers 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 Ticket counter personnel 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 1.0E-02 0 Security screeners 9.5E-04 9.5E-04 9.5E-04 9.5E-04 Sky. caps 0 0 0 3.8E-03 Passengers 0 1.1E-02 2.0E-01 5.5E-02 Public Belon the TNA system 6.8E-02 6.8E-02 6.8E-02 6.8E-02 mar the TNA system 0 1.1E-02 6.0E-02 6.0E-03 Frorat irradiation cf baggage contents Consumable items 0 0 1.3E-fl5 0 Nonconsumable items (suitcase, 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 jewelry, etc.) Total Person.Sv 1.2E-01 1.4E-01 3.6E-01 1.6E-01 Percon. rem 12.0 14.2 '36.0 15.5 Note: a.2E-02 = 1.2x10 8 etc. Table 5.10 Summary of annual individual doses from all scenarios Scenario Behind the in front of NRC counter the counter Pre. check.in Curbside limit Radiation exposure (mSv) _ (mSv) (mSv) (mSv) (mSv) . Workers Operators 2.0E + 00 2.0B + 00 2.0E + 00 2.0E + 00 5.0E + 01 11aggage handlers ' 1.0E + 00 1.0E + 00 1.0E + 00 1.0E + 00 5.0E + 00 Ticket counter personnel 6.0E-01 6.0E-01 1.7E-02 0-5.0E + 00 Security screeners 3.2E-01 3.2E-01 3.2E-01 3.2E-01 5.0E + 00 - Sky-caps 0 0 0 2.5E-01 5.0E + 00 Passengers 0 1.0E-05 1.8E-04 5.0E-05 5.0E + 00 Public Below the TNA system 7.5E-05 7.5E-05 7.5E-05 7.5E-05 5.0E + 00 Near the TNA system 0 1.2E-06 6.7E-06 6.7E-06 5.0E + 00 - From irradiation of baggage contents L Consumable items 0 0 2.4E-07 0 Nonconsumable items (seitiase, 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 clothing, etc.) Notes Natural sources of radiation: Natural background 10l!+ 00 Yearly dose from foodstuffs 1.4fb01 2.0E+ 00 = 2.0x10oe tc. l' L NUREG-1396 38 h a

6 EFFECTS OF ACCIDENTS . For the purposes of environmental analysis, several acci-Figure 6.1 illustrates the isodose contours for a source in a dent scenarios were selected to conservatively bound a stuck position. Additional dose rate measurements can be spectrum of accidents that could occur. Scenarios other found in the licensee's emironmental report (SAIC, than those discussed also would be possible, but their 1989). consequences are expected to be lower. The described = scenarios are considered conservative in terms of both The operating procedures for the EDS-3Cs installed in accident potential and radiological consequences. concourse areas require that the source be transferred when the number of people in the airport is low and that In assessing potential accidents, two mWor factors were the immediate area be cordoned off at approximately considered in developing a series of postulated accidents: 14 m (45 ft) to limit the radiation exposures to members of i the probability of occurrence and the subsequent severity the public to 0.02 mSv/hr (2 mrem /hr). TNA personnel-of an accident. A complete range of postulated accidents would limit their exposure while working to dislodge the was described in FAA's application for an amendment to source by positioning themselves away from the interface its license for proposed operations. These included an between the cask and the EDS-3C.Their average dose accident involving the trrinsfer of the californium 252 rate would be about 0.2 mSv/hr (20 mrem /hr) during the ' (Cf 252) source from the cask into the EDS-3C, an acci-15 minutes it might take to dislodge the source. The. dent during transport from the manufacturer, and postu-estimated collective dose for this scenario is less than lated operational accidents, such as a fire or an explosion. 3.0x10A person Sv (0.03 person rem). The estimated probability that the source might become dislodged is less The doses calculated for these accidents are effective than 10 3 per source insertion or removal (SAIC,1989). dose equivalents resulting from the inhalation of dis- ~ persed radioactive material. Exposure pathways other than inhalation can be expected to result in minor in-6.2 Transportation Accidents . creases in dose commitment received. Deposition of Cf 252 in soil and/or vegetables may require decontami-The environmental impacts of radioactive shipments in. -nation if the accident mvolves sigmficant amounts of volving all modes of transportation in the United States Cf 252. q under regulations in effect as of June 30,1975, have been documented in the " Final Environmental Statement on 6.1 Sotirce-Transfer Accidents the Transportr. tion of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes"(NUREG-0170). External dose rates during transfer of a source would bc slightly higher than those during normal operations be. This section addresses the radiological impact of an acci-cause the shielding would be less as the source was moved dent resulting from the transportation of one Cf-252 from the transfer cask to the EDS-3C.The highest dose source annually. Minor traffic accidents would have no rate would occur at the time the source was passed from effect on the integrity of the cask containing the source the cask into the EDS-3C. If the source were to become and would not pose a radiological hazard (llozorgmanesh, stuck in this position, a high radiation field would result. 1981), f a2 mswmr N (20 mrommt / / g at mSvmr (to mremmr) 005 msvmr o 1 (5 mremmr) < > 200 cm Figure 6.1 Isodose contours for source wedged at interface of cask and EDS-3C l 39 NUREG-1395 ]

6 Effectsof Accidents The bulk of the cask is composed of water-extended. Table 6.1 shows that the potential for serious exposure polyester neutron shielding, which does not melt like the would not exist following a postulated accident involving a borated wax compounds used previously in the prototype,. fire. Cleanup of the accident would be complicated, it Model EDS-2 (Ryge,1989). lead shielding around the might require bringing in a crane to manipulate the re-center of the cask where the source is located reduces the mains of the shielded cask or bringing in another shielded gamma ray dose rate. Although the melting point of lead cask for source storage. A large water-filled tar k could is about 327'C (620*F), a serious crash followed by a hot serve as both a receptacle for the source and a shielding fire of long duration could destroy the neutron shielding tool to provide protection against radiation emitting from and seriously compromise the gamma ray shielding. Table the source. Carefut emergency planning for such scenar. 6.1 shows the dose equivalent rates from neutron and los would limit the dose during recovery of the source. A gamma radiation at various distances from an unshielded person working at an average distance of 10 m (33 f t) from 150 pg point source of Cf-252.The absorbed dose rates in the source for 4 hours could receive a dose equivalent of tissue are based on data given fora distance of1 m(3 ft)in about 0.3 mSv (30 mrem). ICRP Publication 21. The dose equivalent rates in Table 6.1 are based on the assumption that the mean quality The second type of transportation accident is assumed to factor for neutrons will increase by a factor of 2.The dose be even more severe that the scenario considered above. rates shown are the upper limits for a radiation field that For this accident, it is assumed that the accident and might be present following a postulated severe accident subsequent fire lead to the complete fragmentation of the and subsequent fire involving the truck transporting the Cf 252 source and its dispersion to the atmosphere.The source. The gamma ray doses rates would be much lower accidental release of radioactivity from ground level and if the lead shield remained intact. transported in the atmosphere under stable conditions was calculated at 4 m/s (13 ft/s). NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145," Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Ac-Table 6.1 h1aximum potential dose equivalent cident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," was used to calculate the average X O values of / fo o i a se ere ccid n and r 6.4x10 5s/m3 and 2.8x10 5s/m3 at 50 and 300 m (54 and Dose equivalent rate (mSv/hr) 328 yd), respectively, from the accident location. Distance im (ft)l Neutron Gamma Total Tables 6.2 through 6.5 summarize the offsite concentra-tions and annual inhalation doses for 10, 50, and 100-percent dispersion from the Cf-252 source at 50 and 1 (3.3) 7.2E + 00 2.lE-01 7.4 B + 00 300 m, respectively, from the point of release. The 2 (6.6) 1.8E + 00 5.0E-02 1.8E + 00 resulting maximum inhalation dose for 100-percent dis-5 (16.4) 2.8E-01 8.5E-03 2.8E-01 persion at a distance of 50 m is 2.4x10 3 Sv (2.4x10J rem), which is well within the U.S. Environmental Protection 10 (32.8) 7.5E-02 2.lE-03 7.7E-02 Agency's (EPA, 1990) protective action guidelines (PAGs) of 0.25 Sv (25 rem) for emergency workers. Note: 7.211+ 00 = 7.2xt0' etc. Table 6.2 Offsite concentrations [at 50 m (54 yd)1 of airborne releases for various fractions of Cf.252 hlaximum Offsite concentration Total permissible source concentra. I'raction activity Release Emission X/Q* tion (MPC) of h1PC (Milq/yr) fraction (Milq) (s/m ) (llq/ml) (Milqlm3) (%) 3 l 2.96E + 03 1.00E-01 2.9611+ 02 6.40E-05 3.70E-08 6.10E-10 1.62 l 2.96E + 03 5.00E-01 1.48B + 03 6.40E-05 3.70E-08 3.00E-09 8.12 2.96E + 03 1.00E + 00 2.96E + 03 6.40E-05 3.70E-08 6.01E-09 16.24 i (

• x/O at 50 m.

l Note: 2.96M 03 = 2.96x102etc. I l l NUREG-1396 40 t

6 Effectsof Accidents ,p L 4' Table 6.3 Annualinhalation dose to the nearest Individual 50 m (54 yd) away from postulated Cf.252 accident 4

p,^

Committed ? o effective Activity

• Dose conver.

dose. i inhaled sion factor ** equivalent 1 . Sv/50 yr Bq) (Sv/50 yr) ( (Bq) ' 1 ' 4.81E + 00 5.00E-05 2.40E-04. 2.40E + 01 5.00E-05 1.20E-03 n 4.81E + 01 5.00E-05 2.40E-03 'llreathing rate = 8.00E+ 03 m*/yr. "lCRP Publication 30. Note: 4.8tE+ 00 = 4.81x10' etc. 1 Table 6.4 Offsite concentrations (at 300 m (328 yd)] of airborne releases for various fractions of Cf.252 Maximum Offsite concentration Total. permissible source concentra. Fraction activity Release Emission X/Q* tion (MPC) of MPC (MBq/yr) fraction (MBq) (s/m ) (Bq/ml) (MBq/m3) (%) 3 2.96E + 03 1.00E-01 2.96E + 02 2.80E-05 3.70E-08 2.63E-10 - 0.71 2.96E + 03 5.00E-01 1.48E + 03 2.808-05 3.70E-08 1.31E-09 3.55 2.96E + 03 1.00E + 00 2.96E + 03 2.80E-05 3.70E 2.63E-09 7.10

• X/O at 300 m.

Note: 2.96E+ 03 = 2.96x10$ ete. Table 6.5 Annualinhalation dose to the nearest individual 300 m (328 yd) away from postulated Cf.252 accident Committed effective Activity

• Dose conver.

dose inhaled sion factor ** equivalent (Bq) (Sv/50 yr Bq) (Sv/50 yr) 2.10E + 00 5.00E-05 1.05E-04 1.05E + 01 5.00E-05 5.26E-04 2.10E + 01 5.00E-05 1.05E-03 'llreathing rate = 8.00E+ 03 m*/yr. "lCRP Publication 30. Nots: 2.10E+ 00 = 2.10x100 etc. This scenario assumes that all the shielding materials are fighting time of 4 hours, the total dose to an individual destroyed.The dose ratc at 10 m. a reasonable distance would be approximately 0.31 mSv (31 mrem). Such a dose for fire control and containment, is appnuimately does not exceert Ihe PV. limit of 1 rem whole-body dose 7.7x10 2 mSv/hr (7.7 mrem /hr). For a maximum fire-(EPA.1900). Although the dose estimates would not 41 NUREG-1396

i 1 61& cts of Accidents ) 1 necessitate offsite protective actions, all U.S. airports explosion were to occur, the force of the explosion could have implemented fire protection and emergency prepar-destr the inside chamber and leave the source virtually edness plans as part of thelt building code requirements. unshi,jded. Table 6.1 provides an upper bound for the radiation ticld that could result. Unless the source was he average distance from a supplier of Cf 252 sources to blown co.pletely away from the EDS-3C, the field various airpoG locations was approximately 1900 km i (1200 mi). ne probability of a severe truck accident dur. would not be radially uniform because of the presence of ing shipment of a Cf 252 source to and from an airport is the shielding components. nc probicm of retrieving the source and placing it in a shicided container is similar to ,j about 7.2x10.e/yr (Sandia National l2boratory,1978), that described in Section 6.2, but the process could be For actual locations, the accident probability ranges from aided with the use of the neutron and gamma ray sun'ey 2.9x10Nyr to 1.4x10 7/yr. instruments that are always kept on site at the airport in he consequences of the postulated accident would depend on location.To assess the population dose result-ing from the Cf 252 dispersal accident, a reference popu-lation density of 386 persons /km' (1000 perr.ons/mir) To evaluate the possibility of such a bomb breaching the withina16 km(10-mi)radiusof theaccidentlocationwas source encapsulation, a test was performed at the U.S. used. lt was assumed that 10 percent of the Cf 252 was Hureau of Mines in 1988 using 4.5 kg (10 lb) of plastic released downwind and that a 60' sector was affected, explosive and a dummy (empty) source capsule simulated %c total number of people alfccted in this postulated in an EDS-3C mockup device (U.S. Hureau of Mines, scenario would bc 5.2x104. The collective dose received 1988). The results showed that the detonation of the by individuals within that sector ou: 'o 16 km would be charge did very little damage to the surrounding enclo-about 5.5 person Sv(550 person rem). lt chould be noted, sure, although the mockup itself was completely dc. however, that dispersion and dilution of tha plume due to stroyed. Most of the framework for the mockup was shat-deposition of Cf 252 on the grouno will significartly re. 9:ed, and pieces of the bismuth block and paraffin shicid-duce the radioactive airborne concentration at 16 km. For further information regarding this scenario, see the licen-U.g were seattered around the area. The polyethylene sec's environmental tcport (SAIC.1989). tube containing the dummy source capsule was found essentially undamaged under the debris. Although the inner metal sleeve and polyethylene were tightly swaged 6.3 @ational Accidents onto the source capsule, the source still appeared to be in good condition, as was later verified by the source manu-The possibility exists that an accident followed by a fire at facturer's leak tests. For further information regarding an airport could happen, if a fire fallowed by a large the results of these tests, see S AIC (1988). t i i NUlWG-1396 42 1

,= - 'T 1 1 7 DECOMMISSIONING I The structural components of the EDS-3 and EDS-3C tions are described in literature. Water plays a significant are not expected to mntain significant amounts of role in ensuring the effectiveness of concrete as a neutron radionuclides after 15 years of system operation. It is shield because hydrogen is the most effective light ele. estimated that a total of 7.4x10' Bq (0.002 nCi) would be ment for slowing down neutrons from Cf.252, present, mainly as a result of the activation of bismuth in the shield. Neutron acthation of the concrete platform For estimation purposes, h can be assumed that all the beneath the EDS-3C is also expected tu be small. Mter neutrons impinging on the surface below the TN A system the initial testing of the prototype model(EDS-2) at both are fission spectrum neutrons (thermal neutrons would Ims Angeles and San Francisco International Airports be strong 4 absorbed by the borated paraffin wax shield-was stopped in 1988, the concrete surface under the ing). The dose rate at the bottom center outside the EDS-2 was surveyed with an ion chamber sutvey instru. EDS-3C crterior shielding is approximately 0.3 mSv/hr ment. Although the system had only been tested for (30 mrem /hr). For fission spectrum ncutrons,0.3 mSv/hr 6 weeks at each airport, no acth ity above background was corresponds to 240 neutrons /cm8 s. Table 7.1 lists the

observed, principal constituents of concrete and the long term acti-vation products from this neutron flux using the data from Erdtmann (1976). Assuming the constituents of concrete llecause concrete is used as a floor barrier at most airport are those listed in Table 7.1, the total acthity (for all facilities, the amount of activation products that may be products) remaining af ter 15 years is 65 Bq (0.0017 Ci).

found in concrete 15 years after system operation can be calculated. Concrete is a natural choice for a shielding Although other elements such as chromium, manganese, material; it is cheap, structurally useful, and versatile. A vanadium, aluminum, sulfur, phosphorus, and titanium great deal of work has been done on conventional and may also exist in elemental concrete, the elements listed special shielding concretes, and a wide variety of composi-in the tab!c are the primary ones (Jaeger et al.,1970). Table 7.1 Major constituents of concrete and long. term activation products Average percent Gamma comrwition energy Activity Constituent by weight Product Half. life (SteV) (Bq/kg) (pCi/kg) Calcium (Ca) 22 Ar-37 34.8 d 0 4.4 B + 01 1.2E-03 K-42 12.4 hr 1.52 6.7E-02 1.8E-06 Hydrogen (1I) 1 H-3 12.3 yr 0 1.1E-01 3.lE-06 Oxygen (0) 51 0 -15 2 min 1.02 1.8E-03 4.9E-08 Silicon (Si) 22 Mn-27 10 min 0.89 2.5E-02 6.7E-07 Carbon (C) 3 C-11 20 min 1.02 4.8E-06 1.3E-10 Bc-10 1.6E + 06 yr 0 4.4E-02 1.2E-06 Iron (Fe) 0.5 Mn-54 312 d 0.83 1.3E-01 3.4E-04 Manganese (Mg) 0.5 Na-24 15 hr 4.12 7.4E + 00 2.0E-04 Total C.5E + 01 1.8E-03 Nme: 4.4E+ 01 = 4.4x105 etc. 43 NUREG-1396

1 i

8 ALTERNATIVES 8.1 Attributes for Evaluation The economic impacts discussed are largely qualitative. He alternatives related to the use of uc'IN A system will require an additional 6109 positions per operational unit: ne primary considerations in a valuc impact assessment the hand scarch alternative will requtre an equivalent are the attributes that are used to characterize the conse-increase of 33 posidons, ne cut m, tads or donar quences of a proposed action. For this assessment, the chnge per flight passenger also was estimated for each staff evaluated four categories: (1) costs of each alterna-alternative. live, (2) health and safety impacts, (3) economic impacts, ond (4) radiological impacts. The costs related to cach alternative refer to the actual monetary expenditures re-8.2 Identification and Assessment of quired to implement and conduct operations under that Alm natises alternative. As a baschnc, the no-action alternative can be ascribed a cost of zero dollars. Although current poli-In accordance with the guidance in NUllEG/CR-3568, cies and procedures for airline safety and security involve FAA cvaluated a number of alternatives and Eclected a real cost expenditures, these costs are not considered in range of possible options for the detcetion of explosivcsin the present context because the costs for the various checked airline baggage.The alternatives studied did not action alternatives are evaluated relative to the no action sufficiently mer. he requirements for detection of explo-alternative. sives as defined 4 FAA in "llackground Technical Infor-motion for the llroad Agency Announcement"[U.S.De-Capital costs include all monetary expenditures required partment of Transportation,1989(a)).These alternatives to cover initial costs of system construction and in'.talla, were the followmg: tion to the point where the system is functional. Capital e No action. costs in this assessment were amortized annually over the e Individual hand scarch of all checked luggage. estimated 15-year operationallife of the EDS-3C assum. ing an interest rate of 10 percent. Operational costs in-Use of enhanced x ray screening.nis might inch de e clude all labor, maintenanec, and overhead expenditures the use of color monitoring screens with enhanced required to operate the system. To facilitate the evaluf mage scanners to distinguish between organic and ation of relative costs on a comparable basis, annual capt-norganic materials. tal and operational costs were prorated on a per flight-Use of chemical vapor detect on methods. These a passenger basis. Unit costs are expressed in terms of dollars per flight passenger, might include usc oichemical vapor detectors ("snif-fers") sensitive to explosives or use of trained ca-nines (olfactory methods). The staff also assessed the health and safety impacts for Use of the EDS-3 in the ramp area (as currentlyli-each altermitive. To determine occupational safety, it analyzed the varying degrees of baggage handling and censed). occupational habits for cach alternative. Industrih. expc e Use of the EDS-3C in the concourse area. rience in regard to similar types of work environments Use of the EDS-3C with enhancco radiation protec-e (e.g., watchouse operations and parcel delivery) indicates tion features to further rnmmuze possible human ex-the rates of los time resulting from injury and accidental deaths of workers per unit time that can be expected for posure to ionizing radiation m the concourse area, these occupations. O the alternatives considered, FAA climinated two as being ineffective and, therefore, not feasible (FAA, Potential radiological consequences constitute the major 1989). He alternatives considered to I e ineffective (be-concern associated with the TNA system. Ilecause the cause of the FAA requirement pertainu, 1hc percent-W. gage and its contents may be activated, both workers age of false positives and the 6 second requirement for and the public may be exposed to the radiation emitted screening) were enhanced x ray screening and chemical during the decay of the induced radioactivity, in cases vapor detection. The remaining alternatives are de-where hand scarch of alarmed bags (those that have indi-scribed in this section. To evaluate the relative advan-cated potentially positive for high nitrogen density) is tages and disadvantages of these alternatives, the NRC required. rcsidual radiation from the hanCag of the bags staff performed an assessment using the methodology in could also expose the public to small amounts of radia-NUREG/CR-3568, tion. For purposes of valuc impact assessment, the col-lective dose measured in person.Sv (person rem) is the To estimate the anticipated number of occupational acci-i measure used to quantify the effect, dents for cach of the alternatives evaluated. the National l 45 NURiiG-1396

8 Alternatives Safety Council's annual statistics for rates of occupational 8.2.2 Hand Search accidents were used (National Safety Council,1986). Ihese rates are expresi,cd in terms of resulting lost work-This alternative assumes that all checked luggage is indi. days. For exampic, the following industry relatedjobs are vidually hand scarched. It will require a significant in-ted in t i d ument published by the National Safety crease in inspection staff, along with attendant labor costs, it also may require changes in airline scheduling to allow for the additional time to complete inspection pro-cedures. Because it is assumed that capital costs for this alternative are relatively small (i.e., inspection tables), i N they are not considered in this assessment. industry p n r The operating costs to consider for this alternative would Transportation and public utilities 1.05 be (1) costs associated with the additional space needed Manufacturing 0.78 I '.the inspection tables and (2) costs associated with the htrmg of additionalinspection perronnel to hand scarch Wholesale and reta;l trade 0.50 each piece of luggage. The average space needed for 10 inspection stations would be 186 m (2000 fir), with a e cost of approximately $269/rn ($25/fte). To inspect the e To estimate the anticitated industrial accident rate, an same am unt Gaggage dat an N3C wouM k aW average of the above ihree examples (0.75 lost workday / to screen, approximately 67,000 hr/yr would be needed: person-yr) was u'.d. For example, if one alternative re-2 x 10' bags /yr x 2 mirvbag x 1 hr/60 min = 66.666 hr/yr 4tdred 20 empoyees to accomplish the job, the accident rate woc be 15 lost workdays /yr (20 employees x 0.75 If an employee working full time for 2000 hours a year is lost workday / person yr), assumed, a total of 33 inspection personnel would be required to hand scarch the same number of bags as For purposes of this assessment, the following opera-would be screened by one EDS-3C.To calculatc the total tional assumptions were rnade for the EDS ~lC: labor costs, it was assumed that cach inspector was paid $10 an hour, with an annual salary of $20,000 ($10/hr x 1hc estimated operating life of the unit is 15 years. 2000 hrlyr). For overhead, health insunmcc, general, and "the unit inspects baggage at a rate of 400 bags an administrative expenses, another 100 percent was added. o hour and operates 16 hours a day. This amounts to $40,000 in labor costs for each mspector, resulting m a totallabor cost of $1,320,000 for cach in-Approximately 6000 bags a day are inspected As-spection station (33 x $40,000/ person-yr). e suming each passenger has two bags, the baggage from about 1.1 million passengers will be inspected. The total annual costs for this alternative arc as follows: Two operational personnel are raquired to attend latbor cost (33 x $40,000/ person yr) $1,320,000 e the EDS-3C during operating hours. '1his requires SP 9W W N 000 six full time equ, valent personnel per operating i unit (three 40-hr/wk shifts). TOTAL ANNUAL COST $1,370,000 Two baggage handlers are required to load luggage Accordingly, for the hand scarch option, the estimated onto the EDS-3C during operating hours. This re-quires six full time equivalent personnel per oper-accident rate is 25 lost workdays /yr (33 personnel x 0.75 lost workday / person yr), ating unit (three 40 hr/wk shifts). Esthnated average annual personnel costs arc as fol-8.2.3 TNA System in Ramp Area lows: the EDS operator, $60,000; each baggage han Th.is alternative involves the use of the TNA systern dler, $45,000; and each EDS assistant or runner,,, $35,000 (all estimates include overhead costs). Sal-(EDS-3)in the ramp or cargo handling area of an airport. ary estimates are from the International Association This alternative is currently licensed and is being used at of Machinists. JFK International Airport in New York and Mtamilnter-national Airport in Florida. It was evaluated in a previous 8.2.1 No Action environmental assessment (NRC,1989). This alternative assumes that present policies and procc-llecent experience at JFK International Airport has dures involving inspection of checked airline baggage are shown tha; additional labor cost is associated with the continued and that present levels of security are main-ramp location relative to the proposed use of the tained. No additional operating or capital costs are as. EDS-3C in the lobby or concourse area. This cost is sumed. related to the logistical problem of locating and bringing NUlti!O-1396 46

8 Alternatives passengers whose bags have alarmed to the 'INA inspec-ture gamma rays, and additional panels of borated poly-tion area (near the ramp area of an airport) where the ethylene and lead were added to further reduce the exter-bags in question are opened and inspected. nis was as-nal dose rates. Dose rate data are given in Section 3.1, sumed to require one assistant (during 'INA system op. cration),16 hours a day,7 days a week, for a total of three For this alternative, the cost of supplementary support assistants.ne additionallabor costs for these three assts-and additional building materials needed for the installa-tants are $35,000 x 3 - $105,000. Currently, two baggage tion of the EDS-3C at indoor and outdoor locations at the handlers and two EDS-3 trained operators must attend airport has been added, ne indoor locations would in-the unit during its operation, his requires 12 full ttme-clude the following: behind the check in counter, in front equhalent personnel for each operating ur.it (six 40-hr/ of the check in counter, and at the pre-check in area.The wk shifts) at a cost of approximately $45,000 a year for only outdoor location would be at the curbside. Because cach bargage handict and $60,000 a year for cach opera-only 6 full time operators and 6 full time baggage han-tor, ne average space needed for each EDS-3 is diers would be needed for the indoor scenario, the esti-93 m- (1000 ft ), with a cost of approximately $269/mr t mated accident rate for this option is 9 lost workdays /yr ($25/fte).The estimated accident rate for thi. alternative (12 personnel x 0.75 lost workday / person yr). is 11.3 lost workdays /yr (15 personnel x 0.75 lost workday / person yr). In the curtside scenario, however, the baggage may go The capital, operational, and annual costs for this alterna-directly into a baggage chute rather than staying on the tive are as follows: same level as the EDS-3C. If this were the case, only three full time baggage handlers would be needed toload luggage onto the system; all bags leaving the system would Capital Cost, be automatically passed to the planc.The estimated acci-Estimated fabrication and construction dent rate for the curbside option is 6.75 lost workdays /yr costs $1,000,000 (9 personnel x 0.75 lost workday / person-yr). ne de-creases in estimated labor costs for the curbside scenario Installation costs are reflected in Table 8.1. Site modification (includes housing) $125,000 % csumate the costs associaled with the construction and Transportation, setup, and testing - $50.000 installat,on of the EDS-3C at the concourse level of an i TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS $1,175,000 airport, a structural feasibility study was performed (see l'eac ck,1989). His study defined the structural con. Arnortimi Annual Cost ($/yr,15 yr cerns related to the support for the system, defined a @ 10%) $151,500 conceptual solution for the support and placement of the Opciational Costs system, and estimated the construction costs associated with the installation of the system. Table 8.1 shows the Space cost ($269/m2 x 93 m2) $25,000 differences in capital and operational costs for both the curbside and indoor scenarios. labor cost 6 operators @ $60,000/yr $360,000 8,2.5 TNA System With Enhanced Radiation 6 baggage handlers @ $45,000/yr $270,000 g 3 runners @ $35,000/yr $105,000 Source change $25,000 controls are added to the basic design of the EDS-3C. Calibration, leak testing, and repair _ $25.000 These additional materials are assumed to be capable of reducing the radiation exposures by at least 50 percent. "IOTAL OPERATION AL COSTS $810,000 installation cost would be inacased because of the added TOTAL ANNUAL COK13 $961,500 weight and materials. 8.2,4 TNA System in Concourse Area necause 6 full time operators and 6 full time baggage handlers would be needed for this alternative, the esti-nis alternative is as described in this er vironmental as-mated accident rate is 9 lost workdays /yr (12 personnel x sessment.The original EDS-3 has been modified slightly 0.75 lost workday / person yr). for concourse installation (now designated as Model EDS-3C) to decrease the external radiation levels. The capital. operational, and annual costs for this alterna. Different materials were selected to reduce neutron cap-tive are as follows: 47 NUREG-1396 n

8 Alternatives r i Table 8.1 Construction costs for curbside and indoor EDS-3C installations Curbside Indoor Attribute installation installation Capital Costs Estimated fabrication costs for EDS-3C $1,000,000 $1,000,000 Construction Costs Outside housing $125,000 $0 Median barriers $5,500 $0 Structural design fee $7,000 $3,000 Analysis of load path through terminal $0 $4,500 Moving equipment $0 $5,500 Construction $35,500 $35,500 Transportation, setup, and testing $50,000 $50,000 TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS $1,223,000 $1,098,500 Amortized annual capital cost ($/yr,15 yr @ 10%) $157,700 $141,700 Operational Costs Space cost ($269/m2 x 93 m ) $25,000 $25,000 m Iabor cost 6 operators @ $60,000/yr $360,000 $360,000 $270,000 6 baggage handlers @ $45,000/yr 3 bangage handicts @ $45,000/yr $135,000 Source change $25,000 $25,000 Calibration, leak testing, and repair $25,000 $25,000 TOTAL OPERATIONAL COSTS $570,000 $705,000 TOTAL ANNUALCOSTS $727,700 $846,700 Capital Costs to the no-action alternative. 'the table shows that the Estimated fabrication and construction average cost of the TNA system, normalized to a per. costs $1,200,000 flight passenger basis, is about $0.78, and the per flight-passenger cost for the hand-search alternative is about Installation costs $200.000 $1.25. The difference is attributable to the number of TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS $1,400,000 employees needed to hand scarch Faggage. Amortized Annual Cost ($ lyt,15 yr @ 10%) $180,500 Oj4 rational Costs The cost effectiveness of a TNA system with enhanced Same as those in Table 8.1 for indoor radiation protection features can also be determined fr m this study, With a marginal annual dose reduction of installation 0.057 person Sv(5.7 tem)and a differential annual cost of TOTAL OPliRATION AL COSlS $705,000 $38,800, the cost for this system would be about TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS $885,500 $6,800! person-rem (the traditional unit of rem is used here for simplicity). This value exceeds the NRC guide-8.3 Suinniai3, line f $100/ person rem (NUREO/III}-0058);therefore, under the assumptions applied in this analys,s, the en-i Table 8.2 gives the value impact summary for the four hanced radiation protection icatures would not be consid-alternatives described in the previous sections in relation cred cost effective. NUREG-1396 48

8 Alternatives Table 8.2 Value. impact summary for airline explosive detection alternatives TNA system TNA system TNA system as proposed with enhanced No Hand in ramp radiation Attribute action search area Curbside Indoor protection Costs Unit capital cost ($) 0 0 1,175,000 1,223,000 1,098,500 1,400,000 Amortized annual capi'.at cost ($/yr) 0 0 151,500 157,700 141.700 180,500 Operational cost ($/yr) 0 1,370,000 810,000 570,000 705,000 705,000 Unit total cost ($/yr) (amortized annual cost plus operational cost) 0 1,370,000 961,500 727,700 846,700 885,500 Cost per Gight passenger ($) 0 1.25 0.87 0.66 0.77 0.81 Ilcalth and Safetyimpacts - Aircraft safety and security

• No change improved improved improved improved Improved Industrial accident rate (lost workdays /unitlyr) 0 25 11.3 6.7 9

9 Radiologicalimpacts Collective dose (person Sv/unitlyr) Occupational 0 0 6.0E-03 1.213-02 1.2E-02 6.0E-03 Public 0 0 1.0E-02 1.511-0 1 1.4E-01 6.4E-02 Public (pre-check in scenario) N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.4E-01 N/A Consumable items 0 0 0 0 1.3E-05

• )

Nonconsumable items 0 0 2.8U-03 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 Total 0 0 1.9E-02 1.611-01 4.9E-01 7.3E-02 Social and Economic impacts Added employrient 0 33 15 9 12 12 Public fear due to RadioacGvity None Nonc increased increased increased increased liight risks Nochange Decreased Decreased Decreased Decreased Decreased Note: N/A = not applicable. ti.0!i-03 = 6.0x10 8 etc. 49 NUREG-1396

9

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 9.1 Summary of Environmental For the purposes of mironmental analysis, the staff Impacts assessed the impact of several different accident scenar-ios to selectively bound a spectrum of accidents that could occur. It evaluated three potential accident scenarios Requirements regarding the inspection of passengers' (i.e., accidents that could occur during source transfer, luggage are not new. An Executive Order of January 5, transportation, and operation of the system)invohing the 1973, required airline companies to inspect all passengers partial or complete fragmentation of the Cf 252 source, and their hand carried luggage for concealed guns, dan-The resulting maximum inhalation dose from the worst-gerous weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices be-case accident involving 100 percent dispersion of the fore permitting the passengers to board commercial air-source at a distance of 100 m (110 yd) would be 1.0x10 8 Sv craft (NCRP Report 95) By 1985, airlines scanned the (0.10 rem), which is well within the U.S. Environmental luggage for about 400 million passenger trips using x ray Protection Agency (1990) protective action guidelines of fluoroscopic scanning systems in the public access areas 0.25 Sv (25 rem) for emergency workers. of airports. The Federal performance standard (21 CFR 102.40) for cabinet x ray systems limits x ray emissions at a The staff performed a cost benefit analysis of alternatives point 5 cm (2 in.)from the external surface of the system to the EDS-3C. The alternatives considered were the to 1.3x10J coulomb /kg (0.5 mrcm)in any one hour. On following: no action, individual hand scarch of checked the basis of this exposure rate, this source would contrib-luggage, use of the EDS-3 in the ramp area, use of the uteabout0.003 Sv(0.3 rem)asanannualdoseequiva-EDS-3C in the concourse arca, and use of the EDS-3C lent lo cach flight passenger. Assuming 30 million passen-with enhanced radiation protection features.1hc evalu-gets travel per year, the estimated annual collective ation clearly demonstrated that the EDS-3C curbside effective dose equivalent is about 0.6 person Sv alternative was the most cost effective method of screen-(60 person rem). ing passenger check in luggage. As illustrated in this assessment, the annual dose from This assessment indicated that a structural engineering FDS-3C operations to members of the public could be study will be required to ensure that the weight of the compared with that from x ray inspection systems that EDS-3C can be accommodated safely on the concourse have been in use since the early 1970s. Even in the worst-Icvel of airports. Construction, installation, and use of the case scenario (pre check in), the maximum individual EDS-3C will affect nearby passenger traffic patterns to dose for passengers was 0.18 Sv/yr (18 rem /yr), and the some degrec at international ticket counters. Ilowever, maximum individual dose to members of the public was essential rigging equipment such as air dollies or forklifts 0.0067 Sv (0.67 rem).1hc average doses to passengers can move the EDS-3C components into the terminal and members of the public from all four scenarios were building during a week night or on a weekend when traffic 0.08 Sy (0.008 mrem) and 0.04 Sv (0.004 mrem), re-in the terminal is at a minimum, spectively. If the additional conservatism of the neutron quality factor was not used (10 rather than 20), the above calculated doses from the EDS-3C would be half the 'lhe NRC staff assessed the internal dose to passengers doses shown. from irradiated foodstuffs. It determined the total effec-tive dose equivalent from the average daily intake of the On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the NRC staff major elements contributing the largest doses (using concludes that the environmental effects of normal op-ICRP Publication 23). If 5 percent of the passengers cration of the EDS-3C when kicated in any one of the carried food items in their tuggage and consumed it within four concourse areas of an airport are expected to be 30 seconds of reclaiming their luggage (after it was extremely small. For all scenarios, the maximum values of screened by the EDS-3C). the annual collective dose to radiation exposure that may be received by workers in an estimated 1.1 million passengers would be 1.3x10 6 restricted areas (such as the operators) and those in unre-person.Sv (1.3x10 3 person-rem). stricted areas (other non TN A workers, passengers, and members of the public) are well below the limits specified n art 20. 'the staff calculated the collective effective dose equiva-lent from wearing 40 g (1.4 oz) of gold jewelry that had

p.. sed through the EDS-3C. If 1 percent of the passen-9.2 Basis for Finding of No Significant gets carried gold jewelry in their luggage and subse-IIHpact quently wore it for an extended period, the dose from this scenario would be 2.8x10 3 person-Sv/yr (0.28 person.

On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the NRC staff remlyr). concludes that the environmental impacts that would I 1 51 NUREG-1396

9 Summary and Conclusions result from the proposed licensing action would not be supporting environmental reports; and other related significant and do not warrant the preparation of an erwi-correspondence, nese documents (in Docket Number ronmentalimpact statement. Accordingly, the staff has 030-30885) and this final environmental assessment may determined that a finding of no significant impact is ap* be examined or copied for a fee at both the NRC's Public propnate. Document Room at 2121 L Street NW., Washington, For further technical details with respect to this action. D.C. 20555, and the NRC's Region I Public Document see the application for a license dated October 31,1986; Room, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, amendments dated April 19 and August 22,1989; the Pennsylvania 19406. 1 NURl!G-1396 52

10 REFERENCES American Society for Testirg and Materials (ASTM), -,ICRU Report 40,"He Quality Factor in Radiation Anmeal Book of ASTM Standards, Sec.12. Vol.12.02, Protection," April 4,1986. " Standard Method for Determining Thermal Neutron Reaction t.nd Fluence Rates by Radioactivation Tech-International Commission on Radiological Protection, niques," Method E262-86, Philadelphia, Pennsyhania, ICRP Publication 21," Data for Protection Against loniz. 1989 edition, ing Radiation From External Saurces," rupplement to ICRP Publication 15, Pergamon Press, Oxford, England, licckett, L, and M. Schneider, Polaroid Corporation, 1971. letter to C. Scher, Federal Aviation Administration, October 30,1987. -,ICRP Publication 23," Reference Man: Anatomi-cal, Physiological, hnd Metabolic Characteristics," Per. 1107orgmanesh,11., "TRANSCASK, Certification and gamon Press,1975. AnalysisScicuce ApplicationsInc.,Cf 252 ShippingCask -, ICRP Publication 28, " Statement 1, rom the 1978 Assembly," unnumt ered SAIC report, Santa Clara, Cali-fornia,1981. Stockhelm M eeting of the ICRP," Pergamo.Oress,1978. -, ICRP Publication 30.

• Limits for Intakes of Caliform.a Department of Ilcalth

Services, Radionuclides by Workers," Parts 1-3 (wit' supple-CA-590-D-118 S,

• Registry of Radioactive Scaled ments), Pergamon Prcr.s, 1979-1982.

Sources and Devices for SAIC Model EDS-3C," Sacra-mento, California, February 1990. -, Statement From the 1985 Paris Meeting of the -, CA 4590 D-122 S," Registry of Radioactive Scal:d Sources and Devices for SAIC Model EDS-3 " August Jaeger, R. G., E. P. Illizard, and A.11. Chilton, eds., 1989. Engmccring Compendium on Radiation Shielding, Vol. IIl, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of federal Repdations, Title 10,

• Energy," and Title Springer Verlag, New York,1970, 21," Food and Drugs," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., revised periodically.

Knoll, G. F., Radiation Detection and Measurement, John Wiley and Sons, New York,1979. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Savannah River laboratory, DP-1246, " Californium 252 Shiciding National Council on Radiation Protection and Mease;- Guide," Aiken, South Carolina, March 1971. ments, NCRP Report 91," Recommendations on 1.imhs for Exposure to lonizing Radiation," liethesda, Mary. Erdtmann, G., Neutron Activation Tables, Verlag Chemic, land, J une 1,1987. Weinheim, New York,1976, pg ,p g p g llall,11., United Airlines, personal telephone conversa-the United States and Canada From Naturalllackground Radiation, December 30,1987. tion with C. G. Jones, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, January 17,1990 (documented in licensing file in NRC s Region 1 Public Document Room). --, NCRP Report 95. " Radiation Exposure of the U.S. Population From Consumer Products and Miscellaneous "'"# 8' llodgman, C. D., R. C. Weast, and A. M. Selby, eds., Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, Chemical Rubber NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology," Quanti-Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio,1960, tative Assessment of Induced Radioactivity in llaggage," final report covering all phases of Interagency Agree-Idaho National Engineering laboratory (IN!!L), EGO-ment No. DTFA-03-87-A-00008, Gaithersburg, Mary-PilY-8274, "lir vironmental Assessment for Explosive land, March 31,1989. Detection Systems Using Thermal Neutron Activation for Airline flaggage inspection," Idaho Falls, Idaho, Sep-National Safety Council, Accident facts, Chicago, Illinois, tember 1988. 1986. International Commission on Radiation Units and Meas-Peacock, T. M., FDE LTD., Consulting Engineers, letter urements, ICRU Report 33, " Radiation Quantitics and to P. Ryge, Scientific Applications International Corpm Units " liethesda, Maryland, April 15,1980. ration [ Appendix L of SAIC (1989)]. November 16,1989. i 53 NUREG-1396

j 10 References Ryge, P., Science Applications International Corpora- -, ICH AA-90-001,

• Background Technical lnforma-tion, letter to C. O. Jones, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-tion for the Broad Agency Announcement," Washington, j

mission, March 1969. D.C., November 1989(a). j i -, Science Applications International Corporation, U.S. Erwironmental Protection Agency RPA), Manualof j \\ctter to C. O. Jones, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis. Protectin Action Guides and Protectin Av :vifor Nuclear i sion, January 11,1990. Incidents, 520/1-75-001-A, Washington, D.C., January l

1990, t

Sandia Natiorml laboratory, SAND 77-1927," Transport of Radionucli in Urban Erwironments: Working Draft U.S. House of Representatives, Committec on Science. Assessment," Albuquerque, New Mexico,1978. Space, and Technology, " Statement of Richard F. lally (former Directo of Aviation Security, FAA)to the Sub-Science Applications Internatim! Corporation (SAIC), committee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials," "Envimnmental Report on En,,,osive Detection System Washington, D.C., February 9,1989. Using *Ihermal Neutron Acthation for Airline Baggage inspection," final report, Santa Clara, Californh, June U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Environmental 1988. Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Re-late J to Amendment of Materials License 29-13141-05; -, Applicant's Environmental Report: Use of Ther-Department of Transportation, Federal Aviatior Ad-mal Neutron Based Explosive Detection System for ministration " Federal Register, Vol. 54, No.156, August Checked Baggage Inspection in Airport lobby Arcas," 15,1989, pp. 33636-33639. NRC Control Number 111217, revised report, December 1989. -, NUREG-0170, " Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation 9f Radioactive Materialby Air and Sherbini, S., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Re-Other Modes," Vols. I nnd 2, December 1977. gion I, memorandum to C. O. Jones, U.S. Nuclear Regt!- latory Commission, February 1990. -, NUREO-0172, " Age Specific Radiation Dose Commitment Factors for a Onc Year Chronic Intake," U.S. Itureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the November 1977. United States: 1939,109th edition, Washington, D.C., 1989,pp,6 1-612. -, NUREO/UR-0058, " Regulatory Analysis Guide. lines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"Janu-6 U.S. Ilureau of Mines," Report of Tests on the Survivabil-ary 1983. ity of the Neutron Source Capsule of the SAIC Nitrogen Explosive Detection System," Pittsburgh, Pennsyh'ania, -, NUREO/CR-3568, "A Handbook for Value-September 1988. Impact Assessment,"!!attelle MemorialInstitute, Pacific l Northwest laboratory, December 1983. U.S. Department of Transportation, Fedem! Aviation L Administration (FAA), " Explosive Detection Systems for Westinghouse Electric Corporation,"The Gamma and l-Checked llaggage; Final Rule (14 CFR Part 108)," Ted. Neutron irradiation of Pharmaceuticals" Contract No. crat Register, Vol. 54, No.170, September 5,1989, pp. 34-55524-WR, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 36938-36949. 1986. r l NUREO-1396 54 i

APPENDIX A INSTAL 1ATION AND RADIATION SAFETY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EDS-3C Appendix A NURilO-1396

THERMAL NEUTRON ANALYSIS (TNA") EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEM RADIATION SAFETY OPERATING PROCEDURES Revised February 20,1990 4 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 2950 Patrick Henry Drive Santa Clara, CA 95054 I Appendix A NUREG-1396 l

CONTENTS i 1 1 General............................................ 1 1.1 Staf6ng....................................... 1 1.2 Personnel Dosimetry.............................. 1 1.3 E q uipment..................................... 1 l 1.4 Documentation.................................. 2 j 1.5 Daily Checks................................... 2 l 1.6 Access to interior of Shielding Modules................ 2 i 1.7 Access to Baggage Passageway..................... 3 l 1.8 Unsttended System.............................. 3 1.9 TNA Daily Log.................................. 3 l 1.10 Surveys....................................... 5 } 1.11 TN A Alarms................................... '. 5 i i 2 Source Handling...................................... 7 2.1 Transport Cask................................. 7 2.2 Transfer and Retraction Hardware.................... 7 2.3 Special Considerations for Lobby installations........... 11 2.4 Loading....................................... 11 2.5 Removal....................................... 16 2.6 Storage or Transpod............................. 16 2.7 Retraction..................................... 19 k i l-3 Emergency Procedures................................ 20 3.1 Baggage Jams.................................. 20 l 3.2 Fire, Explosion, Disaster........................... 22 3.3 Earthquake.................................... 22 3.4 Source Stuck st interface.......................... 23 3.5 Source Transfer incidents......................... 24 ~ 3.6 Power Loss or System Fallure....................... 24 3.7 Detection oi Source Leak.......................... 24 4 Bag Activation....................................... 26 4.1 Monitoring..................................... 26 4.2 Exit Monitor System.............................. 26 4.3 Calibration / Check Procedure....................... 26 5 Cf 252 Source Leak Test Procedure....................... 28 5.1 Source Leak Test................................ 28 i 5.2 Conveyor Belt Wipe Test........................... 28 5.3 Sample Analysis................................. 29 NUR110-1396 ii Appendix A .r._..,.,._m.., m ,,-_.m,-e..,.., 34-.. .--.,r.

l l SECTION 1 GENERAL 1.1 STAFFING AN work on and around the system shall be done under the immediate supervision of an . authorized system operator who has been trained and quebfled in operation, source handling, and emergency lrocedures. The operator rnuet have received training and demonstrated profleiency n radiation safety and these procedures for the explosive detection system. 1.2 PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY TNA operators shall wear a neutron / gamma radiation badge dosimeter fc? au work on and around the system when the source is on site. Other personnel such as baggage handlers whose work on the TNA is Imited to leading and/or unloading baggage may also be required to wear dosimeters depending on the particular installation site. Personnel must not enter the beggage passage for any reason with th9 source in the operating position. Film badges a W be changed on a monthly basis. TN contractor for this doelmstrio devloe wit be accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). 1.3 EQUIPMENT The following equpment shaN be readily available on site, in operational condition, and calibrated appropriately. Portable survey meters wil be calibrated overy six months with sources whose calibration is traceable to NIST. An ion chamber survey meter capable of reading 0.1 mrom/hr. A neutron survey meter capable of measuring levels as low as 0.1 mrom/hr. The baggage activation exit monitor system wiu be mounted so that aR beggage leaving the TNA is monitored. Visable and audible devloes will be used as required for alarm purpose. A check source shaN be available for daily operational checks. Long-handled tools for emergency source handung and baggage retrieval. Waming signs, yellow / magenta ropes, etc., for defining a radiaton area. Source transport cask.

Appendix A 1

NUREG-1396

TamperWng seals, paper type, with SAIC logo. 1.4 DOCUMENTATION The following documents will be on site and readily available: Copy of the Radioactive Materials Doense and State X-ray machine registration. Copies of applicable radiation safety regulations (e.g. NRC Regulations and any applicable State Regulations) SAIC Radiation Safety Guido Radiation Safety Operating Procedures for the TNA Notices to employees and the public, as required Emergency onll litt with numbers for: System Operators FAA (local) - SAIC 24 hour Emo Contact Airport Emergency NRC Region Offloo State Radiation Protootion Offlos Cgn of survey instrument calibrations, survey results, leak test results, personal dosimeter results operator training oortiflostos. 1.5 DAILY CHECKS The alarm threshold for t w bag activation exit monitor shall be tested daily with a check source. (See Section 4.3.) Operation of the shield doors and indiostor lights shall be checked daily by obsW the lights tum off and on while passing a bag through the system. Operation of the.*X-rayon' indicator lights shall also be checked daily. Completion of the e'Jove checks shall be logged daily. 1.8 - ACCESVO INTERIOR OF SHIELDING MODULES The doors to the areas undemeath the outer ' skin

• shal remain closed and locked; the keys will be kept in the possession of the system operator.

Aeoess to the computer and HV power supply is limited to 1 hour per week (within any seven day period) with the source in the system. NUREO-1396 2 Appendix A

b 1.7 ACCESS TO BAGGAGE PASSAGEWAY Access, meaning personnel physicaly entering ireto the baggage passage, is prohibited unless the source is in the RETRACTED postion. Briefy (on th9 order of one minute) reaching into the passage with tools from outside is permitted without retraction of the source. Aoosts is permitted ony by the system operator. Gamma and neutron survey meters will be used before any person enters the baggage passage to insure that the radiation dose equivalent level is soceptable, i.e. Indioeting that the source is property retracted. The duration of stay by the operator inside the neutron.'rta egener. region of the TNA, with the source in the retracted psition, is ilmited to a cumulative total of one hour within any seven day period. The source will be removed from the system ll the operator must be inside for longer than the one hour limit. The operator shaN log his stay time in the interrogation region for dose sooumulation. 1.8 UNATTENDED SYSTEM When the system must be left unattended, the entrance and exit doors to the baggage passageway will be closed and locked. The source shen be left in the OPERATING position to maintain the lowest extemal dose rates. The tamper irdicating seal must be in place. Figure 1 shows where this seal is to be located. The seal is the paper type imprinted with the SAIC logo. The date when seal was put in place shen be recorded on it. 1.9 TNA DAILY LOG Radiation safety related incidents shall be noted in the daily log by the system operator. Items to be noted shall include but not be limited to: Source transfers Source retractions Opening of the computer and high voltage supply sooess doors (include duration) Personnel entering the beggage passageway (include duration) - Beggage jams (include reasons for jams) Inspections - Emergencies Tamper-indicating seal breakage, by operator during source handling or by actual attempted tampering. - Daity exit monitor calibration Door position ind'estor operation Proper operation of 'X ray On' indiostor light. Appendix A 3 NUREG-1396

z C l. x r s l ?": l C G' a u -m.. -1 m a e ..-.-..~ .w i t = = ENTRANCE

• l EXIT l

i k d 1 g ..., g.. ... A - ~l a) PAPER SEAL - LOCK SOWW ACMSS PANEL \\ r e eysem u J i 4 Figure 1. Tamper-indicating Paper Seal. ~d - a) Placement b) FuB-size Example

1 This log wlN be kept at the TNA site, available for inspection by the field maintenance staff, the radiation safety offloor, and the regulatory agencies. The log shaN be property dated, and signed at completion of the work day, 1.10 SURVEYS A radiation survey will be taken immediately following the initial source insta'ia6n into the TNA, using both neutron and gamma ray survey meters capable of reading _0.1 rrewn/hr. If a maintei: anos actMty or unusual occurrenos might have effected the TNA shieloing, a new neutron and gamtr.a rey survey must be performed before proceeding with system operation. After routine source re-40Ggs or replacements, a gamme/ neutron survey shall be performed; however, if no changes to the system shielding accompanied such actions, only a gamma-ray survey wiu need to be taken. Dose rates shen be measured 30 cm from the surface at the locations shown in the Figure 2. The readings shen be compared with the accompanying table of expected values with the source IN or RETRACTED. If readings inconsistent with the expected values are obtained (allowing for source deosy), contact SAIC for instructions. Note survey results in the log book. 1.11 TNA ALARMS if the TNA alarms, the alarm condition must be resolved. AN alarms wiu be treated as due to real wfA.20: and must be resolved before the bag is permitted to be placed on the aircraft. The most direct and sure method is by inspection of the beg's contents by trained security personnelin the presence of the passenger. The suspect bag or certain suspect contents from the bag may be passed through the TNA a second time to resolve the alarm, if suspect contents have been separated out from the bag, the nonsuspect petions must also be run through the TNA to clear that portion as well. In all cases, the bag or selected contents of a bag should not pass through the TNA more than a maximum of thras times. The bag should be placed in a different orientation on each successive pass through the system, if the bag fails to clear aber 3 times through the TNA, survey the bag for residual actMey (see Sec. 4.1) and ceN security for hand search if required. Appendix A NURilG-1396

l 5 l \\ 1 2 BAGGAM BAGGAM 7 ..........p 8 3 4 i l 6 t DOSE RATE (area /hr) Positions Neutron Gamma Ray j. l l-4 IN < 0.1 < 0.2 5,6 IN c 0.1 < 0.1 7,8 IN < 0.2 < 0.2 5 RETRACTED < 0.4 < 0.2 I l i i Figure 2. Radiation Survey Locations and Expected Values. i l NUREG-13% 6 Appendix A ~ -

SECTION 2 SOURCF, HANDLING 2.1 TRANSPORT CASK The cask is boltr4 to the shipping platform for shipment. The plaiLan is also used for source transfers to assure alignment of the cask with the TNA. The cask is in flush contact with the side of the TNA to that the source is never unshielded during transfer. The front of the cssk (Figure Sa) has a Source Insertion / Exit Point in the center. The Source insertion / Exit Point has a polyethylene plug to reduos radiation beam exiting out of the souros hole, to acceptable levels for shipment. This plug is covered _ by a removable metal plate. The rear of the cask (Figure 3b) has a ccT@Lisat for Telsflex cable storage. This is also covered by a removable metal plate. The cst,pa,6,4at contains a padlock, a cable look bracket, and a removable cable pressure bracket (Figure Sc). When the cable lock bracket is fastened in place, R locks the Toloflex cable in position, holding the source in the center of the cask. The cable pressure bracket covers the cable lock bracket. The cable pressure bracket is removed by unlocking the puntw*. and lifting the bracket out and away from the lip on the bottom edge of the cable lock bracket. The Telellex cable is released by partially unscrewing the two flathead screws in the cable lock bracket until it is loose entran to raise. Then the bracket is lifted up and off the Teleflex cable and the right hand screw is tightened to hold it out of the way. 2.2 TRANSFER AND RETRACTION HARDWARE Figure 4 shows the cask in position for source transfer, and a detailed view of the source transfer ring and source transfer adapter. The ring and adapter are oriry used for source transfer; they are stored inside the recess in the TNA. The loose support of the adapter ellows k considerable leevet h adapting to misalignment of the cask and the TNA. Both the ring and the adapter are machined from polyethylene for low friction. Figure 5 shows the retraction stop assembly in the source cask which prevents the source from being retracted farther than the intended distance. It consists of an aluminum holder to which a pCiJJ./eas tube is attached; the inside diameter of tho tube (0.25') allows the Teleflex cable to pass easily (0.21') but it is too small to not the source (0.37*) go through. The tube is threaded and pinned into the holder. ' A swiveling bar engages the cable and clamps it in place. The bar is held in position by a pw*w*. When the bar is raised the cable is free to slide through. The holder is attached to the TNA by two screws which can be accessed only when the bar is raised. Appendix A 7 NUREG-1396

Source Insertion /Esit Point .t o \\ l I l Telefles Coble Storoge ( ) s _, / b) Y \\u i i Pe6.tk / h n v L-c.w. er.. w. e, 6.i e) / v.i twi cow. mw c.w. toc 6 o,.chet i Rgure 3. Transport Cask. a) Front Vow b) Rear Vow C) Locidng Assembly i NURiiG 1396 8 Appendix A

(KiinOM c0WM RCMOWO TRou cos rcw sounct twsrtM set wnumr .,r-cos sovacc casx y rurrona N es a) \\ -s em \\ \\y sa - z--,- \\ \\ \\ p 'ptJQ 3 ) h7 N \\ M \\\\\\\\\\ M \\ 'k.//I r \\ 4 \\\\ hNm,m amar S c ~ b) Fgure4.- Placement of Cask for Source Transfer, a) OverallView b) Detail Vlow of Source Transfer Ring and Source Transfer Adapter Appendix A 9 NUREG-1396

as arrucrew srw Asstun y 3p naocw "N N / \\ Mif )d ll i avornwr Y \\ / \\ / q, aA w roo mo san \\ ramtx cant a) m / / b /,6' oa m f / J*** &S&W difi55555%YL l ~ / ) / hi ,// / aw4m = f / b) l l Figure 5. Retraction Stop Assemby, a) Front Vow b) Cross section Vow NUllEG-1396 10 Appendix A.

2.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSTALLATIONS IN PUBLIC AREAS Thema anfatv.critirsal orar*4eren must be shaarved to avrM maalble radiation armsure to members of the pubhc. Standard operations such as souros installation, source exchange, or source removal for planned system maintenance shall be scheduled at a time of day when few or no nonossential personnel are present, e.g.,12 iriidr;wM. Prior to beginning any transfer operation, the ' Scheduling Checklist for Source Handling * (Figure 6) shall be completed to ensure coordination of date and time with airport facility management, airport scourity and airline management. To avoid possible radiation exposure to the general public or airport personnel, an area out to 45 feet in au dirootions from the TNA unit shal be cordoned off using yellow / magenta rope and posted with

• radiation area
• waming signs. At 45 feet the dose rate from a bare 150 microgram Cf 252 source is less than 2 mrom/hr. Also ensure that the airport security has cordoned off the areas above and below the unit. Only the TNA operator and other authorized personnel shall be allowed in the controlled area during source transfer operations.

When moving the sourca between the EDS unit and the cask, make sure the source is in its proper position by observing the cable markings (Figure 7). Use the gamma survey meter to confirm the source is the correct location. Move the source quickly to as to minimize the time the souros spends between positions, because the source path comes close to the underside of the TNA, resulting in high radiation levels in the downward direction, it is imoerative that the arxece not be storw=4 between the IN and RETRACTED nositions 2.4 LOADING This is a mafetv-critical oramareira which ra M raadt in a hioh radii.lon area if not ca(Iigt out orreartv. It is remaihla to arw*4antaltv remove the hare source from the svatam. leavingit remniatelv urist'z' ';c' The rearatar rp me review the orrww4ure carefully before startino to make sure that it is fulk urw4arstemel. Alan review arelirehle emeroenev procedures. All source handling operations must be carried out by at least two people, one of whom is a quellflod system operator. A survey meter must be used. Review Section 2.3 before starting. The ' Checklist for Source Loading * (Figure 8) is to be completed each time this operation is performed. Appendix A 11 NURl!G-1396

1 I SCHEDULING CHECKLIST FOR SOURCE HANDLING l l Source hand'ing operations for TNA systems sher be done at a time of day when a minimum number of people are present (e.g.12 midnight). In el cases, en area to 45 feet from the TNA unit shaR be cordoned off to avoid possible radiation exposure to nonessential personnel. Use yellow /magente rope and poet " radiation area

• oeution signs. Nonessential personnel includes everyone except the TNA operators f isTeirs the source handling and other authorized personnel who may be present for maintenance or as observers. Also ensure that the airport security has cordoned off the areas above and below the TNA unit.

The necessity for a scheduled source handung procedure is anticipated for: i DATE TIME i The following must be notified. Indicate the name of the person contacted along with the date and time notmod. Name Date Time Airport Facility Management Airport Seculity Airline Management The above personnel have been notified that a source handling procedure has been schedule at the time listed above. Operator Signatures: / Figure 6. Scheduling Checklist for Source Handling. NUlWG-1396 12 Appendix A l m. m-w. -e ,-w-w u-,- -p w --w- -w

• ,-+w+-

r-e---- - - --+- v-e. a.r-e

EXT & MOM COVEM MEACVED ! MOM EOS FOR SOURM TAAhWiM SEE Ehl AMQEndNE POGin;W /!' EDS SO@CE CASK \\ rn s - PL A TFORM

• TR & FLEX CABlf M M FOR 00SERWwt col 0R80 AAADC AKA M TO SOU9M POGT50N a)

M SOURCE flAL Y NS8RTED NTO ROK HCnLE A T PCGTR>f fI OMEEM SOLMM FLAL Y NS&MTED NTO BDts nsaLE A t PONT50N ft SOLMM r i. TELULEX CABLE asa SOsna nernACrao armaDs nseRLE A T POSf780N 92 YRL OW. mre onAnro wr to SCALE s0uem nrL y winnAnwNro cAs< neats A rPo8vinw or b) I Figure 7. Cable Markings. a) Vowing Positions b) Color Coding 1 Appe9 dix A 13 NUREO-1396 i

_.., ~ ~ 1 CHECKLIST FOR SOURCE LOADING This is a safetv cridemi orocedure which nas M rami e in a hiah rartimHan area if not carried out oranartv. It is co==3h;a to annirtantally remove the bare amwoe from the avstem. I; leavino it completely unshielded. The opergttor must review the orocedure carefully bef9fp i startino to make sure that it is fully understc41 Also review amphomble omsprgency proondures. All source handling operations must be carried o:A by at least two people, one of whom is a qualified system operator. A gamma survey meter must be used. Review Section 2.3 before starting ' ~ A copy of this checklist is to be completed each time the operation is performed. _ Familieri A yourself with the entire procedure before starting. Check off eacti step as It is e.n r, eted on a copy of this procedure. -j ,,,,, _ Uomplete " Scheduling CnMPJist for Source Handigg. _ Push up the TNA top cover and lift off the side rest, s ,_, Unfasten the cask Wm the platform, roll it off onto the floor. _ Place the platform at the side of the TNA below the source access. l _ Adjust the platform leveling screws to level the p;e;wiin and line up the platform holes -with the tapped holes in the TNA. _ Fasten the platform to the TNA with bolts. _, Bolt the eye hook bar to the system and the winch on to the oask. _ Roll the cask up to the platform, line up the wheels with the rail. Unlock.and open the TNA source access door as wide as possible so it will not interfere with the cask movement. _ Hook cable to eye-hook and crank up to about two feet from TNA. Remove the cover plates from the cask Source Insertion / Exit Point and the Teleflex ~ cable storage compartment by unscrewing the captive screws in the plate. _ From the FRONT of the cask, remove the polyethylene plug from the Source g u Insertion / Exit Point by unscrewing the two screws and pulling out the plug. Avoid the radiation beam comino from the cask source hole, Figure 8. Checklist for Source Loading NURl!O-1396 14 Appendix A 7

N -,., '....,,, t Mount the source transfer ring on the front of the cask with its screws, with the - ~ conical hole toward the TNA. (See Fgure 4). Unsorow the Retraction Stop tube assemb9 (tube with httached aluminum pleoe) retaining sorows and remove the assembly.from the TNA. e} { ~ Place the source transfer adapter on the adapter support loosely held in position for - y ~ ' transfer, (See Figure 4); Crank the cask up to the TNA slowly until it it in firm contact, guiding the adapter as necessary to make sure that the adapter engages tlw ring property, ~ Unlock and disengage the cable clamp at the back of the cask. insert the source into the TNA by pushing the cable into the cask uritil R stops. A green mark on the cable will be at the cesk surface. (See Fgure 7.) Verify source insertion with the gamma survey meter at the TNA surface above the cask. A reading less than 0.1 mrom/hr should be obtained. _. Release the ratchet and unwind the winch 15 tums, re-engage ratchet. _ Slowly roll the cask away to the winch cable limit, about 18' 2', reaching in after - about 8* separation to hold the cable fixed at the TNA well so that the source is not pulled out of the TNA. Pull the cable through the front of the cask, making sure the source stays fully _ inserted in the TNA. _ Remove the source transfer adapter, making sure the source stays fully inserted in the TNA, and lower the We*ar support. Place the Retraction Stop tube on the cable, tube first, and slide it toward the TNA, finally inserting R. _ Screw the Retraction Stop in place. _ Clamp the source with the clamp / locking bar and lock with padM. _ Coil the excess cable up neatly and tuck into the TNA source access recess. _ Release the winch ratchet and roll the cask off the platform, detach the platform. _ Close and lock doc, replace outer panel and lower the top panel. Store the cask on .4 platform. Store keys securely. _ Replace tamper-indicating paper seal. Figure 8 (con't). Checklist for Source Loading Appendtx A 15 NUltEG-1396

2.5 REMOVAL { This is a safetv. critical orocedure which twild result in a hiah radiatinn eran if not narried t out oronertv. It is nossible to accidentally remove the hare mamos from the svatam. leaving it comolatelv unshielded. The anaratar nw set review the siec2 are carefully before startina to make sure tPat it is fully undarstr-:-1 Alan renew annairmhla amarnancy procedures. j I All source handling operations must be carried out by at least two people, one of whom is a qualified system operator. A gamma survey meter must be used. Review Section 2.3 before starting._ i The ' Checklist for Source Removal" (Figure 9) should be completed each time this operation is performed. l 2.6 STORAGE OR TRANSPORT The following procedures shall be followed to prepare a source for storage or transport. After placing the source in the cask, thread a tamper-indlicaWig wire seal with the padias through the locking holes. Close the padlock and affix a lead seal over the ends of the wire. (See Figure 3c.) Coilbp the remainder of the Teleflex cable and place it in the storage 00inped.ii6nt. . Replace the cover plate on the rear of the cask. Unbolt the cask from the platform and roll the cask away from the TNA. Unbolt the platform from the TNA. Insert the polyethylene plug into the front of the cask and replace the cover plate on the i front of the cask. Avoid radiation beam coming from cask source hole. Thread one tamper indicating wire seal through the holes in the two bolts on the cover plates on the front and rear of the cask. Replace. and lock the cover panel on the TNA. For shipment, roll the cask onto the platform and bolt them together. The platform serves as a shipping pallet. Follow DOT shipping procedures for labeling and completing the 3 forms. 1 ,I If the cask will remain in a public area with the source inside for longer than 1 hour, rope off area the within 3 feet of the cask and post radiation area signs. Place tamper-indicating paper seals on cover plates on the front and rear of the cask. l NURI!G-1396 16 Appendix A

CHECKLIST FOR SOURCE REMOVAL -This is a mafetv-crWm! ornredora which could raen e in a hiah radiation area if not carried out oranartv. It is nnemihla to ar-P-Rally remove the bare mource from the system. !=vina it comolatelv unshieldad. The anaratnr moet review the orocadore carefullv before startina to make sure that it is fully understood. Also review monlicable emercancv procedures. All source handling operations must be carried out by at least two people, one of whom 'is a quellfied system operator. A survey meter must be used. Review Section 2.3 before starting. A copy of this checklist is to be completed each time the operation is performed. Familiarize yourself with the entire procedure Afore starting. Check off each step as it is completed on a copy of this procedure. _ Complete the ' Scheduling Checklist for Source Handling'. i _ Push up the TNA top cover and lift off the side panel, i _ Unfasten the cask from the platform, roll it off onto the floor, i _ Place the p'eiivim at the side of the TNA below the source access. Adjust the pioiturm leveling screws to level the plativim and line up the platform holes with the tanpad holes in the TNA. _ Fasten the platform to the TNA with bolts. i . _ Bolt the eye book bar to the system and the winch on to the cask. j _ Roll the cask up to the platform, line up the wheels with the rail. Unlock and open the TNA source access door as wide as paa=ihla so it will not interfere with the cask movement. _ Hook cable to eye-book and crank up to : bout two feet from TNA. Remove the cover plates from the cask Source insertion / Exit Point and the Teleflex cable storage compartment by unsu;,2.g the captive screws in the plate. _ From the FRONT of the cask, remove the polyethylene plug from the Source Insertion / Exit Point by unscrewing the two screws and pulling out the plug, i Figure 9. Checklist for Source Removal. Appendix A 17 NUR11G-1396

Mount the source transfer ring on the front of the cask with its screws, with the. ~ conical hole toward the TNA. y. i . _ ' Unlock and lift the clamp / locking bar, releasing the cable. Unscrew the Retraction Stop' tube assembly retaining screws and remove the - assembly from the TNA, being careful to leave the source fully inserted in the TNA. 1 i Place the source transfer adapter over the cable, with the tapered end away from the - TNA, slide it up to the TNA and position it on the adapter support loosely held in position forVansfer, being careful to leave the source fully inserted in the T>lA. - I Unock and disengage the cable clamp at the back of the cask. insert the free end of the cable into and through the cask. _ Crank the cask up to the TNA slowly until lt is in firm contact, guiding the adapter and I cable as necessary to make sure that the adapter engages the ring property and the cable does not kink. - Draw the source into the cask by pulling the cable from the back of the cask until it stops. A yellow mark on the cable will be at the cask back surface indicating the source is in the cask. (See Fgure 7.) t Verify that the source is in the cask with the gamma survey meter by moving it along 5 the surface of the cask. A maximum reading will be obtained m the middle of the cask with lower, approximately equal readings at the ends of the cask. L _ Clamp and lock the source cable at the back of the cask. _ Coil up the excess cable and place it in the cask recess. Replace the cask plug and cask covers. Avoid radiation beam coming from the cask source hole. t Release the ratchet and unwind the winch 15 tums, re-engage ratchet, and roll the cask away to the winch cable limit. _ Remove the source transfer adapter, and lower the adapter support, i Replace the Retraction Stop tube in the TNA and fasten. . Release the winch ratchet and roll the cask off the @viiii, detach the Munii. Close and lock door, replace outer panel and lower the top panel. Follow procedures for storage or transport as appropriate. Store keys securely. Figure 9 (con't). Checklist for Source Removal. NURl!G-1396 18 Appendix A

L 2.7 RETRACTION Do not retract souros during emergencies, except when the passageway must be entered by eperator. Maxknum shielding exists ordy when source is in the normal operating position. The source shall be moved to the RETRACTED position llIt is necessary for the operator to enter the baggage passageway for any reason. The operator must not remain in the baggage passageway for longer than 1 hour per week (total within any seven day period) even with the source retracted; note passage actMties in the log with times to keep treck of the time.- li the source must be retracted, keep nonessential personnel out of the work area by roping off the area to 6 feet from the side of the TNA with the source access panel. Use magenta and yellow rope and post ' radiation area' caution signs. To retract the source, follow these procedures:. Unlock and remove the source cover panel from the TNA. Pull the Teleflex cable until it is stopped by the source retraction plug. Do not remove ti.e retraction plug. Lock the Teleflex cable in the RETRACTED position so that it does not move back into the system. 1 Appendix A 19 NUREG-1396

+. l' ' SECTION 3 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES These procedures shall be oosted in a prominent position naar the TNA for immq4 ate refprpnpe in the event of an emergency. Flpure.10 should be posted separately or as the first once. - 3.1 BAGGAGE JAMS Baggage may be stopped in the TNA due to a beggage jam; such occurrences pose no imminent danger of radiation exposure to personnet, if a jam ocours, the baggage in the TNA should be removed as soon as possible to minimize bag activation. First, determine the cause of the stoppage. -This is accomplished by opening the exit and entranos shielding doors to visually inspect the baggage passageway while remaining outside the TNA. L.atch the doors in the open W Caution: The doors must be l cioned monin as anon as possible to minimize exposure imm the passaan noenino. under l no circumstances should the doors be left open longer than 10 minutes. as the done rate j outside the TNA withall three doors open is approximataty 20 mram/hr. First, use long-handloo tools to clear the baggage without entering the passageway. - If it s necessary to enter the baggage passageway to unism the system, the source must 1 first be retracted. (See Section 2.7). Access is permitted only by the' system operator. Remember to use the gamma. survey mater to ensure that the source is retracted before entering omsageway. If the.coerator's aumulative duration of stay inside the neutron interrogattion region is grastar than 1 hour per week fduring and 7 day neriodi the source After removing any bags that have remained in the system, use the gamma meter to survey them on the surface to ensure that the radiation level is less than 0.5 mrem /hr. If the level is higher than 0.5 mrem /hr, the bag must be put aside for et least 5 minutes until the level deceys to less than 0.5 mrem /hr. See Section 4.1 for bag activation procedures, once % stoppage is cleared, note the time and the reason for the stoppage in the TNA Deity L a. Also note if any of the stopped beggage sunsyed above the 0.5 mrom/hr level. ' NUlWG-1396 20 Appendix A

EMERGENCY CONTACT GUIDE Emergency Tyne Persons to be Contacted Fre/Esplosion/Deester

1. Airport Fro Oopwtmort. Immedete Emergency Aspetence

2. Airport Securty. Cordon off Ares

3. Cay / State Radetion Control. Immediate Rodeologeoel Assetence

4. City / State Emergency Managemert

5. N.R.C. Regen OfAce

s. sAsC/sanie Ciers. Redemon Omoer

7. SAIC/ Santa Clers. Manager of Operosione

s. uoense Holder (FAA)

Rosesion Soloty incidente

1. Airport Securtty. Cordon all Area (where omre hee been

2. Cay /sisse Remenon Coreros exposure or there le 3.Cny/stese Management imminent danger of

4. NRC Redebon esposure)

5. sAIC/senia Ciers. Redisson.

Omoer

s. sAIC/serna Clare. Manager of Operemone

7. Ucense Holder (FAA)

Radleton Safety incidents

1. Airport Securty. Cordon cR Aree (stuck souros, transeer

2. sac /serne Ciers. Remenon sessey Ommer prialems, etc. where

s. sAaC/senes Ciers Manager et Plaid Operemone W there is no knminent preedom cannot be rasohed danger of esposure)

4. City /Stsee Radlegion Contal

5. NRC Region Citos

s. uoense Holder (FAA)

Operator inness or

1. SAIC/Sante Clare. Manager of Fleid Opereelons Accident (which prevents en 2. Operator to serve es replacement operator from reponing to work)

System Febuns, immhant

1. SAIC/ Santa Ciers Englneer (Coremot other engineer.

or Actuel(due to hardware He we content em twmanary personnel, by peger N or software problems) neesseery, for repair and/or eNpment of parts.)

2. SAIC Redleton Safety Omoor Power Loss, Large.ecele

1. Airport Feogtv Menegement

2. aAc/sents daare. Manager of Feld Operatone

3. sac Redemon sorsey Ommer Power Lose, to Bulleng

1. Akport Feobtv Management

2. sac /serne Caere. Manager of Plead Operemons

3. sac m sesety Omoer Figure 10. Emergency Contact Guide Appendix A 21 NUREG-1396

3.2 FIRE, EXPLOSION, DISASTER L Fires, explosions, or other disasters give rise to concerns for imminent danger of radiation exposure. The following procedure is supplied in checklist form for rapid and accurate handling of such emergencies.- j _ Call the airport fire department. _ Remove any injured personnel to a safe distance. _ Give emergency first aid if necessary. _ Call airport security. Conduct area survey to determine level / extent of exposure or radios::tive material s release. _ Cordon off area to a safe distance, where exposure level is less than 2 mrom/hr. _ Call state / local radiation control for immediate rectiological assistance. _ Maintain security until assistance arrives. _ Call NRC regional office, f _ Call SAIC radiation safety officer. Calllicense holder. _ Render emergency assistance as needed.- 3.3 EARTHQUAKE Earthquakes give rise to concems for imminent danger of radiation exposure. The following procedure is supplied in checklist form for rapid and accurate handling of such e h emergencies. _. Remove any injured personnel to a safe distance. _. Give emergency first aid it.necessary. _ Visually inspect TNA for damage'and areas where radiation may be released. 3 L _. Survey area surrounding machine, if high radiation levels exist: Call airport security. Cordon off area to a safe distance, where exposure level is less than 2 mrem /hr. . NUREG-1396 22 Appendix A

.W ~ _._ CaN state / local radiation control'for immediate redological assistance. _ Maintain security until assistance arrives. _ Call NRC regional office. _ car SAIC radiation safety officer. _ CaN license holder, if no sigrecent radiation exposure exists, clear the baggage from the system, if the power is off, fobow the procedures in Section 3.6. When power is restored, or if power remained on after the earthouake, initiate system power up sequence. 3.4 SOURCE STUCK AT INTERFACE A source stuck at the interface is a situation where there is imminent danger of radiation . expceure. The following procedure for hs&diirg such a situation is given in checklist form for rapid and accurate handling of such an energency. _ Alat airport security personnel present. Area should already be clear. Ensure area within 45 fSet 'of TNA has been oordoned off, and that the areas above and below the system are clear. _ Conduct a gamma survey to verify stuck source and determine extent of dose rate. _ Attempt to dislodge source. Attempt to realign machine / cask mating by wiggling the cask from side to side, withoutmoving.#utrasitbadomards. WARNING: Do not ' nttamat to har* out the eaak.- This could ramin in a totally unshielded source, _ If s:xJrce does not dislodge: Call state / local radiation control for immediate radiological assistance. CaN NRC regional office. CaN SAIC radiation safety officer. Calllicense holder. Maintain security until assistance arrives. Appendix A 23 NUREG-1396 t

p l3.51 SOURCE TRANSFER INCIDENTS'. Source transfer Inc.idents include a souros stuck in a cask or the TNA, a broken Teleflex - cable, or a source coming off the end of the cable. These incidents pose no imminent danger of radiation exposure to personnel. As source handling already requires airport security personnel to be present (see Sdetion 2.3), inform them of the situation. Ensure that the area within 45 feet of the TNA has been cordoned off, and that areas above and below the TNA are clear. Attempt in aH cases to push the source into a normat operating position, but do not attempt repair. - Call the SAIC radiation safety officer for funher instructions. Also call: 1) state / local b redistkm control, 2) NRC regional office, and 3) license holder. 3.6 POWER LOSS OR SYSTEM FAILURE Power loss or system failure (e.g. conveyor belt failure) poses no imminent danger of radiation exposure.. In such incidents, clear ba90aDe from the system with long-handled tools without entering the passageway. - If it is necessary to enter the passageway, retract ; the source first. ' (See Section 2.7.) Use a gamma survey meter to ensure source has been retracted before entering passageway. After removin0 the ba00ege, ensure that the t shielding doors are closed and place source back into normal operating position for maximum shielding. Survey each-bag to ensure residual acevation is less than 0.5 mrom/hr. -if the level is higher than 0.5 mrom/hr, the bag must be put aside for at least 5' minutes until the level decays to less than 0.5 mrem /hr., Call airport facility management to determine extent of power loss or caN SAIC for assistance in system failures. See Section 4.1 for bag activation procedures. -l 3.7

DETECTION OF SOURCE LEAK in the unlikely event that a source leak test or conveyor belt wipe test reveals a leak, it is I

imperative to perform the following procedures to prevent the spread of contamination and l-release of airborne activity. _ Stop operation of the TNA system. Leave cask in place flush with the TNA system. Ensure area within 45 feet of TNA has been cordoned off, and that the areas above and below the system are clear. i u _ Conduct a gamma survey to determine extent of dose rate. L CaN state / local radiation control for immediate radiological assistance. Call NRC regional office. Call SAIC radiation safety officer. 1 R NUREG-1396 24 Appendix A

t-4 M license h006Bf. Maintain securtty until assistance arrives. E I t ) 'f, Appendix A 25 NUREG-1396 l t

-. ~ D' - SECDON 4-BAG ACTIVATION - 4.1 MONITORING - . All baggage leaving the system passes the exit monitor detector. Baggage which does not trigger the alarm may be handed over to be loaded on aircraft. Baggage which exceeds the activation threshold triggers the indicator light and audible alarms. Such bags mus;; diecked with an ion chamber survey meter (Bicron RSO 5 or equivalent) on the surface of the bag to assure that the actMty level is acceptable for. loading on the aircraft. The dose rate must be less than 0.5 mrom/hr everywhere; if the bag exceeds this dose rate it must be put aside for at least 5 minutes and rechecked until the 0.5 mrom/hr level criterion is met. Five minutes is generally sufficient to ensure all residual actMty of the bag and contents has decayed. Bags which continue to fall to meet the 0.5 mrom/hr criterion must remain aside since the bag itself may contain radioactive ma+erial. Notify local airport security personnel and the SAIC radiation safety officer for further instructions. 4.2 EXIT MONITOR SYSTEM The baggage activation exit monitoring system consists of a detector assembly with lead collimator to view the baggage and an dose rate monitor type electronics package containing high voltage supply, amplification, count rate meter circuitry with adjustable p . threshold whica triggers audible / visible alarm indicators and. a signal.to the TNA-- li computer. When a bag F asses the detector, some of the activation gamma rays from the bag are L detected. If tie count rate exooeds the set threshold, the indicator light goes on, tho' audible alarm munds and the circuit communicates the event to the TNA computer. Bags which trigger the alarm are to be set aside to be checked using the survey meter. (See Section 4.1 above). The TNA identifies the activation alarm bags as well as explosive . suspect bags. This typically operates with a mechanical diverter which physically separates these-suspect bags from the baggage flow where they can be cleared individually. 4.3 CAUBRATION/ CHECK PROCEDURE This' calibration procedure is used to set the exit monitor threshold where it will trigger on any. bag which might have a surface dose rate above 0.5 mrom/hr. NUREG-1396 26 Appendix A f

---

w.

--+,- -, -.., - - r--- w - -, =., -eme -Y

- Set threshold using a Cs 137 check source'of 5 microcuries strength placed in the' middle

• . bag with light weight contents so that the threshold triggers when the bag passes.

1.g will be one of the bags used for daily TNA operational checks. Exit monitor - operation is to be verifled daily as one of the regular daily system tests. Appendix A 27 NUREG-1396

SECTION 5

Cf-252 SOURCE LEAK TEST PROCEDURE The califomium 252 ' sealed source must be tested for leakage of radioactive material overy

' six months. This involves % e cotton swab to wipe the surfaces as close to the souice - as possible. (W. ping trx vuos itself would result in= an y&ce icontamination, expo viped as a check on accumulated .Similarly, the conveyor be' also at six mo.2 intervals. The leak test samples are then sent-to a spoolfloaHy authorized agency for ard,3. The address of the a0ency utilized in this case is: Radiation Detection Company ATTN: Chemistry Department 162 Wolfe Road Sunnyvale, Califomia 94086 i The following materials are needed for the wipe Wk -~ a wipe test cotton swab whh @sstycover - a wipe test filter paper with plastic bag -- an ion chamber gamma survey meter 5.1 SOURCE LEAK TEST The source transport cask is placed in position for mioeding the source. The procedures for these tasks are given in Sections 2.1, 2.5, and i'.6. The source is withdrawn into the cask, then reinserted back into the system. The cotton swab cover is labelled with the source suial number and the current source ^ strength is noted.1The aperture of the source transport cask is wiped thoroughly with the swab, wiping as much area inside the aperture as can be reached.. The cotton swab is then removed and inserted into its labelled cover. 5.2- ~ CONVEYOR BELT WIPE TEST i The filter paper is used to wipe the surface of the TNA conveyor belt, wiping across tho' belt surface in at leart four places. The plastic bag is labelled, identifying the place and date, and the filter paper placed in it. - NUREG-1396 28 Appendix A -o

1 l 5.3 SAMPLE ANALYSIS The cotton swab and filter paper are then held close to the survey meter to make a preliminary measurement. If the meter registers any radiation level above normal background, follow the emergency procedures in Sec. 3.7. If the radiation level of the test wipe is simply equal to the background levels, the test wipe is placed in an envelope and mailed to Radiation Detection Company. The results of the wipe test analysis will be provided within two weeks. A record of these wipe tests and the analysis results must be maintained on file for three years following each test. l Appendix A 29 NUREG-1396

VI L t f i P ' i = 1 1 - i I J l 1 ) ) i t i. i .N 1 1 l l I

o; Ji APPENDIX B TABLES IN ENGLISH SYSTEM OF UNITS CORRESPONDING TO TABLES IN SECrlONS 5 AND 6 j. 4 %) Appendix B '- NUREG-1396

s t Table 5 l(a) Potential activation products (for slow neutrons *) of baggage contents centshing 1 kg. (2.2-Ib) masses of various elements 0.5 min delay 10-min delay 60-min delay liose rate Dose rate Dose rate Gamma (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ Half. life (Mev/ Activity 2,2 lb Activity 2.2 lb Activity 2.2 h Product dps/pg" (min) dist) (gCl/g) @ 1 ft) (pCi/g) @ l ft) (pCilg) @ l ft) 1.02E-15 0.00E + 00 1.02E-15 0.00E + 00 1.02E-15 0.rJE + 00 11 3 8.42E-10 6.49E + 06 N-16 3.50E-03 1.19E-01 4.60E + 00 2.31E-10 639E-09 2.18E-34 6.01E-33 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0-19 3.51E-03 4.48E-01 1.04E + 00 1.97E-09 1.23508 8.17E-16 5.10E-15 2.10E-49 1.31E-48 F-20 1.97E + O2 1.83E-01 1.64E + 00 3.61E-05 3.55E-04 8.58E-21 8.44E-20 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Nc-23 2.43E + 01 6.20E-01 1.45E-01 1.69E-05 1.47E-05 4.13E 10 3.60E-10 2.21E-34 1.92E-34 Na-24 1.80E + 00 8.80E + 02 4XE + 00 2.19E-06 5.41E-05 2.17E-06 5.37E-05 2.09E-00 5.16E-05 Mg 27 1.29E + 00 9.46E + 00 9.14E-01 ' l.51E-06 8.29E-06 7.54E-07 4.14E-06 1.94E-08 1.06E-07 Al 28 2.72E + 02 2.24E + 00 1.78E + 00 2.83E-04 3.03E-03 1.50E-05 1.60E-04 2.87E-12 3.07E-11 Cl-38 5.55E+ 00 ~ 3.72E + 01 ' 1.49E+ 00 6.69E-06 5.98E-05 5.60E-06 5.01E-05 2.21E46 1.97E-05 - Ar 41 1.06B + 01 1.10E + 02 1.28E + 00 1.29E-05 9.87E-05 1.21E-05 9.30E-05 8.83E-06 6.78E-05 K-42 239E-01 ~ 7.42E + 02 2.73E + 02 2.91E-07 4.76E-04 2.88E-07 4.72E-04 2.75E-07 4.50E-04 Sc-46m 4.73E + 04 3.12E-01 1.42E-01 1.89E-02 1.61E-02 130E-11 1.11E-11 7.62E-60 649E-60 Ti-51 3.57E + 00 5.76E + 00 3.50E-01 4.09E-06 8.59E-06 130E-06 2.74E-06 3.18E-09 6.68E-09 % 52 1.79E + 03 3.75E + 00 1.43E + 00 1.98E-03 1.70E-02 3.43E-N 2.94E-03 333E-08 2.86E-07 Cr 55 3.22E + 00 3.56B + 00 6.57604 3.55E-06 1.40E-08 5.59E-07 2.20E-09 331E-11 131E-13 ' ' M n-56 1.11E + 02 1.55E + 02 1.70E + 00 1.35E-N 137E 03 1.29E-M 1.32E-03 1.03E-04 1.05E-03 ' - Co-60m 2.33E + 03 1.05E + 00 1.23E-03 2.04E-03 1.50E-05 3.85E-06 2.84E-08 1.80E-20 133E-22 Ni-65 7.64E + 00 1.51 402 5.63E-01 9.27E-06 3.13E-05 8.88E-06 3.00E-05 7.06E-06 2.38E-05 Cu 64 4.58E + 00 7.64e + 02 1.95E-01 5.57E-06 6.51E-06 5.52E-06 6.46E-06 5.28E-06 6.17E-06 Cu 66 - 1.47E + 02 5.10E + 00 9.56E-02 1.67E-04 9.58E-05 4.59E-05 2.64E-05 5.15E-08 2.95E-08 : Zn-69, 3.69E + 00 5.70E + 01 4.78E-06 4.46E-06 1.28E-10 3.97E-06 1.14 E-10 2.16E44 6.21E-11 Ga-70 5.43E + 01 2.11E + 01 5.55E-03 6.50E-05 2.16E-06 4.76E-05 1.58E-06 9.20E-06 3.06E-07 On-72 2.59E + 00 8.46E + 02 2.03E + 00 3.15E-06 3.84E-05 3.12E-06 3.81 E-05 3.00E4M 3.65E-05 Oc 75m 638E + 01 8.15E-Ol' 5.59E-02 5.07E-05 1.70E-05 1.51E-08 5.2SE-09 5.41E-27 1.81E-27 Oc 75 1.05E + 00 8.28E + 01 3.18 & O2 1.27E-06 2.43E-07 1.17E-06 2.24B-07 7.73E-07 1.47E-07 Oc 77m 9.05E-01' 8.84E-01 631E-02 7.44E47 2.82E-07 434E'-10 1.64E-10

4. llE-27 1.566 27 As 76 3.26E + 00 - 1.58E + 03 337E-01 3 96E-06 8.02E-06 3.95E-06 7.98E-06 3.86E-06 7.81E416 Sc-77m 5.69E + 03 2.90E-01 9.63E-02 2.10E-03 1.21E 2.90E-13 1.67E-13 3.73E-65 2.15E-65 Sc 79m 2.15E + 01 3.91E + 00 9.57E-03 2.39E-05 137E-06 4.44 E-06 2.55E-07 630E-10 3.61E-I l Se 81 1.33E + 01-1.85E+ 01 1.44E-02 1.59E-05 137E-06 1.11E-05 9.61E-07 1.71E-06 1.48E-07 Sc-83 3.45E + 00 2.25E + 01 1.27E + 00 4.13E-06 3.15E 05 3.0SE-06 235E-05 6.61607 S M E-06 Er-80m 5.4SE + 00 2.65E + 02 2.41E-02 6.66E-06 9.62E-07 6.49E-06 9.39607 5.70E-06 8.24E-07

- Ilt-80 ' 2.91E + 02 1.778 + 01 7.00E-02 3,47E-N 1.46E-04 2.39E-M 1.00E 338E-05 1.42E-05 Et-82m 2.31E + 02 6.10E + 00 4.22E-04 2.65E-N 6.72E-07 9.02E-05 2.28E-07 - 3.08E-07 7.79E-10 Kr-81m 3.77B + 02 2.22E-01 1.27E-01 9.63E-05 734E-05 1.27E-17 9.69E-18 2.09E-85 1.59E-85 Kr-83m 1.74E + 01 1.12E + 02 2.26E-03 2.llE-05 2.86E-07 1.99E-05 2.70E-07 1.46E-05 1.98E-07 Rb-86m 4.20E + 01 1.02E + 00 5.46E-01 3.64E-05 1.19E-M 5.72E-08 1.87E-07 1.01E-22 331E-22 Rb-88 2.05E + 00 1.78E + 01 637E-01 2.45E-M 935E-06 1.69E-06 6.46E-06 2.41E-07 9.22E-07 Y-90m 4.16E + 00 1.91E + 02 6.30E-01 5.05E-06 1.91E-05 4.88E-06 1.84E-05 4.07E-06 1.54E-05 Nb-94m 3.80E + 01 6.26E + 00 1.17E-02 4.37E-05 3.07E-06 1.53E-05 ,1,07E-06 6.03E-08 4.23E-09 Mo-101 1.35B + 00 1.46E + 0! 1.51E + 00 1.60E-06 1.45E-05 1.02E-06 9.25 E-06 9.52E-08 8.62 8-07 Rh-104m 3.60E+ 03 4.35E + 00 3.48F-02 4 04E-03 8.44E-04 8,90E-N 1.86E N 3.09E-07 6.45E-08 Rh-104 1.54E + 04 7.05E-01 1.11E-02 1.15E-02 7.63E-04 1.01E-06 6.71E-08 4.55E-28 3.03E-29 ~14107m - 8.42E + 00 3.55E-01 1.52E-01 3.86E-06 3.52E-06 3.41E-14 3.11E-14 139E-56 1.27E-56 Pd 109m 9.12E + 00 4.69E + 00 1.14E-01 1.03E-05 7.0$E-06 2.53E-06 1.73E-06 1.57E-09 1.07E-09 Pd 109 337E + 00 8.08E + 02 1.24E-02 4.10E-06 3.0$E-07 4.06E-06 3.02E-07 3.89E-06 2.90E-07 Ag-108 - 5.09E+ 03 2.41E + 00 2.94602 5.36E-03 9.46E-04 3.49E-N 6.16E-05 1.99E-10 3.51E-Il Ag-110 831E + N 4.10E-01 2.96E-02 4.34E-02 7.71E-03 4.61E-09 8.19E-10 9.14E-46 1.62E-46 .In-114 9.43E+ 01 1.20E + 00 2.2 tE-03 8.59E-05 1.14E-06 3.56E-07 4.72E-09 1.03E-19 136E-21 In-116m(2) 1.26E+06 3 63E-02 8.20E-02 1.10E-04 539E-05 1.88E-83 9.26E-84 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 In-116m(l) 1.29E + 03 5.42B + 01 2.47E + 00 1.56E-03 2.31E-02 138E-03 2.05 E-02 7.28E-04 1.08E-02 See footnotes at end of tahic.

Appendix il 1

NURIiG-1396 ..m.

Table 5.1(a) (continued) 0.5-min delay 10 min delay 60-min delay Dose rate Dose rate Dose rate Gamma (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ - Italf life (Mev/ Activity 2.2lb Activity 2.2 lb Activity 2.2 lb Prod act dps/pg" (min) dist) ( Ci/g) @ l ft) (prl/c) @ 1 ft) (pCi/g) @ 1 ft) 5 116 - IJ6E + 04 2.37E-01 1.55E-02 3.83E-03 3.57E-04 3.31E-15 3.08E-16 I.3C' 'a 9.84E-80 Sn-115m .1.09E + 00 9.52E + 00 3.29E-01 1.28E-06 2.52E-06 6.40E-07 1.26E-06 1.68E 332E-08 Sb-I t2m 7.08E + 00 4.21E + 00 5 %E-02 7.93E-06 2.84E-06 1.66E-06 5.94E-07 4.42E-10 1.58E-10 Sb 114m 8.42E + 00 1.55E + 00 3.48E-01 8.19E-06 1.71E-05 1.17E-07 2.45E-07 2.29B-17 4.78E-17 Te-131 2.08E4 00 2.50E + 01 3.54E-01 2.49E.-06 530E-06 1.92E-06 4.07E-06 4.79E-07 1.02E-06 I-128 2.00E + 02 2.50E + 01 8.75E-02 2.40E-04 1.26E-04 1.84E-04 9.68E-05 4.61E-05 2.42E-05 Xc.125m ' 1.70E + 01 9.50E-01 1.11B-01 1.44E-05 9.56E-06 1.40E-08 935E-09 2.03E-24 1.35E-24 Xc137 1.99E + 00 3.84E + 00 1.50E-01 2.21E-06 1.99E-06 3.98E-07 3.58E-07 4.80E-11 432E-11 Cs 134m 9.28B + 00 1.748-02 234E-02 2.54E-14 3.56E-15 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Ila-136m 131E+ 03 5.13E-03 1.92E + 00 739E-33 8.51E-32 0.00E + 00 0.00B+ 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Dol 39 1.55E + 00 833E + 01 - 4.18E-02 1.88E-06 4.71E-07 1.73E-06 435E-07 1.14E-06 2.87E-07 IA140 1.92E + 00 2.41E + 03 232E + 00 233B-06 3.25E-05 2.33E-06 3.24E-05 2.30E-06 3.19E-05 Pr 142 3.43E + 00 1.15E + 03 5.83E-02 4.17E-06 1.46E-06 4.15E-06 1.45E-06 4.02B-06 1.41E-06 Nd-151 3.52E + 00 1.24B + 01 1.69E-01 4.16E-06 4.22E-06 2.45E-06 2.48E-06 1.50E-07 1.52E-07 . Sm-153 1.19E + 01 2.79E + 03 535E-02 1.45E-05 4.65E-06 1.44E-05 4.63E-06 1.43E-05 4.58E-06 Sm-155 . 2.81E+ 01 2.22E + 01 8.24E-02 336E-05 1.66E-05 2.50E-05 1.24E-05 5.25E-06 2.60E-06 ' Eu 152m(2) 9.21E+00 9.60E + 01 7.38E-02 1.12E-05 4.94E-06 1.04E-05 4.61E-06 7.26E-06 3.22E-06 Eu-152m(1) 132E+03 5.58E + 02 2.41E-01 1.60E-03 132E-03 1.59E-03 2.29E-03 1.49E-03 2.15E-03 Gd-161 2.19E + 01 3.70B + 00 3.09E-01 2.43E-05 4.50E-05 4.09E-06 7.59E-06 3.51B-10 6.50E-10 Dy-165m 1.64E + 05 1.26E + 00 1.09B-02 1.52E-01 9.91E-03 8.15E-04 533E-05 9.29E-16 6.08E-17 Dy 165 8.698 + 02 1.41B + 02 1.28E-02 1.05E-03 8.10E-05 1.01E-03 7.73E-05 7.87E-M 6.04E-05 lio.166 1.98B + 01 1.61E + 03 2.75E-02 2.41E-05 3.97E-06 2.40E-05 3 96E-06 235E-05 3.87E-06 Er 167m 4.798 + 04 3.78E-02 9.71E-02 6.09E-06 3.55E-M 1.40E-81 8.13E-82 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Yb-175 1.39E + 00 6.03E + 03 3.09E-02 1.69E-06 3.13E-07 1.69E-06 3.13E-07 1.68E-06 3.11E-07 Yb-177 1.13E + 00 1.14E + 02 1.22B-01 137E-06 1.00E-06 1.29E-06 9.47E-07 9.54E-07 6.99E-07 Im-176m - 4.78E + 01 2.21E + 02 1.82E-02 5.80E-05 634E-06 5.63E-05 6.15E-06 4.82E-05 5.26E-06 1x-177 2.22E + 00 9.66E + 03 3.02E-02 2.70E-06 4.89E-07 2.70E-06 4.89E-07 2.69E-06 4.87E-07 lif 178m 1.10E + 03 7.17E-02 9.77E-01 1.07E-05 6.25E-05 1.41E-45 8.29B-45 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 lif 179m ~ 2.46E + M 3.12E-01 2.878-01 9.85E.-03 1.70E 6.75E-12 1.16E-11 3.96E-60 6.82E-60 . W 187 3.47E + 00 1.43E + 03 4.31B-01 4.22E-06 1.09E-05 4.20E-06 1.09E-05 4.10E-06 1.06E-05 Re-186 - 3.62E + 00 5.44E + 03 1.80E-02 4.40E-06 4.75E-07 4.40E-06 4.75B-07 437E-06 4.72E-07 Ile 188m - 2.18E+ 01 - 1.86E + 01 7.96E-02 2.60E-05 1.24E-05 1.83E-05 8.72E-06 2.84E-06 135E-06 Re-188 1.85E + 01 1.02E + 03 4.78E-02 2.25E-05 6.45E-06 2.23E-05 6.41E-06 2.16E-05. 6.20E-06 Os-191m 1.19E + 00 7.80E + 02 6.51E-03 1.45E-06 5.65E-08 1.43E-06 5.60E-08 137E-06 536E-08 + 1r 192m 3.12E + M 1.40E + 00 2.47E-M 2.96E-02 4.39E-05 2.69E-04 3.98E-07 4.79E-15 7.10E-18 Ir-194 2.73E + 01 1.16E + 03 5.12E-02 3.32E-05 1.02E-05 3.30E-05 1.01E-05 3.20E-05 9.84E-06 Pt-199m ' 3.83E + 00 2.40E-01 3.42E-01 1.10E-M 2.26E-M 1.34E-18 2.76E-18 2.67E-81 5.48E-81 Pt 199 ' 3.89E + 00 3.08E + 01 1.07E-01 4.68E-06 3.00E-06 3.78E-06 2.43E-06 1.23E-06 7.87E-07 Au-198 - 1.18 E + 01 3.88E + 03 4.03E-01 1.44E-05 3.47E-05 1.43E-05 3.46E-05 1.42E-05 3.43E-05 lig-205 2.03E + 00 5.20E + 00 4.80E-03 2.31E-06 6.65E-08 6.51E-07 1.88E-08 8.31E-10 239E-11 1* Th-233 1.19E + 02 - 2.23E + 01 1.08E-02 1.42E-M 9.23E-06 1.06B-04 6.87E-06 2.24E-05 1.45E-06 l.- U-239-1.01E + 02 235E + 01 5.21E-02 1.21E-04 3.78E-05 9.15E-05 2.86E-05 2.09E-05 6.54E-06 ' Integrated thermal fluence in HDS-3C = 4.5H+ 05 neutrom/cm'. "dps = disintegration (s) per second. tdis = disintegration. Note: 8.42H 8.42x10 4 etc. NUlti!G-1396 2 Appendix B

t Table 5.2(a) Potential activation products (for fast neutrons *) of baggage contents containing 1-kg(2.2-Ib) masses of various elesments ~ d 0.5-min delay 10-min 2-y 69-sein

• L7

) Dese rate Dese rate Dese rate h (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ (arem/br/ Italf-life (MeV/ Activity 2.2lb Activity 2 2 lb Activity 2.2 It Gamma isotope tion ** Product dps/ pat (min) disti) (gCi/g) @ 1 ft) ( Ci/g) @ 1 ft) (pCi/g) @ 1 ft) Target Reac-Be-9 n.a lie-6 1.27E+ 03 134E-02 C-12 n.2n C-11 L18E-08 103E+ 01 LO2E+00 7E4E-14 4.80E-13 5.67E-14 3.47E-13 LO3E-14 629E-14 N-14 n2n N-13 L49E-03 9.96E+ 00 LO2E+ 00 9.72E09 5.95E43 5.02E-09 3.07E-08 L55E-10 9.48E-10 0-16 n.p N-16 L74E-03 L19E01 4.86E + 00 6J9E-10 1E6E-OS 6.01E-34 L75E-32 0.00E + 00 0.00E+ 00 O -13 na C-15 7.9SE-03 4.10E-02 3.62E + 00 L15E-11 2.50E-.10 2.12E-81 4.59E-80 0.00E+ 00 0.00E+ 00 F-19 n.p O-19 LO9E+ 00 4 52E-01 LO4E+ 00 3.42E-06 114E-05 162E-12 LOIE-11 8.24E46 5.14E-45 F-19 n.a N-16 232E+ 01 L19E-01 4.86E + 00 8.52E-06 239E-04 S.02E-30 2.34E-2S 0.00E+ 00 0.00E + 00 Ne-20 n.p F-20 1.2SE-01 LS3E-01 633E01 130E-07 4.95E-07 3.10E-23 L18E-22 0.00E + 00 0.00E+ 00 Ne-22 n.a 0-19 3.92E-03 4.52E-01 LO4E+ 00 123E-08 7.6SE-OS 5.81E-15 3.63E-14 196E-48 L85E-47 Na-23 np Ne-23 7.18E-01 6.27E-01 439E-01 '2.79E 735E-06 7.69T-11 102E-10 7.68E-35 102E-34 Na-23 n.a F-20 L21E + 00 L83E-01 1.63E + 00 L23E-06 120E-05 193E-22 2E6E-21 0.00E+ 00 0.00E+ 00 Afg.25 np Na-25 1.67E-02 LOOE + 00 3.93E-01 7.98E-OS IESE07 L10E-10 160E-10 9.87E-26 2335-25 Mg-26 n.p Na-26 6.82E-03 L67E-02 1E1E+ 00 4.49E-17 4ESE-16 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Al-27 ap Mg-27 1.09E-01 9.45E + 00 8.93601 7.10E-07 3 80E-06 3.54E-07 L90E-06 9ME-09 4.84E-08 Si-2S n.p Al-28 6.51E-01 2.25E + 00 L78E+ 00 3.77E-06 403E-05 2.02E-07 2.16E-06 4.15E-14 4.43E-13 Si-29 n,p AI-29 L00E+ 00 6.52E + 00 238E + 00 6.41E-06 9.15E-05 2335 06 333E-05 LISE-OS L645 07 w P-31 ap Si-31 5.14E-02 L57E+ 02 8.66E-04 3.47E-07 LSOE-09 332E-07 L73& O9 166E-07 IJSE-09 P-31 n.a Al-28 L90E-01 2.25E +(M 178E+ 00 L10E-06 L18 E 05 5.90E-08 630E-07 L21E-14 129E-13 S-34 n.p P-34 1E4E-02 107E-01 3.19E-01 233E-08 4.46E-08 3.59E-22 6.87E-22 7.21E-95 IJSE-94 Cl-37 n.a P-34 169E-01 207E-01 3.19E-01 3.41E-07 6.52E-07 525E-21 LOOE-20 LOSE-93 102E-93 Ar-40 n.a S-37 3.77E-03 5.06E + 00 2.79E + 00 2JSE-OS 3.98E-07 6.43E-09 LOSE-07 6.8SE-12 L15E-10 Ca-40 n2n Ca-39 4.80E-03 1.45E-02 LO2E + 00 L36E-18 831 5 18 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 0.00E+ 00 0.00E+ 00 V-51 ap Ti-51 2.06E-02 5.76E + 00 3.58E-01 IJ1E-07 182E-07 4.18E-OS 8.98508 102E-10 2.19E-10 Cr-52 n.p V-52 3.25E-02 3.76E + 00 1.43E + 00 100E-07 L72E-06 3.48E-OS 2SSE-07 3 46E-12 2.97E Cr-53 ap V-53 3.60E-03 L55E+ 00 INE + 00 L95E-OS L21E-07 2.73E-10 L74E-09 5.44E-20 3.40E-19 Mn-55 nc Cr-55 LO7E-02 3,56E+ 00 6.57E-04 6.56E-OS 2.59E-10 LO3E-08 4.07E11 6.12E-13 2.41E-15 Mn-55 n.a V-52 3.70E-03 3.76E + 00 L44E+ 00 2.28E-OS L97E-07 3 96E-09 3.42E-08 3.94E-13 3.40E-12 Ni-60 n.p Co40m 6.23E-03 LO5E+01 SE5E-02 4.07E4S L43E-08 11SE-08 744E-09 8.02E-10 2E2E-10 Zn-64 ap Cu.64 2.11E-03 744E-02 1.89E01 L53E-10 L73E-10 5.76E-48 6.53E-48 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Zn-66 n.p Cu-66 3.59E-03 5.10E + 00 935E-02 2.27E-08 L27E-08 6.23E-09 3.50E-09 6.98E-12 3.92E-12 Ga-69 n.a Cu-66 7.86E-03 5.10E + 00 935E-02 4 96E-OS 2.78E-08 IJ6E-OS 7.66E-09 1.53E-11 S.58E-12 Se-77 n.n Se-77m L63E+ 01 2.92E-01 9.70E-02 336E-05 L96E 05 5,43E15 3.16E-15 L58E-66 9.22E-67 Br-79 n.2n Br-78 LO3E-03 6.40E+ 00 LO3E+ 00 6.59E-09 4.07E-08 236E-09 1.46508 LOSE-11 6.49E-11 Y-89 n.n Y-89m 3.75E+ 01 162E-01 9.01E-01 6.75E-OS 3.65E 04 8.25E-16 4.46E-15 3.02E-73 163E-72 2 Ru-100 n.p Tc-100 2.20E-03 2.67E-01 6.75E-02 42E-09 1.64E-09 7.94E-20 . 3.22E-20 3.46E-76 L40E-76 9 Rh-103 n.a Tc-100 - 3.97E + 00 167E-01 6.75E-02 733E-06 2.97E-06 1.43E-16 5.81E-17 6.25E-73 153E-73 $ Rh-103 n.n Rh-103m 6.43E-01 5.61E + 01 1.69E 432E-06 43SEOS 3E4E-06 3.89E-08 107E-06 110E-08 O Cd-112 n.2n Cd-111m ~ 3.69E-02 4.87E + 01 2.Bm ^ 148E-07 4.26E-07 2.16E-07 3.72E-07 LO6E-07 L83E-07 ~. See footnotes at end of table

~ ~ '~' .-7, n,_,, _y .~ : .+. 4 p, ~ w _ 2 Table 5.2(a) (continued): ~, C-0.5-min delay 10-min delay min delay ~ t C . Dose rate ~ ',ese rate - .' Dese rate l Gamma (mrem /I'r/ ' Activity. (mrem /hr/ - ' Activity ' ~ 2.2 lb - (arem/br/..' l M ' Target Reac- .dps/pgt

(min) disti)

( Cilg)l @ 1 ft) { Ci/g) @ I ft) - ( Cilg) ' @ I ft) : isotope tion" Product . Italf-life f (MeV/.. . Activity - 2.2 lb 2.21b In-115 n.n In-115m 4.04E-02 : 2.70E-02 1.65E-01 7.29E-13. 7.22E-13 0.00E + 00. 0.00E + 00 0.00E+00 : 0.00E + 00 ~ - Ba-137 n.n Ba-137m 100E-01 . 2.55E+ 00

199E-01 2 95E 1.06E-05 2.23E-07 8.02E-07

2.80E-13 L01E-12 Pr-141 n,2n Pr-140

1.25E-02 339E+ 00 . 5.05E-02 - 7.63E-0S ' 231E-0S' . 1.07E-08 331E-09. 3.98E-13 - 1.21E-13

• Fast neutron fluence in EDS-3C = 2.5E+05 neutrons /cm2
  • n = neutron. a = alpha. p = proton.

idps = disintegrations.s)per second. tidis = disintegration. Note 1.27E+03 = 1.27x103 etc.'. l z. >5 a c.W C:: .....-.c. ~ _,,.. _,... m..

Table 5.3(a) Major activation products of baggage contents containing 1 ka (2.2 Ib) masses of various elements 0.5-min delay 10-min delay 60-min delay - Dose rate Dose rate Dose rate Gamma (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ (mrem /hr/ Half life (Mev/ Activity. 2 2 lb Activity 2.2 lb Activity 2.2 lb Product dps/ g* - (min) dis **) (pCilg) 6' 1 ft) (pCi/g) @.1 ft) ( Cilg) @ 1 ft) F-20 1.97E + 02 1.83E-01 1.64E + 00 3.61E-05 3.55E-04 8.58E-21 8.44E-20 0.00E + 00 0.00E + 00 Na-24 1.80E+ 00 8.80B+ 02 - 4.12E+ 00 2.19E-06 5.41E-05 2.17E-06 5.37E.05 2.09E 5.16E-05 . Al-28 2.72E + 02 2.24E + 00 1.78E + 00 2.83E-04 3.03E-03 1.50E-05 1.60E 2.87E-12 3.07E-11 ~ K-42 2.39E-01 7.42E + 02 2.73E + 02 191E-07 4.76E-04 2.88E 4.72E-04 2.75E-07 4.50E-04 - Sc-46m 4.73E + 04 3.12E-01. 1.42E-01 ' 1.89E-02 1.61E-02 1.30E-11 1.11E-11 7.62E-60 6.49E-60 V 52 1.79E + 03 3.75E + 00 1.43E + 00 1.98E-03 1.70E-02 3.43E-04 2.94E-03 3.33E-08 2.86E-07 Mn.56 1.11E + 02 1.55E+ 02 1.70E + 00 1.35E-04 1.37E-03 1.29E-04 1.32E-03 1.03E-04 1.05E-03 Sc-77m 5.69E+ 03 2.90E-01 9.63E-02 ~ 2.10E-03 1.21E-03 2.90E-13 1.67E-13 3.73E-65 2.15E-65 . Dr-80 2.91E + 02 1.77E + 01 7.00E-02 3.47E-04 1.46E-04 2.39B-04 1.00E-04 3.38E-05 1.42E-05 . Rb-86m 4.20E + 01 1.02E + 00 5.46E-01 3.64E-05 1.19E-04 5.72E-08 1.87E-07 1.01E-22 3.31E-22 Rh-104m 3.60E + 03 4.35E + 00 3.48E-02 4.04E-03 8.44E-04 8.90E-04 1.86E-04 3.09E-07 6.45E-08. Rh-104 1.54E + 04 7.05E 1.11E-02 1.15E-02 7.63E-04 1.01E-06 6.71E-08 4.55E-28 3.03E-29 = Ag-108 5.09E + 03 2.41E + 00 194E-02 5.36E-03 9.46E-04 3.49E-04 6.16E-05 1.99E-10 3.51E-11 Ag-110 - 8.31B+ 04 4.10E-01 2.96E-02 4.34E-02 7.71E-03 4.61E-09 8.19E-10 9.14E-46 1.62E-46 - In-116m(l) 1.29E + 03 5.42E + 01 147E+ 00 1.56E-03 131E-02 1.38E-03 2.05E-02 7.28E-04 1.08B-02 In 116 1.36E + 04 2.37E-01 1.55E-02 3.83E-03 3.57E-04 3 31E-15 3.0SE-16 1.06E-7v 9.84E-80 1128 2.00E + 02 2.50E + 01 8.75E-02 140E-04 1.26E-04 1.84E-04 ' 9.68E-05 4.61E-05 2.42E-05 Eu 152m(l) 1.32E+03 5.58E + 02 ' 2.41E-01 1.60E 2.32E-03 1.59E-03 2.29E-03 1.49E-03 2.15E Dy-165m 1.64 E + 05 1.26B + 00 1.09E-02 1.52E-01 9.91E-03 8.15E-04 5.33E-05 9.29E-16 6.08E-17 lif-179m 2.46E + 04 3.12E-01 2.87E-01 9.85E-03 1.70E-02 6.75E-12 1.16E-11 - 3.%E-60 6.82E-60 Total 1.03E-01 2.82E-02 1.45E-02 ' 'dpa = disintegration (s)per second. "da = disintegration. Note: 1.97E+ 02 = 1.9h108 etc. ~., ' Appendix 11 5 NUREG-1396

n i Table 5.4(a) Calculated beta dose to'the skin - . from a 1 pCl/cm2 source Beta dose (rem) Averaged over en area of At points - skin at the - ' on the skin Variable basal layer basallayer Radius (in.)larca (in.2) 0.2150/0.1550 0.164 23 180/18.5050 0.105 Horizontal distance (in.) .l 0.0000 0.164 1.5100 0.159 1.5832 0.103 1.6501 0.163 1.7106 0.163 2 1.7647 0.1 1.8125 0.154 .1.8539 0.157 1.8889 0.152, l 1.9176 0.146 1.9398 0.136-- 1.9558 0.121 1.9653 0.099 1.9685 0.080 ' 1.9717 0.063 1.9812' 0.040 1.9972-0.026 2.0194 0.017 2.0481 0.010 '2.0831 0.006 2.1245 0.003 2.1723 0.001 2.2264 0.000 2.2869 0.000 2.3538 0.000 2.4270' 0.000 t VARSKIN MOD 1: l=., Note: The doses were calculated usinh685 in. 1. Duc source with radius =1 c l Skin thickness = 0.0028 in. ' Source: .I l-. RadionucliJe = Al-28 l! Average beta energy = 1.240 MeV X 90 datance = 0.2547 in. -l l Source strength = 64.5 Cilin.' Irradiation time = 60s All ecil damage occurs in an area with a radius of 2.427 in. t 1 q.. 1; NURI!O-1396 6 Appendix B j 1 1 p:

- Tsble 5.5(a) Elemental composition of the contents of an aluminum suitcase (quantitles in ounces) Cloth. Toilet. Tooth. Sult. - Element : Ing. Shoes ries paste ' Shaver Shampoo Paper case Total 1.2 5.0 9.0 29.3 -liydrogen 10.8 1.9 0.8 ' O6 Carbon' 89.8 - 17.3 5.1 0.4 0.08 6.8 35.5 46.1 201.1 23.4-0.2 Nitrogen 17.0 5.1 1.0 Oxygen 37.1 7.7 1.1 3.8 2.6 39.7 41.0 - 133.0 0.01 0.01 - Sodium 0.3 0.2 Manganese 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.03 Silicon 0.5 0.003 0.5 0.007 . Phosphorous 0.003 0.01 0.007 0.02 Sulfur 19.0 3.2 15.8 Iron 0.7 0.7 Calcium .. Aluminum' 160,1 160.1

• All data are from Westinghouse (1986) report. except the weight from aluminum (this amount was increased to refleet an all-aluminum suite.w).

Table 5.6(a) Gamma dose rates from EDS.3C activation of the contents of an aluminum sultcase Gamma Element Sulicase (mrem /hr/ Gamma dose mass activity 2.2lb rate @ 1 ft Element (oz) ( Ci) @ 1 ft) (mrem /hr) liydrogen 29.3 Carbon 201.1 1.40E-13 Nitrogen - 23.4 2.40E-09 s Oxygen 133.0 1.10E-05 Sodium 0.01 6.20E-07 5.4IE-05 .1.54E-08 Manganese 0.03 1.30E-03 1.37E-03 1.17E-06 Silicon 0.* 3.50E-08 Phosphorous 0.5 2.00E-13 Sulfur 0.02 Iron 19.0 Calcium 0.7 Aluminum 160.1 1.28B + 00 3.03E-03 1.38E-02 Total-1.38E-02 Note: 1.40E 13 = 1.40x10." etc. . Appendix 11 7 NURiiG-1396 -

Table 5.7(a) Committed effective dose equivalent from daily intakes of elements I hour after EDS 3C screening Weighted Committed effective dose Mean committed Microcuries/ gram of element equivalent from 1 day's intake daily Induced dose. Target - intake rad 4-equivalent. 0.5 min delay

• 10-min de'ay' O.5 min delay. 10-min delay nuclide (oz) nuclide (rem /Ci)

(pCi/g) ( Cilg) (mrem) - (mrem) Na-23 1.55E-01 Na-24 1.43E + 03 6.20E-05 6.15E-05 1.38E-05 1.37E-05 P-31 4.94E-02 P-32 7.77E + 03 1.22E-06 1.22E-06 4 65E-07 4.65E-07 Cl-37 1.84E-01 Cl-38 2.00E + 02 1.99E-N 1.59E-04 6.95E-06 5.82E-06 K-41 1.16E-01 K-42 1.10E + 03 8.24E-06 8.16E-06 1.06E-06 1.04E-% - Mn-55 1.31E-04 Mn-56 9.32E + 02 3.82E-03 3.65E-03 4.66E-07 4.45E-07 -] Cu 63 1.24E-04 Cu-64 4.29E + 02 1.58E-04 1.56E-04 8.37E-09 8.29E-09 As-75 3.53E-05 As-76 4.74E + 03 1.12E-N 1.12E-04 1.88E-03 1.87E-08 ' Br-79 2.65E-04 Dr-80m 2.31E + 02 1.89E-04 1.84E-04 1.15E-Oo 1.12E-08 ~ 11r 79 2.65E-04 Ilt 80 5.55E + 01 9.83E-03 6.77E-03 1.44E-07 9.95E-08 Total 2.29E-05 A16E -, 'From Table 5.l(a). Note: 1.55E-01 = 1.55x10 ' etc, Table 5.9(a) Summary of collective doses from all scenarios - Scenario Behind the in front of counter the counter Pre check in Curbside

Radiation exposure (person. rem)

-(person. rem) (person. rem) (person. rem) Workers Opcrators 1.2E + 00 1.2E + 00 1.2E + 00 - 1.2E + 00 llaggage handlers 6.0E-01 6.0E-01 6.0E-01 6.0E-01 Ticket counter personnel 3.0E + 00 3.0E + 00 1.0E + 00 -0 Security screeners 9.5E-02 9.5E-02 9.5E-02 9.5E-02 l-Sky-caps 0 0 0 3.8E-01 Passengers 0 1.lE + 00 2.0E + 01 5.5E + 00 Public Uclow the TNA system 6.8E + 00 6.8E + 00 6.8E + 00 6.8E + 00 'Near the TNA system 0 1.lE + 00 6.0E + 00 6.0E-01 From irradiation ofbaggage contents Consumable items 0 0 1.3E-03 0 Nonconsumable items (suitcase, 2.8E-01 2.8E-01 2.8E-01 2.8E-01 clothing, etc.) Total 1.2E + 01 1.4 E + 01 3.6E + 01 1.6E + 01 Nok: 1.2H+ 00 = 1.2xllP etc. cNUREG-1396 8 Appendix 11

Table 5.10(a) Summary of annual individual doses from all scenarios Scenario llehind the in front of NRC counter the counter Pre. check.in Curbside limit ' Radiatloa exposure (mrem) (mrem) (mrem) (mrem) (mrem). Workers Operators 2.0E + 02 2.0E + 02 ' 2.0E + 02 ' 2.0E + 02 5.0E + 03 Baggage handlers 1.0E + 02 .1.0E + 02 1.0E + 02 1.0E + 02 5.0E + 02 Ticket counter personnel 6.0E + 01 6.0E + 01 1.7E + 00 0 5.0E + 02 - Security screeners 3.2E + 0! 3.2E + 01 3.2E + 01 - 3.2E + 01 5.0E + 02 Sky-caps 0 0 0 2.5E + 01 5.0E + 02 Passengers ' 0 1.0E-03 1.8E-02 5.0E-03 5.0E + 02 Public - ' inclow thilNA system 7.5E-03 7.5E-03 7.5E-03 7.5E-03 5.0E + 02 Near the TNA system 0 1.2E-04 6.7E-04 6.7E-04 S.0E + 02 Frorn irradiation of bagage contents Consumabic items 0 0 2.4E-05 0 Nonconsumable items (suitcase, 2.5E-02 2.5E-02 2.5E-02 2.5E-02 elothing, etc.) Notes: Natural sources of radiation: Natural background 3.011+ 02 Yearly dose from foodstuffs 1411+ 01 2.011+ 02 = 2.0xt0* cte. Table 6.2(a) Offsite concentrations lat 50 m (54 yd)] of airborne releases for various fractions of Cf.252 Maximum Offsite concentration fotal permissible source concentra. Fraction activity Release ' Emission X/Q* tion (MPC) of MPC (Cl/yr) fraction (Cl) (s/m3) (pCi/ml) (Cl/m ) (%) 3 8.00E-02 1.00E-01 8.00E-03 6.40E-05 1.00E-12 1.62E-14 1.62 8.00E-02 5.00E-01 4.00E-02 6.40E-05 1.00E-12 8.12E-14 8.12 8.00E-02 1.00E + 00 8.00E-02 6.40E-05 1.00E-12 1.62E-13 16.24

• X/O at 50 m, Note: 8.0011. 02 - 8.00xto. eie.

Appendix 11 9 NURI'G-1396

h w 7 Table 6.3(a) Annual inhalation dose to the. nearest individual 50 m (54 yd) away from postulated Cf.252 accident - Committed ' eNective Activity

• Dose conver.

dose - Inhaled slon factor ** equivalent (MCI)- (rem /50 yr.mCl) (rem /50 yr) 1.30E-07 1.85E + 05 2.40E-02 6.49E-07 1.85E+05 1.20E-01 1.30E-06 1.85E+05 2.40E-01

• Breathing rate = 8.00E+ 03 m8/yr.

"lCRP Publication 30. Note: t.30tLO7 = 1.30x10 7 etc. Table 6.4(a) Onslu w centrations lat 300 m (328 yd)] of airborne. -I releases fr r various fractions of Cf.252 Maximum ONsite concentration Total permissible concentra. Fraction source activity _ Release Emission X/Q* tion (MPC). of MPC 1 (Ci/yr)- fraction (Cl) (s/m3) ( Ci/m!) (Ci/m3) (%)- 8.00E-02 1.00E-01 8.00E-03 2.80E-05 1.00E-12 7.10E 0.71 h ' 8.00E-02 - 5.00E-01 4.00E-02 2.80E-05 1.00E-12 3.55E-14 ~3.55 - 8.00E-02 1.00E + 00 8.00E-02 2.80E-05 1.00E. 7.10E-14 7.10 .i ' *xlO at 300 m. . Note: 8.00H-02 = 8.00x10 2 eie, F Table 6.5(a) Annualinhalation dose to the nearest individual 300 m (328 yd) away from postulated Cf.252 accident Committed eNective Activity

• Dose conver.

dose - Inhaled sion factor ** equivalent i (mci) (i,em/50 yr.mCl) ' (rem /50 yr) 1 5.68E-08 1.85E + 05 1.05E-02 i 2.84E-07 1.85E+05 5.26E-02 l 5.68E-07 1.85E+05 1.05E-01

• Dreathing rate = 8.00E+ 03 m*/yr.

"lCRP Publication 30. Note: 5.68F.08 = 5.68x10 ' etc. NUllEG-1396. 10 App:ndix B l l.

,_m ) 1 y APPTNDIX C DOSE RATE AND FLUENCE INFORMATION FOR EDS-3C e - Appendix C NUREO-1396 i-.. ..i i. .ii - iei .. i --a i. i. i imaii e rii-is em ai--rm ii i-m -i

l DOSE RATE MEASUREMENTS ON EDS 3 Dose rates for neutrons and gamma rays were measured using survey instruments for various positions and system conditions. Measurements were performed with and without the extra shielding on the sides of the system, both with the souros in the operating position and in the retracted position. Additional measurements were made with the source cask placed against the system with the source positioned at the interface to simulate a source stuck in mid trantfor at the worst case W%. The results of earlier measurements of radiation from the ends of the system are also given. METHOD OF DOSE RATE MEASUREMENT Neutron dose rates were measured using the Nuclear Research Corporation Model NP 2 Snoopy. Two instruments were used. The NP 2 uses a BF3 proportional counter inside a roughly 9'x9' cylindrical moderator / absorber to achieve a rem response. At a detector count rate of approximately two counts per second, a one mrom/hr dose rate reading is produced. Because most of the dose rates were at the extreme low end of the meter range, the meter readings were b*rd to read and subject to the statistical fluctuations of indtvidual neutrons. To alleviau this problem and achieve better precision, the readings were obtained by counting pulses from the NP 2 counter output in a counter gated by a timer. For all except the interface measurements, a counting time of 1000 seconds was used. The counter to dose rate calibration was obtained separately for each meter using reproducible positions at which the dose rates were high enough to provide reliable direct readings of the meter face. The statistical contribution to the counting error averaged about 10 20% at the one sigma level. The calibration error of the NP 2 is given as 15%. Gamma ray dose rates were obtained using a Bicron Corporation *raicro rem' meter, i calibrated by the manufacturer. Figure F 1 shows the positions used for the dose rate measurements, measured at mid cavity height. The position numbers refer to the following tables of dose rates. Neutron dose rates given are the conventional rem readings multiplied by a factor of two in anticipation of the ICRP recommended change being put into the regulations (ICRP Publication 45; also see Section 5 of this report). All the dose rates are normalized to the nominal maximum source strength cf 150 micrograms. The data are given to three places for more accurate rounding. Appendix C 1 NUREG-1396

3-5 D* 8 2 ) D D. 8 6 D C C 4 I C D [ C I 3 C g. C C C' 8 8 C ] A\\ A 8 f I t f A A I 8 \\ g B C C 8 8 R C C C I 16 C 12 D C C D 13 C 15 js 30 0 D' 11 17 D 14 Figure F-1. Positions for dose rate measurements NUREO-1396 2 Appendix C l'

MEASUREMENT RESULTS Tables F 1 and F 2 show resuhs with and without extra shielding with the source in the operating position. Tables F 3 and F-4 give the results with the source in the retracted position. Figure F 2 shows approximate isodose oor a;ts for the data of Table F-1, with extra shielding, source in operating pos} tion. For the transfer interface measurements, the cask was placed in contact with the system as for a sourr - a %r. The source was then retracted to the interfeos position, using the neutron r 038 rn Mter to find the maximum dose rate position. Measurements for this conditiot Mrs # sn in Table F 5 and associated isodose contours given in Figure F-3. When the EDS. In use for screening baggage, the doors will be pushed partially open by the bags to permit them to flow through. The opening is then obstructed by the bag which shields some of the neutrons and gamma rays, indMdual bags very greatly in their effectiveness as shielding, but they are on the average fairty good absort>ers. The neutron and gamma ray dose rates were measured with baggage flowing in a recycHng mode. The bags were filled with clothing Roms, though generally not as heavily packed as bags actually seen at airports; actual heavy bags would give lower dose rates. The bag flow rate was at or above the maximum rate that the system computer can handle,10 or more bags per minute. At this rate the doors are continuously being held partly open by the bags so that they never fully close, l.ower bag flow rates result in lowsr dose rates. Measurements were made on axis 100 cm from the entrance and exit ends of the EDS. The position of the body of an indMdual working as a baggage handler loading or unloading the EDS was also measured; this position is 75 cm (30') from the end of the EDS and 50 cm (20') off axis. These measurements were made at the mid height of the baggage passage. For comparison, measurements were also made at these same positions without baggage flow and with the doors closed. The results of these measurements are given in Table F-6. . Appendix C 3 NUREG-1396 i j

l l Table F-1. EDS-3 Dose Rates with Extra Shielding Sourse in operating Position [ Neutron Q F multiplier = 2 Normalized to 150 microgram source Dose Rates Dose Rates <--------mram/hr-------- <-- '----mrem /hr--------> l Position Gamma Neutron Total Position Gamma Neutron Total i 10 cm 50 ca (A) 1 0.043 0.030 0.073 (E) 2 0.056 0.024 0.040 5 0.025 0.030 0.055 3 0.173 0.166 0.339 14 0.025 0.027 0.052 4 0.037 0.034 0.071 5 0.037 0.036 0.073 100 ca: 6 0.025 0.045 0.070 (C) 7 0.142 0.105 0.247 1 0.025 0.023 0.048 8 0.031 0.023 0.053 2 0.031 0.027 0.058 9 0.031 0.018 0.049 3 0.043 0.042 0.085 10 0.037 0.018 0.056 4 0.031 0.036 0.066 11 0.037 0.014 0.051 5 0.025 0.033 0.058 1 12 0.161 0.127 0.288 6 0.025 0.025 0.050 13 0.031 0.036 0.067 7 0.037 0.030 0.067 14 0.037 0.030 0.067 8 0.025 0.019 0.044 15 0.037 0.034 0.071 9 0.019 0.024 0.042 16 0.204 0.155 0.359 10 0.019 0.015 0.034 17 0.043 0.020 0.064 11 0.025 0.017 0.042 18 0.043 0.022 0.005 12 0.056 0.033 0.089 13 0.025 0.020 0.045 30 cm 14 0.025 0.029 0.053 (B) 15 0.025 0.029 0.054 3 0.037 0.033 0.070 16 0.043 0.032 0.075 2 0.050 0.031 0.080 17 0.031 0.012 0.043 3 0.111 0.083 0.194 18 0.025 0.018 0.043 4 0.037 0.034 0.071 5 0.025 0.037 0.062 200 cm: 6 0.031 0.038 0.069 (D) 7 0.099 0.060' O.159 1 0.012 0.023 0.036 8 0.031 0.022 0.053 2 0.025 0.031 0.056 9 0.025 0.025 0.049 5 0.019 0.025 0.043 to 0.025 0.017 0.042 8 0.019 0.022 0.040 11 0.031 0.018 0.049 9 0.019 0.020 0.038 12 0.099 0.092 0.191 10 0.012 0.016 0.028 13 0.031 0.032 0.s63 11 0.019 0.016 0.034 14 0.037 0.022 0.059 14 0.019 0.013 0.032 15 0.037 0.039 0.076 17 0.025 0.012 0.036 16 0.130 0.127 0.257 18 0.019 0.009 0.027 17 0.043 0.016 0.060 18 0.037 0.014 0.051 NUREG-13% 4 Appendix C

e ? Table F-2. EDS-3 Dose Rates. NO Extra Shielding souYce in Operating Position Neutron Q F multiplier = 2 Normalized to 150 microgram source Dose Rates Dose Rates <--------mrem /hr--------> <--------area /hr--------> Position Gamma Neutron Total Position Gamma Neutron Total 10 cm 60 cm (A) 1 0.045 0.035 0.079 (E) 2 0.045 0.042 0.087 6 0.028 0.037 0.066 3 0.196 0.354 0.549 14 0.033 0.082 0.086 4 0.045 0.093 0.137 5 0.033 0.074 0.108 100 ca 6 0.033 0.062 0.086 (C) 7 0.161 0.239 0.400 1 0.024 0.033 0.068 8 0.033 0.035 0.068 2 0.033 0.087 0.090 9 0.033 0.032 0.066 3 0.053 0.061 0.114 10 0.033 0.033 0.067 4 0.033 0.074 0.108 11 0.033 0.030 0.063 5 0.022 0.026 0.048 12 0.161-0.368 0.529 6 0.028 0.030 0.088 13 0.036 0.137 0.173 7 0.045 0.068 0.113 14 0.045 0.073 0.118 8 0.028 0.022 0.050 15 0.046 0.111 0.156 9 0.022 0.041 0.063 16 0.167 0.33S 0.802 10 0.020 0.033 0.063 17 0.056 0.047 0.103 11 0.031 0.031 0.062 18 0.000 0.053 0.053 12 0.048 0.090 0 135 13 0.028 0.061 0.048 30 cm 14 0.028 0.051 0.079 (B) 15 0.033 0.062 0.095 1 0.033 0.019 0.052 16 0.056 0.073 0.129 2 0.045 0.037 0.082 17 0.033 0.059 0.093 3 0.139 0.184 0.324 18 0.000 0.045 0.045 4 0.045 0.067 0.111 5 0.033 0.042 0.075 200 ca: 6 0.033 0.037 0.071 (D) 7 0.111 0.116 0.228 1 0.017 0.017 0.034 8 0.036 0.041 0.076 2 0.022 0.028 0.051 9-0.028 0.036 0.064 5 0.017 0.017 0.034 10 0.028 0.033 0.061 8 0.022 0.020 0.042 11 0.390 0.059 0.449 9 0.013 0.041 0.054 12 0.127 0.210 0.333 10 0.013 0.036 0.049 13

0. 0 ?,6 0.083 0.119 11 0.022 0.030 0.052 14 0.045 0.047 0.092 14 0.020 0.027 0.047 15 0 045 0.072 0.116 17 0.022 0.038 0.061 16 0.167 0.210 0.377 18 0.000 0.048

-0.048 17 0.046 0.046 0.089 18 0.000 0.067 0.067 Appendix C 5 NUREG-13%

Table F-3. EDS-3 Dose Rates with Extra Shielding Source in Retracted Position = 2 Neutron Q F multiplier Normalized to 150 microgram source Dose Rates Dose Rates <--------arem/hr--------> <--------area /hr-------- Position Gamma Neutron Total Position Gamma Neutron Total to ca: 60 cm3 ( A') 1 0.041 (E) 2 0.042 6 0.009 0.052 0.061 3 0.003 0.027 0.031 14 0.130 0.396 0.627 4 0.028 6 0.004 0.036 0.040 100 ca: 6 0.061 (C) 7 0.046 1 0.052 8 0.054 2 0.066 9 0.062 3 0.037 10 0.033 0.136 0.170 4 0.066 11 0.042 0.E23 0.166 5 0.067 12 0.056 0.163 0.219 6 0.041 13 0.056 0.257 0.313 7 0.009 0.042 0.061 14 0.139 0.276 0.414 8 0.063 IS 0.069 0.240 0.309 9 0.000 0.061 0.068 16 0.056 0.164 0.219 10 0.080 0.122 0.173 17 0.042 0.193 0.235 11 0.072 0.193 0.266 18 0.028 0.148 0.175 12 0.122 0.250 0.373 13 0.100 0.246 0.386 30 cm: 14 0.111 0.301 0.412 (5) -15 0.100 0.282 0.382 1 0.038 16 0.117 0.273 0.390 2 0.047 17 0.075 0.195 0.270 3 0.007' O.031 0.038 18 0.047 0.107 0.154 4 0.042 6 0.008 0.051 0.059 200 cat 6 0.052 (D) 7 0.009 0.045 0.053 1 0.051 8 0.063 2 0.047 9 0.007 0.049 0.056 5 0.042 10 0.047 0.141 0.187 8 0.042 11 0.056 0.158 0.214 9 0.053 12 0.100 0.166 0.266 10 0.011 0.087 0.098 13 0.102 0.306 0.408 11 0.050 0.104 0.154 14 0.139 0.396 0.53S 14 0.061 0.172 0.234 15 0.104 0.294 0.397 17 0.060 0.134 0.184 16 0.102 0.208 0.311 18 0.036 0.068 0.104 17 0.072 0.180 0.263 18 0.046 0.146 0.190 NUREG-13% 6 Appendix C 1

Table F-4. EDS-3 Dose Rates, NO Extra Shielding Source in Retracted Position Neutron Q F aultiplier = 2 Normalized to 160 microgram source Dose Rates Dose Rates <--------ares /hr--------> <--------arem/hr-------- Position Gamma Neutron Total Position Camma Neutron Tota) 10 m 80 ca: -(A) 1 (E) 2 b 3 0.063 14 0.150 0.463 0.603 4 100 ca: 6 (C) 7 1 8 2 9 3 to 0.0$0-0.223 0.273 4 11 0.060 0.247 0.307 6 12 0.100 0.198 0.296 6 13 0.090 0.319 0.409 7 14 0.100 0.241 0.341 8 15 0.085 0.333 0.418 9 16 0.110 0.264 0.364 10 0.090 0.181 0.271 17 0.060 0.280 0.340 11 0.105 0.276 0.381 18 0.055 0.239 0.294 12 0.160 0.369 0.529 13 0.120 0.391 0.511 30 cm3 14 0.250 0.376 0.626 (B) 15 0.130 0.374 0.504 1 16 0.175 0.377 0.552 2 17 0.115 0.309 0.424 3 18 0.075 0.204 0.279 4 S 200 ca: 6 (D) 7 1 8 2 9 5 10 0.050 0.238 0.288 8 11 0.115 0.289 0.404 9 12 0.166 0.293 0.458 10 0.055 0.126 0.180 13 0.120 0.368 0.478 11 0.070 0.156 0.226 14 0.135 0.370 0.506 14 0.090 0.204 0.294 15 0.130 0.427 0.587 17 0.005 0.175 0.260 16 0.165 0.338 0.603 18 0.060 0.118 0.178 17 0.120 0.290 0.410 18 0.060 0.239 0.299 Appendix C 7 NUREG-13%

0.04 0.05 w \\ \\'N/ X /N X6 / ?/ \\w- / 0.04 Figure F-2. Isodose contours based on dose rate i NURilO-13% 8 Appendix C

Table F-8 Dose Rate Measurements for Source " Stuck" at Interface Position During Transfer (area /hr) Line # 10 cm 30 ca 100 cm 200 cm ~ 10 9.3 S.1 11.8 5.3 11 9.3 13.1 12.6 3.7 12 14.3 26.1 20.2 13 8.9 14 0.5 0.8 15 6.0 16 12.9 22.2 17.2 17 7.8 10.9 10.1 3.1 18 7.8 11.0 8.1 4.0 7 _e \\ 30 mesm/hr g 11 \\ / \\

i. -= =

= I' N.. _ _ y , _m-11 ,see em Figure F-3. Isodose contours for source " stuck" at interface of cask and E05-3 system. Appendix C 9 NUREO-13%

l l f-l Table F-5. CDS DOSE RATES FROM ENDS <<-- SCALED TO 150 ug -->> NEUTRON N DOSRAT GAMMA TOTAL FOSITION DOSRAT QF=2 DOSRAT DOSRAT 100 CM, entrance 0.095 0.206 0.097 0.303 Handler,.entr'nce 0.092 0.199 0.006 0.285 a 100 cm, exit 0.082 0.177 0.129 0.306 Handler, exit C.043 0.115 0.065 0.180 no baggage flow, doors ci,osed 100 cm, exit 0.012 0.027 0.043 0.070 Handler, exit 0.009 0.020 0.043 0.063 t ? ? i t l NUREG-13% 10 Appendix C

APPENDIX D NATIONAL INSTIRITE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY REPORT ON TNA SYSTEM ' Appendix D NUREG-1396

u o c '1' OUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INDUCED RADIOACTIVITY IN BAGGAGE _ Final Report Covering All Phases of interagency Agreement No. DTFA03 87 A-00004 Msech 31,1989 Prepared for Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center Atlantic City Airport, NJ 08405 Donald A. Becker Nuclear Methods Group Center for AnalyticalChemistry NationalInsthute of Standards and Technology Gathersburg,MD 20099 l I ~ Appendix D NUlGG-1396

~ __D ) QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INDUCED RADIOACTIVITYIN BAGGAGE INTRODUCTION This report is the Final Report of the Interagency Agrcemeu between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (Aviation Security Branch, ACT 360; Contract No. DTFA03 87 A-00008) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [formerly, National Bureau of Standards (NBS)). The title of this project is " Quantitative Assessment of Induced Radioactbityin Baggage".Theinteragency Agreement became eff ectke in April 1987, This report covers all work accomplished during the entire 2 year project. The overall approach used by NIST Involves the evaluation of Induced radioactkity in each element in the periodic table, ard consists of three phases. These phases are: 1) neutron actNation calculations; 2) neutron fluence charactertzelon; and 3) quantitative assessment of actualInduced radioactivities. The first phase, neutron utkation calculations, lovdves the crtical evaluation of actkation calculations for the prototype neutron actMtion systems, and the development of a complete set of expected Induced radioactMiles for all elements, including thermal, epithermal, and fast neutron actNations. These calculations are based on neutron fluence rates and energy spectra information provided by the FAA contractor developing the prototype systems. The second phase consists of a systematic characterization of the neutron fluence rates In the prototype baggage transporting systems. This includes a mapping of the thermal fluence rate over the baggage travel area. Further, the neutton energy spectrum characteristics wil be evaluated for tiw baggage Irradiation area. This latter Information should provide useful information on the actual epithermal and fast neutron - components, if any, but may be limited due to the relatkely low fluence rates expected. The third phtse of the project is the quantitative determination of actual induced radioactNity levels for a number of eternents, using one or both of the FAA prototype neutron actNation detection systems, as avalable. The data.from this phase provides a verification of the calculated Induced activities. The data from a.1 three phases WRI then provide a comprehensive understanding of the levels of induced radioactkilles to be expected from any element or combination of elements which passes through the thermal neutron actkation exploske detection system (EDS). Once fully understood, the data wil provide the means to systema'ically establish a verified maximum and expected Induced radioactivity level for any material. Appendix D 1 NUREG 13%

This project required 2 years for coinp:6;ei The first 6 months of work (FY87) included aH of phase one and part of phase two. The second year of work included the completion of phase two and aN of phase three, in addition, the FAA requested and obtained a stx month rocost extension to this project. This Final Report contains all of the information from the entire project IMuding all information previously reported to the FAA. 4 PHASE 1. NEUTRON ACTIVATION CALCULATIONS Neutron irradiation of the various elements to form radioactive products is well understood, and the physics is relatively straightforward. The equation to calc'Jiate these values is as fol;ows: 1 i Ao = ($mo + $,pi !) (1 - e-u) where: Ao = lnitial radioactivity, at zero decay time in units of Becquerels (disintegrations /second) [ m = mass of element in grams a = lsotopic abundanca of target isotope (1,00 = 100% abundance) i ns No - number of atoms / gram atomic weight (6.022 x io ) A = gram atomic weight of the element $th = thermal neutron fluence rate (n Cm ,,c 1) 2 = thermal neutron cross section in bams (10 24 cm ) a o d 4 9.pl - epithermal neutron fluence rate (n cm sec ) 44 i 1 = resonance Integralin bams (10 cm') d A- = decayconstant(see ) = i t = Irradiationtime(sec) ? Thus, the factor * ** * " calculates the number of atoms of the element being Irradiated; (1 e.u) the saturation factor which is a characteristic of the halfIlfe of the activation product; $mo calculates the reaction two per atom for thermal neutrons; and $ept I calculates the reaction rate per atom for epithermal neutrons (Note: For this work the ' thermal" neutron fluence and cross sections are defined as the 2200 m/s fluence and cross sections, Further, caution must be used in calculating the epithermal reaction ra'e per atom because the resonance ;ntegral I is higNy dependent on the irradiation facNlty used.) - The above calculation holds for the normal case of a single activation product. In some cases there are l multiple activation products, and more complicated calculations are required. WhNe multiple activation l NUREO-1396 2 Appendh D

products wRl not be diammad in detal here, they have been taken into consideration where appropriate for t5e calculated actMty values contained in this report. Netaron Enarales: Thermal Epkharmal. Fast Nuclear reactors fueled by uranium 235 are tha moet common source of neutrons ior irradiation. Their neuttoa energy spectrum consists of three girpw,Wr ; thermal neutrons; epithermal neuttons; and fission spectrum (or fast) neutrons. A typical neutron spectrum plot is shown in Figure 1, wkh the three components clearly shown. The fission spectrum neutrons (or test flux) are those obtained from the fission process, kself, wkh little or no moderation or thermalization. As these last neutrons are moderated or slowed down, they contribute the second componert to the spectrum, the opkhermal flux. Finally,when the noterons have been totaHy thermalized, they have only the normal thermal energy or MaxweHlan distribution (thermal neutrons). Different irradiation envi onments or conditions wil resuk in different ratios of the three components, as can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the neutron energy spectrum for the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR), pneumatic tube Irradiation poskion RT 4. It is clear that this position is highly thermalized, wkh very little contribution from fast Aux. WhRe most of the information and cross sections rvalable in the literature have been determined for uranium-235 fission neutrons, the neutron energy spectrum forasaCf fission neutrons is virtually identically to ass, and thus data from uranium fission neutrotw can be correctly appibd to caillomium neutrons u that from and vloe versa. In fact, a rooert publication, Compendium of Benchmark Neutron Fleids for Reactor Dosimetry ag2 ass [1], contains substantial information gained from Cf measuren' ants which is used for u reactor as2 dosimetry. A comparison between the unmoderated fission spectrum from Ciandtheunmoderatedfission spectrum from Unas is taken from this publication and shown as Figure 3, and demonstrates the slmlarity between these two fission spe:tra. It should also be obvious that since the neutron energy loss and thermalization processes for the two types of fission spectra are the same, the thermal and spithermal portions ofthe Cf neutron energy spectrum under consideration here wRl be essentially identical to the 23sU data as2 in the literature. D-D Neutron Generator as a Neutron Source The deuterium <leuterium (D D) neutron generator is a smaN charged particle accelerator, which accelerates charged deuterium atoms to an energy of 150-200 kV and directs them into a deuterium target. The D-D generator is a variation of the better known deuterium-trklum (D T) neutron generator which produces fast neutrons with an average energy of approximately 14 MeV which are used for a variety of purposes. The D D generator utlizes the nuclear reaction: 2H+2H -+ 8He + 'n + 3.266 MeV Appendix D 3 NUIEG-1396

wkh art average neutron energy output of approximately 2.5 MeV in the frortal direction [5). However, this energy is somewhat variable depending on the neutron direction. For example, at zero degrees from frontal, a 200 kV D.D generator emits neutrons of 3.05 MeV, compared to an energy of 2.10 MeV at 150' from frontal [5). These neutrons are moderated and thermalized in slmlar ways to the fission spectrum neutrons discussed above with the advantage that no high energy neutrons above ~ 3.5 MeV are produced. Thus, in the higNy thermalizing environment tad by the contractor in the exploske detection system (EDS), the neutron energy spectrum experienced by the baggage should not be greatly different from that expected from the " Cf system. If k is significantly different, the neutron energy rneasurements which are described below should document any such differences. ) l Neutron Energy Measurements Measurements of neutron energies (i.e., thermal, opkhermal, fast) with foi techniques are made wkh several conventions which, while not strictly accurate for all cases, are suff',clently accurate so that exceptions may be neglected. The first convention is that all (n gamma) nuclear reactions which are due to neutron energies below 0.6 eV (the energy below which 1 mm of Od absorbs virtually all neutrons; the cadmium cutoft') are called thermal neutron reactions, and are defined using $th and c. (Note *. An assumption is made here that i the thermalization process occurs at roughly room temperature (20 *C,293 'K) and the neutrons thus have j a velocky of approximately 2200 nVs). The second convention is that all (n, gamma) nuclear reactions which ( occur due to neutrons which are not absorbed by 1 mm of Cd are called epkhermal neutron reactions, and l are defined using $ pl and the resonance integral cross section t. (Note: As mentioned previously, caution l l must be used when selecting the appropriate resonance Integral to match as closely as possible the irradiation { l. environments.) The fast neutrons are characterized by fast neutron reactions such as (n, p), (n, alpha), and i (n 2n). These fast neutron reactions have threshold energlos for their production and Individual measured l or calculated cross sections, i These above conventions are used throughout the nuclear scientific communhy, and will help to understand 1 the calculations used in Phase 1 of this project as well as the measurement tecnniques used in Phases 2 and 3. Calculated ActMtles Calculated radioactivkles from one pass in a theoretical neutron Interrogation system are shown in Table 1. f These values are based on a number of assumptions including the neutron fluence rate, the neutron energy spectrum, the effective irr Wlon time, and on the literature values for nuclear constants. Each of these assumptions is discussed below. A second table (Table 2) lists the 35 nuclear reactions which produce the highest activity levels for one or more of the decay conditions shown. This table will also be discussed more fully below. NURt!G-1396 4 Appendix D .n- +.. - -. e

7 l4 The general assumptions used in Table 1 are as folkms: Thermalneutron fluence rate = 1 x 10' n + cm sec'i 4 4 4 d Epithermal neutron fluence rate = 2 x 10 n

• cm see 5

4 4 Fast neutron fluence rate = 1 x 10 n + cm sec Effectiveirradiation tirne - 1second The thermal neutron fluence rate and effective Irradiatioa time were chosen to provide a total neutron dose close to, but slightly higher than, the neutron dose information provided by the FAA contractor (SAIC). The as2 best estimate of the contractor for the existing Cf system (with two opposed 143 pg sources) was a total 8 8 average fluence of ~5 x 10 neutrons /cm per pass. Thus, the 1 x 10' thermal neutrons for a one second Irradiation used in calculations for the theoretical interrogation system as shown in Table 1 should always produce a calculated actMy which is somewhat higher than expected in the actual system (s). The nuclear constants used in these calculations were generally those contained in Erdtmann's bleutron Activation Tables [2] All activation products with halflNes greater than 0.1 second were considered. Initial actM60s shown in Table 1 were obtained from this comptation, Wh modifications for the fluence rates given above, in addition, two computer programs were written in the BASIC language on a CP/M microcomputer to calculate initial actMist and decayed activities from the basic nuclear constants. Using these computer programs, checks were made of the calcu',ated actkilles found in Reference 2, and with a few 6xceptims (most of which were typographical errors in the book) the data agreed very well, it should also be noted that tNse calculations assume zero neutron self shleiding effects. *.)lch is the appropriate

• worst case" assumption. Elements with high neutton cross sections and/or reno 2noe Integrals (e.g., greater than ~ 10 bams) begin to see an effect called neutron self-shleiding,where the Interior of a thick sample"wes" fewer neutrons than the exterior of the sample, due to neutron absorption by the exterior. Thus, one gram of gold in a sphericai shape would activate much less than, say, one gram of gold as a thin gold plating on the surface of many articles scattered throughout a container. This offect would reduce the expected actMies of many of the activation products listed in Table 1, but is an uncontrollable variable. As a consequence, the zero neutron self shielding assumption is used, in Table 1, only reactions which produced initial activities greater than 0.001 Booquerellgram of element (disintegration /sec/g) are shown. This level was chosen in order to prevent the table from becoming totally useless due to excessNe size, yet contain all actMies that are significant. The basis for choosing the value of 0.001 Becquerel /g, was the levels of naturally occurring radioactMy found in food. For example, *0Kis a nt ally occurring radioactive isotope which is contained in essentially all food that we eat. It has an abundance of 0.0117%, a halfIlfe of 1.25 x 10' years, and a high energy gamma-ray line as well. Since K 40 Appendix D 5

NUREG-13%

H has a apoolRc actNity of $38 plooourteelgram of potassium, and, for example, peanuts contain 0.674% potassium l3), one gram of peanuts has 5.85 pCl of *0K or 0.20g Becquerols (dps), it seems reasonable to consider an amount of induoed radionotMy equal to 1/100 that containeci naturally in a single pannut to be 8 negligible. [It should also be noted that the naturaRy occurring radionuclides "C and H add a further 60% 100% of done to that due to the *0K disintegrations in foods.) The data inTable 1 does not contain Information on the type of emissions from the various activation products, g because of the verlod potential use of this information. Thus, a nucleat reaction which has a relatkely high I actWy level but no gamma ray emission may be signifloant for some considerations (e.g., ingestion of food) I but not others (e.g., baggage handling). Information on the particle and gamma-ray emission abundances and energies of the various radioisotopes are readly available and can be factored in when this information is required for health physics purposes l Table 2 contains a listing of the thirty-five actNation products from Table 1 whose actMy exceeded one of i these ortteria: > 100 Beoquerel/g at zero decay; > 10 Becquerel /g at 1.0 minute decay; > 1 Becquerel /g at 1.0 hour decay. These times were selected to Ilustrate: at zero decay, the maximum actMy produced; at one minute decay, an actWy level which may be relevant for baggage handlers; and at one hour decay, most likely the earfleet time at which an airline passenger couki receNo their baggage after completion of a flight-It can be soon from Table 2 that in only three cases, for indium, europium and dysprosium (three relatively rare elements), would the radioactfvity Induced in a gram of the pure element after 1 hour decay exceed the i amount of natural redloactNity in a 2 ounce bag of peanuts. It should also be noted that all of the actkities i shown in Table 2 were calculated by computer and the results agreed well with the data in Reference 2. \\ PHASE 2. EVAltJATION OF NEUTRON FLUENCE RATES AND ENERGIES IN THE BAGGAGE IRRADIATION SYSTEMS i The second phase conslots of a systematic characterization of the actual neutron fluence rates experienced by baggage passing through the two experimental thermal neutron explos}ve detection systems (EDS). There were a total of four irradiations in the EDS systems to measure the neutron fluences and energies seen by as2 fois passing through the systems. Two irradiations used the Cf EDS, and two irradiations used the douterium deuterium (D D) neutron generator EDS system. All irradiations and the results obtained are discussed in detal below, after a brief description of the techniques used for tnese determinations. .NUREO-13% 6 Appendix D

l Nataron Measuremarts Using Foi Techniouma The measurement of a neutron field using the 900 actiwakion technique is both reistively almple and fality accurate. The various elements which may be used as indicator lots undergo nuclear reactions sooording to the previously described equation when passed through an EDS system or cther neutron field, and they are then counted on a calibrated radioactMty detector in order to ecourately determine the induced number of disintegrations per unit time. The equation used earlier in this report for the actkation calculations can be rearranged as folicms: C*A meseNo+o(14 9 eG where: 9 = neutron fluence rate (n.cm#sec) (for the neutron energy range of interest) C = net' detector counts per second of the gamma-ray of interoet corrected for decay, 4 deadtime and pulse pleup (sec ) ' A = gram atomicwelght of the element m = mass of elemort in grams a = lsotopic abundance of target isotope (1.00 = 100% abundanos) ns No = numberof atoms / gram atomicweight(6.022x1o ) - neutron cross section in bams (10*cm') (for the neutron energy range of interest) o d A

decay constant (see )

t = trradiationtime(sec) t = detector efficiency for the gamma ray of Interest and the counting geometry used to obteln C G = gamma-ray abundance (number of emitted y rays at the energy of interest per i disintegration) The above equation can be used with the 2200 m/s (thermal) neutron cross section (om) and the actMty found in a bare foR after subtraction of the actMty determined in a cadmium covered tol [C = (Ctwo Cod)) to L establish the thermal neutron fluence rate in a system. The same equation can be used with the resonance integral (1) and the actMty found in a cadmium covered fol (Cod) to estimate the epithermal neutron fluence rate in a system. However, it should be noted that the epithermal neutron cross sections vary considerably q for different elements, and most elements have high resonance absorption peaks in their activation spectrum. Therefore, the uncertainties associated with the epithermal fluence values are correspondingly greater. For fast neutrons, the same equation is used but an entirely different nuclear reaction is used, with a neutron l Appendix D 7 NUREG-13%

energy threshold and specif6c remotion cross section. These calculations are used below to measure neutron Auence rates in the two EDS systems. ~ The use of multiple fois as was done for the irradiations described later allows an inference of both the thermal and epithermal fluences, based on the following derivation: i Since ($ o)iew - ($in oih + $ epi () i then , g { $th oih + 4.pll y ) $th = tih [ oih + l1 Therefore, if, as in NBSR RT 4, the $.pl = 0.02 (in is known, then for a well characterized facility like RT 4 the opithermal contribution can be estimated by $ o = tin [oth + 0.021), and the thermal fluence can be estimated using a bare fol, oy use of the oi = oih + 0.02 i relationship [ot = total (thermal + epithermal) cross section, in bams), Thus, the epitharmal fluence fraction, $ pt/hth, oan be roughly estimated by irradiating several elemental fois with differing r asonance Integral cross sections I, and solving the calculations for various op! thermal fractions unti the therrnal fluence values agree. This was done for the first two irradiations described below, and reasonable values for the epithermal fraction were obtahed. In the second two irradiations, actual cadmium covered fot Irradiations were made using gold fois and the gold-cadmium ratio determined for both the D-D and d'Cf s) stems, as weX as for several of the NIST nuclear reactor Irradiation positions. lrradiation vii Califomium - 252 Svatem est The firs' foi irradiation in an EDS for this protect took place on July 6,1987, using the Cf EDS system as ) set up for testing at the San Franc!sco airport. A package of three foils, including one each of gold, tungsten and coppe f, were irradiated by SAIC. The foils were positioned inside a piece of luggage and passed 10 times through the EDS. The ten passes were completed at 22:50 EDT on July 6,1987, and that time was taken as J the effecthe To Thus all foi actMtles were decay corrected to that time, i Unfortunatety, transfer of the irradiated fois to NIST by SAIC ran afoul of an alt flight which was cancelled en l route, and so we were not able to obtain the foils unti ~ 40 hours after the end of irradiation. Two of the fois, i . gold and tungsten, could still be counted. The copper 64 actMty, with a 12.7 hour half 4tfe, was not able to l - NURI!O-1396 8 Appendix D l V

t be used. The loss of the copper actkiry is particula iy unfortunate because tte small resonance integral Ior the copper provides a good measure of the thermal reutron fluence wkhout significant actkation by epithermal neuttons. Results obtained from this first Irradiation are gNen in Table 3. As can be seen from this table, the Gold and tungsten foi data agree reasonably well, and provide an estimate of the total neutron fluence for the 252Cf system of ~ 7 x 10 n + cm.2per pass (a20% relative). Evaluation of the apparent epithermal fractbi provided 5 an estimate of 6% ephhermal neutrons. This I apparern epithermal fraction has a higher Ltne attainty than does the second irradiation, because no copper data was avalable to confirm the true thermal neutron fluence value. Note also that the fluence rate given above is for the date of irradiation only, July 6,1987, due to the decayof es2Cl whh a 2.64 year halsife. (Note: The actual fluence values shown in Tables 2 and 3 have been recalculated using the gold cadmlum ratio data obtained from irradiations 3 and 4. This data now provides an improved evaluation of the epithermal neutron coritribution, and this WHI be discussed more completely under the Neutron Energy Measurements section in this report.) kradiation #2 D-D Neutron Generator Svetem The second foi irradiation took place in the prototype D-D neutron Generator EDS system. The foi samples were irradiated between 15:56 and 19:39 (EDT) on September 21,1987, by passing them through the EDS system a total 100 times by the FAA contractor, SAIC. A total of fNe different fols were used, the copper, gold and tungsten used previously plus folls of nickel and titanium in an attempt to measure the fast neution fluence. According to P. Ryge of SAIC, the five foils were kept in the original maling envelope, placed inside a suitcase near the top, with the remainder of the suitcase filled with"norrnal" travel ltems. This sukcase was then passed through the system 100 times over the approximately 4 hour period. The series of passes were expected to be representatNe of typical neutron exposure in an EDS system. Since the Irradiation process took such a long time (approximately 4 hours) an " average

• end-of-irradiation time of 18:00 on September 21,1987 was used for the calculations. In order to evaluate what effect on the

. results this long Irradiation period might have, a calculation was also made for the hypothetical situation of a continuous irradiation of 4 hours duration. The results of this calculation for copper 64 (the worst case) show only a small effect of about 10% (for copper;less for tungsten and gold), and this data is included with all data from this second irradiation. This small effect was considered to be within the measurement uncertainty, and thus all other calculations assume the single Irradiation at 18:00 hours. Appendix ;D 9 NUREG-1396

The results from this sooond irradiation are gWen in Table 4. A transfer time to NIST of approximately 16 hours for the lots permitted measurement d the coppor44 radioactMy, and this promded a better estimate of both the neutron fluenoe/ pass and the opkhermal fraction. An estimate d the total neutron tuence for this D-D neutron generator system is about 3 x 10 n + cm* per pass (e20% relative). Evaluation of the epithermal s traction provides a very approximate value d 6% opithermal routrons. Measurement of the radioactMy in the last neutron fois (nickel and thanium) for irradiation #2 provided no detectable radioactMy above background from feet neutron edivation. This la very likely due to the very low fast neutron compoi,in in the D-D EDS system. An additional attempt to measure the inet neutron component was carried out in the third irradiation, and is desertbed in that section. I Irr=tlation #3 D-D Neutron Generatar Svatam The third EDS Irradietlon took place again in the prototype D-D neutron generator system which was at that time located at the Los Angeles Intemational Airport. The foi samples were ftwed to a cardboard holder in a sealed package, which was then placed unopened in a ' packed" = arena and irradiated for 100 passes 1 through the system by SAIC. The irradiations took place between 6:00 and 8:00 pm (EST) on Monday, December 7,1987. A total of four different fois were in the package (Au, Ni, Cu, W) plus a cadmium covered gold fol. According to P. Ryge d SAIC, the package was handled in a way to be

• representative d normal f

i exposure to the beggage transfer EDS systems? L Based on the data developed for irradiation #2 and described there, the end of irradiation time (Tzero) used 4 was P 00 pm EST, December 7,1987, f The rer.ults from this third Irradiation are given in Table 5. Again the transfer time for the fois package to NIST was about 16 hours, providing good counting data for the gold, copper and tungsten tols. The measured total neutron fluence per pass was approximately 2.2 x 10 rrem, with an uncertainty of approximately 20% j 8 8 L (relative). Agaln, there was no measurable radioactMy above background for the nickel fol, due no doubt to the very small fatit neutron component in the EDS systems. A calculation of the minimum radioactivity detectable in 8 the counting system used gave a value of < 2x10 fast neutrons / pass, which is less than 1% fast neutrons. A gold.cadmlum ratio was measured in this irradiation, and these results wil be discussed below under the section entitled Neutron Energy Measurements. t NURl!G-1396 10 Appendix D --.--a - m

Irradiation #4. Caillamium-252 Svstam The fourth and final EDS trradiation of this project took place between 08:47 and 11:25 on March 29,1988. The aample materials had been sont to P. Rygge of SAIC ftxed ln posklon inside of a large corrugated cardboard container. This container is shown schematloally in Figure 4, and was the largest possible container stil able to th through the EDS system. N The system used for this fourth irradiation was the Cf system, which was set up and workl.g at the San Francisco airport. The box was passed unopened through the system 100 times. A transfer time of approximately 28 hours delNered k to NIST st approximately 16:00 hours, March 30,1988. The box contained a total of eight bare gold foils distributed as shown in Figure 4, a ninth gold fol encapsulated in cadmlum (0.1 cm thick) for the cadmlum ratio measurement, a copper foll, and a set of three small pure bismuth pellets. The large number of gold foils in this irradiation were used to measure the neutron fluence variation throughout the Irradiation volume. Positions were selected to represent the extreme locations possible in the EDS systems. The results from itradiation #4 are given in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 provides the measured neukon fluence per pass for both copper and gold, and agreement between the two is very good. There is also good agreement with the gold and tungsten fluence values in Table 3, made using only ten passes in the *Cf system in the first EDS Irradiation. Inhlally, it was puzzling that there did not seem to be an appropriate reduction in the last *Cf irradiation to account for decay of the sources, but upon calculation, the amount of decay expected is only about 17%, which could effectively be masked due to the large variation of relative fluences in the irradiation container due to position as discussed below (almost 50%). Table 7 gives the results from the measurement of neutron fluence vs. position in the irradiation container. From this data, h is apparent that the neutron fluence is about 30% higher in the vertical center portion of the Irradiatkm cavhy (Figure 4, A-3 to A 5) compared to the vertical sides of the cavity (Figure 4, A 1 to A 2, and A 4 to A-6). The top-to-bottom fluence variation is much smaller, particulariy at the edges. It should also be noted that this box was filled whh several full boxes of paper towels and some addhional crumpled paper towels, to add stability and weight for the handling and Irradiation processes. The effective density and composition was estimated to be a little less dense than usual baggage, but not appreciably different from the contents of a suitcase primarily packed with clothing. Neutron Enerov Measurements Neutron energy characterization was made of the EDS systems t y using gold cadmium ratio measurements for estimating the epithermal neutron fluences and with several att6mpts at measuring fast neutrons thrcagh I I Appendix D 11 NUREG-1396

l use d threshold fois. These two methods are d6scussed separately below. The cadmium ratio of any element is defined as the ratio of the radioactMty induced in a bare lot of the element to the radioactMty induced in a almtar foi d the same elemert which is located in exactly the same positions, except completely encased with Interlocking covers of 1 mm thick cadmlum metal. Thus, for gold the cadmium ratio Au(Cd) is defined as: Au(Cd) = A9 (Cd) i where: At(bare) = saturated actMty at zero decay for the bare 108, and At(cd) = saturated actMty at zero decay for the cadmlum covered foR. Gold cadmium ratio measurements were made in irradiations 3 and 4. This Information plus slmlar i measurements for three irradiation positions in the NIST nuclear research reactor (fueled by23sU) are shown in Table 8. It should be emphasized that whRe gold cadmium ratio and fluence measurements are by far the most commonly used foR measurements in the nuclear field, and the high sensitMty made gold an obvious choice for this EDS study, such measurements are higNy dependent upon specific fois used due to neutron l self shielding effects and the very high resonance cross sections for gold 197 (the mono-nucIldic stable as2 lootope of gold), in this study, the gold cadmium ratio for the Cf EDS was very similar to tte NBSR RT 3 irradiation factity, and thus the r - Jeted fluence measurements could ts compared directly to the known L fluence values for this NBSR facIlty. What was somewhat surprising was that the neutron energy spectrum 1 for the D D EDS was substantially " harder" (i.e., had more energetic neutrons and a lower Au(Cd) ratio) than that from the Cf EDS, When corrected for neutron self-shielding in the gold fois [8), the D-D system as2 l measurement indicated that 48% of the neutrons had erorgies above about 0.5 ev (the cadmlum cut off energy), versus 29% epicadmium neutrons for the Cf EDS. (Note: The NBSR RT 3 Irradiation faclity had 888 26% epicadmium neutrons.) in addition to the epithermal (i.e., epicadmium) measurements made with cadmium ratios, measurements were attempted using fast neutron threshold fois of titanium and/or nickelin irradiations number 2 and 3. All such attempts gave results in which the fast neutron product,,f present, could not be detected above the background radioactMty, even with very long counts. This was not a surprise since the actual number of fasj neutrons above about 2 MeV (the threshold for these fast neutron reactions) was expected to be very small. The data obtained from the best count (from a nickel fol) was used to calculate a "less than" value, which h showed that there was < 2x10 fast neutrons /cm / pass (above the 2.2 MeV threshold for this specific nuclear 8 8 reaction). Anactualmeasurementof thessCoradioactMtyfromthessNi(n.p)58Conuclear reactiononanickel C NUREG-1396 12 Appendix D i

s 4 follrradiated in the NBSR RT 3 faculty, when normallzod to the 2.2x10 necm expected for a single pass in the D-D EDS, gave a value d 0.001 count /3 hours counting time. Even with 100 passes through the system, the expected 0.1 count /3 hours would be totally lost in the background d the lowest background counting system avanable. Thus, direct fast neutron measurements using threshold foRs are just not possible for either EDS system unless the entire counting system is brought to the EDS system so short lived radioactMies could be attempted, and possibly could not be measured even then due to absolute sensitMy limitations. PHASE 3. QUANTITATlW DETt'RM! NATION OF INDUCED RADIO. CTIVITY LEVELS A in order to verify the calculated actMy values reported in Phase 1 of this study, actual measured actMylevels were determined in elements exposed to the appropriate neutron fluences. This was accomp!!shed using two different methods as described below. 252 Method 1 entalled the counting ol lnduced radlorictMy in pure element fous actually passed through the Cf EDS and the D D EDS. There are very few elements with both the sensitMy and the appropriate halfille to allow such measurements without actually moving an entire germanium detector and counting system to the airport location where the EDS was located. Three elements (copper, tungsten and gold) were used to develop this data, and the results are found in Table g (2s201 EDS) and Table 10 (D-D EDS). In addition, Method 2 was employed. This method utilzed the NIST nuclear reactor (NBSR) RT-3 Irradiation U faculty, shown in Table 8 to have neutron fluence characteristics very simRar to the Cf EDS exceptthat the 8 neutron fluence is about 1.3x10 times higher. A sample of well characterized material (NIST Standard Reference Maternal 1633, Coat Fly Ash), which has a large number of known elemental concentrations was s irradiated in RT 3, counted, and the actual induced radioactMles measured were corrected to the 8x10 4 252 nacm fluence expected for one pass through the Cf EDS. These results are found in Table 11 for 13 additional elements. In all cases the actual measured actMty levels found corresponded closely to the expected actMty levels as found in Table 1 and shown again in Tables g through 11. In addition to the above, one case merited special consideration. In Table 1, for the element bismuth (Z = 83), a special case is noted in a footrv2ts. This concerns the potential problem of the bismuth 210 activation product decaying to polonium-210, which is an alpha emitter. This would most probably be ignored except that a common over-the-counter med'icine contains large quantitles of bismuth. Since alpha particles are easily stopped by something as thln as a sheet paper, they are usually only of concem when they may be inhled (as radon) or Ingested through Iood or med' cation. Appendix D 13 NUREG-13% l

i l l. It was therefore thought useful to consider the effect of neutron exposure in an EDS to the produdion of l polonium-210 from bismuth. This was done in two ways: first, a detaled calculation was made following the production of bismuth-210, beta decay to polonium-210, and the alpha decay of polonium-210. Second, several pellets of pure bismuth were irradiated in irradiatio. d4, with 100 passes through the "Cf EDS. This blemuth was then dissolved and the bismutWpolonium precipitated out, recovered, and counted in an alpha detection system. The results of the above bismuth evaluations indicated that the amount of polonium 210 produced in these EDS systems is minimal. Calculation showed that 100 grams of bismuth passed through a neutron fluence s 4 of 1x10 necm would produce a maximum of 0.0004 decays of polonium 210 per second (d/s). Measurement of Ihe radiochemically prepared bismuth / polonium sample (bismuth weight = 150.6 mg) which j had been passed 100 times through the "Cf EDS gave no alpha counts detected for a 100 minute count, l confirming the calculation of minimal production of polonium 210. j QONCLUSION Although the initial FAA project was for the evaluation and characterization of only the "Cf EDS, soon afterwards it became apparent that for a substantial portion of the project period only the D-D system was 1 available for Irradiations. This, coupled with the expressed interest of FAA in the characteristics of both system, fostered the expansion of the project (with no additional funding) to both the "Cf and D D systems as described below. 'l All thra phases of this project as described in the introduction have been completed. In Phase 1, calculations were made for the neutron irradiation of all elements under conditions almilar to that iound in the EDS systems, j and these data are found in Tables 1 and 2. In Phase 2, the neutron fluence rates, neutron distributions, and 1 l ' neutron energy characteristics of both of the EDS systems were systematically evaluated and data recorded J l In Tables 3 through 8. In Phase 3, quantitatNo measurements of induced radioactivity in 16 elements were made and good agreement with the calculated activities from Table 1 tound. These data are found in Tables j l 9 through 11, l The combined information found in th9 report provides a comprehenske understanding of the neutron ) Irradiation characteristics of these two EDS systems, and provides as well the information necessary to ] quantitatNely evaluate the Induced level of radioactivity which would be produced in any specified material passing through a thermal neutron EDS system. NUIEG-1396 14 Atipendix D

PLEFERENCES 1. J. A. Grundi and C. M. Eisenhauer. Comoandium d Benchmark Nataron Fields for Reactor Dosimetry. NBSIR 854151, U. S. Dept. d Commeroe, Washington D. C. (1986). 2. G. Erdtmann, Neutron Actkation Tables. Verlag-Chemie Publishing Co., NYC (1976). 3. C. T Young. Nuts, in Kirk-Othmar Conclas Encyclooedia d Chemical Technoloav. Mey-interscience Publishing Co., NYC (1985), p. 807. 4. W. N. McElroy, et. al., HEDL Progress Report (October,1971). 5. S. S. Ncrgdwalla and E. P. Przybylowicz, ActWation Analvals with Neutron Generators. John Wiey & Sons, NYC (1975). 6. . STM Annual Bock of Standards, Volume 12.02, Method E262 86,' Standard Method for Determining Thermal Neutron Reaction and Fluence Rates by Radioactivation Techniques," ASTM, Philadelphia, PA (1987). 7. D.A. Becker and P.D. LaFleur,"Chara::terization d a Nuclear Reactor ior Neutron Activation Analyses," J. Radionnat. Chem.19,149-157 (1974). 8. N.P. Baumann,' Resonance Integrals and Self-Shielding Factors for Detector Fols,' Report No. DP 817, Savannah River Laboratory (1963). Appendix D 15 NUR110-1396 ...-.h

lF i .j s'

g.,a

?. i .., r . i ; #.I', i 1, Q:, ..i :: o i l i.L 10' g y-s t j.. f l's 3 3, t 4 1-I s l Mswethon g Epthe, mot five five g n I ~ ~ 4. s 10" - 'l .,1 ,k V

E 10

~ y u ,9 A 's h lession flun s i t s p / \\ i 30 ' 's. 5 l 'g i e i e i i e i e i i i 4 4-tod to 10 10' 10' - 8 10 10 u.viron.n.,n i.vi i s. Figure 1. Typical fJeutron Spectrum from a U* Nuclear Reactor. ,= l F . e. .NUREG-13% 16 Appendix D i 1.

W, 7 i ,,, 10 MElii;TERRIIEEMiiMEHinlEBlii?BBI;;;"hase omend MBgi3Ea t

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==~ mayigI!; i gan,-- maiss M ]5ik khid'f55iQjg nw =r g 2.g.n g. 80n E{i]i. BEUF : Rho ' I emat. mm MElb. sumum i. tq!E!!' immi i u igang y 10" [EEE REEM"IU5I5h ? "~' Fhkh, ElidfEkki ""~ EEiin!!ME Elo" [ r ammu t np mayo samt4 "_N!N- ? ~ma hLa hll' mahl WRill EUE . Eiil' E5Ei cr EEEE EE55 55-NRi ((E i y 'O, Bau. mah =^ - _ igliL iMEIF-I -EL.; p@ g

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tr_ c.- = ,~ q;j BBil!H enh maa.. WEE ' " n =""'g n m E 10, WRI!V . BHi E

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10 gliBii;lRaunE.J _M E__b:g!!D ia d, 3r___ i Heli sa MEUa1 ~~ ,_,j V 30, 4 sur.~. c,_ u%:.::, io-io io s . io ' io-7 io-6 io" 5o-4 to 3 io a io i ioo ,,,,m, ,,,,,,m ,a m,P io N(VIRON [NtRGY (MeV) Figure 2. NIST Reactor RT 4 Positivi. Sand 115* lteration Differential Flux Solution (4 Appendix D 17 NUREG-1396 ii-

0.3 E U 235 Sssion E Of 252Sssion ,E a D 0.2 i g $al! e lii 0.1 4 cd O.0

• 1 2

3 4 5 6 7 Neutron Energy Group Course Seven Group Display of the Unmoderated Fission Neutron Spectra of Ur Figure 3.

1) 0-0.25 MeV; 2) 0.25 0.8 MeV; 3) 0.81.5 MeV; Calltornium-252 [1]. (Note: EnergyGroups are:

4) 1.5-2.3 WV; 5) 2.3-3.7 MeV; 6) 3.7-8 MeV; and 7) 8-12MeV).

Apper. dix D 18 NURl!G-1396

.n Top

t. t; I

I'- I I A-l ' A-3 A-4 Left Right Side Side - 't A-7 Cu I I:. -A-8 A-2 A-5 A-6 i i i i i i Bottom Figure 4. Front View of Container for Irradiation No. 4, Fluence Mapping [ Dimensions: 0.406 m (16 in). high; 0.000 m (26 in) wide; approximately 0.762 m (30 in) long). (See Table 7 for fluence values). . Appendix D. 19 NURIIG-13% -

- -. -...~.- p e {J- (f:: I3 10 U N MODERATED FISSION SPECT RUM m 12 10 Y T -Iv' z-v X l033 = 3 x i z. -Q RT-3 10 0 3 1 =. .wz t x X L .10' l RT-4 1 1 1 i 1 e 1 a, a a a a s l-2 3 4 5 .6 7 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 NEUTRON ENERGY (MEY) 1 f Figure 5. Integral Neutron Fluence Rate for the RT 3 and RT4 Irradiation Positions in the NIST Nuclear L Reactor [ Note: Unmoderated Fission Spectrum is that of Uranium-235 (Refemce 7)]. , NUREG-1396 20 Appendix D

Tableil. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay -1 -Hydrogen none' 2 Helium none 3 1.ithium-6 n,a Hydrogen-3 12.35 y 0.011 0.011 0.011 4 Bery111um-9 n,a .Heliuw o 0.802 s 1280 5 Boron none 6 Carbon none' 7 Nitrogen-15 n,y Nitrogen-16 7.13 s 0.0004 7 Nitrogen 14 n,2n Nitrogen 13 9.96 m 0.0001 8 0xygen-16 n,y Oxygen-19 27.1 s 0.0004 8' 0xygen 18 n,a carbon-15 2.46 s 0.001' 9 Fluorine-19 n,y Fluorine 20 11.0 s 19.7 0.449 .9 Fluorine-19 n,p 0xygen-19 27.1 s 0.11 0.024 9 Fluorine-19 n,a Nitrogen-16 .7.13 s 2.32 0.007 10 Neoa-22 n,y Neon-23 37.6 s -2.43 0.804 1(, Neon-20 n.p -Fluorine-20 11.0 s 0.013 li Sodium-23 n,y Sodium-24 15.02 h 0.180 0.180 0.172 t 11 Sodie-23 n,p Neon-23 37.6 s 0.072 0.024 11 Sodium-23 ti, a Fluorine-20 11.0 s 0.121 0.003 12 Magnesium-26 n,y Magnesium-27 9.45 m 0.129 0.120-0.002 12 Magnesium-25 n.p Sodium-25 60 s .0.002 0.001 12 Magnesium 26 n,p Sodium-26 1.0 s 0.001 'None greater than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

Appendix D 21 NUREG-1396

Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 13 Aluminum-27 n,y Aluminum-28 2.25 a 27.2 20.0 13 Aluminum-27 np Magnesium-27 9.45 m 0.011 0.010 14 Silicon-30 n,y Silicon-31 2.62 h 0.006 0.006 0.005 14 Silicon-28 n,p Aluminum-28 2.25 m 0.065 0.048 14 Silicon-29 n,p Aluminum-29 6.52 a 0.100 0.090 L 15 Phosphorus-31 n,y Phosphorus-32 14.28 d 0.002 0.002 0.002 15 Phosphorus-31 np Silicon-31 2.62 h 0.005 0.005 0.004 15 Phosphorus n,o Aluminum-28 2.25 m 0.019 0.014 16 Sulfur-36 n,y Sulfur-37 5.06 m 0.001 0.001 16 Sulfur-34 n,p Phosphorus-34 12.4 s 0.002 16 Sulfur-36 n,o Silicon-33 6.3 s 0.001 17 Chlorine-37 . n,y Chlorine-38 37.2 m 0.555 0.545 0.181-17 Chlorine-37 n,y Chit-ine-38m 0.8 s 12.0 o l. 17 Chlorine-37 n,a Phosphorus 12.4 s 0.027 0.001 1 17 Chlorine-35 n.p Sulfur-35 87.2 d 0.001 0.001 0.001' -18 Argon-40 n,y Argon-41 1.83 h 1.06 1.05 0.726 l 19 Potassium 41 n,y Potassium-42 12.36 h 0.024 0.024 0.023 20 Calcium-48 -n,y calcium-49 8.72 a 0.042 0.059 21 Scandium-45 n,y - Scandium-46 -83.8 d-0.022 0.022 0.002 21 Scandium-45 -n,y Scandium-46m 18.7 s 4825 522.

22 Titanium 50 n,y' Titanium-51 5.76 m 0.357 0.317

• 1ess than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

. N'UREG-1396 22 Appendix D

Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product --- Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour _ decay '23 Vanadium-51 n,y-Vanadium 52 3.755 m 179. 149. 0.003 23 Vanadium-51 n.p. Titanium 51 5.76 m 0.002 0.002 24 Chromium-50 n,y chromium-51 27.71 d 0.002 0.002 0.002 24 Chromium 54 n,y Chromium 55. 3.56 m 0.322 0.265 24 Chromium-52 n p. Vanadium 52 2.755 u 0.003 0.002 25 Manganese 55 n,y Manganese-56 2.582 h 11.1 11.1 8.49 25 Manganese 55 n,p Chromium 55 3.56 m 0.001 0.001 26 . Iron none' 27 Cobalt 59 n,y Cobalt 60 5.272 y 0.002 0.002 0.002 27 Cobalt-59 n,y Cobalt-60m 10.98 m 233.

218, 4.40 28 Nickel-64 n,y Nickel-65 2.520 h 0.013 0.013 0.010 28 Nickel-58 n,p Cobalt-58m 8.94 h 0.001 0.001 0.001-

-28 Nickel np Cobalt-60m .10.48 m 0.001 0.001 29 Copper-63 n,y Copper-64_ 12.74 h 0.458 0.458 0.434 29 Copper 65 n,y Copper-66 5.10.m 14.7 12.8 0.004 30 Zine-68 n,y Zine-69 57 m 0.369 0.365 0.178 30 Zine-68 n,y Zine-69m 13.9 h 0.002 .0.002 0.002. 30 Zine-70 n,y Zine-71 2.4 m 0.028 0.021 31 Callium 69 n,y Callium-70 21.1 a 5.43 5.25 0.756 31 Callium-71 n,y callium-72 14.10 h 0.259 0.259 0.247 31 Callium-69 n,a Copper-66 5.10 a 0.001 0.001

• None greater than 0.001 decays /sectucam of element (<0 001 Becquerel /g)
• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Beequerel/g)

Appendix D 23 NUREG-1396

Table 1.. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element)- Activation Product Z-Isotope Reaction Froduct Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 32 Cermanium-70 n,y Germanium-71 11.2 d 0.004 0.004 0.004 32 Germanium 74 n,y Germanium 75 82.8 m 0.105 0.104-0.064 32 Germanium-74 n,y Germanium-75m 48.9 s 6.38 2.73 32 Germanium-76 n,y Germanium-77 11.30-h 0.001 0.001 0.001 i 32 Germanium 76 n,y-Germanium 77m 54.3 s 0.871 0.405 i 33 Arsenic-75 n,y Arsenic-76 26.3 h 0.326 0.326 0 ~. 318 - 34 Selenium-76 n,y Selenium-77m 17.5 s 568. 52.8 - 34 Selenium-78 n,y Selenium 79m 3.89 m 2.15 1.80 34 Selenium-80 n,y Selenium-81 18.5 m 1.33 1.28 0.140' ^ 34 Selent"- S0 ' n,y Selenium 81m 57.3 m 0.069 0.068 0.033 34 Selenium-82 n,y Seleniua 83 22.5 m 0.345 0.335 0.054 34 Selenium-82 n,y selenium t'3m 70,0 s 0.040 0.022 34 Selenium-77 n,n' Selenium-77m 17.5 s 1,63 0.151 1 1 35 Bromine-79 n,y Bromine 80 ?7.4 m 29.1 28.0 2.67 35 Bromine-79 n,y Bromine-80m 4.42 h 0.548 0.547. 0.468 35 Bromine-81 n,y Bromine-82 35.4 h 0.007 0.007 0.007 35 Bromine-81 n,y Bromine-82m 6.1 m 23.1 20.6 0.025

• 1 mss than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquer31/g)

NUREG-1396 24 Appendh D L 1

Table 1. ' Calculated Activities from One Pass in i Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target (dscays/sec/ gram of element) Activation Product - Z Isotope-Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 36 Krypton-78 n,y Krypton-79 34.9 h 0.001 0.001 0,001 36 Krypton-78 n,y Krypton-79a 50 s 0,074 0.032 36 Krypton-80 n,y Krypton-81m 13.3 s 37.7 1.65 36 Krypton 82 n,y Krypton 83m 1.86 h 1,74 1.73 1.20 36 Krypton-84 n,y ' Krypton-85m 4.48 h 0.023 0.023 0.020 36 Krypton-86

• n,y Krypton-87 76 m 0.012 0.012 0.007 37 Rubidium 85-n,y Rubidium-86 18.65 d 0.001 0.001 0.001 37 Rubidium-85 n,y Rubidium-86m 1.018 m 4.20 2.13

',y Rubidium 88 17.7 m 0.205 0.197 0.020. 37 Rubidium 87 n 38 Strontium-84 n,y Strontium-85m' 67.7 m. 0.004 0.004 0.002-38 Strontium-86 n,y Strontium-87m 2.81 h 0.044 0.044 0.034 '39 Yttrium-89 n,y Yttrium-90 64.0 h 0.026 0.026 0 ^?S 39 Yttrium 89 n,y Yttrium-90s 3.19 h 0.416 0.414 0.335 39 Yttrium-89 n n' Yttrium-89m 15.7 s 3.75 0.265 o 40 Zirconium none 41 Niobium-93 n,y Niobium-94m 6.26 m 3.80 3.40 0.005 42 Molybdenum-92 n,y Molybdenum-93m 6.85 h <0.002 <0.002 <0.001 42 Molybdenum 98 n,y Molybdenum-99 66.02 h 0.001 0.001 0.001 42 Molybdenem-100 n,y Molybdenum-101 14.6 m 0.135 0.129 0.008 43 Technetium unstable /not found naturally 44 Ruthenium-102 n,y Ruthenium-103 39.6 d 0.001 0.001 0.001 44 Ruthenium-104 n,y Ruthenium-105 4.44 h 0.029 0.029 0.025

• 1.ess than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

Appendix D 25 NUREG-1396

e Table 1. Calculated Activities frna One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation Syst 2 (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product ~Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 45 Rhod.'.um-103 n,7 Rhodium-104 42 s 1543. 573. 45 Rhodium-103 n,y Rhodium 104m 4.35 a 360. 307. 0.025 45 khodium-103 n,a Technetium-100 16 s 0.397 0.030 45 Rhodium-103 n,n' Rhodium-103m 56 m 0.064 0.063 0.030 46 Palladium 106 n,y Palladium 107m 21.3 s 0.842 0.119 46 Palladium-108 n,y Palladium-109 13.46 h 0.337 0.337 0.320 e 46 Palladium-108 n,y Palladium-109m 4.69 m 0.912 0.787 46 Palladium-110 n,y Palladium-111 22 m 0.088 0.085 0.013 46 Palladium-110 n,7 Palladium-111m 5.5 h 0.001. 0.001 0,001 47 Silver-107 n,y Silver-108 2.41 a 509. 382. 47 Silver-109 n,7 Silver-110 24.6 s

8310, 1532.

1 1 48 Cadmium-106 n,y Cadmium-107 6.5 h' O.002 0.002 0.002 '48 Cadmium-110 n.- Cadmium-111m 48.7 m 0.022 0.0.12 0.009 48 Cadmium-114 n,y Cadmium-115 53.5 h 0.002 0.002 0.002 48 Cadmium-116 n,y Cadmium-117 2.6 h 0.002 0.002 0.001 48 -Cadmium-116 n,y Cadmium-117m 3.4 h 0.001 0.001 0.001 l'- 48 Cadmium-112 n 2n Cadmium lilm 48.7 m 0.004 0.004 0.002 49 Indium-113 n,7 Indium-114 71.9 s 9.43 5.29 49 Indium-113 n,7 Indium-114m 49.51 d 0.001 0.001 0.001 49 Indiure 115 n.7 . Indium 116 14.2 s 1360. 72.7 49 Indium-115 n,7 Indium-116m 54.2 m

129, 127.

59.9 49 Indium-115 n,r Indium-116m' 2.16 s 127000 0.001 49 Indium-115 n n' Indium-115m 4.50 h 0.004 0.004 0.003 o

• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

. NUREG-1396 26 Appendix D

4 Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity -Target (decays /sec/ gram of element). Activation Product Z-Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay l 50 Tin-112 n,y Tin-113m 20 m 0.018 0.017 0.002 50 Tin 120 n,y Tin-121 26.8 h 0.002 0.002 0.002 50 Tin-122 n,y Tin 123m 40.1 a 0.012 0.012 0.004 50 Tin-124 n,y Tin-125m 9.2 a 0.109 0.101 0.001 ,51 Antimony-121 n,y Antimony-122 2.72 d 0.073 0.073 0.072 51 . Antimony-121 n,y Antimony-122m 4.2 a 0.708 0.600 51 Antimony-123 n,y . Antimony-124 60.3 d 0.003 0.003 0.003 51 -Antimony-123 n,y Antimony-124m 93 s 0.842 0.538 51 . Antimony-123 . n,y Antimony 124m' 20.3 m 0.013 0.013 0.002 52 Tellurium 126 n,y Tellurium-127 9.4 h 0.019 0.019 0.018 52 Tellurium-128 n,y Tellurium 129 70 m 0.057 0.056 0.031 52 Tellurium-130 n,y -Tellurium-131 25.0 m 0.208 0.202 -0.039 53 Iodine 127 n,y Iodine-128 25.00 m 20.0 19.5 3.79 54 Xenon-124-n,y Xenon-125 17.0 h 0.008 0.008 0.008 54 Xenon-124 n,y . Xenon-125m t 57 s 1.7 0.620 .- 54 Xenon 126 u,y Xenon-127m 72 s 0.014 0.008 -54 Xenon-130 n,y Xenen-131m 11.9) d 0.053 0.053-0.053 54 Xenon-132 n,y Xenon-133 5.29 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 -- 54 Xenon-134 n,y Xenon-135 9.17 h 0.003 0.003 0.003 54 . Xenon 134 .n,y Xenon-135m 15.3 m 0.001 0.001 54 Xenon-136 n,y Xenon-137 3.84 a 0.200 0.167

• 1.ess than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

Appendix D 27 NUREG-1396 u.

Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target-(decays /sec/ gram of element) i Activation Product Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 55 Cesium 133 n,y Cesium-134 2.06 y 0.002 0.002 0.002 55 Cesium-133 n,y Cesium-134m 2.9 h 0.928 0.924 0.731 56 Barium-130 n,y Barium-131m 14.6 m 0.009 0.009 0.001 56 Barium-135 n,y Barium 136m 0.31 s 131. I 56 Barium 136 n,y Barium-137m 2.55 m 0.039 0.030 f $6 Barium 138 n,y Barium-139 83.3 m 0.155 0.154, 0.094 56 Barium-137 n n' Barium-137m 2.55 m 0.500 0.085 o 57 Lanthanum-139 n,y Lanthanum-140 40.23 h 0.190 0.190 0.187 58 Cerium 13? n,y Cerium-137 9.0 h 0.014 0.014 0.013 I 58 Ceriur 138 n,y Cerium 139m 56 s 0.054 0.026 . 58 Cer'.um 140 n,y Cerium-141 32.51 d :0.005 0.005 0.005 58 C6rium 142 n,y Cerium-143 33.0 h 0.027 0.027 0.026 q 59 Praseodymium-141 n,y Praseodymium-142 19.16 h 0.343 0.343 0.331 - 59 traseodymiu:n-141 n,y Praseodymium-142m 14.6 m 13.3 12.7-0.770 I I 59 Praseodymium-141 n.2n -Praseodymium-140 3.39 m 0.012 0.010 60 Neodymium-146 .n,y Neodymium-147 10.99 d 0.007 0.007 0.007 -l 60 Neodymium-148 n,y Neodymium-149 1.73 h 0.073 0.073 0.049 l 60 Neodymium-150 n,y Neodymium-151 12.4 m 0.352. 0.333 0.034 61 Promethium unstable /not found naturally -62 Samarium-152 n,y Samarium-153 46.5 h 1.19 1.19 1.17 -: 62 Samarium-154 n,y Samarium-155 22.2 m 2.81 2.72 0.432

• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g) i NUREG-1396

.8 Appendix D 1 l

Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity-Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Reacticn Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 63 Europium-151 n,y Europium 152 13.4 y 0.029 0.020 0.020 63 Europium 151 n,y Europium-152m 9.3 h 132. 1%. 123. 63 Europium-151 n,y Europium 152m' 96 m 0.021 0.914 0.597 .63 Europium 153 n,y Europium-154 8.5 y 0.002 0.002 0.002 64 Cadolinium 158 n,y Cadolinium 159 18.6 h 0.040 0.040 0.039 64 Cadolinium-160 n,y - Gadolinium-161 3.7 a 2.19 1.32 65 Terbium-159 n,y Terbium-160 72.3 d 0.014 0.014 0.014 66 Dysprosium-156 n,y Dysprosium-157 8.1 h 0,003 0.003 0.003 66 Dysprosium-164 n,y Dysprorium-165 2.35 h 86.2 85.8 64.2 66 Dysprosium-164 n,y Dysprosium-165m 1.256 m 16400 9420 6.81 67 Holmium-165 n,y Holmium-166 26.8 h 1.98 1.98 1.93 68 Erbium-162 n,y Erbium-163 75 m 0.022 0.022 0.013

68 Erbium-164 n,y Erbium-165 10.36 h 0.016 0.016 0.015 (8

Erbium-166 n,y Erbium-167m 2.27 s 4790. 68 Erbium-168. n,y Erbium-169 9.3 d 0.002 0.002 0.002 68 2rbium-170 n,y Erbium-171 7.5 h

0.085 0.085 0.077 69 Thulium-169-n,y Thulium-170-130 d 0.030 0.030 0.030 70 Ytterbium-168 n,y Ytterbium-169 32.02 d 0.005 0.005 0.005 70 Ytterbium-174 n,y Ytterbium-175 4.19 d 0.139 0.139 0.138 70 Ytterbium-176 n,y Ytterbium-177 1.9 h 0.113 0.112 0.078 71 1.utecium-175 n,y 1.utecium-176m 3.69 h 4.78 4.77 3.96

-71 Lutecium-176 n,y Lutecium-177 6.71 d 0.222 0.222 0.221

• Less than'O,001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

Appendix D 29 NUREG-13%

Table 1. Calculated Act ivities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogacion System (Cont.). Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 72 Hafnium-177 n,y Hafnium-178m 4.3 s 110. 0.007 L72 Hafnium 178 n,y Hafnium-179m 18.7 s 2460 2.66 . 72 Hafnium-179 n,y Hafnium-180m 5.5 h 0.007 0.007 0.006 72 Hafnium-180 n,y Hafnium-181 42.4 d 0.003 0.003 0.003 73 Tantalum-181 n,7 Tantalum-182 115 d 0.008 0.008 0.008 73 Tantaluu-181 n,y Tantalum-182m 15.9 m 0.038 0.036 -0.003 i 74 Tungsten 184 n,y Tungsten-185m 1,64 m 0.014 0.009 74 Tungsten-186 n,y Tungsten-187 23.9 h 0.347 0.347 0.337 .75 Rhenium-185 ni Rhenium 186 90.6 h 0.362 0.362 0.359 L75 Rhenium-187-n,y Rhenium-188 16.7 h 1.85 1.85 1.77 75 Rhenium-187 n,y Rhenium-188m 18.6 m 2.18 2.10 0.233 '76 Osmium-190 n,y .Osimium 191 15.3 d 0.002 0.002 'O.002 76 Osmium 190 ~ n,y Osmium-191m 13.0 h 0.119 0.119 0.113 76 Osmium-192 n,y Osimium-193 30.2 h 0.017 0.017 0.017 77 . Iridium 191 n,y Iridium-192 74.3 d 0.090 -0.090 0.090 77 Iridium-191 n,y Iridium-192m 1.4 m 3120 1900 l l77 Iridium-193 n,y Iridium-194 19.38 h 2.73 2.73 2.63 78 Platinum-196 n,y = Platinum-197 18.3 h 0.006 0.006 0.006 78 Platinum-196 n,y Platinum-197m 81 m 0.007 0.007 0.004 ~. 7 8 , Platinum-198 n,y Platinum-199 30.8 m 0.389 0.380 0.101 j 78 Platinum-198 n,y Platinum-199m 14.1 s 0.363 0.020 79 Cold-197 n,y Gold-198 2.695 d 1.18 1.18 1.17 OLess_ than 0.001 decays /sec/Bram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

NURiiG-1396 30 Appendh D

-Table 1. Calculated Activities from One Pass in a Neutron Interrogation System (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Reaction Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 80 Mercury-196 n,y Mercury-197 64.1 d 0.042 0.042 0.042 80 Mercury-196 n,y Mercury-197a 23.8 h 0.004 0.004 0.004 80 Mercury-198 n,y Mercury-199m 42.6 m 0.004 0.004 0.002 80 M:rcury-202 n,y Mercury 203 46.60 d 0.001 0.001 0.001 80 Mercury-204 n,y Mercury-205 5.2 a 0 203 0.178 n,y Thallium 206 4.2 a 0.651 0.552 81 Thallium 205 82 Lead ~ none' b 83 Bismuth none 84 Polonium unstable /not found naturally 85 Astatine unstable /not found naturally 86 Radon unstable /not found naturally 87 Francium unstable /not found naturally 88 Radium unstable /not found naturally 89 Actinium unstable /not found naturally 90 Thorium-232 n,y Thorium 233 -22.2 a 11.9 11.5 1.83 91 Protactinium unstable /not found naturally j 92 Uranium-238 n,y Uranium-239 23.5 m 10.1 9.81 1.72

• None greater than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)
• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g) s*

The special case of mosBi (n,y) 8 " Bi ..,2n Po is discussed in the text under Phase 3. S i Appendix D 31 NUREG-1396 I

=- E F p Table 2 1 Listing'of Calculated' Activities from Table 1 Having the Highest Activities as Defined in the Text

• Activity Target (decays /sec/ gram of element)

Activation Product s 2 Isotope Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour decay 4 Beryllium-9 Helium-6 0.802 s 1280 13 Aluminum-27 Aluminum 2.25 m 27.2 20.0 -i 21 Scandium-45 Scandium-46m 18.7 s 4825 522 23 Vanadium-51 Vanadium-52 3.76 m 179 149 0.003 25 Hanganese-55. Manganese-56 2.58 h 11.1 11.1 8.49 9 27 Cobalt-59 Cobalt-60m 10.48 m 233 218 4.40 '29 Copper-65 Copper-66 5.10 m 14.7 12.8 0.004 34 Selenium-76 Selenium-77m 17.5 s 568 52.8

35 Bromine-79 Bromine-80 17.4 m 29.1 28.0 2.67

-35 Bromine-81 Bromine-82m 6.1 m 23.1 20.6 0.025 45 Rhodium-103 Rhodium-104 42 s 1543 573 f45 Rhodium-103 Rhodium-104m 4.35 m 360 307-0.025 ~47 Silver-107 -Silver-108 2.41 m 509 382 47 Silver-109 Silver-110 24.6 s 8310 1532 49 Indium-115 Indium-116 14.2 s 1360 72.7 l 49 Indium-115 Indium-116m 54.2 m 129 127 59.9 l -49 Indium-115 Indium-116m' 2.16 s 127000 0.001 y. 53 -Iodine-127 Iodine-128 25.0 m 20.0 19.5 3.79 l. c E' < 156 Barium-135 Barium-136m 0.31 s 131 59 Praseodymium-141 Praseodymium-142m 14.6 m 13.3 12.7 0.770 L 1

• For Initial Activity, >100 dps/g; for 1 minute decay, >10 dps/g; for 1 hour decay, >l dps/g.
• Less than -0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g)

NUREG-1396 32 Appendix D i L

l' Table 2. Listing of Calculated Activities from Table 1 Having the Highest Activities as Defined in the Text * (Cont.) Activity Target (decays /sec/eram of element) Activation Product Z Isotope Product Halflife Initial 1 min decay 1 hour dect.y 62 Samarium-152 Samarium-153 46.5 h 1.19 1.19 1.17 63 Europium 151 Europium-152m 9.3 h 132 132 123 66 Dysprosium-164 Dysprosium-165 2.35 h 86.2 85.8 64.2 66 Dysprosium-164 Dysprosium-165m 1.26 m 16400 9420 6.81 67 Holmium-165 Holmium-166 26.8 h 1.98 1.98 1.93 68 Erbium 166 Erbium-167m 2.27 s 4790 -71 Lutecium-175 Lutecium-176m 3.69 h 4.78 4.77 3.96 -72 Hainium-177 Hafnium-178m 4.3 s 110 0.007 72 Hafnium-178 Hafnium-179m 10.7 s 2460 2.66 75 Rhenium-187 Rhenium-188 16.7 h 1.85: 1.85 1.77 77 Iridium-191 Iridium-192m 1.4 m 3120 1900 77 Iridium-193 Iridium-194 19,38 h 2.73 2.73 2.63 79 Gold-197 cold-198 2.695 d 1.18 1.18 1.17 -90 Thorium-232 Thorium-233 22.2 m 11.9 11.5 1.83 92 Uranium 238 Uranium-239 23.5 m 10.1 9.81 1.72

• For Initial Activity, >100 dps/g; for 1 minute decay, >10 dps/g; for 1 hour decay, >l dps/g.
• Less than 0.001 decays /sec/ gram of element (<0.001 Becquerel /g) l

' Appendix D 33 NUREG-1396

4 4- ' Table 3.: Neutron Fluence Results from Irradiation No.1 (asaCf) ? t Activation - - Foi Gamma Ray Neutron Fluence ? Element i. Product Weight (g) Energy (kev) ' per pass (rVem')* Gold "Au 0.7502 411 7.5 x 105 1s7 5 Tungsten W 2.9598 479 7.6 x 10

• Actual fluence values recalculated from first report using redetermined absolute e'ficiency values and using

' the procedure from ASTM Standard Method E262 for gold. This procedure could only be used after the- .I gold-cadmium ratios had been measured. See text under Irradiation #4. .i i Table 4. Neutron Fluence Results from Irradiation f No. 2 (D-D Generator)

Activation Foll -

Gamma Ray Neutron Fluence a Element. Product Weight (g) Energy (kev) per pass (n/cm ):. l i Copper "Cu 9.294 511 3.0 x 10 t 5 "Cu 9.294 511 2.9 x 10" t ~ Gold "Au 0.7653 411 2.7 x 10 i 5 187 5 Tungsten W 3.332 - 1497 3.4 x 10 ,) " Actual fluence values recalculated from first report using rodetermined absolute efficiency values and using _ i the procedure from ASTM Standard Method E262 for gold.- This procedure could only

• ssed after the gold-cadmium ratios had been measured. See text under Irradiation #4.

Dhis value calculated for a continuous 4 hour Irradiation at lower fluence Instead of a single higher fluence i Irradiation (See text). L i L ' N Ulm O-1396 34 Appendix D d, l

( _ Table'5. Neutron Fluence Roses from Irradiation No. 3 (D-D Generator)- ~Actkation Fou Gamma Ray Neutron Fluence Element Product Weight (g) Energy (kev), per pass (n/cm')* 5 Gold '"Au 0.7503 411 1.9 x 10 5 Copper "Cu 11.14 511 2.7 x 10 187 5 Tungsten W 3.331 479 2.0 x 10 Table 6. Neutron Fluence Results from Irradiation No. 4 (2s2Cf) Activation Foll Gamma Ray Neutron Fluence 2 Elemen: - Product Weight (g) Energy (kev) - per pass (n/cm ): 5 . Gold ' 1"Au 0.3148 411 . 7.9 x 10 .;c l Copper "Cu 7.417 511 7.7 x 10' I \\ \\4 e . Appendix D, 35 NUREG-13% .-i--is---i-imi-en --imi---m----- -m

,c,. c;, n a s:p : j}. ,jf w; e . Taue 7. Neutron Fluence vs.' Position inas2Cf EDS Using Gold Foils i RelatNe Measure Fluencg) - Foll I.D. Position in Container

• Fluence per pasas (n/cm 5

A1 Top /Left 0.87. 6.9 x 10 5 A-2 BottonVLeft. 0.86 6.8 x 10 5 A Top / Middle - 1.13 8.9 x 10 5 A7 Middle / Middle 1.00-7.9 x 10

o b

5 A-5 Bottorn/ Middle 1.31 10.3 x 10 5 A4 Top /Right 0.89 7.0 x 10 1 5 A-8 Lower Middle /Right 0.85 6.7 x 10 5 A6 Bottom /Right . 0.85 6.7 x 10 5 Average 7.6 x 10 (317%)* 5 5 Range 6.7 x 10 to 10.3 x 10 'See Figure 4 for diagram of positions in container. . Dhis folid had moved somewhat by the time it was received back at NIST. Exact position during irradiation sequence is thus unknown, but fluence value is consistent with the position given here and shown in Figure 4. j ' Uncertainty value shown is the 10 standard deviation of all eight foils. t 4 . q, e i e l L .NUREG-1396 36 Appendix D l. L ?

Table 8. Results from Cadmium Ratio Measurements. Previously Measured Cadmium Ratios (Ref. 7)* - Gold Cadmlum Ratios irradiation Facilty (This Study) Gold Copper Cobalt D-D EDS (irrad #3) 5.0 as2Cf EDS (Irrad. #4) 8.3 1: NBSR RT 3 9.2 10.3 G5 42 - NBSR RT 1: 18.3 NBSR RT 4 82.7 87 540 390 'See text about using caution in comparing different foil element cadmium ratios and even measurements for the same element such as gold when small differences In thickness can produce signWicant differences in neutron self shielding factors. 'ir Appendix D - 37 NUREG-1396 1 n --_m. ^

l1 Table 9. Comparison of Calculated and Measured Radioactivities from One Pass in the as Cf EDS [ Irradiations No. 1 (Tungsten) and No. 4 (Cold and Copper)) Measured Activity. Target Calculated *'. Activation Product Initial Activity Initial Activity 2 Isotope . Product Halflife (d/g/s) (d/s/g) Camma Ray 29 Copper-63 Copper-64 12.74 h 0.458. 0.374 511 kev 74 Tungsten-186 Tungsten-187 23.9 h 0.347 0.217 479 kev 79 Cold-197. Gold-19P '2.695 d 1.18 1.08 411 kev L

• Calculated Initial Activity is that found in Table 1 of this report, calculated for the 8

8 conditions described (thermal fluence = 1 x 10 n cm per pass). [ Note from Table 6 I Cf EDS puts out about 0.8 of this fluence / pass.} [ that the 888 1 I Table 10. Comparison of Calculated and Measured Radioactivities One Pass in the D-D EDS.[ Irradiation No. 3) Measured Activity l Target Calculated

• j Activation Product Initial Activity Initial Activity j

Z Isotope Product Halflife (d/g/s) (d/s/g) Camma Ray j 29 Copper-63 Copper-64 12.74 h 0.458 0.127 511 kev 74 Tungsten-186 Tungsten-187 23.9 h 0.347 0.077 479 kev 79 Cold-197 Gold 198 2.(95 d 1.18 0.342 411 kev 'Caldulated Initial Activity is that found in Table 1 of this report, calculated-for the 8 8 L conditions described (thermal fluence = 1 x 10 n cm per pass). [ Note'from Table 5 l that the-D-D EDS actually puts out only about k of this fluence / pass.) zu l ' NUREG-1396 38 Appendix D .n

Table 11. Comparison of Calculated and Measured Radioactivities from One Pass in a Simulated EDS b Measured Activity Target Calculated

• Activation Product Initial Activity Initial Activity Z.

Isotope Product Halflife (d/g/s) (d/s/g) Camma Ray 24 Chromium-50 Chromium 51 27.71 d 0.002 0.003 320 kev 26 Iron-58 Iron-59 44.50 d <0.001' O.0001 1099 kev 27 Cobalt-59 Cobalt-60 5.272 y 0.002 0.002 1332 kev 30 Zine-64 Zine 65 243.9 d <0.001 0.0001 1115 kev 37 Rubidium 85 Rubidius _. 18.65 d 0.001 0.001 1076 kev ) 38 Strontium 84 Strontium-85 64.84 d <0.001 0.00004 514 kev 51 Antimony"123 Antimony-124 60.3 d 0.003 0.002 1691 kev 55 Cesium-133 Cesium-134 2,06 y 0.002 0.002 796 kev -56 Barium 130 Barium-131 11.8 d <0.001 0.00004 496 kev 63 Europium-151 Europium-152 13.4 y 0.020 0.018 964 kev -63 Europium-151 Europium-152 13.4 y 0.020 0.017 1408 kev 65 Terbium-159 Terbium-160 72.3 d 0.014 0.011 879 kev 72 Hafnium-180 Hafnium 181 42.39 d 0.003 0.003 482 kev 70 Tantalum-181 Tantalum-182 114.5 d 0.008 0.007 1221 kev 0 Calculated Initial Activity is that found in Table 1 of this report calculated for the 2 conditions described (thermal fluence = 1 x 108 n cm per pass). In this Table, the measured activity was obtained using the NBSR RT-3 irradiation b as2 facility at NIST, which vss shown to be very similar to the Cf EDS facility (see text). The counting data this obtained was corrected to the experimentally determined-S 252Cf EDS fluence of 8 x 10 n cm per pass. ' Isotopes having calculated initial activities of less than 0.001 decays / gram /second were not included in Table 1, as specified in the text. Appendix D 39 NUREG-1396

- - ~ ~ ' ~ a ib NRC FORM 336 U 8, t 'VCLEAR REGULATORY COMMis$lON

1. FIEPORT NUMDER M 1102,

. Rev no 'Num-1 j woi, aam - - BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET t rs. it any.) - (see instructions on in

r. vers.)

NUltEO-13% - 8,1 tile AND SVSTITLE

3. DA1E REPORT PUBUSHED.

Environmental Assessment of the'Ihermal Neutron Activation Explosive Detection uoy7g i yg3n System for Concourse Use at U.S. Airports I August 1990

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR (bl

6. TYPfi OF REPORT C.O. Jones Technical

7. PERIOD COVERED (hotusive Dates) 1989-February 1990

8. PLRFOf tMINO OHGANIZAllON - NAMii AND ADDRESS Uf NF4C. provide D6 vision, Ottice or Rege. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. arul

. mellerig address; it contractor, provkle name and malling address.) Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear IteEulatory Commission / ' Washington, DC 20555 e O. 6PONSORNO OFtGANLZAllON = NAME AND ADORESS (It NRC, type '6ame as above*; it contractor, provide NRC Division. OHice or flegion. U,8. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and malline address.) Same as above. to. 8VPluMENTARY NOIES

11. ADSTRACT (200 words or less)

J 'this document is an environmental assessment of a system designed to detect the presence of explosives in checked airline baggage or cargo. The system is meant to be installed at the concourse or lobby ticketing areas of U.S. com- - mercial airports and uses a scaled radioactive source of californium-252 to irradiate baggage items. 'Ihc major im. pact of the use of this system arises from direct exposure of the public to scattered or leakage radiation from the source and to induced radioactivity in baggage items. Under normal operation and the most likely accident scenar-los, the environmental impacts that would be created by the proposed licensing action would not be significant.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (Ust words or phrases that watt assist researcters in locating the report.)

13. AVAr ADIUTY STATEMENT Unlimited

-I!xplosive Detectors SAIC Model EDS-3C "[, 'IhcrmalNeutron Activation Californium-252

TNA-Federal Aviation Adtr sistration (FAA)

Unclassified EDS Concourse lixplosive :tectors 1** ""*") Airline llaggage Inspection Systems Unclassified 16, NUMbt;Ft OF PAGliS 16, PHICE

NRC FORM 335 (2-40)

A E

l:'. i r i -.g-

16 g

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