ML20063E109
| ML20063E109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1994 |
| From: | Delgeorge L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9402090074 | |
| Download: ML20063E109 (8) | |
Text
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Commtnw alth Edison.
i> M '.' 1400 Opus Place
. Downers Grove. Illinois 60515 January 26,1994 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:
Document Control Desk
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Notice of Violation inspection Report Nos. 50-373/93033; 50-374/93033 NRC Docket Numbers 50-373 and 50-374.
References:
1.
W. L. Axelson letter to W. F'. Murphy, Dated November 22,1993, Transmittiag NRC Inspection Report 50-373/93033; 50-374/93033, 2.
John B. Martin letter to M. J. Wallace, Dated December 27,1993 Transmitting the-Notice of Violation for NRC Inspection Reports 50-373/93033 and 50-374/93033.
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) respectfully requests the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to reconsider the categorization of the subject violation at Severity Level (SL) 111.
This request is made on behalf of all six CECO's stations in recognition of the generic implications that this violation presents for their implementation of the corporate Fitness-for Duty (FFD) program.
The escalation of the severity level on the FFD violation for an individual who was improperly granted onescorted access, independent of the circumstances, in CECO's view was not contemplated in the Commission's Enforcement Policy. We believe reconsideration of the circumstances of the violation is appropriate and suggest that categorization at SL lli was inconsistent with the Commission's Policy as applied to these facts.
The facts leading to this violation are not in dispute. An individual was granted unescorted access before the station discovered that his pre-access drug test was positive. This was, as you acknowledged, the first and only such error in over 5,500 pre-access drug tests. You also recognized -
the station's prompt and extensive corrective actions. Despite the limited nature of the circumstances of -
the violation and the extensive history of good program performance, you concluded that a SL lli was warranted because the grant of the unescorted access to a person who failed a FFD test was the *very action that 10 CFR part 26, ' Fitness for Duty' was intended to prevent."
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. In CECO's view,' this inMroretation is inconsistent with Commission policiee regarding the non- -
ounitive nature of the Enforcoment Policy, the encouragement of licensee self-evaluation and program enhancement, and the severity of FFD violations. Escalated enforcernent is inconsistent with the enforcement examples which the Commission adopted contemporaneous with its adoption of the FFD l
rule bocause those examples do not support escalated enforcement whenever an individualis improper!y granted unescorted access contrary to FFD requirements. Therefore, we suggest that consistent application of these policies on reconsideration could result in a reduction in the severity level of this violation.
When the Commission adopted the CFD rule and the accompanying enforcement guidance,it did not adopt the strict interpretation which supports the issuance of a SL 111 violation here. -In explaining the changes to the Enforcement Policy to include FFD violations, the Commission stated:
The examples for Severity Level 111 are significant because they represent sianificant individual violations or significant breakdowns l
in basic elements of a fitness-for-duty program. 54 Fed. Reg. at 24493 (emphasis supplied).
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Significant Individual violations did not include individuals who had been granted unescorted j
access but who later had positive drug tests. Such individuals were not considered to create a i
significant safety concern because they would also be subject to the plant's behavioral observation program. Only unobserved conduct for a substantial period in a vital area or significant process deficiencies would provide the basis for an escalated FFD violation.'
i By the same logic, where an individualis mistakenly granted unescorted access, only the same circumstances can raise a SL 111 safety concern. Therefore, the interpretation of the rule presented by this violation, appears contrary to the Commission's expressed understanding of the Enforcement Policy, in the absence of a claim that the individual was unobserved in the vital area for a substantial l
period or that the process problem was significant, no safety significance follows from simply finding an individualin the plant with unescorted access and a positive drug test.' To make such a finding would essentially modify the Enforcement Policy by not considering specific circumstances as is done for the other FFD examples. Such consequences can be avoided only by reconsidering and modifying the interpretation of the Enforcement Policy reded upon in assigning SL lit to this violation.
i CECO acknowledges that had this event occurred as the result of long-standing problems with its FFD program, then other considerations, especially compliance with Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, might have applied to result in a SL 111 problem. But there was no indication of programmatic problems here for the reasons already enumerated.
Here, the specific circumstances of the individual violation were acknowledged not to be significant because the individual was under observation and had very limited access to the vital
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area.
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CECO urges the NRC to reconsider and reduce the severity level of the violation in light of the
. spec c c rcums ances of this event and the generic implications for the evaluation of deviations from ifi i t
FFD requirements.
i Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison Company's response to the. Notice of Violation (NOV) l which was transmitted in the Reference 2 letter in regards to an NRC Inspection Report transmitted in the Reference 1 letter. The violation regarded a failure to fully evaluate information obtained from the
. l fitness for duty program prior to authorizing an individual to receive a photo identification badge and i
unescorted access to LaSalle County Station If there are any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to JoEllen '
Burns, Regulatory Performance Administrator at (708) 663-7285.
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Resp ctfully, l Louis O. DelGeorge Af/) v -
y Vice President I
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cc:
J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Rlli A. T. Gody Jr., Project Manager, NRR D. Hills, Senior Resident inspector, LaSalle k
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. CECO urges the NRC to reconsider and reduce the severity level of the violation in light of the
.l specific circumstances of this ovent and the generic implications for the evaluation of deviations from FFD requirements.
Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison Company's response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) which was transmitted in the Reference 2 letter in regards to an NRC Inspection Report transmitted in l
the Reference 1 letter, The violation regarded a failure to fully evaluate information obtained from the -
fitness for duty program prior to authorizing an individual to receive a photo identification badge and unescorted access to LaSalle County Station.
If there are any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to JoEllen '
Burns, Regulatory Performance Administrator at (708) 663-7285.
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Respectfully.
I ffBO Louis O. DelGeorge Vice Presider t i
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cc:
J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Rlll A. T. Gody Jr., Project Manager, NRR D. Hills, Senior Resident inspector, LaSalle bbc:
W. P. Murphy, Site Vice President, LaSalle County Station l
D. L. Farrar. Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager, NORS J. E. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor, LaSalto L
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4 ATTACHMENT RESPOi TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION Nh..NSPECTION REPORT '
50-373/93033; 50-374/93033 -
VIOLATION: 373(374)/93033-01 During an NRC inspection conducted on November 4,1993, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the ' Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," '
l 10 CFR Part 2, the violation is listed below:
1
- 10 CFR 26.24(a)(1) requires that a licensee provide a means to deter and detect substance abuse by Implementing chemical testing programs for persons subject to this part. The program shall include testing within 60 days prior to the initial granting of unescorted access to protected areas or assignment
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to activities within the scope of this part.
I Paragraph 5.5 of the Licensee's ' Corporate Nuclear Security Guideline No. 224," Revision 0, Juty 1991, (which implements 10 CFR 26.24 in part) requires in part that each nuclear station shall assure that a -
negative pre-access test result has been received for each individual prior to issuing a photo f
identification badge.
j Contrary to the above, on October 18,1993 ine licensee failed to assure that a negative pre-access test result had been received for an individual prior to issuing a photo identification badge and granting unesecrted access to protected arecs. Specifically, an individual, who had tested positive for a
.l controlled substance, was issued a photo identification badge and was granted unescorted access to protected areas. (01013)
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The is a Severity Level til violation (Supplement Vil).
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b ATTACHMENT l
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION j
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-373/93033; 50-374/93033 (Continued)
REASON FOR VIOLATION:
Commonw 1th Edison Oompany (CECO) agrees that a contractor was inappropriately granted unescorted access prior to confirmation of a negative pre-access test result. The contractor was working within the protected area of the station when the Assistant Security Administrator was notified of the positive test results by Corporate Fitness For Duty (FFD). This was a violation of CECO's Fitness For Duty Program.
Pre-access testing is conducted on-site and the test results are forwarded to Corporate FFD. The date of the negative test result is entered by Corporate FFD into the information Management System (IMS).
computer. If a presumptive positive test result is obtained on-site, the specimen is forwarded to a.
1 laboratory for further analysis and no date is entered into the computer. Site personnel check IMS for the date of the negative test. If a date is provided in IMS, the date is recorded on the Station Security Check-in Form (Attachment A of LaSalle Administrative Procedure LAP-1100-4, ' Station Security Badges / Key Cards") along with other critical badging information such as fingerprinting and background screening. When all this information is obtained and entered on the form, the Station Security Administrator or designee authorizes issuance of a security badge.
t On October 15,1993, a contractor provided s specimen that was classified as presumptive positive.
The specimen was sent to a laboratory for confirmatory testing. Meanwhile, the in-processing clerk.
i began completing the Station Security Check-in Form for the contractor as well as other contractors j
tested on that date. The clerk recorded a date of 10-15-93 in the 'FFD TESTING
- section of the form.
This date was based on personal knowledge of when the pre-access test was performed.. The clerk had just been assigned these duties and was not adequately trained on the badging process. She was not told that 'FFD TESTING
- referred to the date'of negative test results.
On October 18,1993, the Assistant Station Security Administrator received the paperwork for badging the contractor. Por LAP-1100-4, " Station Security Badges / Key Cards' it was his duty to verify the date -
of the negative test results in IMS. However, this was not property done and the contractor war authorized unescorted acct,ss.
The root cause of this event was personnel error. The CECO Assistant Security Administrator did not verify receipt of the negative drug test results prior to granting unescorted access.
j A contributing cause to the event was inadequate training of the in-processing clerk who inserted improper dates on Attachment A of LAP-1100-4, ' Station Security Badges / Key Cards'.
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ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTIOf> REPORT 50-373/93035; 50-374/93033 (Continued)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED:
1.
When the error was identified, the contractor was immediately located, escorted off site and denied access to all CECO nuclear plants.
2.
An investigation into the contractor's whereabouts during the time he had unescorted access was conducted. On October 19,1993, the contractor accessed the protected area at 0643 and exited it at 1556. During this time, the contractor accessed vital areas from 1039 to 1131 (52 minutes). The vital areas accessed included the Unit 1 Reactor Building (passing through), the t
Unit 2 Reactor Building and the Off Gas Building. The contractor was accompanied by a badged co-worker at all times while in the vital areas. On October 20,1993, the contractor accessed the protected area at 0643 and exited it at 1607. On October 21,1993, the contractor accessed the protected area at 0645 and exited it ta 11S when he was escorted off-fite. During the time from October 19 to October 21,1993, the contractor spent the majority of his time in administrative type activities or in the Unit 2 heater bay area, all non-vital areas of the plant.
3.
Interviews were conducted with the contractor's foreman and a co-worker. These individuals stated that they did not observe any aberrant behavior by the contractor.
4.
A review of the contractor's work history from October 19 to October 21,1993 was conducted.
The contractor performed no safety-related work during this time.
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1 ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIO!ATION
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NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-373/93033; 50-374/93033 (Continued)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLA 110NS:
1.
The in-processing clerk no longer enters data on the security badging form. All required information is now entered by the Station Security Administrator or designee. These changes i
commenced October 27,1993.
2.
On November 2,1993, LAP-1100-4, " Station Secuirty Badges / Key Cards' was revised to i
address the following:
a.
The Station Security Check-in Form now specifies that the date required is the date of the negative drug test results. This will preclude entry of data corresponding to the date i
A the test was performed, as occurred in this event.
b.
The procedure now requires the Station Security Administrator or designee to enter the fingerprint, background and negative drug screen dates on the Station Security Check-in Form.
c.
A Security Force Supervisor in the Badge Fabrication Facility willindependently verify those dates on IMS and/or Index System prior to badge fabrication. This will ensure that a single error does not result in the issuance of a security badge to someone who -
l has not met all Fitness For Duty requirements.
3.
On October 28,1993 all other CECO Station Security Administrators were prnvided a detailed description of the event including the cause and corrective actions.
P 4.
On November 19,1993 a lessons learned notification was sent to the other five CECO station Support Services Directors and Security Administrators.
5.
In early October,1993, prior to this event, LaSalle Station identified weaknesses in the FFD program and implemented revisions to the program to eliminate these weaknesses. LaSalle Station requested that Corporate FFD personnel perform an independent assessment of LaSalle's FFD program. All recommendations from the Corporate assessment and a subsequent Off-site Quality Verification FFD assessment have been implemented.
Based on the above actions, LaSalle Station has fully implemented the FFD Program. Systems or proc-1 are in place to meet all requirements of the FFD Program.
k DATE WHEN FULL COMPUANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:
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LaSalle Station was in full compliance on October 21,1993 when the individual with the positive drug test results was escorted from LaSalle Station and denied access to the CECO sites.
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