ML20062M831
| ML20062M831 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8112180271 | |
| Download: ML20062M831 (2) | |
Text
o TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY S E G j C,54 CH ATTANOOG A. TENNESSEE 374 1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II" ' ' E4. I EG A r,, ',,
December 10, th8!10E014 A9 32 HTRD-50-518/81-25, -520/81-24 m
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liECElVED B
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director r-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DEC 171ggj%
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
-,. ' C L.r; k m:[f, <S' Region II - Suite 3100 E';
'C El darietta Street C.
3 Ar'anta, Georgia 30303 V ';
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT A - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - UNACCEPTABLE WELDS DOCUMENTED AS ACCEPTABLE BY ONE INDIVIDUAL -
HTRD-50-518/81-25, -520/81-24 The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector P. A. Taylor on September 18, 1981 as NCR HNPA-177. Our first interim report was submitted on October 19, 1981. In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. If you h&ve any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 L
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8112180271 011210"
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PDR ADOCK 05000 S
An Equal Opportunity Employer
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ENCLOSURE
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HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS A1 AND A2 UNACCEPTABLE WELDS DOCUMENTED AS ACCEPTABLE BY ONE INDIVIDUAL 10CFR50.55(c) REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)
HTRD-50-518/81-25, -520/81-24 Description of Deficiency While perforcing regular weekly surveillance of inspectors activities, it was observed that one unacceptable weld had been accepted. This unacceptable weld was one of a random sampling of four welds per inspector which are regularly checked as a part of the Hartsville Nuclear Plant weld inspection program. Upon further investigation of eight additional welds, four were found unacceptable. All of these were inspected by the same individual.
Previous surveillances before August 3,1981, had indicated acceptable work performance pertaining to quality of work. However, this individual received a disciplinary suspension from July 27 through July 31, 1981.
Records indicate that the unacceptable quality performance occurred after his returning from suspension on August 3, 1981. The employee had apparently developed a malicious or lackadaisical attitude as a result of the disciplinary action and the pending reduction-in-force.
Safety Implications Failure of a system or feature due to undetected unacceptable welds could result in degradation of systems required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant. Therefore, this condition could have jeopardized the safe operation of the plant had it remained uncorrected.
Corrective Action To establish the validity of inspections performed before disciplinary suspension, 10 welds inspected before July 27, 1981 were randomly picked for reexamination. Results of reinspection indicate that these welds were all acceptable.
All welds accepted by the individual in question following his disciplinary suspension have been identified and reinspected. As a result of this reinspection, 20 welds were found to be unacceptable.
These welds have been documented and tagged. Unacceptable welds will be processed and repaired by our standard process control system.
Since the individual in question is no longer in the employ of TVA we do not anticipate a recurrence. TVA is continuing its regular weekly surveillance program to detect problems of this type. Special~ awareness of weld inspectors who have received disciplinary suspensions will be noted so that poor performance can be detected and remedied.
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