ML20062M632
| ML20062M632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1982 |
| From: | Foster D GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8208200161 | |
| Download: ML20062M632 (4) | |
Text
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t Georgia Power Company Post Offce Box 4545 Atlants, Georgia 30002 b
- " "* * ' 522" Vogtle Project Southem Company Services. Inc.
Post Offee Box 2625 Brmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 August 6, 1982 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street File: X78G03-M29 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Log:
GN-186 Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Reference:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Units 1 and 2 50-424, 50-425; Starting Air Valves, Diesel Generators Gentlemen:
On July 7, 1982, Georgia Power Company reported a potential deficiency concerning the starting air valve assembly on the standby diesel generators to Mr. Virgil Brownlee. Georgia Power Company has concluded this condition is reportable as a significant deficiency and a substantial safety hazard.
Enclosed is our report for this item.
This response contains no proprietary infonnation and may be placed in the NRC Public Document Room upon receipt.
Very truly yo
/
b D. O. Foster Project General Manager DOF/CWH/tlp Enclosure xc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Victor J. Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D.C.
20555 R. J. Kelly J. A. Bailey R. W. Staffa R. E. Conway
- 0. Batum J. L. Vota G. F. Head H. H. Gregory, III W. F. Sanders J. T. Beckham, Jr.
E. D. Groover J. H. Boykin L. T. Gucwa D. E. Dutton M. Malcom R. H. Pinson C. R. Miles, Jr.
D. L. McCrary M. Manry R. A. Thomas P. D. Rice
'. OFFICIAL COP e
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Evaluation for a Significant Deficiency Evaluation for a Substantial Safety Hazard Introductio_n_:
On July 7, 1982, Mr. C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Project QA Manager, informed Mr. Virgil Brownlee on the NRC of a poten-tial deficiency concerning DeLaval diesel generators.
Background:
On May 13, 1982, Transamerica DeLaval notified the NRC of a defect in components of DSRV or DSR diesel generators.
A potential problem exists with the starting air valve assembly that could result in engine non-availability.
Plant Vogtle was identified as a site where this defect could exist.
The potential defect is related to the length of the cap-screw which holds the starting air valve assembly in the cylinder head.
If the capscrew " bottoms" in the tapped hole in the cy-linder head before the assembly is properly seated, the torque wrench reading would be misleading and the assembly could fail.
The starting air valve assembly was manufactured and installed in the cylinder head by Transamerica DeLaval.
Field inspection at the Vogtle site has confirmed the use of deficient capscrews.
Analysis of Safety Implications:
The standby diesel generator l
provides an emergency source of onsite power to safety-related equipment to ensure its' continued operation following an acci-l dent occurring coincident with a loss of offsite power.
Because the design and fabrication of the diesel generators for each unit is the same, a common made failure could be postulated in the starting air valve assembly of both engines due.to improperly l
l sized capscrews.
The result of the common made failure is a loss of power to both trains of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and most of the emergency safety features (ESF) equipment, r
==
Conclusions:==
This condition represents a deficiency found in design and construction, which, were it to have remained uncor-rected could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant.
Due to the problems presented by the potential failure of diesel generators, this condition also represents a signifi-cant deficiency in the final design such that the design of the deisel generators does not conform to the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report.
Additionally, this condition has been reported to the NRC as a Part 10CFR21 by Transamerica DeLaval since it could cause a loss of redundancy and required safety functions may not be able to be performed.
Corrective Action:
In their report to the NRC, Transamerica DeLaval describes two possible corrective actions.
These are:
(1)
Remove the existing capscrews; cut %" off the screw, reinstall the shortened screw.
(2)
Remove the existing capscrew and replace with 2-3/4" capscrew available through Transamerica DeLaval.
The use of shortened screws provides adequate thread engagement while eliminating the possibility of bottoming in the tapped hole.
Corrective action will be verified at the Vogtle site by E.
D. Groover and will be completed by 11/30/82.
==
Conclusion:==
This condition represents a reportable significant deficiency and a Part 10CFR21.
Because Transamerica DeLaval has previously reported this condition to the NRC as a Part 10CFR21,
Georgia Power Company is reporting this condition as a Part 10CFR50. 55 (e) (significant deficiency.)
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