ML20062A972
| ML20062A972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1978 |
| From: | Goldberg S NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7810180176 | |
| Download: ML20062A972 (21) | |
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NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM UhITEDSTATESOFAMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10/3/78 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of g #1 f f %
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS Docket No. 50-395
'L ejN COMPANY 4p (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear y
h l-Station, Unit No. 1) g h'
f g
o-NRC STAFF MOTION FOR SUMMAR.Y-0ISPOSITION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Staff (Staff) moves that contentions A6 and A7 admitted as matters in controversy in the captioned proceeding be dismissed pursuant to 10 CFR 12.749 for want of a genuine issue of nkaterial 1/
5 fact.
The Staff is of the opinion that the attached affidavits, t'o'gether
,d with the Intervenor's responses to discovery, demonstrate that there?~is " rib i
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factual basis for these contentions and, thus, that there are no genuine issues c.a of material fact worthy of adjudication at the hearing. Accordingly,.the; Atomic
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dafety,arld.LicensingBoard(Board)shoulddismissthesecontentionsaIamatter
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of law.
Sumary Disposition Procedures l
The sumary' disposition procedures set forth in 10 CFR,12.749 are analogous to l
the sumary judgment procedures contained in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units i
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1/ Although the Staff stipulated to some of the contentions, it explicitly reserved the right to move for summary dispositlan pursuant to 10 CFR 92.749.
See " Stipulation of Contentions" entered into between the Intervenor and NRC Staff on March 30, 1978, at paragraph 8.
7 WI OLYO (7 G G
2-1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217 (1974). As explained by the Appeal Board,
.i a motion for sumary disposition:
enables the court to go beyond the complaint itself and to determine, on the basis of extensive matters such as affidavits submitted by one or more of the parties, whether i.e., whether there is warrant for an evidentiary trial; TTact" bearing there is "a genuine issue as to any materia upon the claim or claims as to which sumary resolution is sought. Id.
Although the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact is U,
upon the moving party, and the record will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "a party opposing the motion...
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact."
10 CFR 12.740.
In this regard, it has been stated that:
fa"7t this stage, mere allegations in the pleadings are not sW ficient to establish the existence of an issue of material fact.
10 CFR 12.749(b) gitations omitte[/.
To defeat sumary disposition ~ an opposing party must present facts in the proper form; conclusions of law will not suffice.
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The opposing-party's facts must be material, substantial, not fanciful, or merely suspicious. /Tootnotes omittef/.
One cannot avoid sumary disposition "ob the mere hope that at trial he will be able to discredit movant's evidence; he' must, at'the hearing, be able to point out to the court some-thing irdicating the existence of a triable issue of material fact." 6 Moore's Federal Practice 56.15/T7. One cannot "go to trial on the vague supposition that scTiiething may turn up."
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6 Moore's Federal Practice 56.15/7 /.
/ citation omittef/.
In Orvis v. Brickman, 95 F.Supp. 60rTO.D.C.1951), the Colirt, in granting the defendant's motion for sumary judgment under the Federal Rules, said:
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All the plaintiff has in this case is the hope that on cross-examination... the defendants
.. will contradict their respective affidavits. This is purely speculative, and to permit trial on such basis would nullify the purpose of Rula 56....
Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 248 (1975).
Thus, although the opposing party need not show that he will prevail on the O
factual issues, he must show by competent evidence that such issues exist 2/
to be tried. - See, e.g., Public Service Company of New Hampshire g d.
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 879 (1974).
In light of these principler,and fo'r the reasons set forth below, the Staff urges the Board to grant summary disposition of contentions A6 and A7.
If the Board is unable to decide in favor of the. Staff on both these contentions, sumary disposition should be granted on any portions of those contentions as 3/
O to which there is no genuine issue of material fact.
2/ This is not inconsistent with the Staff's responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as discussed in the case of Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, et al. 55 L.Ed 2d 460 (.1978).
The
' Supreme Cr.urt therein, citing approWngTy from the " threshold test" pre-scribed by the Cormissicn for evidentiary consideration of energy conser-vation issues under NEPA, confirmed that an intervenor must make a "' showing
... sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further.'" Id. at 486.
Showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists would seem to E the minimum required by this principle.
3/ Section 2.749 authorizes a " decision by the presiding officer in that party's
/movant's/ favor as to all or any part of the matters involved in the pro-
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ceeding.' (emphasis added)
See, e.a., Public Services Company of Oklahoma, et al.
(Black Fox Station, Units T7nd 2), L::P-77-46, 6 NRC 167 (1977); Ine T61e6a Edison Comoany (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), LBP-73-30, 6 AE~
691, 699 (1973).
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.A.
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Contention A6
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"The State of South Carolina has duly issued a certificate for Sumer pursuant to Section 401 of.the FWPCA, and has duly issued an NPDES permit under Section 402 of the FWPCA. The thermal effluents and the cooling system intake velocities presumably will c7nply with South Carolina's FWPCA standards.
Even so, the thermal c scharge from the Sumer plant will result in a depletion of oxygen and a corresponding degradation of water quality downstream frem the Monticello Reservoir. The thermal effluents will also adversely affect plankton and the spawning of landlocked striped bass in the Congaree River downstream from the Sumer plant.
Intake velocities in the cooling system will exceed 0.5 fps thus causing excessive mortalities of indigenous aquatic life. These impacts have not been adequately considered in the over-all cost-benefit analysis required by NEPA."
A.
Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard O
(1) 0xygen Depletion
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1.
Under a conservative analysis, it is assumed that the passage of cool-ing water through the Summer plant will cause it to lose 40% of its dissovled oxygen. The volume of water with reduced oxygen content (represented by the discharged cooling water from the Sumer plant) constitutes 8.0% of the total volumo of water pumped to Parr Reservoir by the Fairfield pumped storage facility during a generating cycle. This conservatively assumes that the discharge of cooling water from the Sumer station moves without mixing or re-aeration to the
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to the Fairfield facility intake and there mixes into the Fairfield discharge water entering.the Parr Reservoir. This represents proportionally 4.8 feet of the 60 foot deep intake channel to the Fiarfield facility, or 24% of the assumed 20 foot oxygenated upper water layer. The reduction of oxygen content in the water going through the Fairfield facility as a result of mixing wito the dis-charge water from Sumer would be 40% of 24% or 9.6%. The Fairfield facility discharge is further diluted with flow from the Broad River upstream, tributaries downstream, and water from the Saluda River (approximately 30% of the flow of the Broad) (Kanciruk, para. 9 ; Appendix A).
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A computer model which predicts the incremental reduction in dissolved oxygen concentration in Parr Reservoir and the Congaree River due to the Sumer nuclear operation under varying conditions has been developed by the Staff and is attached as Appendix C to the Staff testimony on contention A6.
The model demonstrates that dilution effects alone will reduce the incremental reductionofdissolvedoxygenconcentrationtoapproximately5.4iinParr Reservoir and 2.4% in the Congaree River under adverse case assumptions (Kanciruk, para.10).
3.
Given the high concentrations and wide fluctuations of dissolved oxygen which are typical of the Broad River during striped bass spawning, these small reductions in oxygen concentration will not have measurable adverse effect on the reproduction of striped bass or plankton in the Congaree-River (Kanciruk, para. 11).
4.
These percentage reductions are well within the average daily, monthly, and year-to-year percentage fluctuations of dissolved oxygen in the waters of l
the Congaree and Broad Rivers during the spawning season and throughout the year (Kanciruk, para.12).
5.
The impact of the Summer plant on the oxygen levels in the Broad River l
is predicted to be negligible or, more likely, non-existent (Kanciruk, para.14).
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(2) Thehnal Effluents 6.
The State of South Carolina has issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPOES) permit to the Applicant which limits the thermal discharge from Monticello Reservoir (through the Fairfield pumped storage 0
facility) to an average of 3 F (1.65 C) A T above ambient as measured at the Fairfield intake in Monticello at a depth of 1 foot (o.3 m) and a maximum 0
discharge temperature of 90 F (32.2 C) (Kanciruk, para. 18).
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7.
A conservative computer model developed by the Staff which simulates O
the incremental thermal effluent effects of discharge from the Sumer station (Sta Appendix C to Staff testimony)' predicts a maximum incremental 4 T 0.63 C (1.1 F) in the Congaree River for an intermittently high release, a discharge A T 50% greater than the NPDES Permit allows. This high release could not long be maintained, as it would have to be balanced by proportionally lower releases or it would raise the monthly average discharge A T above the NPDES Permit limit. Analysis for a steady state (average) condition of a 3 F (1.65 C)
U A T indicates a AT for the Congaree of 0.42 C (0.76 F) (Kanciruk, para. 24 ).
(.)
8.
These predicted 6 T's are within daily and monthly temperature fluctuations for this river system during the present spawning season (Kanciruk, para.
25).
9.
Natural daily temperature fluctuations during spawning season can average 1.5-0 0
U 2.5 C (2.7-4'5 F'), with monthly ranges of 10 C (18 F) 3
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- 10. Considering that the majority of the observed spawning in the Congaree 0
River occurs prior to mid-May (below temperatures of about 70 F (29.9 C)), the closest spawning area to the Summer plant is at river mile 53 (35 miles downstream from the plant), eggs rapidly drift downstream from the original spawning area, and the inherent conservatism of the staff's model itself, the Staff predicts that this adverse case AT due t,o Sumer plant operation will have no significant adverse effect on striped bass spawning in the Congaree. Similarly, this small incremental A T will have no adverse affect on plankton populations in downstream areas (Kanciruk, paras. 26-27).
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- 11. Under more realistic and reasoniMe~(Ehough siill conservative) conditions (See Staff testimony at paragraphs 21,29-30), the predictedd T for the Congaree 0
River due to operation of the Sumer plant (0.21 C) is negligib.le and is estimated to have no predicted adverse biological consequences to plankton or striped bass
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spawning in the Congaree River (Kanciruk, para. 31).
- 12. In sum, given the magnitude of the predicted d T's (or even the lack of l
anyAT above stream ambient due to thermocline effects), the distance of the spawning population from the Fairfield facility discharge (approximately 35 miles), the limited exposure time for the eggs, the fact that the majority of spawning taken p' lace prior to mid-May at temperatures below 70 F (21.1 Q, there I
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should be no significant impact on striped bass spawning due to the,
at on of the Summer plant (Kanciruk, para. 33)."
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(3)
Intake Velocities
- 14. The intake velocity for the Summer intake structure measured between the trash rack ana traveling screens, under normal conditions, will range from O.51 fps to 0.44 fps and average 0.48 fps.
Under the unusual condition i,/
emergency drawdown (when the elevation of the Monticello Reservoir is at 418 feet),theintakevelocitywillbeslightlyincreasedto0.55 fps (Kanciruk, para. 35).
- 15. Compared with intake velocities of operating power plants located in the southeastern United States, the Summer intake velocities are not at all un-characteristicorexcessive(Kanciruk, para.39)._.
. _ 16.
Fish impingement losses depend on a myriad of factors, in addition to velocity, such as intake placement, basin morphology, species composition, population structure, interactions between discharge and intake areas, season, etc.
Nonetheless, the designed intake approach velocities for the Summer station are not exce;sive and are generally within recommended guidelines (Kanciruk, para.38).
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B.
Discussion g
0 As the attached affidavit of Dr. Kanciruk and the discovery record demon-strate, contention A6 is an appropriate contention for summary disposition and dismissal. As relevant to contention A6, under normal operation, th'e small reduction in di.ssolved oxygen concentration due to the thermal discharge
.from the Summer plant will have, at most, a negligible effect on the water quality downstream from:the Monticello Reservoir. Thermal effluents will have
(;)
ro significant adverse effect on striped bass spawning or plankton populations in the Congaree River, and the designed intake velocity for the Summer intake structure falls generally within accepted gufdelines and is not uncharacteristic or excessive compared with intake velocities at similar generating facilities in the region.
The Staff further believes that the following additional matters warrant the attention of the Board in its consideration of the instant motion. The first matter concerns the permissible legal scope of contention A6.
It is well established that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider the efficacy of state water quality standards and effluent limitations incorporated into the. terms of the Nat'ional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Permit issued to the Applicant herein by an authorized permit issuing agency under 5402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA)
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or whether the Summer facility will comply with these standards. Such jurisdic-tion rests with the state of South Carolina by delegation ~from EPA in this
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instance. See1511(c)(2)oftheFWPCA,33U.S.C.51371;PublicService Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1 7 NRC 1, 25-25 (1978). Rather, the role of the NRC in the context of centention A6 is to consider the environmental impact that would result from thermal dis-charges from the Sumer. plant authorized by the NPDES Permit and factor the determined impacts into the cost-benefit balance which the NRC must perform under the National Environmental Policy Act. H. The Board had recognized O
this jurisdictional division and delineated the scope of contention A6 See, April 24, 1978 "Prehearing Conference Order"; Transcript accordingly.
e of August 3 deposition of Brett Bursey (August 3 deposition) at 137.
One of the principal claims underlying contention A6, according to the Inter-venor, is that the predictive model utilized, in part, to arrive at the thermal criteria limitations set forth in the' NPDES Permit is not valid.
See "Intervenor Brett A. Bursey's Answers to Interrogatories of NRC Staff" l C (Interrogatory Answers), served August 2, 1978, at 7; August 3 deposition at Tr. 136. As members of the Board aptly noted during the August 3, 1978 deposition of the Intervenor, such an issue is beyond'the purview of the Board's jursidiction and outside the scope of contention A6. Id. at-Tr..137-38, 146-47.
' A second major proposition underlying the Intervenor's claims in contention A6 l
is that the NPDES Permit does not govern the temperature of the Monticello l
Reservoir.
See August 3 deposition at Tr. 142. This is not true. The NPDES
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Permit sets a thermal limit on the discharge from the Sumer station at the S
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i discharge pipe into the Monticello Reservoir as well as at the edge of the f
therm'al mixing zone as measured at the surface of the intake (one foot depth)
I to the Fairfield pumped storage facility discharge. The Monticello Reservoir
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is classified by the Environmental Protection Agency as a navigable water in which Federal and state water quality standards apply. Water quality standards implicitly reflect the quality of water to be maintained to sustain an assigned water usage. Surface waters within the Monticello Reservoir must meet the water quality and use restrictions spec'ified for tributaries to the Broad River in this region under section III.8 of the South Carolina Water Quality Standards.
The Broad River in this region is class 1fied by the Department of Health and Environmental Control, the NPDES permit issuing state, as Class B for purposes of fish propagation and use after treatment for industrial and domestic purposes. Average monthly temperature rise in the reservoir is limited to 0
0 90 F (32.2 C) at the edge of tiie zone of mixing (NPDES Permit, p. 2).
l_
With regard to the Intervenor's direct case on contention A6, during the taking
' pd of the Intervenor's deposition on June 13, 1978, Applicant's counsel asked the Intervenor why there would be a depletion of oxygen due to the thermal discharge from the Sumer station as asserted in contention A6. Transcript of June 13, 1978 deposition-of Brett Bursey (June 13 deposition) at 127. The Intervenor replied:
"I'm que: sing." j. When asked how significant he believed the degradation of-water quality would be in the Broad River if the temperature rise in the Parr Reservoir were limited to 3 above ambient (the NPDES Permit limitation), the Intervenor responded: "I don't know."
Id. at 124. When
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,.. questioned regarding the portion of contention A6 concerneu with the aquatic impact due to the intake velocities in the plant cooling systen (allegedly in excess of.0.5 fps), the Intervenor acknowledged that he knew of no data regarding the impact on indigenous species in neighboring water bodies assuming intake valocities in excess of 0.5 fps and had established no criteria to define the parameters of the term " excessive mortalities" as used in contention A6.
Id. at 129-130. Moreover, as the Staff testimony indicates,
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the approach velocity to the intake screening at the Summer station will average 0.48 fps under normal intake conditions and is within recommended guidelines for facility approach velocities.(Kanciruk, para. 38).
C.
Conclusion with Respect to Contention A6 As demonstrated above, no genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved concerning the aquatic impacts which form the subject of contention i
A6.
Hence, the Board should find for the Staff as a matter of law and grant
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summary disposition and dismissal of contention A6.
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l II. Contention A7 The Applicant's ability to anticipate, detect, or mitigate the impact of accidental releases of radioactive materials to the Broad River is inadequate to protect the potability of the water supply for the municipalities of Columbia and West Columbia.
A.
Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard (1) General
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The Technical Specifications for the Summer operating license will require the reporting of all releases which either exceed radioactivity limits pre-scribed therein or which are the result of accident, mishap or operational g
error (Stoddart, para.1).
2.
Duke Power Company experienced two incidents of effluent releases from its Ocnnee nuclear plant between 1973 and 1978 which fell within the regulatory
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characterization of " anticipated operational occurrences".
(See 10 CFR 550.34a and NUREG-0017 referenced in Stoddart affidavit, para. 12).
In both incidents, however, concentrations of radioactive materials at water supply intakes down-stream of the' point of release were calculated to be a small portion of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits fordrinking water (Stoddart, paras. 8-10).
(2) Anticipated Operational Occurrences 3.
Section 11 of the Final, Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and section 3.5 of the Environmental Report (ER) contain the Applicant's analyses of the magnitude of plant liquid radioactive releases from normal operations, including " anticipated operational occurrences." The phrase " anticipated operational occurrences" is derived from the phrase " expected operational occurrences" in 10 CFR 550.34a
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(See NUREG-0017) and is employed by the Staff and Applicant to denota events, such as upsets, leaks, spills, and similar mishaps, which are anticipated to
occur.on the order of one event per year during the normal operating lifetime of a plant as the result of design deficiencies, construction errors, operator errors, or equipment malfunctions (Stoddart, para.12) 4.
It is assumed by the Applicant and Staff that an average of 0.15 Ci/yr of radioactive material will be released to the environment in liquid effluents from the Sumer nuclear plant as the result of anticipated operational Q
occurrences (Stoddart, paras.13,14).
(3) Accidents 5.
The term " accident" generally connotes an event of a more serious nature then an " anticipated operational occurrence ". Accidents are divided into classi-fications (classes 3 through 9) per the terms of the proposed Annex to then Appendix D, 10 CFR Part 50. Accidents have a lower probability of happening then anticipated operational occurrences (Stoddart, paras. 15, 16).
O 6.
The only postulated accident which has the potential for releasing radio-active liquids to a drinking water supply is the gross failure of any tank outside the containment that contains radioactive liquids.
Both the Staff and Applicant h' ave calculated that the accidental release of the contents of such a tank containing design basis inventory of radioactive materials would not result in radioactivity concentrations in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits,for drinking water at the nearest municipal water supply intake.
In more than 600 reactor-
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years of operating experience, no such postulated accident has occurred (Stoddart, para.16).
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(d)AnticipationofLiquidEffluentReleases 7.
Section 11.2 of the FSAR describes design features incorporated in the plant for the control, collection, and treatment of liquid radioactive wastes in anticipation of spills, upsets, or leakage from systems or components con-taining radioactive liquids in the course of nonnal operations, including anticipated operational occurrences. These features are acceptable to the Staff (Stoddart, para.17).
i 8.
The liquid radioactive waste treatment system is provided to process anticipated liquid radioactive wastes prior to discharge to the environment or reuse in the plant. The systems are described in sections 9.3, 10.4.8, and 11.2 of the FSAR and are acceptable to the Staff (Stoddart, para. 20).
(5)
Detection of Liquid Effluent Releases O
9.
Section 11.4 of the FSAR contains a description of the design features incorporated in the Summer plant for the detection of radioactive materials contained in releases to the Monticello Reservoir, Fairfield Pumped Storage Facility, and Broad River (Stoddart, para. 22).
- 10. The Applicant has provided continuous radioactivity monitoring instru-mentation on each normally or potentially radioactive effluent stream.
Each of these monitors has the capability, upon alarm, of initiating the automatic termination of the flow of the effluent stream.
In addition, process monitors i
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on principal process streams will continuously measure the radioactivity
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levels in these streams to detect and annunciate leakage of radioactive materials into normally nonradioactive process streams or to detect and annunciate the buildup of above normal radioactive material concentrations in radioactive process streams (Stoddart, para. 23),
11.
In addition to continuous radioact'ivity monitoring instrumentation, principal process streams and all effluent streams will be sampled and analyzed for radioactivity content on a frequency which will be established in the operating license Technical Specifications. Each batch of liquid waste will be sampled and analyzed prior to discharge (Stoddart, para. 24).
(6)
Mitigation *of' Liquid' Effluent Releases I
- 12. The Applicant's design features for systems relative to liquid radio-(n V
active effluents, described in paragraphs 17 through 24 of the'Stoddart affidavit, serve to mitigate the effects of the inadvertent release.of liquid radioactive effluents by detecting, controlling, preventing, or otherwise minimizing such l
releases, thereby minimizing the potential effects of such releases (Stoddart, para.26).
- 13. The Applicant's radioactive waste treatment systems are capable of keepir)g radioactive material in effluents to the environment "as low as is reasonably acheivable" in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 550.34a and corres-
e.
ponding guidelines of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I.
No additional provisions are required for the further reduction of releases of radioactive material in effluents,(Stoddirt, para. 27).
B.
Discussion l
The attached affidavit of Phillip G. Stoddart and the discovery record demon-h-
strate that the Board should grant summary disposition of and dismiss contention A7.
In response to Staff interrogatory A7-5, the Intervenor states that " C here i
is no mention of efforts by the Applicant to detect, prevent or mitigate l
accidental releases into the Broad River".
See Intervenor's Answers to Interrogatories at 9.
According to the Intervenor, there should be included a discussion of the consequences of Class 9 accidents. See August 3 deposition at Tr. 194.
In a similar regard, the Intervenor singled'out an incident.involv-ing a release of radioactive effluent from the Duke Power Company's Oconee nuclear O
plant into the source of the ciemson university drinxing water as worthy of consideration in this proceeding.
See June 13, 1978 depo'sition at Tr. 136.
As the attached affidavit of Mr. Stoddart indicates, certain design features have been incorporated into the Summer plant to provide for the anticipation, detection and mitigation ~of radioactive liquid effluent releases resulting from normal operation (including anticipated operational occurrences) to the Broad River. As further noted in the Stoddart affidavit, these design features
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combine to ensure that anticipated levels of radioactive liquid effluent
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releases to the environment will be "as low as is reasonably acheivable" in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 150.34a. The incident alluded
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to by the Intervenor regarding the Oconee facility involved an anticipated opera-tional occurrence.
In that incident, concentrations of radioactive material at the water supply intake downstream of the point of release were calculated to be a small fraction of the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 for drinking Q
water.
l With regard to the matter of accidental releases, the only postulated accident which has the potential for releasing radioactive liquid effluent to a drinking water supply is the gross failure of any tank outside the containment that contains radioactive liquids. This incident was considered as a design basis event in the FSAR.
It was calculated that this postulated liquid tank rupture accident would not result in radioactive releases in excess of the specified Q
limits in 10 CFR Part 20 for drinking water at the nearest municipal water supply intake. When questioned by the Applicant on oral deposition whether he postulated a liquid waste system failure of a more severe nature than that postulated by the Applicant, the Intervenor responded:
"I do not know."
See June 13, 1978 deposition at Tr. 159.
Further, in more than 600 reactor i
years of operating experience, no such postulated accident has occurred.
Lastly, with respect to the Intervenor's claim that the~ consequences of Class 9 accidents should be considered, it is a well settled Commission policy that the
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.P consequences of Class 9 accidents are not considered in connection with land-See most 'ecently Offshore Power based nuclear plant license applications.
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r Systems'(Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 7 NRC _ (August 21,1978).
C.
Conclusion'with Respect to Contention A7 As demonstrated above, no genuine issues of material fact remain to be O
resolved concerning the abiiity of the Appiicant to adequateiy anticipate detect or mitigate the impact of accidental releases of radioactive materials to the Broad River so as to protect the potability of the water supply for Columbia and West Columbia, South Carolina. Accordingly, the Board should find for the Staff as a matter of law and grant summary disposition of and dismiss contention A7.
CONCLUSION-For the reasons set forth above, the Board should grant summary disposition O
of and dismiss contentions As'and A7 in this proceedin9 f
Respectfully submitted,
/.b %.40Y Steven C. Goldberg I
Counsel for NRC Staff f
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland l
this 3rd day of October,1978.
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