ML20062A830

Forwards Listing of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed During Sept 1990

ML20062A830
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/02/1990
From:	Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RAR-90-75, NUDOCS 9010230160
Download: ML20062A830 (6)

Text

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[^x Commonwealth Edison

') ' ouad Cites Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North

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Cordova. H!inots 61242 9740 9

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Telephone 309/654 2241 RAR-90-75 October 2, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C.

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SUBJECT:

Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes Tests, and Experiments Completed NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 t

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes,. tests, and experiments completed during the month of September, 1990, for Quad-Cities Station Units I and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30.

A summary of the safety evaluations

re being reported in compilance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).

Respectfully, 1

COMMONHEALTh EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES l'UCLEAR POWER STATION i

Robey Technical Superintendent RAR/LFD/jmt Enclosure cc:

A.B. Davis, Regional Administrator T. Taylor, Senior Resident' Inspector 9010230160 901002

{DR ADOCK 05000254 PDC 0027H/00612-f&Y'ty

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V Special Test:#1-134'

l.i Description i

Special Test No. 1-134 was completed on August-8'-1990. This test Li determined the capability of the. Service Water. System'to' supply' adequate flow to components and the capabilitiesaof the major heat exchangers and coolers.

to handle the required heat loads.

Evaluation l

i 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluatedi in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this'~

special test will not change the. design 1 unction or configuration f

of the Service Water. System,ttherefore it can not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an' accident..or

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malfunction of equipment evaluated iniche FSAR.

,y 2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a.different type;

,l than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

is not. created because'.this special test utilizes. normal operating

6 configurations of the Service Water.Syv m, so the possibility of.

an accident or malfunction'of a differet. type,than evaluated in the' il FSAR is not created.

3.

The margin of safety, an' defined in the bas's for anyDTechnicaltSpeci-

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fication, is not reduced because' service water is not addressedLin i

the Technical Specifications.-and this-test uses normal-design. con-1 l

figurations and monitoring, which does not affect the margin of safety.

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,se, Special Test'#1-143' Description Special' Test No. 1-143 was completed on August 2, 1990. Tliis test determined the capability of the Service Water pumps to.supoly; adequate flow to the Service Water Header.

Evaluation a

1.

The pr<,bability of an occurrence or the consequence of_an' accident, or merfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated

.l in ',he Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this' srecial test will not change the design function or configuration.

of-the Service Water System. therefore 4.t can not increase the probability, of an occurrence or the consequence of.an accident or malfunction of equipment as evaluated in the FSAR.

2.

The possibility'for an accident or malfunction.of a different type' than any previously evaluated in the: Final Safety Analysis ReportJ is not created because this special test utilizes normal operating-configurations of the Service Water System, so'the-possibility of I

an accident or malfunction of a different: type than any'previously-evaluated in the FSAR does not exist.

3.

The margin of safety, as' defined in the basis for any Technical Speci.

fication, is not reduced because the Service Water System is not~

addressed in Technical Specifications, and this test uses normal-design configurations and monitoring.:

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Safety Evaluation #90-502:

l Core Monitoring Code Update'for Software Problem Report Corrections 5

Description j

This revision of the Core Monitoring Code was installed to correct the.

Software Problem Reports (SPRs) listed in GE Field Disposition Instructions (FDI) #RBGU Revision 17.

Evaluation j

1.,The probability of an occurrence'or the consequence of'an accident,.

or malfunction of equipment important to safety as.previously: evaluated '

in the Final Safety Analysis _ Report is not increased because: th'is,

z installation involves a computer-program which haa.no contro1 Lover l

any. equipment, and therefore cannot increase the probabilityjof anj j

occurrence or the consequence of'an accident.

2..The possibility for an accident or malfunction of.a,different type >

than any previously evaluated in.the Final Safety Analysis Report,

't is not created because the computer program has.no' functional control-i over any equipment. Also, the program'is utilized:by the nuclear; engineers for safety related calculations.-concerning thermal limits.

The limits and the calculational. techniques were.not:changediin,the.

.t udpate. Therefore, the limitsLtake:into account alll accidents-described =

in the FSAR which are thermal limited and do notLcreate;any new. type of accident.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in-the basis for any Technical-Speci-

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Code being installed does not affect any. safety limits.; It;is being' fication, is not reduced because the revision lof the: Core Monitoring.:

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y installed to. correct software problems within the codeland will have no af f ect on the calculation 'of the: safety.11mits'. q

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Safety Evaluation #90-575 i

Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow Line~to Condenser Isolation Description To quantify the leakage.past PCV 1-3201A. temporarily close'the 1-3213A valve which is a manual - normally open, S-locked isolation valve to the condenser.-

Evaluation

1., The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an ' accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety"as.previously evaluated-in the Final Safety Analysis Report is'not increased because the worst-case would be the loss of the IA-3201 feedpump and the,FSAR evaluationL is for the loss of all three feedpumps.,In addition,-the.feedwater?

system is not safety related.

Finally ;the unit.operatorLwill.beo aware of the situation and an operator will'be'available to open the-valve as needed.

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Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunction-of.adifferent,thpe 2.

than any previously evaluated in the Finni Safety AnalysisiReport' is not created because the loss.of feedwater accident is;the only potential accident scenario for this; work. -Not allowing minimum flow for the feedpump could cause a pump malfunction,butritiis also' covered-for in the evaluation for' loss ofz feedwater.

a 3.

The margin.of safety, as defined in the basis'for any. Technical.Speci-.

fications, is not reduced because the feedwater system does;not constitute the basis for any Technical Specifications..

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,x Safety Evaluation #90-627 i

Procedure Change'QCAP!600-6

Safety Evaluation,#90-628.-

Procedure Change QCRP-1910-3 Procedure Change QRP 1000-1l Description f

a' This change replaced the use of film dosimetryswith thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD).

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Evaluation

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1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence,of an~ accident.

or malfunction of equipment important~to safety as previously evaluated:

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in.the Final Safety Analysis Report _is not' increased because since film badges are not part of: any equipment or component of a system,;

switching to another type of. dosimetry (TLD) will not affect the safety evaluation.

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2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunci:fon of a diffhrent type than any previously evaluated in the Final: Safety Analysis Report.

is not created because during any accident lor malfunction,of equipment.

.i radiation IcVels could increase. TLD! badges-will be able to record l

this radiation. The.following.is a list'of TLD advantages,over film l

dosimetry:

No. latent image. fading, temperat_ure-and humidity insensitive, tissue equivalent, and shorter-processing' time.

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The margin of safety, as defined in the1 basis for.anyhTechnical Speci-i fication, is not reduced because the TLC is.more advanced.than film.

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