ML20059M803
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}}{{#if:EXHIBITS (DOCKETING AND SERVICES BRANCH INFORMATION, LEGAL TRANSCRIPTS & ORDERS & PLEADINGS|{{#arraymap:EXHIBITS (DOCKETING AND SERVICES BRANCH INFORMATION, LEGAL TRANSCRIPTS & ORDERS & PLEADINGS|,|x|| }}{{#if:{{#show:ML20059M803|?site}}|{{#invoke:Navbox|navbox}}
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{{#Wiki_filter:- __ OIIT*hf$F/f M I-0-27 323- 06/9 ~ b hen dC Y'**** ENCLOSURE 1 Zb
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Pf/ 7 AT PACIFIC. GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY M DIABLO CANYOH POWER PLANT 1 Onsite Safety Review Group (OSRG).93 L-ea Po,16 November 1992 Monthly Report ei 4 SUWaRY The following items sumarize the OSRG's observations and concerns from t A more detailed description follows and all items that 4 November meetings. were reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. The recent failure of a 4kV auxiliary saltwater pump motor feeder cable 1. is the third of this type in the past three years. Seismic restraints for monorail hoists, designed to prevent interactions with nearby safety related equipment, are not always being. 2. installed af ter use. Two OSRG concerns from the October monthly. report related to the Operability Evaluation (CE 92-20) on.CFCU; were resolved in November.- 3. CESCRIPTION The following items were discussed by the OSRG. ' Generally, where concerns exist, they have been discussed with the appropriate TRG Chairman'or responsible department head and an AR has been initiated. if applicable. 1. NCR DC1-92-EM N054: Hi-Pot (test) on ASW PP Motor 1-2 4kV Cable F ail e_o. A recent f ailure of the ASW 1-2 feeder cable de t'he' third CONCERN: The OSRG DCPP document?d failure of this type in the past three years. i has concerns e;erding reportability (i.e., outside design basis since the 40 year cable life potentia 11y'is invalidated) and regarding the 4cck of docue.entati g for the acceptability'of potentially degraded-cable. NOTE: There are twelve total ASW' Trump cables, both rf ts inclusive; two have experienced failures. RESOLUTION: Design basis reportability was mentioned by Regulatory Ccepliance during a TRG meeting. - The OSRG member asked the TRG'to 1 address this issue at its next meeting.. Preliminary indication is that the condition is not reportable. The cable design basis does not-y include submergence, the probable root _ cause. The OSRG will continue to track this concern. The concern regarding lack of documentation for the acceptebility.of the potentially degraded condition was presented to the TRG by the attending OSRG member. An AE to AR A0283380 will track the NCR Safety 1 Analysis update to address this issue. f 'hb r* 93111903359Ma73-10 gDR ADocn o PDR
k ( i OSR3 November 1992 Monthly Report' Page 2 of 5 The OSRG consensus is that the cable is not rated for:long term submergence, and therefore, the cable is not failing-to meet submergence requirements-(1.e., not outside design basis).
- However, degradation of the cables, due to submergence..~1s a potential unreviewed safety question. -(The cable is not~ designed for submergence but is being exposed to-this conditinn.) The Safety =
Analysis requested above by the DSRG should address this concern. DISCUSSION:- The first f ailure of 'a hi-pot test' on thisL type of cable was in October 1989 on ASW PP 2-2. The second failure was in May_1992 on the Bus 14E feeder. All three insulation failures were experienced in the vicinity of the first circuit' pull box:just outside the turbine. building. This is the low point in a.long horizontal run of cable just west of the turbine wailding. The fact that water has been documented in these pull boxes, and the fact that the most recent failure occurred-t approximately 3 days after a rain shower (water found.in ASW PP:1' ' associated pull box. 2 ft. above cable elevation), leads to-a' strong preliminary conclusion that the cable'has been degraded due.to repeated submergence over the past 20 years. 2. Walkdown of Plant-Mounted Monorail Hoists. per OSRG Ohen item 97-02 Uters to Monitor for IRS-Outace), to Assure Seismic- 011ps Were Reinstalled. CONCERN: Seismic restraints for monorail hoists, designed to prevent 'f interactions with nearby safety related equipment 'are not-being, instelled after use in all cases. Controls to assure that plant-mounted (trolleys and hoists are secured are not consistentlyechanical Main irp m ented. work orders, at the OSRG's request.- Recently Electrical.~ Maintenance has been found to have the same problem. RESOLUTION: The OSRG initiated AR A0286084 recently on a missing hoist seismic stop above Centrifegal Charging Pump (CCP) 1-1.. An AE was. issued to request a' seismic interaction analysis of this condition and: another AE was issued to request modification of electrical werk orders _ to include steps to secure hoists and seismic stops. Work order C0107374 was initiated to reinstall the missing stop and re-stenci1_the monorail. This issue will be followed via the AR and.the OSRG's Open Item 92-02. DISCUSSION: In 1991 the OSRG' issued AR A0235110 requesting thati Mechanical Maintenance establish procedural-guidance to ensure-applicable work orders contained steps to secure monorail hoists. Riggers who use such equipment are in the Mechanical Maintenance-section. Mechanical Maintenance responded by stating that instructions would be added to RT work orders and planners would be directed to add I instructions to CH work orders. l 1 -..--.-.- - -.---..~.. =
i !9 i f k NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIS$1DN l'e tNo-Qt2 7 h O b d un v e muer es fweic &n%_ Official Eih. No. W[ ~2d.. J9Uc% c co. Shff,___ _,__ rDrt,Tintp / AC 1~ W.._ n :. a., /, __ __ _..._ _ _, k ! 01 /f D [ ca ato hisKfMit.my-21-3g w sv o~. e., tyw cetes 41 df s**
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s Onsite Safety Review Group November 1992 Monthly Report 1. Nonconformances The OSRG either attended TRGs for the following NCRs or, if the TRG was Specific critique not attended, reviewed the completed NCR package. comments have been provided to.the responsible Chairman and/or ARs have. been initiated, if applicable. DC1-92-EM-N054: Hi-Pot (test on ASW PP Motor 1-2 AkV Cable Failed. (OSRG Surveillance 92-055.kwr 2. Regulatory Correspondence NRC letter to PG&E, Notice of Violation, HRC Inspection Report No. 92-16, dated July 7, 1992 Chron192621. PGLE letter to NRC. Reply to Notice of Violation-in.NRC Inspection Report No. 92-17, PG&E Letter No. DCL-92-161, dated July:20, 1992, Chron193142. PGLE letter to NR'C, Response to Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1,. Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, PG&E Letter No. DCL-92-150, dated June 30, 1992, Chron192218. 3. Miscellaneous Items Walkdown of plant-mounted monorail hoists, per OSRG Open Item 92-02 c) (Items to Henitor for 1R5 Outage), to assure seismic stops were -reinstalled. (OSRGeSurveillance 92-052.tes) b) TES evaluation of CFCU imbalance due to fan blade deformation. (OSRGSurveillance92-054.bal) c) OE 92-20. Rev. 1: OE for Unit 2 CFCUs with Cracked Backdraft Damper Blades, d) DCP H-47225: Cycle 6 Core /SG Tube Plugging G w. ..u .,...n.,, ,n.,
i 1 g ! * *
- UPDATE AT 0216 BY GOELZER ENTERED BY H00 J0LLIFFE * *
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Mu 3 7 f-PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYOH POWER PLANT Onsite Safety Review Group (OSRG). December 1992 Monthly Report' SUMHARY The following items summarize the OSRG's observations and concerns from the~ meetings' for this inonth. A more detailed description follows and all items that were reviewed are listed in' Attachment 1. ' 3. A recent NCR on Diesel Fuel OllLpiping corrosion did not adequately l address two earlier ARs from February 1990 that identified the same problem. The NCR does.not address the need for corrective actions for-1 past failures to identify and resolve this problem. 2. There is an apparent inconsistency between administrative procedures-governing reportability of seismic hazards that are corrected on. the spot. 3. In response to a Nuclear Safety Oversight Comittee (NSOC) request, the OSRG examined current operability evaluations for potential-interrelationships. Such interrelations could impact accident analyses. 4. A f ailure of the speed reference input to the Unit 2 main' turb'ine digital-electrohydraulic controls (DEHC) occurred on 8/31/91..A year-later, an NCR resulted, in part,'due to the' same prcblem in Unit 1. However.efter this'second occurrence, the investigation and testing- ~ was a major effort. The thoroughness and determination of the TRG trembers involved in this effort were noteworthy. 5. The HRC suggested possible similarities between a heavy loads rigging' incioent and an earlier incident. Bect: 2 DCPP took exception to this, any lessolis to be learned may not be recognized. A DESCRIPTION The following items were. discussed by the OSRG. Generally, where concerns exist, they have been discussed with the appropriate TRG Chairman or-responsible department head, and an AR-has been initiated,:if ' applicable. 1. NCR DC2-92 TH N028: Corrosion of Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) Annubar Piping and Diesel Fuel Oil (Of0) Piping CONCERN: The NCR did not adequately address two Tebruary 1990 ARs! which identified Of0 piping corrosion. Although an NCR action item provided for an investigation of the details associated with these'ARs, the NCR does not provide' corrective. actions to address this failure of the problem resolution process to preclude subsequent DFO:(and,- possibly, ASW) piping and pipe support corrosion.
I 1 + OSRG December 199? Monthly Report Page 2 of 7 RE50LllTION: The OSRG's concerns were discussed with the TRG chairman. The need for additional corrective actions to address these concerns 1 will be discussed in an early January 1993 TRG for this NCR. Additionally, this NCR will be included in OSRG 01 89-14 regarding ineffective corrective actions, and in 01 89-25 regarding ARs with improper QE determinations. DISCUSSION: On 6/18/92, a hole about one and one-half inches in diameter was found in the annubar piping for ASW train 2-2. Corrosion was also noted in the annubar piping of the other ASW trains. Subsequent inspections of other piping in the Unit 2 west buttress pipe trench on 6/21/92 revealed corrosion of the two cardox lines and DF0 train 0-1 piping. On 7/?/92, ultrasonic testing of the Df0 train 0-1 piping revealed one location that was below the minimum wall thickness requirement. An Engineering evaluation revealed that the DF0 piping would still have performed its intended function. A voluntary LER (1 92-006-01) was submitted for the DF0 piping degradation. The TRG root cause for the DF0 and ASW piping degradation was general corrosion due to breakdown of the coal tar coating. This exposed the piping to standing water and the saltwater / air environment. Standing water seeping through the coating resulted in piping corrosion, especially at the air / water interface. As the iron oxide formed and expanded, the coal tar coating was further degraded, and the corrosion spread 7 The standing water in the trench was due to inadequate drainage, caused by flow blockage by pipe supports and external debris. Contributory causes identified by the TRG were:
- 1) inadequate surveillance and inspection procedures which did not provide ir.;' uction for identif G at N of corrosion, and 2) inadequate initial epplication and maintenance of the coal ter coating on the underside of the DF0 and ASW piping.
The TRG corrective actions include the development and implementation of a program to inspect and repair or repire the remaining areas of corrosion on DF0 and cardox piping and supports. The program will also include improvenents in the surveillance program, the protective coatings, and drainage of the pipe trench. Additionally, standing water in the trench will be minimized as part of this program. To address the generic plant concern of corrosion, a task force was formed. It will develop and implement a comprehensive program for actual or potential corrosion problems in other safety re?ated piping.
I e f-05R3 Detecer 1992 Honthly Report l Page 3 of 7 i i l The dispositioning of the 199n ARs resulted in repairs to the affected corrosion areas. Also, an increase was made in the frequency of the j OF0 system leak inspection surveillance (STP H-91). However, STP M-91 (as noted in one NCR contributory cause) did not specifically-address corrosion problems, nor did the STP require inspection of all DF0 trcnsfer piping or the coated ASW piping in the Unit 2 west buttress i pipe trench. A QE was not initiated for either of the ARs, nor was HrM requested to evaluate the significance of corrosion on coated piping. Thus, the previous corrective actions were ineffective. 2. Administrative Procedure (AP) C-1051: Seismically Induced System Tiiteraction program ($1 SIP) Review of flousekeeping Activities ~ CONCERN: t.n NRC Resident Inspector revealed an apparent inconsistency between administrative procedures. The or.e governing reporting of l seismic hazards disagrees with those governing problem resolution and I operability evaluations. RESOLUTION: Action Request A0288854 was initiated by the OSRG and routed to Quality Control. It details the apparent inconsistency between AP C-1051 and procedures C-12 and C-29 (Problem Resolution and l Operability Evaluations, respectively). The Quality Control section is l responsibic for C-1051 and its revision. l DISCUSSION: When a SISIP problem is fuund, it may be corrected on the spot. The applicable procedure for plant housekeeping ac'.'"ities is AP unanaly2cd in_ procedure,3,1ows proble3Lt.q_go undocumented a C-10SI. This 1 such casts _. 97 ) asis is that the TQU4!!Fe~nt remains operable end the problem is discovered and corrected 50 quickly that ~ any potential inoperability is comentary. OCPP's position is that any potential operabilit.fconcern begins at the time of discovery;. However, this S! SIP policy appears to be in conflict with APs C-12 i (Problem Resolution) and C-29 (Operability Evaluations). Both proceduresrequireanARtobewrittenandthe_ pas _t,,ggetabi.,Hty_ond tsdm. Suth..condt i,ons, mamquite, tqpor.l.i ng reporTaliTTity to' brY@i.ly rendied. SISIP hautdi may place-the plant to tfie Nxt, even Mas in an un maTyTe7 condition, and Lossibly outside of'the design basis. Discussions on tmRTer are cont 1nuTrPF--- l 3. AR A0283432, AE.9: Interrelationships Between Operability Evt.luations j i 1 T0H) CONCERX: The OSR3 raised a concern that multiple OEs could create conditions adverse to nuclear safety in unrecognized ways. ( RESOLUTION: The HSOC requested that the OSRG look into potential interrelationships between current OEs. An OSRG member reviewed the current 0Es and categorized their effects on FSAR Chapter 15 Condition i 111 and IV events. j l L J}}