ML20059L701
| ML20059L701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1993 |
| From: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Lieberman J SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351B829 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9311170303 | |
| Download: ML20059L701 (4) | |
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/pn Muq#o, UNITED STATES
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% NJ November 10, 1993 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510-0703
Dear Senator Lieberman:
I am responding to your letter of October 5, 1993, in which you expressed your concern over recent events and trends at Unit 2 of the Millstone nuclear power plant.
The Nuclear Regulatory.
Commission is also concerned about the effectiveness of efforts that Northeast Utilities (NU) has undertaken to improve perfor-mance at Millstone 2.
Although the Commission believes that Millstene 2 remains safe to operate, aggressive NU management-involvement and NRC regulatory oversight are needed to ensure continued plant safety and performance improvement.
During the past several years, the NRC has steadily increased the resources it has devoted to the inspection and oversight of the facility.
A brief narrative of recent NRC staff and NU activi-ties is enclosed.
The NRC will continue to devote an enhanced level of effort for the foreseeable future until there are indications of sustained improvement at Millstone.
The Commission views the report by NU's Independent Review Team (IRT) as encouraging in that it is candid and critical in its-assessment of NU's own performance and clearly identifies root and contributing causes of the August 5, 1993 isolation valve leak.
Our oversight effort will focus on ensuring that the improvements that NU identified in response to the IRT findings and recommendations are accomplished.
NU's plans and efforts to improve performance have, to this point, been undertaken in an environment of increasing oversight by the NRC and intense public scrutiny.
Even when NU reaches a point when they have addressed all the findings that the'!mC'and others have identified and NU fulfills all the commitments they.
have made to the NRC, we will not be fully satisfied.
What NU must demonstrate to the NRC is that they can sustain these performance improvements on a continuing basis and not merely in response to enhanced scrutiny by the NRC and the public.
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I want to assure you that the NRC will continue to nonitor the Millstone 2 situation closely until the Commission is fully satisfied that the problems identified at the plants are com-pletely corrected and that improved performance will be sustained.
Sincerely, d
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Ivan Selin
.i Enclosure As stated f
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The NRC staff reviewed the report by the Independent Review Team (IRT) and found it candid and critical of NU's performance.
The report clearly identified root and contributing causes that led to the leak and potential failure of a letdown isolation valve on August 5,1993, resulting in a forced unit shutdown.
Before and at the time of the event, NRC Region I and Headquarters held frequent conversations with NU to discuss NRC's technical safety concerns in this matter.
Following the event on August 5, 1993, the NRC conducted a special inspection of the activities associated with the event. The inspection disclosed poor management oversight and work control of this safety swificant activity by NU. As a result of this information, NRC management quickl' took a number of steps to convey its significant concerns with NU's performance.
In particular, the Region I Regional Administrator discussed this matter with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Northeast Utilities in mid-August.
Following that conversation, the Region I Deputy Regional Administrator met personally with the CEO and senior NU management onsite to more fully discuss our concerns with NU's performance at Unit 2 since the Spring of 1993.
NRC senior management met again with NU senior management on October 1,1993, to review the findings, recommendations, and plans for implementation of the IRT findings.
The meeting also was held to discuss the three apparent violations that the NRC staff identifieo regarding the Unit 2 event on August 5, 1993.
The NRC is currently evaluating escalated enforcement in this matter. At the meeting, NU senior managers asserted their commitment to operate their nuclear units safely or not at all, and to ensure consistency of their standards of performance with this philosophy.
The NRC staff believes that the primary performance issue at Hillstone is one of-attitude and dedication to conservative plant management and operation, the principal focus of the IRT report.
NU management's acceptance of the findings of the IRT and the comprehensive corrective measures it initiated in response, while encouraging, will require continued vigilance by NU and the NRC.
In response to the performance decline at Millstone Unit 2, NU made several significant organizational changes to improve safe plant operation.
It has also issued management directives restricting work on valves during plant operation, particularly the type of repair that was conducted on the letdown i
isolation valve previousli nota.i. NU produced and distributed to each of the roughly 3000 employees in its nuclear organization a video emphasizing its commitment to conservative operating philosophy.
NU made additional-enhancements to its control of work activities and communicated management expectations for safe plant operation during face-to-face meetings with supervisors. Furthermore, following the meeting of October 1,1993, NU provided in writing'to the NRC, a commitment to augment management oversight of the pending Unit 2 startup as well as future critical Millstone operations.
The NRC has been and will be devoting substantial efforts on the part of its 4
resident and region-based inspection staff to verify that these corrective actions are implemented and that safe plant operation will continue.
Enclosure
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2 We note that sev$hal years ago, the NRC and NU recognized the decline 'in its performance at the Millstone Station.
In response to these concerns, NU conducted a s2 ries of self-assessments in mid-1991 and later developed a Performance Enhancement Program (PEP) in mid-1992 to address the performance problems identified. The PEP is a long-term (3-5 year) program to enhance NU 1
performance and provides substantial additional resources to its nuclear operations to support key programmatic improvements. However, NU performance since mid-1992 has improved only marginally, as reflected in the most recent NRC report of the systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) covering the period from February 1992 to April 1993. Moreover, performance at Unit 2 has clearly declined since April 1993, although performance at i
Millstone Units 1 and 3 remains steady or slightly improving.
NRC devoted additional inspection resources to follow the licensee's implementation of the PEP and its effectiveness at achieving performance improvement. We plan to continue this effort with particular focus on those areas of the PEP related to the IRT recommendations. We also will continue to maintain a substantial inspection program at Millstone, including a resident inspection staff of 4-5 supplemented by 1-2 region-based inspectors.
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