ML20059J877
| ML20059J877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J876 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009210012 | |
| Download: ML20059J877 (3) | |
Text
_ _. - -
l
[ p rece\\
UNITED STATES fjh#$
NUCLEM REGULATORY COMMISSION "V/ c '
wasssNotou. o. c. rosbs s6'.J/
l s,.....
SAFETYEVALUATIONBYTHEOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULAT10t!
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 114 AND 96 TO FACILITY OPERATIN(a LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY-
[
SALEM GENERATING STATION. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated May 21, 1990 and supplemented by letter dated July 18, 1990, Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. I and 2.
The proposed amendments would relax the reportability requirements for the reactor tri) breaker and reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing. The tecinical specifications require the NRC to be notified imediately if the action statement concerning the number of channels required to be operable is entered as a result of maintenance testing of the reactor trip breakers (RTB) or reactor trip bypass breakers (RTBB). The Action Statement is entered, when in Mode 1 or 2, or with the control rod system energized in Modes 3, 4, or 5, when any procedural acceptance criteria is exteeded or l
trip forces exceed the recommended upper limit.
In addition, repairs cannot be made until the NRC is notified. The proposed change would eliminate the immediate NRC notification requirement; however, a written report to the NRC would be required within 30-days if the following acceptance criteria were exceeded:
1.
A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar, or 2.
A RTB or RTBB response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification Limit.
The July 18, 1990 supplemental letter did not increase the scope of the original amendment request and did not affect the staff's original no significarit hazards analysis.
2.0 EVALUATION Following the Salem ATWS events of February 22 and 25 1983 the licensee implemented extensive revisione tothemaintenanceandsurve,illance p0 khhhkb b72 P
__ ~ _.. _ _
-?-
procedures associated with the reactor trip breaker (RTB) and reactor trip i
bypass (RTEB) breakers. Since many of these procedural changes were proto-typical in nature, they were broad in scope and contained very conservative i
test and acceptance criteria. Additionally, because of the safety significance of these events, the NPC staff imposed conservative reportability recuirements i
to ensure timely notification of hardware related deficiencies. These addi-tional reporting requirements were subsequently incorporated into the talem i
Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications as required by the staff's SER dated April 28, 1983, that provided restart authorization for Salem, Units 1 and 2.
Subsequently, Generic Letter 83-28 (GL 83-28) established industry wide required j
actions based on the generic implications of the Salem ATWS events. These actions addressed issues related to reactor trip system n11 ability and general management capability. GL 83-28 did not impose additional reporting requirements beyond those already in existence. -
10 CFR 50.72 was established to promulgate imediate notification requirements for any plant condition presenting a clear challenge to safe operation.
Subsequent revisions have further defined those significant events where imediate NRC action to protect the public health and safety may be required or 4
where the NRC needs accurate and timely information to respond to heightened public concern. Thus, the present version of 10 CFR 50.72 clearly addresses the immediate reporting requirements associated with any significant RTB or RTBB deficiency that is found during normal operation (i.e., not found during surveillance / maintenance testing)
.These are the same reporting recuirements that currently exist for Salem 1 and 2, and no changes are being mate to these requirements. For conditions found during surveillance / maintenance the revisions to 10 CFR 50.72 generally do not require the reporting of,those stoblem (NUREG - 1022, Supplement 1, Section 11. 2.3, page 4). The licensee 1as proposed to continue to report surveillance / maintenance test results that do not meet either of the following criteriat 1.
A RTB or RTBB that fails to trip with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar, or 2.
A RTB or RTBB response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the te::hnical sp6cification limit.
Instead of imediate notification the' licensee has proposed to submit a Special Report (written report) wIthin 30-days of the event.
The principal. issue that led to the establishment of the Salem Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specification imediate notification requirements was questionable RTB reliability. Subsequent to the implementation of enhanced maintenance / surveillance procedures, Salem has conducted approximately 95 separate surveillances on the RTBs and RTBBs. There have been no instances of any breaker failing to meet its design safety function (trippingopen)underhormaloperatingconditions(noadditio~nal weight on the breaker trip bar).
1 i
i
l The above changes represent a change in reporting requirements only. No
)
changes in testing conducted, the frequency of testing, or acceptance criteria i
'are being made.
By reporting surveillance / maintenance test results that fail
{
to meet the above stated criteria,.the staff will continue to be informed if RTB and RTBB are degrading at Salem 1 and 2.
Therefore, the staff finds.these i
changes to the reporting requirements for RTB and RTBB surveillance / maintenance-testing to be acceptable.
l The July 18,1990 supplement corrected an error in the Salem 1 technical speci-fication page that was in the original submittal. This change brought the unchanged portion of the requested technical specification c1ange into agreement with the currently approved technical; specifications.
3.0 ENVIRONMQTALCONSIDERATION These amendments relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. Accord'ngly the amendments 1
meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion, set forth in 10CFR51.22;c)(10). Pursuantto10'CFR51.22(b),noenvironmentalimoset statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (55FR26293)onJune 27, 1990 and consulted with the State of i
New Jersey. No put,lic comments were received and the State of New Jersey did not have any conments.
i' The staff has concluded, based on the considerations-discussed above, that*
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the ublic will not be endangered by operation in the' proposed manner,
- 2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the and Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
James Stone i
Dated: September 10, 1990 I
a l
(
i l
l P
k
,, - _. _ _ -. _. _ ~ - _ _ ~. _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _.. _.. _ - -.