ML20059J264
| ML20059J264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J260 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009190238 | |
| Download: ML20059J264 (4) | |
Text
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,(,,, 4 NITED STATES 4
g NUCLEAC & 'lLATORY COMMISSION
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..NGTON, D. C. POSSE
-i SAFETY EVAL.,UATION BY_THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
RELATED-TO AMENDMENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43
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L DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI-2 DOCKET NO. 50-341=
1.0 INTRODUCTION
' By letter dated November 15, ~988, as' supplemented November'16,1989, the
~ Dettoit Edison Company (Deco or the licensee) requested an amendaent to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi-2. The proposed amendment would-revise Ta>1e'3.3.7.5-1, associated action statement and Table 4.3.7.5-1,. associated surveillance requirements.
. dealirg with accident monitoring instrunentation. 'The proposed changes will eliminate confusion with current TS and better reflect Fermi-2 con.pliance with regulatory requirements.
In addition, the proposed change al bws the TS:to better reflect the as-built conditions'of the plant. The application also requested char.ges to the neutron flux and Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) radiatien nonitors, and containment isolation velve: position indication.
instrun.entation. These changes will:be evaluated under a separate. cover.
2.0 FYALUAT,1,0])
Technica1' Specifications 3/4.3.7.5 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, currently contain instrument yequiren.ents which are not well defined, particultrly when more than one range of the instrunent exists. The proposed an.endt.ent adds the required instrunentation to correspond to Regulatory Guide 1.97, F.evision 2 December 1080, in order to clarify the' requirements.
In addition, several other changes-are being proposed in order' tc clarify the-i instrunentation tequired to inipleirent this Regulatory Guide in. specific terais in order to minimize the need for clarification by the users.
In addition to y
the proposed change to Specification 3/4.3.7.5, Accident'Honitoring Instrunentation, several other specifications were identified for revision.
The Ncvenber 16, 1989, letter supplemented the original Noverrber 15,1988 application by amending the listing of instruirent ranges provided to clarify the accident monitoring instrunentation forl the:SGTS. The conclusions reached-in the no significant hazards consideration published.n the Federal Register onMay17,1989(54FR21305)remainunchanged.
2.1 Te c h n i c a l Sp,e,c i,fj,c,a,t,i o,n,s, C h a n g e s The Technical Specification change request would specifically change the followir.g items:
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-2.1.1 Reactor Vessel-Water Level 3/4.3.7.5; Table 3.3.7.5-1, Item 2 Current:
- 2. Reactor Yessel Water Level Fuel Zone Proposed:
- a. Fuel Zone 1
F Wide Range' 1
c The criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2 December 1980 requires-indication from the bottom of the core support plate to the lesser of -
either the top vessel or center line of the_ main steam. lines.= The fuel zone range is a)propriate for monitoring the lower portions of this required range )ut not the-higher portion. Therefore wide range water level indication is also required to fully monitor the required range.
2.1.2 Drywell Sump Level 3/4.3.7.5. Table 3.3.7.5-1,-Item 15 Current:
- 15. Drywell Sump Level-4 Proposed:
- 15. Deleted Drywell sump level is listed in Regulatory Guide 1.97,~ Revision 2, December 1980 as a Type P and Type C variable as it indicates whether plant safety functions are being-accomplished and.providessindication as to the status of the Reactor Coolant: System Boundary. However, in the BWR Mark I containment design,)the' drywel1~ sumps are isolated upon a loss-of-coclantaccident'(LOCA signal.
Subsequently,'the sumps fill and spill into the suppression pool where 1evel information is-available-throughout the course of an accident.
Since the post-accident function described for the drywell sump level indication in Regulatory (which is Guide (RG)-
1.97 is carried out by the suppression pool:1evel instrument-listed in specification 3.3.7.5), the licensee proposes to delete drywell sump level from Table 3.3.7.5-1. = The drywell-. sump level instrumentation's -
normal operating function continues lto be covered by Specification i
3/4.3.7.5, Leakage Detection System. DECO provided justification -in.a L
letter dated September 30, 1985, for this variation from'the RG 1.97' requirements based upon the containment design.
The staff-letter dated September 1,1987, found this variation from RG 1.97 acceptable. Since the drywell sump -level does not serve a post-accident function.and does not need to meet the Category I requirements of RG 1.97, itlis acceptable to remove the reference to these instruments from this table.
Eliminating the item ensures that no confusion exists as to the function of these instruments post-accident.
2.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation-Valve Position 3/4.3.7.5. Table: 3.3.7.5-1.:
Item 16 Current:
- 16. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position ACTION 80 1
Proposed:
- 16. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position ACTION 82
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1 ACTION E0, as currently required, results in the following action:
With the riur.ber of OPERABLE accident monitoting instrumentati::n chanr.els less than the Finimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of i
Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the' inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
.gs ACTION 82, as proposed, results in the'following a: tion::
}!ith the number'of OPERABLE accident sonitoring instrumentation char.nels _less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirenents of T-tu 3.3.7.5-1, wit _hin 48_,ho,u,rs either:
Restorethe,,inpperablechannel(s),toOPERABLE' status,y a.
j b.
Declare the affected isolation valve ino M W s) g,17h K W,[p g,17,i"c[,t*i,oK [.[2[ $perable and take the 7,1W,b Tre tirae fraine of /8-hours to, restore OPERABILITY remains unchanged in the proposed change, the ACTION of Specification' 3/4.6.3, Primary Containment-1so16 tion Valves, will result in" appropriate isolation of the penetration or will result in a shutdown to HOT SHUTDOWN within,the next'12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, as dces ACTION 8O. and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ACTION 80 fails te provide an explicit requirenent to reach COLD SHUTDOWN.
2.1.4 Accident Ponitorina Instronentation Survtillance RectuirementL3/'4.3.7.5 YeWe"4;.y.Y W '
These-changes are litaited to the changes in instrunent requirements trade in T6ble 3.3.7.5-1 in that surveillance frequency requireinents and applic.able OPERATION C0hDIT10NS for the more specific-instrunent listings ate the sant as those specified for the more genere.1 listings which are replaced. The instrunients deleted, or for which the nonenclature is changed in this table, are consistent with the changes in Table 3.3.7.5-1.
The essociated survcillerce requirements (Table 4.3.7.5-1) have been act'ified tc r eflet t the changes in the instrun.ent listings. The surveillerce testing at4d frequer.cy requirenents rec.ain unchanged and therefore, this portion of the proposai has no in: pact on' safety.
2.2 Co,n,clusion The proposed changes enhance safety by povidirig a noro detailed listing of itt,uit ed Accident Fonitcring Instronent6 tion, thus, tlin.iiiatiic the possibility of a non-conservative misinterpretation of the TS. The propo wd instrunentation listed reflects the instrun.entaticn used at Fcrmi-2 to cen. ply with regulatory.
ec;uiren,ents er d alitys the TS1to better reflect the Fernti-2 cor. figuration (as -
oppend to the more generic listirig of instronent types currently listed in theTS),
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l The proposed change also redifies the action requirenient for primary conteint.er.t autot4 tic isolation valve indication to allow an alternative action which provides additional flexibility under the provisions of the Prier.ary Containe:entIsolationValvesT5(3.4.6.3). This iroproves safety by eliminating the potential situation where the plant would be required to be shutdown, where I.
operation under the alternative action requirenent is justified. The unnecessary 31ont shutdown increases the risk of an unplanned plant transient during the sluidown and subsequent restart-activities.
The changes provide clearer direction to the plant operators concerning accident monitoring instrurentation requirenents and results in consistent application of TS requirener:ts. The changes, therefore, act to enhance safety.
Based on the above evalueticn, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.
3.0 Et:VIL0bilEllTAL C0llSIDERATION This en:endnent involves a change in the requiren.ents with respect to the instellttien or Use cf a facility corrponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirenents. We have detern.ined that this anendirent involves no significant incnase in the aircunts, ar d rio significant change in the types, of any effluents which niay be released offsite, er.d that there is :o si occupatice61 radiatico exposure.gnific6nt increase in irdividual or cunulative The Coimission has previously issued a proposed fit dr.g ti.et this an.endnent involves no significant hazards consicitatier, 6nd there has been no public connent on such finding.
Accordirgly, this antndcent nieets the elisibility criteria for categorical exclusico set forth in 10 CFR 51.??(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.PP(b), no environnuit61 inpect steterent or environntr.tt.1 assessnent need be prepared in cc.rerection with the issuance of this (n.endnent.
4.0 00!1CLUS10N l'e beve concluded based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) thtre is reasonable assures.ce that the health end refety of-the public will nct be er.dar.gered by operation in the proposed nianner, (2) such activities will be ctrducted in con.pliar.ce with the Connission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this (n.endnent will not be ininiical to the corr #ron defense end security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principi Cct.tributor: John Stang, NRR Date:
September 10. 1990 i
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