ML20059H987

Forwards McGuire Unit 2 Cycle 9 Startup Physics Test Rod Swap Methodology Criterion Failure Rept,Per Deviation That Exceeded Acceptance Criterion for Ref Bank Measurement for Rod Swap Test Completed on 930914

ML20059H987
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire
Issue date:	10/29/1993
From:	Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9311100301
Download: ML20059H987 (23)

Text

[?

.m

- 1 W:eItiakr Comporty T C AlcArr.wn e

h&cirr Nudent Generation Department Vice Presiderit L

52700ihmers ihrry Road (KfG01A)

(704)STS-4800 I

' Huitendlle, NC28018-BM (704)875-4809 fu DUKEPOWER October 29, 1993 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.

20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-370 McGuire Unit 2 Cycle 9 Startup Physics Test Rod Swap Methodology Criterion' Failure Report

Dear Sir:

The attached report is provided in sccordance with the requirements specified within the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Duke Power Company's " Rod Swap Methodology.

Report for Startup Physics Testing", dated May 22, 1987.

The rod swap test was-completed on September 14, 1993.. The measured worth of the reference bank (shutdown bank B) deviated from the predict worth.

This deviation exceeded the acceptance criterion for the reference bank measurement.

As specified within the May 22, 1987 NRC SER, a' report is to be submitted to the~NRC within 45 days'of the test.

The acceptance critoria for all other bank measurements were met.

The total rod worth acceptance criterion was also met.

In addition, the review criteria for all other bank measurements were met, except for control bank B.-

Other related anomalies were observed during the startup physics testing for McGuire Unit 2. Cycle 9.

Accordingly,-

1 the attached report provides a discussion of the sequence of events during the startup physics testing, including measurement results and actions taken on the anomalies that were observed.

Please contact Paul Guill at (704) 875-4002 if there are any questions regarding this submittal Very truly yours, ON T. C. McMeekin

)

j I

9311100301 931029 i

gDR ADOCK 0500 0

90085 mn -m.n w-m

,.s

[

- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-October.29, 1993 page 2 xc:

Mr. S. D.

Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region II-U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. George F. Maxwell Senior NRC Resident Inspector, McGuire McGuire Nuclear Station:

Mr. Victor Nerses, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 9H3 Washington, D.C.

20555

n-r P

s ;+-

~

U.-S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 29, 1993 page 3 bec: With Attachment R.

O.

Sharpe 1

P.

F. Guill M. T. Cash S. C.

Ballard 1

R. H. Clark (NS)

D.

E. Bortz (NS)-

G. A. Copp (NS) i L.

T. Burba (NS) i File: 801.01

\\pfg126.nrc i

[

l 1'!

i t

t h

i I

i k

l h

7 Introduction / Background j

At McGuire Nuclear Station, rod worth measurements are performed using the Rod Swap methodology i

described in the topical report, " Rod Swap Methodology Report for Startup Physics Testing (DPC-NE _

1003A)" The testing methodology described in this report employs two sets of criteria for evaluating test results. These criteria are:

a. review criteria, which has no safety significance, and

b. acceptance criteria, which is based on meeting safety analysis input assumptions.

Attachment I contains an execrpt from the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for DPC-NE-1003A i

which details the review and acceptance criteria for rod worth measurements performed using the rod i

swap methodology.

l During the McGuire Unit 2 Cycle 9 rod swap test performed on September 14,1993, the worth of the'-

reference bank (shutdown bank B) was measured 17.5% below its predicted value. This desiation exceeded the 15% acceptance criteria for the reference bank measurement. The acceptance criteria for all other bank measurements was met, including the criteria on total rod worth. The review criteria for all other bank measurements was also met, except for control bank B.

> contains the sequence ofevents during the McGuire 2 Cycle 9 Zero Power Physics Testing including measurement results and actions taken on any anomalies observed.

Since the acceptance criteria for shutdown bank B was exceeded, a review of the safety analysis input ~

parameters which are sensitive to changes in rod worths was performed to confirm the acceptability of the FSAR Chapter 15 accident analyses. All input parameters and Chapter 15 accident analyses were -

found to be acceptable. The purpose of this report is to summarize the evaluations performed to explain j

the rod worth desiations observed as directed by the NRC SER for DPC-NE-1003A.

Evaluation A review was performed in the following areas to identify possible causes of the reference bank over-prediction.

?

- anal tical models and calculations 3

- plant procedures and measumd data (reactivity computer traces)

- correlation of flux map measurements to missed rod worth

- fuel and burnable poison manufacturing data

-i A resiew of the computer models used in the generation of control rod worth data and the calculation of tod swap test data was performed. Arcas investigated included the following:

l

- cycle 8 operating historv

- cross section generation

- model setup i

- rod swap calculations

.f

- test conditions relative to those assumed in the predictions l

J

4 4

No significant errors were found in the setup of the computer models, or in the calculation of rod swap

- test data.

.I Differences in the delayed neutron fraction between the ARO and rodded conditions can impact the measured rod worths by several percent. For McGuire 2 Cycle 9, beta-effective for the shutdown bank B inserted condition increased by 0.66% This would have resulted in a small increase in the measured reference bank (shutdown bank B) worth, i

A review of plant procedures and reactivity trace data from the strip recorder showed no anomalics. The -

maximum boron dilution rate for the reference bank measurement was 310 pcm/hr, which is well below l

the maximum recommended dilution rate of 500 pcm/hr.

The potential for a mis-loaded fuel assembly or burnable poison rod as the cause of the missed rod worth was investigated. A review of the documents used to generate the core load map used for core loading and a review of the core reload procedures was conducted. All documents and reload procedures were correct. Upon completion of the core reload, a video tape of the core is made. His tape is used to independently confirm core loading. The video tape of the M2C9 core was re-reviewed confirming that the core was loaded properly.

7 Burnable poison (BP) rods are shipped in the fuel assemblies in which they are intended to be used.

Therefore, the possibility of a mis-loaded burnable poison rod is extremely remote. In addition, during fuel receipt, the number of fingers contained on the BP rods is confirmed against the number of BP rods indicated on the core load map for the assembly ofinterest. The correct BP assembly idenitifiers are also confirmed to be in their correct location after the component shuffle in the spent fuel pool.

Manufacturing records were also reviewed to confirm that the correct BP's were shipped with the fuel assemblics in which they were intended.

Comparisons between measured and predicted power distributions were performed and indicated an in -

out power tilt, where power in the center of the core was being under-predicted and power at the core.

periphery was being over-predicted relative to measured. Since shutdown bank B is located near the core periphery and rod worths are proportional to power (square of the flux), the in-out tilt is consistent with the rod worth desiation observed. Similarly, the over-prediction of the worth of control bank B is consistent with the observed in-out power tilt since this bank is also located near the core periphery. -

Figures I and 2 show the predicted versus measured power distribution comparisons at 30%FP and HFP conditions.

Reasons for the in-out tilt were investigated and two minor contributing factors were found. They are:

- predicted burnup distribution relative to the actual burnup distribution, and

- deviations in the burnable poison B-10 content relative to the design specification.

i A review of the measured to predicted power distributions for McGuire 2 Cycle 8 showed a slight under-prediction in the predicted power in the fresh fuel assemblics. Because of thinature of the McGuire 2 Cycle 9 design, the majority of the cycle 8 fresh fuel assemblics are located on the core i

periphery. Since these fuel assemblics are more reactive than the actual fuel assemblics based on predicted to measured bumup comparison, an over-prediction of the core power on the core periphery

c a

j.-

i 1

ll i

p results. The in-out tilt at HZP resulting from this bumup mismatch was calculated to be approximately Ti 2.0%

r 3

A review of the manufacturing data for the for the burnable poison rods contained in the cycle 9 core indicated slight desiations in the as-built loadings of B-10 relative to the design loading. The B-10 j

loading for the 3.0 w/o cight and twelve fmger BP assemblages on average were 1.4% and 1.7% lower i

than their design values. Since the twelve finger BP assemblages are preferentially. located in the core '

I center (see Figure 3), the deviation in B-10 loadings results in a slight power shift to the center of the core. The magriitude of this power shift at HZP condition is approximately 0.6% Fuel rod MTU E

loadings, U-235 content and pellet densities were also reviewed against design values. No significant '

deviations were observed.

l t

The above effects are cumulative and when accounted for result in a 1.8% reduction in the calculated reference bank worth and a 2.2% reduction in the control bank B wonh. If the full in-out tilt were accounted for, a reduction of between 6.0 - 7.0% in the reference bank and control bank B wonh would ll result.

A redew of the zero power physics test data was performed to detennine if this test data indicated any

~

gross core anomalies which would indicate reasons for the missed rod worth predictions. A summary of

.l the test results are shown in Table 1. Good agreement for all measurements and predictions was observed with the exception of the measured rod worths. Independent confirmation of the reference bank worth calculated from the reactivity computer can be inferred using critical boron endpoint data j

for the ARO and shutdown bank B inserted configurations and a predicted boron worth. Based on this information, the measured shutdown bank B worth would be 81 pcm higher than what was measured by the reactivity computer. Using this inferred measured reference bank worth, the difTerence between the l

predicted and measured reference bank worth would have been 10.0%

y Conclusion In conclusion, a review of the McGuire Unit 2 Cycle 9 rod swaps results has found no errors in the i

computer model or calculations performed to generate rod swap data, or errors in the rod worth j

i measurement or procedures. The most probable cause of the rod worth over-prediction is the result of -

the accumulative effects of small variations in the inputs (Beta's) to the reactivity computer, small deviations in the burnable poison B-10 loading relative to design values, small deviations in the predicted versus measured burnup distribution and the presence of an in out power tilt. Note also that i

the inferred reference bank worth from the boron endpoint data ' isagreed with the worth from the d

reactivity computer. Since the acceptance criteria for the reference bank was exceeded, a review of safety analysis physics parameters which are sensitive to changes in rod worths was performed to.

confirm the acceptability of the FSAR Chapter 15 accident analyses. All input parameters and Chapter -

l

- 15 accident analyses were found to be acceptable. Note that the total rod worth acceptance criteria was.

q also met.

f i

.i

'h

i

+

1 Table I I

Zero Power Physics Test Results i

Boron Endpoint Test Results t

Predicted BoronMeasured Boron Condition Conc. (ppmb)

Conc. (ppmb)

DifT. (P-M).

ARO-1710 1701 9

Isothennal Temperature Coefficient Test Results i

Predicted Measured Condition ITC (pem/F)

ITC (pcm/F) Diff. (P-M) j ARO

-1.20

-1.90 0.70 i

Rod Swap Test Results -

i i

Measured Predicted Difference

% Difference Bank lD Wonh Worth (M - P) -

(M/P-1)* 100 Ref.

Bank SB 888.0 1077

-189

-17.5 1

CA 303.5 277 26.5' 9.6 2

SA 313.6 318.

-4.4

-1.4 3

SE 354.4 405

-50.6

-12.5 4

CD 482.2 452 30.2 6.7 5

SC 421.8 462

-40.2

-8.7 6

SD 426.9 462

-35.1

-7.6 7

CB 651.3 790 138.7

-17.6 3

CC 738.2 825

-86.8

-10.5 Total 4579.9 5068

-488.1

-9.6 4

Measured boron difference (ARO - SB in) for reference bank = 120.5 ppmb Predicted boron difference (ARO - SB in) for reference bank = 134 ppmb Predicted DBW for reference bank = -8.04 pcm/ppmb t

i o

~

Figure 1 1

M2C09 30% FP POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON NODE VS. MEASURED, D AT 213 SWD, 0.2 EFPD, FCM001 H

G F

E D

C B

A i

.8897

• 1.2102 *

.9791

• 1.1657 *

.9369

• 1.2309

• 1.1532 *

.8527

• 8 *

.9310

• 1.2200

• 1.0290

• 1.1570 *

.9230

• 1.1070

• 1.0390 *

.7980 *

-4.4361 *

.8033 * -4.8494 *

.7519

• 1.5060

• 11.1924

• 10.9913

• 6.8546 *

• 1.2102 *

.9914

• 1.1790 *

.9067

• 1.2791

• 1.2953 a 1.1704 *

.6582

• 9

• 1.2240

• 1.0420

• 1.2020 *

.9480

• 1.2180

• 1.2150

• 1.0640 *

.6300 *

• -1.1275

-4.8560 * -1.9135 * -4.3565

• 5.0164

• 6.6091

• 10.0000

• 4.4762 *

.9791

• 1.1790 *

.8903

• 1.2590 *

.9952

• 1.3070

• 1.1114 *

.6277

• 10

• 1.0290

• 1.1930 *

.9130

• 1.2770

• 1.0460

• 1.2440

• 1.0600 *

.6220 *

• -4.8494 * -1.1735 * -2.4863 * -1.4096 * -4.8566

• 5.0643

• 4.8491 *

.9164

• 1.1657 *

.9067

• 1.2590 *

.9102

• 1.1658

• 1.2531

• 1.1017 *

.4370

• 1.1780 *

.9510

• l'2740 *

.9530

• 1.2020

• 1.2870

• 1.0860 *

.4430

• 11 =

• -1.0441 * -4.6583 * -1.1774 * -4.4911 * -3.0116 * -2.6340

• 1.4457 * -1.3544-*

......*..................****..........w.....**..................******..........

.9369

• 1.2791 *

.9952

• 1.1658 *

.8526

• 1.1817 *

.6979 *.

L 12 *

.9340

• 1.2380

• 1.0690

• 1.2110 *

.9160

• 1.2270 *

.7370

• 3.3199 * -6.9036 * -3.7325 * -6.9214 * -3.6919 * -5.3053 *

.3105

• 1.2309

• 1.2953

• 1.3070

• 1.2531

• 1.1817 *

.8458 *

.3781

• 13

• 1.1290

• 1.2380

• 1.2740

• 1.2670

• 1.2180 *

.8720 *

.4030

• 9.0257

• 4.6284

• 2.5903 * -1.0971 * -2.9803 * -3.0046 * -6.1787 *

• 1.1532

• 1.1704

• 1.1114

• 1.1017 *

.6979 *'

.3781

• 14

• 1.0660

• 1.0970

• 1.0870

• 1.0930 *

.7400 *

.4040 *

• 8.1803

• 6.6910

• 2.2447 *

.7960 * -5.6892 * -6.4109 *

.8527 *

.6582 *

.6277 *

.4370

• NODE 15 *

.8190 *

.6480 *

.6320 *

.4470

• MEAS

• 4.1148

• 1.5741 *

.6804 * -2.2371 * % ERROR I

NODE NOXE CORE AVERAGE 1.0000 MEAS CORE AVERAGE

.9999

% ERROR CORE AVERAGE

.0068 NODE NO..E MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 1.3070 AT ASSEMBLY C-10 MEAS MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 1.2870 AT ASSEMBLY C-11

% ERROR MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 11.1924 AT ASSEMBLY C-08 PERCENT ERROR BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM VALUES IS 1.5540 AVERAGE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ERROR 3.8828 PERCENT ROOT MEAN SQUARE OF THE RELATIVE ERROR 4.6133 PERCENT ROOT MEAN SQUARE OF THE DIFFERENCE 4.6845 PERCENT

o

=4 Figure 2 M2C09 HFP POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON NODE VS. MEASURED, D AT 211 SWD, 7.8 EFPD, FCM006 H

G F

E D

C B

A

{

. * * *........... * * * * *..... * *... * *....... * * * *. * * * * * *.. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * = * *.....

1.2247 *

.9754

• 1.1662

• 1.0813 *

.8217 1.0057

• 1.3045

• 1.0757 8

• 1.0120

• 1.2930

• 1.0990 a 1.2110 *

.9570

• 1.1090

• 1.0160 *

.7940 *.

.6225 *

.8894 * -2.1201

• 1.1313

• 1.9227

• 5.1578

• 6.4272

• 3.4887

• 1.3045

• 1.0945

• 1.2595 *

.9790

• 1.2682

• 1.2192

• 1.1065 *

.6472

• 9

• 1.2950

• 1.1140

• 1.2640

• 1.0000

• 1.2330

• 1.1870

• 1.0400 *

.6350 *

.7336 * -1.7504 *

.3560 * -2.1000

• 2.8548

• 2.7127

• 6.3942

• 1.9213 *

. ***.....**. ***......***************** ************************************=***

1.0757

• 1.2595 *

.9787

• 1.2903

• 1.0211

• 1.2449

• 1.0514 *

.6221

• 1.0890

• 1.2500 *

.9810

• 1.3120

• 1.0630

• 1.2130

• 1.0360 *

.6310

• 10

• -1.2213 *

.7600

• 2345 * -1.6540

• 3.9417

• 2.6298

• l'4865 * -1.4105 *

• • • • • • • • .s**********************.**************

1.2247 *

.9790

• 1.2903 *

.9641

• 1.1649

• 1.1880

• 1.0515 *

.4423

• 11

• 1.2070 *

.9940

• l'.3070 *

.9790

• 1.1790

• 1.2220

• 1.0530 *

.4540

• 1.4664 * -1.5091 * -1.2777 * -1.5220 * -1.1959 * -2.7823 *

.1425 * -2.5771 *

.9754

• 1.2682

• 1.0211

• 1.1649 *

.8809

• 1.1430 *

.6946

• 12 *

.9570

• 1.2350

• 1.0660

• 1.1840 *

.9100

• 1.1730 *

.7250

• 1.9227

• 2.6883 * -4.2120 * -1.6132 * -3.1978 * -2.5575 * -4.1931 *

• 1.1662

• 1.2192

• 1.2449

• 1.1880

• 1.1430 *

.8485 *

.3974

• 13

• 1.1170

• 1.1940

• 1.2190

• 1.2050

• 1.1700 *

.8630 *

.4140

• 4.4047

• 2.1106

• 2.1247 * ~1.4108 * -2.3077 * -1.6802 * -4.0097

• 1.0813

• 1.1065

• 1.0514

• 1.0515 *

.6946 *

.3974

• 1.0330 *. 1.0520

• 1.0400

• 1.0460 *.

.7240 *

.4180

• 14 *

• 4.6757

• 5.1806

• 1.0962 *

.5258 * -4.0605 * -4.9282 *

.8217 *

.6472 *

.6221 *

.4423

• NODE EQXE 15 *

.8010 *

.6400 *

.6290 *

.4520

• MEAS

• 2.5843

• 1.1250 * -1.0970 * -2.1460 * % ERROR j

NODE EQXE CORE AVERAGE 1.0000 MEAS CORE AVERAGE 1.0000

% ERROR CORE AVERAGE

.0038 NODE EQXE MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 1.3045 AT ASSEMBLY G-08 MEAS MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 1.3120 AT ASSEMBLY E-10

% ERROR MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE IS 6.4272 AT ASSEMBLY B-08 PERCENT ERROR BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM VALUES IS

.5716 AVERAGE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ERROR 2.3359 PERCENT ROOT MEAN SQUARE OF THE RELATIVE ERROR 2.7622 PERCENT ROOT MEAN SQUARE OF THE DIFFERENCE 2.6985 PERCENT l

~

.4' i

FIGURG S 1

M2C9 FULL CORE BURNABLE ABSORBERS AND SOURCE ASSEMBLY LOCATIONS 1

1 0

5 2

8 16 16 8

3 8-16 SS 16 8

4 8

16

' 12

-12 16 8

5 0

16 0

12 8

16 8

6 16 8

12

^ 12 8

16 I

7 16 12 12.

12 12 12 16

[

8 0

12 12 12 12 0

9 16 12 12 12 12 12 16

.p 10 16 8

12' 12

'8 16 11 8

16 8

12 8

16 8

'f 12 8

16 12 12 16 8

i 13 8

16 SS 16

.8

'14 8

16 16~

8-i 15 0

R P

N M

'L K

-J H

G F

E ~

D C

B A

NUMBER OF NUMBER OF BURNABLE ABSORBER BACKPLATES PINS 8

24 12 24 16 24 Total 664 72

• refers to assembly locations with 2 5 w/o EPs.

All others have 3.0 w/o bps.

1

9 u

Excerpt From Rod Swap Methodology Topical Report

t Based on our review of the material submitted, we find the rod swap methodology as.

proposed by Duke Power Company to be acceptable subject to the following conditions:

l 1)

The boron dilution rate for measurement of the reference bank'.

shall not exceed 500 pcm.

t 2)

All banks, both control and shutdown banks, must be measured.

3)

The review criteria are:

i A.

The absolute value of the percent difference between measured and predicted integral worth for the reference bank is s 10 percent.

B.

For all banks other thnn the reference bank, either (whichever is _

greater) ;

1) the absolute value of the percent difference between inferred and predicted integral worths is 515 percent or 2) the absolute value of the reactivity difference between inferred and predicted integral worths is s 100 pcm._

C.

The sum of the measure / inferred worth of all the rods must be s 110 percent of the predicted worth.

4)

The acceptance criteria are:

3 (1)

The sum of the measured / inferred worth of all the rods must be > 90 percent of the predicted rod worth.

(2)

For all banks other than the reference bank, either (whichever is greater)

~

a) the absolute value of the percent difference between inferred ar.d predicted integral worth is < 30 percent or b) the absolute value of the reactivity difference between inferred and predicted integral worths is < 200 pcm.

(3)

The absolute value of the percent difference between measured i

and predicted integral worth for the reference bank is < 15 percent.

5)

Additional testing is required if the reference bank boron concentrations -

and reactivity computer worth do not agree. Remedial action for failure of -

an acceptance or review criterion requires investigation and solution within 30 days (for acceptance criterion) or 60 days (for review criterion).

The licensee must then submit a report of the findings to the NRC within 45 days of the test (for acceptance criterion) or within 75 days of the test (for review criterion).

1 P

)

i

)

(I 1

LAtt:chment 21

, Page1 of12; d

q

. Predicted Data vs. Measurement Results and Actions Taken on 1

Anomalies Observed During McGuire 2 Cycle 9 Zero Power Physics Testing -

j and Power Escalation Testing.

l

_u Zero Power Physics Testine

1) Criticality Following a Change in Core Nuclear Characteristics.

(PT/0/A/4150/28) _

l I

I Estimated Critical Conditions:

1686 ppm Borc.n Concentration Li 166 SWD on Control Bank D Actual Critical Conditions:

l d

1686 ppm Boron Concentration 164 Steps on Control Bank D (196 pcm inserted Worth)

I t

Reactivity Anomaly as per ECP/ECB Evaluation (PT/0/A/4700/51) _

j i

0.8 ppm or 6 pcm higher than predicted ARO, HZP, No Xe, Eq. Sm. Critical i

Boron Concentration.

j

2) Boron Endpoint Measurement (PT/0/A/4150/10)

Predicted Conditions:

]

r 1710 ppm Boron Concentration at.All Rods Out (ARO).'

l 1

Measured Conditions:

y 1701 ppm measured Boron Concentration at ARO 1

Reactivity Anomaly:

9 ppm or 71 pcm lower than the predicted value I

i

~. <.

I 1!

O

Page 2 of 12 Acceptance Criteria:

50 ppm or 396 pcm

3) Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement (PT/0/A/4150/12)

Predicted ITC Value

-1.20 pcm/Deg F Measured ITC Value

-1.898 pcm/Deg F Acceptance Criteria:

Predicted +/- 2 pcm/Deg F f

4) Control Rod Worth Measurement (Reference Bank) PT/0/A/4150/11 Predicted:

Shutdown Bank B as Reference Bank Wonh = 1077 pcm Differential Boron Worth -8.04 pcm/ ppm Measured:

Shutdown Bank B Estimated Water for Measurement of Shutdown Bank B 4683 gallons 1

The dilution was stopped at 4600 gallons, it was necessary to insen Control

]

Bank D to maintain critical conditions Subsequently borated approximately j

115 gallons of boric acid to achieve Control D-Bank ARO and Shutdown Bank B at 12 steps withdrawn.

I Measured Worth from Reactivity Computer:

a 888 pcm

-17.5 % Difference i

15% Acceptance Criteria 1

Att:chment 2 Page 3 of12

~

Meamred (Inferred) Worth from the Boron Dilution:

969 pctn

-8.36% Difference between inferred & measured bank work Actions Taken:

At this point the Reference Bank Measurement Acceptance Criteria had been violated. The maximum dilution rate was well within the limit of 500 pcm/ hour. A review of the reactivity computer traces reviewed no anomalies with the measurement. The fact that the boron dilution showed over-shoot also supported -

the low measured worth of Shutdown Bank B. There was no information supporting the need to re-measure the reference bank. The inferred worth was within 10% of the predicted worth. In addition, the Estimated Critical Position -

(rodded), the ARO boron endpoint, and the ITC measurement were within good agreement of the predicted values. This information indicated that no gross anomalies requiring suspension of testing wasjustified. Nuclear Engineering (NE) gave concurrence to continue with :he testing program. PIP 2-M93-0884 was generated to document and track this issue.

5) Control Rod Worth Measurement: Rod Swap (PT/0/A/4150/11A)

Table 1shows the results from the Rod Swap measurement. All Acceptance Criteria for the Rod Swap measurement were met. Control Bank B exceeded the review criteria. A review of actual critical rod heights versus predicted critical rod -

heights indicated good agreement. This was further indication that no gross anomalies existed and no question of an unreviewed safety question was outstanding. The Acceptance and Review criteria for total control rod worth were met. At this point, power escalation to 30% with the High Flux Power. Range Trip Setpoints set to 85% was initiated. A power distribution map at 30% would provide another independent rheasure of the core behavior.

Power Escalation Testine

6) Core Power Distribution at 30% Power Full-Core Flux Map M2C9F001 was taken at 30% power. Page 7 of12 shows the reaction rate error distribution from this power distribution map. From the resuhs of this map the Acceptance Criteria for RMS Error of Reaction Rate Distribution (5%) was violated (Actual 7.4%). The Maximum magnitude error in reaction rate Acceptance Criteria (10%) was also violated (Actual 16.1%). The power distribution map exhibited a substantial in-out tilt, with the core interior power being under-predicted and the core periphery power over-predicted. Page 8 H

of 12 shows the locations of the control rods. The power distribution anomaly 4

i

~

~~

~ Attachment 2 -

~

Page 4 of 12.

)

matched the results seen on the measurement of the reference bank. Fuel Assembly' powers adjacent to shutdown bar.k B were significantly over-predicted j

~

which would result in an over-prediction of the bank worth. However, low power maps often exhibit quadrant or in-out tilt patterns. In-out tilt patterns in particular often dramatically improve as power level is increased. However, the magnitude of these errors do not cause the test Acceptance Criteria to be violated. There was substantial margin in all of the incore peaking factors. Nuclear Design and Reactor Engineering (RE) again discussed the appropriate actions for power escalation testing. The power escalation procedure and program would allow power escalation to 78% if no unresolved safety issues were identified. NE and RE both I

believed substantial safety margin would exist in escalating power. In addition, physics model comparisons to measurement normally improve with increasing power level. - Because the cause of the in-out tilt was unknown, power escalation was limited to 60% with the trip setpoint remaining at 85%. Another flux map would be taken at this power level. RE and NE efforts at root cause evaluation were intensified.

7) Core Power Distribution at 60% Power Full core flux map M2C9F002 was taken at 60% power. Page 9 of12 shows the reaction rate error distribution from this map. The in-out tilt pattern was much improved. However, a localized power distribution anomaly in N08, P09, and R08 was evident.' A localized power depression of approximately 10% was observed in all three locations. The RMS error acceptance criteria for the power distribution was met. However, the maximum reaction rate error acceptance criteria was not met. RE and NE again discussed the appropriate actions for continued power escalation. Two specific power distribution anornalies were evident:

1) The in-out power distribution tilt which would most affect core margin

2) The localized power depression Several possible causes were discussed:

1) Core Misload

2) Measurement Error

3) Unlatched Control Rod

4) Mis-aligned Control Rod

5) Broken Rodlets from a Control Rod

6) Flow-Temperature Anomaly

7) Modeling problems

8) Minor Fuel or BP Manufacturing Discrepancies

9) Quadrant Symmetry Differences ofFuel Assemblies Prior to power escalation to above 60%, the most significant items from above were eliminated. A review of the core verification video tape verified proper core load. A thorough review of the measured data could not identify any problems

kt 6

4

. Attcchment 2'

~

Page 5 of12 with the measurement. Core Location G09 was used as the calibrate path for the

- maps. The normal calibrate path (J10) was not accessible. RE and NE could find -

nothing with this calibration location affecting the measurement. Calculations from NE indicated that a fully unlatched control rod cluster would represent errors 4 to 5 times the magnitude being observed. RE and NE performed trace pair analysis of symmetric instrumented locations to verify no significant control rod -

mis-alignment. RE reviewed printouts from OAC General 67 to verify all Digital Rod Position Indications were indicating proper rod alignment. The change in rod drop times from cycle 8 to cycle 9 for core locations PS, N9, and PIO were reviewed. OAC plant data was reviewed and no flow / temperature anomaly was found. In summary, NE and RE had adequately eliminated:

A) Core Mis-load B) Unlatched Control Rod Cluster Assembly C) Significantly mis-aligned control rods D) Most measurement problems E) Flow-Temperature Anomaly NE and RE also agreed that the localized anomaly was in an area of non-limiting locations. NE and RE knew that adequate margin existed to increase power level to 90% and, as an additional precaution, set the power range high trip setpoints to 100%. Prior to increasing power level, NE reviewed the safety analysis to ensure adequate margins existed for increasing power to 90%. This review considered the in-out tilt as well as the localized anomaly.

1

8) Core Power Distribution at 90%

i Prior to performing the map at 90%, a visual inspection was made to verify the incore instrumentation tube runs from the ten path to the seal table for locations R08, N08, P09, H15, and R06. The listed locations were verifieel to be correct.

i Full Core Flux Map M2C9F003 was taken at 90%. Page 10 of 12 shows the reaction rate error distribution from this map. The RMS error acceptance criteria for the power distribution as well as the maximum reaction rate error was satisfied.

The in-out tilt pattern was still evident and about the same magnitude as the map performed at 60%. Also, the map continued to show the localized power depression in the region of N08. At this point NE and RE decided upon several actions:

1) Remain at 90% with the power range trip setpoints at 100%

2) Take another map at 90% the next day for data closer to xenon stability

3) NE and RE continue to evaluate anomaly and impact on safety analysis

4) Perform rod movement tes:s with the incore detectors approx. 5 in. below the top of core in selected locations.

Attochment 2 Page 6 of12 The control rod movement tests were performed on Shutdown Bank B and Control Bank C. Detectors were placed 5 in. below the top of the core in locations H13,314, and N08. Both banks were clearly observed moving in and out of the core. There appeared to be no problem with the control rods tested. Full core map M2C9F004 was performed at 90% Page 11 of 12 shows the reaction.

rate error distribution from this map. The RMS error acceptance criteria for the power distribution as well as the maximum reaction rate error was satisfied. This map confirmed the results of the first map taken at 90% The in-out tilt pattern and localized power depression were still evident. RE and NE discussed results and NE agreed to perform a 10CFR50.59 evaluation for continued power increase to 100% Also, RE performed an Engineering Operability Evaluation for continued power increase to 100% The operability evaluation concluded that the reactor core and its components are fully operable for normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the FSAR and Safety Analysis required by the Technical Specifications.

9) Core Power Distribution at 100%

Power was escalated to 100% power. Full core flux map M2C9F006 was performed. Page 12 of 12 shows the reaction rate error distribution from this map.

The RMS error acceptance criteria for the power distribution as well as the maximum reaction rate error was satisfied. This map exhibited the same phenomena and confirmed the results of the two flux maps taken at 90% The in-out tilt pattern and localized power depression were still evident.

r

P0376.X GRD ZZMV 21SEP93 SNA

' ~

1 NCGlJI.J DETECTOR RUN (UNIT 2, CYCLE 91 anbu30p PTC 2/0;7001 PASS 21 RELATIVE ELRORS IN OETECTOR THEORETICAL FACTORS, (CALC.-MEiS. )/ MEAS., FOR AXIAL COFIGURATION 1

+

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

' O A

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** 0.063 ****** -0.003 0

B

-0. 056 ***** * ?" " - - 0.049 ****** 0.116 ****** ******

""""-P

• • • • • • -0.056 0

C

-""""M

---

P

• • • • • • -0.005 ****** 0.043 0.089 ****** ****** *** ** ****** ""?'-"-

O O

• • • • • • -0.005 *-- -- ****** ****** "-"- " -0.009 ****** -0.018 ****** -0.057 ****** -0.051 0

E

• • • • • - 0. 0 7 7 ***** * - - - " 9 r"""

- -0.069 ****** -0.059 ****** ****** ****** ******

-"~--

O F

0.075 ******

0.005m""-************-0.089************************************

0.046 ******

O G

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** -0.095 ****** ****** ****** -0.110 ****** ****** 0.015 ***** ****** ******

O H

• • • • • • 0.105 0.072 -0.020 ****** -0.111 ****** -

?'--

• • • • • • ****** -0.043 *++*** 0.117 ****** 0.109 0

J 0.021 ***** ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.111 -0.103 ****** -"" - ****** ****** ****** 0.082 ******

K

• • • • • • 0.020 ****** ****** ""---

-0.092

• • • L'**

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** 0.000 ****** ****** ******

N O

N L

• w++*

• m**

• • • • • ****** - 0. 0 7 2 * ***** ****** -0. 0 2 0

• M " - - ****** -0.036 ******

0. 018 " " " P 0.038 0

--"-"- - " -'": ****** ****** ****** 0.012 ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ******

N O

\\e 2 -

N

-0.009 ****** -0.014 ****** 0.048 ****** 0.163 ****** ****** ****** *****n ~0.022 0.012 e

0

-Q P

• • • • • • -0. 0 0 7 ****** **** ** - ' 't " - ****** 0.148 ****** ****** ****** ******

e" -

O e o

$, g R

• • • • • • 0.109 ****** 0.14 2 '"' - - - - **** ** 0.040 3,'o eM C THE MEAN VALUE =

0.0061 AND THE STANDARD DEVIATION =

0.0722 FOR THE ABOVE 55 VALUES VW w -$h THE MEAN OF THE ABSOLUTE VALUES =

-0.0578. THE MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE =

0.1628 AT N-08. THE MAX. NEG. =

-0.1114 AT H-06.

a C

U 4m" m

M m ca llr= -

45 ee 93

• we NN' h

m,_

1---1--

... m..

w y

3 m

.Att chment 2 UNIT 2

,ge 3 on2 h

OP/2/A/6100/22 ENCLOSURE 4.3 - DIAGRAM 2.1.1 CONTROL ROD LOCATIONS North>-

180-R P

N M

L K

J H

G F

E D

C B

A 1

sA4 CB4 CC-1 CB-1 sA-1 2

GR-2 GR-2 GR1 GR-1 G R-I sD4 sB4 sB-1 sC-1 3

GR-1 GR-2 GR-1 GR-1 sA4 CD-2 sE-1 CD-1 sA-1 4

GR-1 GR-2 GR-1 GR-1 GR-2 sC4 sD-1 5

GR-1 GR-1 CB4 CC4 CA1 CC-1 CB-1 6

GR.1 GR-2 GR1 GR-2 GR-2 sB4 sB-1 7

('

GR1 GR-2 r

CC4 sE4 CA4 CD4 CA-1 sE-2 CC-2 8

27D*

GR1 GR1 GR-2 GR-2 GR2 GR-l GR-1 sB4 sB4 9

GR2 GR-1 CC4 CA-2 CC-2 CB4 10 CB4 GR 2 GR-2 GR-1 GR-2 GR-1 sD4 sC 2 11 GR-1 GR-1 sA4 CD-2 sE4 CD-1 sA4 12 GR2 GR1 GR-1 G R-2 GR-1 sC4 sB4 sB-2 sD-2 13 GR-1 GR-1 GR2 GR1 sA4 CB4 CC4 CB-2 sA-2 14 GR-1 GR-1 GR-1 GR-2 GR-2 15 o'

XX-Y XX - BANK NAME; Y - RCC NO GR-A A - GROUP NUMBER t

UNIT 2

y i

gg p

" ~ A --

, -P037/RX GR7

ZZPM /

21SEP33 SNA'

' - 1

~

MCGUIRE DETECTOR RUN IUNIT 2. CYCLE 93~rnbuo04

- 79G 2/07/002 PAS $ 21 EELATIVE E7JtcRS IN DETECTOR THEORETICAL FACTORS 3 (CALC.-MEAS. 3/ MEAS., FOR AXIAL CtNFIGURATION 1 01:

02 03 04

' 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

- 0.

• • • • • • ****** *w *** ****** 0.005 ****** -0.020.

A O

B,

-0.047 ****** ****** -0.010 ****** 0.042 ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.040 0

0.042 ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ******

. t' C-r"-

"9

• • • • • • ****** -0.043 ****** -0.003 O,

.. O

• • • • • • -0.045 ****** ******.***w* ******.'O.016 ***w*

-0.021 ****** -0.048 ****** -0.027 E

--P"""

• • • • • ****** ****** -0. 0 3 3 **sm ****** ****** - 0. 00 6 ****** -0. 0 2 6 ****** *** *** ** **** ******

O F

0.018 ****** -0.044 ****** ******

M****

-0.018 ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.003 *** m 0 g-

---

9

-0.02b ****** ***** ****** -0.015 ****** ****** 0.000 ****** "---""

M* m 0

H

• • • • • • 0.036 0.037 0.013 ****** -0.015 ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.006 ****** 0.062 ****** 0.052 0

- J

'O.036 ****** ******'****** ****** *** m -0.022 -0.009 ****** ****** ****** ****w

• • • • • • 0.016 ** m

• O

'K

• • • • • • -0.014' M****

-"---* ****** -0.015 ****** ****** ****** ****** ** m

• 0.015 ****** ****** -"---m N

0,

• • • • • • -0.023 ****** ****** 0.015 ****** ****** 0.002 ****** -0.029 ****** 0.016

E L

O n

M 0.001******---"-******--"r?"e****w************

p O.

O oC g 2' N

0.015 ****** 'O.039 ****** -0.019 ****** 0.096 ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.010 0.019 my h P.'

• • • • • • -0.009 ****** ****** ****** ****** 0,069 ****** ****** ****** ******

' O o- *

• • • • • • 0.052 ****** 0.115 ****** ****w 0.025 5

R -

ej; m

. 3

• 1

• 1.

• M o

-=s E

THE HEAN VALUE z 0.0025 AND THE STANDARD DEVIATICH =

0.0354 FOR THE ABOVE 55 VALUES l *p ' r, -

THE HEAN OF THE ABSULUTE VALUES =

0.0273. THE MAXIMUM MAGNITUDE =

0.1148 AT R-08. THE MAX. NEG. = -0.0478 AT D-12.

'I

- c 5:.

=.

O.

o.

D

~

4

- 1

- a :: -

m 90 '. n -

.; a y

• I i

- O e m3 n-

. m

~ NN

.,y

--.--..---x n

.-m

.-.,,,n,-.

.a

.a,n,

.s u----,--<.

,-u ww,,..-,c.

s

,-r--m-

-n-

-a-.'r

,, - sen +

sw-s-,s -w m

v

-. -,~ _ _. -

-w-.-

.~,w+o e

P037/RX CRP Z2MX -

21SEK3 SNA

': 1 -

NOGUIRE DETECTOR RUN (UN37 2, CYCLE Q) anbu004 HMS 2/09/003 CASS 22 RELATIVE ECROR3 IN OETECTOR THEORETICAL FACTORS, ICOLC.-MEms. )/ MEAS., FOR AMIAL CINF7CCATION 1 w

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 03 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 0

A

• • • • • • • ww*******-----r 0.014 ****** -0.030 0

B

-0.053 ****** ****** 0.014 ****** 0.020 ****** ***+** ***** ***** -0.031 0

C

• • • • • • *r***

-0.010 ***** 0.018 0.053 ****w

• • • • • • *****

• w m ****** *****

O O

• • • • • • -0.016 ****** *w***

• • • • • • ****** -0.003 -----" -0.016 ****** -0.043 ****** -0.051 0

E o***** ****** ****** ****** -0.025 ****** ****** ****** -0.027 ****** -0.030 ****** ****** ****** ******

O F

0. 0 2 6 ****** -0. 0 04 ** *m

• • • m

• ** ** * - 0. 0 3 5 ****** m*'**

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** 0.012 ******

O G

---""-******""""-"*****-0.040******************-0.040************

0.005 *** m ****** ******

O H

o*****

0.055 0.047 0.002 **w ** -0.041 """"-- ****** ******

P-----

0.017 ****** 0.071 ***** 0.071 0

J 0.032 ****** ****** m *** ****** *----

-0.049 -0.029 **** w ****** ****** w****

• • • • • • 0.024 ******

O K

• • m e 0.006 ----" ** m * ***** -0.035 w****

• • • • • • ****** w **** ****** 0.011 ****** ****** ******.

O 3 n@

L m m* - - " - - w=***

• • • • • -0. 0 2 9 w****

- " " " - - 0.017 ******

• w m -0.003 ****** 0.004 ****** -0.002 0

M

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.009 ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** ******

g O.

0

.o2-N

-0.005 ****** -0.056 ****** -0.007 ****** 0.098 ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.013 -0.007 g

0 o

P

• • **** -0. 0 0 2 ****** " r ?""' " ****** ******

0. 082 M ?"i-" ****** ****** ******

so e'

. O 8

R

• • • • • • 0.041 ****** 0.087 ** m *

• m ** 0.012 go M 44 9

o

• 1 THE HEAN VALUE a 0.0021 AND THE STANDARD DEVIATION =

0.0373 FOR THE ABOVE $5 VALUES 9.

THE MEAN OF THE ABSOLUTE VALUES =

0.0288. THE MAXIMUH MAGNITUDE =

0.0976 AT N-08. THE MAX. NEG. e

-0.0558 AT N-04.

W 3. '

- c-

1. C C.

o ll: !

l

.m W 8*

~

to w O n -.

w lll!" '

oE on 93

• n-a NN.

1 1

1 1

.u

1 s.

Attrchm:nt 2 Page~ 11 of 12 Reaction Rate Dror Distribution Second 90% Power Flux Map M

O 4

O l-4 W

O It 4 $ $ $

=

is n'

is 4

it M

O ir 4

it it I<

O.

O.

if ir it It ir at it O

ii O ii I(

ir si 36 d $

e4 M

i(

I-A

• h a te *

• e4 it it 0

0 O.

0 $

0 o

it si O.

W si it Z

ni e

is U

C sp o * $ O It it O

si a s sc st a

ir 4

Ir o

• EO

• i * $

)

4 i(

ic O IF O is M

It lr g

• O e4 i,

it

• e O.

O.

O.

Z M

O.

st M w ar ir y

is i

ir ic ii H

O Ir si e

0 it iL O

O at W Z 4 e ic 8

at 3 F b

t it ni 1r it

(

ic O-1E N

tr II

,M

> 10 ir M $

ir o

ir 16:

4 it it si it ir ir it at ir ir o

N si Jk O.

O.

O.

A 4

ir at It it it 16 sc g

H i

sc O

ar ir o

it it O

at it it A Z 16 4

36 it IK it it i;

ir it iF t es b

,N.e M

e4

• M ar ir it 3

ic e4

(

M st M n N sr it O.

ir li.

O.

O.

ir at 16 nr ir J

.e4 O.

O.

Q 4 It it nr si sr

(

.e ir ii y

O ar O

ic

$O it it O

Ic at ir o

q M 4

e e

it 4

11 4

it it it W

O.

g

-ir si N

le it

(

It

$ i.

sr 36 4

it g 6 e4 in 35 O

It se n(

(

1r i,

it 1;

> O it N

li sc ir it-it ir i

O O i t

it i

i[

It a[

it it ir s(

II ie M

it it is it it D

o ll O

• Ic ir e.

4 it i

• ll

• e ic is it ac w as O

st W

,4 at st O

• ir ir a

ir N'

e.4 ll ii a:

4 g

• IL it JI I[

II I'

+

si ir at l

It it J:

It O sr d

O $

st at it it it os O it it ni O.

• i.h O n li it O $ O it it ic Ic it O*

il 4

O st M H O.

D

a it it It 4

3 e

ir it iL st pi g.

OM ir o

d M

$ 40 si N

it d

• 4 0 4 wC4 I'

ed' 4 O $

N IL O

it O'

e 40 E

.J N ad E0 it O O O w O it O

Ir O

it O

b D

i(

r o t

it' N ar

• O st M sc 36 a

N q I-N e

ac d

ai it d

si o

si 3

ii H

sr b

Q 8%

ii 0 $

1r l.

ii O.

O.

.O ir it O.

Ir li O

• it O $ $ O si l'

4.e

-p si ir ir si si t

w mi O

ar U

=

st in 4

4 s s ai at

? I bd W H

- g 4 * * $

si 40 $

0 ir 4

• 4 O

O O

sr ir 1.

M 3 4

it O

4 O

+

O.

O.

it ii

r O.

iv Q

ii O.

Z H 4

E D O O g it er st it Er P

r tr O

O 4

N 4

gO O.

O.

pg ar E

.a o

• 4 o

o J

• s Os

• O $ nn it it M $

• 4 0 Mw H O

li O.

o.

o ai ii M S H

g ir O

• M d

is n

4 le r

O si M O Zu O M

Ir ii it it si 4

• W H

6-l(

• O ir O

• O I'

it O

it w

JK I

in e

e at ic 4

It B

I O

H N

gas ad it ic O

l' it s'

k e se ir r

e-

• 4 $ e it ir O O O M FE8

ll tt t 9 ll $ lL !;99 58 g$

$ $ $ e Q

1:

2 it O O

.J ir wQ it

• s * $ $

it JL 4

8 4

40 0 "g

sr g g 4

ai.{ E 4 $

N (0

O' e

ir N

O A

O

• O d $

i(

lt It

$ =

N W ad O 4 O $ 0 $ 0 It it ir b,

su M

O O $ 0 0

i' it ir ir:

0 it ir it ir O,

F O

O e

4 a

• 16 16 O

Z g

n * $

ir e-it es $ $

N N

it a

si all i' O * $

O 4

it li O.

O.

0 84 it N

ll W

O l'

si O $ O $

0 kl I ir e s

• 3 b K

d K

t O~

9 bl9 0

4 W

&as M i.

N

$ s

> D O. ' $

a e4 O

si Z Z w

o it O

is 4 4 gO g h

U Yk k 5 w w M

m 4 e u O w w a x, e, x = = =

z =

O E

h*

glee O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O'

.-P037/;DC GRP ZZMT-260 Cit 3' SNA 1

NCGUILE DETECTOR RUN (UNIT 2, C/CLE 9) srbuo04 MG 2/09/00's FASS 23 RELATIVE EIRORS IN DETECTUR THEOPITICAL' FACTORS, ICALC.-MEAS.1/ MEAS., FOR AXIAL CCNFIGURATION 1

.e 01 02 03 0'+

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 N

O A

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** 0.005 ****** -0.043 0

0

-0.053 ****** ****** 0.010 ****** 0.067 *w***

• • • • • • ****** ****** -0.056 0

C

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -0.012*****

0.019 0.046 ****** ****** ****w O

D

• • • • • • 0.002 ****** **+*** ****** ****** -0.004 ****** -0.036 ****** -0.057 ****** -0.048 0

E

• • • • • m***

wm** - - - " " ~ - 0. 0 3 9 ***** * ***** ****** -0. 0 3 3 ****** - 0. 0 3 9 ****** ****** - F - " " - ******

O F

0.021 ****** 0.003 ***** ***** ****** -0.031

---M-9

• • • • • • ****** ****** * **** ****** 0.013 ***++w 0

G

"-"""9

-0. 03 8 m ' - "-

n---- ****** -0.043 ****** ****** O.014 ****** ****** ******

O H

• • • • • • 0.061 0.054 -0.006 * * * * -0.040 -9"'"9

• • • • • • ****** ***** 0.011 ****** 0.065 --- " o' O.062 0

J 0.020 ****** * **** ****** ****** ****** -0.041 -0.024 ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.054 ******

O K

0.008 ****** -"---- ** *** -0.052 ****** ""---- ****** ****** ****** 0.009 ****** ****** ******

g 0

a L

• • u w* ****** ****** e----

-0.040 ****** r-----

O.013 ****** ****** -0,017

---

M 0.005 ****** 0.003

=

m 0

H

• • • • • • ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.010 ****** ****** "----- ****** ****** ****** ******

"O"'O.

C O

H

-0.014 -----" -0.002 ****** 0.011 ****** 0.097

-M"--"

• • • we--"--?----"

-0.014 -0.023

$i$

0 P

• • • • • • -0.011 ****** ****** *** *

• n****

0.085

---"M-0 og R

• • • • • • 0.039 ****** 0.085 P-F---

--- :'- 0.005 s:ei N4 THE NEAN VALUE =

0.0015 AND THE STANDARD DEVIATION =

0.0396 FOR THE ABOVE 55 VALUES

':in

• THE MEAN OF THE ABSOLUTE VALUES =

0.0312. THE MAXINUM MAGNITUDE =

0.0970 AT N-08. THE MAX. NEC. =

-0.0566 AT 0-12.

m" $.

'O C"

c:

- C.

o 2

av >

. De :: ;

m O n t=6 2' N 3_

oo M2 ~

N N-

._