ML20059F616
| ML20059F616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1994 |
| From: | Schrock C WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-94-003, CON-NRC-94-3, FRN-58FR58804, FRN-59FR38889, RULE-PR-73 58FR58804-00028, 58FR58804-28, AE81-2, AE81-2-115, NUDOCS 9401140094 | |
| Download: ML20059F616 (3) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:" n ~ 7b _ NRC-94-003 WPSC (414) 433-1599 EECCPiER f 414) 433-5544 EASYUNK S2891993 WtSCONBIN PUBl.lc SERVICE CORPORATION 600 North Adams e P O Box 19002
- Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 94 JJ 10
'T G January 4,1994 Secretary of the Commission Attention Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Comments on Prooosed Vehicle Intrusion Rule
Reference:
1) 58FR58804 dated November 4,1993 Publication on Vehicle Intrusion at Nuclear Power Plants Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) is the operator of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant and is hereby providing comments to the NRC's proposed rule for " Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," (Reference 1), Based on our evaluation of the proposed rule, the associated regulatory analysis, and the backfit analysis, we have concluded that the rule is not justified for the following reasons: 1) The NRC has stated in the regulatory analysis that "NRC has concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. However based on recent events, NRC believes that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future." The recent events referenced by the NRC include two unrelated events (TMI intruder and World Trade Center Bombing). Nuclear power plants have been and continue to be considered hardened targets and therefore are not by nature the target of choice for a terrorist. Promulgating rulemaking because conditions may change in the future is a dangerous precedent to set. If the NRC and FBI had evidence that nuclear power plants 9401140094 940104 PDR PR 73 SBFRSBBo4 PDR
l r l V. Secretary of the Commission ) January 4,1994 Page 2 are now considered a greater terrorist target than they were in the past it would certainly warrant re-evaluating the Design Basis Threat. But by the NRC's own admission, there is no indication that this increased threat exists now or that it will in the future. i 2) The basis for the Backfit Analysis and promulgation of the rule is that the regulations "would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety." Improvements and reductions in risk can always be made; however, the cost versus the benefit received must be part of the equation. As cited by the NRC, the current threat estimate is low and the Design Basis Threat required by regulation is higher. It has not been proven that an inadequate margin between current threat and Design Basis Threat exists. If the current risk is indeed sufficiently low, what basis exists for incurring costs to provide a larger margin of safety? The current margin of safety has not been shown to be inadequate. 3) The size of the proposed explosive that must be considered as part of the design basis is considered safeguards information. It is not understood how the NRC determined the quoted size of explosive that needs to be considered. To our knowledge the explosive size proposed by the NRC far exceeds any device previously detonated during terrorist activities in the United States. The bombing at the World Trade Center, which by def'mition was a " soft" target, was estimated to be caused by a quantity of explosives that is significantly below that proposed in the NRC rulemaking. The explosive size should be based on some reasonably expected size and have some clearly explained basis. 4) By combining the weight of the vehicle and of the explosive, the barrier must be substantially increased in stopping strength. It would also indicate that the Design Basis Vehicle Threat would be a suicide mission. With the exception of the Marine barracks in Beirut, there have been no known suicide strikes against U.S. targets. The vehicle and explosives should be distinctively separate if this rule continues. 5) If NRC feels the need to continue with promulgation of the rule a re-evaluation of the implementation schedule is in order. It is unreasonable to expect licensees to evaluate all of the supporting technical documentation in the 90 days currently provided in the proposed rule. To date, NRC is continuing the development of materials for licensee use in assessing the impact of this rule. It is more reasonable to expect licensees to familiarize themselves with the previous generated material, apply the material to site specific conditions, and assess whether the design requirements are met by current site characteristics within 180 days of receiving all the information currently being generated by NRC to support the rule. The currently proposed date (90 days after issuance of final rulemaking) is not reasonable given the technical nature of the requirements and the need to do site specific analysis. The NRC has estimated the industry financial burden to run between $47,500 and 587,120 for the efforts necessary to perform the requested evaluations and submit the necessary summary letter to the NRC. These estimates do
f, '. Secretary of the Commission January 4,1994 Page 3 not include the capital cost of the modifications that may be necessary to the plant and protected area barriers. The estimated capital costs are not insignificant. By unnecessarily limiting the time allowed before the submittal is due licensees may need to devote multiple engineering personnel to the task. By allowing a more reasonable 180 day submittallicensees should be able to perform the analysis at a lesser cost than if the analysis is required within 90 days. In closing, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. We believe the rule is not justified because sufficient basis for the rule and the associated costs of implementation have not been provided. Ca W C. A. Schrock Manager-Nuclear Engineering DJM/gdl cc - US NRC Region III US NRC Senior Resident Inspector US NRC Document Control Desk =wcuan i}}