ML20059E221

Responds to Questions Re ACRS Thermal Hydraulic Phenomema Subcommittee 920303 Meeting

ML20059E221
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/06/1992
From:	Zuber N Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Catton I Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-CT-2015, NUDOCS 9311030131
Download: ML20059E221 (3)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS -

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ivan Catton, Chairman Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee FROM:

y Novak ZOer ACRS Invlted Expert

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO I. CATTON'S QUESTIONS:

ACRS THERMAL HYDRAULIC PHENOMENA SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, MARCH 3, 1992 The following is my response to your questions posed during the '

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subject subcommittee meeting.

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Ouestion 1:

Is full pressure-full length (FP/FL)' testing-i necessary?

Answer:

Yes, because it provides the most ' ef ficient path for:

resolving the issues raised by NRR.

As FL/FL facility minimizes distortions, it minimizes also the number of potential "what if" questions that may/will be raised in" the future.

Question 2:

Should Westinghouse be told to perform theseLtests?

Answer:

Yes, if Westinghouse and NRC intend to resolve the issues in the most effective manner.

If not, Westinghouse should accept the risk of facing the "what if" questions in the future with the attendant delays and (potential)

I confrontations.

Ouestion 3:

Should RES perform such tests alone?

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Yes, if NRC is.to maintain full control of the program and-3

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freedom of action.

This approach provides~also the best " optics"

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for the public.

It is therefore the optimal path.

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However, if funds are not available to follow this path then, as a M

j minimum, NRC should establish a cooperative program and participate j

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assessment of operating nuclear power plants and of new plant:

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Ivan Catton 2

designs under development by vendors, the NRC needs to attract and to maintain a highly trained and talented technical and scientific staff (at its headquarters and in laboratories).

1 Furthermore, such a staff must be kept abreast with technical developments and scientific advances here and abroad.

These requirements can be best met by following the " hands on" approach; that is, by a direct participation of the staff in experimental and analytical activities. A cooperative program with DOE, Westinghouse, and EPRI will provide a framework to carry out such activities.

Question 4:

If the staff (RES) is to perform the test, should they be conducted in the ROSA IV facility?

l Answer:

Definitively Hg1 (for technical and political reasons).

Technical reason:

1 If the present configuration of ROSA IV has distortions of geometry and configuration (pressurizer, hot legs, cold legs, etc., see INEL's table) the test result will be questionable and will introduce, therefore, a ngw set of "what if" questions.

Although some modifications of ROSA IV can be made, they will require time, funds, and full cooperation from Japan.

Furthermore, not all distortions can be removed.

For example, the distortions associated with the 2 cold leg penetrations in the ROSA IV vessel (versus four penetrations on the AP600) will still remain.

Political reasons:

This approach entails the transfer of the most advanced nuclear technologv tu a foreign country.

Past experience from the 2D/3D international program shows clearly how beneficial such a transfer can be to a foreign technology.

Specifically, the know-how levels of a foreign country in design, experimentation, instrumentation, computer code development, computational techniques and in computer hardware are brought immediately to the know-how level of this country.

By transferring this advanced technology to a foreign country at this point in time, the U.S.

will definitively loose its leadership position in the field of nuclear power.

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Ivan Catton 3

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I have heard that a value of $100M can be associated with this transfer of technology.

I see no rationale to do it.

Indeed, it seems silly to me to transfer $100M worth of goods in order to save about $15M from a program, i-d 9

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