ML20059C433
| ML20059C433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/28/1990 |
| From: | Brady R, Burnett R, Cunningham R NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Bernero R, Halman E NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-45 NUDOCS 9009050045 | |
| Download: ML20059C433 (17) | |
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MEMORANDUM: FOR:- Robert M..Bernero, Director E
Office'of Nuclear. Material-Safety'and Safeguards Edward i. Halman, Acting Director Office of Administration FROM:
Raymond J. Brady, Director-Division of Security, ADM Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Industrial and y
Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS l
SUBJECT:
FOREIGN TRAVEL TRIP REPORT A
Attached are a Trip Report Abstract and a more detailed trip report covering.
the visit made by the NRC team from June 5 8, 1990, to the Urenco gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants in Almelo, the Netherlands, Gronau, West Germany, and Capenburst, England, g
Raymond J. Brady,, Director Division of Security, ADM
.U U Robert F. Burnett. Director Division of, Safeguards and.
Transportation, NMSS
.M.% D Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS j.
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Enclosures:
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Robert M. Bernero, Director
' MEMORANDUM FOR:
Office of-Nuclear Material
- a Safety and Safeguards Patricia G. Norry, Director Office of Administration FR0h:
Raymond J. Brady, Director.
Division of Security, ADM Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Industriel and Medical Nuclear Safety, HMSS
SUBJECT:
FOREIGN TRAVEL TRIP REPORT Attached are a Trip Report Abstract and a more detailed trip report covering the visit made by the NRC team from June 5-8, 1990, to the Urenco gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants in Almalo, the Nethctlands, Gronau, West Gormany, and Capenburst, England.
Raymond J. Brady, Director Division of Security, ADM Robert F. Burnett, Director l
Division of Safeguards and Transportation, HMSS Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
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TRIP REPORT ABSTRACT =
DATE OF REPORT July 13, 1990
'OFFICI AL: TRAVELLERS:
TRAVEL TO:
Almelo, ' th'e Netherlands Raymond J. Brady Gronau, West Germany, Robert F. Burnett
'Capenburst, England.
Charles J. Haughney Donald:J. Kasun-BEGINNING ON:
06/03/90
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Peter Loysen UNTIL:
06/09/90 a
0FFICE:
ADM Division of Security NMSS Division of' Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Division of Safeguards and Transportation MEETING TITLE AND/0R AFFILIATION:
a:
Visits to Urenco gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants and discussions on safety, environmental, safeguards, and security issues with plant management.
-CRGANIZED BY:
NRCiLouisianaEnergyServices,Urenco,Inc.,andUrenco,Ltd.
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ABSTRACT AND/0R
SUMMARY
OF MEETING RESULTS:
During the period of June 5-8, 1990, the travellers visited the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants operated by Urenco in Europe. They were accompanied by representatP es of the U. S. Department of Energy, Louisiana Energy Services (LES), Urenco, Inc, and Urenco, Ltd.
The purpose of the visits was to gain more detailed safety, environmental, safeguards, and security information, about the plants' design, construction, and operation in preparation for reviewing a license application by LES for a similar plant in the United States.
The visits included two days at Urenco Nederland in Almelo, the Netherlands, one day at Urenco Deutschland in Gronau, Federal Republic of Germany, and one day at Urenco (UK) in Capenhurst, England.
The discussions focused on safety and environmental considerations involving UF handling, safeguards in place at the plants, and g
classificati5n and control of sensitive information.
Site visits included plant' tours of operating feed, cascade, and take-off halls,
'research facilities, and the centrifuge machine assembly building at-p1
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Much of the information' disclosed was classified,' proprietary,
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'or provided in-confidence.
The objectives of-the visits - familiarization with ga.C centrifuge.
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. enrichment operations and identification of issues that might impact licensing ;were completely satisfied.
Urenco personnel were open and frank in discussions, and the NRC team was given access to the most
. sensitive portions of the facilities.
While the'prini'ples of operation of the Urenco plants are the same, significant technical differences exist among them, and Urenco expects to provide the most modern, safe,.
and secure features for the LES plant.
With the possible exceptionLof UF6 tails disposition, there do not appear to be any unresolvable safety or environmental issues based on the demonstrated operation of the Urenco-plants.
In regard to nuclear material safeguards, the systems installed in the'Urenco plants would provide a good start in satisfying NRC requirements, but additional positive measures to protect against and detect unauthorized production and enrichment will be necessary..
-Security, and especially classification, procedures of the Tripartite 1
governments, which are followed by Urenco, differ from those that will be-l required for LES.
A series of actions involving Urenco, LES, NRC, and DOE will be necessary to provide appropriate security-classification measures for' classified information and material in the United States, s
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VISITS TO l
4 URENCO GAS CENTRIFUGE URANIUM ENRICHMEPT PLANTS
-ALMELO, THE NETHEPLANDS GRONAU, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY CAPENHURST, ENGLAND JUNE 5-8, 1990
SUMMARY
During the period of June 5-8, 1990, an NRC team visited the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants operated by Urenco in Europe. They were accompanied by representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy, Louisiana Energy Services (LES), Urenco, Inc, and Urenco, Ltd.
The purpose of the visits was to gain more detailed safety, environmental, safeguards, and security information,-
about the plants' design, construction, and operation in preparation for reviewing a license application by LES for a similar plant in the United States.
The visits. included two days at Urenco Nederland in Almelo, the Netherlands, one day at Urenco Deutschland in Gronau, Federal Republic of Germany, and one day at Urenco (UK) in Capenburst, England.
The discussions focused on safety and environmental considerations. involving UFi handling, safeguards in91 ace at the plants, and classification and coMtrol of-sensitive information.
Site visits included plant tours of foperating. feed.. cascade, and take-off halls, research facilities, and the
-centrifugo machine assembly building at Gronau.
Much of the information disclosed was classified, proprietary, or provided in confidence.
.The objectives of the visits - familiarization with gas centrifuge enrichment
- operations and identification of issues that might impact licensing - were completely' satisfied.
Urenco personnel were open and frank in discussions, y
1 and the NRC team was given access to the most sensitive portions of the facilities. While the principles of operation of the Urenco plants are.the g
same, significant technical differences-exist among them.and Urenco expects-i L
'to provide the most modern, safe, and secure features for the LES plant.
With l
the possible exception of UF tails disposition, there do not appear to be any unresolvablesafetyorenvirbnmentalissuesbasedonthedemonstrated
' operation of-the Urenco plants.
In regard to nuclear material safeguards, the L
systems insta11ed'.in the Urenco plants would provide a good start in L' b satisfying NRC requirements, but additional positive measures to protect against and detect unauthorized production and enrichment will be necessary.
. Security, and especially classification, procedures of the Tripartite E
governments, which are followed by Urence, differ from those that will be l?
required for LES.
A series of actions involving Urenco, LES, NRC, and DOE 4
will be necessary to provide approoriate security-classification measures for
. classified information and material in the United States, i
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_7, BACKGROUND' In mid-1989, LES announced that it was proceeding wi a plans to develop the first commercial uranium enrichment plant in the United States, to be. located at Homer, Louisiana.
LES, a partnership comprising components of Urenco, Inc.
(a wholly-owned subsidiary of Urenco, Ltd. ), Fluor Daniel, Inc., Duke Power Company, Louisiana Power & Light Company, and Northern States Powe-Company, would employ the gas centrifuge technology and equipment provided by Urenco, Ltd.
Urenco has s u ceasfully operated gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants in Europe for mar,, years, and currently has facilities in Almelo, the Netherlands, Gronau, Feocral Republic of Germeny, and Capenhurst, England.
The U.S. plant, to bs known e.s the Claiborne Enrichmeat Center (CEC), would be-modelled after the latest urenco designs in service, and would have a capacity of 1.5 million separative work units (SWU) per year.
The NRC staff,-having little experience with gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology, immediately embarked on a familiarization program which began with a btlef' visit in September-1989 to Urenco's Almelo and Gronau plants by R.M. Bernero, R.E. Cunningham, and P. Loysen.. The program also included a visit to DOE uranium enrichment facilities, award of a technical assistance contract to a
,00E laboratory for development of specifications for material control and accounting,. and initiation of a rulemaking for uranium enrichment safeguards (presently not cavered in NRC regulations).
The initial visit to the Urenco plants pointed out the need for more detailed visits, particularly by NRC Safeguards staff, to the plants prior to receipt of an application for
-licenses by LES.
Accordingly, arrangements were made through the Netherlands Embassy and the U.S. Department of State, and later with LES, Vrenco, Inc.,
and Urenco Ltd., for classified visits to the three plants.
The objective was 1
to gain insights on safety, environmental, safeguards, and security matters related to -gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, and to identify potential issues that could impact licensing of the proposed LES plant in the United States, i
THE NRC TEAM VISITS The NRC team consisted tf R.J. Brad', Director,-Division of Security, ADM, R.F. Burnett,- Director, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS, C.J.
Haughney, Chief, Fuel Cycle Safety Branch, Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS, D.J. Kasun, Acting Chief, Domestic Safeguards and Regional Oversight Branch, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS, and P. Loysen,-Licensing Project Manager, Fuel Cycle Safety Branch, Division of Industrial' and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS.
The team was-accompanied throughout the visits by W. Shepard, Office of Classification Technology and Policy, DOE, P.G. LeRoy, LES Licensing Manager, Duke Engineering & Services, Inc., E.F. Kraska, Senior Technical Manager, Urenco, Inc., M.B. Kratzer, Board Member, Urenco, Inc., A.J. Lorimer, Project Director, Urenco Ltd., and D.
Aston,-Company Scretary, Urenco Ltd.
A list of the many other individuals with whom the team interacted at the three sites is attached at th9 end of the.
report.
The Urenco plant visits included two days at Urenco Nederland in Almelo, one day at Urenco Deutschland in Gronau, and one day at Urenco (UK) in Capenhurst.
The overall agenda provided for extensive briefings by the Almelo plant experts in the principal areas of interest, followed by an overall plant tour detailed ciscussions on individual topics, and additional plant observations.
The pattern was repeated at the other plants, but without extensive briefings
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l and with emphasis placed on differen'.es among the plants.
Of special interest was a detailed tour through the centrifuge machine assembly building at the O
Gtonau site.
Prior to the Capenhurst plant visit, the UK government hosted a j
dinner in Chester, providing the opportunity for informal exchanges with J
Urenco (UK), Beitish Nuclear Fuels Limited, and UK Department of Energy safety, safeguacds, and security personnel.
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The remainder of the report is separated into individual sections dealing with safety and environmental, safeguards, and security and classification matters.
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL I
Introductions were made all around at the beginning of the vists at Almelo,
' and welcoming talks given by Dr. H. Rt. horst, Mr. D. Aston, and Mr.
A._
Lorimer,.with remarks being made by Messrs. Haughney, Burnett, and Brady, as 1
well as Mr. P. Verbeek of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. N.
Hootsmans provided a detailed explanation of the or0anization and management of Urenco Ltd., Ultra-Centrifuge.Nederland, and Urenco Nederland, and the
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development of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.
He stressed the importance of quality assurance throughout plant activities and its main objective to ensure reliability for economic success.
In that regard, he stated that in 1988 overall Urenco production since inception was 95 percent of installed capacity.
Attainment of a high degree of safety is an important benefit of the QA program as well.
Mr. B. Dekker delivered an extensive briefing on the safety and environmental aspects, of the Alrrelo plants, including the design and operating philosophy, features for worker and environmental protection, and licensing.
The NRC team asked about the compa v's position on disposition of UF tails, noting the i
g interest on that issue in the United States and the visTt by Mr. Haughney and 1
Mr. Loysen to the Cogema tails defluorination plant at Pierre 1ctte, France.
Mr. Larimer stated that the policy of the Troika countries is to store UF tails as-an asset, with checks and monitoring of storage cylinders to ensbre their integrity.
Urenco offers to return tails to its customers, and some accept the offer.
At Almelo, for example, only about.50 percent of the tails generated have been retained onsite.
This may explain Mr. Bernero's observation last fall that there seemed an inordinately small number of tails cylinders at tFe plants.
Mr._ Dekker mentioned that a risk analysis performed in the UK conclu4d that outside storage in cylinders was acceptable.
After touring the plant and receiving additional briefings on safeguards and security-classification matters, discussions were held with plant engirieers to get a better understanding of how material flows through the plant and where potential problem areas might be.
In addition to the known situation related to' feed,-take-off, homogenization, and blending stations; feed purification L
(essentially desublimers), contingency and crash dump systems, and flow t
control systems may provide points for system upset and will need to be examined in connection with the LES application.
Apparently, during normal operation, the plant is easily controlled and runs without significant process flow perturbation.
No accidents involving releases of UF have been reported.
g One Urenco manager indicated that running the plant, per Ne, was boring!
At Gronau, the newest of the three plants, Urenco Deutschland is in the process of adding 600,000 SWUs to bring the total capacity to one million SWUs o
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,n= tentrifuge machines for the addition are of the TC-12 type, the same_as will be used at LES.
Dr. G. Meyer-Kretchmer and Mr. J. Pokar provided most of the briefing on the Gronau plant, which was short because of the
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interest by the NRC team in visiting the centrifuge machine assembly building, and the need to leave in time to fly to England in the early evening.
One-interesting difference among the plants and discussed here is the methods.in which UFs product and tails are collected to the take-off stations.
At Gronau and.largsly at Almelo, UF is collected in desublimers, which are essentially g
large cold traps,' isolate 0 from the main process flow stream, and then
- reheated and sent to the product and tails cylinders.
At Capenhurst, UFc is compressed (still at subatmospheric pressure) and sent directly to the pFoduct
- and tails cylinders.
The former method involves an extra step and a significant accumulation of UF outside of cylinders, which is problematical, g
wh le the latter method is morE continuous, but involves compressors and their attendant leakage potential.
The LES plant would use-three stages of co.hpression, two at the exit from the cascades, and one adjacent to the take-off stations.
This final compression is done as close to take-off as possible to minimize the amount of heat tracing required to keep the UF 6 gaseous at the pressure extant.
For over a year, classified details of the gas centrifuge machines developed by Urenco have been unavailable to the NRC staff.- Urenco has maintained that NRC should not care about the details because the machines contain so little uranium and their failure is inconsequential.
The staff has stated that it needs to' understand.the machines to reach or agree with Urenco's conclusions.
It was with this background that Urenco permitted the NRC team to tour the centrifuge assembly building at Gronau, and in fact, explained all facets of machine construction and assembly.
A cutaway of a current model machine was of great value in the explanation.
Most of the information obtained on this tour was classified, some aspects of which are discussed in the Security and Classification section of-this report.
The information and the results of actual centrifuge machine failures in the plants help the NRC team to understand why Urenco believes that machine failures have little or no safety implications.
BNFL's Capenburst Works, which contains the oldest operating centrifuge machines in the Urenco enterprise, is not being expanded beyond its 800,000 SWUs per year capacity.
In addition to the distinction of using compressors, rather than desublimers, for collection of UF from the cascades, Capenburst g
heats feed cylinders in steam chests to sublime solid UF directly to gas, without going through the liquid phase.
Thenewerplanth(andtheproposed LES plant) heat feed cylinders in autoclaves with either electrically heated or steam-heated air.
This also permits the reduction to subatmospheric pressure for feeding to the cascades to be taken withiri the autoclaves, a safety feature that will be incorporated at LES, but not used at Almelo or Gronau.
It is not clear, however, whether feed purification would occur before or after pressure reduction.
The Capenhurst plant radiation protection manager explained his practices for control of worker and public exposure to uranium and HF.
Combined internal and external doses to workers are very low, averaging some 55 millirems per year in 1989, and arise mostly from maintenance and waste processing activities.
In the UK, acute exposures to HF are based on a concept called toxic load, which is expressed as (concentration)2 x time, so as to limit j
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- exposures to very high concentrations, if evenifor short times.
For the' times of interest, the numerical value of the HF toxic load is similar to that 'used -
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.by the NRC..
The plant manager mentioned that the old gaseous diffusion plants at Capenhurst were being decommissioned, and that the high assay plant has been 1
decommissioned.
However, there are no specific arrangements for
' decommissioning:the gas centrifuge plant in the future, inasmuch as it would be but.a small part of the total BNFL site.
In connection with current decommissioning, BNFL has large amounts of-uranium-centaminated aluminum which is.is easily cleaned and recycled for unrestricted uso.
T limit equivalent to
- 10.pCi/gm is used for this purpose.
- The NRC team' asked if Urenco could provide a listing of the.aMonal release or discharge limits that are applicable in the Troika countries.
Urenco agreed to compile them and send th.n at a later date.
LSAFEGUARDS On June 5-at Almelo, the briefings covered primar.ily plant operations, plant safety and environmental considerations, and current regulations.
Several parts of the Almelo~ complex were visited, including the original buildings now decommissioned, the laboratory areas, and the operating cascade halls.
On the
-following day, June 6, discussions focused on IAEA/ EURATOM safeguards implementation and inspections.
Site personnel demonstrated a typical IAEA inspection visit, including the photo-matching of valves and piping in the cascade hall.
On June 7, the NRC team visited the Gronau complex for discussions concerning plant operations, safeguards, and centrifuge design and manufacture.
The afternoon tour was highlighted by demonstrations of machine assembly techniques and quality control testing.
On June 8, the team visited the Capenburst complex for final talks on plant operations and safeguards, as implemented in the U.K.
Urenco personnel were open and frank, answering all questions asked.
Access was provided to the sensitive areas in both the production halls and manufacturing plants.
There seemed to be a sincere desire on the part of Urenco personnel to satisfy the team's information needs.
Many of the details of centrifuge design, fabrication, installation, and operation are considered to be classified by the Urenco companies and the tripartite governments.
All three plants have been placed under IAEA/ EURATOM safeguards, there being no national safeguards programs in the three countries.
Joint team inspections are conducted monthly, with an additional 6-8 Limited Frequency Urannounced Access inspections per year.
Notification is provided to IAEA four days in advance of all product shipments.
An annual physical inventory (off-line)'is conducted at each plant and the inventory differences (MUF) are provided to IAEA and EURATOM.
Historically, the MUFs have averaged about 0.1 percent of feed the first year of operation (plate out losses) and about 0.01 percent thereafter.
Allowable limits are 0.2 percent.
The int,talled material control and accounting systems include all normal functions such as sampling, measurements and assays, bookkeeping, item tracking, use of seals, etc.
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'The safegu'ards findings and conclusions resulting from-the visits include:-
"' - The Urenco and foreign government personnel:were very responsive to w
the NRC team's inquiries.
Briefings were well prepared, comprehensive, and complete.. Plant tours included access to areas normally embargoed to all but certain Urenco personnel.
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'The objectivt of the trip were completely satisfied,' and the
-information'got..ared will significantly aid in preparation for review of an application for licenses by LES.
i The safeguards systems in use at the Ureneo plants would provide a good start toward satisfying NRC requirements.
Additional measures will be required to protect against and detect any unauthorized enrichments.
SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION From June 5-8, 1990, Raymond Brady, the NRC Director of Security (0/SEC) and William Shepard of DOE's Office of Classification and Technology Policy, were members of-the NRC team that visited Urenco's three gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants in Europe.
The following unclassified narrative reflects j
the results of 0/SEC's discussions and observations.
Since some subject arecs were discussed at all three plants, they wOl be discussed only once for sake of brevity where discussions were essentialiy the same.
The classified visits and discussions were extremely valuable since 0/SEC is responsible for the overall NRC security-classification program at LES.
a Almelo Plant
- After a general site orientation session conducted by senior officials of L
Ulta-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the shareholder, and Urenco Nederland, the production enterprise, the NRC team visited specific areas of.the plant, including the separation buildings (e.g., cascade halls, and central control
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room), office arear., and reinted support areas.
The security classification implications of erch were discussed while at the plant.
-The team also received a short orientation on the plant's security and classification program (except that applicable to the centrifuge asse.mbly area,. which was subsequently covered during the Gronau plant visit).
Almelo's program is' based on a classified " Tripartite Handbook of Security and Classification Procedures," dated 1985, and a related " Centrifuge Classification Guide," dated 1987.
0/SEC.had detailed discussions on June 5 and 6, 1990, with Roelof-Gerritsen, Head of ' Security and General Affairs for Urenco Nederland, and Erich Kraska, Senior Technical Manager (formerly associated with the Gronau plant) of l
-Urenco, Inc.
Discussions centered on security-classification topics applicable to the Almelo plant and their possible implications to the LES plant.
The Almelo plant's security program consists of physical barriers (e.g.,
4 fences and watchmen), intrusion detection equipment (e.g., CC'V), personnei J
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. security clearances, classified document and material control procedures, and visitor controls.-
During discussions, Messrs. Gerritsen and Kraska indicated that the classification guide was prepared and approved in 1987 to cover all information concerning gas centrifuge development and application.
There has-been no subsequent, change notices or interpretative documents. ' Based upon an initial review of the guide items (topics), it was obvious that some of the items concerned research and development work (e.g. Item 3.10) wl.ich were not relevant to LES activities.
Subsequent discussions with Mr. David Mton, who is Chairman of the Security and Classification Working Group as well as the Urenco Ltd. Company Secretary, confirmed this fact.
He agreed to provide us.
with (1) an annotated version of the guide which will, focus on LES activities, and (2) a component drawing of the TC-12 machine which will be installed at LES' Claiborne Enrichment Center.
This annotated guide and component drawing will be very helpful since NRC/ DOE needs to provide LES, e.g., Fluor Daniel, current / applicable classification guidance.
No terms, phrases, words or components, per se, are classified because of their association with the Tripartite gas contrifuge program.
Currently, throughputs and in,entory differences (ID) at the Urenco plants are unclassified.
In fact, the guide doesn't really address material control and accounting (MC&A), and the MC&A plan for the LES plant may need to be classified.
Also, an inventory.
difference in any amount may-need to be classified and then declassified after a period of six months from date of inventory assessment, providing (a) any resulting investigation is completed and (b) the initial classification determination was not due to extenuating circumstances.
ID data would remain classified for the duration of an investigation.
I Mr. Aston said that Urenco Ltd. has filed / searched U.S. patent records, and he did not foresee any classified LES patent applications.
During a general discussion of Almelo's safety and environmental systems, including autoclaves, waste treatment facilities, and air handling systems, UCN said that none, per se, had any classification implications.
LES personnel should, however, carefully review any safety analysis reports to assure that no classified information is inadvertantly included when describing plant or centrifuge operational characteristics, since some information is classified.
The Tripartite classification guide contains a number of items which are classified RESTRICTED, which is the lowest of four classification levels used by the Tripartite Governments to protect classified information.
The U.S. has agreed to protect RESTRICTED information as CONFIDENTIAL, which is the lowest classification level used by the U.S. Government to protect classified information.
Urenco personnel were informed of this fact and advised that any classified information' transferred to LES, as previously agreed upon by the respective governments, will be protected as classified, consistent with 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95.
Also, another area that needs further discussion is the marking of Urenco documents - the U.S. portion marks documents, while the Tripartite Governments do not.
While at Almelo, the team also saw how Urenco destroyed classified centrifuges which had crashed or became technologically obsolete.
Since a complete centrifuge is classified Secret (external visual access to a complete
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n centrifuge and assembled units are not classified), it must'be destroyed by pulverizing, shredding, etc. to preclude access to classified information.
Gronau Plant
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Senior personnel of Uranit GmbH, the shareholder, and Urenco Deutschland, the production enterprise, gave the NRC team a short briefing on the plant's security-classification program and a comprehensive briefing / tour of the classified centrifuge assembly area (CAA).
Gronau's security-classification program is also based on the aforementioned Tripartite security and classification procedures.
The plant's security measures includes armed guards, dogs, double fences, badges, clearances, and security containers.
D/SEC had specific discussions on June 7, 1990 with Ernst Steinebach, Manager of Security and Sefeguards for Urenco Deutschland, Franz Fischer, Uranit Assembly _ Plant M/.aager and other personnel invclved with CAA activities.
Urenco considers the following centrifuge design expertise and manufacturing know-how to be extremely sensitive and important:
Design Expertise Manufacturing Know-How Metallurgy Machining Composite Technology Flowturning Mechanics Welding Tribology Bonding Gasdynamics Assembling Electric Drive Composite Manufacturing Vacuum Technology Quality Control Classified centrifuge components and related classified support equipment are manut.;tured-at cleared government, plant, or contractor sites.
The centr"ge assembly process consists of removing the classified compoh: its/sub-assemblies from an adjacent storage area and af sembling them through a series of manual and automated steps emphasizing quality control.
Automated functions include a-CAA self-contained, x ray system which indicates classified information (e.g. diameter of a centrifuge) and a DEC VAX computer
- system with remote terminals containing product inventory data which also processes classified information.
Classified documents (e.g., engineering
-specifications) are handled by CAA personnel.
No classified radiographs are taken.
Once the centrifuges are assembled and tested, they are moved into a cascade hall on small transports (carts), bolted to the floor, connected to plant systems, and brought on-line.
The cascade hall contai s a number of
- centrifuge cascades which operate in series and parallel to enrich uranium.
Within the cascade hall are cabinets housing tiie controls for the cascades and the electrical supply required to drive the motors of the centrifuges.
While on the piant ' tour, the team saw a classified cutaway model of a centrifuge which showed its components / subassemblies.
LES said it plans no such model at its plant.
Information on cascade performance and operating characteristics is classified.
Thus, each cascade hall contain numerous automated information systems (i.e., process control and data acquisition systems) handling classified data which are displayed / monitored in a control room which is
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manned around the clock.
Computer programs are used to supervise plant 1
k functions, and both the programs and the relatec' data (e.g., centrifuge l
frequency) are classified.
No matter (e.g., printouts or centrifuge
-components) was seen to be marked with-its assigned classification level.
Centrifuge plants can be expanded on a modular basis, and therefore it is i
possible to add-capacity to a plant consistent with market demand.
In each i
plant visited, we saw Urenco expanding its enrichment capacity through either contruction of new cascades or installation of more effective / efficient machines.
In fact, at the Gronau plant there were additional guards on duty to escort _ construction workers, since classified work was being performed.in an adjacent area.
Large movable physical barriers in the cascade halls were
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used to preclude visual access-to classified matter.
Urenco Ltd. has advised the U.S. Government (e.g., NRC/ DOE) of the need to i
receive LES plant operating data in order to review warranty claims and to providt technical-assistance for the safe and efficient operation of the LES i
plant.
Broadly speaking, three categories of information need to be made available to Urenco, viz: information on plant operations, information to l
satisfy warranties, and information from centrifuge autopsies.
The reverse flow of information is a controversial and major topic of discussion between the U.S. and Tripartite Governments because of its Atomic Energy Act Restricted Data implications, as well as its Vrenco-LES Joint. Venture implications.
DOE is currently assessing the leghi implications of such a transfer of operating data and will be advising interested parties of its decision.
Capenhurst Plant I
Senior persennel of British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), the shareholder and Urenco (UK),
he production enterprise, gave the team a general site orientation b efing and tour.
The plant's security-classification program is also based on che previously mentioned Tripartite security and classification procedures.
Capenburst's security program included watchmen, fences, badges, clearances, security containers, visitor control, and prohibition of articles (e.g., camera and sound recording equipment).
D/SEC had specific discussions on June 8, 1990 with BNFL's Colin Scane, Plant Manager, and Mike Olney-Smith, Security Officer, as well as with Chris Price, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Security Branch representative.
The team visited certain areas of the plant, including the cascade halls, where several generations of machines, ranging from LECs, 3LCs to TC-11s, were in use, and their safeguards / security features were discussed.
At each plant, the security-classification aspects of IAEA and EURATOM safeguards system visits and inspections were discussed.
Based on these discussions, it was determinec' that each plant has:
j 1.
Established procedures to handle IAEA/ EURATOM visits and inspections, which include procedures to protect commercially sensitive information and classified information.
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2.
Negotiated its own Facility Attachment (FA)-which contains, for example, a short description of the facility, accounting measures for the facility, provisions for surveillance measures, and a detailed
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description of the mode and scope of IAEA routine inspections.
This FA is considered extremely sensitive and is protected accordingly by.the plants and their respective governments.
Based on the~d m ussions, Vrenco Ltd. agreed to clarify IAEA/ EURATOM access to commercially sensitive / classified information, especially that contained in IAEA/ EURATOM notebooks (e.g., photographs).
This is of ircerest, since 10 CFR Part 95 covers. access by IAEA representatives to classified information.
j
'The team also discussed the plant's classified document control program (e.g.,
'l marking and handling of classified documents) with regard to Control Room activities and'to office procedures.
The plant manager's' secretary discussed BNFL's program which included personal computers, document registers, security containers, and the preparation of monthly plant performance progress reports.
From a security-classification perspective, Capenhurst plant personnel are very concerned about protecting the pipe arrays and the height of centrifugas in the cascade halls.
Another major area of concern is uncleared
. construction / maintenance workers and visitors.
Uncleared visitors are only
.taken on preplanned, unclassified routes to minimize their amount of time in 7
the plant for security reasons.
Plant personnel said that security, safeguards, safety, installation, and production people must work closely during the design, installation, and production stages to help assure i.
respective concerns are addressed, and to minimize future problem areas.
LES Plant-LES' CEC in Homer, Louisiana will consist of separation halls; a centrifuge assembly building; office buildings; guard house; feed, product, ar.d uils storage areas; and related support facilities.
Based upon discussions during the trip with various personnel, especially.
Messrs. LeRoy, Kraska and Kratzer, some preliminary comments / perspectives can be made regarding the proposed low enriched uranium enrichment plant.
LES has already done some initial building / process drawings which have not been submitted to NRC for review / comment.
LES should plan to receive 5 sea /iand containers of the 36-foot type every three weeks for three years by NL, FRG or UK ships under the control of foreign government cleared personnel.
For security reasons, no containers / shipments will have parts for an entire centrifuge machine.
LES needs to prepare and submit for NRC aoproval a Transportation / Facility Security Plan for these classified shipments, which includes where they will be off-loaded from the ship and subsequently stored before actually assembled.
SEC is currently discussing with U.S. Customs personnel the security-classification implications of these shipments.
The actual assembly work is expected to start in January 1995 by European / United States personnel in LES' Centrifuge Assembly Building (CAB),
which is one of the most highly sensitive / classified areas of the plant.
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. _17 Urenco-Ltdt will retain ownership of the assembled centrifuges u. Mil they are actually bolted to the floor in the cascade halls for warranty r.nd other reasons. The 60 person assembly shop team will initially be comprised of 20
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European and 40 U.S. personnel, all of whom will be at least "L" type cleared by their respective governments.
Based on the sensitivity of these assembly activii.ies, according to Gronau plant personnel, LES should determine whether or not the U.S.-personnel should be "Q" rather than "L" cleared.
Foreign nationals will be permanently assigned to the CAB ~ area for three to four years.
Over time, fewer Europeans and more Americans will be in this area as the' Americans acquire the necessary skill /experienea.
According to Mr. LeRoy, all permanent LES plant personnel (about 200) will be at'least "L" cleared.
LES also needs to consider clearances for their joint venture partners, such as senior Louisiana Power and Light Company personnel.
In addition; it is estimated that SEC will have to process about twenty LES
- related foreign security assurances a year for personnel (e.g., visitors).
LES will receive classified assembly books / manuals / procedures from Urenco Ltd.
Gronau plant personnel also thought they would need, on occasion, access to some engineering / manufacturing specifications.
LES, through NRC, has already received a classified Urenco design package which was addressed to Urenco, Inc., Fluor Daniel and Duke Engineering and Services personnel, some of whom-were not NRC cleared.
SEC marked the package consistent with U.S. security-classification requirements.
LES and NRC recognize the need to have current classification guidance for this project and to handle classified matter consistent with 10 CFR Part 95.
SEC is focusing on certain information security issues as noted in this report.
LES will probably need several security containers to store classified documents and to establish security areas to store classified parts.
LES said it will establish and implement a security program consistent with 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 NRC security policies and procedures to protect classified matter (i.e., documents, information and material).
ihus it will implement various' physical security measures (e.g., use personnel identification badges,.
watchmen and security containers), information security measures (e.g., mark classified' documents), personnel security measures (e.g., use clearance and
-visitor control procedures), and automated information system security measures. ' LES did not foresee any need for communication security measures (e.g., a secure telephone system) between the various partners in the U.S. or in Europe.
LES will need to establish NRC exclusion and limited security areas at its plant.
Exclusion areas (where mere access to the area will result in access to classified matter) will include the centrifuge assembly / storage areas and the' cascade halls, including the control room.
These areas will contain classified information (such as centrifuges, pipework and gauges).
Limited areas (a security area where watchmen or other internal control can prevent
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l access by unauthorized persons to classified matter) will include the office building and the auxiliary areas containing support services, such as health physics functions.
Classified matter in limited area will include monthly reports and computer media.
Based on this visit and related discussions, LES needs to:
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,1..
Submit preliminary plant architect / engineering /contruction/ process
. drawings'to NRC. safety, safeguards and security personnel to assure.
adequate consideration of their respective areas of. concern.
2.-
Decide whether or,not U.S. personnel in the centrifuge assembly area will need NRC "Q" clearances because they will have access to either sensitive / classified (1) engineering or manufacturing specifications or (2) complete centrifuge machines / components and sub-assemblies.
3.
Receive and comply with updated specific centrifuge classification guidance, since~the 1987 Centrifuge Classification Guide is not focused i
on TC-12 machines nor LES-activities.
(The Chairman of the Security and Classification Working Group has agreed to furnish NRC/ DOE such guidance.)
l 4.
Establish positive procedures to assure that LES (including Fluor Daniel)-
generated matter'is reviewed and marked by an authorized classifier, y
5.
' Receive guidance from the U.S. Government (based on DOE input) on the f
~
transfer of U.S.-origin operating information from LES to Urenco Ltd.,
concerning information on plant operations, information-to satisfy warrantiec, and information from centrifuge autopsies.
(DOE is preparing.
a legal opinion on the reverse flow of information from U.S. to Europe).
a 6.
- Receive clarification on the portion marking of foreign government
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2 information.
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'I 7.-
' Submit a security plan and otherwise meet the requirements of 10 CFR-
-Part 25 and 95 to protect classified documents, information, and material.
This will involve, for. example, using security containers to store classified documents; establishing security areas to protect
- i classified centrifuge machines / components /sub-assemblies in use and storage; providing adequate security'for centrifuges during shipment;.
using protective personnel; and processing classified data /information on automated information systems in office, assembly and operational areas.
E f 8.
Inform NRC on the security classification implications of IAEA visits / inspection especially what types / levels of.information they niay have access-to at LES.
' Conclusions y
The visits and related discussions at the three Urenco enrichment plants were very informative from a security-classification perspective since D/SEC developed a deeper appreciation and understanding of the plants' overall security programs, discussed matters of mutual interest with plant and tTriparitite Government personnel, and identified some areas of future concern.
At the conclusion of the Capenhurst plant visit, the NRC team telephoned GPA/IP to advise that the results of the trip had been eminently successful in every way, and that this information should be conveyed to Carlton Stoiber at the Department.of State.
Mr. Stoiber was en route to Vienna to participate in the initial discussions on the Phase III Agreement for transfer of classified information from the tripartite governments to the United States, and he L
wished to know the outcome of the NRC team visits prior to the discussions.
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LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Almelo
[
Hubert Rakhorst' UCN Commercial Manager Norbert Hootsmans UCN Managing Director.
Claus Joseph UCN Safeguards Consultant-Ben Dekker.
Urenco Security and Safeguards Manager Pieter Verbeek-Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gronau Gustav Meyer-Kretchmer Head, Urenco Plants Division.
Ernst Steinebach Urenco Security and Safeguards Manager
-Jochin, Pokar.
Uranit Licensing Manager Franz Fischer Uranit Assembly Plant Manager Martin Fleischer FRG Ministry'of Foreign Affairs
~!
Hans Romagen BMFT Safeguards Office Capenhurst' 3
Colin Scane Urenco Plant Manager Peter Friend-Urenco Safeguards-Officer Timothy Moore BNFL Chief Design Engineer Robert Foulkes<
BNFL Safeguards Officer David Sedgwick-BNFL Health Physics Manager Michael Olney-Smith BNFL Site Classification Officer l
Peter Agrell UK Department of Energy - International Safeguards Graham Andrewi UK Department of Energy Safeguards Office Christopher Price UKAEA Security Branch i
l-l l
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