ML20059B682
| ML20059B682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000925 |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1993 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059B673 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-93-228 NUDOCS 9401040218 | |
| Download: ML20059B682 (47) | |
Text
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N6 O SEQUOYAH FUELS A GENERAL A7'OM/CS COMPANY SEQUOYAHFAC/L/TY GORE, OKLAHOMA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM/SS/ON BRIEFING March 2,1993 1
9401040218 930514i ~
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INTRODUCTION Purpose Discuss potential violations in IR 92-32 Describe circumstances surrounding potential violations Describe mitigating circumstances Characterize onsite and offsite health, safety, and environmental significance
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I INTRODUCTION
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Agenda
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- SFC Actions
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- Sa"ety Significance
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' EVENT DESCRIPTIDN { continued}
Chronological Order of Events l
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11/17/92 - Midnight shift; digest tanks ready to transfer to adjustment tank i
Digester #3 contents transferred to adjustment tank, acid added j
Digest #2 contents transferred to adjustment tank Began feeding uranium concentrate to Digester #3
- 1) Opened Digester #3 gate valve
- 2) Digester #2 gate valve stuck open
- 3) Concentrate feed to digester #3 not continuous Approximately 12,000 pounds of concentrate fed from bin #1, presumably to digester #3; 8,000 pounds actually: fed to. digester #2
EVENT DESCRIPTIOl\\ { continued?
Chronological Order of Events Nitric Acid added to digester #2; agitator turned on; reaction triggered 8:50 am - Release reported to Control Room Unusual Event declared
- Immediate process area evacuated NOx entered Control Room; HVAC systems shut down Mitigating actions taken on digester #3; no action taken on digester #2 Emergen.cy process shut down initiated 9:08 am - Reaction generating NOx stopped
EVEN I DESCRIP IIOl\\ { continued}
Chronological Order of Events 9:10 am - IN on-essentia personne evacuatec 9:10 am - Air sam ales ta(en in Gore 9:1 L am - Site Area Emergency declared 9:26 am - Air samples ta(en in We abers Falls 9:53 am - Site Area Emergency terminated Estirnated 2,970 aounc s (23,200 cubic feet) I\\ Ox releasec in 18 minutes, anc dilutec by 85,000 cfm roof "ans (di ution factor o" O.03)
AGENDA l
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l Event Description l
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AGENDA
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Event Description v
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SFC ACTIONS Three S=C investigations 1
Root Cause o# the Event z
Root Cause of Ventilation Problems Assessment of Emergency Response 1
Findings consistent with findings of AIT i
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SFC ACTIONS (continuec)
L Fincings provicec to Region IV Corrective Action Plan cevelopec
- Generic Actions
- DUL Actions
- UF6 Actions Public meeting on 12/9/92
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SFC ACTIONS 1
(continued) l Follow up letter on ' 2/' L/92
- Cause of the event Procedure violation by an operator Broader issue: "operationa work-arounds" Corrective actions complete
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AGENDA
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- SFC Actions
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POTENTI AL VIOLATIONS Jigestion 3rocedure vio ation Integrity 0+contro room Emergency arocedure violation -
personne exposure Contingency alan arocec ure vio ation -
personnel accounta ai ity Contingency p an procec ure vio ation -
air horn signa Event c assification
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DIGESTION PROCEDURE Cause
- Failure to follow procedure Corrective actions
- Enhanced digester operation procedure
- Modified work-around response Immediate assessment of equipment problems Repair prior to use,.or
- lssue condition report documenting problem and justifying continued operation
- Reviewed all work-around operations per new procedures prior to restart
- Significant procedure changes plant wide
- All employees memo emphasizing procedural compliance
- Process shut down; digester system no longer operated
- Operations personnel involved were counseled, reprimanded, or discharged a
'l\\TEGRITY O col \\ TROL ROOM Cause
- Pressure difference not considered in system design modification
- Gaseous releases not considered in HVAC system design Corrective actions
- Ventilation system evaluated and modified
- HVAC system
- Installed pressure differential instrumentation in Control Room
- New CPIP.on emergency ventilation control
- Additional emergency equipment.in control room
- Engineering upgrade had already corrected programmatic weaknesses
~ EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
~
Personnel Exposure Cause Failure to o low procec ure Incivic ua s invo vec 7ac inacequate sensitivity to c.7emical 7azarcs Corrective actions Remecial c7emica training :or H&S personnel Completed lazwoaer training or all employees Conc uctec emerc ency c ri I Potential or recurrence signi icantly rec ucec L
ay UF6 system slut cown
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N. PROCEDURE
Personnel Accountability Internal evaluation
- Some weakness identified
- No procedural time limitations for accountability
- Personne accountability was completed as required
- Did not hamper emergency response actions Improvement actions taken
- Conducted drill focusing on personnel accountability
- Weekly upc ate to personnel accountability system Conclusion
- Weakness corrected
- This is not a violation
~ CC'NTINGEl\\ CY PLAl\\ PROCEDURE
~
Air Horn Signal
- Cause Fai ure to "ollow procec ure
- Corrective action Operators instruc~:ec on arocedure Conc UCtec c ri
- Missed step cid not af"ec: evacuation i
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EVENT CLASSIFICATION Internal evaluation
- Event properly classified by procedures
- West half of Main Process Building (included Digestion Area) evacuated and plant shut down immediately
- Emergency response was prompt and effective Procedure enhancement
- Notification process clarified
- Alert conditions clarified for gaseous releases Conclusion
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- The event was properly classified
- Sequence and timing of classification had no overall effect on emergency response This is not a violation e
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AGENDA Event Description
- SFC Actions
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SAFE I Y SIGNIFICAN C E O!= I\\ Ox RELEASE
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V onitoring anc Observations Fenceline anc of" site air samples showed no elevatec measurements Plume pat 7 sampling in Gore showed no elevated measurments Downwind sampling in We.aaers Falls slowed no elevatec measurements Of" site oaservers: Clouc wel a o"t, dissipatec I\\ o clean up necessary No raciologica re ease
' SAFETY SIGl\\IFICAN CE 0: l\\ Ox RELEASE Onsite Signi"icance NOx release rapidly dissipated
- No radiological release No clean up necessary 11 SFC workers reported possible NOx exposure symptoms 5 SFC workers received elevated NOx exposure - physical examinations show no need to continue follow ups NOx health effects are acute - not chronic
- NOx is an eye and respiratory irritant
- Symptoms should appear within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
- Not a carcinogen Prognosis: No present or long term health effects I
SAF E I Y SIG \\ l =lCANC E O= l\\ Ox RELEASE Offsite -ealth Consequences Approximately 34 people offsite examined by physicians Majority worked in neighboring tree farm Physicians' statements: No continuing health effects No long term health effects expected l
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~ $AFETY S G \\ l =lCAl\\ C E O = NOx R'ELEASE Of site Environmental Significance Low concentrations 0
\\ Ox are common.y 3 resent in t7e environment ho raciological re ease No e evatec h Ox measurements o site; downwinc sam a ing in Gore anc Wea aers Falls
\\ o o aservec im aacts at c rounc level; Clouc wel a o t, cissiaatec Conc usion: No camage to o site environment
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CONCLUSION L 30tentia Violations a
into 2 Categories Fai ure to 20 ow 3 rocec ures Digestion arocecure Emergency arocec ure - personne' exposure Contingency plan arocec ure - air lorn signa Ecuipment Design Integrity of Contro loom SFC Denies 2 '30tential Violations Contingency 3 an 3rocec ure -
Personnel Accountaaiity Event Classi ication
col \\ CLUSION (continued)
Overall Safety Significance is Minor
- No long term health effects
- No environmental effects
- NOx is a substance everyone deals with everyday Nevertheless, SFC appreciates the seriousness of any unplanned onsite or offsite release SFC Took Prompt, Appropriate Actions to Handle the Event Event properly classified Successful emergency response
- Affected area immediately evacuated
- Plant promptly shut down
- Timely environmental monitoring L
4 CONCLUSION (continued)
SFC Took Quick Action to investigate and to Correct Causes of the Event Prompt internal investigation and root cause analysis Plant wide procedure changes Training and contingency drill System design changes Processes involved Have Been Permanently Shut Down l
and Appropriate Personnel Actions Taken l
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1 While Some Violations Occurrec, SFC Has Taken Comprehensive Corrective Action and Escalated Enforcement is I\\ ot Warranted I
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CPIP-34 t
~ SEQUOYAH FACILITY CONTINGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE Revision #5 PD-92.01.14
Subject:
EMERGENCY EVACUATION Page 7 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1
- LOCAL OR PLANT EVACUATION To be announced over the Facility Public Address System three times (slowly and clearly) at approximately 15-second intervals.
" ATTENTION ALL PLANT PERSONNEL:
O[8$
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THERE IS A
) Udd b_,/,ept.f_J h (chemical releafe/ fire)
'D1GJ UA]Q2 I
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(other hazard)
INDICATED IN THE N Ay?hy) f (specify %rea) 3 PERSONNEL IN THE AFFECTED AREA SHOULD M(/A' A 7t'f./
)
A EVACUATE TO
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(specify ASC to be used) l (Provide any additional instructions bh MuW LM/T& h Y
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necessary.)
,aE K 1 bt9acA %,tos t'sIbydaaw
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j (additional instructions necessary) l Time Announced:
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Announced by:
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- Revised
.SEQUOYAH FACILITY CONTINGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE CPIP-14 Revision #9 PD-92.02.12
Subject:
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Page 7 of 18 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 5 INITIAL NOTIFICATION MESSAGE Sequoyah County Sheriff (Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Person Contacted M/ I '
Src 1 '
' Time # *50 EC Initials } M Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission of Oklahoma (Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Person Contacted / s v ! v Ia *
Timed #
EC Initials USNRC Emergency Operations Center (Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Person Contacted Timeef47 EC Initials
~
National Response Center (Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Person Contacted dd~ Nm/-
Timedf.M EC Initials Str54 flerxJ "f45-l%
e This is at the Sequoyah Facility near Gore, (name) e * [few
- Oklahoma, We have declared a Site Area Emer ency at
& rb, f$m *
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/.A/7'r4 We have an
_t = /irti = ty release of 9g f,gy
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(time /date)
(Ammonia / Hydrogen Fluoride / Uranium Hexafluoride/ Uranium-Yellowcaka).
For Ammonia or HF Only:
This substance is an extremely hazardous substance in accordance with 40 CFR 302 (a).
The release started at 0 7I M (AM M) and lasted ef#/Adm JC, (time)
' f dur'stion p' T
(hrs / min).
The-estinted-quanthy 9 Me releasw la Rg,-
.A N f
4
. STAT US SHEET SITE AREA EMERGENCY Date lH lS2' j
r Time 6 9 /d AM/FM OSh [
kYhL 1.
Location of incident:
(general)
{ specific) 2.
Date/ time of incident: M 7 /0 -
/[' /[' f A 3.
Cle.ss of Emergency:.$tY tl16d E nie(q a nl c.y' r.
4.
Type of actual (A) or projected (P) release:
( T airborne
(
) waterborne
(
) surface spill
/ /
(
) none 4 0,q.t N r t
hours Estimated duration:
t 5.
Estimated quantity of hazardous material released or being released:
Eg Height of release:
(
) ground level
(
) 50 meters (stack) f.
r, 6.
Chemical and physical form of released material:
A D I, T7/ 7h fM b
7.
Meteorological Conditions:
Wind Velocity
/8 mph Wind Direction (from): /G# degrees Temperature oF Atmospheric Stability Class Form of Precipitation l
Highttime a
Wind Speed Daytime Son Strength thin overcast strong moderate slight 350% cover <35% cover sassasss=s:stss=ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss=ssssssssssa
<5 A
A-B B
5 A-B B
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D E
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C C-D D
D D
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D D
D D
se ss sa n a s s a n z a s asse s sss ss s ss ans ss ss sssss sss = sss s s s ssssss s s ss s s s s ss as A
conservative estimate is obtained by selecting atmospheric stability Class F.
l RUER TO CPIP.21 FOR CITAILID INTORMATICM l
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neusaam.
~
PD-92.01.17
~
Subject:
ALERT Page 6 of 14-hM1ssal
//-t 7-?L ATTACHMENT 2 k'
)
Page 1 of 2 V6AL
/\\
'Y NITIAL NOTIFICATION MESSAGE t
I f
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ALERT C
-~hy ~42 ~ u r #,,41, l
(59Energedcy Notification Bo gf equoyah County Health Department i
S d
I Tab D) f/f-775#Ig. ' qw.
Person Contacted $d /N$4 elm-Tire /4.'/O EC Initials [8Mf.
.f Jn'ay feu O
WJ1S fo:27 Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission of Oklahoma i
(Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Tine EC Initials Person Contacted USNRC Emergency Operations Center (Emergency Notification Book, Tab D)
Person Contacted Tire _
EC Initials O National Response Center - Offsite release (Energency-
~
Notification Book, Tab D)
Time EC Initials Person Contacted t
at the Sequoyah Facility callinc.
This is (name)
No offsite We have declared an Alert at (tine /date) protective actions are necessary.
(Based upon Onsite Emergency j
Director judgement, use one of the following statements):
We have not had a release of hazardous materials.
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or We have had a hazardous materials release but-do not exrect 2.
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this situation to have off-site consequences.
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- Revised
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Contributing Factors i
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DRAPt I
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November 20, 1992 9:10 a.m.
EVENT DESCRIPTION At 8:52 a.m.,
on November 17, 1992, an Unusual Event was declared I
due to nitrogen dioxide (NO:) fumes being emitted from the Digestion Area and spreading to the surrounding process areas including the Control Room and the Process Laboratory.
The Unusual Event was elevated to a Site Area Emergency when the determination that the plume from the NO fumes was not being contained within the facility 2
property.
All personnel not on the Emergency Response Team were evacuated to the South Gate Guard Building.
The Site Area Emergency was terminated the same day at 9:53 a.m.
The Digestion Area consists of three digestion vessels (tanks) and two adjustment tanks.
Yellowcake (uranium ore concentrate) is mixed with nitric acid (HNO ) and heated to " digest" the yellowcake.
3 The resulting solution is then transferred to the adjustment tanks where it is adjusted to comply with process requirements prior to being transferred to the Solvent Extraction Process.
The presumed status of the three digestion tanks at the time of the event was that Digester #1 had a completed batch, ready to transfer to the adjustment tank; Digester d2 was filling with nitric acid with no yellowcake present; and Digester 73 had a batch that was being heated.
During the event, and for a short time afterwards, it was believed that the NO: fumes were being produced from Digester r3 since it was the only digester with an active reaction taking place.
Digester #2 was supposed to contain only nitric acid, which would not produce significant NO: fumes by itself.
However, samples of the contents of Digesters #2 and F3 taken after the event revealed the uranium content in Digester 2 was 410 grams per liter (g/1), while the uranium content in Digester #3 was 260 g/1.
The fact that Digester d2 possessed a uranium concentration of 410 g/l indicates that the tank contained more than just nitric acid.
Even if some of the solution from the previous batch (uranium concentration - 740 g/l) was left in it, it would not be enougn to have elevated the uranium concentration to 410 g/1, recognizing the recent addition of nitric acid.
Yellowcake must have been introduced into the digester to produce this concentration.
In contrast, the uranium concentration for Digester #3 was much lower than would be expected for a 12,000 pound batch of uranium concentrate.
The combined total of uranium contained in Digesters i
This evidence strongly indicates that the 12,000 pounds of yellowcake that was believed to have been fed into Digester #3 was actually fed into both Digesters #2 and
- 3.
1
+
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The yellowcake that.was fed into the Digesters is of Russian
{
origin.
This concentrate has a uranium content of about 87 %,
i indicating that it is primarily UO and not UO.
The reaction of l
2 3 g this concentrate with nitric acid is an exothermic. reaction, meaning that once the' reaction-is started, it will continue.on its own without additional heat or energy.
In Digester #2 when the nitric acid and the yellowcake were combined unknowingly, the
}
reaction was not properly regulated, and the reaction created NO, that resulted in the release, which was transported via powered j
roof vents from the building.
+
Secuence of Events t
0850 Announcement to evacuate the west side of main process building.
l 0851 Unusual Event declared and announcement for all I
non-essential personnel to report to.the Assembly and Support Center at the South Guardhouse.
0900 Off-site assessment done by R. Adkisson on.
~
j nooile phone to R. Cook.
l 0905 Robert Jones inspected. process area, noticed l
plume traveling off-site, recommended plume l
tracking.
0909 The Sr. Shift Supervisor failed to upgrade the event to a Site Area Energency without being prompted.
l 0910 L.
Silverstein brought radios down from Control Room to Onsite Emergency' Response Organization in the lunch room.
l 0910 UE upgraded to a Site Area Energency.
Off-site I
Environmental Assessment began air sampling at Gore.
i l
0910 Shift personnel accounted for.
l l
l 2
l l
l
n 0910 Ron Adkisson went to GoreJand saw only faint cloud up high.
Met with the Mayor of Gore, 1
and the Gore Police Department after briefing f
from Offsite Environmental response group'at the sampling site.
He then called the Mayor of Webbers Falls and received notification of the-Site Area Emergency from police mobile phone f
notification.
0915 H&
S. Tech's Chris. Watson and Robert Crutchfield to track plume offsite (air samples-and drager reading taken).
Negative results on
-j tests.
0920 John Ellis arrived at Gore Mayor's office j
0920 Robert Jones goes back into plant and H&S Techs j
proceeded with recovery samples of process.
area.
0925 Offsite Response Center activated by R.
Cook.
(Alternate Offsite Emergency Director) i 0925 Robert Davis notified Sequoyah County Health Department by phone.
0926 Larry Silverstein' brought additional radio's down from Control Room.
0926 Drager readings taken in lunch room indicated "Non Detectable".
F I
0928 Discussion on ventilation of Control Room.
thru Opened door leading from front of MPB to 0931 Control Room and opened panels on Control Room' air handling unit.
0929 Nurse and ambulance called for at-the-South Guardhouse to render First Aid for inhalation j
victim.
0930 Sequoyah County Sheriff was notified of a Site Area Emergency at the Sequoyah Facility.
r 0933 Scott Munson called for Jeff Haybacker on-radio, however, Jeff had been relieved by Robert Jones and he responded.
i 0933 Hazard Materials Emergency Response of Oklahoma was notified by the Emergency Communicators.
3 t
i m,
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~~
0935 Health Dept. called Offsite Response and had.
not' received formal notification from Sheriff's office.
0936 Health and Safety Technicians report the Main Hallway is clear.
0937 H&S checking officc7, reading room, men's change room - testad ok by Drager.
-)
0937 NRC Emergency Operations Center was notified of a Site Area Emergency by Emergency l
Communicators.
i 0938 The Offsite Response' Center made contact with Joe Sheppard in Washington.
j I
0938 H&S Tech's were taking readings in Control.
i thru Room, and other H&S Tech's were surveying the.
0941 area.
0940 Personnel accountability at South Guardhouse was almost completed.
0940 The PA System at the Offsite Response _ Center _
q was not working.
4 0943 Offsite Response Center receives information that-digest seems to not be leaking.
Al' things seems quiet in plant.
0945 The National Response Center was notified by l
the Emergency Communicators.
0945 Ron Adkisson and Pam Bennett arrived at the' Offsite Response Center.
0945 The Offsite Emergency Director,_ contacted the Hazards Assessment Team Leader and was provided with an onsite assessment.
0946 Drager reading was taken in the Control Room i
and indicated non-detectable, however, i
responders indicated detectable by smell.
l 0947 Offsite Emergency Director converses with Hazards Assessment Team Leader.
j i
0950 The PA System at the Offsite Response Center i
began working (turned off).
j l
4 l
1 i
.-. -. - ~
i 4
0950 R.A.
parker. notified all Onsite Emergency.
responders to report to the Control Room.-
j i
i 0951 The Event was terminated.
Approx.
Health and Safety Supervisor informed personnel.
i 0952 who had exited thru routes other than change rooms to go back to change rooms and use the PCM-1B.
f 0952 R. Adkisson briefed Offsite Team and air samples were taken at Gore, Negative results, i
was informed the County Health Department was notified by the Offsite Environmental Assessment Group.
i 0953 Sequoyah County Health Department received I
formal notification from the Sequoyah County i
Sheriff office.
0953 Offsite Environmental Assessment confirmed l
plume had dissipated.
Offsite Emergency.
I Director conferred with Onsite Emergency Communicator and Hazards Assessment primary.
l 0959 John Ellis assembled workers'in the lunchroom to explain potentials and hazards.
1000 All Offsite boards-were updated and discussed with offsite response teams.
1000 Health and Safety Technicians began changing out air samplers and continued area recovery samples.
1005 H&S began monitoring personnel at the Assemble j
and Support Center who had by-passed PCM while evacuating - no detectable levels.
.l 1015 The alternate Offsite Emergency Director (Reggie Cook) contacted Ed Jones at G.A.
i 1015 Ron Adkisson called about outside I
communications.
1015 The primary Offsite Emergency Director conversed with the Sequoyah County Sheriff and the County Emergency Management Director at the
]
Offsite Response Center.
1015 Public information received call from local" citizen.
i 5
)
i
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1016 Close out was. issued to the Sequoyah County l
Sherift's office by the' Emergency communicators.
i 1017 Close out to NRC Emergency Operations l
Center by Emergency Communicators.
1020 Began performing offsite sampling.
l 1022 Close out to Hazardous Materials Response Commission of Oklahoma by Emergency Communicators.
j 1022 Close out to the National Response Center by Emergency Communicators.
1025 Sequoyah County Health Department arrived at Offsite Response Center.
')
1027 John Ellis spoke with employees and informed l
them of the circumstances of the event.
1031 The Maintenance office and the reading room were surveyed and not released.
l l
l 1104 A PA announcement was given informing emplcyees the 1st & 2nd level Digestion. full-face
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J respiratory protection.
l 1114 H&S personnel began restoring Emergency Equipment and continued assessment of areas'and
]
notifying facility personnel of bioassay needs.
1155 Manager, Health and Safety received telefax from the Manager of the' Environmental Lab from sample location 2110 on Highway 64 West.
1200 The Environmental department issued instructions for technicians to being began soil and vegetation sampling.
1300 PA announcement made that all potentially exposed personnel should submit a urine sample (repeated at 2100 hrs 11-17-92) 6 I
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