ML20059A680

Forwards Responses to NRC Questions on ABWR Certified Design Matl Document 25A5447.Changes Will Be Incorporated in Next Rev of Document Currently Scheduled for mid-Nov 1993

ML20059A680
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	10/20/1993
From:	Quirk J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Joshua Wilson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MFN-169-93, NUDOCS 9310270056
Download: ML20059A680 (75)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:) GE Nuclear Energy cunew rw a cx;w w 175 Damra Avme Se kie. CA 95125 October 20, 1993 MFN 169-93 Docket No. STN 52-001 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Jerry N. Wilson, Acting Director Standardization Project Directorate

Subject:

Responses to Questions on the ABWR Certified Design Material, 25A5447 Gentlemen: Enclosed are thirty-four (34) copies of GE responses to NRC questions on the ABWR Certified Design Material (CDM), Document 25A5447. These NRC questions were received by CE in the period following submittal of the document to NRC August 31, 1993. Several of the responses include CE commitments to revise 25AS447. These changes will be incorporated in the next revision of the document currently scheduled for mid-November 1993. Some of the NRC questions and comments related to the SSAR, Section 14.3, which describes the criteria and methodology used by CE to develop the CDM. The enclosed package does not include responses to these questions and comments. As a result of recent GE/NRC discussions on SSAR Section 14.3, GE will be expanding the existing material to include a broader discussion of the factors influe.cing CDM development. It is expected that this revised material will address many of the NRC comments. The revision will be included in the SSAR amendment currently scheduled for submittal to NRC in mid-November 1993. As always, GE personnel will be available to provide clarification of this material and to answer any questions the staff may have. Sincerely, ~ J l Q-r fect Manager A NR Certification Program Mf782, (408) 925-6942 enclosure cc: N. D. Fletcher (DOE) J. N. Fox (GE) T. A. Boyce (NRC) A. J. James (CE) J. A. Beard (CE-Rockville) R. Louison (GE) h 27000i 9310270056 931020 F PDR ADOCK 05200001 M A PDR .Q

~. -. ~.. E .N . GENuclear Energy O senew Enn cmer 17$ Cane %e%e Se Jose CA 95125 October 20,-1993 MFN 169-93 Docket No. STN 52-001. I Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Jerry N. Wilson, Acting Director Standardization Project Directorate

Subject:

Responses to Questions on the ABUR Certified Design Material, 25A5447 Gentlemen: Enclosed are thirty-four (34) copies of GE responses to NRC questions on the ABWR Certified Design Material (CDM), Document 25AS447. These NRC questions were received by GE in the period follow.ing submittal of the document to NRC August 31, 1993. Several of the responses include GE commitments to revise-25AS447. These changes will be incorporated.in the next revision of the document currently scheduled for mid-November 1993. Some of the NRC questions and comments related to the SSAR, Section 14.3, O which describes the criteria and methodology used by CE.to develop the CDM. The enclosed package does not include responses to these questions and comments. As a result of recent GE/NRC discussions on SSAR Section 14.3, GE will be expanding the existing material to include a broader discussion of. the factors influencing CDM development. It is expected that this revised' material vill address many of the NRC comments. The revision will be included in the SSAR amendment currently scheduled for submittal to NRC in mid-November 1993. As always, CE personnel will be available to provide clarification of this material and to answer any questions the staff may have. Sincerely. O J F _Q ect Manager A Certification Program M 782, (408) 925-6942 enclosure. cc: N. D. Fletcher.(DOE) J. N. Fox (CE) T. A. Boyce (NRC) A. J. James (GE) J. A. Beard (GE-Rockville) R. Louison (CE) =

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUKBER/NAME: Projects Comments NRC COMMENT: 1. I/F requirements should include methodology to meet interfaces in Section 4. 4. Section 1.1, Definitions. Delete the work "other" in the definition cf Type Test. 5. The GE request to use Japanese metric units in the design certification material is under staff review, and will be responded to separately. GE RESPONSE: 1. GE agrees and has modified Section 4,0 to include a discussion that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(viii). 4. GE does not concur. GE believes the intent of this definition is best served if the word "other" is included. 5. Noted. No GE action proposed at this time. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: 1. See attached. 4. None. 5. None. O 11-REv2:\\ci 37

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES OO Section 4.0 Interface Requirements: GE proposes the following additions to address the justification requirements of 10 CFR Part 52.47(a)(1)(viii). The interface requirements defined in this Section are similar in nature to the Design Commitments identified in the tables of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) provided in Section 2.0 above. In particular, the following matters are addressed in one or more of the interface requirements: supply of cooling and makeup water, heat removal for water-cooled systems, separation and independence of divisions, Remote Shutdown System (RSS) controls for system operation, seismic capability, criteria for electrical power systems, monitors, automatic initiation of system operation, and flood limiting features. Each of these design features / design characteristics is also discussed in one or more of the Design Commitments and their corresponding ITAAC in Section 2.0. An applicant for a combined license (COL) that references the ABWR Design O Certification must provide design features or characteristics that comply with the interface requirements for the ABWR design.and ITAAC for the site-specific portions of the fa ility design, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(c). Because the interface requiremente for the ABWR design are similar to the ABWR Design Descript, ions in Section 2.0, for which ITAAC have been developed, compliance with the interface requirements is verifiable through inspection, testing, or analysis. Therefore, there is justification that a COL applicant will be able to develop.ITAAC to verify compliance with the design features or characteristics that implement the interface requirements. O T1 REV2:\\c:-38

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.1.1 RPV r r i NRC COMMENT: 2.1.1 Submit DD change "The vessel skirt does not have openings connecting the upper and lower drywell regions." (CE fax dated 9/15/93) 1 GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will add this entry to the next revision of 25AS447. 'l O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per GE fax. t 2 1 O T1 REV2 \\ct 14 i

25AS447 Rev. 0 ABWR oasin corescatioamatarist The CRD housings are inserted through and welded to the CRD penetrations in the reactor vessel bottom head. The CRDs are mounted into the CRD housings. The in-core housings are inserted through and connected to the bottom head. For an RPV System that requires to be instrumented for flow-induced vibration (FIV) testing, a flanged nozzle is provided in the top head for bolting of the flange associated kp, with the test instrumentation. C: The integral reactor vessel skirt supports the vessel on the Reactor Pressure Vessel M Anchor bolts extend from the pedestal through the flange of the skirt. RPV stabilizers are provided in the upper portion of the RPV to resist horizontal loads. s Lateral supports for the CRD housings and in-core housings are provided. j' A restraint system is provided to prevent a RIP from being a missile in case of a l postulated failure in the casing weld with the bottom head penetration. The restraint system is connected to the lugs on the RPV bottom head and the RIP motor cover. 5 O OQ The RPV insulation is supported from the reactor shield wall surrounding the vessel. Insulation for the upper head and flange is supported by a steel frame independent of gy g the vessel and piping. G 1 ? The RPV pressure boundary and the supports (RPV skirt, stabilizer and CRD O housing /in core housing lateral supports) are classified as Seismic Category I. These components are ASME Code Class 1 vessel and supports, respectively. The shroud support and a portion of the CRD housings inside the RPV are classified as Seismic Category I and ASME Code Class CS structures. The following ASME materials (or their equivalents) are used in the RPV pressure boundary: SA-533, Type B, Class 1 (plate); SA-508, Class 3 (forging); SA-508, Class 1 (forging); SB-166 (UNS N06600, bar); SB-167 (UNS NOS600, seamless pipe); SB-564 (UNS N06600, forging); SA-182 or SA-336, Grade / Class F316L (maximum carbon 0.020%, forging) or F316 (maximum carbon 0.020% and nitrogen from 0.060 to 0.120%, forging); and SA-540, Grade B23 or B24 (bolting). A stainless steel weld overlay is applied to the interior of the RPV cylindrical shell and the steam outlet nozzles. Other nozzles and the RIP motor casings do not have cladding. The bottom head is clad with Ni-Cr-Fe alloy. The RIP penetrations are clad with Ni-Cr-Fe alloy or, alternatively, stainless steel. The materials of the low alloy plates and forging used in construction of the RPV I pressure boundary are melted using vacuum degassing to fine grain practice and are supplied in quenched and tempered condition, b Electroslag welding is not applied for the RPV pressure boundary welds. Preheat and interpass temperatures employed for welding of the RPV pressure boundarylow alloy

2. t.1-2 Reactor Pressure VesselSystem

t 'ABIdR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES - - (~1 p SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.2.1 RC&IS NRC COMMENT: See attached. CE RESPONSE: GE agrees and will make this change in the next revision of 25A5447. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per attached. L ? i f 1 O s T1 REV2 \\ct 39 i h =, .m =

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~ i 1 i ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION _Z_G ANGES SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.4.4 RCIC i i i NRC COMMENT. 1 REACTOR SYSTEMS COMMENTS ON GE ABWR TIER 1 REV. I 1. In our July 8,1993 FSER on Chapter 5.4.6, RCIC, the RCIC. system was approved based on its ability to function without AC power for.at least 8 hours. Amendment 32 changed both Tier 1 and Tier 2 material 1to ( indicate that RCIC will now be designed to function without AC power for only 2 hours. This is unacceptable to the staff, and will remain an open item until CE modifies Tier 1 and Tier 2 materials to indicate ability to function for 8 hours. CE RESPONSE: O i CE believes that in terms of Tier 1 treatment, there are no changes required in the current ITAAC which confira 2-hour RCIC performance. The basic CE approach to RCIC operation without AC power is as follows: i i

1) The SSAR will commit to desienine RCIC and the necessary supporting

[ auxiliaries for 2-hour operation without AC power. This will be { supplemented by a COL Action _ Item requiring it be demonstrated the as-procured, as-built RCIC has 8-hour operating capabiliev. The distinction between design and capabilf tv is that the latter is based on best-estimate, realistic assumptions, whereas the former involves the requirements being in formal design and procurement documentation.

2) Tier 1 will only address the 2-hour aspect of the SSAR commitments.

This is justified because this is the top-level design characteristic which leads to the as-built capability. i i 'i PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: l i None. l T1 REV2:\\ct-10 i-i l.

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES 't SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.6.1 RUCU NRC COMMENT: .i Design Description 1. Add statement discussing system isolation on initiation of S14s and the leak Detection System (LDS). GE RESPONSE: CE does not concur. Isolation of the RWCU (including on initiation of S14) is addressed in Section 2.4.3, Item (2), Page 2.4.3-1. This is consistent with the Tier 1 guideline that the bases for containment isolation will be handled in Section 2.4.3. O ~ PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. ~ h 5 f a i I I T1 REV2 \\ct-5 l

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES (3 SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.6.1 RWCU NRC COMMENT: Desien Descriotion 2. Add statement that safety-related components (isolation valves) are physically separate. GE RESPONSE: GE does not believe this is necessary. Figure 2.6.1 shows the isolation valves are located on either side of the containment, and the configuration check in ITAAC No, I will confirm this. This will confirm adequate separation of the isolation valves. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. i l O T1-REV2:\\c s-6

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES' O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.6.1 RWCU NRC COMMENT: 7 IT6AC 1. Add tests to verify that system isolates on initiation of SLCs and actuation of the LDS. i f CE RESPONSE: CE does not concur. ITAAC No. 2 in Table 2.4.3 will verify operation of isolation logic and ITAAC No. Sa in Table 2.6.1 (together with the testing invoked by Item 1.2(4)) will confira valve operability. Consequently, no additional testing ITAAC need be included. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. 'I 1 h O j T1 REV2 \\ct 7

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES s SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.6.1 RWCU NRc COMMENT: ITAAC 2. Add inspection to verify physical separation of safety-related components (isolation valves). GE RESPONSE: CE does not concur. See response to CUW Item 1 (Design Description) above. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. rr U 1 T1-REV2 \\ct-8 j

i ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES nV SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.6.1 RWCU NRC COMMENT: SSAR Power supplies not discussed in SSAR text. This discussion should be

added, i

l GE RESPONSE: The SSAR discussed RWCU power supplies in several sections. 1. Divisional power assignments for the containment isolation valves are covered in Table 6.2 7 under C31. 2. Pump power is addressed in Figure 8.3-1, Sheet 2. O' 3. Power for the RWCU differential flow sensors is addressed in Section 7.3.1.1.2. In addition, the SSAR in general does not identify specific power assignments below the MCC level for non-Class lE systems. Consequently, the SSAR doeonot specify loading assignments for RWCU non-Class lE components other than the pumps. PROPOSED SSAR CHANGES: For clarity and completeness, Section 5.8.4 will be modified to indicate l RWCU components receive power from the appropriate non-Class lE load groups. No other SSAR changes are believed necessary or appropriate. l O T1-REV2 \\ct 9

k) / 23A6100 Rev. 2 ABWR standard safetyanssysis Report f f( The manufacturer will be required to conduct facton or valve test lab demonstration test prior to their use in the plant. vMW3 The CUW System vahing configurati ns between the system pump dict arge piping and connections to the feedwater systerr sill be designed and installed forpi.as break locatim s. Specifically, breaks in the MS tunnel or in the system equipment compartment coincident with single active component failures (eg. check valve failures) will not result in feedwater reverse flow into the CUW System compartments. A tabulation of CUW System equipment data, including temperature pressure and flow - capacity, is provided in Table 5.4 6. 5.4.9 Main Steamlines and Feedwater Piping 5.4.9.1 Safety Design Bases in order to satisfy the safety design bases, the main steam and feedwater lines are designed as follows: (1) The main steam, feedwater, and associated drain lines are protected from potential damage due to fluidjets, missiles, reaction forces, pressures. and temperatures resulting from pipe breaks. (2) The main steam, feedwater, and drain lines are designed to accommodate stresses from internal pressures and earthqnake loads without a failure that could lead to the release of radioacthity in excess of the guideline values in published regulations. (3) The main steam and feedwater lines are ancessible for insenice testing and inspection. (4) The main steamlines are analvzed for dynamic loadings due to fast closure of the turbine stop valves. l (5) The main steam and feedwater piping from the reactor through the seismic l interface restraint is designed as Seismic Categorv 1. (6) The main steam and feedwater piping and smaller connected lines are designed in accordance with the requirements of Table 3.2-1. 5.4.92 Power Generation Design Bases 1 (1) The main steamlines are designed to conduct steam from the reactor vessel over the full range of reactor power operation. S d-50 Component and Subsystem Design - Amendment 32

i INSERT A The CUW containment isolation valves power supplies are listed in Table 6.2-7. Each of the two CUW pumps receives its power from separate plant investment protection (PIP) buses, as depicted in Figure 8.3-1. Power to the CUW differential sensors is addressed in Section 7.3.1.1.2. All other CUW components receive power from their respective non-Class 1E load groups (ie, from Bus A or Bus B as appropriate). O 1 O

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION:- TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.7.5 EMS NRC COMMENT: See attached. CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include this change in the next revision of 25A5447. I l l PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per attached. \\ l O T1-REV2:\\cs-40 ._2__._-_________---_--_

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L + ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES Ov SYSTEM NUXBER/NAME: 2.9.1 Radwaste NRC COMMENT: a. CE committed to adding "These valves close upon receiving a IDCA signal" to the Design Description (DD). As of Amendment 32, this has not been added. i GE RESPONSE: GE does not concur. Closure of these containment isolation valves is. addressed in Section 2.4.3, item 11. This approach is consistent with the overall Tier 1 strategy of defining isolation signals / conditions in Section 2.4.3 rather than in each individua' system having containment isolation .O valves. - PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. T t b. O T1-REv2:\\ci 31 i 4 c-

=. 1 - 1 ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION:' TIER 1 REVISION 2' CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.9.1 Radwaste I i NRC COMMENT: b. The staff is still unclear as to why the drain system for the "non-ECCS" areas of secondary containment do not need backflow protection. p i i GE RESPONSE: The attached response provides the requested information. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. l i O i T1-REV2:\\ct 32 - t y y

('Sg Eggoonse to hRC Ouestion SPLB Comments. Item 2.9.1.1.b V The sump pumps in the nondivisional area of Floor 100 (B3F) are provided with check valves which are non-seismic and non-safety-related. If they should fail to prevent backflow, the water level in the sump would rise. The sump pumps would operate as described in Subsection 9.3.8.2.5. A high-level switch would start the first sump pump to pump water out of the sump. If the water level continues to rise, a separate high-high level switch would start the second pump and actuate an alarm in the main control room. This would most likely alert plant operators to take corrective actions. In addition to these considerations, the sumps in question are located in areas which have water-tight doors which preclude flow into the nondivisional corridor area of B3F. The complete nondivisional area would have to be flooded to a height above the water-tight doors before water would enter into the nondivisional corridor area. This is discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.1.2.1.1 (penultimate paragraph). This evaluation concludes that even with no sump pump transfer at all, the worst case flooding event (suppression pool cleanup system rupture which results in the entire suppression pool flooding into the B3F area) would not result in any essential functions being compromised, and plant integrity would be maintained. On the basis of these considerations, it is concluded that the drain system for the nondivisional areas of secondary containment does not need Seismic Category I, safety-related backflow protection. T1 REV2:\\c-33 0

ABWR DESIGN' CERTIFICATION:' TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES-1 i O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.10.7 Main Turbine j NRC COMMENT: Add "IVs" under actions for protective action #3, on page 2.10.7-2. 1 i o CE RESPONSE: GE agrees and will make this change in the next revision of 25A5447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. h O 11-REV2:\\cs 36

'l .l ) ABWR DESIGN-CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES i SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.11.3 RCW I .i NRC COMMENT: 3. 2.11;3 - REACTOR BUILDING COOLING WATER [ GE added a level detector on the RCW standpipe shown on Figures 2.11'.3 I a-c. The sensor on Fig. 2.11.3c is not correct. ? l k CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will correct this item in the next revision of 24A5447. k k PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. lO 71-REV2 \\cs-30 t

J .ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES SYSTEM NUKBER/NAME: 2.12.1 i NRC COMMENT: P 1. In ITAAC Table 2.12.1, there appears to be a typo in the Acceptance Criteria column of entry 5. i CE RESPONSE: CE concurs and will change "out" to " output" in the next revision of 25AS447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See above-N rA4o)1uf, p m. ' t O T1-REV2 \\ct-25

O O O ~ S I Table 2.12.1 Electric Power Distribution System b k Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria CD f Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria y 1. The basic configuration for the EPD 1. Inspection of the as-built system will be 1. The as-built EPD System conforms with (} System is described in Section 2.12.1. conducted. the basic configuration described in Section 2.12.1. B-g 2. UATs are sized to supply their load 2. Analyses for the as-built UATs to 2. Analyses for as-built UATs exist and a requirements, during design operating determine their load requirements will be conclude that UAT capacity, as j modes, of their respective Class 1E performed. determined by its nameplate rating, divisions and non-Class 1E load groups. exceeds its analyzed load requirements, during design operating modes, for its Class 1E division and non-Class 1E load group. 3. UATs are separated from the RAT (s). 3. Inspections of the as-built UATs will be 3. As built UATe are separated from the conducted. RAT (s) by a minimum of 15.24m. g 4. UATs are provided with their own oil pit. 4. Inspections of the as-built UATs will be 4. As-built UATs are provided with their own { drain, fire deluge system, grounding, and conducted. oil pit, drain, fire deluge system, lightning protection systems. grounding, and lightning protection 2 systems. 5. The PMG and its output circuit breaker is 5. Inspections for the as-built PMG, the PMG 5. As-built PMG and its output circuit separated from the RAT (s) power feeders. output circuit breaker, the RAT (s) and their breaker is separated from the RAT (s) The PMG and its output circuit breaker respective instrumentation and control power feeders by a minimum of 15.24m, instrument and controlcircuits are circuits will be conducted. or by walls or floors. The PMG and if out M, separated from the RAT (s) circuit breaker instrument and control s instrumentation and control circuits. circuits are separated from the RAT (s) instrumentation and control circuits by a e minimum of 15.24m, or by walls or floors E outside the MCR, and are separated by I. routing the circuits in separate raceways inside the MCR. 2 lE = Nc 6 v = i!- ~ ~

~ 4 \\ ABWR DESIGN' CERTIFICATION: TIER'l REVISION 2 CH.ANGES

(

SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.12.1 l 4 NRC COMMENT: 4. The design description for the EPD (2.12.1) has a commitment that there are no automatic connections between divisions. To be consistent, such a'- design commitment regarding no automatic connections between divisions should be included for design descriptions 2.12.14 and 2.12.15. i GE RESPONSE: 1 GE concurs and will incorporate the statement in 2.12.14 and 2.12.15 in the next revision of 25A5447. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See attached markup. k ? O i T1 REV2:\\cs 28 - 2

2SAS447 Rsv. O ABWR ossion certisestion natorini 2.12.14 Vital AC Power Supply Design Description The Vital AC Power Supply consists of Class 1 E and non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies, and their respective alternating current (AC) distribution panels, power, and instrumentation and control cables to the distribution system loads. The AC disuibution system also includes the protection equipment provided to protect the AC distribution equipment. The Class IE Vital AC Power Supply connections to the Electrical Power Distribution (EPD) System and the Direct Current Power Supply are shown on Figure 2.12.14. The Class 1E Vital AC Power Supply consists of four divisions (Division I,II, III, and IV) of uninterruptible power supplies with their respective distribution panels. Each Class lE power supply provides uninterruptible, regulated AC power to Gass IE circuits which require continuity of powcr during a loss of preferred power (LOPP). Each Class lE Vital AC Power Supply is a constant voltage constant frequency (CVCF) inverter power supply unit. The non-Class 1 E Vital AC Power Supply consists of uninterruptible power supplies with O their respective distribution panels. Each non-Class 1E power supply provides uninterruptible, regulated AC power to non-Class 1E circuits which require continuity of power durmg a LOPP. Each non-Class 1E Vital AC Power Supply is a CVCF inverter power supply unit. Each Class 1E CVCF unit has three input power sources. Except for the Division IV CVCF unit, the normal power to each Class 1E CVCF unitis supplied from an AC motor control center (MCC) in the same Class IE division as the CVCF unit.The Division IV Class 1E CVCF unit is supplied AC power from a Division II AC MCC. The backup power for each Class IE CVCF unit is supplied from the direct current (DC) battery in the same Class IE division as the CVCF unit. In addition, each Class IE CVCF unit contains an alternate power supply. The alternate power supply is a voltage regulating device, ard is supplied power from the same AC power source as the normal power supply. Each Class 1E CVCF normal and backup power supply is synchronized, in both frequency and phase, with its alternate power supply and maintains continuity of power during transfer from the inverter to the alternate supply. Automatic transfer between each Class IE CVCF unit's three power sources is provided. Manual transfer between each Class IE CVCF unit power source is also provided. Each Class IE CVCF unit is sized to provide output power to its respective distribution panel loads. THEM Mr Nes AaroMA rc CoNNsc7 tom BE TsJGC A) CLAS$ il DihWNS. \\ V Vital AC Power Supply 2.12.14-1

k 25A5447thv.0 ABWR onsira corawcetionuserser 2.12.15 Instrument and Control Power Supply Design Description The Instrument and Control Power Supply consists of Class 1E and non-Class 1E interruptible power supplies and their respective alternating current (AC) distribution panels, power, and instrumentation and control cables to the distribution system loads. The AC distribution system also includes the protection equipment provided to protect the AC distribution equipment. The Class 1E Instrument aad Control Power Supply connections to the Electrical Power Distribution (EPD) System are shown on Figure 2.12.15. l The Class 1E Instrument and Control Power Supply consists of three divisions (Division I, II, and III) ofinterruptible power supplies with their respective distribution panels. Each Class IE power supply provides interruptible, regulated AC power to Class IE circuits which do not require continuity of power during a loss of prefe:Ted power (LOPP). The non Class 1E Instmment and Control Power Supply consists of an interruptible, power supply with its respective distribution panel. The non-Class 1E power supply O provides interruptible, regulated AC power to non-Class IE circuits which do not require continuity of power during a LOPP. Each Class 1E Instrument and Control Power Supply is a voltage regulating device. The power to each Class 1E Instrument and Control Power Supply voltage regulating device is supplied from an AC MCC in the same Class IE division as the device. Each Class IE instmment and Control Power Supply is sized to provide output power to its respective distribution panelloads. Ts/EAE' A At s' N# sf etTaaf/9 T#e. dod/WF8T##4K GGTHCe<) Cap.u of Postow.s. Class IE Instrument and Control Power Supplies and their respective distribution ] panels are identified according to their Class IE division and are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective divisional areas. Independence is provided between Class 1E divisions, and also between Class IE divisions and non-Class 1E equipment. Class IE Instrument and Control Power Supply system distribution panels and their .i circuit breakers and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements. Distribution _ panels are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents. Class IE Instrument and Control Power Supply system interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault opens before other devices. Instrument and ControlPower Supply 2.12.15-1 .l

= ~ ABWR DESIGN" CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.12.12 ) NRC COMMENT: 2. ITAAC figure 2.12.12 shows a connection to "CVCF Inverter," but figure 2.12.14 shows a connection to the "CVCF Power Supply." It appears these should read the scae. i GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and plans to use the term "CVCF Power Supply" in the next revision of 25AS447. i PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANCES: Change CVCF Inverter to CVCF Power Supply. See attached markup. a f O T1-REV2 \\cs 26 t ,v-- g

0 0 O' O b I e to 2 DIV 11 DIV I DlV IV DIV HI BATTERY DIV !! DIV 1 DIV ll DIV 111 AC MCC AC MCC AC MCC AC MCC !~ T) I) I) T) I I I I l NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER I I I i i l l I I I I I I I DC DC DC DC k DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION -k { PANEL PANEL PANEL PANEL v v v v v v v v v 1 f LOCAL CVCF DCMCC LOCAL CVCF LOCAL CVCF LOCAL CVCF E 4 DISTR INVERIER DISTR INYEfMER DISTR INWEAMR DISTR INYEfWEft n E PANEL PANEL Ps40s C PANEL PANEL ** N"## g \\ (TYP) Ssarh y/ \\ (TYP) / \\(TYP) / \\ (TYP) Jur72y / Q 4 settiy 3"!!1f g 2 DIV 11 DC DIV 1 DC DIV IV DC DIV 111 DC {- I a I s E Figure 2.12.12 Direct Current Power Supply (Class 1E) l- )

V i l ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1' REVISION 2 CHANGES' 4 O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.12.12 NRC COMMENT: ? 3. Design description 2.12.12 was revised regarding the manual connections between divisions via the spare battery chargers which were removed from the description and the figure. The commitment should be simplified to avoid l confusion. The commitment should state no automatic connections between divisions and interlocks are provided to prevent manual paralleling / connection between divisions. The ITAAC should also be revised to match any changes. l' i i GE RESPONSE: i GE concurs and will revise the wording in ~ the -next revision of 25A5447. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANCES: Revised wording agreed to verbally by GE/NRC (C Christensen/ Thatcher and Knox). See attached markup. E i 1 .. t I T1-REV2:\\ce-27 ew w e y y w i-%

25A5447 R1v. O ABWR oasion certisatin unteries. 1 2,12.12 Direct Current Power Supply Design Description The Direct Current Power Supply consists ofClass 1 E and non-Class 1 E batteries, battery chargers, and their respective direct current (DC) distribution panels, motor control centers (MCC), power, and instrumentation and control cables to the distribution system loads. The DC distribution system also includes the protection equipment provided to protect the DC distribution equipment. The Class IE Direct Current Power Supply and its connections to the Electrical Power Distribution (EPD) System are shown on Figure 2.12.12. The Class IE DC electrical power distribution system consists of four Class 1E divisions (Divisions I, II, III, and IV) of batteries with their respective DC electrical distribution panels, DC MCCs, if provided for motor loads, and battery chargers. The Class IE DC distribution system provides DC power to Class 1E DC equipment and instrumentation and control circuits. The non-Class 1E DC electrical power distribution system consists of non-Class IE batteries with their respective DC electrical distribution panels, DC MCC,if prosided for motor loads, and battery chargers. The non-Class IE DC distribution system provides DC power to non-Class IE DC equipment and instrumentation and control circuits. Except for Division IV, each Class 1E dhisional (Divisions I,II, and III) battery is provided with a normal battery charger supplied alternating curtent (AC) power from a MCC in the same Class IE dhision as the battery. The Dhision IV normal battery charger is supplied AC power from a Dhision II MCC. There are no automatic connections between Class IE '~ " j "rgx:, Y - 2 "n iC p: _ - _7 pE E i 8 8v' 5'#- t ...,,,t_.... -.. t _ nc _-..... .t-t...., 4 o -.c..... ....w........... 1 /.2 5:r=:r 9: '"m IE 'm":q drgn: x:. :":d ' n. i; ?.C p: r-app"c :s ic bn:cq cha.p. ;..d n ic OC pa. cr a :p= h.. ic h u;g ing= i '~ pm_ yaralleling between Class IE dhisions. ZewcLoc8s ur twaspep re pggdrar nuut Each Class 1E battery is sized to supply its design loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging. Each Class IE normal battery charger is sized to supply its respective Class 1E dhision's normal steady-state loads while charging its respective Class 1E battery. The Class 1E battery, and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements. The Class 1E battery, battery charger, and DC distribution panels, and MCCs are rated i to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Direct Current Power Suppy 2.12.12-1 i y-

~ O O' Table 2.12.12 Direct Current Power Supply ~ { inspections Tests Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i Design Commitment inspections Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria f 1. The basic configuration of the Direct 1. Inspections of the as-built system will be 1. The as-built Direct Current Power Supply t Current Power Supply is described in conducted. conforms with the basic configuration Section 2.12.12. described in Section 2.12.12. B [ t 2. Except for Division IV, each Class 1E 2. Inspections of the as-built Class 1E Direct 2. Each as-built Class 1E divisional divisional (Divisions 1,11, and till battery is Current Power Supply will be conducted. (Divisions I,II, and lit) battery is provided provided with a normal battery charger with a normal battery charger supplied supplied AC power from a MCC in the AC power from a MCC in the same Class r same Class 1E division as the battery.The 1E division as the battery.The Division IV Division IV normal battery charger is normal battery charger is supplied AC supplied AC power from a Division 11 power from a Division 11 MCC. MCC. 3. 3. Tests of the as-built Class 1E inessesy 3. The as-built Class 1E 5:": / ': ;: ^ C 4 i: r ;:52; x:= h::d;-icd _; L."C mineages. interlocks will be conducted by ~---- -"r'/ :- ":- CC p c.. -, c ir ; k -;:r: ner": : ^: "' - i;^^: / '- ;- - attempting to close each interlocked pair interlocks prevent paralleling h ^.C :nd of breakers. o Class 1E divisions.The,"C a DC 3' 5 connections between Class 1E divisions "" / r'r ;:n 0: ;x'. z^4aralleling b "###W d## N*N h are manual only. between Class 1E divisions. \\ro t'as vsc7 Mapunt l 4. Each Class 1E battery is sized to supply its 4. ~ 4. design loads, at the end-of-installed-life, a. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E a. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E for a minimum of 2 hours without batteries to determine battery batteries exist and conclude that each recharging. capacities will be performed based on Class 1E battery has the capacity, as the design duty cycle for each battery. determined by the as-built battery I rating, to supply its analyzed design e loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a I minimum of 2 hours without T recharging.

b. Tests of each as-built class 1E battery

b. The capacity of each as-built Class 1E h

will be conducted by simulating loads battery equals or exceeds the g which envelope the analyzed battery analyzed battery design duty cycle = y h design duty cycle. capacity. m --m f u-- w

==~re _rp***t*4 w- + s-+ree'

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,Me .w e.guur -9 Jem S-c 'm* W h.* 9 e'

-.. =. - ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES-O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.12.17 -l NRC COMMENT: 5. In the design description for lighting (2.12.17), the commitment regarding non-Class 1E AC standby lighting serving passageways was deleted. Was this intentional or a typo? If it was intentional, provide the basis. t l l CE RESPONSE: CE concurs and will add the statement in the next revision of 25A5447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See attached markup. .s O T1-REV2:\\c: 29 'I

m 2SAS447Rsv 0 ABWR onie ceniscarieausteisi } i 2.12.17 Lighting and Servicing Power Supply Design Description The Lighting and Senicing Power Supply (LSPS) consists of multiple lighting systems and a non-Clasa IE senice power supply system. The non-Class IE senice power supply system supplies power to non Class 1E loads which are not required for plant power > l operation. There are four lighting systems: the normal alternating current (AC) lighting system, the standby AC lighting system, the emergency direct current (DC) lighting system, and. the guide lamp lighting system. I I he normal AC lighting system provides lighting needed for operation, inspection, and repairs during normal plant operation in areas containing non-safety related equipment. The normal lighting system is part of the plant's non-safety-related systems and is supplied by the non-Class IE power system buses. The AC standby lighting system is comprised of the non-Class IE AC standby ligl. ting system and the Associated Class IE AC standby lighting system. The non-Class 1E AC standby lighting system sen'es both safety-related and non4afety-related areas-dis powered by the plant investment protection (PIP) buses. The Associated Ci s IE AC standby lighting system serves the safety-related divisional areas and the p eways -i and stairwells leading to the divisional areas. ( u p 7ggfg rg sfg s m o s Q u a sino m e u.s Each division of Associated Class lE AC standby lighting is supplied power from its respective Class IE division (Division I, II, and III). The Associated Class 1E AC standby lighting in the main control room (MCR) is supplied from divisions II and III. The Associated Class 1E standby AC lighting in the division IV battery room and other division IV instrumentation and control areas is supplied from division II. The DC emergency lighting system is comprised of the non-Class IE DC emergency lighting system and the Associated Class 1E DC emergency lighting system.The DC - emergency lighting system provides DC backup lighting, when AC lighting is lost, until the normal or standby lighting systems are energized. The non Class 1E DC emergency lighting system supplies the lighting needed in plant areas containing non-safety-related equipment and is supplied by the non-Class 1E DC system.The Associated Class 1E DC emergency lighting system supplies the lighting needed in plant areas containing safety-related equipment. Each division of Associated Class 1E DC emergency lighting is supplied by power from . its respective Class IE dhision (Dhisions I, II,III, and IV).The Associated Class IE DC. emergency lighting in the MCR is supplied from divisions II and III. Lighting and Servicing Power Supply 2.12.17 1

~ O O O t Table 2.12.1 Electric Power Distribution System (Continued) b. N s inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria IDg Design Commitment inspecthons. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 33 6. UATs power feeders, and instrumentation 6. Inspections for the as-built UATs and 6. As-built UAT power feeders are separated and control circuits are separated from RAT (s) power feeders, and from the RAT (s) power feeders by a the RAT (s) output power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits will minimum of 15.24m, or by walis or floors, instrumentation and control circuits. be conducted. except at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium voltage M/C switchgear. As-built UAT instrumentation and control circuits, are separated from the RAT (s) instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 15.24m, or by walls or floors, except as follows: a) at the non-Class 1E DC power sources, where they are routed in separate raceways, b)inside the MCR, where they are separated by routing the circuits in separate raceways, and c) at the t switchgear, where they are routed to s opposite ends of the medium voltage M/C I Escra> gear / App toursk sa WJOTE switch dr1 r w D r far scoercMGr M. 7. The MPT and its switching station 7. Inspections for the as-built MPT and 7. As-built MPT and its switching station instrumentation and control circuits are RAT (s) and their respective switching instrumentation and control circuits, separated from the RAT (s) and its station instrumentation and control from the switchyard (s) to the MCR, are switching station instrumentation and circuits will be conducted. separated from the RAT (s) and its 3 control circuits. switching station instrumentation and 3 control circuits by a minimum of 15.24m, g-or by walls or floors. MPT and its y switching station instrumentation and g control circuits, inside the MCR, are Q [ separated from the RAT (s) and its g E switching station instrumentation and - gi s control circuits by routing the circuits in 3' h. separate raceways. E 3 .it: w a t.. I

q .ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES i q. -4 x, SYSTEM KUMBER/NAME: 2.14.1 PCS i l NRC COMMENT: .} 2.14.1 Primary Containment System 1 i Desien Descriotion In the second paragraph on Page 2.14.1-3, the first sentence should read,. "The containment internal structures designated Seisaic Category I are designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic and static load conditions....." l l-GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include this change in the next revision of 25A5447. 1 i PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: l - Per NRC comment. .: { f -. i ~ i i 9 b 9 9 T1 REV2:\\ct 1

25AS447 Rsv. 0 ABWR onian cenmestion stuial 1 The following PCS components are classified as Seismic Category 1; the reinforced concrete containment structure, the drywell head, equipment hatches to both upper and lower drywell regions, personnel locks into upper and lower drywells, the combined personnel access and equipment hatch into the wetwell, the basemat, the reactor pedestal, the reactor shield wall, the DEPSS, and containment piping and electrical penetration sleeves. Q gg The containment internal structures designated Seismic Category I, are designe to accommodate the dynamic and static load conditions and load combinadons associated with the containment design basis accident. The loads to be applied to these structures are associated with: (1) Live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and building vibration loads from normal plant operation. (2) Earthquakes loads from safe shutdo m earthquake. (3) Blowdown pressures and temperature from design basis loss-of-coolant accidents. O (4) Hydrodynamic loads and structural vibradons resuldng from steam discharges into the suppression pool. (5) Reaction forces on structures resuldng from pipe breakjets or fluid impacts. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.14.1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Primary Containment System. i Primary Containment System 2.14.1-3

.~. _ _ q 1 ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION:' TIER 1-REVISION 2 CHANGES SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.1'PCS -i NRC COMMENT: 2.14.1 Propose DD change "Each vacuum breaker has a position indication switch that provides position indication and an alaru in the main control Room (MCR) with adequate sensitivity to detect the suppression pool bypass capability of the containment." (open item 24B and J-7) i GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include this material in the next version of 25AS447.. This includes a new ITAAC No. 9 aimed at confirming vacuum breaker position i sensing sensitivity. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See attached mark-up. i r .E ) 1 i l T1-REV2:\\ct 2 ,r. L

25AS447 R2v. O ABWR onion ceniscutiu unwriei ( \\ The reinforced concrete diaphragm floor, separating the upper drywell and the wetwell gas spaces, has a steel liner plate on the underside. The design differential pressure of 2 the diaphragm floor between dowell and wetwell is 1.76 kg/cm in the downward direction. The RPV pedestal forms the lower drywell region and consists of a cylindrical double shell composite steel structure. It is anchored to the basemat and supports the RPV through a support ring girder. The pedestal also supports the reactor shield wall. The pedestal consists of two concentric steel cylindersjoined together radially by vertical - steel diaphragms and filled with concrete. The pressure suppression venting paths are q an integral part of the pedestal structure, which includes (1) the ducts which interconnect the lower and upper drywell regions, (2) the vertical downcomers from the interconnecting ducts to the horizontal vents, and (3) the horizontal vents that direct steam into the suppression pool. The horizontal vents consist of 30 pipes uniformly spaced around the perimeter of the pedestalin ten stacks of three each. The 2 total horizontal vent area is greater or equal to 11.55 m.The distance from the pedestal containing these horizontal vents to the outer suppression pool wall is greater than 7.4m..All HVAC ducts, cabling and piping between the upper and lower drywells are routed through the interconnecting ducts. Vacuum relief between the dqwell volumes and the wetwell gas sp.:ce is provided by vacuum breaker valves on piping sleeves penetrating the pedestal wall. Eight normally 2 closed swing check valves with a total flow area of at least 1.53 m are provided. Each bW Awalarm in the main %osition indication switch /0iat providgp ~ vacuum breaker has c n of oom (MCR). /.Wr 4 M hx h7 lht. Allow A4Aff+4dm. 9001 p' The water vofiime in th'iuppression poolincluding the vents is equal to or g3rter3aii ~ e 3,580 cubic meters. The safety relief valve (SRV) discharge lines terminate in standard "X" type quenchers. The horizontal center line of the safety relief valve discharge line . k,, (SRVDL) quencher arms are located at or below the elevation of the center layer of S horizontal vents in the suppression pool. The quenchers are placed in the suppression , k. I pool in two radial rings. Eighteen of10 equally spaced locations in each radial ring have 5 Y. quenchers installed. Water return paths connect the region within the pedestal to the vertical downcomers and horizontal vent paths. The lower drywell floor is provided with corium protection 2 fill of at least 1.5 meters thickness and a minimum 79 m area clear of obstructions to debris spreading. The corium protection fill contains less than 4% of calcium carbonate material by weight. Sumps imbedded in the concrete are protected by corium shields made of alumina which are at least 330 mm and no more than 470 mm tall; The channels which allow water flow in to the floor drain sump is less tnan 10 mm high and at least 1.06m long. Thermally activated flooding valves are also located in this region. 2.14.1 2 Primary Containment System i e r~ -. ~- -

s T ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION:- TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES; -p/; s SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.1 PCS-NRc coxxEur: t 2.14.1 Containment Susps .We are still evaluating this issue and will provide comments ASAP. P CE RESPONSE: i GE believes the current Tier 1 treatment of this issue (Section 2.14.6) is entirely adequate. { PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES:

None, i

l j l 1 i 71-REV2 \\cs-3 .r

1 ) ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES i SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.1 PCS M NRC COMMENT: 2.14.1 Propose new ITAAC "The vacuum breaker position indication switch can detect a valve opening of ???..." (Open item 24B and J-7) 4 GE RESPONSE: i i CE agrees to include an ITAAC on this issue and has added a new item No. 9 to Table 2.14.1'. GE does not believe it is appropriate to base this new ITAAC on a specific numerical value of valve opening.. Allowable bypass leakage is specified as an A/K term. The area can only be determined when the geometric details of the as-butit, as-installed valves are known since the K factor is dependent upon these details. t O ~ PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See response to 2.14.1, Item 5 above. l l 1 ] T1 REV2:\\ct-4

Table 2.14.1 Primary Containment System { inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria 3 Design Commitment inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Cetteria 1. The basic configuration of the PCS is as 1. Inspections of the as-built system will be 1. The as-built PCS conforms with the basic i shown on Figure 2.14.1. conducted. configuration shown on Figure 2.14.1. 2. The primary containment prassure 2. Inspections of ASME Code required 2. An ASME Code Certified Stress Report 3 boundary defined in Section 2.14.1 is documents will be conducted, exists for the pressure boundary components. designed to meet ASME Code, Section 111 requirements. 3. The ASME Code pressure boundary 3. A structural integrity test (SIT) will be 3. The results of the SIT of the pressure components of the PCS retain their conducted on the pressure boundary boundary components conform with the integrity under internal pressures that will components of the PCS per ASME Code requirements of the ASME Code. be experienced during service. requirements. 4. The maximum calculated pressures and 4. Analyses of the design basis accident will 4. The maximum calculated pressures and temperatures for the design basis be performed using as-built PCS data. temperatures are loss than design y conditions. E accident are less than design conditions. 5. The primary containment pressure 5. An integrated leak rate test of the primary 5. The primary containment pressure 'h boundary including penetrations and containment will be conducted, boundary including penetrations and ( isolation valves has a leak rate equal to or isolation valves has a leak rate equal to or less than 0.5% per day (excluding MSIV less than 0.5% per day (excluding MS!V leakage) of containment gas mass at the leakage) of containment gas mass at the maximum calculated containment maximum calculated containment pressure for the design basis accident. pressure for the design basis accident. 6. The design differential pressure of the 6. An SIT will be conducted of the 6. An SIT report exists concluding that the diaphragm floor tietween the drywell and diaphragm floor with the drywell pressure diaphragm floor is able to withstand the wetwellis 1.76 kg/cm in the downward greater than wetwell pressures by 1.15 design differential pressure. y 2 disection. times the design differential pressure. g 7. The horizontal vent system consists of 30 7. Inspection of the installed horizontal vent 7. Confirmation that horizontal vent system E vents configured as described in Section system will be conducted. Is configured as described in Section k 2.14.1. { 2.14.1. I 8. MCR displays and alarms provided for the 8. Inspections will be performed on the MCR 8. Displays and alarms exist or can be N PCS are as defined in Section 2.14.1. displays and alarms for the PCS. retrieved in the MCR as defined in Section I{ 2.14.1. f y g nm6a q,a n a d oAcet.

O O O t Table 2.14.1 Primary Containment System (Continued) h ^ tu T, inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria (0 [ The water volume in the suppression poolg. Analyses of the as-built PCS will be & The water volume in the suppression pool including the vents is equal to or greater 18 performed. 10 including the vents is equal to or greater 3 3 than 3580 m. than 3580 m. g . The SRVDL quencher arms are located at 16. Inspection of the installed SRVDL 1rThe SRVDL quenchers are located within or below the elevation of the center layer il quenchers will be conducted. O the suppression pool as described in of horizontal vents in the suppression Section 2.14.1. pool The quenchers are placed in the suppression pool in two radial ring. Eighteen of 10 equally spaced locations in each radial ring have quenchers installed. R

11. The corium protection fill contains less tf. Tests will be performed on corium VCCorium protection fill contains less than U

than 4% of calcium carbonate material by protection fill materials to determine the ' 2' 4% of calcium carbonate material by g weight. calcium carbonate content in a test facility weight. i}

d. Lower drywell imbedded sumps are W Inspections of the lower drywell sump YL Lower drywellimbedded sumps are k

protected by corium shields made of g corium protection shields will be a protected by corium shields made of { alumina. performed, alumina. o g g. 1/ The containment internal structures are Jfr. A structural analysis will be performed ta. A structural analysis report exists which able to withstand the structural design g which reconciles the as-built data with g concludes that the as-built internal basis loads as defined in Section 2.14.1. structural design as defined in Section structures are able to withstand the 2.14.1. design basis loads as defined in Section 2.14.1. '? P E D 8 g. a n 3' fle 9 3 = E I i a a

a.

3 S. .h. ---m m m m-m w

-s - s s PROPOSED ADDITION TO ITAAC 2.14.1 9. The vacuum breaker posi-9. Analyses of the as-built vacuum 9. An analysis report exists tion switches have' adequate breakers will be performed. which concludes that the vacuum sensitivity to detect the breaker position switches have allowable supression pool adequate sensitivity to detect bypass capability of the-the allowable suppression pool containment. bypass capability of the containment. 71-REV2L -~-

t ABWR DESIGN-CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.4 SGTS NPM COMMENT: Negative pressure should be relative to the " surrounding spaces," not "outside atmosphere" in the DD and ITAAC. Outside atmosphere-is a subset-of surrounding spaces since all sides of the structures housing SGTS are not exposed to atmosphere. ,r 1 GE RESPONSE: GE does not concur. As shown on Figure 2.14.4, the SGTS pressure sensors O monitor the differential pressure between the reactor building and the outside atmosphere. This reflects the SGTS design defined in the SSAR. v Since SGTS performance will be monitored (in part) by these instruments, GE believes the Tier 1 material is appropriate as-is. Furthermore, this is a i technically correct approach since the intent of the SGTS is to prevent direct leakage from the reactor building to the outside atmosphere. f P PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. s LO l T1-REV2:\\c:-34 l

.~_ - f ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIEh' 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.6 ACS NRC COMMENT: 2.14.6 Submit DD change "The COPS pneumatic actuated valves shown on Figure 2.14.6 have active safety-related functions to both open and close,andpegformthesefunctionsagainstadifferentialpressure of 7.34 kg/cm (absolute) +/- 5% and under fluid flow and I temperature conditions." (CE fax dated 9/15/93) GE RESPONSE: i GE concurs and will include these changes in the next revision of 25A5447. - t O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: i Per GE fax, 5 5 O i T1 REV2:\\ct 11 i + -n. . 1

25A5441r%v. 0 ABWR oasin coniscation usterias O 2.14.6 Atmospheric Control System Design Description The Atmospheric Control (AC) System consists of a nitrogen supply, injection lines, exhaust lines, bleed line, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The AC System also has the containment overpressure protection system (COPS). Figure 2.14.6 shows the basic system configuration and scope. The AC System is capable of providing an inert atmosphere within the primary containment. Except for the primary containment penetrations, isolation valves, and suppression pool level sensors, the AC System is classified as non-safety-related. The outer rupture disk of the COPS has a rupture differential pressure ofless than 0.306 kg/cm The inner rupture disk of the COPS is selected such that the COPS has an 2 2 actuation pressure of 7.34 kg/cm (absolute) d55 The COPS has the capacity to allow at least 28 kg/sec steam flow when the containment is at the actuation pressure of the system. The AC System primary containment penetrations, isolation valves, and suppression pool level sensors are classified as Seismic Category I. Figure 2.14.6 shows the ASME Code class for the AC System piping and components. AC System components are located in the Reactor Building, except for the nitrogen supply. Figure 2.14.6 shows the Class 1E divisional power assignments for the AC System components. In the AC System, independence is provided between the Class lE divisions, and also between the Class IE divisions and non-Class IE equipment. The main control room has control and open/close status indication for the containment isolation valves. AC System components with display interfaces with the Remote Shutdown System (RSS) are shown on the Figure 2.14.6. The safety-related electrical equipment located in the Reactor Building is qualified for a harsh environment. j The COPS pneumatic actuated valves shown on Figure 2.14.6 have active safety-related functions to both open and close, and perform these functions muuhur Milinundesel pressurp fluid flow and temperature conditions. gab st a t $ lp %k V 2.1441 Atmosphoric Control System

l 'I ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES i SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.6 ACS NRC COMMENT: 2.14.6 Submit Figure change - Add footnote to Figure 2.14.6 to indicate "3. The ACS include provisions for supplying nitrogen to the COPS piping between the inner and outer rupture disks." (GE fax dated 9/15/93) GE RESPONSE: l GE concurs and will add this note to the next revision of 24A5447. O i PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per GE fax. t i l 1 l T1 REV2 \\es-13

~ O O O~ J' = euNT 3 STACK _ OUTER 3. AC 3 A RUPTURE JL o DSK HPIN AC$xHS"ST i NNS AC oagN S G h Jk SUPPLY 3 HVAC l~ fc'8 l 2l NNS g AC 2 g____J g q '__________ w I N l l AC SGTS l l 5 ,l lll8 l l M r--'T-I J'F T'---! i E f-} y /l-- p-l) fl-- I L _J d -+-- { r DRYWEU. l i l"" FROM w l I NITROGEN INNER 3 l l l SUPPLY 5 / RUPTURE 7 q g l l BLEEDUNEVALVE ['"'! i si s l-DISK T '/ m -1 l l S, se 1 L.---i pi-T.---l l l l { pF-l --l j rl+_,rRO,ugE,70R tg I lh

@ DviSmi-R 2 HVAC e

AC l l DV.Ill l / $- --,s%i,,,, s,',,,,,, s l lL / H L DMSIONil R %,/ q L----j j f f---{ J l J DV.IV g n f CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Q SYSTEM NOTES: E

1. INBOARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DVISION il OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ARE

~ POWERED FROM CLASS IE DMSION l EXCEPT AS NOTED WITH *$*, WHICH IS POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION til. I Ba

2. THE COPS FLOW PATH FROM THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TO THE PLANT STACK HAS NO VALVES OTHER THAN THOSE SHOWN ON THE FIGURE.

N I E-( E' bl S A. Figure 2.14.6 Atmospheric Control SystemQ n',& ti th (09.6 ~ ~ ffefva wm ydw PM ILch% k W Or Ovph i-

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.14.6 ACS NRC COMMENT: 2.14.6 Submit ITAAC change - ITAAC 8 to indicate "pegform these functions against a differential pressure of 7.34 kg/cm (absolute) +/- 5% and under." (CE fax dated 9/15/93) CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will add these changes to the next revision of 25A5447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per GE fax. O T1 2iV2:\\cs 12

y/ k Table 2.14.6 Atmospheric Control System (Continued) b m e inspections. Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria

r

• g Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria ng 6.

Main control room displays and controls 6. Inspections will be performad on the 6. Displays and controls exist or can be { provided for the AC System are as main control room displays and controls retrieved in the main control room as y defined in Section 2.14.6. for the AC System. defined in Section 2.14.6. m j 7. RSS displays provided for the AC System 7. Inspections will be performed on the RSS 7. Displays exist on the RSS as defined in are as defined in Section 2.14.6. displays for the AC System. Section 2.14.6. 8. The COPS pneumatic actuated valves 8. Tests will be conducted in a test facility for 8. Upon receipt of an actuating signal, each shown on Figure 2.14.6 have active both opening and closing under valve both opens and closes. safety-related functions to both open and differential pressure, fluid flow and close, and perform these functions esmier temperature conditions. deerem4ekpsessurgfluid flow and W.d4 Mmperature conditions. Y 9. The two valves in the containment

9. Tests will be conducted on the as-built AC 9.

The two valves in the containment b overpressure protection system fall open System pneumatic valves, overpressure protection system fail open on loss of pneumatic pressure or loss of on loss of pneumatic pressure or loss of k electrical power to the valve actuating electrical power to the valve actuating if solenoid. The other pneumatic valves solenold.The other pneumatic valves shown on Figure 2.14.6 fait closed on loss shown on Figure 2.14.6 fait closed on loss of pneumatic pressure or loss of electrical of pneumatic pressure or loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoids. power to the valve actuating solenoids. f E [Aba/ 4 S j 67 M y@ t x l 3 l T v S; e ii- =

N s

P l

9 ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.5 HVAC NRC COMMENT: SA. The MCAE should be maintained at least 3.2 mm water relative to the surrounding spaces, not the outside atmosphere. This is the regulatory position in SRP.6.4. CE RESPONSE: GE does not concur. GE believes the Tier 1 commitment as stated is more + appropriate because the differential pressure measuring device shown on Figure 2,15.5a is only capable of measuring the difference between the control room and the outside atmosphere. This measurement configuration, l coupled with the self-evidently reasonable assumption that the surrounding spaces in the control Building will be at very-close-to-atmospheric pressure, is the basis for the GE approach. Furthermore, this Tier 1 treatment is entirely consistent with tl.e MCAE treatment in the SSAR which shows differential pressure sensing between the control room and the outside atmosphere. In summary, GE does not believe any Tier 1 changes are appropriate. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: l None. 4 71 REV2s\\cs 17

ASWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O V SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.5 HVAC NRC COMMENT: Sb. The TSC should be maintained at a positive pressure relative to the surrounding spaces, not the outside atmosphere. l l GE RESPONSE: GE does not concur. For consistency with the MCAE approach discussed above in Item a), GE believes it is appropriate to leave this entry as-is. O V PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. 1 T1-PEV2:\\ct-18

. =.. _. ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2'CHAMGE1 ) -SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.5 (TSC) NRC COMMENT: i

Attached, CE RESPONSE:

CE concurs and will make this change in the next revision of 25A5447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per attached, e r b E l r O T1 REV2 \\cs 15 _. _ _..,,.., _.______._____~______________________.____.-_:.

2sAsurnem o ABWR oniv,conmesensatens n k dr & (2) Service Building HVAC System. y Technical Support Center HVAC System The Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC tem provides a controlled environment for penonnel comfort and safety in the TS The system consists of an air conditioning unit with two supply fans, two exhaust fans, and an emergency filtradon unit with two circulating fans. The emergency 81tration unit will have at least 95% removal efBelency for all forms ofiodine (elemental, organic, particulate, and hydrogen iodide) from the influent system. Toxic gas moniton may be required in the outside air intake of the TSC HVAC System; these sensors are not in the CertiBed Design. The TSC HVAC System Is classified as non safetyrelated. The TSC HVAC System is located in the Service Building. On receipt of a signal for high radiadon in the normal air intake for the TSC ventilanon system, the normal air intake damper closes, the minimum outside air intake damper opens and the ventiladon air for the TSC is routed through the emergency Sitration unit. I' In the high radiadon mode, a posidve pressure is maintained in the TSC relative to the outside atmosphers. interface Requirements Toxic gas monitors will be located in the outside air intakes of the TSC HVAC System, if the site is adjacent to toxic ps sources with the potential for releases of significance to plant operadng personnel in the TSC. These monitors sha!! have the fo!!owing requirements: (1) Be located in the outside air intake of the TSC HVAC System. (2) Be capable ofdetecting toxic gas concentradons atwhich personnel protective actions must be initiated. Service Building HVAC System The Service Building HVAC Sptem serves the Operstlonal Support Center (OSC) and the rest of Service Building, excluding the TSC, and it consists of an air conditioning unit, supply fan, and two exhaust fans. Inspections, Teets, Analysee anti Acceptance Criterin For portions of the CRHA HVAC System within the Certined Design, Table 2.15.5a provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with ="=W j acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the CRHA HVAC Systems. Hestms. wnstwne smrNe condnientne srunwrw 2.ss.s.s s 1-1 d 2.ET-d uJmo ous** Ptv C 9 : LO CS 'O C '80

r; ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES emU SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.6 FPS wRc coxuENT: 3. QA problem - Figure 2.15.6, Fire Water Protection Water Supply System, t Check valves shown on figure are backwards. If system was built according to the figure, the system would not perform its intended function. t CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will correct this figure in the next revision of 25AS447. O a PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. l i J i O 1 ') T1 K V2a\\ct 35 'l , :r-. + .4.

= l i ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES i em SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.10 Reactor Building ] NRC COMMENT: 2.15.10 - REACTOR BUILDIPG ITAAC entries $8 and 9 are missing. Note that Rev. 1 of the ITAAC was supposed to add pages 2.15.10 19/20 that may contain these ITAAC entries, but the pages were not in the package. 1 GE RESPONSE: O GE recognizes that some copies of 25A5447 Rev. 1 did not include Page 2.15.10-19/20. Copies have subsequently been sent to NRC (T. Boyce). .i Any Tier i recipient who needs a copy should call R. Louison of GE at (408) 925-1682 and request copies. t PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: None. I 1 [ v i P -f i 'l T1-REV2 \\ct 16 I ~.. _.

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.10a Reactor Building NRC COMMENT: 2. QA problem - Figure 2.15.10a (Rev. 1) Lines on top of building in figure do not line up with the building. l GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include the necessary changes 1.n the next revision of 25A5447. O FROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment and Revision 0 of 25AS447. l O T1 REV2 \\ct 19 } ,r .~

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2' CHANGES se O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.10 R/B NRC COMMENT: ITAAC ITAAC f8 and #9 provided in the April 23, 1993 submittal. appear to have. been inadvertently deleted or else they were moved to page 2.15.10-19 which was not included in the final copy. They should be reinstated in Table 2.15.10 on Page 2.15.10-18 (or 2.15.10-19). t CE RESPONSE: See above response to the Item 5, 2.15.10. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANCES: N/A O 714tV2:\\cs-24 .. ~., _ _ _, ~

- c.. I l ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1-REVISION 2 CHANGES I - I SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15 12 Control Building NRC COMMENT: 1. Desinn Description - i a. In the fifth paragraph on Page 2.15.12-2, the second sentence should read, "It is designed and censtructed-to' accommodate the' dynamic and static load condition.........." a CE RESPONSE: CE concurs and will include this change in the next revision of 25A5447. i PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANCES: i Per NRC comment. ' f 1 s T1 REV2:\\ct 20 ] i e w rewee-r -w-nw---- m- ~ w w a ~ w----e

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES tf SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.12 control Building NRC COMMENT: e i b. In the same paragraph, " fires" should be deleted from load Condition #2, Internal Events. CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include this change in the next revision of 25AS447. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. i i 1 O T1-REV2:\\ce 21 'l 1 ~

ASWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION:- TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.12 Control Building NRC COMMENT: 2. Firures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12g The panel wall (El 3500mm) shown in Figure 2.15.11a adjacent to a. Column Line CD should also be shown in Figure 2.15.12e. b. The panel wall (El 7900mm) shown in Figure 2.15.12b between Column Lines C5 and C6 should also be shown in Figure 2.15.12f. c. The panel wall (El.12300mm) shown in Figure 2.15.12g adjacent to ' Column Line C1 should also be shown in Figure 2.15.12b. i O' k GE RESPONSE: CE concurs that these figures need to be modified and will.do so in the next revision of 25A5447. In the case of comments a) and b), GE proposes to delete the panel walls shown in Figures 2.14.12 a) and b), respectively. Basis: these panel 5 walls are not important and do not merit Tier 1 treatment. In the case of-( comment c), CE proposes to move the section cut in Figure 2.15.2g to pass l through the equipment access door. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per. attached markup. In addition, CE believes there are additional minor CB figure changes comparable to those in this response. GE will be-including these changes.in the next revision of 24A5447. These changes will_not be technically substantive. The next revision of 24A5447-will also include modifications to the Section 3.2 figures to reflect the items discussed.in this response. i_- .J T1 REV2:\\c: 22 .-r y ,m-....,,---,-m

~ O O O~ O b . l t - k a i 2 - TZ - l -m \\ i l l l l wm pes-2F. ---r x.i... m. 7 /_ , a n.t C. ; li i a i 7 E 7 m-as f f sw Notes: =a -ense 84r

1. A gap between C/B and R/B at the elevation at the top of basemats is no less than 2m.

2. A gap between C/B and T/8 at the elevation of the top of

-JV\\m, y $ r ' Comm ent ' e2. a. v s g Figure 2.15.12e Control Building Arrangement, Section A-A'

1. -n

~ h4 l PgI.*Iag ~ O m y w rp, o b Au-m"x E" = ss = a A / o a c e t c n L N ].[ = rj e J m w _~ c l E J* E: 1 u f B T.- e l J* B 'm E e p. on m w c i = a t 1 c 1* T. . nb + e E S llt n I t ~ e 'l m e a g n N ca a M r r A O g n i d r l i u l B ,j lo J* 'm E r t n e o l C = J" ca b 2 " E 1 l 5 12 1 2 + I e r u g i F = _J

i f

agg a r f r y r e y r a e s s a n t e o h n e n n. m. 0 o 22 2 a = a m m a = n n n n h . O w e _N c6 ,$a6E=g m = e is = i! c! J

~ O O O~ b g m 5-O'{*A h _ -1 -R-oum un e y 270- + + l +- y h kh.*m-/-@ l l E ~ so. i s e l l 3$- + ! = + $ / + o g =.c e 9 w i l r u. } ll ll ll 180

• b g tv1armf Qc C.~a n Y

2. C.

h. = 9 5 t;; g Rgure 2.15.12g Control Building Arrangement, Floor 1F-Elevation 12300 mm { a M4 +~ e

ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES l' '%/ SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 2.15.13 R/W NRC COMMENT: Desien Description In the fifth paragraph on Page 2.15.13-1, the first sentence should read, "The external walls of the RW/B below grade and the basemat are designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions........" CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will include this change in the next revision of 25A5447. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. I T1-REV2 \\ct-23

d ) ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2' CHANGES i SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 3.2b RAD DAC -i NRC COMMENT: t Wording change request in Table 3.2b i i l l CE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will make this change in the next revision of 25AS447. E l PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: Per NRC comment. i 1 'I P ) e l l T1-REV2:\\ct 42 e .-,.-m.-- e .e,, .a-- n w

m Table 3.2h Ventilation and Airtmene Monitoring { Q n hospecdosis. Tests. Anahses and Acceptance Cdtede D g Acceptance Cdtsete Design Conomhanent

.., r* n Teets, Analysse

1. Plant design aheu provnde for

1. Expected concentrations of airbome

1. Calculation of radioactive airbome

) conteinment of airbome rad 60ecthro radioactive material shaN be calculated try concentratkm shau demonstrate that: l I mdadels and the ventileden system will radionuchde for normal plant operations

s. For normally occupied rooms and I

J c e ' ' n t eneintain and anticipded operstional occurrences areas of the plant (i e, those ersas y onconeradone of airbomeradionucEdes for each equipment cubele, corddor, and ,,q,;nng,,,,;,,,ce,,,,,op,,,,, c at levole consistent wish personnel access operating area requiring personnel and maintain the piant), equ&briurn access. Calculations shau consider: tvations d Wrw needs.

s. Totalventination flow rates for each rodeonuclides wig be a smal; fraction (10% or less) c4 the ocx:upational eres.

concentration limits bsted in 10CF R20 O Appendix B. a g

b. Typicalleakage characteristics for

b. For coms that requireinfrequent access (such as for non-routine A

equipment located in each aree. equipment manntenarx:el, the ventilation system shan be capabis of g C 5 reducing radioactive airborne 3 concenarations to (and maintmining 0 them att the occupational concentration limits Instad in 10CFR20 U Appendix B during the pedods that ( occupancy is required. s For rooms that seldom require access

c. A radiation soorts term in each fksid c.

system based uport an assumed (sudt as the backwseh receiving tank onges rate of 100,000 pCurle/nec(30 tcom), plant design shou provide g A minuta deci.f) appropriately adlussed containment and ventilation to reduce g* j for radological decay and buNdup of airborne contammation spread to Q O other areas of lower contorninetion. actbsatedcorrosion and wear ~ n P'~h a 2 R [ i e E i h N b O

h ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: 3.4 I&C DAC NRC COMMENT: 1. Attached markup of Sheet 3.4-1. 2. Comment on Sheet 3.4 2\\ t GE RESPONSE: 4 1. CE concurs. 2. CE concurc that the statement in ITAAC No. 3 should be clarified since there are DTMs in Division IV. This will be provided in the next revision of 25A5447. PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: 1. Per NRC comment. 2. See attached markup. O 71-REV2 \\c: 41

i sa w now.o D x=aunmesmer g-3 0 3,4 Instrumentation and Control i introduction Subsection A pre Ees a descripdon of the configuradon of safetyeelated digit; instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment encompassed by Safety System I and Control (SSLC). Subsecdon B consains a descripdon of the hardware anl development process used in the design, tesdag, and installadon of !&C! This includes descriptions of the p xesses used to establish programs tha 'l mitigate the effects of electromagnede interference, establish setpoints fo; channels, and ensure the qualiScadon of the installed equipment Subsection discumes the diverse features implemented in I&C system daagn to provide support for posadated worswnee common. mode failures orSSLC. .T.% c-The devices addressed in this section are electronic components of the A i minned systems. These components are conagured as real dme mic use microprocessors and other prog ~ammable logic device to perform data communicadons, and system logic processmg.These components a I automade, on-line se!&diagnoede femmres to monitor these tasks and o5 tin I capability to and in malaran=== and m. '"-am The operadog programs for thesecontrol l in pveT===* rendenly memory (FAOM)]. Acontmiler's operasing systeml permit Seld adjustment of h parameters under proper change cont Adjustable pemmeters are stored in electncaDpelternate renden or equivalent. A, Safety System Logie and Controi Design Doesr$ption Safety < elated monitoring and trip togic for the plant proesction d l equipment. SSLC integrates the amomade d-N --Wa and triplogic: manual osca-initiation Amcdons _ ="" with the as8 sty acdons of th relased systetna. 3514 generates the protecdve Amcdon signal M H mitigadon of reactor accidents. The reladonship betweenl and provide J. SSLC and systems for plant protection is shown in Figure S.4a. l - ressed,soewate conaviled signal SSLC Mp-tcomprises =L+: Procesars that perform signal conditioning, satpoint comparison inidation and reset selfesse, calibradon, and bypass Asocdons. The sig associated with a particular safettrelated syst l f certam switches and lad =a s, belong to SSLC. However, SSLC is 9 system: SSLC is the aggregate of signal processors for severa SSLC hardware and soRware are classised as Ctess IE, ' F'* u.s l i wi s.i m,c or i

• ytdac: 9O CS'CC
• S O sod

'**~d "3"O D IE N.

O o gom q y i b i Tatde 3.4 hestruenentation and Control an o Mr^' n. Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria t e. Acceptance critone i ; n'" mTests, Analysee D eelg a 8' m l 8" 8'""" '** 'ad c"*'d

1. The es-built SSLC conforms with the 1

1. Inspections of the es-built SSLC win be descripelon in Section 144A). Diverse

1. The ;; '.=4 c___5, SSLCle conducted.

backup support equipment for SSLC defined in heel =i 3.4(AL The q ; TM cornprising everse bedesp support conforms with the description in Section i funceone ter SSLC le defined in SecIlon 14 (C).

2. Safety-relatedrnoniseringandartplogic

2. Tests wlN be performed on as-instelled

2. A test report exists which concludes that 3.4 iC).

p the SSLC design beels perfotmance for the plane protocelen systems resides in SSLC using almulatedinput signals. Il _ SSLC equipment.S8trineogreses Wie System ouspute willbe rnonitored to reqidremonte are met. d autosnatic desiolongneNng and trip logic determine operability c4 safsey-related I funcetone sad enenuel operaer hastation Amcelone. f functions MM widithe esfety 8 = acalone of the oefety taleted eyesome. 7 I SSLC generates the protoceve lancelon S 0 signesethee amtv a.meanor trip and provide 2;. - ^ f snitigeaien of g '**d ***Id'"' 3. d 2

3. The DTM,TLU, and OLuefor RPS and 3.

a. The test signal exists only in the Cla

^ ^* :

a. Tests willbe performed on SSLC by 1E sSwision undes test in SSLC.

I' h0SIV in each of Gie tour'- :t are W h Wudt provkling a east signalto she EC N y @NQass E AC sourus. equipmentin only one Class 1E end EUs for ESF 1 and ESF 2 m,, g i, n. and. e -ed.e,n

b. '. J' of the as-insteiled Ctess tE elecencelisolation exists berween g

The

b. In SSLC, physical separation or 3

i,i - t: divtalonel Close E DC divleienein SSLCwillbe performed. Class 1E divisions. Physical p ._'hiSSLC." ^ :;f_.:+is ~~ ovhted between Goes 1E sevleione end esperation or electricalisolation exists g es between these C4ess 1E dnewons and p( bp.Ones IE divisione endnon-Osos nonh TE M. O IE { n O

m..

-N g b d % bTAr w Lbf a v.# .e m + %%-+ a m a. .a w-- m .m m..

O b b,m q n i g Table 3.4 Instrumentation and Control g g ?g Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria g Safety System Logic and Control sp 1. The equipment comprising SSLC is 1. Inspections of the as-built SSLC will be 1. The as-built SSLC conforms with the g defined in Section 3.4(A). The equipment conducted. description in Section 3.4(A). Diverse comprising diverse backup support backup support equipment for SSLC functions for SSLC is defined in Section conforms with the description in Section 3.4 (C). 3.4 (C). 2. Safety-related monitoring and trip logic 2. Tests will be performed on as-installed 2. A test report exists which concludes that for the plant protection systems resides in SSLC using simulated input signals. the SSLC design basis performance SSLC equipment. SSLC integrates the System outputs will be monitored to . requirements are met. automatic decision-making and trip logic determine operability of safety-related functions and manual operator initiation functions. functions associated with the safety y actions of the safety-rtriated systems. t 4 SSLC generates the protective function signals that activate reactor trip and { provide safety-related mitigation of a reactor accidents. 3. The DTM, TLU, and OLUs for RPS and 3. 3. MSlV in each of the four instrumentation

a. Tests will be performed on SSLC by a.

The test signal exists only in the Class l&C 1E division under test in SSLC. p t e v si n Class 1 sources. u entin n on Cl 1E The DTMs and SLUs for ESF 1 and ESF 2 division at a time. In Divisions I,11, and lli are powered from their respective divisional Class 1E DC

b. Inspection of the as-Installed Class 1E

b. In SSLC, physical separation or y

sourcen in SSLC, independence is divisions in SSLC will be performed. electrical isolation exists between j' provide d between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E divisions. Physical p between Class 1E divisions and non-Class separation or electrical isolation exists 3, 1E equ ipment. between these Class 1E divisions and E' non-Class 1E equipment. h \\ = v g ht5.s t-e. -fda. mis A 38$Uld y A -p

.w ABWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: TIER 1 REVISION 2 CHANGES O . SYSTEM NUMBER /NAME: '5.0 Site Parameters t i NRC COMMENT: T Add an item to Table 5.0 addressing Exclusion Area Boundary. (Handwritten comment on Table 5.0) i GE RESPONSE: GE concurs and will add this material in the next revision of 25A5447. Exception: GE does not plan to include the "(1000 feet)" on the basis that + Tier 1 uses only metric units. O PROPOSED TIER 1 CHANGES: See attached markup. l 1 i t i i O T1-REV2:\\ct 43 --- - i

25A54471ltv. 0 ABWR ossiga cumcmina unerini I r\\ e Table 5.0 ABWR Site Parameters Maximum Ground Water Level: Extreme Wind: Basic Wm' d Speed: 61.0 cm below grade 177 km/hr(I)/197 km/hr(2) Maximum Hood (or Tsunami)Ievel: Tornado 30.5 cm below grade

• Manmum tornado wind speed:

483 km/hr i e

• Maximum pressure drop:

0.141 kg/cm d N Precipitation (for Roof Design):

• Missile spectra:

Spectrum I

• Maximum ramfall rate:

49.3 cm/hrW 2

• Maximum snowload:

0.024 kg/cm Ambient Design Temperature: Soil Properties: 1 1% Exceedance Values

• Minimum static bearing 8W
• Maximum:

37.8*C dry bulb capacity: 7.32 kg/cm ts 25'C wet bulb (coincident)

• Minimum shear wave velocity:

305 m/sec ) 26.6*C wet bulb (non-coincident)

• Uquefaction potential:

None at plant site

• Minimum:

-23.3*C resulting from site ( 0% Exceedance Values (Historical Limit) speciSc SSE ground [

• Maximum:

- 46.l*C dry bulb motion 26.7*C wet bulb (coincident) -l 27.2*C wet bulb (non-coincident) Seismology: _ W

• Minimum:

-40*C

• SSE response spectra: See Figures 5.0a and 5.0b Meteorological Dispersion (Chi /Q):

g Y bl/0 3

• Maximum 2-hour 95% EAB 1.37 x 10-8 sec/m
• Maxunum 2-hour 95% LPZ 4.11 x 104 8

sec/m g g M bpg I

• Maximum annualaverage g g.

g 4 3 (8760) hour) LPZ l.17 x 10 sec/m b I.37 co-3m/m' e~% ( a( 104 M e s % vp m fa 76, G %.m (1) 50-year recurrence interval; value to be utilized for design of non-safety-rdated structures onsy. (2) 100-year recurrence interval;value to be utilized for design for safety-related structures only. 2 (3) Maximum value for 1 hour over 2.6 km probable maximum precipitation (PMP) with ratio of 5 minutes to 1 hour PMP of 0.32. Maximum short-term rate: 15.7cm/5 min. (4) Spectrum I missiles consist of a massive high kinetic energy missile which deforms on impact, a i rigid missile to test penetration resistance, and a small rigid missile of a size sufficient to just pass through any openings in protective barriers. These missiles consists of an 1800 kg automobile, a 125 kg,20 cm diameter armor piercing artillery shell, and a 2.54 cm diameter solid steel sphere, all impacting at 35% of the maximum horizontal windspeed of the design basis tornado.The first two missiles are assumed to impact at normal incidence, the last to impinge upon barrier openings in l the most damaging directions, j (5) At foundation level of the reactor and control buildings. (6)This is the minimum shear wave velocity at low strains after the soll property uncertainties have been applied. (7) Free-field, at plant grade elevation. (f)from p+1V LO (&n Nn a ' h Letm h /)(W ,uxhuty did coau pWDa La_ sw r= eter. s>2 }) b o c >v cs h * % _ ] :p t h, J & Meec' (O (Ft c .}}