ML20058P645

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Discusses 931202 Mtg Meeting Re Activities Concerning Restart of Plant.List of Meeting Attendees & Util Handout Matl Encl
ML20058P645
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/1993
From: Merschoff E
NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II)
To: Medford M
Tennessee Valley Authority
References
NUDOCS 9312270217
Download: ML20058P645 (27)
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Text

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v DEC 6 Igg 3 Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Dr. Mark 0. Medford Vice President, Technical Support 3B Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MANAGEMENT MEETING

SUMMARY

On December 2, 1993, the NRC staff met in the Region II office with representatives of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) management staff to discuss activities regarding the restart of Sequoyah Unit 1. is a list of the individuals who attended the meeting and Enclosure 2 is the handout material supplied by TVA.

The topics discussed included the Sequoyah Post Restart Plan, process changes between Unit I and Unit 2 startup, controls for maintaining work priorities, and schedule for Unit I restart.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely, (Original signed by E. Merschoff)

Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Presentation Notes cc w/encls:

(See page 2) 230043 I }/

9312270217 931206 PDR ADOCK 05000327 l

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i Tennessee Valley Authority -

2 cc w/encls:

Mr. Craven Crowell, Chairman Mr. Robert Fenech, Site Vice Tennessee Valley Authority President ET-12A Sequoyah Nuclear P1 ant 1

400 West Sumit Hill Drive Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, TN 37902 P. O. Box 2000 i

Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. W. H. Kennoy, Director l

4 Tennessee Valley Authority Mr. R. M. Eytchison, Vice President i

ET 12A Nuclear Operations j

400 West Sumit Hill Drive Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, TN 37902 3B Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Mr. Johnny H. Hayes, Director Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 l

Tennessee Valley Authority ET 12A Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director 400 West Sumit Hill Drive Division of Radiological Health Knoxville, TN 37902 3rd Floor, L and C Annex 5

401 Church Street TVA Representative Nashville, TN 37243-1532

.l Tennessee Valley Authority Rockville Office County Judge 11921'Rockville Pike-Hamilton County Courthouse-Suite 402 Chattanooga, TN 37402 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. D. E. Nunn, Vice President General Counsel Nuclear Projects Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority ET llH 38 Lookout Place 400 West Sumit Hill Drive 1101-Market Street Knoxville, TN 37902 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. B. S. Schofield, Manager Hr. Bill Harris

.l Nuclear Licensing and Route 1, Box 26 Regulatory Affairs Ten Mile', TN 37880 Tennessee Valley Authority 4G Blue Ridge -

bec w/encls:

(See page 3).

1101 Market Street j

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. R'4ph H. Shell Site Licensing Manager 1

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1

Tennessee Valley Authority l

P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 q

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DEC 6 gg3 Tennessee Valley Authority 3

bec w/encls:

J. R. Johnson, DRP/RII G. C. Lainas, NRR F. J. Hebdon, NRR P. J. Kellogg, DRP/RII S. E. Sparks, DRP/RII D. E. LaBarge, NRR NRC Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 4

DRP/RII DRP/$JI DbRLID y.

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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES i

NRC S. D. Ebneter L. A. Reyes i

S. A. Varga A. F. Gibson E. W. Merschoff R. V. Crienjak P. J. Kellogg S. E. Sparks W. E. Holland (via telephone)

C. Casto TVA R. M. Eytchison R. A. Fenech J. S. Baumstark i

D. Keuter R. H. Shell R. F. Driscoll R. R. Thompson

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ENCLOSURE 2 i

AGENDA TVA/NRC SQN UNIT 1 RESTART MEETING DECEMBER 2,1993 INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW BOB FENECH WORK PRIORITIES U2 OPERATIONS JIM BAUMSTARK BACKLOG / SIP JIM BAUMSTARK U1 RESTART DAN KEUTER U2 CYCLE 6 RFO DAN KEUTER LESSONS LEARNED DURING JIM BAUMSTARK STARTUP INTERVAL UI APPLIED TO U2:

CONTAINMENT LINER THERMAL BARRIER CHECK VALVES U2 APPLIED TO Ul:

VOLTAGE REGULATOR AIR OPERATED VALVE REGULATORS MFP RECIRC FCV/ WALL THINNING NUCLEAR ASSURANCE RESTART ASSESSMENT DICK DRISCOLL 1

SUMMARY

BOB FENECH I

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t SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 OUTAGE ORGANIZATION UNIT 1 OUTAGE s-DAN KEUTER

?d1JiUTAGE DIRECTORS (D) II. LAf;ERGREN/h. ROGERS (N) J. l'ATRICK/J. LEWIS I

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I Pl.Ah!SCII MAINTENANCE EhGINEERING RADCON M ATFRI LI_S II. Birch L. Bergen -

P. Trudel J. Osborne C. Landreth S. Crowe J. Teesue R. Brlmer J. Vinteill

- G. Petty OPERATIONS TEC11 SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS P1ANNING G. Castoi!

J. Wi!!!s J. Carnes D. Citrl D. Gibbs Duty blansger B. Ifenselman Doty blansger

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F UNIT 2 PROCESS UNIT 1 PROCESS RESTART LIST MRRC approval required for deletion.

MRRC approval required for deletion.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Restart actions, as identified by MRC, Restart actions, as identified by MRC, DOCUMENTS are uniquely coded by NA.

are uniquely coded by NA.

ADDITION AND DELETION OF MRRC review and approval required.

New WOs/WRs processed in WOs/WRs accordance with existing processes, System engineers review decisions e.g., SSP-3.4, -7.2, -6.21.

affecting their systems.

System engineers review decisions affecting their systems.

SYSTEM READINESS System readiness reviewed with BRC, System readiness reviewed with Technical Support Manager, and Technical Support Manager and MRRC.

Operations Superintendent.

DEPARTMENT READINESS-Department readiness reviewed with Site Department readiness reviewed during Vice President and MRRC.

monthly Sequoyah Management Assessment Review Team meetings.

STARTUP AND POWER Outage closcout, startup, and power Outage closcout, startup, and poveer ASCENSION -

ascension conducted in accordance with ascension will be conduced in Appendix 11 of the Restart Plan.

accordance with SSP-7.2 and Operations' startup and operating procedures.

9 STA.RTUP AND POWER ASCENSION REVIEW AND APPROVAL MATRIX--

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OUTAGE PHYSICAL WORK COMPLETlON Outage scope (for mode / power level)

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New WRs R

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SYSTEM READINESS System Readiness Affirmation (for Mode)

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1 System Performance R

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R OPERATIONS READINESS i

System Alignments (for mode / power level)

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Chemistry Parameters R

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AUGMENTED OVERSIGHT (Personnel / Processes)

Plant Management R

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1 Mode 5 prior to entering Mode 4.

I 2 Mode 3 prior to pulling control rods to achieve criticality.

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C - COMPLETE R - REVIEW A-APPROVAL l

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I CILRT December 19, 1993 ESTABLISH VACUUM 1st Week January MODE 4

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SIGNIFICANT REMAINING MODIFICATIONS Containment Liner Work 12/11/93 Hangers in Containment 12/12/93 Snubber Addition / Removal 12/12/93 Thermal Barrier Check Valves 12/12/93

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Reactor. Coolant Pump Oil Collection 12/30/93 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Screens 12/30/93 1

Rad Monitor Cable Pull 1/3/94 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level Transmitter

-1/3/94 1

Boric Acid Secondary Injection 1/7/94 (at least Tie-Ins) l Containment Cooler Temperature Control /alves 1/7/94 (Containment Work Only)

Erosion / Corrosion -

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I SIGNIFICANT REMAINING MAINTENANCE Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Maint 12/10/93 Arrowhart Contactors (Except PMTs) 12/10/93 -

Ice Condenser Maintenance 12/12/93 Containment Coatings 12/12/93 t

Lower Compartment Coolers 12/12/93 Local Leak Rate Testing 12/14/93-MOVAT and DP Valve Testing 12/19/93 Air Regulators / Gauges (108 WOs)

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OTHER REMAINING WORK Bulk Work Off In Shops

- Mechanical (MMG) - 486

- Electrical (MEG) - 186

- Instrument & Controls (MIG) - 220

- Modifications (MOD) - 189

- Other Groups - 57 Planning Work - 235 Materials - 65 Engineering Evaluation - 20 Restart List - 135 i

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 REFUEL ORGANIZATION UNIT 2 REFUEL JOIIN GNTES I

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LESSONS LEARNED DURING STARTUP INTERVAL P.

STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL (SCV) ISSUES UNIT 1:

Description of Problem

  • Some corrosion of the SCV in the vicinity of the SCV/ concrete expansion joint behind the flashing was observed.

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  • Insulation and expansion joint material have absorbed water.

Actions

  • Water chemistry analyzed to be pH of 8.7 and tetraborate concentration of - 600 ppm.
  • 17 representative wall thicknesses of SCV were measured.
  • Structural calculation for SCV was reviewed.

Analysis

  • 3 of 17 wall thicknesses were under tolerance of 1.365" (1.375" less 10 mil tolerance) with i

the thinnest being 1.357".

  • Existing design margins are such that a conservative minimum wall thickness of 1.33" is acceptable.

Conclusion

  • Measured wall thickness for Unit 1 SCV is within design basis limits.

UNIT 2:

  • Several areas of the SCV/ concrete expansion joints were inspected and found to have significantly less corrosion than Unit 1.
  • seals and insulation are functional.
  • No signs of corrosion above seal.

- Water chemistry samples consistent with Unit 1 with respect to potential for corrosive environment.

i THERMAL BARRIER CHECK VALVES Description of Problem

  • Thermal Barrier check valves for Unit I were found to be stuck open and the same problem was postulated for Unit 2.
  • Check valves are designed to protect the downstream CCS piping which is not rated for I

full RCS pressure.

Calculations

  • Calculations show that:

Piping would not fail due to pressurizing to full RCS pmssure.

Check valve 679 (150 # ANSI rated valve) would hold without gross failure.

Valve 680 (150 # ANSI rated valve) would hold without gross failum.

Valve 687C (2000# rated vent valve) would hold without gross failure.

Conclusions

  • Any resulting leakage from over pressum would remain within containment with the disk of check valve 679 providing a barrier. Packing leakage through the above mentioned valves would occur.
  • Probability of a Thermal Barrier Leak causing a I.oss of Coolant outside of containment esiculated to be 2.1 E-7. (No history of thermal barrier leaks in Westinghouse plants.)

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  • Therefore if we sustained a rupture of the Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger, the reactor could be shutdown and maintained without the off site dose rates exceeding thei; design

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Actions f

  • Unit 2 shutdown to low end of Mode 4 and thermal barrier check valves cut out of system, cleaned up and reinstalled. (7 of 8 valves were found stuck open)
  • Unit I thermal barrier check valves will be evaluated for replacement / rework during current outage.

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MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR l

UNIT 2:

Description of Problem

  • Multiple problems have occurred with the Unit 2 main generator voltage regulator since stanup.

Actions

  • Volts / hertz and minimum excitation limit canis found to be faulty at separate times and replaced.
  • Generator taken off line twice for voltage regulator mpair. Separate outage for thermal barrier check valves used for voltage regulator trouble shooting.
  • All 14 drawers from both units tested on site.

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  • Best drawers from both units installed in Unit 2. Remaining drawers (7) being refurbished by Westinghouse.

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  • Westinghouse Engineers completely tested / adjusted Unit 2 voltage regulator.
  • Investigating the replacement of both units' voltage regulators with updated devices.

Current Conditions

  • Voltage regulator functioning.
  • Voltage regulator parameters monitored each shift.
  • One power amplifier drawer unplugged.

UNIT 1:

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  • All drawers will be refurbished by Westinghouse prior to Unit I restart.

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CHARGING HEADER FLOW CONTROL ~ VALVE 2-FCV-62-93 Description of Problem i

  • Operators found pressurizer (pzr) level increasing greater than expected.

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  • Operators went to manual control on 2-FCV-62-93.
  • 2-FCV-62-93 did not respond and pzt level continued to increase.
  • Troubleshooting found actuator supply pressure at 30 psig.
  • Supply pressure to 2-FCV-62-93 was increased to 48 psig allowing the valve to function properly
  • Regulator for 2-FCV-62-93 is 0 to 35 psig range.
  • Vendor concurred with the new setpoint (48 psig).

Conclusions

  • 30 psig supply pressure worked at NOP/NOT whem valve AP is low.
  • 30 psig supply pressure is insufficient at high valve AP, e.g. while reducing RCS pressure.
  • 2-FCV-62-93 used plant Vendor Manual (VM) to set the supply pressure at 30 to 35 psig.

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  • Instrument Data Packages (IDPs) are non tech-spec calibration procedures, i

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  • Source documents are Nuclear Engineering (NE) or vendor information.

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  • Replaced 2-FCV-62-93 regulator with 100 psig regulator.

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  • IDP for 2-FCV-62-93 revised to set supply pressure range to 65-66 psig.
  • IDPs now placed on hold when information is identified that affects plant settings.

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Actions (Continued)'

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Conducted overall AIR OPERATED _ VALVE (AOV) review.

  • Walkdown of SIGNIFICANT AOV's as identified by operations.
  • WR's written on discrepancies / all work completed as of 11/30/93.
  • Review ofIDP/ Cal Card / VM pressure supply requimments.

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  • Review of most severe operational conditions for each AOV.
  • Determine if an AOV has opemted at those conditions.

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  • If not, test at those conditions.
  • All others, review base design requirements.
  • Develop / proceduralize matrix data for ALL AOV's.
  • Addmss discrepancies as done for SIGNIFICANT AOV's.

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  • Input into appropriate data acquisition system.
  • Evaluate additional issues raised.
  • Use of non-safety related VM's for IDP's.
  • Review of calibration card data against VM to identify discrepancies.
  • Industry effons/ issues on AOV high AP testing.

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A MAIN FEED PUMP RECIRCULATION CONTROL VALVE Description of Problem

  • Pipe expander downstream of Main Feed Pump B (MFP) recirculation control valve (2-FCV-003-084) experienced a through-wall failure.
  • Failure occurred after approximately one month of service (10/21/93 to 11/23/93).

Conclusions

  • Exact reason for failure is unknown.

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  • Believe rapid failure due to excessive cavitation resulting from seat leakage.12b results are still pending.

Actions

  • Replaced recirculation control valve and expander.
  • Monitoring temperatures daily to determine extent of seat leakage.
  • Increased frequency of Ultrasonic testing F

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SUMMARY

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