ML20058P063
| ML20058P063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1990 |
| From: | TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058P060 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9008160018 | |
| Download: ML20058P063 (338) | |
Text
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1UELEClRIC COMANCHE PEAK '
STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. I UNIT 1 L CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR 1
10CFR55 CERTIFICATION INITIAL. REPORT i e
AUGUST 3,1990 P i3 t' 45 '
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' TABLE OFL CONTENTS O. ;
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.. SECTION PAGE
. TABLE OF CONTENTS i 1- 'GENERAI/ SIMDLATOR INFORMATION. 1-1 2 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW '2-l' 3 'ANS 3.51985 CHECKLIST - 3-1 4 SIMULATOR FACILITY OVERVIEW 4-1 ,
5- INSTRUCTOR INTERFACE 5-1 6- SIMULATOR TESTS Real Time Test 6-1 l
Steady State and Normal Operations Tests 6-2 Transient Tests 6-5 l
' Malfunction Tests - 6 --
7 SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION. SCHEDULE' 7.t 8 FOUR YEAR TEST SCHEDULE - 81 i
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- f GENERAL SIMULATOR INFORMATION !
o . Owner: TU : Electric -
P.O. Box 2300 Glen Rose, Texas. 76043-1147 Operator: TU Electric's! Nuclear Training Department Manufacturer:- Singer Link Miles Simulation Corporation-Reference Plant: CPSES Unit 1, Docket No. 50-445 Type: Westinghouse NSSS,;4-Loop, PWR Rating: 3411 MWt,1160 MWe l - Date Available for' Training: -
- Limited use: January,1985 L Ready for Training: June,1986 l
Initial Report per 10CFR55 l-
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TU Electric EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW p
The CPSES simulator is a full scope, high fidel!!y device ced to deliver training to the control room operators. In the Spring of 1982, TU Eh ctric purchased the CPSES simulator from the Singer Company (Link Simulation System Division). 'Ihe s Jnulator was delivered in late 1984 and was -ased for limited training of operecers in ea11y 1985. It was decared " Ready for Training" in June 1986.
The May 25,1987 revision to 10CFR55 requires that a pst referenced simulator or simulation facility be available by March 25,1991. Regulatory Guide 1.149 was written to assist in the simulation facility certification process, Regulatory Guide 1.149 endorses ANSI /ANS-3.5 1985. ,
To this end, the CPSES simulator must accurately represent the reference unit control room environment, control panels and controls, and simulate the reference unit perfonnance and responses as closely as possible.
To provide and maintain the high degree of required realism for Licensed Operator Training, management controls have been established and implemented to ensure the simulator design configuration is properly documented, maintained and updated as necessary. These controls consist of:
Nuclear Training Procedure NTP 603, Simulator Design, Testing and Certification Management Nuclear Training Procedure NTP-201, Training Impact System Simulator Operations / Maintenance Instmetions Training Guideline 032 CPSES Unit I controlled prints, technical manuals, design basis documents / data and procedures have been used to validate the simulator. To further enhance simulator performance, prior to data being available from CPSES Unit 1 operation, data from the following sources has been utilized for reference and comparison:
-operating power plants similar to CPSES Unit 1.
Braidwood Unit 1 WolfCreek
- Best Estimate" engineering code from TUE's Reactor Engineering Department
-CPSES Unit 1 pre-operational test data Other validation materials include Plant Design Modifications, Operating Experience Reports, Plant incident Reports and Licensee Event Reports. These are reviewed by the Operations / Engineering Training Manager and the Simulator Operations Supervisor per procedure NTP-201 " Training .
bupact System" to determine if any changes are required to be incorporated into the simulator in support Licensed Operator Training programs and required date of implementation.
Actual controlled plant operating procedures are used on the simulator for training and cenification l testing. No significant differences exist between the controlled copies of procedures. Some procedure examples are:
-Integrated Plant Operating Procedures
-System Operating Procedures
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-Alarm Procedures i
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Abnormal rating Procedures l
-Emergency rating Guidelines l
- Selected rations Testing Procedures
.-Technical pecification.
The above validation information,ine# ; procedures, make up the simulator design data base, while changes to these documents and other requested changes to the simulator make up the j simulator update design data base.'
l TU Electric takes exception to ANS/ ANSI-3.5 1985, Section 3.1.l(7) Normal Plant Evolution -
"Startup, Shutdown and Power Operations With I.ess Than Full Reactor Coolant Flow." The ,1 CPSES Unit 1 Technical Specifications prohibits operation in this condition.
i In addition to the primary training role, the simulator and its support personnel have an active role in the licensing and safe operation of Comanche Peak Unit h Activities winch have been supported with the aid of mstructors, plant operators and engineering staff include:
= -Procedure Validation (e.g.: IPOS, ALMS, ABNs, ER0s) .
-FSAR commitment review / validation !
-Remote Shutdown Panel Operations i
-Emergency Planning exercises
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Plans are to submit a Form NRC-474 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 2 upon !
completion of a Unit 1/ Unit 2 difference study and its comparison with the Unit I plant specific simulator. This will allow Licensed 0 xrator Training / resting for dual unit Licensed Operators and future training for Unit 2 Licensec Operators.
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k A TUELEClRfC SECTION 3. 1 l
0 ANS-3.5-1985 : CHECKLIST l
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Comanche P,eak Steam Electric Station Simulator Certification Checkilst l
' Page 1 of 6 All detailed information not contained in the initial cenificaiton package is available for review on site.
Simulation Facilliv infor== tion
/ 1. GeneralInfonnation General information has been prepared and includes 11e following' items:
- a. Manufacturer: Link-Miles (formerly Singe Link)
- b. Owner / Operator: Texas Utilities Electric
- c. Reference Unit: Unit 1 of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
- d. Plant Type: Westinghouse 4 - Loop, Pressurized Water Reactor
- e. Plant Rating: 3314 MWt /1160 MWe ;
- f. Availebtury Date: January 1985
- g. Repe. t Type: Initial u k 2. Simulator Control Room Fidelity Comoarison A comparison of the simulator control room and the reference unit control room has been completed and the differences have been identified. A description and listing of these dtfferences, including the disposition of each of the differences has been pret ved for the following items:
- a. Physical arrangement
- b. Control panels and equipment
- c. Plant system controls
- d. Control room environment b v V 3. Instructor Station A description and listing of the instmetor station capabilities has been prepared for the following items:
- a. -Initial conditions
- b. Malfunctions (causes, effects and severity ranges) ;
- c. Instructor Directed Actions -
- d. Remote functions and capabilities
, e. Limits of simulation and a descriotion of how the instructor is notified when theselimits are exceeded
- d. Any other additional capabilities (i.e., fast time,I/O overrides, etc.) ,
- 4. Ooeratina Procedures
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Identify any significant differences between the procedures used on the simulator and procedures used at the reference unit.
V [5 Renorts and Records Documentation to support compliance with the standard is available and may be I retrieved.
Simulator Desien Data Design data is available to provide the information outlined in ANSI /ANS 3.5. Where the design data was derived or collected from other than the reference unit, the data is specifically identified and referenced as to its. origin and applicability to the reference unit and includes:
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J Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station '
L Simulator ~ Certification Checklist Q Page 2 of 6 :
/ 1. Sggpe of Simulation Data Data is available for the following items:
- a. M1 drawings
- b. El drawings l
- c. Electrical and Wiring Diagrams (EWD's)
- d. Instrumentation and Control Diagrams (ICD's)-
- e. Simulatorlogic Diagrams "
f, Simulator System Diagrams
- g. Simulater Control Room and Panel Layout Drawings
- h. > Annunciator Response Manuals (ALM's) i
/ b2. OoeratiorlaLQiaracterist cs i Data Data is available for the following items:
- a. Plant Operations Package (POP)(Reactor Core Design Data) !
- b. Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints Book (PLS)
- c. ' Instrumentation and Control Setpoint Document
- d. TectinicalManuals ,
- e. TechnicalDataManual l
Nb. Perfonnance Data '
i Data is available for the following items:
- a. Plant Transients
- b. Plant Startup
( c. Plant Heatup
- d. Plant Operations
- e. RETRANTransients L
' f. CPSES Operating Procedures
- i. Simulator Operation Observations (SAR's) '
Skughter Documentation Configuration management controls have been established and documentation is available for the following items:
I / b1. SimulatorSystems System design specification data is available for each simulated system and includes details for the following items:
- a. - System Model Description
- b. Simulated System Diagrams
- c. Simulated System Logic Diagrams
- d. Math Model Description
- e. Assumptions
- f. Simplifications
- 2. Simulation Software Source Code The simulation software source code is available (for restricted use), uplated and
,-- q) . detailed in accordance with approved admimstrative controls.
L Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station )
Simulator ~ Certification Checklist P Page 3 of 6
/ W 3. - Simulator Hardware I Simulator hardware documentation is available and includes the following items: l
- a. Billof Materials I
- b. Wiring List .
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- c. Hardware Design Documents t l
- d. Special Circuit Design ,
- e. InstrumentationModifications Simulator Canabilities ne simulator possesses the capabilities identified in~ ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1 including:
/ h 1. Normal Plant ivolutions ..
De simulator nas wrformed the evolutions identified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section .
3.1.1. Exceptions iave been identified and corrective actions are indicated on the attached SAR listing or an exception has been documented and taken.
- 2. Plant Malfunctions ne events identified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1.2 have been performed. ;
Responses have been compared to actual'or best estimate response. Exceptions
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have been identified and corrective actions am indicated on tirs attached SAR listing or an exception has been documented and taken. ,
Simulator Environment p The simulator complies with the items identified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.2 including: .;
/ Wl. Dearee of Panel Simulation The simulator has been verified to contain the operational panels necessary to provide the controls, instrumentation, alarms and other man-machine interfaces to conduct the normal plant evolutions described in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1.1 and '
respond to the malfunctions described in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1.2. ,
Photographs of the CPSES Unit I control room panels have been taken and are available. A comparison has been made to verify the fidelity of the simulated
, controls to the reference unit controls for the following items. 4
- a. Size
- b. Shape !'
- c. Color
- d. Demarcation
. e. Configuration-A list of deviations has been prepared and is attached. The deviations have been ,,
reviewed and if the deviation detracts from training, corrective action is specified or "
an exception has been documented and taken.
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Comanche Peak Stosm Electric Station Simulator Certification Checklist Page 4 of 6
_ _ _ / 2. Panel Controls The simulator meters, recorders, switches, annunciators, controllers, plant computer interface hardware and other components or displays that function during normal, abnomial, and emergency evolutions have been verified to comply with the criteria contained in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.2.2. Plant information is displayed to the operator in the same fonn and units that are available in the reference unit.
Photographs of the CPSES Unit I control room panels have been taken and arc s
available. A comparison has been made to verify the fidelity of the simulated controls to the reference unit controls for the following items:
- a. Size
- b. Shape
- c. Color
- d. Demarcation
- e. Configuration A list of deviations has been prepared and is attached. The deviations have been reviewed arxl if the deviation detracts from training, corrective action is specified or an exception has been documented and taken.
v O m 3. Control Room Environnwnt The simulator control room environment complies with the criteria contained in l
ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.2.3. Plant information is displayed to the operator in the !
same form and units that are available in the reference unit. Photographs of the CPSES Unit I control room panels have been taken and are availabic. A comparison has been made to verify the fidelity of the simulator environment to the reference unit environment for the following items:
- a. Floor Plan
- b. Furnishings
- c. Lighting
- d. Communicationsequipment
- e. Configuration (includes color, appearance, mim'es, engraving, labels, etc.)
- f. Audio / Visual cues (includes background noise, annunciators, etc.)
- g. Documents (includes procedures, prints, etc., and locations of same)
- h. Other miscellaneous (meludes obstructions, personal computers, SPDS, etc.)
A simulator discrepancy list has been prepared and is attached. The discrepancies have been reviewed and corrective action is being taken to resolve identified discrepancies or an cxception has been documented and taken.
Svntems to be Simmimm e d and the Deeree of Co-alet===ms The simulator complies with the items identified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.3 including:
- 1. Systems Controlled or Monitored from the Control Room lhe systems and simulation necessary to monitor or perform the nonnal plant evolutions described in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1.1 and the malfunctions !
described in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.1.2 from the control room have been included in the simulator design. Manipulation of the controls and observation of plant response is the same as in 'he reference unit. Systems interact to 3rovide a totally integrated plant response. A list of deviations has been preparec and is attached. The deviations have been reviewed and if the deviation detracts from training, corrective action is specified or an exception has been documer:ed and taken.
1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Simulator Certification Checklist i O Page 5 of 6 ,
/& 2 Systems Controlled or Monitored Extemal to the Control Room !
The systems and simulation necessary to monitor or perform the rmnnal plant evolutions described in ANSUANS 3.5, section 3.1.1 and the malfunctions :
described in ANSUANS 3.5, section 3.1.2 extemal to the control room have been .
included in the simulator desiFn. Manipulation of the controls and obsen ation of i plant response is the same as in the reference unit. The operator interface is similar to that in the reference unit. A list of deviations has been prepared and is attached.
The deviations have been reviewed and if the deviation detracts from training, corrective action is specified or an exception has been documented and taken. I Simaalator Tr=I-1-= cammhillales ,
The simulator cornplies with the items identified in ANSVANS 3.5, section 3 A including:
Vh 1. InitialConditions lhe simulator has the capability to store 60 initial conditions. A minimum of 10 initial conditions are operational and include a variety of plant operating conditions, fission product poison concentrations, and vrious times in core life. A current-initial condition listing is attached.
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- 2. MalfurStiam '
The simulator has the capability to conveniently insert and tenninate the malfunctions specified in ANSUANS 3.5, section 3.1.2. The malfunctions may be actuated simultaneously and/or sec uentially. Actuation of the malfunctions does i
not alert the operator in a manner (ifferent than that expected in the reference unit.
i Capabilities exist to incorporate additional malfunctions if necessary.
V . Other Control Features The simulator has the additional capabilities specified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, section 3.4.3 and includes the following: .
- a. Freezing simulation ,
- b. Step time simulation
- c. Replaysimulation
' d. Fast time simulation
- e. Slow time simulation .
- f. Backtracking
- g. Sna> shot
- h. CR" display screen image printing v' 4. InstructorInterface lhe simulator has the capabilities specified in ANSVANS 3.5, section 3A A which will allow the instructor to perform job related tasks in the following capacities:
- a. Auriliary Ooerator change valve and breaker positions, reset relays, manually control valve positions, and start or stop pumps controlled extemal te the control toom b, Instrumentation and Controls Technician trip and reset bistables, disable alarms and take alarms out of sen ice l
l Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station t Simulator Certification Checklist
, Page 6 of 6 Simaalater Tests Testing of the simulator has been completed and the documentation is available. The simulator i i comples with the performance criteria specified in ANSVANS 3.5, section 4 including:
- h 1. Computer Real Time Testinn i The simulator software completes execution within the design time interval, and '
there are no noticeable differences which adversely impac. :::dnm'g bween the simulator and the reference unit in time base relationships, sequences, durations, rates and accelerations for the normal plant evolutions described in ANSUANS 3 ',
section 3.1.1 and the malfunctiens described in ANSVANS 3.5, section 3.1.2.
Discrepancies which were idernified have been documented and reviewed, ano corrective actions are specified or an exception has been documented and taken.
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/ k2. Simulmor Wlid=' ion Testine The validity of the simulator has been verified thru acceptance testing. The !
acceptance tests were evaluated as satisfactory and properly documented.
d D screpancies which were identified have been documented and reviewed, and conective actions are indie ed on the attached SAR listing or an exception has been documented and taken.
/ h3 Simn1= eor oetability Testine The operabiity of the simulator has been verified thru performance testing.
Perfonnance test documentation is available. Data was collected for the specific or comparable points and resolutions listed in ANSUANS 3.5, Appendix B2.
Performance rests were conducted for each of the tests specified in ANSUANS 3.5, Appendix B2 and evaluated for the following: e
/ e. Steadv_ State hdem=q Data was collected at power levels of 30%,75% and 100% power, and evaluated for the specific or comparable points listed in ANSUANS 3.5, Appendix B2 and the performance was determined to be acceptable when cornpared to the Perfonnance Criteria specified in ANSVANS 3.5, section 4.1. '
The full Swer stability test was run for 60 minutes and was detennined to be '
, acceptab e when compared to the Performance Criteria specified in ANSUANS 3.5, section 4.1, Discrepancies which were identified have been doctanented and reviewed, and conective actions are indicated on the attached SAR listing or an exception has been documented and taken,
- b. Trami-w Performance Data was collected for the listed transients and for the specific or comparable points and resolutions listed in ANSVANS 3.5, Appendix B2 and the performance for each listed transient was determined to be acceptable when compared to the Perfonnance Criteria specified in ANSUANS 3.5, section 4.2.
Discrepancies which were identified have been documented and reviewed, and corrective actions are indicated on the attached SAR listing or an exception has n documented and taken.
Reviewed by: Add O Dee: 9O Simpiator '
rations Sprvisor Approved by: ubW -D Dae:
ID '
Operati%Mg Training Manager
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Tusheme SIMULATION FACILITY OVERVIEW SIMULATOR ENVIRONMENT I A!! simulmed panel dimensions, arr9ngements and controls have been reviewed to ensure they do not detract from trairung. De differenas the have been identified are: i The simulator room ceiling has not been modified to match changes in the plant.
Operator comments indicate the this is not a problem and a human factors review i concurs with this. No further work is planned or anticipated.
Not all Unit 1 Control Room back panels are on the simulator. Panels installed on the I simulator not normally utilized by Limnsed Operators only have limited capabilities. !
ne stached drawings indicate the simulator panel location with relation:.lup to control room location.
De consnunication systems available in the plant have been installed on the simulator with the ,
exception of a radio base station. This base station is installed on a case by case basis as required to meet certain trainiry objectives, it is not normally used during routine training exercises. 1 Noises normally hearc in the control room are simulsed, including background noises on the plant page pany conununications system. ;
Fumishings in the plant and the simulator have been reviewed. Only minor differences exist (ie:
1 chairs) and they do not detract from traini 4 SIMULATOR TRAINING CAPABILITIES ne simulator is modeled to the extent required to suppon Licensed ratorTrainiq;. This includes the capabilities to perform all functions from the main contr anels and grting r remote functions Oocal valves, breakers, etc.) that impact control boarc indications. Systems modeled to support the training programs include:
Auxiliary Feedwater . Condensate Condenser Vacuum . Hester Drains .
Extraction Steam . Main Feedwater Service Air . Instrument Air Auxiliary Steam . Extraction Saam Main Steam . Reactor Coolant Turbine Gland Sealing Stearn . In-Core Instrumentation Loose Pans Monitonns . NuclearInstrumentation P-2500 Pescess Computer System . N-16 RM l! Radiation Moniton'ng . Control Rod Drive
. Digital Rod PositionIndication . Reactor Protection ERP Computer System (SPDS) Reactor Controls Steam Generator . Steam Generator Blowdown Safety injection . Residual Heat Removal Turbine Electrohydraulic Control . Circulating Water Automatic Turbine Test Service Water Main Turbine and Auxdiaries . Boron Recycle Turbine Plant Cooling Weer . Vents and bram' s Ploor Drains . Oaseous Waste Processing
. . Annuncisors .C Cooling Water Ventilation Chilled Waer .
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- Core Boron Thermal Regeneration
- Seismic Chemical and Volume Control . Demineralized D
- Synt Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup = Electrical Distribution
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- Main Generator and Auxiliaries
- Fire Protection Liquid Waste Processing Primary Sampling Controlled copics of plant procedures are utilized by the training programs for operations and training on the simulator. These same procedures are utilized for validation of the simulator design .
and performance. '
The simulator possesses the capability for storage of 60 initial conditions. These initial conditions are m sintained/ modified to meet the needs of the training meet simulator certification needs. Capabilities exist for: programs which utilize the sim variety of plant conditions ,
l various fission product poison concentrations a
various times in core life. .
IDENTIFIED DESCREPANCIES Section 7 contains a list of all currently open discrepancies (SARs) that pose:
A concem identifying en existing conditinn that is causing an immediate impact on the ability to conduct operator training.
A concem identifying an existing condition that is degradmg the quality of training.
A concem identifying a change that will be needed to conduct future operator training (e.g.: procedure changes, plant design modifications, training program change).
Each discrepancy has been assigned a priority and completion date in accordance with current TU Electric Sunulator Operations / Maintenance Guidelines.
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' B - Sesomec Panel
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K Alarm Panel G - Leading Edpo Flow Meter
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B - Seismic Panel E
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A G - Lee % Edge Flow Meter B H - Operator's Desk wMh SPDS J - P-2500 Computer Termmel l Cvoz l Cvoi ] L - mn Composer Sm M- FIM-21 Report Processor L
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O i i h A 1UELECTRIC 1 4 s SECTION 5
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Q INSTRUCTOR INTERFACE ,
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INSTRUCTOR STATION SPAN OF CONTROL )
i Instructor Station Functions
. Freeze /Run . . Instructor Directed ;
.Initializmion (Reset) Actions '
Norsmally . Snapshot . Backtrack Used . Time Controls . Replay ',
During M alf w Gers . If3 Override '
Training Regulv - Annunciator Controls i Composite . Instructor's Notepad '
- Boolean Trigger . Switch Check Override ;
. Monitor Pararnwers .Qwrsting Lirnits ;
Time Mark - . V deo Copy Select ;
Non Training - Peripherals On/Off . Chart Drive Controls t
Functions P.nergency Power Off
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I INSTRUCTOR STATION FUNCTION DESCRIPTIONS !
- 1. Freese/Ran ,
When the simulator is funnionang as a realistic imitation of the Control j
Room of the reference plant. it is said to be in the "run" state. That is, all i ,
the software and 1/0 is mnning so that changes in the state of the plant are -
faithfully reproduced. The " freeze" condman will cause all dynamic simulsion to stop and all conditions existmg at the time of activation will remain constant. ;
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- 2. Initialization Used to reset the simulator to a fixed starting point for a (Reset) l training session. It reads in the initialized part of the common data base c that is saved with a snapshot in an Initial Condition (IC). This gives values !
to all the instruments on the f simulsion model equations. Thus, whenpanels and to all the simulator the variables is brought out of used in freeze after resetting to an IC, it runs realistically. !
- 3. Snapshot t Used '.o save a complete set of the trainer (an IC) that can be used leer for initialization. It wrnes the initialized part of the common data base to a disc ;
file for later recall. The principal ICs that represent important stages in a plant's cycle are saved in protected ICs. Snapshot IC s are used for temporary storage. ,
l 4. Time Controls Allows the instructor to modify the real time rase at which the simulator
' r;vmally runs. In SLOW TIME the entire simulator slows down so that >
bras can cleady see what is happening during a fast transient. In FAST E, calculations for certain parameters are accelerated in order to speed up the response of certain slow parameters and avoid long delays dunng a training session. Step time allows an instructor to run the simulator for 1/20 of a second (a frame) or one second.
- 5. Malfunctions Simulmed plant malfunctions may be input with a variety of options to demonstrase abnormal operational condaions or to teach recovery procedures. Choice of severw' y for variable malfunctions. including the ability to increase or decrease k with time (ramping), time delays and spontaneous insertion through use of the remote control device (RSCU) are some of these options. C ite malfunctions may be defined to simplify insertion of ofrol malfunctions. Malfunctions can also be set to *
- activate as a of certain simulator conditions this is represented by a logic equation using simulator variables, called a Boolean tngger. :
- 6. Boolean Trigger Allows the instructor to create their own boolean expression for use as a malfunction trigger.
- 7. Monitor Allows the instructor to display values of any analog parameters Parameters selected on the monitored parameter CRT.
- 8. Time Mark Allows the instructor to put a visible spike on all recorders at one time, to give a reference mint from which to compare parameter behavior. Also, starts timer on N onitor Parameters CRT.
- 9. Video Copy Allows the instructor to make a copy of the screen of any of the Select terminals at any time, allowing him to have a permanent record of whatever the conditions were a a particular time.
PAGE 5-2
__ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _____., _. _ ..._ _.._.._._._ _ L
w theen it. Instreeter Directed Allows the instructor to set values of various parameters not Action included on the control panels. These include plant performance changes, local operator actions and environmental effects.
- 11. Backtrack O- .
Allows the instructor to rerum to 6.previously stored state of the current simulation run. Thus, he can repeat a section af training or a difficult
- wcdeie. An automatic snapset is taken every minute and is saved in tiw acktrack file this enables the instructcr to reset to the desired backtra state. This file contains 60 snapshots (I hour's simulation work). The instructor can go backwards or forwards while stepping through the file to see which simulator state to which he wants to reset.
- 12. Iteplay Allows the instructor or student to go back and review the action that took place earlier in the cunent training exercise. The status of all lights and meters is saved in a replay file. As the instructor goes back in the replay file, he can see the appearance of the control boards and review what action took place. The rate at which the ou can be replayed can be varied from 1 to 10 times faster than it was reco .
- 13. I/O Override Gives the instructor the ability to simulate equipment failure on the control boards for any analog 10 device or any status light.
I4. Annunciator Controls Provides the instructor with master control switches for all annunciators functions: silence, acknowledge and reset.
- 15. Instructor's Nedepad An on line notepad where :ch instructor can keep notes for himself or for others. This provides a kind of electronic mailbox allowing instructors to communicate across training sessions. j
- 16. Switch Check Override This function allows the instructor to override the correct setting of a switch or potentiometer for any givet;IC that has been reset.
Normally this is not used unless there is a hardware problem. All of the switches and potentiometers must be set correctly for an IC for the simulator to behave realistically.
- 17. Operating Limit IrwiW Ontv. to notify instructor when certain simulator dynamic model lirnits have been reached.
. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeesseeeeeeeeeeee
- Non training functions -
- 19. Pe rats >
Used to put the simulator into/out of sleep mode.
- 20. Emergency
. Power Off Immediately removes all power from Simulator Room Control 1 Boards,111ustration, when button is pressed. It is used only when i a
situation presents imminent danger to personnel and/or equipment.
- 21. Chart Drive Controls . Allows control of the power to the chart drives for the recorders in the Control Room.
O PAGE S 3
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'I sECTION 6 i
O sinutAron czariricirron rests l
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SIMULATOR REAL TIME TEST l
O The Simulator Real Time Test was a continuous check of simulator response during the performance of the Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident test. Points were monitored for proper sequencing, durations, rates and accelerations. The test verified that the software and hardware dynamic responses replicated those expected of the reference plant. The computer complex was verified to be executtng roodel calculations in real time.
This test was deemed satisfactory.
O l
O Page 6-1
.,,...e x _. . . _. . .
l TV Ebaic STEADY STATE AND NORMAL OPERATIONS TESTS STEADY STATE STABILITY )
his test was conducted in compliance with ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 section 3.1. It was a test to i validate the simulator performance of a 60 minute,100% power, steady state, Beginning of Life, 1 equilibriurn Xenon run. '
he initial conditions of 100% power was estsblished for 60 seconds before the actual data collection commenced. Data was collected in several forms: computer printout with a one minute resolution, simulsor trend charts, and thermal trend charts.
De simulator computer values were checked to ensure they did not drift more than two percent and that they were withm the two percent tolerance limit of the reference plant design data used for modeling. His was done by comparing values at the beginning and end of the test. -
This test was deemed satisfactory.
Simulator heat balance data was recorded for tests at rated thermal power levels of approximately
,_ 25%,75%, and 100% for review. CPSES Unit I has just recently reached 100% rated power for the first time and is not yet "conunercial". Actual plant data will will be used to update the simulator as required by ANSI /ANS 3.51985 Section 5.2 " Simulator Update Design Data" and Section 5.3 " Simulator Modifications."
NORMAL OPERATIONS TESTS i O PLANT STARTUP- COLD TO HOT STANDBY This test was conducted in compliance with ANSI /ANS-3.51985 section 3.1. It was a test to validate the simulator performance from an initial condition of - Mode 5, RCS Tempet ature 10(f F.
RCS Pressure 250 psig and Pressurizer solid - to a condition of Mode 3, RCS Temperature 557'P, RCS Pressure 2235 psig and Pressurizer level 25 % - utilizing current controlled plant i
i
- Integrated Plant Operating Procedures, System Operating Procedures and Licensed Operator Training Program selected Operations Testing Procedures (surveillance tests),
his test was deemed satisfactory.
NUCLEAR STARTUP PROM HOT STANDBY TO RATED POWER his test was conducted in compliance with ANSI /ANS 3.5-1985 section 3.1. It was a test to validate the simulator performance from an initial condition of- Mode 3, RCS Temperature 557F.
RCS Pressure 2235 psig and Pressurizer level 25% - to a condition of- Mode 1, Reactor Power 100%, RCS Temperature 589'P, RCS Pressure 2235 psig and Pressurizer level 60 % utilizing l current controlled plant Integrated Plant Operating Procedures, System Operating Procedures and i Licensed Operator Training Program selected Operations Testing Procedures (surveillance tests).
Bis test WAs deemed satisfactory.
i O
Pagte 6 2
Tu swwie TURBINE STARTUP AND GENERATOR SYNCHRONIZATION ;
This test was conducted in conjunction with the Nuclear Startup from Hot Standby to Rated Power.
O This test was deemed satisfactory.
c REACTOR 1 RIP POLLOWED BY RECOVERY TO RATED POWER !
This test was conducted in compliance with ANSI /ANS 3.5-1985 section 3.1. It was a test to :
validate the simulator performance from an initial condition of Mode 1, Reactor Power 100%, i RCS Temperature 589 'F, RCS Pressure 2235 psig and Pressurizer level 60% to a condition of -
Mode 1, Reactor Power 100%, RCS Temperature $89 'F, RCS Pressure 2235 psig and '
Pressurizerlevel 60 % utilizing cunent controlled plant Integrated Plant Operating Procedures, ,
System Operating Procedures and Licensed Operator Training Progran selected Operations Testing Procedures (surveillance tests).
, This test was deemed satisfactory. ?
i LOAD CHANGES This test was conducted in conjunction with the Nuclear Startup from Hot Standby to Rated >
Power.
This test was deemed satisfactory. '
STARTUP, SHUTDOWN AND POWER OPERATIONS WrrH LESS THAN FULL REACTOR COOLANT FLOW This test was not conducted due to Unit 1 Operating License /rechnical Specifications not allowing .
this configuration.
CORE PERPORMANCETESTING:
Petformance of Plant Hem Balance and Shutdown Margin Calculations These tests were conducted in conjuncdou with the Nuclear Startup from Hot Standby to Rated Power.
These tests wue deemed saisfactory.
REACTIVITY COEPPICIENT AND CONTROL ROD WORTH MEASUREMENTS These tests are conducted in the plant using temporarily installed instrumerwation therefore, they have not been performed on the simulator for this certification. However, similar plant startup '
tests have been performed on the simulator by licensed operator training prior to actual plant performance.
O Page 6 3
. . _ . . , _ _ ~ . _ , . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ __- . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ .-
Til EA*
OPERATOR CONDUCTED SURVELLANCE TESTING Licensed Operator Training selected tests were conducted in conjunction with the Nuclear Startup from Hot Standby to Rated Power.
These tests were deemed satisfactory.
i l
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S t
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n' Eintric TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE TESTS .
( The ANSI /ANS 3.5 Appendix B2.2 transient tests have been completed. Attached is a copy of the completed Manual Reactor Trip test procedure and test abstracts from the following perfonnance tests:
Simultaneous Trip of All Feedwater Pumps Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam isolation Valves Simultaneous Trip of All Reactor Coolant Ptunps Trip of Any Single Reactor Coolant Pump Main Turbine Trip (Maximum Power 1.evel which does not result in iminediate Reactor Trip)
Maximum Rate Power Ramp (100% down to approximately 75% and back up in loom Maximum Size Reactor Coolant System Rupture Combined with Loss of All Off Site Power Maximum Size Unisolable Main Steam Line Rupture Slow Primary System Depressurization to Saturated Condition using Pressurizer Relief or Safety Valve Stuck Open i
I .\
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Page 6-3
W Enseinc MALFUNCTION TESTS The ANSI /ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.2 Plant Malfunction Tests have been completed. Attached is a
" Malfunction Cause and Effects" listing for all certified malfunctions.
i These tests were deemed satisfactory. Minor discrepancies identified during testing have twen scheduled for completion as shown in Section 7.
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1 i
PT-AN-9005 Ptg3 7 of 9 1
1 ATTAckMENT 7.A g PAGE 1 OF 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION i PERFORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT I i
Title:
LOSS or rrrn PT No.: PT-AN-9005 Date test conducted: 7/29/90 I i
Procedure .
Synopsis: 1) Main feedwater pumps were manually tripped ,
from_a 100% full power, BOL, equilibrium ,
Xenon condition._ The transient was continued i for ~1800 seconds.
Were any malfunctions used during this test?
No Yes - Attached list contains the following: '
- 1) Malfunction l's,
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.
Could rates?
the PT have been tested at different severities or range of '
No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator.is capable of testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually tested, (
- 3) initial conditions for each tested option, and
- 4) final condition / duration for each tested option.
- Description of Baseline Data
- 4) TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Groun Best Est. RETRAN Code
- 2) ,
4 1
O 4
n e , . - -.. n - -
PT-AN-D005 Pego'8 of 9 i
ATTArnMENT 7.A PAGE 2 OF 3 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design l Review Committee?
j l
No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results of review.
Were any deficiencies identified during this test? "
No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number)):
i Date by which corrective actions are to be made:,
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e. ,. Simulator Action Request number)):
1 Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) [] Additional deficiency list attached. '
[] Ho deficiency list attached.
)
M-M-M5 p393 9 og 9
&TTAFME NT 7 A PAGE 3 or 3 i Were any Exceptions taken for this test?
l No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Exception:
Justification: _
- 2) Additional Exception / Justification list .
attached. I No additional list attached.
Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the
( criteria setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985. l The results of this test have been determined to be:
Satisfactory i
ll Unsatisfactory due to:
Performance Test Schedule updated to include retest of this PT. Retest scheduled for:
l Note: This PT or'a copy of, shall be retained IAW Procedure NTP-603, " Simulator Design, Te ting and Certification i Management".
Reviewed and Approved by: / " ~
/ kd Op / Engr Trng Mgr Ddte /
o v
PT-AN-D006 Pego 6 of 0 i
l ATTACRMENT 7.A
[} FAGE 1 OF 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION i PERTORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT l i
)
PT Ho, i PT-AN-9006 !
Date test conducted: 7/29/90 Procedure 1) All four MSIV's were closed from from a 100% power, i beginning of life (BOL) condition with the TDATW '
. pump disabled. .The transient was allowed to continue until the. transient was determined to be - ,
i stable by the Test Operator. '
were any malfunctions used during this test?
( ) No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction l's, 2)
Malfunction descriptions, and ?
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.
Could the PT have been tested at different severities or range of rates?
No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually tested,
- 3) initial conditions for each tested option, and
- 4) final condition / duration for each tested option. '
Description of Baseline Data >
l 1)
TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Groue Best Est. REinAN Code 2)
I.
r e
6
i PT-AN-9006 Pcg3 7 of G 1
' ATTAFHMENT 7.A '
PAGE 2 OF 3 v
Was the baseline data used the judgement of_the Simulator Design Review Committee?
I No Yes - Attached list contains the following: I
- 1) Documentation of their review, and R 2)
Results of review. i l
( Were any deficiencies identified during this test? (
No Yes, then complete below: ,
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
i i t
- Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number)):
Date by which corrective actions are to be made: I
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
i Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number)):
Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) Additional deficiency list attached.
No deficiency list attached.
O
.V 7
_ _ _ __ .__ ~ . _ _ . . _ - _ . _ . ._. .
FT-AN-9006 rega 8 of 8 AUACHMENT B.A l PAGE 3.Or 3 '
Were any Exceptions taken for 'his test?
No Yes, then cornplete below ,
- 1) Exception:
i Justification: 5
- 2) C Additional Exception / Justification list attached.
l No additional list attached.
Acceptance Criteria:
The results of this test must satisfy the criteria setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985.
tO l
i V The results of this test have been determined to be: ,
Satisfactory 1 Unsatisfactory due to:
l Performance Test Schedule updated to include retest of this PT. Retest scheduled for:
Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAW Procedure NTP-G03,
" Simulator Design, Testing and C tific tion Management". l Reviewed and Approved by: M d- / I f0 Ops /E ,r Trng Mgr -Dat6 0
8
PT-AN-9007 Ptg3 6 of G ATTACHMENT 7.A
( PAGE 1 Or 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PERFORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT-PT
Title:
4/4 RCP TRIP PT No. : PT-AN-9007 j Date test conducted: 7/29/90 ,
Synopsis: 1) The RCP's are tripped utilizing malfunction RCO2A, B,C, D from a _100% power, beginning of life (BOL) condition with the TDATW pump disabled. . Simulator response is monitored and observed until stable conditions are reached.
Were any malfunctions used during this test?
j No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction 4's,
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.
() Could rates?
the PT have been tested at different-severities or range of !
No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of '
testing,
' 2) option (s) v;ich were actually tested,
- 3) initial conditions for'ench tested
' option, and l di final condition / duration for each tested option.
Description of Baseline Data 1)
TO Electric's Nuclear Fuels Groue Best Est. RETRAN Code 2)
I l-l l l
PT- AN- D007 !
pgg) 7 gg g
)
1 l
\
ATTACHMENT 8. A PAGE 2 Or 3
[O Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design Review Committee? >
No []Yes- Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and-
- 2) Results of review.
Were any deficiencies identified during this test?
v No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
t Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number: b d Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
l Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i . e . , Simulator Action Request number)): l l Date by which corrective actions are te be i made: i
- 3) [] Additional deficiency list attached.
No deficiency list attached. s
PT-AN-9007 peg) g of g ATTACHMENT 7.A PAGE 3 OF 3 Were any Exceptions taken for this test?- No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Exception:
Justification:
- 2) C Additional Exception / Justification list attached.
C No additional list attached. Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the criteria set forth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985. The results of this test have been determined to be: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory due to: [ Performanco Test Schedule updated to include retest of this PT. Retest scheduled for: Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAW Procedurre NTP-603, " Simulator Design, Testing and Certificatir n Management". q Reviewed and Approved by: / ~ *
/ d
, Ops n'gr Trng Mgr DOd C) :
1 _9
l atM10NCnON CAUSES AND EFFECTS RC02
' LOSS OF REACTOR COOT ANT FLOW TYPB: BOOLEAN CAUSE: !
. UNDERFREQUENCY TRIP RELAY 1-HXA/IPCPX FAILS CLOSED A380KED XMETEAE, CONDETEOM:- POWER > 3%
ORTZON8: SC02A: RCP i1 RC02C: RCP i3 I RCO22: RCF #2 RC02D: RCF #4 DRBCRXD TXOM :. THE SELKY3D RCP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT THE-RCP BREAK IS OPEh
~ HE AFFECTED LOOP FLOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM AND THEN INCREASE AS REVERSE 7"*,0W IS ESTABLISHED AND THE LOW FLOW ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE. Tr?
SLIGHTLY DUE TO DECREASE' ,/ ORE DELTA-P. UNAFFECTED LOOP FLOWS WILL INC IF REACTOR POWER IS GREATER THAN THE P8 PERMISSIVE THE REACTOR WILL TRIP AND ASSOCIATED PLANT CONTROL LOGIC WILL ACTUATE. IF THE REACTOR-POWER IS LESS THAN P8 PERMISSIVE THE PLANT WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND THE AFFECTED LOOP TAVE AND DELTA-T WILL DECR THEFLOW FEED AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL " SHRINK" WILL DECREASE. AND ST THE REMAINING STEAM GENERATORS WILL ASSUME A HIGHER STEAM LOAD RESULTING IN A HIGHER STEAM A O FLOW AND STEAM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE'SLIGHTLY. S' REAM LOAD WILL INCREASE LOOP DELTA-T'S AND TAVE WILL CHA THE HIGHER RsQUIRING PROPER VALUE. ROD MOVEMENT TO RESTORE THE TAVE SETPOINT TO I ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. AR2TORATZOM: '
. MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY, '
r Reouired malfunction per ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Section 3.1.2 1 Page 126
PT-AN-9003 Paga 6 of 8 1
.ATTACMMENT 7.A f'.
A PAGE 1 Or 3 - COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PERTORMANCE= TEST ABSTRACT PT
Title:
Sinale-RCP Trie
==_ l PT No.: PT-AN-9008 Date test conducted:' 7/27/90 Procedure ,
i Synopsis: 1) Reactor Coolant Pump 4 was atopped-from 100% Full Power, BOL, Equilibrium Xenon Condition (IC-15) with the TDAFW Pump disabled. .The transient was allowed'to continue until the ; transientLwas determined to be stable by the- ! Test Operator. Were any malfunctions used during this test?. i No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
-1) Malfunction:#'s, 1
- 2) Malfunction' descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.-
l l l)
\~ /
l l Could rates? the BT have been tested at different severities or range of > I No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually. tested,-
- 3) initial conditions for each tested-option, and-final condition / duration for1each tested-option. ,
Descriptir : 4 w ' 'ar )ata
- 1) JU @ ; ultelear Fuels Groun Best ' Est . RETRAN Code 2) 3)- W 4) i 4,
1
FT-AN-9008 Paga 7 of 8
~
/g ATTAPHMENT 7.A <
_ ( ,) PAGE 2 OF 3 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the SLmulator Design Review Committee? No []Yes- Attached list contains the following:_ 1). Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results of review.
Were any def3cfaaeita identified during this test? , O No a m , then complete below:
.1) De14cisacy
Description:
SG 1 & 4 ores-sures selks,pb and down at what acoears to be a laram maonitude. ADDrQZimatelv 1 min- > ute into-transient. than se?(le out cuickly.
-Correc*.ive Action' Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action i
Request number) ) : Investicate and resolve oer SAR 90SA0575. I Date by which corrective actions are to be
; ( made: 2/15/91 i
3
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
N/A Corrective Action Planned [and applicable l document numbers - (i.e. , . Simulator. Action Request number)]: ) i 1
' Date by which corrective actions are to be-made:
i
- 3) Additional deficiency list attached.
[5] No deficiency list attached. < (
- -- ,e- -
-r a .,v,
iPT-AN-9008 Pago 8 of 8 ; l
) ATTACHMENT 7.A-PAGE 3 OF 3 Were any Exceptions taken-for this test?
No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Exception:
Justification: i
- 2) Additional' Exception / Justification list 4
attached. No additional list attached.
) Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the criteria setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985.
The results of this test have been determined to be: Satisfactory i Unsatisfactory due to: U Performance Test Schedule l updated to include retest of l Retest scheduled for: this PT.
- 1. .
Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAW Procedure NTF-603,
" Simulator Design, Testing and C rtific tion fanagement".
i Reviewed and Approved by: / ~
/ O ops /E .r Trng Mgr ba +!e
- O
+ + ne -w+a,-m g
FT-AN-9009. Page 6 of 8 l l ATTACHMENT 7.A
;( ) PAGE 1 OF 3
)
l COMANCHE PEAK STEAM' ELECTRIC STATION
' PERTORMANCE TEST ABSTFACT PT
Title:
. MT TRIP. NO RX TRIP I PT No. : PT-AN-9009 ' l Date test conducted: ~ 7/27/90 Synopsis: -1) Turbine was manually trioned from aooro:<imatelv
'33% cower. -Transient allewed to continue untbl the olant wa's stable Were any malfunctions used during this test?
v No- Yes - Attached list contains the following:- 1)- Malfunction 4's, - I
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of.
ANS-3.5. l ) Could the PT have been tested at'different severities.or range of
^
rates? i~ l' No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of
(; : testing,. ! l
- 2) option (s) which'were-actually tested,
- 3) initial conditions for'each tested-option, and-
- 4) final condition / duration for each . tested option. '
Description of Baseline Data 1) TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Groun Best Est. RETRAN Code 2) l
^
'q ) .
FT-AN-9009 Pags 7lof 8 ATTACHNENT 7.A
) PAGE 2 Or 3 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design Review Committee?
No. Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results of review.
Were any deficiencies identified during thisitest?' b No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
SG' Steam Flows are , unbalanced for the first t4== sten follow- '! ino the turbine trio. They then balance ! out as exnected. 4 Corrective Action Planned (and applicable
-document numbers (i . e . , Simulator Action Request number)]: Investicate and resolve-Der 90SA0576.
Date by which corrective actions are to be
. /T made: 2/15/91
, V
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
N/A' l-l Corrective Action Planned (and' applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator: Action Request number)): Date by which corrective. actions are to be-j made: -'
- 3) Additional deficiency list attached.
No deficiency list' attached. 4 i
E
'PT-AN-9009 Pega 7 of 8 -* f- ATTAClilENT 7. A '
1 PAGEs 2 OF 3 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the-Simulator Design Review Committee? No Yes - Attached list contains the following: ?
- 1) Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results'of review.
Were any deficiencies identified during this test?. No- Yes, then completeLbelow: 1)- Deficiency
Description:
SG Steam Flows are unbalanced for the first tima steo follow-ina the turbine trio. Thev titan balance out as exoected. Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document' numbers :(i.e. , Simulator Action. Request number)): Investicate and resolve.
/~'A Date by which corrective actions are to be made: 2/15/91 .Nus l ,
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
N/A , Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i .e. , Simulator Action - Request number)]: l' L Date by which corrective. actions are to be made: ' l 3) Additional deficiency list attached. No deficiency list attached. L l 1
. - . . . - . . . - - -- . . - . . .~. -- - .- __ -
.i i
PT-AN-9009 Paga 8 of 8 ATTAERNENT 7.A
.] PAGE 3 OF 3 Were any Exceptions taken for.this test?
i No Yes, then complete below: 1)' Exception: l l l l
.1 1
-Justification: 'l i
- 2) =
Additional Exception / Justification. list- . attached. No additional list attached. Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the O criteria setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985. The results of this test have been determined to be: Satisfactory
~
- . Unsatisfactory due to:
i' - Performance Test Schedule updated'to include-retest of-this PT. Retest scheduled 4 for: Note: This- PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAN Procedure NTP-603, "Simulater Design, sting-and Certification Management".
- j ), n >
- Reviewed and Approved by: l -- ' ' ~ " "
D s/ Engr-Trng Mgr-
/ (3 Y #
hat [~ (') - , V e e - . - . , , - . . . .
, . , - - . ~ - , .
1 1 i PT-AN-9010 ~
-Pags 6 of 8 7-i ATTACHMrtrT 7 : A . 1
( .PAGE 1 OF 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM-ELECTRIC STATION PERTORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT ! PT
Title:
- MAX PWR RATE RAMP PT No. : PT-AN-9010-Date test conducted: 7/30/90 Procedure 1) A 5%.per minute ramp to 75% power followed by 10 minutes at 75% power then a 5% per minute . i ramp.to 100% power from a 100% power, beginning of life (BOL) condition was performed.
- Were any malfunctions used during this test?- -
( ) No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction I's, ~
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability.to Section 3.1.2 of ANS i g -3.5.
t
/~h
(, ) Could rates? the PT have been tested at different severities or range of 3 No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of testing, '
- 2) option (s) which were actually tested, s
- 3) initial conditions for each tested option,.and
)
- 4) final condition / duration for each tested
- option.
Description of Baseline Data i 1) TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Grono Best Est . ' RETRAN Code
'2) i- . ut ,/ ;
c f
PT-AN- 9010 Pags 7 of 8 1; I i ATTACHMENT 7.A
-(
PAGE 2 OF 3 Was the ' baseline data used the judgement of a panel of experts? l 1 No Yes - Attached list contains the following: j 1). Documentation-of their review, and
- 2) Results of review.
Were any deficiencies identified'during this test? i l No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e. , Simulator Action Request number)]: , Date by whichl corrective actions are to be made:
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective = Action Planned'[and applicable ' document - numbers' (i.e. , Simulator Action Request number) ] : i-Date by which corrective. actions are to be !: made:
- 3) [] Additional deficiency list attached, i
[] No deficiency list attached. l 4
PT-AN- 9010 Pcga'8fof 8 {
-ATTACHMENT 7.A - ~) PAGE 3 Or 3 l
Were:any Exceptions taken for this test? i No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Exception:
1
.1 l
Justification: _ I
- 2) Additional Exception / Justification list attached.
l((] No additional list attached. Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy-the j criteria setforth-in ANSI /ANS-3.5,~1985. > The results of this test have been i determined to be:
-Satisfactory Unsatisfactory due to: I i
Performance Test Schedule-updated to include retest of Retest scheduled. this PT. J for: Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAN Procedure NTP-c ' 603,." Simulator Design, Testing and Certification Management". h Reviewed and. Approved by: L / 70~ Ops / ngr Trng Mgr- 16atf o
PT-AN-9011 Page 6 v1 9
~
ATTACRMENT 7.A PAGE 1 OF 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PERTORMANCE TEST-ABSTRACT PT
Title:
. Mai LOCA'w/ Blackout ~ PT.No. : PT-AN-8T,1 Date test' conducted: 7/27/90 , Synopsis: 1). Maximum ,OCA with a loss of all off-site oower f rq n a' 100% f ull oower condition . Were any malfunctions used during this test?= ( ] No ( Yes - Attachet list contains the following: 1). Malfonction #'s,
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and-
'3 ) Applica.5111ty-to Section 3.1.2-of, ANS-3.5.
Could rates? the PT have been tested at different severities or rango of. No Yes - ' Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually tested,
- 3) initial conditions for each-tested option, and . ,
- 4) final condition / duration for each tested option.
Description of Baseline' Data- - 1) Review of almulator data was derived from'a table too dineumaion of the Simniator Damian Review Cc- 4ttee and the
#minuten" of that meetina are attached as baseline data.
2) O
i PT-AN-9011 Page 7 of 9 ATTACRMENT 7.A fG .- PAGE 2 Or 3 ) (s-) 1 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design Review Committee?
- No !
Yes - Attached list contains-the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and .i'
- 2) Results of review.
Were any deficiencies identified durit.g this test? No (]Yes,'thencompletebelow:
- 1) Deficiency ~
Description:
i Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator: Action Request number)) : , O (, f Date by which corrective actions are to be made: i
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
I: Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i . e . , Simulator Action Request number)]: Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) Additional deficiency list attached.
No deficiency list attached. yb
. . - . ~ _ _- - . - - - - . .- . - . .- _ _ - - _ - - - - _
- l .
GT-AN-9011' Page 8 of 8= j ATTACHMENT 7.A ( PAGE;3 Or.3 were any. Exceptions taken for this test? i No- Yes, then complete below: j
- 1) Exception:
i Justification: 2)- Additional Exception / Justification list-attached. ; No additional list attached. ! l l ( Acceptance Criteria: -The results of this test must-satisfy the criteria set forth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985. The results=of this test have been determined to be.
)
! Satisfactory
' Unsatisfactory due to:
- i. i Performance Test. Schedule updated to include retest of I
this PT. Retest scheduled for: Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained'IAW' Procedure NTP-603,
" Simulator Design, Testing a .Certif' cati Management" Reviewed and Approved by: - - '
/ 3 78 Opaf/ Engr Trng Mgr Gatp j e
v 4 5 A w w , - ..,w-. , ,- -.,m. , , _
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED01 O LOSS OF Afl OFF-SITE POWER v ersE: nOOLEAN CAUSE: - NATURALSECTION OF SWITCHYARD DISASTER (TORNADO) CLEARS 138 KV AND 345 KV ASSUMED INITIAL CONDIFICW: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: nonx ,
==me==
DESCRZ9 TION: 4 THE TORNADO RESULTS IN AN EAST AND WEST BUS 86 RELAY LOCKOU ALONG WITH A FAULT ON THE SUBSTATION (DECORDOVA 138KV AN PARKER, VENUS, BENBROOK, AND COMANCHE. PEAK 345KV) LINES. THE FAULT WILL TRIP AND LOCKOUT ALL LINE BREAKERS, SWITCHYARD BREAKERS,'AND GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS. WILL RESULT. A REACTOR-TURBINE TRIP SAFEGUARDS BUSES.-THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL SAFEGUARDS COMPONENTS WILL ACTUATE AS INDICATED BY PLANT CONDITIONS. WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. INSTRUMENTATION AND ANNUNCIATION RESTORATZOM: O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS OPERATOR RESTORATION OF TH 34SKV SWITCHYARD AND SUBSTATIONS. Required malfunction per ANS:/ANS-3.5-1985 Section 3.1.2 O - Page 45
.. - - - - - -- - - __ _ _ _ _ _ . - ~ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
l., -
- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS '
I l i- RC09 l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ' COLD LEG RUPTURE '0 i TYPE: CAUSE: BOOLEAN PIPE BREAK AT REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SUCTION ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER 0PTIONS: RC09A1: LOOP #1 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09A2: LOOP #1 - DOUBLE ENDED OUILLOTINE SHEAR ' RC0981: LOOP #2 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC0982: LOOP #2 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR RC09C1: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) i RC09C2: LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED OUILLOTINE SHEAR RC09D1 LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09D2: LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR NOTE: THE RCS IS MODELED WITH LIFE DEPENDENT BASELINE ! ACTIVITY. RADIATION LEVELS ARE ACTIVITY DEPENDENT. ! CURRENT BASm TNES I BOL .1 uCi/cc MOL .3 uCi/cc EOL .5 uCi/cc O DESCRIPTION: THE EFFECT OF THE LOCA WILL BE A LOSS OF MASS FRO COOLANT SYSTEM, CONSISTENT WITH SPECIF CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION LEVEL AND SUM THE REACTOR, AND TO LIMIT THE CONTAINMENT ! J TEMPERATURE INCREASES. REACTOR /rURBINE TRIP ANl l PRESSURE AND, ATTHE APPROPRIATE SETPOIN i ACTUATION SI, RHR, CS, CCW, OF THE SW, ANDESF AFW PUMP SYSTEMS INCLUDING STARTING AND APPROr'RIATE CONTA 3 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. ESF PERM ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. i RESTORATION: RESET SIMUIATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. Required malfunction per ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Section 3.1.2 l Page 133 I - i
CIMtrLkTom Ravraw monmD bSETIN3 ' i
. Augu:;t . 3,'- 1990 '
~
Attendees:. J.R. Walker, Ops /Eng LTraining Manager '(previous FWR SRO License) q J.E. Ellard,. Simulator Training Supervisor (previous I PWR-SRO License)- l C.W. Davis, Training Specialist (Current ' RO License) l E.L. Dyas, Simulator Operations. Supervisor (previous PWR SRO License)
)
Mr. Davis was in' attendance representing the Operations' Department. J Performance Test results were reviewed for the - following Performance Tests:- PT-AN-9001 Steady State - 254 PT-AN-9002 SteadyJState - 75% PT-AN-9003 Steady State - 100%- PT-AN-9004 Man'ual Rx Trip' PT-AN-9005 Loss of Feed l PT-AN-5006 MSIV 4/4 Closure PT-AN-9007 RCP 4/4 Trip PT-AN-9008 Trip of a Single-RCP PT-AN-9009 Main Turbine Trip With No Reactor. Trip PT-AN-9010 Max PWR Rate Ramp PT-AN-9011-Maximum LOCA With A. Loss Of Off-Site Power Simulator response - was judged as satisfactory. PT-AN-9012 ~ Maximum Unisolable: Main Steamline Rupture IRC
, PT-AN-9013 Depressurization ~ Nith A Loss of- ECCS PT-AN-9014 Real Time Test PT-AN-9015 Normal Plant'Operationa.
PT-AN-9016 Reactor Trip and Recovery i L Two SAR's were written, each on:a bad data point. They were: 90SA0576:- completion 2/15/91 and:90SA0575 - completion 2/15/91. The associated pts were judged eatisfactory. Mr.requested be Walker stated to be that a QA Audit performed withinon 60 certification days. submittal would l l$ & # Y j $ $ fC' roved Dale /
FT-AN-9012 Pags 6 of 8 1 i ATTAR'HMENT 7. A-- -
) PAGE 1 OF 3 '
. COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION- l PEPEORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT l PT Titles. Max Unisol1 MSL Ruot PT No. : PT-AN-9012 Date test conducted: 7/27/90 t
Synopsis: 1)- Mavimum severity (3006) MSL ructure-inside. , reactor containment in a'1004-IC-13 with a control rods in Manual-and TDATW oumo disabled. Tranmient allowed no continue until stable. ! Were any malfunctions used during this test? No Yes - Attached list-contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction l's,=
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
-(~'
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1 2 Eof.
ANS-3.5. Could rates? the PT have been tested at different severities or range of-No Yes - Attached list contains the following: options which the~ simulator is capable of 1 1) testing, .i
- 2) -option (s) which were actually tested, l
- 3) initial conditions for each tested option, and
- 4) final condition / duration for each tested option.
Description of Baseline Data
- 1) 1T Electrics Nuclear Fuels Grouc Best Est4 mate REikAU Code.
2) 3) 1: l' l p u l l
l PT- AM- 9012 Pope 7 of 8 3
; p_s'- ATTACMNENT 7.A - ; PAGE 2 OF 3 L
was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design Review Committee? l l Ho Yes - Attached list contains the following: I
- 1) Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results of review. I were any deficiencies identified during this test?
No: Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Deficiency
Description:
i r Corrective Action PlannedL(and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number)): l O Date by which corrective actions are to be made: i
- 2) Deficiency'
Description:
I
-l Corrective Action Planned (and' applicable document numbers (i .e. , Simulator Action Request number)] :
l. 1 1 l l \ Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) ((] Additional deficiency list attached.
No deficiency list attached.
PT-AN-9012 Paga 8 of 8 I f ( ATTACHMENT 7.A~ PAGE: 3 OF 3 I J
'l Were any Exceptions taken for this test?-
No - Yes, then: complete below: ,
- 1) Exception:
Justification:
- 2) Additional Exception / Justification list attached.
No additional list attached. D Acceptance Criteria: The resalts of this test must satisfy the criteria setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985. Tb's results of this test have been determined.
+ o be :
. i Satisfactory Unsatisfactory due to: i l
i f Performance Test Schedule updated to include retest of this PT. Retest scheduled , for: Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be< retained IAW Procedure NTP
-603, " Simulator Design, Testing and Certification Management".
Reviewed and Approved by: / d - 9O Ops /En 'r Trng Mgr Dade O u 4
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS01 TYPE: MAhv STEAM RUPTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT VARIABLE: 0 - 1.13 X 107 LBM/HR (0 - 3004 OF NORMAL l CAUS5 STEAM FLOW FOR ONE STEAM GENERATOR) \ WELD FAILURE AT STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET NOZZLE Ass 0NED INZTZAL CONDZTION: POWER > 3% OPTIONS: Ms01A: S/G 01 NB01C: S/G #3 NB013: S/G 02 NB01D: S/G #4 EQ21:INTERMEDIATE TER EFFECTS ARE EASED ON 100% SEVERITY. SEVERITi' LEVEL, AT AN PLANT RESPON8E WILL BE LESS SETPOINTS. SEVERE AND MAY NOT RE&CE ALL ACTUATION DESCR19 T10M: l GENERATOR AND THE MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE SETPOINT, REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR. STEAM LINEINJECTION SAFETY ISOLATION,AT AND THE WILL DECREASE RAPIDLY UNTIL STEAM LINE I , j THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL CONTINUE T RAPIDLY. ' GENERATORS.THIS WILL ALSO CAUSE SEVERE SWELL IN THE S THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE,THE RAPID STEA DECREASE. LEVEL, AND TEMPERATURE TO RESULT FROM THE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL. PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO DECRE - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SPR ANNUNCIATION DEVELOPS ACCORDING TOAND INDICATION INDIVIDUAL LOGIC, WILL RESPOND IT TO RESTORA T20M: l RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION . Reautred malfunction per ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Section 3.1.2 O
^
Page 98
..__....,,,,-,,--,.-..-.,,,,.-cm,.,_
E FT-AN-9013 Pags 6 of 8 ATTACHMENT 7.A ( PAGE-1 OF 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ; ) PERTORMANCE TEST ABSTRACT ' PT Titles. Deoress W/ Loss ECCS I PT No.: PT-AN-9013' Date test conducted: .7/27/90 ' i Synopsis 1) Przr'PORV' fails ooen in a 100% full oower econdition. TDAFW one and CCPs disabled. Transient allowed to continue until RCS oressure is-stable. Were.any malfunctions used during this test? No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction 4's,
- 2) Malfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to SectionL3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.
Could rates? the PT have been tested at different severities?or range of No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) ' options which'the simulator is' capable of.
testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually tested,
- 3) initial conditions-for each tested option, and
- 4) final condition / duration'for each: tested option.
Description of Baseline Data 1)_ TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Groue Best Est4 mate RETRAN Code. L 2) 4 l l I 1 l I 4
PT-AN-9013- Pega 7 of 8 l I' ATTACHMENT 7.A ' PAGE 2 OF-3 Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design Review Committee? ' No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and
- 2) Results'of review.
Were any deficiencies identified during this test? No Yes, then complete below: 1)- Deficiency
Description:
t Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number}}: L ' [) (_/ Date by which corrective actions are~to be ' made:
'2) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request . number) ] : i Date by-which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) [] Additional deficiency list attached.
((] No deficiency list attached. l
yT-AN-9013-Page 8 of 8 ATTACMMENT 7.A PAGE 3 Or 3-Were any Exceptions taken for this test? No Yes, then. complete below:
- 1) Exception:
i , Justification: i 4
- 2) Additional Exception / Justification list ;
attached. No additional list. attached, i'
\ !
l Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the criteria <setforth in ANSI /ANS-3.5,. 1985. The results of this. test havetbeen j determined to be: Es] Satisfactorv [. . Unsatisfactory due-to:
)
i Performance Test Schedule I updated to include retest of ' this PT. Retest scheduled for: Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAN Procedure NTP-603, " Simulator Design, Tes ing and Certification-Management". e ! c Reviewed and Approved by: I2 Md 1 / 79 YNO Ops /$ngr Trng Mgr bat 4 D G I
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX16 PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE LEAES TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 -100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUS5: . POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE MALFUNCTION ASSONED Z N Z T Z A Zo CONDZTZON: 100% POWER OPTZONS: RX2 6A t PCV-455A AX2 dB: PCV-456A DESCRZPTZON: INSERTION OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE TO OPEN AT'THE SELECTED SEVERITY RATE. THE DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE INDICATION WILL INCREASE. THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILL INCREASE. i ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WILL DECRE?.SE, AND PRESSURIZER CONTROL AND BACK-UP HEATERS WILL RESPOND TO THE PRESSURE DECREASE. AS PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASES THE CHARGING PUMP SPEED WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN LEVEL, AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL BE EXCEEDED. WHEN PRESSURIZER LEVEL REACHES 17% THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL ISOLATE AND PRESSURIZER HEATERS WILL BE CUT OUT. AT A SEVERITY OF ABOUT 30,400 LBS/HR THE CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL O SUSTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. AS SEVERITY INCREASES PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE TO THE REACTOR T AND SAFETY INJECTION LOW PRESSURE SETPOINTS. IF THE PRESSURE IN THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK IS EXCEEDED THE RUPTURE DISKS WI RUPTURE AND CONTAINMENT. REACTOR COOLANT WILL BE RELEASED INTO THE RESTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION VALVE. REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED POWER OPERATED REL l l Malfunctio~n required per ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Section 3.1.2 l O Page 193 i l .
I PT-All-9004 Fage 1 of 9
-r CPSES ISSUE DATE- TEST NO.
SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE JULY 27, 1990L PT-AN-9004 TEST MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ~ REVISION NO. 00 l l l i l l-Simulator Performance Test i MANUAL REACTOR TRIP PT-AN-9004-REV. 00 t t l I l= Approved by: c! d6 Date: // I? O Supdrvis[r, Simulator Operations. / V
-TU ELECTRIC
. - .. . ~ , - - - . . . -
' '. PT-AN-9004 Pago 2'of 9 l l
1 1.0 Purpose
;O i The purpose of this performance test is to verify' the capability of the CPSES Unit 1 Simulator to perform a Manual Reactor Trip. <
Test acceptance criteria is specified in ANSI /ANS-3.5. 2 .' O Applicability - l This instruction-applies to all personnel assigned by the l Supervisor, Simulator Operations or the-Operations / Engineering Training- Manager to implement or support implementation of this procedure. 3.0 -References . 3.1 ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985, "American National' Standard-Nuclear Power Plant Simuletors for Use~in Operator Training" 3.2 Regulatory Guide 1.149,'" Nuclear Power Plant Simulation
-Facilities for Use in Operator Licen'se Examinations",
Revision'1, November 1986 3.3 10 CTR Part 55, "Operato'rs' Licenses" 3.4 CPSES Procedure Procedure NTP-603, " Simulator Design, Testing. and Certification Management" O
\j 3.5 NUREG-1258, " Evaluation-Procedure for Simulation Facilities Certified Under 10CTR55" i 4.0 Definitions 4.1 NTP -
Nuclear Training Procedure \ i 4.2 LORT - Licensed Operator' Requalification Training 4.3 P2500 - (PPC) Process Plant Computer or Primary Plant Computer 4.4 SAS. - Safety Assessment System (Emergency Response-T Facility Computer System / Safety Parameter Display System [ERFCS or SPDS)) 5.0 Responsibilities 5.1 The Simulator Test Coordinator will schedule this test. 5.2 The Supervisor, Simulator-Operations will maintain this test current.
- i. 6.0 Instructions 6.1 Prerequisites l G
D 1 TU ELECTRIC l
. . . _ . , _ _ . , . . - , _ . . . . . . - , _ _ , , - , _ ,m.... . . _ . - . . . ..
'PT-AM-9004 Paga 3 of 9 6.1.1:
Simulator time-is scheduled. 6.1.2 Simulator training. load-is available-and loaded. 6.1.3 Simulator software personnel are present ': 0 support the test operator. 6.2 Scenario
~\
The reactor is. manually tripped from a 100% power, beginnina of life - (BOL) condition. Simulator response <is monitored and t observed-until stable conditions are-reached. 6.3 Procedure
.6.3.1 Reset the simulator to a BOL, 100% full power, equilibrium' Xenon condition.
6.3.2 . "real Placetime", the simulator in run and verify operation in 6.3.3 Setup the P2500l computer and instructor's booth SAS- i terminal to monitor, trend.and-record the parameters ; listed below as need fort the-test using the shortest time resolution possible. l 1 PABAMETER M M imuruiua a POINT ID I RECORDER , Neutron NI-31B SR COUNT l-ATE Flux (%) NI-35B SAS'NIS TR DISPLAY 1-tiR-4 5 IR CURRENT ^SAS-NIS TR DISPLAY-NI-41B PR POWER 1-NR-45 : SAS NIS TR DISPLAY 1-NR-45 1 PCS Auct- TI-412A RCS AUCT HI TAVE I
-Hi Tave P2500 T0499A 110HE P:r PT-455A -I PRZR PRESS SAS RCS TR DISPLAY
. Press 1-PR-455 Par .:
LT-459B PPZR LVL CH'I Level Ski RCS TR DISPLAY 1-LR-459 , Per TI-453 Temp PRZR LIQ TEMP P2500 T0480A ' NOME
.I Note: No P2500 or SAS point is available for Total Steam riow.
Total FT-513 SG 1 STM FLO SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-FP,-510 Steam FT-523 SG 2 STM FLO Flow FT-533 SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-FR-520 SG 3 STM FLO SAS SG TR DISPLAY FT-543 SG 4 STM FLO FR-530 SAS SG. 'IR DISPLAY 1-FR-540 TU ELECTRIC n 0
. ~
w PT-AM-9004 Pcg3 4 of 9 M BS 22218 $sDistrTOR & morne in Baccfman Note: No F2500 or R&B point is available for Total Feedwater Flew. Total rT-511 SG 1 FM TLO SAS 3G TR DISPLAY reed FT-521 1-TR-510 SG 2 TW TLO SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-TR-520 riow TT-531 SG 3 TW TLO SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-TR-530 TT-541 SG 4 TW TLO SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-rR-540 Auxiliary SG 1 ATW TLOW reedwater SAS SG TR DISPLAY NO!!E SG 2 AIN TLOW SAS SG TR DISPLAY llONE riow SG 3 AFW TLOW SAS SG TR DISPLAY NONE SG 4 hrW TLOW SAS SG TR DISPLAY NotiE Loop Thot TE-413A RCS HL 1 TEMP SAS RCS TR DISPLAY 1-TP&413A Loop Tcold T%-413B RCS CL 1 TEMP SAS RCS TR DISPLAY 1-TR-413B S/G Press PT-514A MSL 1 PRESS SAS SG TR DISPLAY NO!!E S/G Level LT-551A SG 1 LVL (NR) SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-FR-510 , S/G Level LT-551A SG 1 & 2 LVL (WR) i SAS SG TR DISPLAY 1-LR-501 6.3.4 Ensure all recorders listed in step 6.3.3 are running and inking properly. 6.3.5 Place the simulator in " freeze". 6.3.6 Mark point. the chart recorders to indicate the test starting 6.3.7 Place the simulator in run and verify operation in i "real time". 6.3.8 Commence monitoring, trending and recording the SAS I
. and P2500 computer points listed in step 6.3.3.
6.3.9 Take snapshots of the instructor's booth SAS trend displays listed in step 6.3.3 at intervals sufficient to capture the entire transient. 6.3.10 Manually trip the reactor. If needed, verify plant response and annunciation using EOP 0.0 and EOS-0.1 as a guideline. I No operator a::tions are to be performed on the control boards except as noted below. After ~5 minutes, reduce the Auxiliary reedwater I flow rate to ~167 ppm per steam generator. O TU ELECTRIC t .
yg. ass pood i Pc93 S of 9 l l 6.3.11 Allow transient to continue until stable simulator l conditions exist. If stabilization occurs prior to ' ()N y_ energization of the source range nuclear instruments, the test shall continue until the source range nuclear ; instruments have energized. j i 6.3.12 Record any annunciators that appear to have an invalid status. Reset alarms as they clear. . 6.3.13 When the test is completed, acknowledge annunciators from the Instructors Station and " Freeze" the { simulator. 6.3.14 Remove and label the control board charts containing the recorded data and tae snapshots of the SAS display screen. 6.4 Data Collection 6.4.1 Attach records of any annunciators that appeared to have had an invalid status during this test. ; 6.4.2 Verify printouts of the recorded are collected, 1 identified and attached to this procedure. 6.5 Data Evaluation r 7 6.5.1 Evaluate the collected data against baseline data to ensure the requirements of ANSI /ANS 3.5 are met. Noto any discrepancies. 6.5.2 Verify the validity of those annunciators recorded in step 6.3.12. Note any discrepancies. 6.5.3 For all noted discrepancies, resolve and document the resolutions in the Performance Test Abstract. '
, . . 6.6 Test Completion 6.6.1 Test r rmed a data lectedt lj.
T4st'operato'r e '
/ YN
/bata/ {
6.6.2 Data Ev untion completed: 1
) >>6b Supeevi's'r, Simulator Operations
/
Dat
$C i
\ f '
/ 3 O Chairmpa. **<iew Board 6a06 '
e l 4
.h h
a
.,e , , - , , ,. . , _ _ - - . , ~. ,
e l PT-AN-9004 . Pag 2 6 of 9 ! 6.6.3 Test Ab ract (Attachment 1) Completed: , kn A L, / SO Supehviso;LQfimulator Operations Date 7.0 Attachments 7.A Performance Test Abstract r i i i
'r e
f O : 1 t O
l PT-AN-9004 Pega 7 of 9 ATTACMMENT 7.A ( PAGE 1 Or 3 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PERTOPJRNCE TEST ABSTRACT PT
Title:
Manual Reactor Trio PT Ho.: PT-AN-9004 Date test conducted: 07/29/90 Gynopsis 1) The reactor was manually tripped from a 100% powes, beginning of life (BOL) condition. The transient was allowed to continue until the transient was determined to be stable by the Test operator. Were any malfunctions used d .ng this test? No ()Yes- Attace.ed list contains the following:
- 1) Malfunction l's,
- 2) Halfunction descriptions, and
- 3) Applicability to Section 3.1.2 of ANS-3.5.
could rates? the PT have been tested at different severities or range of ( ) Mo Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) options which the simulator is capable of testing,
- 2) option (s) which were actually *ested, 3) initial conditions for each tested option, and 4) final condition / duration for each tested option.
Description of Baseline Data 1) TU Electric's Nuclear Fuels Grouc Best Est. RETRAN Code
- 2) i O
PT-AN-9004 Pega 8 of 9 { 1 ATTACEMr.NT 7.A i [] \_,/ PAGE 2 or 3 j Was the baseline data used the judgement of the Simulator Design i Review Committee? 4 No Yes - Attached list contains the following:
- 1) Documentation of their review, and {
- 2) Results of review. i Were any deficiencies identified during this test?
(3) No Yes, then complete below:
- 1)
Description:
__ l Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action ' Request number)): ' l Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 2) Deficiency
Description:
Corrective Action Planned (and applicable document numbers (i.e., Simulator Action Request number)): Date by which corrective actions are to be made:
- 3) ((] Additional deficiency list attached. l e
s No deficiency list attached. g ~l (- i i 1 1 1
i CT-AM-9004 pe93 9 og 3 - I ATTACHMENT 7.A ! (~~) PAGE 3 OF 3
\s_,/ i Were any Exceptions taken for this test?
No Yes, then complete below:
- 1) Exception:
9 i s Justification: , i i i
- 2) Additional Exception / Justification list i attached.
() No additional list attached. Acceptance Criteria: The results of this test must satisfy the criteria set forth in ANSI /ANS-3.5, 1985.
\' The results of this test have been determined to be:
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory due to: l Performance Test Schedule updated to include retest of , this PT. Retest scheduled
- for:
Note: This PT or a copy of, shall be retained IAW Procedure UTP-603,
" Simulator Design, Testing and Certification Management".
Reviewed and Approved by / -
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i ; I M A U.,F U N C TU @ N , o CAUSES AND EFFECTG ' t I t i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS INDEX C.Qdi Dtit E. ail CC01 RUPTURE OF COMPONENT COOLING LINE 2 CCO2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP (S) TRIP 3 CC03 Malfunction Deleted 4 CHOI CONTAINMENT H2 PURGE SUPPLY FAN FAILURE 5 CH02 CONTAINMENT H2 PURGE EXHAUST FAN FAILURE 6 ? CH03 CHLORINE IN CONTROL ROOM 7 CH04 LOSS OF CONTAINMENTINTEGRITY 8 CRdl FAILED FUEL ELEMENT 9 CS01 FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY HX OUTLET VALVE 10 CS02 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP (S) 11 CS03 RWST LEAK 12 CSO4 NaOH CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK LEAK 13 CS05 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUMP RECIRC VALVES STUCK CLOSED 14 CS% SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY 15 CV01 LOSS OF CHARGING PUMP (S) 16 CV02 LEAK IN NORMAL CHARGING LINE INSIDE CONTAINMENT 17 CV03 REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL PAILS IN BORATE MODE 18 CV04 LOSS OF REACTOR MAKE-UP CONTROL 19 CV05 LETDOWN CCW CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 20 CV06 INADVERTENT DILUITON 21 CV07 INADVERTENT BORATION 22 CV08 LErDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK 23 CV09 LOSS OF REACTOR MAKE-UP WATER PUMP 24 CV10 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL #1 FAILURE 25 CV11 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL #2 FAILURE 26 CVL2 REACIVR COOLANT PUMP SEAL #3 FAILURE 27 CV13 LEAK IN LETDOWN LINE INSIDE CONTAINMENT 28 CV14 LEAK IN LEIVOWN LINE OI.TTSIDE CONTAINMENT 29 CV15 LErDOWN HX OUTLET PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE (PCV 131) 30 CV16 Malfunction Deleted 31 CV17 HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 32 CV18 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEAK 33 CV19 FAILURE OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 34 i 6/28/90 1 i
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS INDEX i Cade EWg East CV20 Malfunction Delseed 35 CV21 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL CONIROL VALVE FAILURE 36 l CV22 VOLUME CON!ROL TANK H2 REGULATOR FAILURE 37 CV23 BORIC ACID FILTER LOW FLOW 38 CV24 BORON THERMAL REGENERATION MODE CONTROL SWITCH FAILURE 39 CV25 BORON CONCENIRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FAILURE 40 CV26 FAILURE OF POSTITVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP SPEED I CONTROLLER 41 CW01 HIGH CONDUCTIVrIY IN THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS 42 CWO2 ' CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP 43 , CWO3 LOSS OF SCREEN WASH PUMP (S) 44 ED01 LOSS OF ALL OFF4ITE POWER 45
- 1 ED02 LOSS OFTRANSFORMER XSTI 46 ED03 LOSS OF 345KV'IRANSPORMER 47 ED04 LOSS OF 6.9 KV 480 V PLANTTRANSFORMER 48 ED05 LOSS OF 6.9 KV BUS 49 ,
ED06 LOSS OF DC BUSES 50 ED07 LOSS OFINVERTER(S) 51 ED08 LOSS OFINSTRUMENT BUS 52 ED09 GRID FREQUENCY VAFJES 53 ED10 GRID VOLTAGEVARIES 54 ED11 FAILURE OF MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHROSCOPE 55 EG01 MAIN GENERA 1DR ALTTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR OVFR EXCITATION 56 EG02 MAIN GENERATURINERNAL FAULT 57 EG03 FAILURE OFMAIN GENERATOR BREAKER 58 EG04 LOSS OF GENERATOR PRIMARY COOLING WATER 59 EG')5 - LOSS OF OENERATOR ALTIDMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROL 60 EG06 DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START FAILURE 61 E007 DIESEL GENERATOR OVERSPEED1 RIP 62 EG08 DIESEL GENERATOR OLTTPUT BREAKER 1 RIPS -63 EG09 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE TO LOAD 64 l EG10 LOSS OF MAIN GENERATOR EXCITATION 65 EG11 HIGH JACKETTEMPERATURE ON DIESEL ' 66 n 6/28/90
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1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS INDEX C2.4.t 11til EAEL O EG12 LOSS OF TRANSFORMER #1UT 67 EO13 LOSS OF UNIT MAIN T" ANSPORMER 68 FWO1 FEEDWATER PIPING RlWrURE OlJISIDE CONTAINMENT 69 FWO2 FEEDWATER PIPING RUPTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT 70 FWO3 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE 71 FWO4 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE BEARING FAILURE 72 FWO5 FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE AUTOMATIC SPEED CONTROL FAILURE 73 FWM MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATING VALVE FAILS 74 FWO7 STEAM GENERATOR WATER HAMMER CONTROL FAILURE 75 FWO8 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START FAILURE 76 FWO9 STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START FAILLRE 77 FW10 HIGH PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE LEAK 78 I FWli LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE LEAK 79 FW12 FEEDWATER HEATER LEVEL SENSOR FAILS HI/ LOW 80 FW13 Malfunction Deleted 81 FWl4 HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMP INADVERTENT TRIP 82 l FW15 HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MODE) 83 FW16 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM 84 i FW17 LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP 85 FWl8 , COND$NSATE RECIRCULATING VALVE PAI13 (1-FV-2239) 86 FW19 HOTWEliLEVEL CONTROL FAII.S
- 87 FW20 CONDENSATE PUMP SEIZURE 88 i FW21 CONDENSATE PUMP SHEARED SHAFT 89 FW22 LOW PRESSURE HEATER BYPASS VALVE FAILURE (1 PV 2286) 90 FW23 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK RUITURE 9i FW24 MOIVR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 92 FW25 FEEDWATER PIPING RUPTURE OlJTSIDE CONTAINMENT 93 lA0i LOSS OFINSTRUMENT AIR 94 1A02 LOCAL INSTRUMENT AIR FAILUTE TO CONTAINMENT VALVES 95 lA03 LOSS OF SERVICE AIR 96 IA04 LOSS OF N2 SUPPLY SYSTEM 97 MSO1 MAIN STEAM RUPTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT 98 MS02 STEAM LINE RUPTURE OLTTSIDE CONTAINMENT AFTER MSIV 99 iii 6/28/90 E
( h1ALFUNCTION CAUSES AND' EFFECTS INDEX . C941 DI.lt f_Egf C MS03 MAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE Ot.TTSIDE CONTAINMEPG BEFORE MSIV 100 l MSO4 MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVE FAILURE 101-MS05 STEAM DUMP CONTROLLER FAILURE 102 MS% ' MOISTURE SEPARATOR / REHEATER CONTROL FAILURE 10' MS07 MSIVINADVERTENTLY SHUTS 104 MS08 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO SHUT 105 MSO9 EXTRACTION STEAM NON-RETURN VALVE FAILURE 106 -l MS10 LEAKAGE OF MAIN STEAM SAFETY. VALVE 107 i MS11 MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER TUBE FAILURE 108 MS12 GLAND SEAL REGULATOR MALFUNCI10N ( 109 ! MS13 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE 110 NIOl SOURCE RANGE MONITOR FAILURE I 111 , NIO2- INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR FAILURE 112 ; NIO3 POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-41 FAILURE- 113 l NIO4 POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-42 FAILURE 114 i O NIO5 NIO6 POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-43 FAILURE POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-44 FAILURE 115 116 I N107 FAILURE OF SOURCE RANGE BLOCK SWITCH 117 NIO8 Malfunction Deleted 118 NIO9 INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL O '9RCOMPENSATED 119 nil 0 NOISY SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL I 120 NI11 POWER RANGE MONITOR OUTPtTT OSCILLATION 121 NI12 INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL UNDERCOMPENSATED 122 nil 3 IMPROPER POWER RANGE HIGH FLUX TRIP SETPOINT 123 PC01 Malfuncdon Deleend 124 RC01 REACit)R COOLANT PUMP FAILURE TO START 125 RC02 LOSS OFREACTOR COOLANT FLOW 126
- RC03 REACII)R COOLANT PUMP HIGH VIBRATION 127 RC04 SHEARED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT 128 RC05 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP LUBE OIL PROM UPPER BEARING OIL RESERVOIR 129 RCM HIGH OIL LEVEL IN REACTOR COOLANT PUMP UPPER BEARING OILRESERVOIR I30 RC07 REACIT)R VESSEL HEAD FLANGE LEAK 131 t'v 6/28/90 i
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I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS INDEX . . CDAL Tidt EALL O RC08 REACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM HOT LEO RUPTURE 132 RC09 REACIOR COOLA!G SYSTEM COLD LEG RUPTURE 133 RC10 REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK INTO CO?RAINME?R 134 RCl1 PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE STUCK 135 RCl2 Malfunction moved to Reactor Control System 136 i RCl3 LOOSE PARTIN REACTOR 137 RCl4 LOOSE PARTIN STEAM GENERATOR #1 138 { RD01 CONTROL BANK CONTINUOUS ROD WITHDRAWAL 139 RD02 CONTROL BANK CONTINUOUS ROD INSERTION 140 RD03 DROPPED ROD 14I l RD04 STUCK ROD 142 RDOS ALL CONTROL RODS FAILTO MOVE 143 , RD06 EIECTION OF ROD FROM THE CORE 144 RD07 BROKEN ROD 145 RD08 CONTROL RODS MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECDON OF DEMAND 146 RD09 DIOTTAL ROD POSITION INDICATION FAILURE 147 RDIO ROD STOPS FAILTO BLOCK ROD MOVEMENT 148 RD11 CONTROL ROD SPEED CONTROL FAILS 149-RD12 DIGITAL ROD POSITION INDICATION LOGIC FAILURE 150 RD13 Malfunction Deleted 151-RH01 RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL PUMP (S) TRIP 152' RH02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM LOW FLOW 153 l RH03 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK 154 l RH04 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE INADVERTENTLY CLOSES 155 RH05 RHR SUCTION RELIEF VALVE FAILURE -l56 RH06 RHR SUMP RECIRC VALVES STUCK CLOSED 157 RM01 VENT STACK GASEOUS RADIATION MONITOR POWER LOSS 158 RM02 INCREASING RADIATION LEVEL ON AREA MONITOR .159 RM03 PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR FAILURE 161 i RM04 CONTAINMENTGASEOUS AND PARTICULATEMONITOR LOW FLOW 162 RP01 FAILURE OF ALL AUTOMATIC REACTORTRM 163 RP02 SPURIOUS REArTOR TRIP 164 RP03 STEAM OENERAi OR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE 165 v 6/28/90
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS INDEX Code 11111 East O RPO4 - REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE 166 RP05 . LOOP COLD LBG NARROW RANGE TEMPERATURE TRANSMTITER l FAILURE 167 RP06. LOOP N 16 INSTRUMENT FAILURE 168 1 RPG .' FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC SAFELY INJECTION ACTUATION 169 > RP08 FAILURE OF SAFETY INJECTION TO ACTUATE MANUALLY - 170 , RP09 CONTAINMENT ISOLA 110N PHASE 'A' FAILURE 10 ACTUATE ON i ! 'S' SIGNAL 171 i RP10. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE 'B' FAILS TO ACTUATE ON 'P' F ; SIGNAL ' 172 ! RPI 1 ' LOOP COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE TRANSMI r1 ::x FAILURE 173
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RP12 LOOP HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE 1RANSMITTER < FAILURE - 174 i RP13 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP SWITCH FAILURE 175 ( l RP14 SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF SAFETY INJECTION 176 { RP15 REACTOR 1 RIP BREAKER JAMMEDCLOSED 177 i RX01 STEAM GENERA 1DR FEED FLOW TRANSMTITER FAILURE 178 l RX02 STEAM GENERATOR STEAM FLOW TRANSMrITER FAILURE 179 l RX03 AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROLTref FAILURE
- 180 j RX04 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 1RANSMITTER FAILURE IS1 i RX05 FAILURE OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1RANSMITTER 182 ,
p RXO6 PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP (S) FAIL ON IN AU1DMATIC 183 s RXO7 ' 1 PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUPS FAIL OFF 184 ! ! RX08 ; t FAILURE OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANSMTITER 185 l RX09 l FAILURE OF TURBINE IST STAGE PRESSURE *IRANSMITTER 186 I l RX10 PRESSURIZER HEATER OUTPUT FAILURE 187 RXI1 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILURE 188 ! RX12 FAILURE OF STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 'IRANSMTITER (IT-507) 189 i RX13
- ' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOP PRESSURE *IRANSMITTER l FAILS 190 f RX14 TURBINE IST STAGE PRESSURE BISTABLE INCORRECTLY SET 191
- RX15 PRESSURIZER SPRAY FLOW CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 192 1 RX16 PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE LEAKS 193 RX17 PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE SEAT LEAKAGE 194 SG01 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 195 1
v1' 6/28/90
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \
. INDEX Code Thl.t Eagg }
O S10l' SI ACCUMULA1DR I.EVELINCREASES 196 SIO2 SI ACCUMUI.ATOR TANK WATER LEAK 197-S103 SI ACCUMULATOR TANK PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE 198-S104 . LOSS OF SAFETY INJECTION PUMP (S) 199
. SW01 FAILURE OF SERVICE WATER PUMP 200 TC01 LOSS OF CONTROL FLUID 201 TC02 LOSS OF AUTOMATIC EHC SYSTEM CONTROL 202 l
TC03 FAILURE OF MANUALTURBINE TRIP 203 - TC04 SPURIOUS TURBINE LOAD CHANGE 204 j TC05 MAINTURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 205 l TC% SPURIOUS TURBINE TRIP 206 TC07 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIPS 207 TP0I TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER FAILURE 208 L TP02 TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMP FAILURE 209 . TP03 GENERATOR HYDROGEN TEMPERATURE HIGH/ LOW. 210 TPO4 LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMP OIL COOLING 211 O TP05 TURBINE LUBE OIL SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 212 TUO! MAIN TURBINETHRUST BEARING FAILURE 213 TUO2 - EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY FAILURE 214 TUO3 Malfunction Deleted 215 TUG 4 TURBINE BEARING HIGH 'I'BRATION 216 TUO5 MAIN TURBINE BEARING OIL LOW PRESSURE : 217 TUO6 MAIN TURBINE ELECTRIC LUBE OIL PUMP (S) FAILURE , 218 TUO7 FAILURE OFTURBINE STRESS EVALUATOR 219 WD01 Malfunction Deleted 220 vii 6/28/90
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W!. FUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS . The- Malfunctions Causes and Effects document describes the malfunctions { available to the CPSES Simulator Operator / Instructor for use in the training h. I of personnel. I The layout and a brief description of each document item is shown below. l l Malfunction Code l Malfunction Title TYPE: Boolean (on or off) or variable with ranges. CAUS5 : The actual cause which initiated the malfunction. ASSONID INIFIAL CONDITION: The assumed starting condition at which the event occured. OPTIONS: ' The options and. malfunction subcodes necessary to' activate the malfunction for selected items. DEBCA19 T10m: A brief description of the effects of the malfunction. O V m RERTORATZQM: A brief description of what will/must occur when the malfunction i l is made inactive to restore the simulator to a desired status. l t l l LO Page 1
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CC01 Q FYFB RUPTURE OF COMPONENT COOUNG UNE VARIABLE: 0 - 30,000 GPM CAUS5:
- PIPE BREAK AT INLET TO ASSOCIATED HEAT EXCHANGER ASSONED ENETEAZ, CONDETZON: 100% POWER O9TIONS: CC01A: CCN PUMP 01 CCO23: CCM PUMP #2 DESCREDTION:
THIS MALFUNCTION RESULTS IN A LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER , FROM THE' SELECTED SYSTEM. DEPENDING ON SEVERITY, SYSTEM-PP. ESSURE AND FLOW WILL DECREASE'WHILE PUMP FLOW'AND POWER REQUIREMENTS INCREASE WITH A DECREASING SURGE TANK LEVEL ~. WHEN A CCW SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE SIGNAL IS RECEIVED, THE OPPOSITE CCW t PUMP AND ITS ASSOCIATED SERVICE WATER PUMP WILL START-IF THEY ARE IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE. EMERGENCY CCW SURGE TANK MAKEUP WILL AUTOMATICALLY START FOR THE PROPER. SURGE TANK COMPARTMENT AT THE LO-LO ALARM POINT, AND WILL SECURE AT THE-HIGH LEVEL POINT. IF-THE LEAK RATE EXCEEDS THE MAKEUP RATE, THE CCW PUMPS WILL. LOSE i SUCTION AND ALL CCW WILL BE LOST TO SYSTEM LOADS. TEMPEPATURES AND PRESSURES WILL REFLECT THE. LOSS OF'CCW. ANNUNCIATION WILL ! O ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. THE OPERATOR-CAN MAINTAIN SYSTEM OPERATION BY ISOLATING THE AFFECTED SYSTEM. RRSTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE PIPE BREAK. $
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i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND' EFFECTS CC02 0 FYPE: COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP (S) TRIP BOOLEAN CAUSE: ' FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFION: PUMP RUNNING' 09FIONS: cc02A: CCW PUMP 01 CC023: CCW PUMP $2 DESCRZRTZOM: THE SELECTED CCW PUMP WILL TRIP RESULTING;IN OPEN-BREAKER j POSITION INDICATION AND A LOSS OF CCW SYSTEM FLOW-AND PRESSUP,E. - IF THE STANDBY CCW PUMP IS AVAILABLE, IT'AND THE ASSOCIATED ') SERVICE WATER PUMP WILL START WHEN'THE AFFECTED CCW PUMP TRIPS, RESTORING CCW SYSTEM FLOW AND PRESSURE. IF.THE STANDBY CCW PUMP IS NOT AVAILABLE,.THE CCW SYSTEM LOADS WILL-LOSE THEIR HEAT-SINK AND THE TEMPERATURE OF THE SYSTEMS AND. COMPONENTS COOLED BY THE CCW' SYSTEM WILL INCREASE.. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RESTQAATION: O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS PUMP RESTART. 1 i i i i , l l l l l 4 i LO 1 p Page 3 5 .'
-1 MALFUNCTION ' CA USES AND ' EFFECTS i
0 i' CC03 O (MALFUNCTION DELETED) b
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS s CH01 Q . CONTAINMENT'H2 PURGE SUPPLY FAN FAILURE (POST LOCA) TYPE: ' BOOLEAN CAUSE FAN DRIVE SHAFT SHEAR ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: POST LOCA OPTIONS: cs01A: CONTAINMENT Hg PURGE SUPPLY FAN #1 C2015: CONTAINMENT H 2 PURGE SUPPLY FAN #2 DESCRIPTIQM: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE THE SELECTED SUPPLY FAN AIR SUPPLY WILL GO TO MINIMUM. THE MOTOR BREAKER WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND THE MOTOR WILL OPERATE AT HINIMUM LOAD. ]3E LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM FOR THE RESPECTIVE SUPPLY FAN WILL ANNUNCIATE, RES TORAt*IOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BROKEN SHAFT. O l l , i l O Page 5 l l'
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CH02
. CONTAINMENT H2 PURGE EXHAUST FAN FAILURE O' TYPE: BOOLEAN '
CAUSE: FAN SUCTION MOV FAILS TO OPEN ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: POST LOCA OPTIONS: ra02A CONTAINMENT H PURGE 2 EXHAUST FAN #1 CR028: CONTAINMENT H 2PURGE EXHAUST FAN #2 DESCRIPTION: WHEN THE SELECTED CONTAINMENT H2PURGE EXHAUST FAN IS STARTED 4 ! THE SUCTION ISOLATION MOV WILL FAIL TO OPERATE. THE EXHAUST FAN AIR FLOW WILL BE MINIMUM. THE DAMPER POSITION LIGHTS ON THE RESPECTIVE EXHAUST FAN HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THE DAMPER HAS FAILED TO ! OPEN. i 1. !. RESTORATION: b MALFUNCHON REMOVAL ALLOWS THE MOV TO OPERATE. i. LO i ! 4 p ( n f I i l !O Page 6 4 i _,___,~..._._.......___...,_.._....,..,....-.__.,.....___,__..__.,_._m . . - , _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CH03 CBLORINEIN CONTROL ROOM TYF : BOOLEAN CAUS5: SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CHLORINE ADDITION TANK, LOWER l CONNECTION BREAK ASSONED INITIAL CONDITION: AT POWER 09TIONS: NONE DRBCRIPTIOd:
-WHEN THE CHLORINE TANK RUPTURE OCCURS THE ENTIRE CHLORIME CHARGE '
WILL BE EXPELLED IN 30 SECONDS TO.THE SSW CHLORINATION BUILDING. THE EXHAUST FANS WILL EXHAUST TH4. CHLORINE GAS OUT OF THE
. STRUCTURE AND-THE CHLORINE CLOUD WILL BE CARRIED TO THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION INLET. THE: CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATICALLY-SHIFT TO THE EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION MODE.
ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RRSTORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE CHLORINE TANK. O ' I l O l Page 7
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l CH04 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY O TYPE: BOOLEAN CA USE: CONTAINMENT PENETRATION FAILURE AT 831'6" LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDS BUILDING PENEIRATION ROOM. ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: LOCA IN PROGRESS OPTIONS: NONE ! l DESCRIPTION: INSERTION OF THIS MALFUNCTION DURING A LOCA CAUSES A 500 CFM LEAK (AT 40 PSIG CONTAINMENT PRESSURE) FROM A CONTAINME?U PENETRATION , IN THE SAFEGUARDS PENETRATION ROOM AT ELEVATION 831'6". THE PIPING PENETRATION HRAM AND VARIOUS VENTILATION SYSTEM PROCESS MONITORS TO ALARM ON THE RM-11 IN THE CONTROL ROOM. RESTORATION: ' RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O O Page 8 , ..--,a, - --:,,- , - - - .,.----,--.,,-.w,. w - . . . , , - . -- . ,,,, . . - . , , , ,,, v- e,--,- ,- - , .w-,,-
t MALFUNCTION CAUSES' AND EFFECTS
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CR01 O VARIABLE:'0 - 1,000 uCi/cc
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ratsoeveteteueur TYPE: CAUSK: - LEAKING FUEL ELEMENT ASSONED ' ZNETEAL - CONDZTION: 100% POWER-OPTIONS: ROKE~ E921: TEE RCS IS MODELED. WITE LIFE ' DEPENDENT EASELINE-ACTIVITY. TEIS MALPUNCTION WILL ADD TO TEE BASELINE ALREADY PRESENT. CURRENT RASELINES BOL .1 uCi/cc mL .3 uC1/cc l p EOL .5 uCi/cc l: DESCREDTZQM: I l UPON MALFUNCTION INSERTION THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ACTIVITY. , WILL BEGIN TO. INCREASE INDICATING A FAILED FUEL ELEMENT. AS THE ( ACTIVITY INCREASES-THE CONTAINMENT AREA MONITORS-WILL START INCREASING APPROPRIATELY ACCORDING TO LOCATION.- IF THE LETDOWN SYSTEM IS IN OPEPATION, THE GROSS FAILED FUEL MONITOR WILL - i DETECT THE ACTIVITY INCREASE AND WILL ALARM AT THE APPROPRIATE
- SETPOINT IN THE CRM. ANY SYSTEM THAT IS PART OF THE REACTOR l COOLANT SYSTEM, IN OPERATION AND HAS AREA ~AND/OR PROCESS MONITORS WILL ACTUATE' ALARMS AS REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY INCREASES. CONTAINMENT GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE ACTIVITY-WILL INCREASE SLOWLY FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.
E R S T Q JtA T Z Q M : RESET SIMULATOR =TO DESIRED INITIAL. CONDITION. o q-l l. l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l CS01 FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY HX OUTLET VALVE l O' TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 1,000 GPM - CAUSE: VALVE LEAKAGE l ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION:. 100% POWER - CONTAINMENT SPRAY ! SYSTEMIN TEST OPTIONS: CS01A: 1-HV-4776 CS018: 1-HV-4777 DESCRIPTION: THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM IS IN OPERATION RECIP CULATING THROUGH THE RECIRCULATION LINE TO THE RWST. WHEN iHE MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE THE SELECTED SPRAY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE WIII LEAK AT A RATE DIrrERMINED BY SEVERITY SELECTED, AND THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY RINGS WILL BE ACTIVE. THE CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVELS WILL INCREASE AND HUMIDirY WILL INCREASE. THE CS PUMP ~ DISCHARGE PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AND FLOW WILL INCMASE. THE RWST LEVEL WILL DECREASE AND CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVELS WILL . - INCREASE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SEVERITY LEVEL, AND THE CONTAINMENT SUMP HIGH LEVEL ALARM WILL ACIUATE. THE RECIRCULA'ITON VALVES WILL CLOSE AND FULL FLOW WILL BE DISCHARGED TO THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY. O RINGS. WITH NO ACTION THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WILL TRANSFER THE WATER IN THE CONTAINMENTIN ABOUT 61/2 HOURS AT 100% SEVERITY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. 1 1 THE OPERATOR CAN STOP THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS AND REDUCE THE l EFFECTS OF THIS MALFUNCTION, 1 RESTORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEAKING VALVE. 1 O Page 10
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l 1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l CS02 ' 0 TYPE . LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP (S) VARIABLE:' O - 1,000'GPM CAUSB: ' FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIF DEVICE A380NED IMETZAL CONDZTZON: PUMP RUNNING 09TZONS: ~ C302A: CS PUMP i1 C302C: CS PUMP #3 0 C8023: CS PUMP #2 C802D: CS PUMP #4 DRBCREDTIQM: THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT THE MOTOR BREAKER HAS TRIPPED OPEN. THE AFFECTED PUMP FLOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM. THE AFFECTED PUMP'S. ASSOCIATED RECIRC VALVE WILL.OPEN DUE TO LOW FLOW. A SINGLE PUMP WILL NOT ADVERSELY. AFFECT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SINCE EACH' TRAIN, (#1 AND
#3) (#2 AND #4), ' HAS 100% CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONTAINMENT COOLING. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY.
RRSTQRATZQN: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS PUMP RESTART. l l I O Page 1] I a-~q y .w, -- p ew-, , . ...w,-- ,, ,n.,, -,,_..,-,.,w,- , , , , . , , , - . - ,,,--,,,-.--..,,,,,n- --,.-en.w, .--,.e.,,aw,w~, ,,.<w.,s
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS s CS03 RWST LEAK-TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 20,000 GPM } CAUS2: WELD FAILURE ASSOMED INIFIA& CONDIFIQIF: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: NOME Dnnt'ETDTTOM: j'
- - TANK LEVEL WILL BEGIN TO DECREA SEVERITY.
E
- COMPLETELY DRAIN THE TANK.AT-1004 SEVERITY IT WILL LOW, LOW-LOW, APPROPRIATE-SETPOINTS AND EMPTY ARE ATTAINED. ALARMS WILL ANNUNCIATE A
{ THE LEVEL DECREASE. PEN RECORDERS WILL FOLLOW ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. nnssonsr1on: , MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. E F i-4 I !~ l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CS04-
-r NaOH CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK LEAK .\
TYPE: VARIABLE:' O - 50 GPM CAUSE- DRAINLINE WELD FAILURE ASSONED INETEAL CONDZTION: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: HONE 1 l DESCRIPTIOM: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL'CAUSE THE LEVEL AND PRESSURE IN THE SODIUM HYDROXIDE TANK TO-DECREASE. THE DECREASING LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL BE INDICATED IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM. WHEN THE LOW LEVEL IS REACHED, THE MOV-DISCHARGE. ISOLATION VALVES WILL SHUT. WHEN-THE LOW-LOW LEVEL IS REACHED, THE AOV DISCHARGE VALVES WILL' SHUT. LOSS OF THE SODIUM HYDROXIDE TANK FUNCTION WILL PREVENT l CHEMICAL ADDITION DURING CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATIONS. l ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. masromarrow: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. O e Page 13 l l
MALFUNCTION CAUSFS AND EFFECTS
.CS05 O CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUMP RECIRC VALVES STUCK CLOSED TYPE: BOOLEAN CAUSE: VALVE STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION
- ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION
- .LOCA - INITIATION OF COLD LEG RECIRC l 09TIONS: Cs05A: 1-HV-4782 Cs05E: 1-HV-4783 i
- l[221
- SINCE THERMAL OVERLOAD IS MOT BIMDIATED THE ANNUNCIATOR RELATED TO NOV OVERLOAD NILL NOT ACTUATE.
l. DEBCREDTZQM: l WHEN THE RWST LOW-LOW LEVEL ALARM IS ACTUATED THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION SHOULD BE MANUALLY SHIFTED TO THE CONTAINMENT l SUMPS. THE SELECTED MOTOR VALVE, MV4782 OR MV4783 WILL FAIL TO 4
' OPERATE. THE OPERATOR SHOULD SECURE THE AFFECTED TRAIN TO i PREVENT EQUIPMENT DAMAGE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS
) APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS ARE REACHED.
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'l RESTORATZQM: i l ! MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS = OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVE. i l l s }
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_ 4,ma , _ __was._A-,ss-a # -- - - , . ---4--------w _ 4-- -v---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - ---ca---------- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS Cso6 Q TYRE : . SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY BOOLEAN CAUS5: - ACTUATION RELAY. FAILURE (CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED). ASSONED INITIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE 09TIONS: C306A: TRAIN " A" C3068: TRAIN-"B" O i DERCREDTION: $ THE RELAY FAILURELFOR THE SELECTED CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM TRAIN WILL CAUSE THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS TO START AND SPPAY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE TO OPEN, CHARGING THE APPROPRIATE. SPRAY RINGS IN THE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT HUMIDITY WILL INCPEASE' WHILE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY'. CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVELS WILL INCREASE AND SUMP PUMPS WILL START. THE CONTAINMENT' SPRAY CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK AND RWST LEVEL WILL DECREASE. THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM WILL TRANSFER THE VOLUME IN THE RWST TO THE CONTAINMENT. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RESTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS SYSTEM RESTORATION.- l I l l r (- I I l 4 i l. O l Page 15 1
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ,. CV01 (0 TYPE: BOOLEAN-LOSS OF CHARGING PUMP (S) CAUSN: - FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE I A380NED INETEAL CONDETZON: PUHP RUNNING OPTEONS: CVOIA: POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP CY013: CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP $1 CV02C: CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP #2 nancnzarzon: MALFUNCTION INSERTION WILL STOP THE RESPECTIVE RUNNING CHARGING PUMP. THE PUMP TRIP WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF FLOW TO THE REACTOR l COOLANT SYSTEM AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WATER. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. THE LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW THROUGH THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER WILL INCREASE LETDOWN FLOW TEMPFRATURE. THE' LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE CAUSING COMPONENT COOLING WATER ! TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE TO MODULATE OPEN ATTEMP TING TO MAINTAIN; OUTLET TEMPERATURE. LOSS OF RCP SEAL WATER FLOW WILL CAUSE REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE-PAST #1 SEAL TO THE CONTROLLED LEAK OFF LINE TO THE VCT, THIS WILL CAUSE SEAL TEMPEPATUP.ES TO O INCREASE. WITH NO CHARGING FLOW AND CONTINUED LETDOWN THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL DECREASE AFD VCT LEVEL WILL INCREASE. THE INCREASE IN LETDOWN TEMPERATURE WILL RESULT IN LETDOWN DIVERSION FROM CVCS DEMINERALIZER TO THE.VCT. AT THE PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL SETPOINT, THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL BE ISOLATED, HOWEVER, PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE DUE TO RCP SEALS CONTROLLED LEAK OFF. STARTING ANOTHER CHARGING PUMP WILL RESTORE CHARGING FLOW AND ALLOW RESTORATION OF LETDOWN AND CHARGING SYSTEMS. OPERATOR RESPONSE TIME WILL EFFECT SYSTEM DEGRADE. nnssonnexam: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS SYSTEM RESTORATION, I l l l L O l Page 16. [
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l j CV02 LEAK IN NORMAL CHARGING LINE INSIDE CONTAINMENT {' TYPE: VARIABLE: 200 GPM AT NORMAL CHARGING PRESSURE CAUS5: - CRACKED WELD AT INLET TO VALVE 1-8378B ASSO9mD ZMZTEAL CONDZTION: '100% 90HER 09TZONS: nonx DESCRZ9TIOM:
\
AS THIS LEAK INCREASES IN SEVERITY, THE CHARGING PUMP FLOW WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL. WHEN THE LETDOWN AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WATER LEAKOPF,:AND CHARGING LINE LEAK RATES EXCEED THE CHARGING FUMP CAPACITY,-THE PRESSURIZER < LEVEL WILL DECREASE. AT 17% PRESSURIZER LEVEL THE LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVES WILL CLOSE. DURING THIS TRANSIENT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WILL DEGRADE TO THE LOW PRESSURE TRIP AND A500CIATED LOGIC WILL ACTUATE IN THE PRIMARY.AND SECONDARY-SYSTEMS. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE.- THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY AND PADIATION LEVELS WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO THE LEAK. THE OPERATOR CAN MANUALLY MANIPULATE'THE PRIMARY SYSTEM INVENTORY. CHARGING AND' LETDOWN SYSTEMS TO CONTROL THE RRSTORRTZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. t t 1 !O Page 17
. . _ . ... . .- . .-_-. -.~. - ....- -. . . - - . . . _ - . . . - - - . . . . - _ . - . . . . . _ . _ . . . - . . . . MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CV03 0 TYPE: REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL FAILS IN BORATE MODE BOOLEAN 1 CAUS3: MAKEUP RELAY 2 ENERGIZED (MU X 2) ASSDNED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER l OPTIONS: nonE DEsCRERTZQs: WITH THE REACTOR MAKE-UP CONTROL SYSTEM SELECTED TO THE SUCTION ! OF THE CHARGING PUMPS. AS BORATED WATER IS INJECTED INTO THE l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM THE ADDITION OF NEGATIVE REACTIVITY WILL CAUSE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM TO l MAINTAIN TAVE. PLANT RESPONSE WILL BE THE SAME AS CV06. l ngsTonATIOn: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS THE REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO MODE SWITCH SELECTION. O I i l l 1 O Page 18
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS-CV04 J Q LOSS OF REACTOR MAKE-UP CONTROL (FAILURE TO OPERATE IN ANY MODE) TYRK: BOOLEAN CAUSK BLOWN FUSE (FUI) ASSUNED ENETEAL CONDITION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: nons 1 4 DESCR19TZQM: WITH THE REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL FAILURE IN'ALL MODES, NO MAKEUP i TO THE' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK OR CHARGING PUMP SUCTION WILL BE AVAILABLE EXCEPT BY MANUAL OPERATOR CONTROL. ANY MAKE-UP FUNCTIONS THAT WERE IN PROGRESS WILL TERMINATE. WITH THE FC VALVES AND PUMP CONTROL SW'S IN AUTOMATIC; BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS 1 AND/OR 2 WILL STOP. FCV110A, FCV110B, FCV111A, FCV111B WILL CLOSE. THE COMPONENTS 4 WILL' RESPOND TO MANUAL CONTROL FOR SYSTEM OPERATION. t ARRTORRTZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS THE REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO AUTOMATIC SYSTEM OPERATION. l l l l r I l i l I s
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l
"~
CV05 ' LETDOWN CCW CONTROL VALVE FAILURE TYPE: . VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF 1-TV-4646 VALVE POSITION CA085: TV-4 64 6 ' POSITIONER FAILURE A380NED INETEAL CONDZTECN:. ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: NoNE \ l EQ23: _ VERIFY STATUS - OF. IDA CVR-13 "CVCS/ETRS DEMIN - BORON SATURATIOM" EEFORE DETERMININC EXPECTED RESPONSE OF ! MIXED RED DEMIN TO LETDOWN TEMPERATURE CEANGES. SEE TNT-891019 FOR COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF MIXED BED DEMIN CEARACTERISTICS. ALSO SEE SIMPLIFICATIONS-TABLE IN TER SDS. DESCREDTZOM: ) 1-TV-4646 WILL FAIL.TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY. THE CONTROLLER DEMAND WILL-TRACK PROPERLY, BUT NEITt?R MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC CONTROL WILL FUNCTION.. LETDOWN OUTLET TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE IF. VALVE-FAILS IN THE CLOSED DIRECTION AND DECREASE IF'THE VALVE FAILS IN THE OPEN DIRECTION. INDICATION AND ANNUNCIATION WILL. RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. O RESTORATION: i MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RETURNS CONTROL OF 1-TV-4646 TO NORMAL. l O Page 20
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS e CV06 ; INADVERTENT DELUTION-TYPS: -VARIABLE: 0 - 100%'OF FT-111A OUTPUT; 100% = 0 OUTPUT CAUSB: - FT-111A' OUTPUT FAILURE ASSONED ENETEAL CONDETZON: 100% POWER OPTZONS: NONE LM,C,8Z2,2LQg: AS THE BORON CONCENTRATION'IN THE REACTOR COOLANT. SYSTEM IS DECREASED POSITIVE REACTIVITY WILL BE INCREASED. IF THE ROD ' CONTROL SYSTEM IS IN AUTOMATIC, THE RODS WILL STEP IN TO MAINTAIN TAVE. ONCE THE CONTROL RODS REACH THE INSERTION LIMIT, THE ROD INSERTION LOW AND: LOW-LOW ALARMS WILL ANNUNCIATE. IF THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM IS.IN MANUAL THERE WILL BE NO ROD MOVEMENT TO MAINTAIN TAVE AT ITS SETPOINT. WITH NO CORRECTION GR BORON DILUTION, TAVE WILL INCREASE AND AN OT N-16 TURBINE; RUNBACK WILL ACTUATE. OPERATOR ACTION AND MANUAL' VALVE MANIPULATION WILL CORRECT BORON DILUTION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. RRBTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES THE SYSTEM FOR' NORMAL OPERATION. 1 i l l l O Page 21 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS I CV07 T3f72 : INADVERTENT BORATION VARIABLE: 0'- 100% OF FT-110A OUTPUT; 100% = 0 OUTPUT CAUS5: - FT-110A OUTPUT FAILURE ASSUNED ZMZTEAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER 097ZONS: nONE i DERCRX9TXOM:
\
[ k AS THE SEVERITY OF BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION IS INCREASED AND INTRODUCED INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, NEGATIVE REACTIVITY IS INSERTED. IF THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM IS IN AUTOMATIC, THE CONTROLLING BANK WILL WITHDRAW TO MAINTAIN-TAVE. CONTINUED i BORATION AND ROD WITHDRAWAL WILL CAUSE THE RODS TO PROGRESS TO ^ j THE HIGH LIMIT AND AUTOMATIC STOP. WITH NO-FURTHER REACTIVITY COMPENSATION TAVE, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND LEVEL WILL DECREASE.- IF~THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASES TO THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT, PRESSURIZER HEATER CUT OFF AND' LETDOWN ISOLATION WILL OCCUR. IF THE PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE SETPOINT IS REACHED A REACTOR. TRIP WILL OCCUR. WITH THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM IN MANUAL, THE RODS WILL NOT WITHDRAW TO MAINTAIN TAVE AND-THE EFFECT WILL BE THE SAME AS WHEN THE RODS HIT THE HIGH LIMIT AUTOMATIC STOP. ' G THE SECONDARY SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO PRIMARY SYSTEM PARAMETERS. OPERATOR MANIPULATION OF THE SYSTEM WILL SECURE.BORATION. REBTORATXDM: ' MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES THE SYSTEM FOR NORMAL OPERATION, e - Page 22
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l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ! C V08 Q TYRE: LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK VARIABLE: 0-- 100 GPM AT NORMAL OPEPATING PRESSURE CAUSR: TUBE LEAK ASSONED INITZAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER OPTIONS: nonx DESCRZRTION: THIS TUBE FAILURE WILL CAUSE IN-LEAKAGE TO THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM FROM THE LETDOWN SYSTEM AT A RATE DETERMINED BY. SELECTED SEVERITY. LETDOWN FLOW AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. THE LETDOWN LOW PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WILL MODULATE TO MAINTAIN UPSTREAM PRESSURE AND LETDOWN FLOW TO THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK WILL DECREASE CAUSING LEVEL TO DECREASE ACCORDINGLY. AT THE VOLUME i CONTROL TANK LOW LEVEL SETPOINT, THE AUTOMATIC MAKE-UP SYSTEM I WILL ACTUATE AND MAINTAIN LEVEL UP TO 100% SEVERITY. THE INLEAK ! TO THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM WILL CAUSE THE OPERATING SURGE TANK LEVEL TO INCREASE TO ITS HIGH LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT. RADIATION MONITORING WILL INDICATE THE INCREASED RADIATION LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO THE ACTIVITY LEVEL AND. MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. OPEPATOR l O ACTION CAN ISOLATE THE LEAK AND MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL USING THE EXCESS LETDOWN SYSTEM. RESTORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEAKING TUBE. l l i l O Page 23
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CV09 Q
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LOSS OF REACTOR MAKE-UP WATER PUMP FYPR: BOOLEAN CAUSB: - MOTOR BREAKER TRIPS OPEN ASSOBSD INITIAL CONDITIOff ANY PLANT CONDITION 097%ONS: CV09A: RMUM PUMP 1 ( CF098: COMM RMUM PUMP
.j HRCRZLt1DN:
MALFUNCTION INSERTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED REACTOR MAKE-UP WATER PUMP TO-TRIP. THE SYSTEM PRESSURE AND FLOW WILL GO TO i i
"0".
{ THE SYSTEMS CURRENTLY USING REACTOR MAKEUP WATER WILL REFLECT THE LOSS ACCORDINGLY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE A3 APPROPRIATE. IF THE ALTERNATE REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP S j AVAILABLE IT MAY BE STARTED LOCALLY.AND THE= SYSTEM OPERATION W!LL BE RESTORED. ! BMLtDBAZZDM: O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION. l O Page 24
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ne: C V10 ' REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL #1 FAILURE FYPB: DOOLEAN CAUSB: - el SEAL OUT OF ALIGNMENT A380NED ENZTZAL CONDETZON: 100% POWER 09TZONS: CY20A: RCP 01 CV10Ci RCP 63 Cv208: RCP #2 CV20D: RCP #4 DRBCRED THOM: THE SELECTr~' JACTOR COOLANT PUMP #1. SEAL LEAKOFF FLOW WILL INCREASE (# alp:,0XIMATELY 50 GPM IN 10 MINUTES. WHILE THE SEAL - LEAKOFF FLvw INCREASES THE il SEAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. APPROXIMA" l#? RCP SEAL LEAKOFF TLOW TO THE RCDT WILL Il1 CREASE TO - 8 GPM AND DELTA P WILL INCREASE. AS THE FLOW THROUGH 6) JEAL INCREASES CHARGING FLOW WILL INCREASE Ill All ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. WHEN THE CHARGIt1G PUMP . _ _ CAPACITY IS EXCEEDED THE PRESSURISER LEVEL WILL DECREASE.THE 1 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL AND MAKE-UP FREQUENCY WILL IllDICATE r THE INCREASED CHARGING FLOW. WHEN THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL REACHES j 17% THE LETDOWN . SYSTEM WILL ISOLATE AND THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL - WILL INCREASE TO ITS NORMAL LEVEL. IF DURING THIS PRESSURI ER ' TRANSIENT THE PRESSURE DROPPED BELOW THE LOW PRESSURE SETPOINT, O- THE REACTOR ACTUATE. WILL TRIP AND ASSOCIATED PLANT CONTROL LOGIC WILL ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. m RERtORAtXDM: ' MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS RCP SEAL $1. x 0 Page 25
- l l MALVUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \
i 1 I l C Vil Q rras: REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL U FAILURE
.OOtzAN
! CApss: . #2 SEAL EXCESSIVE WEAR ASSONED ENZ7%AL CONDZtXON: 100% POWER Ost% CMS: CY12A: ACP 01 CV22C: RCP #3 l CV2281 RCP $2 CV12D: RCP #4 1 l nnnenzaE10s: l l THE SELECTED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP #1 SEAL LEAK OFF WILL DECREASE i TO 0.0 GPM IN 10 MINUTFS AND #1 SEAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WILL l INCREASE SLIGHTLY. THE LEAK OFF FROM #2 SEAL TO THE RCDT WILL INCREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 7 GPM. l THE CHARGING SYSTEM WILL I REFLECT THE INCREASED DEMAND AND WILL SUSTAIN SYSTEM 1 i REQUIREMENTS INDEFINITELY. IT THE #1 SEAL HAS ALSO FAILED, SEAL ' LEAK OFF FLOW AND THE FLOW THROUGH #2 SEAL WILL INCREASE. TOTAL LEAKAGE FROM THE RCS WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 57 GPM. THE FAILURE i 61 AND #2 SEALS WILL ALSO RESULT IN INCREASED SEAL LEAK OFF 1 WATER TEMPERATURE. THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP WILL BE UNABLE TO MAItitAIN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM MAKE-UP AND THE PRESSURILER LEVEL WILL DECREASE. PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL LOGIC O ACTUATION WILL SECURE LETDOWN FLOW AND THE SYSTEM WILL RETURN TO NORMAL. AnnEORAEZOM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED NITIAL CONDITION. l O Page 26 _m -_m -
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.mm ii MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECT5 C V12 0 FYPR!
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL #3 FMLURE BOOLEAN CADS & $3 SEAL EXCESSIVE WEAR A88')30RD INIFIA& CCelDIFION: 100% POWEA 0FFIONS: CY12A: RCP i1 CY22C: RCP 03 CG23: RCP 62 CV22D! RCP $4 DRBSJLZR21Mt: THE TAILURE Or #3 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WILL RESULT IN A DECREASING SEAL STANDPIPE LEVEL AND INCREASED TLOW TO THE RCDT THROUGH $2 SEAL LEAK CTF AND THE CONTAINMENT SUMP THROUGH THE #3 SEAL LEAK OFF. APPROXIMATELY 2 GPM WILL GO TO THE RCDT AND 1 GPM TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP. MORE FREQUENT STANDPIPE PILLING MAY BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SYSTEM OPERATION. IF THE 42 SEAL HAS ALSO FAILED THE FLOW RATE TO THE RCDT WILL INCREASE. IT THE
$1 AND 02 SEALS FAILED ALSO, THE RCS LEAKAGE INTO THE CONTAINMENT THROUGH THE #3 SEAL WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 100 GPM.
THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE $1 AND #2 FLOW RATES. THE RESULTANT LOSS OF MASS FROM THE RCS WILL EVENTUALLY CAUSE A LOW PRESSURE CONDITION RE3ULTING IN APPROPRIATE LOGIC ACTUATION.
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RESET SIMULAIJR TO DESIRED IMITIAL CONDITION. 1 muassa O Page 27
l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS C V13 LEM IN LETDOWN LINE INSIDE CONTAINMENT j FYPR: VARIABLE: 0 - 150 GPM AT NOPNAL OPEPATING PRESSUP.E CAUSR - CRACKED WELD DOWNSTREAM OF LCV-460 i ASSOMED INIFIAZ, CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OFFIONS: NOME l I DEBCREDr2on: AS THE LEAK INCREASES IN SEVERITY, CHARGING PUMP FLOW WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. WHEN TMT, SEVERITY OF ! LEAK AND LETDOWN FLOW EXCEED CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY, THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL DECREASE APPROPRIATELY. AT 17% ' l PRESSURIZER LEVEL THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL BE ISOLATED, ISOLATING THE LEAK, AND THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL TiTURN TO HOPRAL. l ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ittE-LEAK WILL CAUSE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE TO RESPOND TO THE LEAK APPROPRIATELY.
- nasrannF1on
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I MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. !O O Page 28
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CV14 Q TYPR LEAK IN LETDOWN LINE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VARIABLE: 0 - 100 GPM AT NOPMAL OPERATING PRESSURE CAUSB: - BROFIN INLET FLANGE ON LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ASSONED EMETEAL CONDETZON: 100% POWER 09t%ONS: nous DERCRE9tXQM: INCREASING THE SEVERITY OF THE LEAK RATE WILL CAUSE LETDOW11 FLOW, TEMPERATURE AND PRESSUPI TO DECREASE. AS PRESSURE DECREASES PCV 131 WILL MODULATE CLOSED TU MAINTAlti SYSTEM PRESSURE, THIS WILL REDUCE FLOW AND INDICATION WILL RESPOtID ACCORDINGLY. WITH THE DECREASED LETDOWN FLOW TO THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK, LEVEL WILL DECREASE TO THE LOW LEVEL SETPOINT ACTUATING THE REACTOR MAKE-UP SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN THE VCT LEVEL. SAFEGUARD BUILDING RADIATION AND SUMP LEVELS WILL IllCREASE DUE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE. THE OPEPATOR CAN ISOLATE THE LETDOWN LEAK BY MANUAL ISOLATION AND INITIATE EXCESS LETDOWN TO CONTROL PRESSURIZER LEVEL. ARR10 rat 1DN: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FLANGE. 4 O Page 29
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS j i i l C V1 S LETDOWN HX OUTLET PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE FMLURE (PCV 131) TYPK: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUSK: VALVE POSITIONER MALFUNCTION ASSONED ENETZAL CONDITION: 100% POWER
- OPTIONS
- nons 31221: TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE FLOW OSCILLATIONS, A 10 SECOND STROKE TIME IS UTILISED. p i,
DESCRE9TZQM: ON AN INCREASING VALVE POSITION THE LETDOWN FLON AND TEMPERATURE ' WILL INCREASE AND LETDOWN PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. DEPENDING ON SEVERITY SELECTED THE INCREASED LETDOWN TEMPERATURE WILL CAUSE THE LETDOWN REHEAT DIVERT VALVE (TCV 381B) TO MODULATE OPEN, COMPONENT COOLING WATER FOR THE LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE WILL MODULATE TO CONTROL LETDOWN OUTLET TEMPERATURE AT 3 110 *F . SINCE FLOW IS LIMITED BY THE LETDOWN ORIFICES SYSTEM PARAMETERS WILL BE RESTRICTED, HOWEVER, WITH A LOW SYSTEM PRESSURE, WATER MAY FLASH TO STEAM AT THE ORIFICE LOW PRESSURE O AREAS CAUSING PRESSURE SPIKES. ON A DECREASING VALVE POSITION THE INVERSE WOULD BE TRUE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIEF VALVE ACTUATION AND ALARM AT THE ACTUATION SETPOINTS. MANUAL CONTROL OF PCV-131 WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. ARRTORAT1QM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE VALVE POSITIONER. O Page 30
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a MALFUN: TION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F i I CV16 ! i (MALFUNCTION DELETED) 't 3 i k ii , i i i i i i 4 ' I r i I i i i! l 1 L ; i i I l~ Page 31
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I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS C V17 i HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS REACTOR C00fANT FILTER l FYPS: VARIABLE: 0.5 - 50 PSID AT NOPJiAL LETDOWN FLOW RATE CAUS5: MECHANICAL PLUGGING OF FILTER ? ASSUMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER l OFFIONS: nons DRACRIDTZQM: AS THE SEVERITY OF THIS MALTUNCTION INCREASES, LETDOWN TLOW WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY AND PCV-131 MAY MODULATE OPEN TO MAINTAIN LETDOWN PRESSURE. CHARGING FLOW WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY TO l MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. I 1 l i ARB TOAA TZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL UNPLUGS THE FILTER. O 1 I i
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MC
- UNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS C V18 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEAK FYPB VARIABLE: 0 - 250 GPM CAUSB:
UNISOLABLE LEAK FROM CRACKED WELD AT TANK BOTTOM ASSO92D INITIA& CONDIFION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: nous DRRCRERREDM: AS THE MALFUNCTION SEVERITY INCREASES THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL WILL DECREASE. AS LEVEL CONTINUES TO DECREASE AUTCMATIC MAKE-UP WILL BE INITIATED. AT 164 TANK LEVEL THE LOW LEVEL ALAPJ4 WILL ACTUATE. WHEN TAFK LEVEL REACHES 2% LCV-112 B/C WILL CLOSE AND LCV-112 D/E WILL OPEN CHANGING SUCTION FOR THE CHARGING PUMPS FROM THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK TO THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK. WHEN THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION IS SHIFTED TO THE RWST HIGHLY BORATED WATER WILL BE INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND THE PRIMARY SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO < THE NEGATIVE REACTIVITY ADDITION ACCORDINGLY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. BERXQRARIDM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. o O Page 33
i l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS C V19 FAILURE OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP ) l FY95: BOOLEAN CAUSB: - MOTOR BREAKER TRIPS OPEN ASSUMED INIFIAI, CONDIFION: 100% POWER, REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEM IN AUTOMATIC , 09FIONS: CY29A: BATP 01 l CV273: BATP $5 ) l 4
)
l DRBCREDTION* ' MALFUNCTION INSERTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED BATP TO STOP AND ALL LIGHT INDICATORS TO BE LOST. SYSTEM FLOW AND PRESSURE WILL ! i DECREASE. BORIC ACID FLOW TRANSMITTER WILL CAUSE FLOW TO BE ! I MAINTAINED AT THE DESIRED LEVEL RATE BY REGULATING FLOW CONTROL ' VALVE FCV-110A, PROVIDED SELECTED FLOW DOES NOT EXCEED THE , CAPACITY OF THE REMAINING BATP. IF THE CAPACITY OF ONE BATP IS ! NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE ENOUGH FLOW AND A +/- 10% DEVIATION l EXISTS, AN ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE AND SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WILL OCCUR. ! SYSTEMS USING THE REACTOR MAKE-UP SYSTEM WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY TO THE LOSS OF FLOW. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE 3 i APPROPRIATELY. OPERATOR MANUAL CONTROL OF THE MAKE-UP SYSTEM i WILL BE ABLE TO CORRECT YOR THE LOST BATP. 4 I RERFORAFION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS SYSTEM RESTORATION. O Page 34
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'I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l \
CV20 ' (MALFUNCTION DELETED) i, j
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1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS C V21 l VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL CONTROL VALVE FAILURE i (L C Vil 2 A) . j FYPS: , BOOLEAN j CAUS5: VALVE MALFUNCTION t i ASSD3SO INIFIAL CCNDIFIOlt: POWER RANGE > 3% j OF FIOa,S t cv22A: FAILS TO VCT 4 CY223: FAILS TO HUT w DRACRZ9 TION: . WITH LCV-112A FAILED TO THE VCT, ALL THE NORMAL FLOW TROM THE 4 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER WILL GO TO THE VCT. IF THE LEVEL i DECREASES THE REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN VCT LEVEL. IF~ THE LEVEL INCREASES FROM A TRANSIENT CONDITION IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, THE VCT LEVEL WILL INCREASE AND ANNffNCIATION WILL OCCUR APPROPRIATELY. IF THE VCT FILLS COMELETELY, RELIEF VALVE ACTUATION OCCURS AT 75 PSIG AND DISCHARGES TO THE #1 HUT. WITH LCV-112A FAILED TO THE HUT, ALL THE NORMAL FLOW FROM THE ' LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER WILL BE DIVERTED TO THE HUT AND THE REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN THE LEVEL IN THE VCT. THE LEVEL WILL INCREASE IN THE HUT IN PROPCRTION TO THE l O LETDOWN FLOWRATE. nastonnexam: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE VALVE MALFUNCTION. k O Page 36
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- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i
C V2 2 j Q rris: VOLUME CONTROL TANK H2 REGULATOR FAILURE
.OOI.EAx CApss - H2
] REGULATOR VALVE 1-8156 FAILS CLOSED A38C5dRD INIFIAL CONDIFION: ANY PLANT CONDITIONS I i 0FFIONS: NoNE 1 - DERCR19tXQM: WHEN THIS MALTUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE THE VCT PRESSURE WILL I DECREASE. THE VCT VENT TO THE WASTE GAS SYSTEM WILL ISOLATE AND l THE LOW PRESSURE ALARM WILL ACTUATE AT THE APPROPRIATE .: SETPOINTS. A LOSS OF H2 PRESSURE DURING NOPMAL OPEPATION WILL REDUCE THE REACTOR COOLANT H2 CONCENTRATION, REDUCING THE OXYGEN CONTROL CAPABILITY RESULTING IN PRIMARY CHEMISTRY CHANGE 3 AS l APPROPRIATE. i ARRTQAATZOM: MALTUNCT1JN REMOVAL REPAIRS THE H2 REGULATOR. j
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i _ C V2 3 BORIC ACID FILTER LOW FLOW I TYP5: VARIABLE: 4 ' 0 - 100% a 100 - 04 OF NORMAL FILTER FLOW i CAUS5: FILTER PLUGGING WITH SYSTEM SOLIDS ASSUSGD ZNETEAL CONDETZON: POWER RANGE, > 3%, REACTon j MAKEUP CONTROL IN AUTOMATIC orrroNs: news ] DEBCREDTXQM: i L AS THE BORIC ACID FILTER FLOW RESTRICTION INCREASES THE BORIC. ACID FLOW TO THE BLENDER WILL DECREASE. FCV-110A WILL MODULATE OPEN ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN THE PROPER BORIC ACID FLOW. AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE BORIC ACID FLOW WILL BECOME LESS AND A DEVIATION ALARM WILL ACTUATE. WITH A DECREASE IN BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE REACTOR MAKE-UP WATER BEING CHARGED INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, TAVE WILL INCREASE SLOWLY AND l
, AUTOMATIC CONTROL ROD ACTUATION WILL BE MORE FREQUENT TO i MAINTAIN TAVE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. I l
REBTCAATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL UNPLUGS THE BORIC ACID FILTER. b i O Page 38
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i 1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1 C V2 4 Q BORON THERMAL REGENERATION MODE CONTROL SWITCH FAILURE l FY92: BOOLEAN CAUS2: SWITCH FAILURE ASSDk3D INIFIAL CONDIFION: ANY POWER LEVEL 09FIONS: CY24A: NO RESPONSE IN DILUTION MODE
- CY248
- NO RESPONSE IN BORATION MODE DERCRERTION: '
THE BORON THERMAL REGENEPATION MODE CONTROL SWITCH WILL FAIL TO CAUSE SYSTEM VALVE ACTUATION WHEN THE DESIRED MODE IS SELECTED. WITH NO RESPONSE IN THE DILUTION MODE THE CVCS AND BTRS SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN AS WAS AND THE BORON CONCENTRATION WILL BE MAINTAINED AT THE PRESENT LEVEL IF THE BTRS MODE CONTROL SWITCH WAS "OFF". THE BORON CONCENTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE IF THE BTRS MODE CONTROL SWITCH WAS IN THE " BORATE" MODE. THE l INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BORON CONCENTRATION IS DISCUSSED IN CV06. IF THE BTRS MODE SWITCH DOESN'T RESPOND IN THE " BORATE" MODE THE CVCS AND BTRS SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN AS WAS AND BORON CONCENTRATION WILL BE MAINTAINED AT THE PRESENT LEVEL O IF THE BTRS MODE SWITCH WAS "OFF". IF THE CONTROL SWITCH WAS IN THE DILUTION MODE THE BORON CONCENTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO I DECREASE AND THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO BORON DILUTION AS DISCUSSED IN CV07. ARREQRAEIQM: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BTRS MODE CONTROL SWITCH. O Page 39 l l , , , . . . - . - ,
l__.____ i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l C V2 5 ) l Q BORON CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FAILURE FYr5: VARIABLE: 0 - 10,000 PPM i CAUSB: - BORON CONCENTPATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DETECTOR FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFIOffi POWER RANGE > 3% l orFIo#S: nous l DESCR19T20M: l 1 THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE MCB BORON CONCENTRATION INDICATION OF THE WATER RETURNING TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FROM THE BORON THEPJ4AL REGENERATION SYSTEM TO FAIL TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY LEVEL. THE BCMS HAS NO ALAPMS OR FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN INDICATION. , AERTORATIQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED DETECTOR. i O [ . i ) i O j Page 40
_ _ _ _ ~ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ . 1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i C V2 6 j ( FMLURE OF POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER I i i FYP5: , VARIABLE: 0 - 96 GPM i CAUS5: PUMP AUTOMATIC SPEED CONTROLLER FAILURE i A#dDMED INIFIAL CONDITION: IN POWER RANGE ! O9TIONS: nonE ' I i DERCRIDTION: i t AS THE CAPACITY OF THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP ! DECREASES THd REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER LETDOWN EFFLUENT l TEMPEPATURE WILL INCREASE AND THE LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CCW ! TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE WILL MODULATE OPEN IN RESPONSE TO THE. ! INCRIASED COOLING LOAD. THE DECREASED FLOW TO THE P.EACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS WILL CAUSE SEAL TEMPERATURES TO INCREASE FROM i REACTOR COOLANT FLOWING INTO #1 SEAL AND PARAMETERS WILL RESPOND { AS APPROPRIATE TO DEGREE OF SEVERITY. THE LETDOWN SYSTEM ! BYPASS / DIVERT VALVES WILL FUNCTION ACCORDING TO LETDOWN SYSTEM ! TEMPEPATURES. THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL WILL INCREASE AND ! PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL DECREASE DUE TO THE LETDOWN / CHARGING RATE ! MISMATCH. SEVERITY OF <.4 WILL CAUSE PDP TO TRIP LO LUBE OIL i PRESSURE AFTER APPROPRIATE TIME DELAY. ANNUNCIATION WILL i ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. l ! i l nassonnszon: \ MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SPEED CONTROLLER. > f i l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS CW01 Q HIGH CONDUCTIVITY IN THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS TYRE: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 40 - 4,000 GPM INLEAFAGE CAUSB: MAIN CONDENSER TUBE LEAFAGE A3809fBD INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER 09tIONS: nous DRBCARRTEDB: THE CONDENSER TUBE LEAK WILL INCREASE THE CONDENSATE CONDUCTIVITY AND OXYGEN CONCENTRATION. THE CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE OXYGEN. OXYGEN SAMPLER AR3809 WILL INDICATE AN INCREASE IN THE CONDENSATE FILTER /DEMINERALIZER WILL NOT REMOVE THE OXYGEN FROM THE CONDENSATE. THE CONDUCTIVITY OF THE CONDENSATE WILL DEFEND ON THE CONDUCTIVITY AND LEAK RATE OF THE CIRC WATER LEAK INTO THE CONDENSER. CONDUCTIVITY CELLS CE2301 THRU 2316 MONITOR CONDUCTIVITY OF THE CONDENSER HOTWELLS AND PROVIDE A SECONDARY SAMPLING SYSTEM ANNUNCIATOR "HI" ALAPN. THE INCREASE IN CONDUCTIVITY WILL BE RECORDED AT THE HOTWELLS, CONDENSATE POLISHER OUTLET, HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCHARGE, BLOWDOWN FROM S/G, VIA THE SECONDARY SAMPLING SYSTEM. IF THE CONDENSATE FILTER /DEMIN ARE IN SERVICE, HOST OF THE IONS WILL BE REMOVED O-AND THE IONS THAT AREN'T WILL CONCENTRATE IN THE STEAM GENERATORS, THIS WILL BE SEEN AS A VERY SLOW INCREASE IN BLOWOOWN CONDUCTIVITY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. THE LEAKAGE OF CIRC WATER INTO THE CONDENSATE WILL CAUSE THE CONDENSATE SLUDGE BUILDUP. FILTER /DEMIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TO INCREASE DUE TO AT 100% SEVERITY THE DIFF PRESSURE WILL INCREASE AT 2 PSID SEVERITY SELECTED. PER MINUTE AND WILL BE PROPORTIONAL TO CIRC WATER LEAKAGE WILL CAUSE EXCESS CONDENSATE AND WILL OPERATE THE CONDENSATE REJECT SYSTEM TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK AS PER SYSTEM LOGIC. i ARREQAAMEDE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TUBE LEAK. O Page 42
i i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i C W02 CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP FYPE: BOOLEAN CAUS5: FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE ASSONED ENETEAL CONDETECN: PUMP RUNNING i OFFIONS: CN02A: CW PUMP $1 CWO2C: CM PUMP #3 l CWO23: CM PUMP #2 CWO2D CW PUMP $4 i i ansca m ion: I THE SELECTED CIRC WATER PUMP TRIP WILL INDICATE AND ANNUNCIATE I IN THE CONTROL ROOM. CIRCULATING WATER FLOW WILL BE REDUCED AND SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY. IF CIRC WATER INLET i ' TEMPERATURE IS LOW THE SEVERITY WILL NOT BE AS DRAMATIC AS IF THE INLET TEMPERATURE IS HIGH. CONDENSATE TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE AND CONDENSER VACUUM WILL DECREASE. IT CONDENSER i i ' VACUUM CONTINUES TO DECKEASE DUE TO THE NEW HEAT BALANCE, THE ' TURBINE WILL TRIP AND THE STEAM M DU'PS WILL BE BLOCKED AT THE LOW VACUUM ACTUATION SETPOINT. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE l i APPROPRIATELY. OPERATOR ACTION TO REDUCE POWER MAY PREVENT THE TURBINE TRIP ACTUATION. ' O - ,.. . . . l MALPUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE OVERCU-1ENT TRIP DEVICE. t 5 o : Page 43
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS
\
{ C W03 O : OOL AN LOSS OF SCREEN WASH PUMP (S) C A tF S E : PUMP SEIZURE TRIPS BREAYER ON OVERCURRENT \ A330NED ENETEAL CONDZ!!ON: 100% POWER 09TZONS: CEO.1A : SNP t1 CWO.f& SWP #2 '. DERCRZ2 TION:
- i 4
WHEN THE SELECTED SCREEN WASH PUMP FAILS, THE SCREEN WASH j 1 OPEPATION INDICATING LIGHTS. WILL BE DISCONTINUED AS INDICATED BY STATUS I EACH PUMP IS A 100% SYSTEM SO A SINGLE MALFUNCTION WILL NOT CAUSE DESIGN SYSTEM LOSS, AS THE UNAF TRAIN WOULD FUNCTION TO DESIGN CAPACITY. IF BOTH UNITS FAIL, j PATE CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL OPERATION.T . REDTORATZOM: i > MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED PUMP, O i O Page 44
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_ _ _ . _ . _ __~._._ _ _ _ _.__ ._ ._ _ __ ___._._._. _ _..._____ _ -. _ ._..._. __ .__ . i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \ ED01 Q fYSS: 800LE.AN LOSS OF ALL OFF SITE POWER
~
4 CAUSS: - NATURAL DISASTER (TORNADO) CLEARS 138 KV AND 345 KV SECTION OF SWITCHYARD I l ASSONED INIFxAL CONDIFICW: ANY PLANT CONDITION i o#rzoNS: nous DEBCRED T10M: THE TORNADO RESULTS IN AN EAST AND WEST BUS 86 RELAY. LOCKOUT i ALONG WITH A FAULT ON THE SUBSTATION (DECORDOVA 138KV AND 345KV, ; PARKER, VENUS, BENBROOK, AND COMANCHE PEAK 345KV) LINES. THE FAULT WILL TRIP AND LOCKOUT ALL LINE BREAKERS, SWITCHYARD j BREAKERS, AND GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS. A REACTOR-TURBINE TRIP j WILL RESULT. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL ENERGIZE THE J SAFEGUARDS BUSES. SAFEGUARDS COMPONENTS WILL ACTUATE AS I INDICATED BY PLANT CONDITIONS. INSTRUMENTATION AND ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY, ARDTQRATION: : MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS CPERATOR RESTORATION OF THE 138KV AND , 345KV SWITCHYARD AND SUBSTATIONS. l l l [ l l O Page 45 l
AfALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED02 O toss or raxxsronuEn xsri TYPE: SOOLEAN ! CAUS5: - WINDING FAILURE
- ASST 2SD INITIAL CONDITION: ANY PLANT CONDITION 09TIONS: nonx EQ23: SSII ALARM " ALTERNATE OFFSITE POWER" WILL ANNUNCIATE FOR BOTE TRAINS. REL&YS FOR INPUT TO TEESE ALARMS l
EAVE BREN UTILISED WITEOUT SUPPORTING DOCUMENFATION REFERENCES. SEE TNT ASSOCIATED WITE SAR$898A0001. 1 Dnscarsexam: 1 THE WINDING FAILURE WILL CAUSE A SUDDEN PRESSURE CONDITION IN THE TRANSFORMER AND ACTUATE THE SUDDEN PRESSURE RELAY AND CAUSE A TRANSFORMER LOCKOUT RELAY TRIP. THE TRANSFORMER VOLTAGE AND CURRENT WILL RESPOND TO THE FAULTED CONDITION. THE LOCKOUT RELAY WILL TRIP THE SOURCE AND LOAD BREAKERS. ELECTRICAL ' DISTRIBUTIT' LINE UP WILL RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE TO THE LOSS OF TRANSFORMER XST1. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. ) O ,,.. . , . MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TRANSFORMER WINDING. L O Page 46 i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED03 LOSS OF 345KV TRANSFORMER FYF5: BOOLEAN CAUS5 :
- WINDING FAILURE ASSUMED INEFIAL CONDIFIC0ft ANY PIANT CONDITION 09FZONS: EE03A: XST2 20033: 1ST DERCRIDTZOM:
THE WINDING FAILURE WILL CAUSE A SUDDEN PRESSURE CONDITION THAT WILL LOCKOUT THE SELECTED TRANSFORMER. THE PARKER LINE BREAKER 6800 AND BREAKER E8 WILL OPEN, GIVING PERMISSION FOR THE AFFECTED TRANSTOPNER DISCONNECT TO OPEN. WHEN ALL RESPECTIVE BUS BREAKERS HAVE BEEN TRIPPED, THE AFFECTED DISCONNECT WILL
- OPEN CAUSING RECLOSURE OF ED.THE PARKER BREAKER 6800 TO RECLOSE FOLLOWED BY
) SUPPLY ITS BUSES. THE UNAFFECTED TRANSFORMER CAN BE RESTORED TO : ACCORDINGLY. INDICATION AND ANNUNCIATION WILL P.ESPOND i 1 i AmRTonAT1on:
'O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL THE AFFECTED TRANSFORMER WINDING.
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l ED04 LOSS OF 6.9 KV - 480 V PLANT TRANSFORMER l TYPR: BOOLEAN CAUSB: FREDER BREAKER FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFICN ANY PLANT CONDITION j OPTIONS: 3DodA: T181 ED0dF: T1EB1 ED043: T182 ED0dG: T1EB2 ED0dc T183 20045: TIEB3 BD0dD: T184 2D04I: T1EB4 , 1 y DRBCAZRTIOM: THE FEEDER BREAKER FOR THE SELECTED PLANT TRANSFORMER WILL TRIP OPEN, DEENERGIZING THE TRANSFORMER AND IT'S ASSOCIATED 480 V BUS. IF THE AFFECTED BUS HAS AN ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE AVAILABLE AND THE TIE BREAKER IS IN SERVICE, THE OPERATOR CAN CLOSE THE CROSS TIE BREAKER WHEN THE NORMAL BREAKER IS OPENED. THE 480 V BUS LOADS WILL BE DEENERGIZED AND THE PLANT CONTROL LOGIC FOR THE ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. IT POWER IS RESTORED, SOME EQUIPMENT WILL RESTART AUTOMATICALLY AND SOME WILL REQUIRE MANUAL RESTAATING. ANNUNCIATION WILL [ ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. 1 l REATORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TRANSFORMER FEEDER BREAKER. O Page 48
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i ED05 4
,0 LOSS OF 6.9 KV BUS FYPS: BOOLEAN i
CAUSS: BUS FAULT OPENS SUPPLY BREAKERS ON LOCKOUT j ASSORIED INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE
- oPFIoNS
- zDo5A t- BUS 1A1 ED05D: BUS 1A4 ED053: BU3 1A2 20053: BUS 1EA1 EDOSC: BUS 1A3 3D05F: BUS 1EA2 DasCREDT20M:
THE SELECTED 6. 9 D' BUS WILL FAULT AND ACTUATE THE BUS LOCKOUT RELAY.- THE LOCKOUT RELAY CAUSES THE NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER TO TRIP AND THE ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKER TO BE BLOCKED. BUS LOADS i WILL BE DEENERGIZED. THE BUSES SUPPLY MAJOR PLANT PUMPS AND THE ' LOSS WILL CAUSE SYSTEM LOGIC AND/OR REACTOR PROTECTION LOGIC TO RESPOND DEPENDING ON PLANT STATUS AT THE TIME OF MALFUNCTION I ACTIVATION. A 480 V SAFEGUARD AND/OR NON-SAFEGUARD BUS WILL BE l DEENERGI7ED AND THE EFFECTS WILL BE THE SAME AS MALFUNCTION i ED05. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. I i O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BUS FAULT. e i I s 1 e i I i l - lO l Page 49 4 I 6
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l I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l ED06 1 , O toss or oc avses , FYF2: BOOLEAN CAUSK MULTIPLE BUS SUPPLY FAILURES ASSDMED INIFIA2, CONDIFIQBF: ANY PLANT CONDITION OFFIONS: spo6A: BUS 101 2006s: BUS 1D3 l l 20063: BUS ID2 EDOSF: BUS 1ED3 l EDOSC: BUS 1ED1 3D0dG: BUS 1ED4 l 3D06p: BUS 1ED2 i DRACREDTZOM: LOSS OF BUS 1D1 RECULTS IN DEENERGIZATION OF THE DC BACKUP POWER t SUPPLY TO THE TURBINE STRESS EVALUATOR, SEAL STEAM CONTROLLER, EHC UNIT CABINET, AUTOMATIC TURBINE TESTER, TG PROTECTION AND VIBRATION EXPANSION CABINETS, ELECTRONIC GENERATOR PROTECTION AND HYDRAULIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT PACKS. LOSS OF BUS 1D2 RESULTS IN DEENERGIEATION OF DISTRIBUTION PANELS 1D2-1, 102-2, 1D2-3, XD2-1, XD2-2 AND XD2-3 AND ASSOCIATED LOADS. DC OIL PUMPS FOR THE MAIN TURBINE, MAIN FEED PUMPS AND O SEAL OIL SYSTEM LOSE POWER. LOSE DC BUS SUPPLY POWER. INVERTERS IV1C1, IV1C2 AND lVIC2 LOSS OF BUS 1D3 RESULTS IN A LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTERS IV1C5 AND IV1C6. LOSS OF BUS 1ED1 RESULTS IN DEENERGIZATION OF DISTRIBUTION PANELS XED1-1, 1ED1-1 AND 1ED1-2. INVERTERS IV1PC2, IV1PC4 AND IV1EC2 LOSE DC BUS SUPPLY POWER. LOSS OF BUSES 1ED3 AND 1ED4 RESULTS IN A LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTERS IV1EC3 AND IV1EC4 RESPECTIVELY. LOSS OF BUSES 102, 1ED1 AND 1ED2 RESULTS IN MULTIPLE LOSSES OF CONTROL AND INDICATION. AFFECTED LOGIC AND ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. ARSTORATZQE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES POWER TO THE AFFECTED BUSES. O Page 50
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED07 Q FYPS: DOOLEAN LOSS OF INVERTER (S) CADSS: INTERNAL FAULT CAUSES NO OUTPUT A88t3GD INIFIAL CoffDIFIcar: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: B007A: IV1PC1 80075: IV1EC1 BD078: IV1PC2 ED07F: IVIEC2 ED07C: IV1PC3 20078: IV1C1 5007D: IV1PC4 20072: IV1C2 DRBCARDtROM: 1 AN INTERNAL FAULT WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED INVERTER OUTPUT TO GO' TO MINIMUM AND, IF NOT EQUIPPED WITH A STATIC SWITCH OR IF THE MANUAL BYPASS NOT CLOSED, THE AFFECTED LOADS WILL BE DEENERGIZED I, RESULTING CIRCUITS IN APPROPRIATE FAILURE RESPONSE BY THE EQUIPMENT AND AFFECTED. REBtORATIOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE INTERNAL FAULT. v O Page 51
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED08 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS j CAUSB: , INTERNAL BUS FAULT ASSCNED INIFIAI- C00fDITIOff ANY PLANT CONDITION 097%CM8: ED08A: 19C1 EDOSE: 1EC1 5D088: 1PC2 EDOSF: 1EC2 EDOSC: 1PC3 BD08G: 1EC3 RDOSD: 1PC4 80088: 1EC4 3BCAZRLtDE: THE SELECTED INSTRUMENT BUS WILL LOOSE POWER AND THE ASSOCIATED I LOADS WILL BE DEENERGIZED. THE LOSS OF POWER TO AFTECTED PLANT ANNUNCIATION, INDICATION.AND CONTROL SYSTEMS CAUSES APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AND LOGIC ACTUATION. RRREQRATIDM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE INTERNAL FAULT. I i O Page 52 l l
i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ED09 { FY9B: VARIABLE: GRID FREQUENCY VARIES 5*1 - 63=HZ. CAUSB: GRID SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ASSUMED INITIAI, CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE 09720M8: nonx i RQ2X: IF A SEVERITY OF 58 Ms Is SELECTED, GRID FREQUENCY DROPS FRON 60 Ba TO 58 Es AT A RATE ' 0F -2.25 Ma/ MIN. ! DRRCRXRTZOM: Tile GRID FREQUENCY WILL~ INCREASE OR DECREASE AT A MAXIMUM PATE OF 2.25 Hz/ MIN TO THE VALUE OF MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. IF THE EHC SYSTEM IS USING FREQUENCY INFLUENCE, THE SYSTEM WILL CHANGE THE i COP" VALVE POSITION TO TRY TO RETURN SYSTEM FREQUENCY TO NORtrA*. BY CHANGINF T;f2J OUTPUT OF THE LOAD REFERENCE LIMITER. IF THE EHC SYSTEM HM, PRP.QUENCY INFLUENCE SWITCHED OFF, THE
'j 4 CONTROLLER WILL MW:AIN LOAD REGARDLESS OF FREQUENCY. THE PRIMARY / SECONDARY FLANT CONTROL SYSTEMS WILL RESPOND NORMALLY TO LOAD CHANGE REQUIREMENTS.
RESTORAt20M: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES GRID FREQUENCY AT 0.2 Hz/ MIN. j i 4 O Page 53 l
.b MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ,
ED10
.Q FYPE:
GRID VOLTAGE VARIES ! VARIABLE: 320 - 370 KV ! CAG85 : . GRID SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ASSONED INKTIAL CCWDIFION: IN POWER RANGE 09tIONS: -nons
-~
ft DRBCRZRTZOM: AS THE GRID SYSTEM VOLTAGE IS CHANGED, THE CONTROL ROOM. , INDICATED VOLTAGE, CURRENT AND MVAR WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. I THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM INDICATION WILL REFLECT APPROPRIATE CURRENT CHANGES OPPOSITE VOLTAGE CHANGES. IF-THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR IS IN MANUAL THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE WILL REMAIN CONSTANT RESULTING IN REACTIVE CURRENT CHANGE AS GRID VOLTAGE l CHANGES. IF THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR IS IN AUTOMATIC, THE .', EXCITATION WILL, RESPOND TO THE VOLTAGE VARIANCE. MVAR j INDICATION WILL REFLECT THE VOLTAGE CHANGE. ASSOCIATED - INDICATION, ANNUNCIATION AND CONTROL WILL ACCURATELY REFLECT THE VARYING GRID VOLTAGE EFFECT ON ELECTRICAL PLANT PARAMETERS. RRSTORATZOM:. MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES SYSTEM VOLTAGE AT A RATE OF 2%/ MIN. 1 8 O Page 54
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EDil 0 r>=> FAILURE CAFSE: oot ^- DF MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHROSCOPE 1 INTERNAL FAILURE OF METER MOVEMENT 1, j' ASSOBSD INITIA& CCelDIrrat: 097%ONS: nonE PARALLELING MAIN GENERATOR t DERCREDT20M: WHEN THE MALFUNCTION BECOMES OPERATE ACTIVE THE SYNCHROSCO EXISTS.- INCONSISTENT WITH RUN/IN STATUS, 1 _ .- REFLECTING THE' GENERATOR / BUS ELEC . ) RESTORA1 q . l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE INTERNAL FAILURE . O i e ' l Page 55 i
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG01 O MAIN GENERATOR AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR OVER EXCETATION TYPE: . BOOLEAN CAU35: AUTOMATIC EXCITER CONTROL MALFUNCTION CAUSES GENEP.ATOR VOLTAGE INCREASE OF 54/ MIN ASSUNED ZNETZAE, CONDZTZON: IN POWER PANGE d ORTZONS: noms 4 DERCREDEZOM: AS THE MAIN GENERATOR EXCITATION ST MTS INCREASING THE GENERATOR TERMINAL VOLTAGE WILL START INCREA ING. THE EXCESSIVE VOLTAGE j REGULATOR CONTROL VOLTAGE WILL CAUSE THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR TO
- SHIFT FROM AUTOMATIC MODE TO MANUAL MODE AFTER A SHORT TIME DELAY WITH RESULTANT ANNUNCIATION. DURING THE TIME OF e
OVEREXCITATION EXCITATION CURRENT,' GENERATOR CURRENT AND VARS WILL INCREASE FROM THE CIRCULATING REACTIVE CURRENT. THE OPERATOR WILL HAVE TO MAINTAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE CONTROL r MANUALLY FOR LOAD CHANGES. EERTOE&TZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE EXCITER CONTROL MALFUNCTION. 4 l i 4 i 3 l Page 56 4 i. w-$=rmew g-g-we e -- + y--+, +-w-- y- e y em g +-e w- ,,'yw'rwe-7tus' w=m-4vwame" W- --er'w'-ww--e-y-1'e m www1 +ww- w r Mosee--ww+ w*-e-T e-w'-t-ev,ww-w-w--w-+
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG02: Q FYPR: MAIN GENERATOR 1NTERNAL FAULT BOOLEAN-CAUBB: - STATOR WINDING INSULATION FAILURE 1 l AS803GD INIFIA& ColfDXf20N: IN POWER RANGE j OR TZON8 :. nous i omscaxawyn: ACTIVATION OF THIS MALFUNCTION STARTS THE MAIN GENERATOR INTERNAL FAULT. AT ACTIVATION THE CORE MONITOR ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE. ACTIVATION PLUS 30 SEC THE FAULT WILL OCCUR, 1 GENERATOR VOLTAGE WILL INSTANTLY DECREASE 15%, GENEPATOR CURRENT AND KVAR WILL INSTANTLY INCREASE OFF SCALE HIGH, THE EXCITER > CURRENT WILL INCREASE AND THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR WILL SHIFT TO MANUAL MODE. 4 GENERATOR FAULT DETECTION RELAYING WILL ACTUATE l g CAUSING GENERATOR LOCKOUT RELAYS 86-1/1G AND 86-2/1G TO ACTUATE. l W3, GENERATOR-LOCKOUT RELAYS WILL FUNCTION TO' TRIP BKR'S E3 AND THE EXCITER FIELD BREAKER, AND INITIATE A FAST BUS TRANSFER FOR-6.9 KV BUSES.TO THE STARTUP' TRANSFORMER. TURBINE / REACTOR TRIPS WILL BE INITIATED ACCORDING TO PLANT STATUS AND GENERATOR LOCKOUT CONTROL LOGIC. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. KEBEOR&t%QM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. t i O Page 57
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG03 lQ l TYRE: FAILURE OF MAIN GENERATOR BREAKER BOOLEAN CAUS5: SPURIOUS PRIMARY TRIP SIONAL ASSU9BD ENZTEAL CCitDETZON: 'in POWER RANGE , ORTZOWS 3G03At ' BREAKER E3 3G033: BREAKER W3
-u DERCREDTZOM: ,
THE SELECTED BREAKER WILL TRIP FROM THE SPURIOUS PRIMARY TRIP- ! SIGNAL, MEGAWATT LOADING WILL REMAIN.THE SAME BUT CURRENT WILL SHIFT'TO MAINTAIN LOAD-THROUGH THE NON-SELECTED BREAKER, .-
- ANNUNCIATION- WILL ACTUATE ' AS APPROPRIATE.
RERTORATION: AUTOMATICALLY CLEARS AFTER THE LOCKOUT RELAY ACTUATES. O l l
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Page 58
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l
' MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG04 Q FYPS:
LOSS OF GENERATOR PRIMARY COOUNG WATER VARIAsi.E: 0 - 1004-='O~- 1,500 GPM CAUSB PRIMARY WATER PUMP DISCHARGE PIPE RUPTURE ASSONED INIFIAZ, CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OPTIONS: nonx DERCR19TZQK: THE PRIMARY WATER WILL LEAK FROM THE' ATTACHED PUMP DISCHARGE , LINE RUPTURE J'" A' FLOW RATE SELECTED BY SEVERITY LEVEL. A HIGH .i - SEVERITY LEVE1 WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE IN PRESSURE, FLOW AND PRIMARY WATER TANK LEVEL DECREASE. THE RESULTING LOW FLOW ACTUATION WILL CAUSE A TURBINE TRIP AND GENERATOR TRIP. AT A LOW ' SEVERITY LEVEL, THE TRIP WILL ACTUATE FROM A LOW PRIMARY WATER TANK LEVEL INDICATION AND. ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND TO THE LOSS OF PRIMARY WATER.-ASSOCIATED PLANT CONTROL AND ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND-AS' APPROPRIATE TO THE TURBINE / GENERATOR TRIP AND PLANT CONDITIONS. REB TORATZQM:
.[
RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. i O Page 59
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG0S Q TYPS: LOSS OF GENERATOR AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROL BOOLEAN' ' CAUSE - VOLTAGE REGULATOR AUTOMATIC CONTROL FAILURE ASSONED ENZTEAL CONDZTZON: IN power RANGE \ OPTZONS: nous D R A C R Z 2 1 Z_Q M : THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR. AUTOMATIC CIRCUITRY WILL NOT RESPOND TO. VOLTAGE CHANGES REQUIF.ED FOR EXCITATION CORRECTION. -WITH A I CHANGE IN LOAD THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE WILL CHANGE SLIGHTLY RESULTING IN CIRCULATING REACTIVE CURRENT AND INCREASED GENERATOR HEATING. INDICATION AND ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND TO THE GENERATOR PARAMETERS AS THEY CHANGE AND AS ALARM LOGIC j d SETPOINTS ARE ACTUATED. OPERATOR MANUAL CONTROL OF THE VOLTAGE- L ] REGULATOR WILL ALLOW PROPER OPERATION OF THE GENERATOR. c , l RESTORATron: f MALTUN? TION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR. !O i J , l i 1 l l i !O Page 60 I i I
. MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG06 Q TYP5 : ~
DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START FALLUPE BOOLEAN CAUS5: - LEAKAGE OF THE RIGHT BANK CYLINDER STARTING AIR VALVES ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: ANY CONDITION REQUIRING A DIESEL GENEPATOR START 09TZONS: E006A : 1DG1 BG06B: 1DG2 RQ.RX: IF TBE DIESBL IS SECURED WEILE THE BOLLFUNCTION IS ACTIVE, TEEN A CEANNEL 2 (LEFT BANR AIR START TRAIN) SIGNAL NUST BE PRESENT TO RE-8 TART TER DIESEL. DESCRE9TXQM: INSERTION OF THE MALFUNCTION CAUSES AIR PRESSURE TO BE APPLIED ON SOME OF THE RIGHT BANK CYLINDERS AT INAPPROPRIATE TIMES. THE NET RESULT OF THIS CONDITION IS OPPOSING FORCES WHICH PREVENT ROTATION OF THE CRANK SHAFT. THE EFFECT OF THIS MALFUNCTION ON THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM WILL DSPEND UPON ELECTRICAL STATUS AND DIESEL SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS. O. . REMOVAL OF THE MALFUNCTION WILL RESTORE THE DIESEL TO A STATE CAPABLE OF STARTING. MALFUNCTION REMOVAL SIMULATES LIFTING THE POWER VALVES. LEADS TO THE RIGHT BANK AIR START SOLENOIDS ADMISSION THIS PREVENTS STARTING AIR FROM BEING APPLIED TO THE LEAKING RIGHT BANK CYLINDER STARTING AIR VALVES. THIS WILL
- ALLOW THE DIESEL TO START ON THE LEFT BANK AIR START TRAIN. TO RESTORE THE DIESEL FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS, RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION.
NQ21: TEIS 3GLLFUNCTION IS BASED ON CPSES PIR-89-194 AND SAR898A045*1. O Page 6'.
MALFUNCTION CAUSES - AND EFFECTS
.EG0 7 Q FYPE : ~ BOOLEAN DIESEL GENERATOR OVERSPEED TRIP CAUSN: SPEED SENSOR FAILURF CAUSES TRIP ASSDNED INITZA& CONDITION: DIESEL GENERATOR-IN OPEP.ATION OPTIONS: EG07A: 1DG1 30078: 1DG2 DESCAZDTZON:
WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMEF ACTIVE THE SELECTED DIESEL GENERATOR WILL TRIP ON AN ENGINE OVERSPEED DUE TO FAILURE OF ' SPRING IN THE OVERSPEED FLYWHEEL DEVICE. THE DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER WILL TRIP OPEN AND THE. PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO THE LOSS OF DIESEL GENERATOR DEPENDING ON-PLANT ELECTRICAL STATUS. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY, RESTOARTZOM: TO RESTORE THE DIE 6EL FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS, RESET SIMULATOR'TO DESIRED INITIAL' CONDITION. l 4 l l l O Page 62
l l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1 I 1 EG08 1 Q TYPE: DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER TRIPS' BOOLEAN CAUSB: MECHANICAL FAILURE CAUSES SPURIOUS TRIP OF BREAKER ASSONID INIFIA& CONDITION: DIESEL GENERATOR IN OPERATION OPTIONS: E000A: 1DG1 BG003: 1DG2-DESCRZRTION: -l l IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR IS OPERATING IN PARALLEL WITH A SITE 1 POWER SOURCE ON A LOAD TEST, THE DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER I OPENING WILL CAUSE NO LOSS OF POWER TO BUS LOADS. WHEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER OPENS THE DIESEL GENERATOR FREQUENCY WILL i MOMENTARILY INCREASE AND THE ELECTRICAL LOAD INDICATION WILL GO J TO MINIMUM. THE SITE POWER SOURCE INDICATION WILL REFLECT THE
. INCREASED LOAD. IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR IS THE SOLE' POWER SOURCE FOR THE BUS AND THE OUTPUT BREAKER TRIPS, THE DIESEL ~
1 GENERATOR INDICATION WILL RESPOND AS ABOVE, HOWEVER, LOADS SUPPLIED BY THE BUS WILL BE LOST UNTIL THE BUS CAN BE REENERGIZED. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. I 1 ( RESTORATZOM. l 1 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MECHANICAL FAILURE IN THE BREAKER. l l 1 l Page 63 1
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i EG09 0 FYPE: DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE TO LOAD BOOLEAN CAUSE: - DIESEL GOVERNOR FAILURE LIMITS LOAD TO 100 KW ASSUNED INIFIAL CONDIFION: DIESEL GENERATOR IN PARALLEL. WITH ANOTHER POWER SOURCE OPTIONS: E009A: 1DG1 EG0W 1DG2 DESCRZ9tXOM: WHEN THE DIESEL GENERATOR IS PARALLELED WITH THE BUS AND THE OPERATOR ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE DIESEL LOAD, THIS GENEPATOR WILL; NOT RESPOND ABOVE 100 KW. ARSTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS THE DIESEL GENERATOR TO LOAD ABOVE 100KW. O i O Page 64 e
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' MALFUNCTION CA USES AND ' EFFECTS l
l EG10 Q TYRE: LOSS OF MAIN GENERATOR EXCITATION. BOOLEAN CAUSB: - PILOT EXCITER SHORT CIRCUIT A380nMD INETEAL CONDITZON: IN POWER RANGE ORTZONS:- nonE DRBCRZDTIOM: THE GENERATOR = PILOT EXCITER SHORT-CIRCUITS, ACTIVATING RELAY ! 64/IPE WHICH ACTUATES THE GENERATOR LOCKOUT RELAYS'86-1/1G AND 86-2/1G. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY, AmmTORAT10m: I l MALTUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS'THE PILOT EXCITER. l 1 O l l l i l I : l l l i i } I lO i Page 65 j- . t-i f,__.__ .._a.
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l0 EGil 1 HIGH JACKET TEMPERATURE ON DIESEL ,. rysm: sOOLEAN CAUS5 - JACKET WATER FLOW RESTRICTION ASSDMED INITIAL CONDITION: DIESEL ~ GENERATOR IN. OPERATION 09tIONS: RG11A: 1DG1 EG113: 1DG2 DESCRIDTION:. THIS' MALFUNCTION CAUSES A RESTRICTION IN JACKET WATER FLOW AND A l SUBSEQUENT INCREASE IN JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE. IF THE DIESEL IS OPERATING THE HIGH TEMPERATURE WILL CAUSE THE COMPONENTS COOLED BY THE JACKET WATER TO OVERHEAT. EQUIPMENT FAILURE CAN RESULT. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ARBTORATIOM: MAL'" UNCTION REMOVAL REMOVES THE FLOW RESTRICTION. E Q.E E . I F MBCEANICAL FAILURE OF TEE DG OCCURRED, THEN TEE l O 8IMULATOR MUST BE RESET FOR DG RECOVERY. l O Page 66
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG12 a ' 0 TYP5: BOOLEAN LOSS OF TRANSFORMER #1UT CAUS5: - WINDING FAILURE ASSONED IL*tIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OPTIONS: nous [ DRBCRER TIOM: : 1
-A TRANSFORMER WINDING FA'ILURE WILL CAUSE A SUDDEN PRESSURE I I CONDITION. THE'41UT BUS-VOLTAGE WILL INSTANTLY DECREASE 20%. =l l THE GENERATOR OUTPUT'WILL RESPOND ~ACCORDINGLY. THE TRANSFORMER
- SUDDEN PRESSURE RELAY (63/1UT) WILL ACTUATE CAUSING THE MAIN ,
i GENERATOR LOCKOUTS TO TRIP. THE RESNT.*!TitG EFFECTS WILL BE THE .i
- SAME AS MALFUNCTION EG02. ANNUNCIA71Gd WILL RESPOND
{ APPROPRIATELY. j __
- i. RRBTORRTZQE: ;
! MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TRANSFORMER WINDING. ] L lO i , i ( li 1 I i l l 1 LO ! Page 67 4
7l.- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS EG13 LOSS OF UNIT MAIN TRANSFORMER TYPE: BOOLEAN' CAUS5: - 345 KV BUSHING FAILURE TO GROUND' ABSONED ENETEAE, CONDZTION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: EG13A: 1MT1 3G133: 1HT2 DRBCRERTIOg: THE-SELECTED UNIT MAIN TRANSFORMER BUSHING FAILURE WILL CAUSE TME TRANSFCAMER TO GROUND FAULT. THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE,WILL-INSTANTLY. DECREASE 15%. THE GENERATOR-LOCKOUTS WILL ACTUATE AND THE EFFECTS WILL BE THE SAME AS MALFUNCTION EG02. -ANNUNCIATION AND INDICATION WILL RESPOND TO THE AFFECTED TRANSFORMER AND RESULTING SYSTEM RESPONSE. RESTORATIQM: , MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TRANSFORMER BUSHING. i O j t
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W01 0 TYPS . FEEDWATER PIPING RUPTURE OUTEIDE CONTAINMENT VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 1 x 103 1 x 107 tygfgg ) CAUSE: WELD FAILURE AT INLET TO FWRV ' ASSONED ZNETZAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER \ OPTZONS: N01A: FEEDLINE 01 N011': FEEDLINE #2 l DEBCRERTZQM: THIS RUPTURE WILL CAUSE FEED FLOW TO INCREASE, DEPENDENT ON THE SELECTED SEVERITY, A FEED FLOW / STEAM FLOW MISMATCH ALAPN WILL l ANNUNCIATE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE REDUCTION IN FEED FLOW WILL l CAUSE THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TO DECREASE ! ACCORDINGLY. THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM WILL i ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL, BUT AS SEVEl'ITY INCREASES THE ! LEVEL WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE. A REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP WILL , OCCUR AT THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR LOW-LOW LEVEL SETPOINT. l THE ABOVE WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASED TAVE IN THE REACTOR , COOLANT SYSTEM AND THE SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND CONTROLS WILL ; RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. AFTER THE REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP, THE MFW PUMPS WILL GO TO THE LOW SPEED STOP AND THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER {
' SYSTEM WILL BE. STARTED. _DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE RUPTURE THE AUXILIARY FEED WILL NOT BE AFFECTED, THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS '
WILL RECOVER AND REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY CAN PROCEED, ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. i RESTORATZQM: i i RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION.
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MA.'. FUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l F W02 Q TYPE: FEEDWATER PIPING RUPTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT VARIABLE: 1 - 1004 = 1 x 103 1 x 1o7 tagfgg CAUS5: WELD FAILURE AT S/G LOWER INLET NOZZLE ASSONED EMET 2AL CONDETZOM: 100% POWER OPTIONS: rWO2A: S/G #1 FWO2C: S/G #3 rwC23: S/G 02 FW02D: S/G #4 DESCRZ9TZQM:
' INDICATED FEED FLOW TO THE STEAM Gk'NERATOR WILL INCP. EASE CAUSING A FEED FLOW / STEAM FLOW MISMATCH AL. NRM, HOWEVER, ACTUAL FEED FLOW INTO THE SELECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL DECREASE AND LEVEL WILL DECREASE ACCORDINGLY. THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL, WITH INCREASED SEVERITY THE STEAM GENERATOR WILL CONTINUE .
TO BLOW DOWN RESULTING IN A REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. THE REDUCED TEEDWATER FLOW WILL DECREASE THE SUBCOOLING EFFECT ON THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND TAVE WILL INCREASE, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL' INCREASE ACCORDINGLY.WITH PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL LOGIC RESPONSE. AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP, THE STEAM AND FEEDWATER LINE O ISOLATION VALVES UILL CLOSE SECURING BLONDOWN ON THE UNAFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR, WHILE COMPLETE BLOW DOWN WILL OCCUR ON THE AFFECTED STFAM GENERATOR. WHEN THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS . START, THE FEED TO THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL MAVE TO BE ' ISOLATED SO AS NOT TO FEED THE RUPTURED LINE. . CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY TO THE SEVERITY OF THE FEEDWATER LINE RUPTURE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. : i REDTORRTZQM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. l Page 70 l
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' MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS !
F WOI LOSS OF MMN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE I TYPR: BOOLEAN CADSB: SPURIOUS TRIP, TRIPS TURBINE CONTROL VALVE ASSC9CED INIFIA& CONDIFION: FWPT RUNNING OFFIONS: FWOJA: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP $1 FWO38: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP #2 8 DRBCAZRTZQM: WHEN THE STEAM GENERATOR TURBINE FEED PUMP TRIPS, THE PUMP. , SUCTION FLOW AND DISCHARGE PRESSURE WILL GO TO MINIMUM. THE ! DISCHARGE VALVE WILL'GO SHUT AND APPROPRIATE ALARMS WILL ANNUNCIATE. A MAIN TURBINE RUNBACK (RB-2) WILL ACTUATE IF GREATER THAN 60% POWER. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. l WITH REDUCED FEED FLOW, THE STEAM GENERATOR I LEVELS AND TEY2 WATER PRESSURE WILL DECREASE CAUSING THE- I FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES TO. MODULATE OPEN AND THE UNAFFECTED l FEEDWATER PUMP TO INCREASE SPEED. THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE'WILL INCREASE ACTUATING CONTROL SYSTEMS ACCORDING TO LOGIC. THE TURBINE RUNBACK (RB-2) SHOULD REDUCE. STEAM LOAD TO A POINT WHERE THE STEAM GENERATOR LOW-LOW LEVEL SETPOINT SHOULD NOT ACTUATE, CAUSING A REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP, O- - THE PLANT SHOULD REACH A-STEADY STATE CONDITION AT A LOWER POWEP LEVEL. { IF ONE FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE IS RUNNING, THE LO-LO STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL ACTUATE REACTOR TURBINE TRIP, BAR202tATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL CLEARS THE FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP SIGNAL, O Page 71
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS FWO4 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE BEARING FAILURE TYPS: BOOLEAN CAUSB TURBINE BEARING FAILURE A380NED ZNETZAL C00tDETZON: 100% PLc ER OFTIONS: r#04A MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP #1 FWO43: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP #2 I DERCRE9TIOM:
- THE SELECTED MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP WILL START EXPERIENCING
$ VIBRATION FROM BEARING FAILURE. AS THE BEARING FAILURE PROGRESSES THE BEARING TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE. AFTER 2 MINUTES THE VIBRATION WILL BE MAXIMUM AND THE PUMP DISCHARGE
- PRESSURE AND FLOW WILL VARY. RAPIDLY AS THE TURBINE STARTS TO SIEZE.
WHEN THE TURBINE SIEZES THE STEAM CONTROL VALVE WILL BE WIDE OPEN IN AN ATTEMPT TO INCREASE TURBINE SPEED AND THE PUM DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, HOWEVER,THE ' DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE WILL PREVENT REVERSE FLOW. THE PUMP , DISCHARGE VALVE AND TURBINE CONTROL VALVE WILL REMAIN A3 IS ' UNTIL AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL CLOSE SIGNALS ARE INITIATED. ERSTORATZQM:
- RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION.
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l \. MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i V FWOS FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE AUTOMATIC SPEED CONTROL FAILURE TYRE! VARIABLE: CAUSE: 2181 - 5560 RPM = LOW SPEED /HIGH SPEED STOP3 I ) FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION i ASSONED INITIAL CONDITION: FEEDWATER PUMP IN AUTOMATIC i OPTIONS: FN05A: MFP #1 CONTROL VALVE 1 MF053: MFP #2 CONTROL VALVE i l DESCRZRTION: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE THE SELECTED MFP VALVE WILL MODULATE TO THE SELECTED POSITION. IF THE CONTROL VALVE REPOSITIONS TO A LESS'THAN REQUIRED POSITION THE MFP SPEED,' PRESSURE AND FLOW WILL DECREASE PROPORTIONATELY AND THE ^ FEEDWATER STEAM GENERATOR REGULATING WATER LEVEL. VALVES WILL OPEN ATTEMPTING TO MAI! IF THE CONTROL VALVES OPEN TO A POSITION HIGHER THAN THAT REQUIRED THE MFP PRESSURE,SPEED AND FLOW WILL INCREASE AND THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES CLOSE DOWN TO MAINTAIN STEAM GENERATOR WATERMAIN LEVEL. i FEEDWATER PROPER SETPOINTS. SYSTEM CONTROL AND ALARM LOGIC WILL ACTUATE A O OPERATOR SPEED MAYPARAMETERS. AND SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. TAKE MANUAL CONTROL TO RESTORE MAIN FEE THE RRATQJtATIOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED . l i Page 73 9 i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS FWO6 0 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCUEATING VALVE FAILS FYPR: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUSB: ' VALVE POSITIONER FAILURE A380tBD ZMZTZAL COND%t%ON: 100% POWER OPTZOM8 : N06A: 1-TV-2289 N068: 1-TV-2290 DREC2LZUZDN: THE SELECTED TEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATING VALVE WILL FAIL TO'THE SELECTED VALVE POSITION SEVERITY AND WILL REDUCE THE FEEDWATER FLOW TO THE-STEAM GENERATORS. THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES-WILL ATTEMPT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE MISMATCH BETWEEN FEED FLOW AND STEAM FLOW. THE FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED WILL INCREASE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DECREASED FEED FLOW RATE. THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM SHOULD STABILIZE AND THE FEEDWATER PUMPS WILL BE OPERATING AT AN INCREASED CAPACITY. IF THE RECIRCULATION FLOW CAUSES REDUCED FEEDWATER SYSTEM CAPACITY- THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL EVENTUALLY DECREASE TO A REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. O BRBTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE VALVE POSITIONER. O Page 74
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W0 7 STEAM GENERATOR WATER HAMMER CONTROL FAILURE i rysE: soOLEAN CAUsE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE PERMISSIVE LOGIC FAILUP.E AssouxD xxzrzAL coNDETZoN: POWER < 3% orrzoNs: nous DEBCRERTIOM: THE WATER HAMMER CONTROL OUTPUT PERMISSIVE SIGNAL FAILURE WILL ALLOW THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES TO BE OPENED BY THE OPERATOR BEFORE PERMISSIVE CONDITIONS ARE MET. THE STATUS LIGHTS FOR CONTROL INDICATION WILL BE IN THE PERMIT CONDITION' WHEN THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED THE SYSTEM WILL EXPERIENCE WATER HAMMER, INDICATED-BY RANDOM PRESSURE AND FLOW SPIKING IN THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM LOOP PARAMETERS.- OPERATOR ACTION TO RECLOSE THE FIV WILL CORRECT THE WATER HAMMER CONDITION. RRSTORRTZON: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES PROPER SYSTEM LOGIC. !V i l f' I l Page 75 1
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS FW08 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START FAILURE TYDR: BOOLEAN CAUSK: BREAKER CLOSING COIL MALFUNCTIONS ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: ANY PLANT CONDITION ' OPTIONS: Fwo8A: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP "A" FIF083: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP "B" DESCRIDTZOM: THE SELECTED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP MOTOR BREAKER.WILL FAIL TO CLOSE WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE. IF THIS MALFUNCTION IS INSERTED DURING A PLANT STARTUP, THE APPROPRIATE STEAM GENERATORS WILL NOT BE FED WITH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER, UNLESS THE SYSTEM CROSS-CONNECT VALVE IS OPENED AND THE OTHER ATW PUMP IS UTILIZED. IF THIS MALFUNCTION IS INSERTED IN CONJUNCTICN WITH A LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW AND THE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP IS MADE UNAVAILABLE BY INSERTING MALFUNCTION FWO9, ALL 1 STEAM GENERATORS WILL HAVE A DECREASING LEVEL UNTIL THE STEAM LOAD IS SECURED, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM THE AFFECTED TPAIN WILL BE' UNAVAILABLE UNTIL CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TAFEN. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. REBTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BREAKER CLOSING COIL. 1 l l l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F WO9 STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP O START FAILURE TYPE: BOOLEAN 1 CAUSE: SPURIOUS CLOSURE OF TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE l ASSUMED . INITIAL CONDIFION: RECOVERY FROM REACTOR TRIP, l TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP RUNNING l 09TIONS: nonx DESC 19 TION: THE TURBINE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE WILL SHUT IMMEDIATELY. THE TURBINE SPEED WILL COASTDOWN TO ZERO. THE TURBINE TRIP WILL RESULT IN A LOSS-OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PRESSURE AND FLOW FROM THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP. THE PUMP DISCHARGE LOW PRESSURE ALARM WILL ACTUATE. IF THE TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP WAS THE ONLY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP RUNNING, ALL FEEDWATER WILL BE LOST TO THE STEAM GENERATORS. THIS WILL REQUIRE STARTING THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FEEDWATER FLOW TO THE STEAM GENERATORS. O - -I : MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS RESET OF THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE. l l O O Page 77
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_- _ .. _ __ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ ___ .. _ MALFUNCTION CAUSES ' AND EFFECTS F W10 \ Q TYPR HIGH PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE LEAK l VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 1.5 x 106 LBM/HR CAUSK: TUBE EROSION ASSO9ED INETZAL CONDETZON: 100% POWER OPTIONS: FW10A: FWH 01A FW10c: FWH 02A FRIOS: FWH #1B FN20D: FWH #2B HQ21: TEE MkXIMUM SEVERITY MILL NOT EXCEED TEE CAPACITY OF
- TEE NORMAL AND ALTERNATE DRAIMS. TEUS, EEATER LEVEL MILL BE MAIFTAINED BY MODULATION' OF TER ASSOCIATED
) ALTERNATE DRAIN VALVE (SEE TNO- 8 81270 ) . f l DRACRERTION: 4 THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF FEEDWATER INTO THE l SELECTED HIGH PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER AT A SELECTED RATE OF SEVERITY. THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO THE LOSS OF FEEDWATER. THE LEVEL WILL INCREASE IN THE FEEDWATER HEATER CAUSING THE NORMAL DRAIN VALVE TO MODULATE OPEN. AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE NORMAL DRAIN VALVE WILL BE-FULL l OPEN WITH AN INCREASING LEVEL. THE ALTERNATE DRAIN VALVE WILL MODULATE OPEN TO MAINTAIN LEVEL. THE LOSS OF FEEDWATER TO THE j HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE.IN SECONDARY i SYSTEM EFFICIENCY. RES TORATIOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TUBE LEAK. i l t !O l Page 78 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W11 LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE LEAK TYPB; VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 1.0 x 106 LDM/HR CADSB: TUBE EROSION ASSDMED ZNZt%AL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER OFFZONS: M22A FWH #3A N22C: FWH #4A M228: FWH #3B N22D: FWH #4B HQXB : . TER MhXIMUN SEVERITY WILL NOT EXCERD TEE CAPACITY OF TEE NORMAL AND ALTERNATE DRAINS. TEUS, EEATER LEVEL WILL BE MAINTAINED BY MODULATION OF TER ASSOCIATED ALTERNATE DRAIN VALVE (SEE TNO-881230). DRBCRZRTIOM: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONDENSATE INTO THE SELECTED LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER. CONDENSATE FLOW WILL INCREASE AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AT A RATE APPROPRIATE WITH SEVERITY. IF THE PREStURE DECREASES SUFFICIENTLY THC STEAM GENERATOR MAIN FEED PUMPS WILL TRIP ON LOW SUCTION PRESSURE AND LOGIC CONTROLS OF THAT ACTUATION WILL TAKE PLACE. THE LEVEL IN THE LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER WILL INCREASE AT A RATE CONSISTENT WITH SEVERITY, CAUSING THE HIGH LEVEL ALAPN TO O-A'.r.'UATE . FWH #3A AND #3B DO NOT HAVE A DRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM, P.iT T!!E HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL CIRCUITRY WILL MODULATE OPEN ITSLEVEL. MAINTAIN ASSOCIATED ALTERNATOR DRAIN VALVE TO THE CONDENSER TO FWH #4A AND #4B DRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND BY MODULATING OPEN THE NORMAL DRAIN VALVE. WITH INCREASED SEVERITY, THE NORMAL DRAIN VALVE WILL FULLY OPEN AND THE ALTERNATE DRAIN VALVE WILL MODULATE TO MAINTAIN LEVEL. CONDENSATE TO THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM EFFICIENCY. B E R 2 0 M t %.Q E : MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TUBE LEAK. O Page 79
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W12 eres:FEEDWATERsoOtr.AN HEATER LEVEL SENSOR FAILS Hl/ LOW i CAUS5: _ LEVEL SENSOR FAILURE ASSONID INITJAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: F#22A: FWH $1A (1-LC-2501) HI j N228: FWH #1B (1-LC-2505) HI N22C: FWH t1A (1-LC-2501) LO ! N22D: FWH t1B (1-LC-2505) LO t DRBCRERTEDM:- WHEN THE SELECTED LEVEL SENSOR FAILS HIGH THE APPROPRI . DRAINWILL' ALARM LINE CONTROL ACTUATE. '/ALVE WILL FULLY OPEN AND THE HIGH LEVEL THE LEVEL IN THE AFFECTED HEATER WILL DECREASE AND.THE LEVEL IN THE AFPROPRIATE $2 FWH WILL INCR CAUSING LEVEL. THE #2 FWH LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM TO MODULATE TO M NORMAL LEVEL ALARM WILLDRAIN LINE CONTROL VALVE WILL FU ACTUATE. INCREASE AND THE LEVEL IN THE APPROPRIATE 42 F CAUSING'THE LEVEL. $2 FWH LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM TO MODULATE T ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ALTE RRBTORATXQM: 4 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEVEL SENSOR. i O Page 80
/ 9A 6
Mer*VNCT10N CAUSES AND EFFECTS 4 FW13 & (MALFUNCTION DELETED) O - V. re IE I E
=
O F W i s-i I m-O _ r Page 81
-in- .
MALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1 i F W14 l i HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMP INADVERTENT TRIP ) TY9W: BOOLEAN
- CADSE
- SPURIOUS ACTIVATION OF OVERCURRENT DEVICE j ASSONED XMETEAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER 09t%CNS: TW14A: KDF #1 1 FW248: KDF 02 I I DasCA19riam: l l t
' THE SELECTED EEnTER DRAIN PUMP BREAKER INDICATION WILL INDICATE l THAT THE BREAKER IS OPEN. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCHAt.3E l PRESSURE WILL DECREASE, RESULTING IN A REDUCTION IN FLOW TO THE 1 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION. THE CONDENSATE FLOW WIT.L INCREASE I TO MAKE UP FOR THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM REDUCED FLOW, BOTH !
- CONDENSATE AND HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE FROM l j THE INCREASED FLOW RF.QUIREMENTS. WHEN THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP l TRIPS, AUTOMATIC TURBINE LOAD REDUCTION WILL BE ACTUATED. THE
HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL WILL INCREASE CAUSING THE HIGH LEVEL ' ) VAIVE TO OPEN AND DISCHARGE TO THE CONDENSER. ANNUNCIATION WILL i 1 AC10 ATE APPROPRIATELY. ' 1
\ 5 t
masromarrom: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL RESTORE THE BREAKER FOR NOP}iAL !
- OPERATION.
i l i l 5 I Page 82 d 6
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS FWi5 0 HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MODE) TYPR: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF SCALE CAUSA: ' A3809BD HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER TAILURE ZNZTEAL CONDETEON: 100% POWER OPTEONS: NASA: 1-LT-2594A N15C: 1-LT-2592A MISS: 1-LT-25948 NASD: 1-LT-2592B DRBCR1992OM: LEVEL TRANSMITTERS LT2594A AND B ARE HIGH LEVEL ColiT ACTUATING DUMP VALVES TO CONDENSER 1B. H LEVEL TPANSHITTERS Y LT2592A AND B ARE FOR LEVEL CONTROL ON HEATER DR - AND 3-2 RESPECTIVELY THEIR PJ.SPECTIVE HEATER DRAINAND PUMPS.CONTROL DISCHARGE THRO DUMP VALVE TO MODULATE OPEN AND HIGH LEVEL ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AT THE PR THE AFFECTED TANK.
. THE O ACTUAL TANK LEVEL DECREASE.THE LOW LEVEL ALARMS WILL ACTU AT LOW-LOW LEVEL. ROTH HEATER DFAIN PUMPS WOULD TRIP WILL HAVE MODULATE A MORE THE HEATER DRAIN DRAMATIC PUMP DISCHARGE LEVEL CONTROL THEY VALVE OF DR CLOSE THE NORMAL DRAIN VALVE. TRANSMITTER ULD L TANK LEVEL AND LEVEL TOTHE ACTUATE INCREASE HIGH LEVELAND ALARM. EVENTUALLY OL CAUS ABB90DATfoN:
MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE SELECTED . O Page 83
_ .___ _. _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
\ MALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECT5 1
, F W16 ! LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM ! FYPS: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% OF VENT PIPE CAPACITY l CAUS5: CONDENSER VENT PIPE FAILURE l ASSOMED INIFIAI, CONDIrICW: 100% POWER l orrIowS: nous l 1 . OES$iSEE YEW l i AS THE s 1 ANSER INLEAKAGE IS INCREASED GREATER THAN THE I CAPACITY OF THE AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM THE CONDENSER VACUUM WILL START TO DECREASE. WITH THE NOPJ4AL CONDENSER EXHAUSTING VACUUM i PUMP RUNNING, THE STANDBY CEV PUMP WILL AUTOMATICALLY START ON I HIGH BACK PRESSURE. AS VACUUM CONTINUES TO DECREASE, THE ! TURBINE LOW VACUUM TRIP WILL ACTUATE, THE MAIN FEED PUMPS WILL i TRIP AND THE STEAM DUMP VALVE PERMISSIVE WILL BE BLOCKED. THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SYSTEMS WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. THE CONDENSER LOW VACUUM WILL DECREASE GENERATOR LOAD AND INCREASE CONDENSER AND EXHAUST HOOD TEMPERATURES AND CONDENSATE OXYGEN
- LEVEL. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY.
]
Q nantonstron: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE CONDENSER VENT PIPE. , i I e I h O l Page 84
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W17 LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP Q Fras CAUSB: soOLEu MOTOR BREAKER TRIPS ON OVERLOAD A88DBSD INIFTAT, COllDIFIOffi 100% POWER OPFIONS: Pwa7A: VAC PUMP A FIF2 7C: VAC P JMP C PW2 78: VAC PUMP B. DRBCRXD920ht: INSERTION TRIP. OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE NORMAL C WILL NORMAL. AUTOMATICALLY START AND CAUSE THE FOR STANDBY OPERATION,IF EITHER OF THE TWO REMAINING CEV PUMPS IS U DECREASING MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM,THE NORMAL CEV PUMP. TRIP WILL CA ULTIMATELY RESULTING IN TURBINE TRIP WHEN ACTUATED BY THE LOW CONDENSER THE VACUUM. PLANT RESPONSE ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. WILL BE LIKE MALFUNCTION FW16. WILL ANNUNCIATION RESTORATION PUMPS IF AVAILABLE FOR BY l.NUALLY STARTING EITRER OF TH OPERATION. BEREQJtAtXDM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL CLEAR THE OVERLOAD CONDITION. l
<, I Page 85
htALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECTS i F W18 CONDENSATE RECIRCULATING VALVE FAILS \ (1-F V 2239)
- FYPS
- VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF VALVE POSITION CAFSS : ' VALVE MALFUNCTION ASSORSD IN2FIAL CONDIFICW: AFTER CONDENSATE SYSTEM STARTUP OFFIONS: NONE '
i DmRCREDrioM: i ! THE CONDENSATE PUMP RECIRCULATING VALVE PROVIDES MINIMUM FLOW PROTECTION FOR THE CONDENSATE PUMPS. AN INCREASING VALVE POSITION WILL INCREASE CONDENSATE FLOW TO THE CONDENSER AND BE OBSERVED IN THE CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTATION. A DECREASING i VALVE POSITION WILL REDUCE CONDENSATE PUMP RECIRCULATING FLOW AND CAUSE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE TO INCREASE. ! ANNLNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. i anRromarrom: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE VALVE. i O
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O Page 86
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MALrvNCn0N CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W19 80TWEU LEVEL CONTROL FMLS TY95: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF SCALE CAUSB: LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LT2217) FAILURE A380HED XMETEAL CCNDETZON: 100% icWER 09720M9: WoWE DRBCR291%DM: THE HOTWELL LEVEL SFNSING DEVICE WILL I M DIATELY GO TO TH VALUE SELECTED BY l:ME MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. THE HOTWELL LEVEL ATTEMPT CONDITION. TO CHANGE NOTWELL LEVEL TO C WHICH (LV2217A & B)WILL CLOSE THE NORMAL AND HIGH FLOW EQUAL TO NORMAL SYSTEM LEAKAGE.RESULTING IN A DECREA DECREASE THE LO-Lo LEVEL SWITCHES WILL ACTUATE,AS NOTWELL LEVEL ALAPNING IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TRIPPING THE CONDENSATE PLANT PUMPS. SYSTEM LOGIC WILL RESPOND TO A LOSS OF CONDENSATE. 4 HIGH FLOW MAKE-UP VALVESINDICATING A LOW HOTWE (LV2217A & B) RESULTING IN AN INCREASING HOTWELL LEVEL AND DECREASING CONDENSAT LEVEL. AS HOTWELL LEVEL CONTIWES TO INCREASE A "HI" LEVEL ACTUATION VALVE WILL (LV2211/2) OPEN THE CONDENSATE REJECT THE REJECT VALVE. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL WHEN THETO INCREASE.WILL HOTWELL MAKE-UP WILL RESUME. LEVEL "LO" SETPOINT IS REACHED THE HOTWELL MAKE-UP, REJECT SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO CYCLE, "HI" AND "LO" SETPOINT. FLUCTUATING THE NOTWELL LEVEL BETWEEN T l m MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL RETURN LT2217 TO NORMAL. 4 Page 87
j MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i F W20 i CONDENSATE PUMP SEEZURE i O ,,,,, . eel.AN CADSS: PUMP INTERNAL SEIZURE ASSUNED ENETZAL CONDEt!ON: 100% POWER 09TZONS: FW20A: CONDENSATE PUHF 01 FW208: CONDENSATE PUHF #2 i .l DERCREDT10E: j ! INSERTION OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SCLECTED PUMP MOT l CURRENT TO INCREASE, CONDENSATE PRESSURE AND TLOW WILL DECREASE. THE PUMP BREAKER OVERCURRENT DEVICE WILL ACTUATE TRIPPING THE SUPPLY BREAKER AND ALARMING IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE CONDENSATE l PUMP TRIP WILL INITIATE A #3 TURBINE GENERATOR RUNBACK. THIS 1 WILL REDUCE LOAD AT THE RATE OF 354/ MIN TO A 60% POWER LEVEL. I PRIMARY AND LOAD REDUCTION. SECONDARY SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC WILL RESPOND TO T I ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY, l 1 assrannexam: I RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. t ) P I O O Page 88
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W21 l CONDENSATE PUMP SHEARED SRAFT
- TYDS
- 900LLkN }
CAUS5: COUPLING FAILURE ASSDMED INIFIA& CoffDIFICW: 100% POWER ' 09TIONS: FW22A: CONDENSATE PUHP 01 FWI28: CONDENSATE PUMP #2 DRACREDE2QM: ~ WHEN THE SELECTED CONDENSATE PUMP COUPLING SHEARS THE CONDENSATE PUMP MOTOR WILL CONTINUE RUNNING AT NO LOAD CURRENT, PUMP FLOW AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. THE OPEPATING PUMP FLOW WILL 4 INCREASE AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. SINCE ) THE CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP SIGNAL WAS NOT ACTUATED, THERE WILL BE i NO TURBINE GENERATOR RUNBACK $3, RESULTING IN A FLOW MISMATCH
- BETWEEN CONDENSATE AND TEED FLOW. THE FEEDWATER PUMP LOW l SUCTION PRESSURE ALARM AND TRIP WILL ACTUATE RESULTING TURBINE
.l RUNBACK #2 AND A LOSS OF FEED FLOW AND CAUSING A. STEAM GENERATOR a LO-LO LEVEL WHICH CAUSES A REACTOR TRIP AND TUR5INE TRIP. THE TEED PUMP TRIP WILL ALSO ACTUATE THE AUTOMATIC START OF THE AUXILIARY TEEDWATER PUMPS. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE j APPROPRIATELY. l l
, RRATORATIQM:
i RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION.
-T l
l O : Page 89 ;
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MALPUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W22 LOW PRESSURE HEATER BYPASS VALVE FAILURE (1 -P V-2 2 8 6) TYPS: VARIABLE: CAUSB ~ 0 - 100% = FULL CLOSE - FULL OPEN SOLENOID VENT VALVE FAILURE A380NED ENZt%AL CONDZt%Cet: POWER RANGE 097%CM9: NONE DRBCARDEXQM: WHEN THE LOW PRESSURE HEATER B/P VALVE FAILS OPEN, CONDENSATE FLOW THROUGH THE LOW PRESSURE HEATERS WILL DECREASE SHAR WITH DECREASED COOLING FLOW THROUGH THE LP HEATERS THE EXTRACTION AS LESS CONDENSINGSTEAM PRESSURE WILL INCREASE IS OCCURRING. AND LEVELS W CONDENSATE TEMPERATURE WILL DECREASE GENERATORS. RESULTING IN COOLER FEEDWATER BEING FED TO TH PRIMARY PLANT PARAMETERS WILL REFLECT THE ADDITIONAL THERMAL LOAD AND-REACTOR POWER WILL INCREASE. OVERALL PLANT EFFICIENCY WILL DECREASE. PLANT CONTROL AND PROTECTION LOGIC WILL ACTUATE ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. IF SETPOINTS ARE ATTAINED RRBEORATXQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED SOLENOID VALVE .
?
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MALFs7NCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W23 frPR: CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK RUPTURE VARIABLE: I - 100% = 200 - 20,000 GPM CAUS5: LOWER PIPING PENETRATION FAILURE A88C8tBD INIF2A& CONDIFION! PLANT START-UP 09FIOMB: nona DRBCRXRPROM: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE THE CONDEN ' LEVEL WILL DECREASE AT A PATE CONSISTENT WITH SEV , AT TFE APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS THE LO AND LO-LO AN ACTUATE. . HOTWELL MAKE APPROPRIATE LEVEL. OPEPATION, UP SYSTEM WILL LOSE MAKE IF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS ARE IN SEIEE, IF LEFT RUNNING.THE LOW SUCTION WILL EVENTUALLY CA OPERATION, IF THE CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP IS IN SETPCTNT. IT WILL TRIP AT THE APPROPRIATE LOW SUCTION PRES ANNUNCI2 TION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ARE AREPORAPXOA : RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. Page 91
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W24 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP TYP5: EOOLEAN
\
CAUS5: SPURIOUS ACTIVATION OF BREAKER OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE I ! ASSOBdBD INITIAZ, CQlfDIFION: ANY POWER LEVEL ORTIONS: Fir 24A: AFN PUMP #1 FF2dS: AFN PUMP $2 l DERCRED T20M: THE 1 ELECTED AUXILIARY EEEDWATER PUMP BREAKER INDICATION WILL , INDICATE THAT THE BREAKER IS OPEN. THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP { DISCHARGE PRESSURE WILL DECREASE, RESULTING IN A DECREASE IN ! PUMP FLOW. SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION WILL OCCUR APPROPRIATELY. t RRATORATION * ) I MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS NORMAL OPERATION. i 4 > O : r f i O Page 92
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F W25 FEEDWATER PIPING RUPTURE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FYPR: VARIABLE: j 1 - 100% = 1 x 103 - 1 x 107 LBM/HR CAUSB: WELD FAILURE DOWNSTREAM OF THE FWIV A8808tEO EMZt%AL CC0FDZt%C0W: 100% POWER OREXONS: 9lV25A: FEEDLINE 03 FR258: FEEDLINE $4 DRBCRED1%QM: DEPENDING ON MALFUNCTION SEVERITY AND REACTOR POWER,A STEAM FLOW / TEED FLOW 4ISMATCH ALAPN WILL ANNUNCIATE. WHILE THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATOR RESPONDS TO MAINTAIN STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY TOTA! MAIN TEED FLOW INCREASES AS MASS IS LOS BREAK. CAPACITY,AS THE MALFUNCTION SEVERITY IS INCREASED BFYOND SYSTEM STEAll GENERATOR TEMPERATURE ANE PRESSURE LEVEL BEGINS TO DECREASE CAUSING! RCS TO RISE. EVENTUALLY THE STEAM GENERATOR TRIP. LOW LEVEL TRIP SETPOINT IS REACHED RESULTING PRIMARY ANNUNCIATE AND SECONDARY APPROPRIATELY. SYSTEM PARAMETERS RESPOND AND FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP AND FWIV, THE STEAM RCS GENERATOR TEMPERATURE WILL AND PRESSURE. CONTINUE TO BLONDOWN CAUSING A R RERfCRAT2OM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. i i O Page 93 _w
MALFUNCHON CAUSES MD EFFECTS IA 0i LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR i TYP5: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 1,000 CFM CAU35: INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER INLET TO AIR RECEIVER WELD FAILURE ASSONED ENETZA2, CONDZTECN: 300% POWER OPTZONS: nonE i DERCRZDTEON: TFIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A DECREASE IN THE INSTRUMENT AIR ' HEADER PRESSURE AT A RATE DETERMINED BY MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. AS THE SEVERITY INCREASES AND INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER PRESSURE DECREASES THE STANDBY INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR WILL t AUTOMATICALLY OPERATE TO SUPPLY THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM ' ACCORDING TO THE CONTROL LOGIC. IF THE LEAK RATE IS LESS THAN , THE CAPACITY OF THE NORMAL AND STANDBY INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS THE SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, IF ' THE LEAK RATE EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY CAPACITY THE SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL DECAEASE AND THE LOW PRESSURE ALARM WILL ACTUATE. AS INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE DECREASES THE AIR OPERATED VALVES W GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE FAIL POSITIONS. CRITICAL VALVES (I.E. AUX FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL AND MAIN STEAM SUPPLY TO TURBINE ' , DRIVEN AIR SUPPLYAUX DAMPERS) FEEDWATER PUMP VALVES AND CONTROL ROOM HVAC OUT , HAVE DOUBLE ISOLATION CHECK VALVES AND AIR ACCUMULATORS OF SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO ASSURE A SAFE SHUTD RERTORA110E: 2 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD. l l 7 O Page 94 l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS a IA02 LOCAL INSTRUMENT AIR FAILURE i Q FYPS: BOOLEAN TO CONTAINMENT VALVES I CAUS5: VALVE 1-HV-3487 FAILS CLOSED 1 ASSONED ENETXA2, CCNDir!0N: 100% POWER l 4 09tEONS: non- ' r DERCA2972DE: 4 < 1 THE INSERTION OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO CONTAINMENT, ISOLATION VALVE 1-HV-3467, TO FAIL TO THE ; 4 CLOSED POSITION AND THE VALVE POSITION INDICATING LIGHTS WILL INDICATE 1-HV-3487 IS CLOSED. 1 THE AIR OPEPATED VALVES SUPPL 4ED ' WITH INSTRUMENT FAILED POSITION. AIR BUS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT WILL REACH THEIR AFFECTED CONTROL AND ALARM LOGIC WILL ACTUATE ; AS APPROPRIATE FOR THE AFFLCTED SYSTEMS.
)
ARAECRATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL RESTORES 1-HV-3487. t O g O Page 95
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i _ IA03 , LOSS OF SERVICE AIR . TY75: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 = 0 - 5,000 CFM CAUS5: SERVICE AIR RECEIVER RUPTURE A380NE6 ZNETEAE, CONDZt%CN: 1006 POWER 09tzoNs: noun i DRACR29T20M:
- . THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE SERVICE AIR HEADER SEVERITY.
PRESSURE AT A RATE DETERMINED BY THE MALTUNCTIOt3 , IF THE LEAK RATE IS LESS THAN THE SERVICE AIR ' COMPRESSOR CAPACITY THE SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAll3ED. . HOWEVER, IF THE LEAK RATE EXCEEDS THE CAPACITY OF THE SERVICE ! AIR COMPRESSOR, THE SERVICE AIR PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AND THE i LOW PRESSURE ALARM WILL ACTUATE. AS SYSTEM PRESSURE DECREASES AUGMENTING AIR TO THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM WILL BE LOST. ALL - SERVICE AIR SUPPLIED COMPONENT WILL GO TO THEIR FAIL POSITION. RR2TORRTZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE RUPTURED SERVICE AIR RECEIVE O . t l t l a t I i O Page 96 > 4
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, 1 i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \ I IA 04 LOSS OF N2SUPPLY SYSTEM FYP5: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 = 0 - 10,000 CFM CAUS5: SELECTED SUPPLY LINE RUPTURE ASSUBW6 ENETEAlo COlO2T2089: ANY PLANT COND1TIOUS OFFIONS: 2A04At LOW PRESSURE N 2 SUPPLY 2A043: HIGH PRES 5URE N2 SUPPLY #1 DRRCREDTZQM: i AS THE No' PRESSURE HEADER RUPTURE INCREASES THE PRESSURE WILL
, DECREASE ROOM.
THE N2 ACTUATING A COMMON TROUBLE ALARM IN THE MAIN CO
- PRESSURE LOADS THAT REQUIRE INTERMITTENT USE WILL .
- BE ISOLATED AND THE PRESSURE WILL REMAIN CONSTANT. THE N2 j
i PRESSURE LOADS THAT REQUIRE MAKE-UP WILL REFLECT THE HEAD PRESSURE DECREASE APPROPRIATELY. 1 APPROPRIATELY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE l i , ARRTORET20M: k MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE RUPTURED 2 HEADER. N !O , e e O Page 97
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . . . . ~ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . . _ , _ _ _
i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ] MS01 , ' MAIN STEAM RUPTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT i FYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 1.13 X 107 LBM/HR (0 - 300% OF NOPMAL STEAM FLOW FOR ONE STEAM GENERATOR) CAUS5 : . WELD FAILURE AT STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET NOZ LE { ASSUMED INIFIAL CONDIFICW: POWER > 3% OFFIONS: us02A: S/G t1 us01c s/G 03 l ns01s: S/G 02 Nsota: S/G tt 3g23: Tas arrscTs Ama s&ssD ON 1004 sWVsRITY. AT AN INTamusDEAva savsazTr LavsL, PLawT mastoNas NII.L as ) i Lass savams AND Mkr Not Rancs ALL ACTUATION } ssTPOINTs. i DRACR19 TXQM: j THIS WILL RESULT IN THE STEAM FLOW FROM THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR AND THE MAIN STEAM HEADER. l.T THE PROPER STEAM LINE , PRESSURE SETPOINT, STEAM LINE ISOLATION, SAFETY INJECTION AND REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR. STEAM PRESSURE IN ALL STEAM GENEPATORS i WILL DECREASE RAPIDLY UNTIL STEAM LINE ISOLATION TAKES PLACE, THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL CONTINUE TO DEPRESSURI RAPIDLY. GENERATORS.THIS WILL ALSO CAUSE SEVERE SWELL IN THE STEAM O THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE,THE DECREASE. LEVEL, AND TEMPERAf** 4 TO RAPID STEAM GEN FEEDWATER ISOLATION AND TEEDWATER PUMP TRIP W1 L RESULT FROM THE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL. SYSTEM CONTINUES TO COOLDOWN THE ISOLATED STEAM GE PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE AT A SLOWER RATE. CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILL INCREASE AC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SPRAY AT THE RESPECTIVE SET ANNUNCIATION DEVELOPS ACCORDING TO 4.4DIVIDUAL LOGIC. AND INDICATTON WILL RESPOND TO THE SITU AESFORAE20E: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. 1 s O Page 98 l
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MALFUNCTION C.40SES AND EFFECTS i \ M502 STEAM LINE RUPTURE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Q TY9S: AFTER MSIV VARIABIJ.. 0 - 1.13 X 107 LBM/HR (0 - 300% OF NOPMAL STEAM FLOW FOR ONE STEAM GENERATOR) CAUS5 : WELD FAILURE DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV AND OUTSIDE OF THE PENETRATION ROOMS A830NEI) ENETZAL CONDZTION: POWER > 36 l OPTIONS: ngE02A: S/G 01 Ns02C: S/G t3 N0023: S/G 02 N302D: S/G 04 MQ2E: TER BrrEcts ARE RAsEn on 1004 SEVERITY. AT AN INTE3GSD1 ATE SEVERITY LEVEL, PLhMT RESPONSE MILL BE LESS SEVERE AND MkY NOT REACE ALL ACTUATION SETPOINTS. I agggExarzon: TH:tS WILL CAUSE A HIGH STEAM FLOW FROM ALL STEAM GENERATORS i RE:3ULTING IN SWELL AND A RAPID DECREASE IN STEAM PRESSURE. AT TM)! STEAM PRESSURE LOW SETPOINT, THE MSIV'S WILL CLOSE, REACTOR TR:!P AND SAFETY INJECTION WILL ACTUATE. WHEN THE MSIV'S SHUT O ST1 TAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL SHRINK FOLLOWED BY PRESSURE AN STABILIZATION. FEEDWATER WILL ISOLATE, MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS WI:'L TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS WILL START. THE REACTOR I COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE RAPIDLY RElrLECTING TH!t MAIN STEAM THE HIGH STEAM FLOW AND WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY ISOLATION. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE 'A' WILL AC'f0 ATE FROM THE STEAM LINE LOW PREDURE SIGNAL. ANNUNCIATION AND INDICATION WILL RESPOND TO THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC, RRgf0 rat 20M: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 99 l . l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS03 0 MMN STEAM LINE RUPTURE OUTSIDE CONTMNMENT BEFORE MSIV FYPR VARIABLE: 0 - 1.13 X 107 LBM/HR (0 - 300% OF NOPJ4AL STEAM FLOW FOR ONE STEAM GENERATOR) CAUBR: WELD FAILURE BEFORE MSIV A380NBD ZRETRAL CONDETEON: POWER > 3% 09t% CMS: N003A: S/G t1 N803C: S/G t3 N2035: S/G 02 Ns03D: S/G 04 MORE: TSB BFFBCTS ARE RASBD ON 1004 SEVERITY. AT AN INTBRMEDIATB SEVERITY LEVBL, PIANT RESPONSB MILL BE LB88 85 VERE AND MkY NOT REACB ALL ACTUATION SBTPOINTS. DRACR2212.QN: THIS WILL RESULT IN HIGH STEAM FLOW FROM ALL STEAM GENERATORS CAUSING SYSTEM. SWELL AND A RAPID PRESSURE DECREASE IN THE MAIN STEAM AT SHUT, MSIV'S WILL THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE SETPOINT, THE ACTUATED. REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION WILL BE THE ISOLATED STEAM GENERATORS WILL RECOVER WITH A O- STABILISING LEVEL AND SLOWLY DECREASING STEAM PRESSURE FROM CONTINUED COOLDOWN OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL CONTINUE TO BLOW DOWN AND DEPRESSURIZE. THE SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION WILL ISOLATE THE MAIN TEEDWATE SYSTEM, TRIP FEEDWATER THE PUMPS. MAIN FEED PUMPS AND START THE AUXILIARY RESPOND ACCORDING TO TEMPERATURE, LOGIC. ASSOCIATED SAFETY INJECTION S THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM STEAM PRASE 'A' LOAD SITUATION AS ITCONTAINMENT TAKES PLACE. ISOLATION PRESSURE AN ACTUATION. WILL RESPOND TO A LOW STEAMLINE PRESSURE ISOLATION ANNUNCIATION AND INDICATION WILL RESPOND TO THE SITUATION LOGIC. AS IT DEVELOPS ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM CON ARREQAARROM: i RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 100
1 MALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l MS04 i MMN STEAM RELIEF VALVE FAILURE ; FYSS: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 = 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION
- CAUSB ,
MAIN STEAM POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE FAILURE ASSDNEO EN!9EAX, CCNDEFZON: 100% POWER 092%ONS: m04A: 1-PV-2325 W O4C: ' 1-PV-2327 ' WO43: 1-PV-2326 WO4D: 1-PV-2328 , E921 SSLBCTING A SEVERITY LEYBL LESS TRAN ACTUAL VALVE POSITION WILL CAUSE TBS VALVE TO CLOSE TO TRE SELECTED SEVERITY POSITION. 1 . DERCEZBtXQM: 4 j THE STEAM FLOW FROM THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL INCREASE, RESULTING IN LEVEL SWELL, A DECREASE IN STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE i AND REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE. STEAM FLOW FROM THE UNAFFECTED STEAM GENERATORS WILL INCREASE SLIGHTLY RESP THE DECREASED PRESSURE IN THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR. THE DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT TAVE WILL CAUSE AUTOMATIC CON ROD WITHDRAWAL, AS POSITIVE REACTIVITY IS INSERTED INTO THE CORE, REACTOR POWER WILL INCREASE. IF THE RATE OF CHANGE IS LARGE ENOUGH, CONTROL ROD INSERTION WILL RESULT. , ALL PLANT O PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS WILL RESPOND AS REQUIRED TO PLANT CONDITIONS AS THEY DEVELOP. APPROPRIATELY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE ARRTORREXON: i MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS CONTROL OF THE VALVE. J l i 4 l l O Page 101
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS J , MS05 STEAM DUMP CONTROLLER FAILURE FYF5: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 =~0 - 7.5 x 106 LBM/HR CAUS5: ELECTRO-PNEUMATIC CONVERTER MALFUNCTION ASSDNED ENZr%AE, CONDETECN: 100% POWER i 09TZONS: noux DERCRED TZQM: l DEPENDING UPON SEVERITY LEVEL, A STEAM DUMP SYSTEM FAILURE IN 3 THE POWER RANGE WILL CAUSE AN INCREASED STEAM LOAD WHENEVER THE INTERLOCK SOLENOID IS ARMED (I.E. C-7,C-8, OR IN THE STEAM PRESSURE MODE). AS SEVERITY INCREASE 3, ACTUAL STEAM HEADER t PRESSURE DECREASES. RCS TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE AND PRESSURIZER , LEVEL WILL ALSO DECREASE. CONTROL RODS WI' L WITHDRAW AND THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM WILL ACTUATE. THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WILL RESPOND AS TRIP $ETPOINTS ARE REACHED AND ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROTRIATE. THE EFFECT OF THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM TO NOT RESPOND FULLY AFTER A TURBINE TRIP WILL INHIBIT EXCESS HEAT REMOVAL FROM THE RCS. THE 3 RAPID DECREASE IN STEAM LOAD WILL CAUSE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TO
" SHRINK" AND PRESSURE TO RAPIDLY INCREASE. THE STEAM O ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF / SAFETY VALVES WILL RELIEVE STEAM PRESSURE AS REQUIRED AT THE ACTUATION SETPOINTS. THE REACTOR WILL TRIP AND-PRESRURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL INCREASE AND ACTUATE THE SPRAY VALVES WHICH WILL LIMIT THE RCS PRESSURE INCREASE. WHEN THE STEAM RELIEF / SAFETY VALVES ACTUATE THE ADDITIONAL STEAM 'uOAD WILL CAUSE THE RCS TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE TO DECREASE.
RRATQRETEOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE ELECTRO-PNEUMATIC CONVERTER. O Page 102
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS
=
MS06 MOISTURE SEPARATORIREREATER CONTROL FAILURE TYPR: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUSB: - REHEAT SUPPLY VAL'IE CONTROLLER FAILURE A8809BD ENZt%AL COND%t%Cet: POWEP. > 3% 099%CNB: 68006A: 1-KV-6581k as90$8: 1-HV-65024 DRACRZRXXQM: AT LOW POWER LEVELS AND MAXIMUM SEVERITY FOR THE SELECTED HIGH FLOW REHEAT STEAM SUPPLY VALVE THE MSR WILL RECEIVE EXCESSIVE-HEATING STEAM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT HP' TURBINE EXHAUST FOR COOLING. THE APPROPRIATE TEMPEPATURE AND STEAM FLOW MONITORS WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY, AND THIS MSR HEATUP PATE MAY BE EXCEEDED. AT HIGH POWER LEVELS AND MINIMUM SEVERITY THE HIGH FLOW REHEAT STEAM SUPPLY VALVE WILL LIMIT THE REHEAT OF THE LP TURBINE INLET STEAM, R3SULTING IN REDUCED EFFICIENCY AND LONG TERM LP TURBINE BLADE DAMAGE. ACCORDINGLY. TEMPERATURE AND STEAM FLOW MONITORS WILL RESPOND O m m m .. HALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE REMEAT SUPPLY VALVE CONTROLLER. l O Page 103
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MALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECTS i MS07 Q FYPS: BOOLEAN MSIV INADVERTENTLY SHUTS 1 CAUSm: . CONTROL SWITCH MALFUNCTION AS#tBIRD INIFIA& CCffDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OFFIONS: W O7At 1-HV-2333A WO7C: 1-HV-2335A 2 078: 1-HV-2334A W O7D: 1-HV-2336A anscnxarzog: i WHEN ACTUATED, THE SELECTED MSIV WILL CLOSE IN 5 SECONDS ISOLATING STEAM FLOW FROM THE ASSOCIATED STEAM GENERATOR AND THE LEVEL WILL " SHRINK". STEAM GENERATOR FLOW WILL DECREASE WHILE PRESSURE WILL INCREASE. THE FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE WILL CLOSE DOWN IN RESPONSE TO THE DECREASED STEAM FLOW.- THE UNAFFECTED STEAM GENERATORS WILL " SWELL" FROM THE INCREASED LOAD AND STEAM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY. THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES WILL MODULATE OPEN TO MATCH STEAM FLOW. THE AFFECTED REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TC AND TAVE WILL INCREASE TO APPROXIMATELY LOOP TH. THE UNAFFECTED REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS WILL INDICATE THE INCREASED LOAD CONDITIONS. THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL l WILL INCREASE MOMENTARILY FROM THE VOLUME CHANGE FROM THE O AFFECTED LOOP AND THEN RETUM TO APPROXIMATELY THE INITIAL POINT ONCE THE UNAFFECTED LOOPS STABILIZE. AFFECTED SYSTEM CONTROL AND ALARM LOGIC WILL ACTUATE AS REQUIRED. j i i l i l nanranntzon: l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MSIV CONTROL SWITCH. 1 l I 1 l l i O Page 104 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS M508 MAIN STEAM ESOLATION VALVE FMLS TO SHUT FYF5: DOOLEAN 3 CAUS5: HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR FAILS TO RESPOND TO TRIP SIGNAL ASSONED INIFIA& CONDIFION: ANY POWER LEVEL OFFIONS: 208A: 1-HV-2333A N#08C: 1-HV-2335A M8088: 1-HV-2334A N#08D: 1-HV-2336A DRACRXDFXQM: i USUALLY THIS MALFUNCTION IS ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR TRIP. THE l SELECTED MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE WILL STAY OPEN WHEN THE TRIP ) SIGNAL IS ACTUATED DUE TO A MECHANICAL FAILURE. THE OTHER - MSIV'S WILL SHUT, ISOLATING THE STEAM GENERATORS FROM THE MAIN l STEAM HEADER. THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL CONTINUE i SUPPLYING STEAM TO THE AVAILABLE STEAM LOADS DEPENDENT ON PLANT STATUS. IF THE REACTOR IS TRIPPED THE AFFECTED STEAM GENEPATOR I WILL COOL DOWN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND PRIMARY SYSTEM PARAMETERS WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. THE UNAFFECTED STEAM GENERATORS WILL STABILIZE AT A NO LOAD STATUS ACCORDING TO i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM STATUS. REATORATIQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MECHANICAL FAILURE. l l 4 iO Page 105 [ i , 4 4 .- , - - . - .- - , - - , , - . . - _ , , . . ~ . - - . . , _ . . . , . - - . . . _ . _ . , . .-_...--._y. . . . , , , . _ . . . _ . . . - - ._ .._ --. - . ....- ~ _ , . , ,
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l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS t
- M509 I EXTRACTION STEAM NON. RETURN VALVE FAILURE FYF5
- BOOLEAN CAUS5: . VALVE FAILS IN CLOSED POSITION i ASSONED ZMETEAL CCNDZTZON: 100% POWER OFFZONS: 2 09A: 1-LV-20278 M 093: 1-LV-2031B W O93: 1-LV-20283 W OSF: 1-LV-20328 l W O9C: 1-LV-2029B WO90: 1-Lv-20338 I 2 09D: 1-LV-20308 m095: 1-Lv-2034B !
t DRACRX9EXQM: ; i THE EXTRACTION STEAM SUPPLY FLOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM TO THE [ AFFECTED TEEDWATER HEATER. THE FEED WATER HEATER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL DECREASE RESULTING IN DBAIN VALVE AUTOMATIC !
' MODULATION AND A LOW LEVEL ALARM. THE LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATER !
OPERATION WILL CAUSE THE AFFECTED WATER SYSTEM, FEEDWATER AND/OR ' CONDENSATE, TO DECREASE IN TEMPERATURE, RESULTING IN OVERALL
- PLANT EFFICIENCY DECREASE. AFFECTED INDICATION AND SYSTEM ,
MONITORED PARAMETERS WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. j O - - -: \ I MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS THE NON-RETURN VALVE TO OPEN. l l I 4 I p i s i O 1 Page 106 ' 1
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS10 LEAKAGE OF MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE FYPS: VARIABLE: 1 - 1004 - 5 x 102 - 5 x 105 LBM/HR CAUSB: . VALVE FAILURE ASSOMED INIFIAI, CONDIFION: POWER > 34 09FIONS: N320A1: 1-MS-021 N320C2: 1-MS-093 N320A2: 1-MS-022 M820C2: 1-MS-094 N820A3: 1-MS-023 M820CJ: 1-MS-095 ASSOAd: 1-MS-024 M820Cd: 1-MS-096 M810AS: 1-MS-025 M820CS: 1-MS-097 M82082: 1-MS-056 M820DS: 1-MS-029 N#2082: 1-MS-059 M820D2: 1-MS-030 I M820B3: 1-MS-060 N320D3: 1-MS-031 N820Bd: 1-MS-061 N820Dd: 1-MS-032
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N82085: 1-MS-062 N82005: 1-MS-033 ' DRBCRXDFZOM: THE STLAM FLOW FROM THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL INCREASE, WHICH WILL CAUSE A LEVEL SWELL, A DECREASE IN STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE AND A DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT LOOP COLD LEG TEMPERATURE. THE DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT TAVE WILL CAUSE AUTOMATIC CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL, AS POSITIVE REACTIVITY IS INSERTED INTO THE CORE, REACTOR POWER WILL INCREASE. IF THE RATE OF CHANGE IS LARGE ENOUGH, CONTROL ROD INSERTION WILL RESULT. . ALL PLANT PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS WILL RESPOND AS REQUIRED TO PLANT CONDITIONS AS THEY DEVELOP. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. THE STEAM FLOW THROUGH THE SAFETY VALVE WILL ACTUATE INCREASES.THE DISCHARGE PIPING TEMPERATURE ALARM AS TEMPERATURE REBRDAntgDE: MALTUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY VALVE. O Page 107
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS11 MolSTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER TUBE FAILURE FYPS: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 3 x 103 - 3 x 105 teg/gg CAtr#3 : - TUBE FAILURE A38CntED ZRZTEAL COND%tEON: IN POWER RANGE 097%CM8: N021A: MSR tlk N8218: MSR 619 DRBAR222'ZDR: AS THE SELECTED MSR TUBE (S) FAIL TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY LEVEL, MAIN STEAM AND TEED FLOW WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY. THE REACTOR COOLANT AND MAIN STEAM SYSTEM WILL REFLECT THE INCREASE IN STEAM FLOW. THE MSR MONITORED PARAMETERS WILL INCREASE SLIGHTLY REFLECTING THE SEVERITY OF LEAK, COMPARED TO FLANT POWER LEVEL. MONITORED TURBINE PARAMETERS WILL SHOW A PROPORTIONAL INCREASE IN HP EXHAUST PRESSURE AND LP INLET PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE, AND AN INCREASE IN MSR HEATING STEAM , FLOW. A PROPORTIONAL INCREASE IN THE ASSOCIATED DRAIN SYSTEMS WILL CAUSE CONTROL ACTUATION AND RESPONSE. ANNUNCIATION AND ; INDICATION WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. ' O REATORATXQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS TFE LEAKING TUBE (S) . l O Page 108
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS12 GLAND SEAL REGULATOR MALFUNCTION FYP5: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAtFSB: . PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE'1-PV-3908A MALFUNCTIONS A88DMED INIFIA& CCNDIFICW: HIGH POWER / LOW POWER 09t%CM8: nonx DRBCRZBT20M: AT TURBINE LOADS OF > 40% THE TURBINE SEALS ARE SELF SEALING AND FAILING THE GLAND STEAM REGULATOR CLOSED WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. AT < 40% TURBINE LOAD THE TURBINE GLAND SEAL STEAM IS SUPPLIED ' BY AUXILIARY STEAM THROUGH 1-PV-3908A. FAILING 1-PV-3908A CLOSED-WILL CAUSE THE TURBINE-SEALS TO PASS AIR INTO THE CONDENSER AND, DEPENDING ON TH5 SEVERITY, AFFECT CONDENSER VACUUM AND TURBINE VIBRATION. FAILING THE 1-PV-3908A HIGH AT ' ANY TURBINE LOAD WILL CAUSE THE GLAND STEAM SYSTEM RELIET VALVE I
-TO LIFT AND RELIEVE SYSTEM PRESSURE.
R E BJt'Q M A t X D M : O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE PV-3908A. i m j O Page 109
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS MS13
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STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE FYF5: VARIABLE: 0'- 100% OF SCALE ( CAUS5 - TRANSMITTER FAILURE l ASSDMED INIFIA& CONDKFKON: IN POWER RANGE OFFIONS: . MS2JA: 1-PT-2325 N#2JC: 1-PT-2327 i l M8233: PT-2326 N#23D: 1-PT-2328 l DESCRERTION: THE SELECTED TRANSMITTER WILL FAIL TO THE POINT SELECTED BY SEVERITY. THE PRESS TRANSMITTER PROVIDES CONTROL SIGNAL TO STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEFS. AS THE STEAM PRESSURE l SIGNAL VARIES FROM 1-PT-2325, -2326, -2327, AND/OR -2328, THE ) ATMOSPHERIC RELIEFS WILL RESPOND AS IF IN' AUTOMATIC. RESTORATZOM: 1 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. , O l I L l ! I l O ! Page 110 - - '
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFFCTS N101 l SOURCE RANGE MONETOR FAILURE FYPR VARIABLE: 1 x 100 - 1 x 106 COUNTS PER SECOND CAUSB: - DETECTOR FAILURE ASSDMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN SOURCE RANGE OPTIONS: NZ0LA: CHANNEL N-31 NIO23: CHANNEL N-32 DRBCRXHXDM: THE SELECTED SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL WILL FAIL TO THE LEVEL SELECTED BY SEVERITY. ALL OF THE-AFFECTED CHANNEL INDICATION AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS WILL RESPOND TO THE FAILED INPUT SIGNAL. IF THE CHANNEL IS SELECTED ON THE AUDIO COUNT RATE DFAWER, THE AUDIO COUNT RATE WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. DEPENDENT UPON SELECTED SEVERITY, ANNUNCIATION AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. ERRTQBIATIQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR FAILURE. O Page 111 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS N102 Q FYF5 : - INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR FAILURE VARIABLE: 1 x 10~11 - 1 x 10-3.ggp3 j CAUS5: DETECTOR FAILURE A8tDNED INIFIA2, CC0EPIFION: IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE I 097ZONS: ~N102A: CHANNEL N-35 WIO23: CHANNEL N-36 DRRCRERTXQM: THE SELECTED INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL WILL FAIL TO THE-LEVEL SELECTED BY SEVERITY, ALL OF THE AFFECTED CHANNEL INDICATION
"!D CONTROL FUNCTIONS WILL RESPOND TO THE FAILED DETECTOR I
, 51GNAL. DEPENDENT UPON SELECTED SEVERITY, ANNUNCIATION AND i
*D CTOR PROTECTION. SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE.
AERTORAT10m: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE DETECTOR FAILURE. O :1
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an==.c MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS Q _ N103 FYP5: POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-41 FMLURE VARIABLE: DETECTOR: CAUSB: VARIABLE: CHANNEL: 0 - 300 MILLIAMPS = 0 - 50% POWER 0 - 200% POWER DETECTOR / CHANNEL FAILURE ASSDBdBD INITIAL OPTIONS: CONDITION: IN POWER RANGE NIO3At DETECTOR Al NIO3D: NIO3B: DETECTOR A2 DETECTOR B2 NJ03C: NIO38: DETECTOR B1 CHANNEL FAILURE nasenzstrog: THE SELECTED DETECTOR OR CHANNEL WILL SELECTED. FAIL TO THE SEVERITY LEVEL SUMMING AND LEVEL DETECTOR CURRENTS WITHESULT GE OF AMPLIFIER ATTENDANT IN?UT INTO THE IN h CHANGEUPPE OF AND W DEVIATION ALARMS AND INDICATION SEVERITY. R AND LOWER DETECTOR ON POWER LEVEL AND BASED O SUMMING AND LEVEL . NGE OF AMPLIFIER OUTPUT OF THE ONLYA F OUTPUT FOR THE POWER RANGE CHANN DEPENDENT UPON SELECTEDONTROL ILL CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE SEVERITY AND INDICATION AND, POWER DEVIATION INDICATIONS (IN RELATION TO ACTUAL. POWER) SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WILLROPRIh
, ANNUNCIATION ACTUATE I'E .
AND AS APP REACTOR , PROTECTION P2BTORATXog: _.- MALFUNCTION REMOVALEDREPAIRS DETECTOR (S) THE FAIL OR CHANNEL. Page 113
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS NIO4 l Q FYP5: POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-42 FAILURE VARIABLE: DETECTOR: 0 - 300 MILLIAMPS = 0 - 50% POWER
- VARIABLE: CHANNEL: 0 - 200% POWER ,
I. CAUSE : DETECTOR / CHANNEL FAILURE A330NED ZMETZAL CONDZTZON: IN POWER RANGE OFfZONS: WIO4A DETECTOR Al NI0dD: DETECTOR B2 NI043: DETECTOR A2 NIO45: CHANNEL FAILURE NIO4C: DETECTOR B1 DRBCRERTION: THE SELECTED DETECTOR OR CHANNEL WILL FARL TO THE SEVERITY LEVEL SELECTED, A FAILED DETECTOR-WILL RESULT IN A CHANGl; OF INPUT INTO THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER AND WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF l DETECTOR CURRENTS WITH ATTENDANT UPPER AND LOWER DETECTOR DEVIATION ALARMS AND INDICATION BASED ON POWER LEVEL AND l SEVERITY. A FAILED CHANNEL WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF OUTPUT OF THE O' SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER ONLY. l EITHER DETECTOR OR CHANNEL OPTIONS WILL CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE OUTPUT FOR THE POWER RANGE CHANNEL CONTROL AND INDICATION'AND, DEPENDENT UPON SELECTED SEVERITY (IN RELATION TO ACTUAL POWER), POWER DEVIATION INDICATIONS, ANNUNCIATION AND' REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ! UNCTIONS WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. R&BTORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED DETECTOR (S) OR CHANNEL. i !O Page 114 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS NIOS POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-43 FAILURE T3fPB VARIABLE: DETECTOR: 0 - 300 MILLIAMPS = 0 - 50% POWER _ VARIABLE: CHANNEL: 0 - 200% POWER cat 183 : DETECTOR / CHANNEL FAILURE A380NED EMETZAE, CONDETEOM: IN POWER RANGE OPTIONS: NIO5A: DE' TOR Al NIOSD: DETECTOR B2 NIO58: DETECTOR A2 NIOSB: CHANNEL FAILURE i NIOSC: DETECTOR B1 DRRCRERREDM: THE SELECTED DETECTOR OR CHANNEL WILL FAIL TO THE SEVERI.Y LEVEL SELECTED. A FAILED DETECTOR WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF INPUT IF/O THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER AND WILL RESULT IN A CHIEGE OF DETECTOR CURRENTS WITH ATTENDANT UPPER'AND LOWER DETECTOR DEVIATION SEVERITY. ALARMS AND INDICATION BASED ON POWER LEVEL AND ( A FAILED CHANNEL WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF OUTPUT OF THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER ONLY. EITHER DETECTOR OR CHANNEL OPTIONS WILL CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE OUTPUT FOR THE POWER RANGE CHANNEL CONTROL AND INDICATION AND, DEPENDENT UPON SELECTED SEVERITY (IN RELATION TO ACTUAL POWER), PONER DEVIATION INDICATIONS, ANNUNCIATION-AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. EEREQRA11DN: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED DETECTOR (S) OR CHANNEL. 4 O Page 115 s -
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS N106 POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-44 FAILURE
.Q FYP5: VARIABLE: DETECTOR: 0 - 300 MILLIAMPS = 0 - 50% POWER VARIABLE: CHANNEL: 0 - 200% POWER CAUSE: DETECTOR / CHANNEL FAILURE L
ASSONED INITIAL CONDITION: IN POWER RANGE l 0FFIONS: NronA: DETECTOR Al NI0fD: DETECTOR B2 NI083: DETECTOR A2 NIO63: CHANNEL FAILURE WIOSO: DETECTOR B1 DERCRZDTIOM: THE SELECTED DETECTOR OR CHANNEL WILL FAIL TO THE SEVERITY LEVEL SELECTED. A FAILED DETECTOR WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF INPUT INTO THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER AND WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF DETECTOR CURRENTS WITH ATTENDANT UPPER AND LOWER DETECTOR DEVIATION ALARMS AND INDICATION BASED ON POWER LEVEL AND SEVERITY. O A FAILED CHANNEL WILL RESOLT IN A CHANGE OF OUTPUT OF THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER ONLY. EITHER DETECTOR OR CHANNEL OPTIONS WILL CAUSE A CHANGE Ill THE OUTPUT FOR THE POWER RANGE CHANNEL CONTROL AND INDICATIOt1 AND, DEPENDENT UPON SELECTED SEVERITY (IN RELATION-TO ACTUAL POWER), POWER DEVIATION. INDICATIONS, ANNUNCIATION AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. 1 . 1 RRSTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED DETECTOR (S) OR CHANNEL.
! Page 116 1 '
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS NI07 ' FAILURE OF SOURCE RANGE BLOCK SWITCH \ fYP5: 800 LEAN CAUSW: ' BLOCK SWITCH MALFUNCTION ASSONED INIFIAX, CONDIFION: REACTOR STARTUP ' OFFIONS: NK07A: BLOCK SWITCH 1/1 N33A . WIO75: BLOCK SWITCH 1/1 N338 EQ21: IF TER SOURCE RANGE CEANNEL DETECTORS GO INTO l l SATURATION FROM EIGE FLUX . TEEY NILL RENkIN IN I SATURATION UNTIL MkLFUNCTION REMOVAL. 1 DERCRZ9TZQM: i DURING REACTOR STARTUP,-AS REACTOR POWER IS INCREASED INTO THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE, THE P-6' PERMISSIVE IS ACTUATED. -THIS PERMITS MANUAL BLOCKING OF THE SOURCE RANGE HIGH FLUX TRIP'AND DEENERGIZES THE HIGH VOLTAGE TO THE SOURCE RANGE DETECTORS WHEN THE BLOCK / RESET SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE BLOCK POSITION. WITH THIS MALFUNCTION ACTIVE THE SIGNAL FROM'THE SELECTED CHANNEL' BLOCK / RESET SWITCH IS NOT SENT, WHEN THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE i BLOCK POSITION. THIS RESULTS IN A FAILURE TO BLOCK THE SOURCE l RANGE n_~ Jil FLUX REACTOR TRIP AND - PREVENTS DEENERGIZING OF THE SOURCE RANGE HIGH VOLTAGE. l RRBFORAFZQE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BLOCK SWITCH. , e I 0 . Page 117 > 4
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS NK08 O (MAIEUNCTION DELETED) l i i i i O i i I i 6 O Page 118 9
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS N109 INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL OVERCOMPENSATED ; PYPR VARIABLE: 0.- 100% = 0,5 - 1.5 DECADES < ACTUAL POWER CAUSB: COMPENSATION VOLTAGE MISADJUSTED A88DNED INIFIAL CONDIFION: LOW IN INTEPREDIATE RANGE ! OPTIOM8: M109A:' CHANNEL N-35 NIO98: CHANNEL N-36 ' DRBCREDTIQM: THIS MALFUNCTION WHEN INSERTED WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL INDICATION.TO READ LOWER THAN ACTUAL FLUX LEVELS DEPENDING ON SEVERITY SELECTED. THE INDICATED RATE I OF CHANGE WILL BE LESS THAN THE ACTUAL RATE OF CHANGE RESULTING i IN A LOWER START UP RATE INDICATION. IMPROPER OPERATION OF THE P-6 PERMISSIVE WILL RESULT DUE TO ABNORMAL CURRENT LEVELS. BR220AktXQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL SETS THE PROPER COMPENSATING VOLTAGE. 1 O B i O l Page 119 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS N110 l NOISY SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL _ TYPS: VARIABLE: 0 - 0.5 DECADE SPIKING-CAUS3: PREAMPLITIER MALFUNCTION I ASStngED ENEtZAL CONDETZON: IN SOURCE RANGE
$ 09 tEON8 :, N120A: CMANNEL N-31 NI208: CHANNEL N-32 DRACREDEXOM:
RANDOM INSTRUMENT NOISE WITH AN AMPLITUDE OF APPROXIMATELY 1/2 DECADE WILL APPEAR ON ALL SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL COUNT RATE AND' START UP RATE INDICATORS. IF THE: CHANNEL IS SELECTED ON THE. AUDIO COUNT RATE DRAWER, THE AUDIO COUNT-RATE WILL ALSO INDICATE THE NOISE, THE CHANNEL TRIP AND ALARM BISTABLES WILL RESPOND TO THE NOISE AS-IF IT WERE ACTUAL NEUTRON FLUX. THE INSTRUMENT NOISE WILL ALSO BE PRESENT WHEN THE CHANNEL IS IN TEST, THE j NOISE WILL NOT BE SEEN WITH THE DETECTOR HIGH VOLTAGE "OFF". IT i THIS MALFUNCTION IS INSERTED WHEN THE REACTOR POWER IS HIGH IN I THE SOURCE RANGE, A REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR. RERTORATEOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE PREAMPLIFIER. t l i O . Page 120
- . - . - _ ~ - . - - . . . . - _ _ . . - - . .- . . - - - -
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS
-Nill POWER RANGE MONITOR OUTPUT OSCILLATION TYF5: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = (SEVERITY) X (CURRENT POWER) 1 CAUS5: . FAILURE OF SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER AdGinMD INETZAR, CONDETZON: IN POWER' RANGE 09tEONS:. M122A: CHANNEL' N-41 MI22C: CKkNNEL N-43 NI223: CHANNEL-N-42 NI22D:- CHANNEL N-44 DESCRZ9TZOM:
THIS MALFUNCTION PRODUCES AN OSCILLATION THAT IS SUPERIMPOSED OVER Th ACTUAL OUTPUT OF THE SUMMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER AT A FREQUENCY OF ONE COMPLETE OSCILLATION PER MINUTE. THE, MAGNITUDE OF THE OSCILLATION WILL BE THE ACTUAL OUTPUT OF THE. SUMMING AND ' LEVEL AMPLIFIER MULTIPLIED BY THE SEVERITY FOR THE SELECTED - POWER RANGE CHANNEL. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OSCILLATION WILL I CHANGE AS REACTOR POWER IS CHANGED. (I.E.: IF POWER IS AT 1004, i A SELECTED SEVERITY OF 100% WIIL CAUSE AN OSCILLATION FROM 100% TO 2004 POWER, THEN DOWN TO 0% POWER. IF~ POWER IS~AT 100%,.A j SELECTED SEVERITY OF 50% WILL CAUSE AN OSCILLATION FROM 100% TO 150% POWER THEN DOWN TO 50% POWER. ) -ALL ALARMS, PERMISSIVES'AND TRIPS WILL ACTUATE AS THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT IS ATTAINED. O RESTORATEQM: > MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SUtMING AND LEVEL AMPLIFIER. 1 l O l Page 121
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS nil 2 Q INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL UNDERCOMPENSATED TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0.5 - 1.5 DECADES > ACTUAL POWER l l CAUS2: - COMPENSATING VOLTAGE MISADJUSTED ASSONED INITIAL CONDITION: LOW IN INTERMEDIATE P.AUGE 09TIONS: NZ12A: CHANNEL N-35 I NIJ23: CHANNEL N-36 i DESCRIDTZOM: THIS MALFUNCTION CAUSES THE SELECTED INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNEL INDICATION TO READ HIGHER THAN ACTUAL FLUX LEVELS DEPENDING ON I SEVERITY SELECTED. THE INDICATED RATE OF CHANGE WILL BE GREATER THAN THE ACTUAL PATE OF CHANGE, RESULTING IN A HIGHER START UP RATE INDICATION. IMPROPER OPERATION OF THE P-6 PERMISSIVE WILL RE.SULT DUE TO ABNORMAL CURRENT LEVELS. RRSTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION PEMOVAL SETS THE PROPER COMPENSATING VOLTAGE. O O Page 122
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MALFUNCTION CAU3ES AND EFFECTS
\
Nila' IMPROPER POWER RANGE HIGQ FLUX TRIP SETPOINT 1 FYPB; VARIABLE: 0 - 150% CAUSB _ BISTABLE TRIP SETPOINTS MISADJUSTED l ASSUMED INIFKA& CONDIFICW: ANY PLANT CONDITION 097%ON8: nong 1' DRSCRZRt%CM: THIS MALFUNCTION CHANGES THE OVERPOWER TRIP SETPOINTS FOR ALL POWER RANGE CHANNELS TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY. WHEN REACTOR POWER EXCEEDS THE SELECTED SETPOINT, THE REACTOR WILL TRIP WITH THE RESULTANT ACTIONS, INDICATIONS, AND ALARMS ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR TRIP.
)
REBTORATZOM:- l MALFUNCTION SETPOINTS'. REMOVAL SETS THE TRIP BISTABLES TO THE PROPER TRIP-O e O 1 Page 123 1
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- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS
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PC01 (MALFUNCTION DELETED)
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RC01 REACTOR COO! ANT PUMP FAILURE TO START FYPE: BOOLEAN CApss: ~ OIL LIFT PUMP RELAY 42XA/IPCPX-LP FAILS OPEN l ASSONED ZNZTEAZ, CONDETECN: PLANT HEAT UP OFFIONS: Ac02A RCP #1 AC02C: RCP #3 RC023: RCP #2 ACO2D: RCP #4 DRACREDT10M: THE MALFUNCTION CAUSES A BLOCK SIGNAliIN THE SELECTED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP START CIRCUIT. IF THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IS RUNNING WHEN THE MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE IT-WILL NOT CAUSE A RCP TRIP.- HOWEVER, IF THE RCP IS STOPPED, IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BE STARTED EVEN THOUGH THE OIL-LIFT PUMP IS RUNNING. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. i l REBTORAtZOM:
. MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL RESTORE THE OIL' LIFT PUMP OERMISSIVE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP STARTING CIRCUIT.
O l l l l 1. O Page 125 4
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. _ _ _ __..._ _ _ _~ .__ _ __ _________ ______._______. _ __._.___________.____
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RCO2 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FLOW FYP5: BOOLEAN CAUS5: ..UNDERFREQUENCY TRIP RELAY l-HXA/IPCPX FAILS CLOSED A380NED EMETEAL CONDZTION: POWER > 3% OPTIONS: RC02A: RCP 01 AC02C: RCP #3 RC028: RCP #2 RCO2D: RCP #4 DESCREDTZQM: THE SELECTED RCP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT THE RCP BREAKER IS OPEN. THE AFFECTED LOOP FLOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM AND THEN INCREASE AS REVERSE FLOW IS ESTABLISHED'AND THE LOW FLOW ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE. THE UNAFFECTED LOOP FLOWS WILL INCREASE SLIGHTLY DUE TO DECREASED CORE DELTA-P. IF REACTOR POWER IS GREATER THAN THE P8 PERMISSIVE THE REACTOR WILL TRIP AND ASSOCIATED PLANT CONTROL LOGIC WILL ACTUATE. IF THE REACTOR POWER IS LESS THAN P8 PERMISSIVE THE PLANT WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND THE AFFECTED LOOP TAVE AND DELTA-T WILL DECREASE. THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL " SHRINK" AND STEAM AND FEED FLOW WILL. DECREASE. THE REMAINING STEAM GENERATORS WILL l ASSUME A HIGHER STEAM LOAD RESULTING IN A HIGHER STEAM AND FEED O FLOW AND STEAM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY. THE. HIGHER STEAM LOAD WILL INCREASE LOOP DELTA-T'S AND TAVE WILL CHANGE REQUIRING ROD MOVEMENT TO RESTORE THE TAVE SETPOINT TO ITS l PROPER VALUE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. 1 RER TOJtA TZQE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY. s 1 I i l O Page 126
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MALFUNCTION CAUSFS AND EFFECTS RC03 Q TYPS: REACTOR COOLANT PUMP HIGH VfBRATION VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 2.5 - 25 MILS > NORMAL CAtFSB ! RCP MOTOR ROTOR OUT OF BALANCE A3809GD ZNZTEAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER 09t% CMS: RC03A: RCP 01 RC03C: RCP t3 RC038: RCP #2 RC03D: RCP #4 DRB.CRXRHDM: AS THE SELECTED RCP SHAFT VIBRATION INCREASES TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY AT A MAXIMUM RATE OF 2 MILS PER MINUTE, THE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BEARING TEMPERATURES WILL INCREASE AS VIBRATION INCREASES. AT SEVERITIES GREATER THAN 15 MILS, THE PUMP CURRENT WILL INCREASE STEADILY-TO A VALUE DEPENDENT ON THE SEVEPITY, AT 100% SEVERITY THE.' PUMP CURRENT WILL VARY ERRATICALLY AND APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES AFTER SEVERITY THE CURRENT WILL INCREASE SUFFICIENTLY TO CAUSE THE RCP BREAKER TO TRIP FROM OVERCURRENT. ANNUNCIATION WILL' ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. OPERATOR ACTION TO REDUCE THE POWER LEVEL BELOW P-8 PERMISSIVE AND IDLE THE AFFECTED LOOP WILL PERMIT CONTINUED OPERATION. O . RERTOAAt%QM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED-INITIAL CONDITION. t e I-O I Page 127
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS-RC04 SBEARED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT eras: nOOLEAN CAUSB: - PUMP COUPLING SHEAR A8809CED ENITEAL CONDETEON: PONER > 3% OPTIONS: RC04A: RCP #1 RC0dC: RCP #3 RC048 - RCP #2 RC0dD: RCP #4-DRBCR191KDR: THE COUPLING FAILURE CAUSES A MOMENTARY INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT ALARM. PUMP VIBRATION AND WILL ACTUATE THE HIGH VIBRATION THE RCP MOTO WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AT A NO LOAD CONDITICN INCREASE TO 40%WHILE LOOP GOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM AND THEN REVERSE.uLOW. THE HIGHER THAN NORMAL REVERSE LOOP FLOW WILL RESULT FROM THE PUMP IMPELLER BEING DIS FROM THE-ANTI-ROTATION DEVICE ON THE MOTOR. LOOP FLOW COASTDOWN WILL BE LESS THAN PUMP TRIP C0%STDOWN TIME. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. IF THE REACTOR POWER IS LESS THAN P-8 PERMISSIVE THE LOOP DELTA T AND TAVE WILL DECREASE FROM
' FLOW. .
AFFECTEDAS.THE LOOP, STEAM LOAD DECREASES ON THE STEAM GENERATOR O STEAM AND' FEED FLOW WILL DECREASE. THE STEAM LOAD ON THE UNAFFECTED STEAM GENERATORS INCREASES, E - TEED FLOW RESPOND ACCORDINGLY, AND STEAM AND BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE PARAMETER CHANGES,AND THEIR DELTA T ALSO INCREAS RESPOND TO RESTORE TAVE. AUTO ROD CONTROL WILL P-8 PERMISSIVE THE' REACTOR WILL TRIP AND ASSOCIA CONTROL LOGIC WILL RESPOND TO THE PJ. ACTOR TRIP. RESTORATEDR: MALFUNCTION HAS BEEN SHUTDOWN. REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED COUPLING AFTER O Page 128
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RC05 \ LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP LUBE OIL O FROM UPPER BEARING OIL RESERVOIR
\
TY95: . VARIABLE: 1% = RCP TRIP IN 10 MINUTES I VARIABLE: 100% = RCP TRIP IN 1 MINUTE CAUS5: OIL RESERVOIR WELD FAILURE ASSUNED ENETZAL CONDZTZON: POWER > 3% 09TIONS: RCOSA: RCP 01 RCOSC: RCP 03 AC053: RCP #2 ACOSD: RCP #4 l DERCRZ9TZQM: THE SELECTED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP UPPER BEARING OIL RESERVOIR LOW LEVEL ALARM WILL BE ACTUATED AND DEPENDING UPON MALFUNCTION ) SEVERITY THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP WILL TRIP AT THE SELECTED TIME INTERVAL. RCP VIBRATION WILL INCREASE AND LOOP FLOW WILL DECREASE. THE RCP BREAKER WILL TRIP ON OVERCURRENT. THE HIGH CURRENT WILL BE REFLECTED ~BACK THROUGH THE POWER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. AFTER THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BREAKER TRIPS, THE LOOP FLOW AND REACTOR PLANT RESPONSE WILL BE THE SAME AS IN THE RCP SHEARED SHAFT MALFUNCTION RC04, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT LOOP REVERSE FLOW WILL BE LESS BECAUSE THE PUMP WILL NOT BE O ROTATING IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RESTORRTZQM:
- RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION.
l I l k l l lO Page 129 l l i l i I .. . . . . . - . -_ , . . _ . . _ . . . , . _ _ , , .. . . , _ . . , . _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . . . , , _ , - , . .. , _ . _ _ , _ . ~ . . . . . _ ,
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RC06 O HIGH OIL LEVEL IN REACTOR COOIANT PUMP
-UPPER BEARING OIL RESERVOIR i TY95: VARIABLE: 0 - 10 GPM CCW INLEAKAGE CAUSB: COMPONENT COOLING WATER COIL LEAK ABS 09GlD ZNZTZAL CCNDZt%ON: 100% POWER OPTZONS: RC06A: RCP #1 BC06C: RCP #3 RC068: RCP #2 RC06D: RCP #4 DRBCRER12DM:
THE INLEAKAGE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER TO THE SELECTED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP UPPER BEARING OIL RESERVOIR-WILL CAUSE A HIGH LEVEL ALARM AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. AS THE WATER AND OIL EMULSIFY A DEGRADED LUBRICANT WILL RESULT AND THE' UPPER RADIAL AND THRUST BEARING TEMPERATURES WILL INCREASE. IN APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES, AT 100% SEVERITY, THE UPPER BEARINGS WILL BEGIN TO DETERIORATE AND MOTOR CURRENT WILL BE ERRATIC AND ROTOR-STATOR VIBRATION WILL INCREASE AND VARY WITH MOTOR CURRENT. THE RCP BREAKER WILL TRIP ON OVERCURRENT. THE HIGH CURRENT WILL BE REFLECTED BACK THROUGH THE POWER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. AFTER THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BREAKER TRIPS, THE LOOP FLOW AND O... REACTOR PLANT RESPONSE WILL BE THE SAME AS IN THE RCP SHEARED SHAFT MALFUNCTION RC04, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT LOOP REVERSE FLOW WILL REVERSE BE LESS BECAUSE THE PUMP WILL NOT BE ROTATING IN THE DIRECTION. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. OPERATOR ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW P-8 AND SECURE THE AFFECTED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP WILL PERMIT PLANT OPERATION AT A LOWER POWER LEVEL. REBTORAt20M: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 130
^ MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1:
RC07 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD FLANGE LEAK , TYPE: VARIABLE: 0.1 10 GPM AT 2235 PSIO CA USE: REACTOR HEAD SEAL RING LEAK ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: RCS PRESSURIZED OPTIONS: RC07A: INNER SEAL RING
- RC075: OUTER SEAL RING tiQ.II: MALFUNCTION RC07A MUST BE INITIATED PRIOR TO' I MALFUNCTION RC97B BEING INITIATED. MALFUNCTION RC07B
- MUST ALSO BE OF AN EQUAL OR LESSER SEVERITY.
. MALFUNCTION RC07B IS MODELED WITH-THE ASSUMPTION - !
' MALFUNCTION RC07A HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY INITIATED. t
- \
DESCRIPTION: WHEN THE INNER SEAL RING LEAKS rr WILL HAVE A NORMAL FLOW PATH THROUGH THE ISOLATION VALVE TO THE RCDT. 'INE DRAIN LINE - , TEMPERATURE ELEMENT WIll INDICATE THE TEMPERA *IURE INCREASE ; .
- APPROPRIATE WisH THE SEVERITY SELECTED. THE OLTTER SEAL RfNG 1 LEAKOFF IS NORMALLY ISOLATED AND A LEAK ON fr CAN BE DETELTED THROUGH VALVE MANIPULATION. ANNUNCIA'ITON WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ' IRE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOSS OF VOLUME WILL CAUSE THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL TO DECREASE WHICH WILL REQUIRE THE ,
CHARGING PLOWTO INCREASE TO MANTAIN LEVEL. OPERATOR ACTION WILL ISOLATE THE LEAKAGE. RESTORATION: ! MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL STOP THE SEAL RING LEAK. s l i i Page 131 % F
MALFUNCTION CAUSES ' AND EFFECTS RC08 REACTOR COOLANT' SYSTEM HOT LEG RUPTURE O' TYPE: BOOl2AN CAUSE: PIPE BREAK AT RX VESSEL T H NOZZLE { ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: RC08A1: LOOP #1 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) l RC08A2: LOOP #1'- DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR _
- RC08E1: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP)
RC0882: LOOP #2 - DOMBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR I RC08C1: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC08C2: LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR RC08DI: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC08D2: LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR lio.TE: THE RCS IS MODELED WITH LIFE DEPENDENT BASELINE ACTIVITY. RADIATION LEVELS ARE ACTIVITY DEPENDENT, CURRENT BASELINES BOL .I uCi/cc MOL .3 uCi/cc BOL .5 uCi/cc QSGCRIPTION: THE EFFECT OF THE LOCA WILL BE A LOSS OF MASS FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, CONSISTENT WITH SPECIFIC SEVERITY SELECTED. THIS WILL BE INDICATED BY A DECREASE IN PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND L CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION LEVEL AND SUMP LEVEL WILL INCREASs. ESF SYSTEMS ACTUATE'IO SHUTDOWN AND REF THE REACIVR, AND TO LIMIT THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND ,
)
TEMPERATURE INCREASES. REACTOR / TURBINE 'IRIP AND ESF SYSTEMS ACTUATION ARE INITIATED BY HIGH CONTAINMENT OR LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND, AT' DIE APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS,CAUSES AUTOMATIC ACTUA'I1ON OF THE ESP SYSTEMS INCLUDING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, CCP, SI, RHR, CS, CCW, SW, AND AFW PUMP STARTING AND APPROPRIATE l AUTOMATIC VALVE OPERATIONS. CONTAINMENT SPRAY WILL ACTUAT 3 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. ESF PERMISSIVE AND BLOCK LOGIC WILL [ ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. l RESTORATION: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O ' Page 132
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MALFUNCTinN CAUSES AND EFFECTS i RC09
-REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COLD LEG RUPTURE TYPEt BOOLEAN CAUSE:
PIPE BREAK AT REAGOR COOLANT PUMP SUCTION ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER } OPTIONS: RC09A1: LOOP #I14 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09A2 LOOP #1 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOUNE SHEAR RC0981: LOOP #2 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09B2: LOOP #2 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR RC09C1: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09C2 LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR RC09D1: LOOP #2 - 4 INCH (TOP OF LOOP) RC09D2: LOOP #4 - DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE SHEAR. j NOTE: THE RCS IS MODELED WITH LIFE DEPENDENT BASELINE
' ACTIVITY.
RADIATION LEVELS ARE ACTIVITY DEPENDENT. CURREbrT B ASFI TNES BOL .1 uCi/cc MOL .3 uCi/cc EOL .5 uCi/cc O DESCRIPTION: l THE EFFECT OF THE LOCA WILL BE A LOSS OF MASS FR COOLANT SYSTEM, CONSISTENT WITH SPECIFIC SEVERITY SELECTED WILL BE INDICATED CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE, BY APRESSURE, DECREASE IN PRESSURIZER RADIATION P LEVEL AND SUMP LEVEL THE WILLAND REACTOR, INCREASE. TO LIMIT THEESF SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT ACTUATE PRESSURE AND TO SH TEMPERATURE INCREASES. REACTOR /rURBINE TRIP AND ACTUATION PRESSURE AND, ARE ATTHEINITIATED APPROPRIATE BY HIGH CONTAINMENT SETPOINTS, OR LO CAUSES AUTOMATIC SI, RHR, CS, CCW, SW, AND AFW PUMP STARTING , 3 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. ESF PERM ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. RESTORA TION: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 133
- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l
R C10 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT l FYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 1,000 GPM AT 2235 PSIG CAUS5: - UNISOLABLE PIPING WELD BREAK ON REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ASSDNED ' INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE i OPTIONS: nons DESCRIDTZOM: A LEAK IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN CONTAINMENT GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE ACTIVITY, AND CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE INCREASES. AS THE LEAK RATE INCREASES , A MORE NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON THE ABOVE WILL BE SEEN. PRESSURI"ER LEVEL WILL START DECREASING AND CHARGING FLOW WII .. INCREASE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. IF THE LEAK RATE INLREASES ABOVE THE CAPACITY OF THE CHARGING PUMP, THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL DECREASE AND AT 17% LEVEL THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL ISOLATE AND PRESSURIZER HEATER CUT OUT WILL ACTUATE. AS SEVERITY INCREASES A REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP WILL OCCUR AND ESF ACTUATION WILL PROVIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AT THE PROPER SETPOINT AND THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS WILL INITIATE TO REFILL AND COOL THE CORE. ALL ASSOCIATED ESF SYSTEMS WILL ACTUATE AUTOMATICALLY TO MAINTAIN LONG TEEM CORE COOLING. v RESTORAT105: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. l l l l l O Page 134
MALFl!NCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS R C11 PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE STUCK FYPR: VARIABLE: 2 - 100% = 420 - 420,000 LBM/HR AT 2485 PSIG CAtTSB SAFETY VALVE INTERNAL FAILURE A38tntED Z M Z T Z A 2e CONDETZON: IN POWER RANGE OPf!ONS: AcalA: VALVE 8010A RC223: VALVE 8010B RC22C: VALVE 8010C DRBCAZR2133N: THE TEMPERATURE INDICATION DOWNSTREAM OF THE SELECTED PRESSURIZER SEVERITY. SAFETY VALVE WILL START INCREASING DEPENDING ON LEAK l PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK LEVEL, TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILL SHOW INCREASES RESULTING FROM THE HIGH ENERGY DISCHARGE FROM THE SAFETY VALVE. PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL START DECREASING AND CHARGING RATE WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. AS THE LEAK RATE INCREASES ABOVE THE CAPACITY OF THE CHARGING PUMP, THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL ; DECREASE AND AT 17% LEVEL THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL ISOLATE AND PRESSURIZER HEATER CUT OUT WILL ACTUATE. AS SEVERITY INCREASES O A REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP WILL OCCUR AND ESF ACTUATION WILL PROVIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AT THE PROPER SF.TPOINT AND THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS WILL INITIATE TO REFILL--AND COOL THE CORE. ALL ASSOCIATED ESF SYSTEMS WILL ACTUATE AUTOMATICALLY TO MAINTAIN LONG TERM CORE CCOLING. 'IF THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK RUPTURES, CONTAINMENT GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE' ACTIVITY, AND
-CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE.
ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RBDTORATXQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SAFETY VALVE INTERNAL FAILURE. O - Page 135
_j MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ;
^RCA2 Q (MOVED TO REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM) l i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS R C13 Q FY95: BOOLEAN LOOSE PART IN REACTOR CAUS5: . LOOSE PART IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD A88DISD INYf2AL CC092FION: ANY PLANT CONDITION 09Fzons: noun r ( DERRRERREDM: THE LOOSE PART CAUSES INDICATIONS AND ALARMS INDICATIVE OF A LOOSE PART IN THE UPPER MEAD OF THE REACTOR VESSEL. THE RIGHT AND LEFT SPEAKERS IN THE LOOSE PARTS MONITORING CABINET WILL NOT GENERATE SOUNDS OF THE LOOSE PART. RERTORAEROM: \ MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REMOVES THE LOOSE PART. O l ( e i Page 137
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECT5 R C14 Q FYF5: LOOSE PART IN STEAM GENERATOR #1 800 LEAN CAUS5: - LOOSE PART IN STEAM GENERATOR fl IMLET PLENUM ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFION: ANY PLANT CONDITION 09FIONS: nonE DRSCREDEZQM: i THE LOOSE PART WILL CAUSE !!OICATIONS AND ALARMS INDICATIVE OF A LOOSE PART IN THE INLET PLEFUM OF STEAM GENEPATOR fl. THE RIGHT 1 1 AND LEFT SPEAKERS IN THE F OSE PARTS MONITORING CABINET WILL NOT i I GENERATE SOUNDS OF TN" " ACE PMT. 1 i s .mmmmmmmmmmmer i
} RRBTORATION:
i MALFtmCTION REMOVAL REMOVES THE LOOSE PART. i i iO i I Y 1 l
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MALFUNCTION CAU5E5 AND EFFECTS i l RDoi 9 FYF5: CONTROL BANK CONTINUOUS ROD WITHDRAWAL 300 LEAN I CAUSB: - MASTER CYCLER FAILURE ASSE2SD KWZFIAI, CCEPIFICW: SUBCRITICAL OR IN POWER RANGE l i OFFIONS: AD01A CONTROL BANK 'A' JtD02C: CONTROL BANK 'C' l 20013: CONTROL BANK 'B' Jt002D CONTROL BANK 'D' i I l DERCE29tiont: l l i
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THE CONTROL ROD BANK WITHDRAWS AT A RATE OF 48 STEPS PER MINUTE. ! ACTUATION OF THE ROD STOPS WILL NOT STOP THE CONTROL BANK ROD i
-l WITHDRAWAL. IF THE REACTOR IS CLOSE TO CRITICALITY, THE REACTOR !
WILL BE TAKEN SUPERCRITICAL ON A STARTUP RATE DEPENDENT UPON l I CONTROL BANK WORTH. REACTOR POWER WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE } i UNTIL TERMINATED BY THE SOURCE RANGE HIGH FLUX TRIP. IN THE J 1 POWER RANGE THE INCREASE IN REACTOR PONER WILL INCREASE T A vg AND {' RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN PRESSURIZEP PRESSURE, LEVEL AND STEAM 1 GENERATOR PRESSURE. THE OVERTEMPERATURE N-16 SETPOINT WILL BE EXCEEDED RESULTING IN A TURBINE RUNBACK AND REACTOR TRIP. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. CORE FLUX WILL I RESPOND TO CONTROL BANK ROD WITHDRAWAL, DEPENDING ON INITIAL ! l CONTROL BANK ROD POSITION AND WORTH. AmstORArg 'E: 1 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MASTER CYCLER FP' LURE. ! i i f I i t 1 i l l l I-L O Page 139 l l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RD02 0 FYPB: CONTROL BANK CONTINUOUS ROD INSERTION DOOLEAN CAUSB: - MASTER CYCLER FAILURE A88t2CBD EN2F2A& CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OFFIONS: A002A: CONTROL BANK 'A' AD02C: CONTROL BANK 'C' AD028: CONTROL BANK 'B' RD02D: CONTROL BANK 'D' DRBCARDt2CM: THE CONTROL ROD BANK INSERTS AT A RATE OF 48 STEPS PER MINUTE. REACTOR POWER DECREASES CAUSING Tave TO DECREASE. THE DECREASE IN Tave WILL DECREASE PRESSURIZET. PRESSURE, LEVEL AND STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE. A REACTOR TAIP WILL OCCUR DUE TO LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. THE REACTOR JORE FLUX WILL RESPOND TO THE BANK INSERTION, DEPENDING UPON INITIAL BANK POSITION AND BANK WORTH. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. BERECRAEROM: MALTUitr. TION REMOVAL WILL STOP THE BANK INSERTION. O. O Page 140 W
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i l RD03 O onomoax l ryss: sOOLEAN l ' CAUS5: - FAILURE OF CRDM STATIONARY GRIPPER COIL ASSONED INIFIA& CCNDIFION: IN POWER RANGE i 09tIONS: ART noo , EG21: Tas asLacTso moc(s) To as amorpse wzL2, ess Tas Roo castomaron resuTrrzcATrou as Tas untrancTrom WUussR (za: moosse rom mon a4) . i DRRCARDEXQM: , i ' THE SELECTED POD WILL DROP TO THE FULL IN POSITION. THIS WILL BE INDICATED BY THE ROD POSITION INDICATION AND ANNUNCIATION. IF MORE TRAN vNE ROD IS DROPPED, ALL FOUR NEGATIVE PATE TRIP - BISTABLES WILL ACTIVATE AND A REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR (SEE SAR 88SA0748). WITH THIS MALFUNCTION ACTIVE, ANY ATTEMPT TO l i WITHDRAW THE DROPPED ROD (S) WILL BE IGNORED. THE F.OD DROP WILL CAUSE REACTOR POWER AND Tave TO DECREASE. THE DECAEASE IN REACTOR POWER MAY RESULT IN A NEGATIVE RATE TRIP r,EFENDING ON THE LOCATION AND/OR NUMBER OF DROPPED RODS. THE DT. CREASE IN ! O Tave WILL DEPEND ON THE WORTH OF THE DROPPED ROD (S) . THE DECREASE IN Tave WILL CAUSE A DECREASE IN PRESSURI",ER LEVEL AND PRESSURE, AND, IF LARGE ENOUGH, WILL RESULT IN A LOW PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP. THE REACTOR CORE FLUX SHAPE WILL RESPOND TO THE j DROPPED ROD (S) DEPENDING ON INITIAL HEIGHT, WORTH, AND CORE i LOCATION. THE DROPPED ROD (S) MAY BE RECOVERED AFTER MALFUNCTION l REMOVAL. ANNUNCIATION WILL ?CTUATE AS APPROPRIATE.
, ARSTORAEXQM:
MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE CRDM STATIONARY GRIPPER COIL. , 9 I O Page 141 c- _ _.,_.;__ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ ___._._.._.2.___. . _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ , _ . _ _ . _ _ .
i ! MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RD04 \'Q FYF3: BOOLEAN STUCK ROD l ! CAUS3 : MECMANICAL BINDING OF ROD '
- ASSCMED INIFIAL CoffDIFIOft REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS SHUT l OFFIONS
- ant nod EQ21: TER SELBCTED ROD (S) To BE STOCR WILL USE TER ROD i DBSteuATOR ZDENTIFICATION AS tnt IthLFUNCTION NUttBER i 1
! (In: mDosse Fom mod 34).
DERCRz9T2ON: ' l THE SELECTED ROD WILL BE STUCK AT ITS PRESENT POSITION. IF THE 1 ROD IS HOVING WHEN THE MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE, THE ROD WILL GO TO Th4 NEXT STEP POSITION AND REMAIN THERE. AS THE ASSOCIATED ROD BANK IS MOVED, THE ROD DEVIATION ALAPJi WILL - ACTUATE INDICATING A MISPOSITJJNED ROD. THE REACTOR CORE FLUX ' SHAPE WILL RESPOND TO THE STUCK ROD THE ROD WILL NOT BE n PERMANENTLY BOUND AND CAN BE RECOVERED AFTER MALFUNCTION REMOVAL. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. l C ld aggromarrom: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL FREES THE STUCK ROD. l i . l l l O , Page 142 1 .
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I MALFUNCTidN CAUSES AND EFFECTS mum. RDOS Q FYF5: ALL CONTROL RODS FML TO MOVE BOOLEAN CAUS5: - PULSER FAILURE ASSC5dBD INIFIAK, CCNDIFIOlt: IN POWER RANGE OFFZONS: nonn l assenzarzon: l THE CONTROL RODS WILL NOT RESPOND TO ANY MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC , DEMAND SIGNAL. REACTOR POWER CANNOT BE CHANGED BY ROD MOVEMENT, ! EXCEPT BY INITIATION OF A REACTOR TRIP. ANY CHANGE IN REACTIVITY REQUIRED FOR MAINTAINING TAVE WILL HAVE TO 3E DONE BY ! BORATION OR DILUTION. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. i , i AnnronArzam: 1 t MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE PULSER. 1 , O . I O Page 143
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l RD06 EJECTION OFROD FROM THE CORE FYF5: BOOLEAN CAUS5: - RUPTURE OF CONTROL ROD MECHANISM HOUSING ASSUMED IN2FIAL COND2F20N: 100% POWER OFFIONS: ANY ROD 3g21: TER SELacTBD ROD (s) To as EJacTBD wzt.L Usa Tas Roc pasteuATom zoswTzrtcATrom As Tam uns.rvucTzou wounam (In: moosed rom moo 34) . l DERCERBEXCE: ! THE-SELECTED CONTROL ROD IS EJECTED FROM THE CORE IMMEDIATELY. I ROD POSITION INDICATION WILL FAIL LOW DUE TO POWER BEING DISCONNECTED. REACTOR POWER WILL RESPOND ACCORDING TO ROD WORTH AND POSITION IN THE CORE AT TME TIME OF EJECTION, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL DECREASE IMMEDIATELY DUE TO THE RUPTURE OF THE MECHANISM HOUSING. THE MASS LOSS FROM THE RCS WILL BE l' 20,000 GPM AT 2235 PSIG. BASED ON AN EQUIVALENT 4 INCH DIAMETER RUPTURE. RUPTURE FLOW WILL VARY APPROPRIATELY WITH D/P. ALL ALARMS AND INDICATION ASSOCIATED WITH PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL ACTUATE. THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, O ACTIVITY LEVEL AND SUMP LEVEL WILL INCREASE. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION WILL OCCUR WHEN THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS ARE REACHED AND WILL PROVIDE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SPRAY TO LIMIT THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE INCREASE. i SEREQEM LQE: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. 1 i O Page 144
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l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS j 4
- I RD07 0 (A SELECTED PORTION OF THE ROD BREAKS OFF)
BROKEN ROD { FYP5: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF ROD WORTH CAUS5: MECHANICAL FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAZ, CONDIFION: ANY PLANT CONDITION i OFFIONS: ANY ROS 3221: Ts3 SELECTED 200(S) To BE amoREN WILL USE TEE ROD DESIGNATOR IDENTIFICATION AS TEE MALFUNCTION NUMBER l (II: RD0394 FOR ROD B4) . 3Q21: AT ANY GIVEN Tits ONLY 10 BROREN ROD MALFUNCTIONS .) CAN BE ACTIVATED. 9 DERCR1911QM: A PORTION OF THE SELECTED ROD WILL BREAK LOOSE. THE SEVERITY SELECTED AND ROD CORE LOCATION WILL DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON THE CORE. IF THE ROD IS BOTTOMED THE SELECTED PORTION WILL REMAIN ON THE BOTTOM WHEN THE ROD IS WITHDRAWN. IF THE ROD IS IN MOTION OR AT A LEVEL OTHER THAN ON THE BOTTOM. THE SELECTED O PORTION WILL FALL TO THE BOTTOM AND THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT OF A DROPPED ROD, AS IN RD03, WITH A VARIABLE SEVERITY OR REACTIVITY EFFECT. THE ROD POSITION INDICATION WILL INDICATE PROPER ROD POSITION ACCORDING TO THE OTHER RODS IN THE BANK, SINCE THE ROD POSITION DETECTOR WILL REMAIN OPERATIONAL. THERE WILL BE NO ROD POSITION INDICATION ALARMS. THE REACTOR CORE FLUX SHAPE WILL RESPOND TO THE BROKEN ROD. REATQAATZQM: RESET SIMULATOR TO DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. t O Page 145 l l l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND GFECTS r RD&8 Q CONTROL RODS MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF DEMAND (AUTOMATIC CONTROL ONLY) TYPE: - BOOLEAN CAUS5: ROD CONTROL CIRCUIT TAILURE ASSOMED INIFIAI, CONDITION: POWER > 3%; RODS IN AUTOMATIC OPTIONS: nong DERCARDEZQE: THE RODS WILL MOVE IN THE PROPER SEQUENCE AND OVERLAP BUT IN A l DIRECTION OPPOSITE TO REQUIRED WHEN A DEMAND SIGNAL IS PRESENT AND ROD CONTROL IS IN AUTOMATIC. THIS RESULTS IN AGGRAVATION OF A SITUATION THAT ROD MOVEMENT WAS INTENDED TO CORRECT. THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO THE'NORNAL TRIP SETPOINTS WHEN THEY AT.E ACTt \TED. THE OPERATOR CAN TAKE MANUAL ROD CONTROL FOR PROPEP ROD U.lNTROL SYSTEM OPERATION. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. RERTORATEON: MALTUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE ROD CONTROL CIRCUIT FAILURE. O Page 146 y_ ...-.__,~....w., ..m..-, . , _ . . _ . , . . . . _ _ . , _ , . , - , , _ _ . _ _ . _ _ , _ . . , . , _ . . - , ~ . . ~ . ......_- ._ .- ,..._.-., -. - . . . . . . . . . .
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l i l RD09 Q FYF5: DIGITAL ROD POSITION INDICATION FAILURE , VARIABLE: 0 - 228 STEPS l CAUSB: DISPLAY CARD FAILURE l A330NED INETZAL CCNDZTEON: 1006 POWER OFFIONS: AuY ROD EQ21: TER SELECTED ROD (S) FOR DAFx FAILURE USE TEE ROD ' DESzomatoR 2DENTIFzcArzou As TER asALrencTrow woumER i (23: R00354 FOR ROD E4) . i DRECA19T20M: THE SELECTED ROD DRPI WILL INDICATE THE SELECTED POSITION. THE ACTUAL ROD POSITION WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED AND WILL TUNCTION NORMALLY WITH THE BANK, RESPONDING TO ALL MOTION SIGNALS. i ARBTORATZOM: 1 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE DISPLAY CARD. i O o 9 O l Page 147 l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ' RD10 Q ROD STOPS FAIL TO BLOCK ROD MOVEMENT 4 FYPS: BOOLEAN CAUS5:
- ROD CONTROL SYSTEM LOGIC FAILURE ASSONED INIFIA2, CONDIFICW: ANY PLANT CONDITION OFFZONS: nome 4
i DRRCRZ9920E: I
- THE ROD STOP LOGIC FOR C-1,C-2,C-3,C-4,C-5 AND C-11 IS BYPASSED.
)
DURING LOW POWER OPERATIONS, AS REACTOR POWER IS INCREASED ABOVE THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE HIGH FLUX ROD STOP (C-1) SETPOINT, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT STOP. HOWEVER, ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE INDICATING THE SETPOINT HAS BEEN EXCEEDED. IF THE INTERMEDIATE PANGE BLOCK CONTROL HAS NOT BEEN ACTUATED, A
)
REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR IF THE RODS CONTINUE TO BE WITHDRAWN. IF < TURBINE POWER IS LESS THAN 15% AND THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM IS IN AUTOMATIC, THE ROD WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT BE BLOCKED FROM EVEN IF THE C-5 LOW POWER INTERLOCK SIGNAL IS ACTIVATED. DURING HIGH POWER OPERATIONS, AS.REACTOP POWER IS INCREASED ; ABOVE THE SETPOINT OF THE POWER RANGE HIGH FLUX PC0 STOP .(C-2), O- CON'fROL ROD WITHDPAWAL WILL NOT EE STOPPED. AN'.4UNCIATION WILL ACTUATE INDICATING THE SETPOINT HAS BEEN EXCELDED HOWEVER. IT THE OVERTEMPERATURE N16 ROD STOP (C-3) OR TF4 OVER POWER N16 ROD STOP (C-4) SETPOINTS ARE EXCEEDED, A TURBIVE RUNBACK WILL OCCUR UNTIL THE OVER TEMPERATURE OR OVER POWER CONDITION IS CORRECTED. RRREORAtXQE ;- MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM LOGIC FAILURE. s
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l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l RDil Q CONTROL ROD SPEED CONTROL FAILS (IN AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL MODE) FYPS: - VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 8 - 72 STEPS PER MINUTE CAUSK ROD SPEED CONTROLLER FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAZ, CONDIFION: POWER > 3% ! 09tIONS: nonx DmmCA19T10m: THE ROD SPEED WILL FAIL TO THE SELECTED SPEED IN EITHER MANUAL 1 OR AUTOMATIC MODES OF THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM. IF THE SELECTED { ROD SPEED IS HIGHER THAN THAT REQUIRED BY A PARTICULAR PLANT TRANSIENT, THE ROD MOVEMENT WILL TEND TO CAUSE AN EXCESS REACTIVITY CHANGE AND THE PMSULTING REACTOR POWER WILL OVERSHOOT IT'S EXPECTED VALUE. THIS 4FFECT WILL BE SEEN WHEN EITHER WITHDRAWAL OR INSERTION OF THE CONTROL RODS IS REQUIRED. THIS WILL RESULT IN A REACTOR POWER OSCILLATION, THE MAGNITUDE OF WHICH WILL BE RELATED TO SEVERITY. IF THE SELECTED ROD SPEED IS LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED BY A PARTICULAR PLANT TRANSIENT, THE r REACTIVITY CHANGE CAUSED BY ROD SPEED WILL NOT PROPERLY COMPENSATE FOR LOAD CHANGE, AND REACTOR POWER AND TEMPEPATURE WILL RESPOND IN A SLUGGISH MANNER, EFFECTIVELY WIDENING THE INT JCATED CONTROL BAND. REntORAT10M: 4 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE ROD SPEED CONTROLLER. l 1 O l Page 149
l l 1 l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1 l l RD12 0 FYF5; DIGITAL ROD POSITION INDICATION LOGIC EAILURE BOOLEAN CAUS5: - ALARM LOGIC FAILURE A380NED ENETEAX, CONDZTZON: 100% POWER OFFIONS: AD22& URGENT ALARM ALL RODS JtD223: NON URGENT ALARM ALL RODS DRACREDTXQM: 1 THE SELECTED ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE. THERE WILL BE NO EFFECT ON i THE PLANT OTHER THAN THE ANNUNCIATION. THE OPERATOR RESPONSE l SHOULD BE TO VERIFY THE CONDITION THAT WOULD NORMALLY ACTUATE THE ALARM. THE ALARM WILL AUTOMATICALLY CLEAR WHEN THE MALFUNCTION IS REMOVED. ERRTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE ALARM LOGIC FAILURE. lO I O Page 150
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RD13 (MALFUNCTION DELETED) O i O Page 151
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- MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ;
I , I' RH01 i 0 FrFs: RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP (S) TRIP soOLzAN CAU33; . FAtiLTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE i ASSUMED INIFIAI, CONDIFION: PUMP RUNNING l, OFFIONS A302A: RNR PUMP $1 A5023: RER PUMP $2 i DRBCREDT10M: l j THE SELECTED RHR PUMP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT THE PUMP BREAKER IS OPEN. THE AFTECTED RHR LOOP FLOW WILL DECREASE TO l MINIMUM, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. ( THE l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE. l THE UNAFFECTED RHR LOOP CAN BE PLACED IN OPEPATION, WHICH WILL ! REESTABLISH CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE l APPROPRIATELY. i i 1 nasronArron: l MALrUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE. l O l l l i i Page 152
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l RH02 l Q FYF5: RESIDUAL BEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM LOW FLOW VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 100% OF RATED FLOW l CAUS5: - PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE MISPOSITIONED AS#tRIED INIFIAL CCIIDIFICN SHUTDOWN - RHR IN OPERATION OFTEONS: AEC2A: 1-8724k A5023: 1-87243 3923: RER IS 300 DELED TO EAVE A LINEAR FLOW RESPONSE TO VALVE POSITIONS. nnnenzarzam: 1 THE SELECTED RHR PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSES CAUSING AFFECTED RHR LOOP FLOW TO DECREASE AND PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE TO INCREASE. THE PUMP RECIRCULATING CONTROL VALVE WILL MODULATE OPEN TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT RECIRC FLOW FOR PROPER RHR PUMP
- OPERATION. DECREASED FLOW THROUGH THE RER HEAT EXCHANGER WILL CAUSE THE HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE TO MODULATE OPEN.
AS THE TOTAL FLOW DECREASES THE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABIL4TY IS j DECREASED AND PLANT COOLDOWN WILL TAKE LONGER. REACTOR COOLANT e SYSTEM PARAMETERS WILL REFLECT SINGLE RNR TRAIN OPERATION. WHEll i O THE PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE IS COMPLETELY CLOSED THE PUMP RECIRC l i FLOW WILL BE MINIMUM AND THE PUMP WILL SEIZE IN 90 SECONDS l CAUSING THE MOTOR BREAKER TO TRIP ON OVERCURRENT. ANNUNCIATION ! WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. i REATCAAt20M: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL OPENS THE RHR PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE. i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RH03 l0 REilDUAL BEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK FYPE: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 5 - 500 GPM AT OPERATING PRESSURE i CAUSB: ' TUBE BREAK 1 ASSUMED INIFIAL CCNDIFICW: SHUTDOWN - RHR IN OPERATION l i i OFFIONS: M0JA: RNR MEAT EXCHANGER "A" i M033: RNR MEAT EXCMANGER "B" l DRSCRER12OM: THI,efILL RESULT IN A LEAK FROM THE RHR SYSTEM INTO THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM FOR THE APPROPRIATE TRAIN SELECTED AT A FLOW RATE DEPENDING ON SEVERITY LEVEL AND SYSTEM PRESSURE. THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AND THE INCREASED VOLUME OF THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM WILL CAUSE THE APPROPRIATE SECTION OF THE CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL TO INCREASE AND THE CCW SYSTEM RADIATION LEVEL WILL INCREASE. THE RHR PUMP FLOW WILL INCREASE AND THE HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET FLOW WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE CCW SURGE TANK HI LEVEL ALARM WILL ACTUATE SECURING ANY MAKE-UP IN PROGRESS. THE PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL ALARM WILL ACTUATE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. AERTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE TUBE BREAK. t i l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RH04 Q RESIDUAL REAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE INADVERTENTLY CLOSES TYPS: - BOOLEAN CAUSB: VALVE OPERATOR MALFUNCTION A380NED ZNETZAL CONDZTECN: SHUTDOWN - COOLDONN 09t%ON8: am04A: HCV-606 RE048: HCV- 60 *1 DRBCREDEROR: THE SELECTED RHR PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSES CAUSING AFFECTED RHR LOOP FLOW TO DECREASE AND PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE TO INCREASE. THE PUMP RECIRCULATING CONTROL VALVE WILL MODULATE ( OPEN TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT RECIRC FLON FOR PROPER RHR PUMP OPERATION. DECREASED FLOW THROUGH THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER WILL CAUSE THE HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE TO MODULATE OPEN. AS THE TOTAL FLOW DECREASES THE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY IS DECREASED AND PLANT COOLDOWN WILL TAKE LONGER. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PARAMETERS WILL REFLECT SINGLE RHR TRAIN OPERATION. THE AFFECTED RRR PUMP WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN RECIRCULATION FLuvl. O ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. KEREQAATXOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED CONTROL VALVE. O Page 155 j
l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RH0S lO - FYPN RBR SUCTION REUEF VALVE FAILURE VARIABLE: 1 - 1008'= 7.7 - 770 GPM CAF#5: - RELIEF VALVE FAILURE , ASSONED INIFIAZ, C001DIFIC0F: SHUTDOWN - COOLDOWN l OFFIONS: AEOSA: 1-8708A i A3033: 1-87083 l 1 EQ21: TER DESIMI CAPACITY OF TEE SUCTION RELIEF VALVE IS 900 GPM. TEUS, IF TER MhLFUNCT2006 SEVERITY IS SET AT 1004 (770 GPN) , TER RELIEF VALVE WILL ONLY PASS - 88.54 OF IT'S DESIST FLOW. l DRRCA19110m: THE SELECTED RHR SUCTION RELIEF VALVE WILL FAIL AT THE SELECTED SEVERITY LEVEL. THE RESULTING MASS LOSS WILL CAUSE REACTOR COOLANT AND RHR PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE TO DECREASE. THE , DISCHARGE OF THE RELIEF VALVE TO THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK WILL CAUSE THE PRESSURE AND LEVEL TO INCREASE DEPENDENT UPON SEVERITY. THE PRESSURIZER LF .L AND PRESSURE WILL RESPOND ACCORDING THE MASS LOSS SEVEE- f. THE RHR PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE O- MAY DECREASE TO A LEVEL WHERE _IE PUMP WILL CAVITATE AND RHR SYSTEM FLOW DECREASE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. 1 RERFORAT10M: e MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SUCTION RELIEF VALVE. . O Page 156
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l 1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS ' aH06 O == suur asciac vatves stucx ctoseo . l Fras: sootzAN CAUSs - VALVE STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION t ASSO3RD INIFIAL CONDIFIC0ft LOCA - INITIATION OF COLD LEG , RECIRC OPTIONS: RE06A: 8811A AE0fs: 8811B i EQ23:vaLv3 OPEmarom amEnzRR TEEmukt ovEmLoap rs nor ; j StupLaTED. TEUS, TER VALVE WILL NOT OPEN. 4 i
- DERCREDTION
i WHEN THE RWST LOW LEVEL SIGNAL IS INITIATED FOR RHR PUMP SUCTION TO BE SHIFTED TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMPS, THE SELECTED MOTOR VALVE 8811A OR 8811B WILL FAIL TO OPERATE AND THE AFFECTED TRAIN WILL
- CONTINUE TO TAKE A SUCTION FROM THE RWST. THE OPERATOR CAN LINE i
UP THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO OPERATE ON SINGLE TRAIN COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. WITH NO OPERATOR ACTION, EQUIPMENT ' DAMAGE AND CORE COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABILITY WILL RESULT, ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. SINCE THERMAL OVERLOAD Ot IS NOT SIMULATED THE ANNUNCIATORS RELATED TO MOV OVERLOAD WILL NOT ACTUATE. l ._ anstaantxas: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL ALLOWS NORMAL OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVE.
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RM01 O VENT STACK GASEOUS RADIATION MONITOR POWER LOSS TY98: 800 LEAN CApss: .. sLOWN FUSE IN POWER SUPPLY / TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKER 13 A380NED ZMETZAL CONDZTECN: 100% POWER OFFZONS: AAf01A VENT STACK 'A'
- RE-5567A/68A/75A Alf013: VENT STACK 'B' - RE-5567B/68B/758 {
)
i DERCRZ9tXQM: THE LOS! OF r"fL TO THE SELECTED VENT STACK GASEOUS RADIATION . MONITOR WILL CAUSE THE MONITOR INDICATION TO FAIL TO MINIMUM. LOSS Or l'OWER ASSOCIATLD PUMP.TO THE MONITOR DOES NOT AFFECT POWER TO ITS RERTOAktZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL RESTORE POWER TO THE MONITOR. O 1 I
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$ MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RM02 INCREASING RADIATION LEVEL ON AREA MONITOR l FYPS! VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF SCALE '
CAUSE - MONITOR MALTUNCTION 1 ASSDNED EMETEAL CONDZTION: 100% PONER 09TIONS: ., i comTarnumme antLarma [ AW02A2 1RE6250/CTE-109 AN02A W: IM6256/IIR-114 AX02A2: 1RE6251/RFM-110 AN02A 7: 1RE6285/STR-115 4 AN02AJ: 1RE6252/CTE-111 AN02AS: 1M6290A/CTE-116 AN02Ad: 1RE6253/RFC-112 AN02AS: 1RE62903/CTE-117
- AN02AS
- 1RE6255/CTE-113 '
airmaniana anrLarma l AN0232: 1RE6257/CAH-118 AW0234: 1RE6286/EEQ-125 AW0282: 1RE6259/FSA-119 AN0255: 1RE6261/PSR-124 AN0233: 1RE6260A/RNR-122 AffYrLThmW RDILB1ma AN02C2: XRE6262/PDP-134 AN02Cf XRE6271/MRB-043 AN02C2: O AN02C3: XRE6264/DNA-036 XRE6266/NEV-038 AN02C7! AN02C#: XRE6287/ ROC-044 XRE6277/FDP-005 RN02Cd XRE6268/GDT-040 AN02C#: XRE6288/ AUX-045 AN02CS: XRE6270/ HUT-042 font antLnzma AN02D2: XRE6272/SFP-001 AN02Dd XRE6279/SCA-007 AN02D2: XRE6274/CFP-003 AN02DS: XRE6289/DFA-008 AN02D3: XRE6278/FSC-006 , Tumarna anrLnzma AN0252: XRE6280/MMk-050 AN0252: ! 1RE6284/CRA-152 me =ceareme- mm cansvant anrLBrno AN02F2: XRE6281/CRM-048 r O Page 159 e
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RM02 O ....,,. INCREASING RADIATION LEVEL ON AREA MONITOR THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED AREA MONITOR IND TO CHANGE TO THE SETPOINT SELECTED BY MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. THE AREA MONITOR. DATA MAS ALARM AND INDICATION IN THE CONTROL R i ALARMS WILL ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. AERtoRAT2CE: e
- MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MONITOR MALFUNCTION.
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i l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS n RM03 V PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR FAILURE j TY95: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF SCALE I CAUSN: ' PROCESS MONITOR DETECTOR MALFUNCTION j A380NED E M E T E A lo CONDETZON: 100% POWER j O9TIONS: 4 Armaomum teou1 Toms j AN03A1: XRE5568A/PVP-093 AN0JF: XRE5702/Hvv-090 l AN03A2: XRE5575A/PVI-094 ANO3G: 1RE5698/SBV-187 l AN03A3: XRE5567A/PVG-084 AN030 XRE5250/MGS-083 RNO382: 1RE5502/ CAP-198 ANOJA: 1RE2959/ COG-182 i ANOJ82: 1RE5566/CAI-199 AN0JU2 : 1RE2325/MSL-178 AN038J: 1RE5503/CAG-197 AN03U2: 1RE2326/MSL-179 AN03C: XRE5896/CRV-092 AN0JUJ: 1RE2327/MSL-180 AN03D: 1RE5637A/MSV-186 RN03U4: 1RE2328/MSL-181 ANO35: XRE5701/ABV-089 AN03V: XRE5700/FBV-088 i I LIQUID RAOMITQas i i AN035: XRE3230/ASC-061 AW03N: 1RE4200/SGS-164 j AN0JI: XRE5380/BRC-077 AN03N: 1RE5179/SGB-173 i ANO3J2 : 1RE4509/CCM-167 RN030: 1RE5100/TBD-172 ANO3J2: 1RE4510/CCW-168 AN03F2: XRE5251/LRL-074 AN03J3: 1RE4511/CCW-169 ANO372: XRE5252/LRC-075 ! ANO3K2: , 1RE4269/SSN-165 RN0373: XRE5253/LWE-076 AN03K2: 1RE4270/SSN-166 ANO38: XRE4180/SFD-062 ANOJ1: XRE4863/SFC-070 ANO3F: XRE418/SFD-062 i DERCRZBE$OE: l 1 THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED PROCESS MONITOR INDICATION TO CHANGE TO THE SETPOINT SELECTED BY MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. THE PROCESS MONITOR DATA HAS ALARM AND INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM. ALARMS WILL ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. , ARRt0AntXOM: 1 j MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MONITOR MALFUNCTION. ! Page 161 l . 4
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i MALFUNCHON CAUSES AND EFFECTS I RM04 0 CONTAINMENT GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE MONITOR LOWFLOW FYF5 BOOLEAN j CAUSB: VACUUM PUMP MOTOR FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER l OPTIONS: nonx I amScarseron: THZS MALFUNCTION CAUSES THE CONTAINMENT GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE MONITOR TO LOSE CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE FLOW. THE LOW FLOW ' CONDITION WILL BE INDICATED ON THE RADIATION MONITOR CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE CONTAINMENT MONITOR INDICATION WILL SLOWLY DECREASE TO MINIMUM BACKGROUND LEVEL AS A RESULT Or NO SAMPLING MEDIUM. RERTQAATEDE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE VACUUM PUMP MOTOR. O . l O Page 162 _ _ . . , . -,.___.~,._....._,_......,.._..,...,,.._,.__,..,,..,.._,._._m_.... -,_ _ ..,.., , . _ . , , . - . . ,,_,,_,,,_,,,,,._..,.__m ,.
i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \ RP01 l FAILURE OF ALL AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIPS Trp5: sOOLEAw CADS 5; . SHORT OF TPANSISTOR Q3 2N7431 (JANTX) 48V POWER SUPPLY ASSONED ENETEAL CONDETEOW. 100% POWER OFTEONS: Nona CADTIDE: ACTUATING mP01 IN CoWJUNCTZoN WITE TC01 (FAILURE or Taastus Taxes) Amp Tr01 (Loss or TrCW) CAN i CAosa Tus LIwres or tab TPCW 8000EL (WITE REGARD To TpCw Tansfam&TUmss) To as axCassac, saa Trol C&Os3 AND EFFECTS. I anscazarxCm: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL PREVENT THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS FRO OPENING WHEN AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL IS ACTUATED. BY ALLOWING STA RELAY (SHUNT 48V TO TRIPBE CONTINUOUSLY RELAY) . APPLIED TO THE UV COILS AN POWER WILL BE MAINTAINED TO THE ROD DRIVE POWER BUS AND THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS. THE P-4 PERMISSIVE TO THE SI LOGIC, FW ISOLATION VALVE, LOGIC, AND 6 TURBINE THE REACTOR TRIP TRIP LOGIC BREAKERS. WILL BE BLOCKED SINCE THEY ARE A FUNCTI 4 THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM WILL STILL i RESPOND TO MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC CONTROL FOR ROD INSERTION, HOWEVER, REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS, AS APPROPRIATE, WILL EE EXCEEDED. ! THE OPERATOR CAN INITIATE A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WHI j WILL OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AND THE PLANT WIL ACCORDING TO CONTROL AND ALAPM LOGIC. A LOSS OF SSPS i FEEDS THE 48V POWER SUPPLY WILL CAUSE A REACTOR NO TRIP. ! SPECIAL PROVIDED, HOWEVER, CORE MODELING PROVISIONS FOR GROSS CORE DAMA i, INDICATION OF FUEL LEARAGE. INSERTING MALFUNCTION CRO e RERFORAEEQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE 48V POWER SUPPLY TRANS l t I i l i ! l iO 1 Page 163 1 i
r MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP02 SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP CAUSB: - REACTOR TRIP CIRCUITRY FAILURE ! ABBDNED EN%t%AL COND%t%OW: 100% POWER 097%ONS: n088 LLERCREH1.QR: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE A NON-SPECIFIC REACTOR PROTECTION CIRCUITRY FAILURE WILL ACTUATE A REACTOR TRIP. THERE WILL BE NO ANNUNCIATION PRIOR TO THE TRIP, BUT ANNUNCIATION WILL RESULT AS APPROPRIATE AFTER THE TRIP IS ACTUATED. ALL CONTROL RODS WILL BE FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE, RPI AND ROD BOTTOM LIGHTS WILL INDICATE ALL RODS IN. REACTOR POWER WILL RAPIDLY DECREASE FOR SEVERAL DECADES AND THEN SLOW DOWN TO A RATE PROPORTIONATE TO DELAYED NEUTRON DELAY, AS POWER DECREASES, ALL i ASSOCIATED PERMISSIVES WILL ACTUATE AS REQUIRED. ACTUATION OF ! (P-4) . WILL TRIP THE TURBINE AND THE STEAM DUMPS WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE PLANT TRIP CONTROLLER. THE TURBINE TRIP WILL ) i CAUSE TAVE TO INCREASE CAUSING PRESSURIZER AND STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TO INCREASE. l PRESSURIZER SPRAY AND RELIEF VALVES WILL i O ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPCiNTS LIMITING PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. THE STEAM DUMPS WILL ACTUATE TO CONTROL STEAM PRESSURE AND REDUCE TAVE TO THE NO LOAD REFERENCE SETPOINT, THE GENERATOR WILL LOGICTRIP AND A FAST BUS TRANSFER WILL TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONS. THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM WILL RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE TO SYSTEM COOLDOWN AND STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL. AERRORARZ.OM: THE TRIP SIGNAL AUTOMATICALLY CLEARS AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP. l Page 164 j
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP03 0 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE TYP5: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF SCALE CAUSB ^ TRANSMITTER FAILURE i j ASSCSED INITIAL CC08DIFION: IN POWER RANGE OFTIONS: RP03A: PT-514 RP03G: PT-534 -! RP038:' PT-515 RP038: PT-535 RP03C: PT-516 RPOSI: PT-536 RP03D: PT-524 RP03J: PT-544 AP035: PT-525 RP03K: PT-545 RP03F: PT-526 RP03&: PT-546 8 D11BCA%2110M: THE SELECTED 'I..ANSMITTER WILL FAIL TO THF 50 INT SELECTED BY SEVERITY, THE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PROV."tf3 CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OF STEAM PRESSURE AND LOGIC int'JTS FOR STEAM FLOW COMPENSATION, THE ANTI-MATER HAMMER CONTRCI. SYSTEM, HIGH STEAM LINE PRESSURE RATE FOR LOOP STEAM LINE ISC ATION, LOW STEAMLINE ' PRESSURE FOR SAFETY INJECTION. A SIGNAL JiPUT TO THE CONTROL O ROOM INDICATION WILL CAUSE THE INSTRUMENTATION TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. THE ANTI WATER HAMMER CONTROL SYSTEM FOR FEEDWATER ISOLATION, MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION AND SAFETY INJECTION ARE 2/3 LOGIC AND WILL BE INACTIVE ON A SINGLE TRANSMITTER FAILURE. AS THE STEAM PRESSURE SIGNAL VARIES FROM PT 515,525,535,545'THE STEAM FLOW COMPENSATION INPUT WILL CAUSE A PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE ON STEAM FLOW INDICATION AND CONTROL. THE COMPUTER AND ANNUNCIATOR INPUTS WILL CAUSE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. 5 . BR&fORAM2.QM: l'ALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. O- ,me-s l
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP04 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE TYF5: VARIA9LE: 0 - 1004 OF SCALE , CAUS5: . TRANSMITTER FAILURE A330NED ZMZTEAL CONDZTZON: > 3% POWER 07TZON8: M04A: FT-414 M0dG: FT-434 M0da: FT-415 M0dN: FT-435 i ModC: FT-416 M04I: FT-436 ! M0dD: FT-424 M0dJ: FT-444 i i M043: FT-425- M0dK: FT-445 " l ModF: FT-426 Mod &: FT-446 , em c l DERCEff.ZZQg: l ' THE SELECTED FLOW TRANSMITTER OUTPUT SIGNAL WILL FAIL TO THE LEV?:L SELECTED BY SEVERITY, ALL FLOW TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE CONTROL VALUE,. ROOM INDICATION AND WILL INDICATE THE FAILED' OUTPUT i-ALL OF THE FLOW TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE INPUT TO THE ] PRIMArd COOLANT LOW FLOW REACTOR TRIP LOGIC. IF THE TRANSMITTER OUTPUT QUES HIGH THE INDICATION IS.:THE ONLY PARAMETER EFFECTED. l p IF OUTPUT GOES LOW THE INDICATION WILL INDICATE LOW FLOd AND l THAT SIGNAL WILL CAUSE A SINGLE TRIP ANNUNCIATION.- REACTOR : COOLANT 10 2/3 AND 2/4 LOGIC DEPENDING ON.THE POWER LEVEL ! PERMISSIVES ACTIVATED. THE LOW FLOW REACTOR TRIP LOGIC WILL } ACTUATE AS Ar?ROFRIATE ON MULTIPLE TRANSMITTER MALFUNCTIONS. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE' APPROPRIATELY l r RERECRAtXOE: \ . l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED FLOW TRANSMITTER. I i l r !O
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP05 O LOOP COLD LEG NARROW RANGE TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE FYPE: ' VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF SCALE CAUSE: 'RTD FAILURE ASSOMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER ORTIONS: MOSA: TE-4118 MOSC: TE-431B i M053 - TE-4218 MOSD: TE-441B DRBCAZRTZOE: THE N' ARROW PANGE COLD LEG RTD'S-PROVIDE INPUT TO TAVE AND N-16 CHANNEL CALCULATION. FAILING THE RTD HIGH WILL INCREASE TAVE SIGNAL AND DECREASE N-16 TRIP SETPOINT. FAILING THE hTD LOW WILL DECREASE TAVE AND INCREASE N-16 TRIP SETPOINT. AN INCREASING TAVE SIGNAL WILL CAUSE AUTOMATIC ROD IN.9ERTION AS THE SIGNAL WILL BE AUCTIONEERED HIGH. THE ROD ACTION WILL CAUSE ACTUAL TAVE TO DECREASE WHICH WILL RESULT IN PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL TO DECREASE ALSO. THE STEAM DUMP CONTROL SYSTEM WILL REACT TO AN INCREASED TAVE, STEK4 DUMP ACTUATION WILL OCCUR IF C-7 INTERLOCK HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY-ARMED. A DECREASING TAVE WILL PROVIDE INPUT TO THE LOW ~ TA17. (FEEDWATER ISOLATION) AND LO-LO TAVE (HIGH STEAM FLOW TRIP INTERLOCK AND BLOCK STEAM DUMP) CONTROL AND PROTECTION LOGIC WHICH WILL ( ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. THE FAILED TC SIGNAL WILL PROVIDE INPUTS TO INDICATION AND N-16 POWER CALCULATION UPGRADE PROTECTION, OVERTEMPERATURE N-16 CALCULATION AND TRIP, AND l- CONTROL ROOM INDICATION, ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE ' APPROPRIATELY.
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nmBronATION: ! MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED RTD. 2 I O Page 167 1
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP06 Q TYPR: LOOP N 161NSTRUM' INT FAILURE VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF SCALE = 0 - 150% N-16 POWER CAUSB : - N-16 INSTRUMENT FAILURE A380nGD EMETEA% COl80ZTZON: POWER > 3% 097%ONS: M 06A: JE-410 M06C: JE-430 M 068: JE-420 AP06D: JE-440 kgggEZRREQM:
'THE L: ' N6 6 INSTRUMENT PROVIDES INPUT FOR TAVE CALCULATION AND CONTROL, G,%RTEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER N-16 BLOCK AND TRIP CIRCUIT LOGIC AND INDICATION'. AS THE SELECTED N-16 INSTRUMENT OUTPUT INCREASES OR DECREASES THE' ASSOCIATED LOGIC AND INDICATION WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.
INCREASING N-16 OUTPUT WILL CAUSE TAVE TO INCREASE RESULTING IN CONTROL ROD INSERTION TO MAINTAIN TAVE RESULTING IN ACTUAL TAVE DECREASING. PRESSURIZER LEVEL.AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASES. APPROPRIATE CONTROL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND TO MAINTAIN REFERENCE PARAMETERS. AN INCREASING SIGNAL TO THE N-16 PROTECTION LOGIC WILL CAUSE THE OVERTEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER N-16, ROD O BLOCK / TURBINE RUH BACK AND' TRIPS TO BE ACTUATED IF 2/4 LOGIC SETPOINTS ARE REACHED. ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. DECREASING N-16 OUTPUT WILL=CAUSE TAVE TO DECREASE AND WILL BE AUCTIONEERED LOW FOR LO TAVE FEEDWATER ISOLATION AND LO-LO TAVE STEAM DUMP BLOCK, IF 2/4 LOGIC IS ACTUATED ON LO-LO TAVE A TRIP WILL RESULT. THE DECREASED N-16 INPUT TO THE OVERTEMPERATURE-AND OVERPOWER N-16 PROTECTION CIRCUITS WILL CAUSE THE CALCULATED SETPOINT TRIP TO BE HIGHER THAN NORMAL FOR THE AFFECTED CHANNEL. ABBtORAEEQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED N-16 INSTRUMENT. O Page 168
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i RP07 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION TY98: 800 LEAN. CAUS5: LOGIC OUTPUT FAILURE-ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: LOCA FROM 100% POWER ORTZONS: M07A: TRAIN "A" M 0 73 1. TRAIN "B" DEBCAZRTIOM: THIS MALTUNCTIOli.SHOULD BE USED WITH A LOCA MALFUNCTION. AS.THE APPROPRIATE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ALARMS ~ARE ACTUATED FROM A LOCA AND ALL ASSOCIATED PARAMETERS RESPOND ACCORDINGLY, THE AUTOMATIC WILL NOT OCCUR. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION FROM THE. SELECTED TPAIN I THE REACTOR WILL TRIP FROM LOW PRESSURIZER I PRESSURE ACTUATE. AND THE ASSOCIATED REACTOR TRIP CONTROL LOGIC WILL THE OPERATOR CAN MANUALLY INITIATE SAFETY ~ INJECTION I AND THE ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS'WILL RESPOND AND EMERGENCY CORE COOLING WILL OPERATE AS APPROPRIATE. ANNUNCIATION WILL '
"UATE AS APPROPRIATE.
RESTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SAFETY INJECTION LOGIC OUTPU ( i O ! Page 169
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP08 Q FAILURE OF SAFETY INJECTION TO ACTUATE MANUALLY TYRE: BOOLEAN CADK5: - WIRING FAILURE ASSOMED INITIAZ, CONDITION: LOCA FROM 100% POWER 09tIONS: M00A: CB03-1/1-SIA1 M085: CB07-1/1-SIA2 agggazRtzon: THE SELECTED MANUAL SAFETY INJECTION MANDSWITCH WILL FAIL TO ACTUATE THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING AND ASSO i
- CONTROL SYSTEMS THE UNAFFECTED SAFETY INJECTION HA' '4ILL BE l OPERABLE AND WILL CAUSE NOPNAL S WETY INJE ATION FOR ASSOCIATED TRAIN COMPONENTS. IF BOTH MANUJ & s. .TCus:S ARE INOPERABLE THE AUTOMATIC SAFETY-INJECTION SIGNALS WILL ACTUATE THE APPROPRIATE CONTROL FUNCTIONS. IF THIS MALFUNCTION .'9 '
ACTIVATED OONCURRENTLY WITH RP07 THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLINC !, COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS WILL REQUIRE " 9.ATOR MANUAL CONTROL. l ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIA' oY. ' O ="c- c'- : 1 MALFUNCTION REPAIRS THE AFFECTED TRAIN SAFETY INJECTION PUSHBUTTON WIRING FAILURE. i i 1 L Page 170 t
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP09 Q CONTMNMENT ISOLATION PHASE 'A' FMLURE TO ACTUATE ON 'S' SIGNAL FYPS: BOOLEAN CAUSE: LOGIC SIGNAL FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFION: LOCA FROM 100% POWER ORFIONS: M09A: TRAIN "A" M093: TRAIN "B" i i i DR2CAZRTZQM: THE AUTOMATIC SIGNAL OUTPUT FOR PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAILS TO ACTUATE FOR THE SELECTED TRAIN. HOWEVER, THE OPERABLE TRAIN WILL' ACTUATE. A DUAL FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE CONTAINI*ENT NOT TO BE ISOLATED AUTOMATICALLY. THE OPERATOR CAN MANUALLY INITIATE PHASE'"A" CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND ALL THE NON-ESSENTIAL SYSTEM VALVES WILL CLOSE.
)RESTORATZQE:
MALFUNCTION REPAIRS THE PHASE 'A' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC SIGNAL FAILURE. e O Page 171 I o
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP10
+
0 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE 'B' FAILS TO ACTUATE ON 'P' SIGNAL TYPE: BOOLEAN CA USB :- LOGIC SIGNAL FAILURE A380NED ENETEAL CONDZTZON: LC;3A FnOM 100s POWER 09TZONS: RF10A: TRAIN "A" AP203: TRAIN "B" i DERCRERTZQE: THE AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION,-PHASE 'B' WILL FAIL TO ACTUATE WHEN THE HI-3 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE SETPOINT IS ACTUATED i
! FOR THE SELECTED TRAIN. A DUAL FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE CONTAINMENT NOT TO BE ISOLATED FOR PHASE 'B' ISOLATION. THE j OPERATOR CAN MANUALLY INITIATE, PHASE B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION i
CAUSING THE ISOLATION VALVES TO ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. , REBTORATZQM: ! MALFUNCTION REPAIRS THE PHASE 'B' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC j SIGNAL FAILURE. i i i i i l. 1 L. i t !O i Page 172 I i
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RP11 O LOOP COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE { FYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF SCALE = 0 - 700'r CAUSB: RTD FAILURE ASSUMED INIFIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: M22A: TE-413B M12C: TE-433B M223: TE-423B M22D: TE-443B DESCRZRTION: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE ASSOCIATED INDICATION FOR THE TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TO INDICATE THE PERCENT OF SCALE DESIGNATED BY THE MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. THIS SYSTEM DRIVES PEN RECORDERS ! IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR W/R REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COLD LEG TEMPERATURE INDICATION. REBTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL RETURN THE SYSTEM TO NORMAL. O O Page 173 9
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r m); MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND' EFFECTS
^ R P 12 LOOP HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE TYPR: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF-SCALE = 0 - 700'F CAUSB: RTD FAILURE ASSUMED ZNETZAL CONDZTZON: 100% POWER OPTIONS: RP22A: ~TE-413A- M22C: TE-433A '
RP228: TE-423A AP22D: -TE-443A DRBCRERTZOM: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE ASSOCIATED INDICATION FOR THE TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TO INDICATE THE PERCENT OF SCALE DESIGNATED BY THE MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. THIS SYSTEM DRIVES PEN RECORDERS-IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR W/R REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT LEG TEMPERATURE INDICATION. s RESTORATXDM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED RTD. 4 O Page 174
t MALFUNCTION CAUSES: AND EFFECTS i. RP13 0 TYPR: MANUAL' REACTOR TRIP SWITCH FAILURE BOOLEAN L CAUS5: SWITCH CONTACT OPERATOR FAILURE ASSD3SD INITIAL CONDITION REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS ' CLOSED-OPTIONS: M23A: CB07 REACTOR TRIP SWITCH M233: CB10 REACTOR TRIP SWITCH DRBCRERTION: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL PREVENT THE REACTOR. TRIP BREAKERS FROM-OPENING WHEN A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP SWITCH IS ACTUATED. POWER WILL BE MAINTAINED TO'THE ROD DRIVE POWER BUS AND THE CONTROL r ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS. THE P-4 PERMISSIVE TO THE SI-LOGIC, FW ISOLATION VALVE LOGIC AND TURBINE TRIP-LOGIC WILL BE BLOCKED SINCE THEY ARE A FUNCTION OF THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM WILL STILL RESPOND IN THE MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC' MODES. .IF REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS ARE ATTAINED THE AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP'WILL OCCUR AND OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. THE REMAINING EFFECTS WILL BE THE SAME AS A SPURICUS' REACTOR TRIP RP02. l - 1 RESTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMO*iAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED REACTOR TRIP SWITCH. I Page 175 1
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ ~ . _ . . MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND . EFFECTS RP14 \0 fYPE: SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF SAFETY INJECTION BOOLEAN CAUSB: GROUND ON FIN 40 P/O SAF OUT A517 (SFGD O/P DRIVER CARD) ASSOMED INITIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE
- OPTIONS: NONE EQ,21: IF RPO1 " FAILURE OF ALL AUTotfATIC REACTOR TRIPS" IS USED IN CONJUNCTION - WILL RP14, TEEN AN SI WILL OCCUR WITE00T A REACTOR TRIP, NORatAL METEODS OF TRIPPING TEE REACTOR ARE- NOT INEIBITED.
Dascazorrom: A GROUND IN THE SFGS OUTPUT DRIVER CARD WILL RESULT IN THE SAME RESPONSE AS ANY AUTOMATIC SI SIGNAL. AN 'S' SIGNAL IS OUTPUT TO -i ALL ASSOCIATED LOGICS AND RESULTS IN APPROPRIATE ACTION, THE REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP, FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP, FEEDWATER ISOLATION, AND AUXILIARY FEED PUMP START WILL ACTUATE. THE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM WILL TRIP AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATIOt? PHA WILL ACTUATE. THE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS WILL START WITH i ASSOCIATED VALVE ACTUATION PER LOGIC. THE SI PUMPS, RHR PUMPS, iO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS, COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS, AND SERVICE WATER PUMPS WILL BE STARTED. PRESSURE WILL INCREASE FROM THE LOAD REDUCTION AND THE STEAM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DUMP SYSTEM WILL ACTUATE. TO REDUCE / MAINTAIN STEAM PRESSURE, THE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS WILL INJECT WATER FROM THE RWST INTO THE RC SYSTEM'AND CAUSE A RAPID INCREASE IN PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE ACTUATING THE SPRAY VALVE AND PZR RELIEF AT THE PROPER SETPOINTS. WITH NO OPERATOR ACTION THE PZR WILL GO SOLID AND THE PZR RELIEFS WILL FILL THE PRT RUPTURING THE
, RUPTURE DISKS. CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURES, HUMIDITY, RADIOACTIVITY AND SUMP LEVELS WILL INCREASE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY.
mascomarzom: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE GROUND. ,O Page 176
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i. 1 L
, RP15 A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER JAMMED CLOSED FYPS: BOOLEAN cat 785 : BINDING OF THE BREAKER'S TRIP MECHANISM l'
ASS.7NED ZhTZTZAL CONDZTION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: WOME 1 EQ23: DEFEAT:NG TEE- REACTOR- PROTECTION SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO l OPEN TEIS TRIP EREAKER MP ~a CAUSE TEE LIMITS OF TEE SIMUL 7. TOR MODEL TO BE EXCEssED. IT IS TEE RESPOWSIBILITY OF TEE INSTRUCTOR TO PRUDENTLY UTILIEE TEIS MALFUNCTION. DRSCR19TZOM: l ALTHOUGH THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WILL BE CAPABLE OF GENERATING ALARMS, STATUS LIGHTS, BISTABLE ACTUATION AND l INDICATION, DEENERGIZING THE-UNDERVOLTAGE COIL OR ENERGIZING THE I SHUNT COIL WILL NOT OPEN 'fMIS BREAKER. AS LONG AS THIS BREAKER REMAINS CLOSED, P-4 STATUS WILL BE'AFFECTED FOR THIS TRAIN. ROD I CONTROL WILL OPERATE AS EXP7.CTED AND WILL BE CAPABLE OF s CONTROLLING RCS Tave AND/OR CORE POWER. DEENERGIZING THE MOTOR ; GENERATOR SETS WILL DROP THE CONTROL RODS. THIS MALFUNCTION I WILL NOT JAM THE BREAKER OPEN. ' RRSTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BREAKER'S TRIP MECHANISM. I l l l I l O Page 177
MALFUNCTION CAUSES ^AND EFFECTS l RX01 Q STEAM GENERATOR FEED FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE TYPE : - VARIABLE:
^
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0 - 5 X 106 LBM/HR l CAUS5: ' TRANSMITTER INTERNAL MALFUNCTION A380NED ENETZAL CONDZTZON: POWER > 3% OPTIONS: M02A: FT-510 M02E: FT-530 M023: FT-511 M02F: FT-531 M02C: FT-520 M02G: FT-540 M02D: FT-521 M02E: FT-541 i m DESCAZ9TZON: i AS THE SELECTED TRANSMITTER'S OUTPUT GOES TO THE VALUE SELECTED t BY SEVERITY, THE APPROPRIATE FLOW INDICATION WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. IF TEEDWATER FLOW IS GREATER THAN STEAM FLOW, TH3. ASSOCIATED FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE WILL MODULATE CLOSE. THIS WILL LOWERRESULT SG LEVEL. IN ACTUAL FEEDFLOW DECREASING..THIS WILL RESULT IN A THE SG WILL BE CONTROLLED AT A LOWER LEVEL BASED UPON. SEVERITY UNLESS A TRIP SETPOINT IS REACHED. ALARMS WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY AS DICTATED BY SEVERITY. IF FEEDWATER FLOW IS LESS THAN STEAM FLOW, THEN THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FOR O THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL OPEN. THE RESULT WILL BE'AS ABOVE EXCEPT THE LEVEL'WILL BE HIGHER AS FEED FLOW INCREASES. RESTORATZQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FLOW TRANSMITTER MALFUNCTION V Page 178
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS bX02 STEAM GENERATOR STEAM PLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE 1 TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 5 X 106 LBM/nR i CAUSB: TRANSMITTER INTERNAL MALFUNCTION ASS 09mD ZM.tTEAL CONDZTZOM: POWER > 3% OPTIONS: RK02A: FT-512 M028: FT-532 RK028: FT-513 RX02F: FT-533 RK02C: FT-522 RK02G: FT-542 RK02D: FT-523 RK022: FT-543 DRBCRERTZQM: AS THE SELECTED TRANSMITTER'S OUTPUT GOES TO.THE VALUE SELECTED BY SEVERITY, THE APPROPRIATE FLOW INDICATION WILL RESPOND
- ACCORDINGLY. IF FEEDWATER FLOW IS GREATER THAN STEAM FLOW, THE ASSOCIATED FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE WILL MODULATE CLOSE. THIS WILL RESULT IN ACTUAL TEEDFLOW DECREASING. THIS WILL RESULT IN A LOWER SG LEVEL. THE SG WILL BE CONTROLLED AT A LOWER LEVEL BASED UPON SEVERITY UNLESS A TRIP SETPOINT IS REACHED, ALARMS WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY AS DICTATED BY SEVERITY. IF FEEDWATER FLOW IS LESS THAN STEAM FLOW, THEN THE FEEDWATER PJ!GULATING VALVE FOR O- T1E AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL OPEN. THE RESULT WILL BE AS AEOVE EXCEPT THE LEVEL WILL BE HIGHER AS FEED FLOW INCREASES.
BR23rQ. RAT 10M: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FLOW TRANSHITTER MALFUNCTION. e O Page 179 l
MALFUNCTION' CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX03
.Q AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROL Trrf FAILURE FYPS: VARIABLE: 550 'T - 600 'F CAUSE: Tref.SETPOINT OUT OF ADJUSTMENT A3800GD ZMETEAL CONDETEON: In POWER RANGE OPTIONS: Monx DRBCREREZOM:
THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROLLING TAVE HIGHER / LOWER THAN THE PROGRAM SETPOINT, DEPENDENT ON SEVERITY SELECTED. A HIGHER Tref WILL RESGT IN INCREASED. REACTOR COOLANT LOOP
- TEMPERATURE WHICH WILL INCREASE PRESSURIZER' LEVEL AND PRESSURE CAUSING PRESSURIZER CONTROL SYSTEMS TO ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINTS TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER PARAMETERS. MAIN STEAM PRESSURE WILL INCREASE SLIGHTLY DEPENDING ON SEVERITY. THE INCREASED Tcold WILL EFFECT THE OTN-16 SETPOINT CALCULATION,
' DECREASING ITS SETPOINT TRIP. THE ELEVATED TAVE WILL BE INDICATED ON THE CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTATION AND WOULD CAUSE ANNUNCIATION AS APPROPRIATE. A LOWER TREF WILL RESULT IN THE OPPOSITE EFFECT AND WILL CAUSE BLOCK / PERMISSIVE LOGIC ACTUATION AS APPROPRIATE. MANUAL OPERATION WILL ALLOW OPERATOR' CONTROL OF Tave RESTORATZOE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL' RESET Tref TO THE PROPER SETPOINT. l O Page 180 l 1-
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX04 0 TYP5: STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CAUS5: TRANSMITTER INTERNAL MALFUNCTION ASSONED INIFIAL CONDITION: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIO9*: M04A: LT-551 M04E: LT-519 M043: LT-552 M04F: LT-529 ' M04C: LT-553 - M04G: LT-539 M04D: LT-554 M04E: LT-549 DRBCRZRTZQM: ' THE AFFECTED LEVEL INDICATOR WILL REFLECT THE SEVERITY SELECTED. IF THE AFFECTED TRANSMITTER IS SELECTED FOR CONTROL, THE SG LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM WILL RESPOND IF IN AUTOMATIC. IF LEVEL IS GREATER THAN SETPOINT, THE FEEDWATER FCV WILL CLOSE. SG LEVEL WILL DECREASE AND CONTROL AT A LOWER LEVEL UNLESS A TRIP SETPOINT IS REACHED. ALARMS WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY AS DICTATED BY SEVERITY. THE OPPOSITE WILL OCCUR'FOR. LEVEL LESS THAN SETPOINT. O RESTORATZOE: I l l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEVEL TRANSMITTER' MALFUNCTIOll. I F 1 i
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS messamma RX05 0 FYRE: FAILURE OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CAUSR t. TRANSMITTER FAILURE ASSO3SD INIFIAL CONDIFION: ANY PLANT CONDITION I OFFIONS: RKOSA: LT-459 RKOSC: LT-461 RK053: LT-460 RK05D: LT-462 DESCRIPTION: AS THE SELECTED LEVEL TRANSMITTER OUTPUT GOES TO THE VALUE SELECTED BY SEVERITY, THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL INDICATOR, CONTROL AND TRIP FUNCTIONS WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. THE HIGH LEVEL REACTOR TRIP IS A 2/3 LOGIC FUNCTION SO A SINGLE FAILURE WILL NOT ACTUATE A TRIP. LEVEL CONTROL SIGNALS WILL CAUSE CHARGING PUMP FLOW CONTROL ACTUATION TO CORRECT A HIGH OR LOW LEVEL SITUATION, HIGH AND LOW LEVEL ALARMS WILL ANNUNCIATE WHEN THE SETPOINT IS ATTAINED. LOW LEVEL HEATERS OFF AND LETDOWN ISOLATION WILL ACTUATE AT A PRESSURIZER LEVEL OF 17%. LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-462 IS FOR COLD SHUTDOWN P1ESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATION ONLY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RESTORATIQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE. l e i Page 182
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX06 PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP (S) FAIL ON IN AUTOMATIC FYPR: BOOLEAN CAUS5: ' LOGIC FAILURE l ASSDBSD INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE ORTIONS: nonx Ha2X: MALrcucTION RX07 BAS PRIORITY OVER TEIS MALFUNCTION. DRBCRIRTXQM: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE ALL PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUPS THAT ARE IN AUTOMATIC WILL TURN ON AND CONTROL GROUP 'C' WILL GO TO MAXIMUM. PRES 5URIZER PRESSURE WILL INCREASE TO THE- i SPRAY VALVE ACTUATION SETPOINT THE SPRAY VALVES WILL CONTROL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WITHIN THE SPRAY VALVE CONTROL BAND AND THE PLANT WILL RETAIN OPERABILITY. THE OPERATOR CAN TAKE MANUAL CONTROL OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS FOR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL. RRBTQAATZDM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE PRESSURIZER HEATER LOGIC FAILURE. s s e O Page 183 l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RXO7 O PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUPS FAIL OFF TYF5 ' BOOLEAN CAUSR PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL HEATER INTERLOCK FAULTY OUTPUT ASSDMED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER OPTIONS: NONE EQ21: ENTERING TEIS MAI. FUNCTION WILL OVERRIDE MALFUNCTION l RX06. ' DESCRERTIQM: WHEN THIS MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE, ALL PRESSURIZER HEATER WILL SHUT OFF OR WILL BE BLOCKED FROM TURNING ON. WHEN THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DECREASES TO THE PROPER SETPOINT A PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE ALARM WILL ANNUNCIATE. AS PRESSURE CONTINUES TO DECREASE A REACTOR TRIP WILL ACTUATE RESULTING IN , ASSOCIATED LOGIC ACTUATION. THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WILL ' RECOVER FROM THE TRIP, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE SLOWLY PROPORTIONAL TO DECAY HEAT AND THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. O RRS TORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL HEATER INTERLOCK-FAULTY OUTPUT. l 1 4 0 l , Page 184 i
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( RX08 0 FMLURE OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TYP5: VARIABLE: 1700 2500 PSIG CAUS2: PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE ; A380NED INETZAL CONDZTION: 100% POWER OPTZONS: MOCA: 97-455' M00C: PT-457 M003: PT-456- M00D: PT-458 , DRACREDTZOM: , AS'THE SELECTED PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS TO THE SETPOINT SELECTED BY SEVERITY, INDICATION AND ANNUNCIATION WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. A INCREASING PRESSURE WILL CAUSE AN INPUT TO THE HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP, N-16 PROTECTION CALCULATION, HIGH PRESSURE ALARM, SPRAY VALVE, AND PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE LOGICS PESULTING IN ACTUATION AT THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS, r A DECREASING PRESSURE BELOW NORMAL WILL PROVIDE INPUTS TO THE LOU PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP, SAFETY INJECTION, SI BLOCK, PRESSURIZER BACKUP AND VARIABLE HEATER CONTROL, LOW PRESSURE O. ALAPN AND PCV 455A AND PCV 456' INTERLOCK LOGICS RESULTING IN ACTUATION AT THE APPROPR2 ATE SETPOINTS. l l RRBTORRTZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED PRESSURE' TRANSMITTER. e l l O Page 185
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX09 Q FAILURE OF TURBINE IMPULSE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TYPS: VARIABLE: 0 - 1000.?SIG CAUSA: PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: ANY PLANT CONDITION OPTIONS: RX09A: PT-505A AXOPS: PT-506A DRBCRZRTION: FAILURE OF THE SELECTED TRANSMITTER ABOVE THE P-13 ACTUATION VALUE WILL CAUSE P-13 LOGIC RESPONSE WHICH CAUSES P-7 ACTUATION. P-7 PERMISSIVE UNBLOCKS PZR LOW PRESSURE, PZR HIGH LEVEL, ALL FLOW TRIPS AND TURBINE-REACTOR TRIP. IF ANY OF THESE CONDITIONS EXIST WHEN P-7 IS ACTUATED, APPROPRIATE TRIP LOGIC WILL BE ACTUATED. FAILURE OF THE SELECTED TRANSMITTER BELOW THE P-8 ACTUATION SETPOINT WILL HAVE NO LOGIC EFFECT SINCE IT IS A REDUNDANT "OR" LOGIC. IF A DUAL FAILURE EXISTS P-13 WILL NOT ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT VALUE AND THE P-7 PERMISSIVE CAN ONLY BE ACTUATED BY NUCLEAR. INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC OUTPUT. ALL MONITORED PARAMETERS WILL 'ESPOND R APPROPRIATELY. ARBTORATZOM:
- MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE.
l l i !O Page 186 r -we- -w-, , ,n,- --,-n,,,,-,--.--,,-w.~-- n- -,-a--,,w- -~,.~-~,s-~. ,w--,,-. ,,--ew.-.. , n,,r-- - - ,
. MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS '
R X10 i 0 TYF3: PRESSURIZER HEATER OUTPUT FAILURE VARIABLE: 0.- 466 KW (0 - 400-KW FOR GROUP C) CAUS3 : - HEATER FAILURE (S) ASSONED INETEAL CONDITION: IN POWER RANGE OFTIONSt. M20A HEATER GROUP A M20C: HEATER GROUP C AX202: HEATER GROUP.B AX2 00 - HEATER GROUP D- + DESCREDTION: 1 i THIS MALFUNCTION-WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED HEATER GROUP (S) HEAT j
-OUTPUT-TO BE DEGRADED APPROPRIATE TO THE SEVERITY SELECTED. AS-l , HEATER CONTROL,IS' ACTUATED BY ASPROPRIATE PRESSURIZER PRESSURES 1
THE. SELECTED HEATER GROUP WIL.u NOT-INCREASE PRESSURE AT A RATE CONSISTENT WITH DESIGN. RECOVERY RATES. LOAD INCREASES WILL HAVE j TO BE LIMITED IN RATE APPROPRIATE TO THE HEATER CAPACITY. i' -- i AEDTORATXQg: i l MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SELECTED HEATER GROUP (S) , !O i l l i l 1 l !O l Page 187 b
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX11 0 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILURE TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF VALVE POSITION CAUSB ? VALVE POSITIONER FAILURE' ASSQHED ENETZAL CONDETZON: IN POWER' RANGE 09TIONS: M11A: TCV-510 . M11C: FCV-530 M128: TCV-520 M11D: TCV-540 DESCRZRTZQM: \ THE TELECTED TEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE WILL FAIL TO THE POSI"AION SELECTED BY MALFUNCTION SEVERITY, PLACING THE AFFECTED J VALVE IN MANUAL WILL RESTORE CONTROL. , IF THE SELECTED POSITION IS LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED THE FEED FLOW TO THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR-WILL DECREASE AND A FEED FLOW / STEAM FLOW DEVIATION ALARM WILL ACTUATE AT THE APPR^PRIATE SETPOINT. THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL DECREASE CONSISTENT WITH SEVERITY SELECTED AND AT THE LOW-LOW LEVEL SETPOINT A REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP'WILL ACTUATE AND THE AUXILIARY TEEDWATER-PUMPS WILL START. IF THE SELECTED POSITION IS GREATER THAN THAT. REQUIRED THE FEED FLOW TO THE-AFFECTED STEAM-GENERATOR WILL-INCREASE AND A FEED l FLOW / STEAM FLOW DEVIATION ALARM WILL ACTUATE AT THE APPROPRIA'iE SETPOINT. THE AFFECTED STEAM' GENERATOR LEVEL WILL INCREASE l CONSISTENT WITH SEVERITY. SELECTED AND AT THE HI-HI LEVEL SETPOINT. FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP, TURBINE TRIP, AND TEEDWATER i ISOLATION SIGNALS WILL BE GENERATED. ASSOCIATED PLANT' CONTROL LOGIC WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. ALL CONDITIONS WILL CAUSE PRIMARY PLANT SYSTEM PARAMETERS-AND - CONTROL LOGIC TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. ANNUNCIATION WILL f ACTUATE AT THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINTS. i \ REBtOAATZDE: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FWRV. l l l I l lO Page 188 L i
m MAlfvNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX12
. FAILURE OF STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (P T-5 0 7)
FYPR: - VARIABLE: 200 - 1,500 PSIG CAUSB: TRANSMITTER MALFUNCTION ASSOMED INITIAL COND2720N: ANY PLANT CONDITION 09TZONS: noux DRBCRX2120M: ACTUATION CAUSES THE STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-507 OUTPUT TO FAIL TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY LEVEL. THE MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INDICATION AND CONTROL LOGIC WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. A HIGHER OR LOWER MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE, WHEN COMPARED WITH MAIN FEEDWATER PRESSURE WILL CAUSE A DEVIATION SIGNAL WHICH WHEN COMPARED WITH STEAM FLOW WILL CAUSE THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP s SPEED CONTROL TO MODULATE AND CHANGE MAIN TEEDWATER PUMP SPEED, CORRECTING FOR THE DEVIATION INPUT. IN THE STEAM PRESSURE MODE, THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM UTILI;ES THE SIGNAL FROM PT-507 FOR MAIN STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL. AS THE TRANSMITTER OUTPUT DECREASES, THE STEAM DUMP VALVES WILL MODULATE CLOSED CAUSING ACTUAL STEAM PRESSURE TO INCREASE WHICH COULD, AT THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT, CAUSE THE STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES TO ACTUATE. AS THE TRANSMITTER OUTPUT INCREASES THE STEAM DUMP VALVES WOULD MODULATE FURTHER OPEN INCREASING STEAM FLOW AND REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY REREOR&EXOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS PT-507. O I Page 189
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l l R X13 ' b REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOP m-- PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS l FYFS . VARIABLE: 0 - 3,000 PSIG CAUSE: PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: COLD SHUTDOWN - BOTH RHR LOOPS 1 IN OPERATION OPTIONS: Ax13A: PT-403 Rx138: PT-405 DESCRERTZQM:' THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TO FAIL TO THE SELECTED VALUE OF FULL SCALE. BOTH PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS HAVE THE SAME LOGIC FUNCTIONS, PT-403 IS FOR TRAIN "A" PROTECTION AND PT-405 IS FOR TRAIN "B" PROTECTION. PT-403 AND PT-405 HAVE INDICATION AND ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM, AND WILL RESPOND TO THE SEVERITY SELECTED. IF THE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH IT WILL CAUSE THE APPROPRIATE TRAIN ACTUATION TO ISOLATE RHR SUCTION FROM THE-REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS 1 AND 4, THIS WILL CAUSE THE RHR PUMPS TO LOSE SUCTION AND CAVITATE RESULTING IN RHR LOW FLOW. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY RESTQJEATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE FAILED PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. A l l O Page 190
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l mumm-m RX14 O TURBINE 1ST STAGE PRESSURE BISTABLE INCORRECTLY SET TYPE: - VARIABLE: 0 - 1,000 PSIG CAUSE: SETPOINT OUT OF ADJUSTMENT A3308mD ENETZAL CONDETEON: IN POWER RANGE OPTIONS: nonx i DESCRZRTZoM: THE EFFECT OF THE SETPOINT BEING ADJUSTED WILL CAUSE THE C-5 LOW POWFR INTERLOCK TO FAIL TO ACTUATE AT THE APPROPRIATE POWER LEVEL. THIS WILL ALLOW OR PREVENT AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROL AT A POWER LEVEL OTHER THAN 15% TURBINE POWER, i nm3ronATIon: i MALFUNCTION REMOVAL SETS THE BISTABLE TO THE CORRECT SETPOINT. j ; 1 k l t, O Page 191
e- - n h!ALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS RX15 PRESSURIZER SPRAY FLOW CONTROL VALVE FAILURE FYPR VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUSB: - PRESSURIZER VALVE MALTUNCNt1 l ASSopCBD INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE OPTIONS: RKISA: PCV-455B AK158: PCV-455C DABCRZHEDR: FAILURE OF THE SELECTED SPRAY VALVE OPEN WILL CAUSE SPRAY FLOW TO DECREASE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. THE PRESSURIZER HEATERS WILL ! CONTROL PRESSURIZER SETPOINTS. PRESSURE BY OPERATING AT THEIR SELECTED FAILURE OF THE SELECTED SPRAY VALVE CLOSED WILL CAUSE REDUCE CAPACITY TO DECREASE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RESULTING FROM A PRESSURE TRANSIENT. SHOULD BOTH SPRAY VALVES FAIL CLOSED THE OVERPRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEM. CONDITION WILL BE TAKEN CARE OF THE' POWER OPE a ANY INTERMEDIATE COMPENSATED POSITION FOR BY EITHER THE 7 % FAILUPR OF THE' SPRAY VALVE WILL BE
,0RIZER HEATERS OR POWER OPERATED RELIETS, DEPENDING OP ' rte REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM '
PRESSURE TRANSIENT SEVERITY V. SPRAY VALVE FAILURE POSITION ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. BER.10RAZZDM: MALFUNCTION VALVE. REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED PRESSURIZER SPRAY Page 192
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS x RX16 O- summe PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE UAKS FYPR VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION CAUBR: . POWER OPEPATED RELIEF VALVE MALFUNCTION A380NEO ENETZAL C&MDETZON: 100% PnWER 09tEONS: M19A: PCV-455A M288: PCV-456A DRRCRE9tXDN: INSERTION OF 'lHIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE TO OPEN AT THE SELECTED SEVERITY RATE. THE DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE INDICATION WILL INCREASE. THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILL INCREASE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. PRESSURIZF.R PRESSURE WILL DECREASE, AND PRESSURIZER CONTROL AND BACK-UP HEATERS WILL RESPOND TO THE PRESSURE DECREASE. AS PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASES THE CHARGING PUMP SPEED WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN j LF. VEL, AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL BE EXCEEDED. WHEN PRESSURIZEP LEVEL REACHES 17% THE LETDOWN SYSTEM WTLL ISOLATE AND PRESSURIZEA HEATERS WILL BE CUT OUT. AT A SEVERITY OF ABOUT 30,400 LBS/HR THE CMARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL SUSTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL.
. AS SEVERITY INCREASES PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE TO TNT REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION LOW PRESSURE SETPOINTS, IF THE PRESSURE INI THE PRESSURIZER RLsIEF TANK IS EXCEEDED'THE RUPTURE DISKS WILL RUPTURE AND REACTOR COOLANT WILL BE RELEASED INTO THE CONTAINMENT.
m===== GBRQRAMDM: MALFUNCTION VALVE. REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED POWER OPERATED RELIEF O Page 193 m
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i i l RX17 PRESSURIZEk RELIEF VALVE SEAT LEAKAGE l
- TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF RATED FLOW
{ CA USE: POWER OPERAT ED RELIEF VALVE SEAT DAMAGE l ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: 100% POWER \ OPTIONS: RX17A: PCV 455A J j RX178: PCV-456A i l DESCRIPTION: INSERTION OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE TO LEAK BY TI'S SEAT AT THE SELECTED SEVERITY RATE. THE DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE INDICATION WILL INCREASE BUT VALVE WILL INDICATE CLOSED. THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE WILLINCREASE. ANNUNCIA110N WILL ACTUA*IE APPROPRIATELY. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WILL DECREASE, AND PRESSURIZER CONTROL AND BACK UP HEATERS WILL RESPOND TO THE PRESSURE DECREASE. J AS PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASES THE CHARGING PUMP SPEED WILL INCREASE TO MAINTAIN LEVEL, AS SEVERITY INCREASES THE CHARGING 1 PUMP CAPACTTY WILL BE EXCEEDED. WHEN PRESSURIZER LEVEL REACHES 17% 'IME LETDOWN SYSTEM WILL ISOLA *IE AND PRESSURIZER HEATERS WILL O BE CUT OUT. AT A SEVERITY OF ABOUT 30,400 LBS/HR THE CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL SUSTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. AS SEVERITY INCREASES PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL CON 11NUE1D DECREASE TO THE REACTOR 1WP AND SAFETY INJECTION LOW PRESSURE SETPOINTS. IF THE PRESSURE IN THE PRESSURIZER i . < ' IEF TANK IS EXCEEDED THE RUPT'JRE DISU WILL RUPTURE AND REACIM COOLANT WILL BE RELEASED INTO THE CONTAINMENT. m an . _ RESTORATION: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE AFFECTED POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE. I l I O Page 194
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS I
\
1 SG01 \ \ I STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ! FYPE: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 15 - 1,500 GPM AT 2235 PSIG { CAUS5: - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE (S) FAILURE ASSONED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 1004 POWER 09FZONS: 30014: S/G 01 s001Ct S/G 03 t s001s: S/G 02 s001D: S!G t4 l f \ anscnzstzag: i AT SMALL LEAK RATES THE EFFECTS ARE MINIMAL. CHARGING FLOW WILL 1
> INCREASE IN PROPORTION TO THE LEAK RATE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. !
! REACTOR MAKE-UP SYSTEM ACTUATION WILL llE MORE FREQUENT ! TO MAINTAIN VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL. ACTIVIfY LEVELS IN THE j STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LINES WILL INCREASE 'tLONG WITH ACTIVITY ' LEVELS 1N THE CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM. AS THE LEAK RATE INC', EASES AND EXCEEDS THE CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY, THE PPESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. THE SELECTED 1 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL INCREhSE WHILE FEED FLOW ' DECREASES, CAUSING A STEAM FLOW / TEED FLOW MISMATCH ALARM. WHEN ! THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL REACHES 17% THE LETDOWN ISOLATION AND PRESSURIZER HEATER CUT OFF WILL ACTUATE. STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION WILL OCCUR AT THE HIGH ACTIVITY SETPOINT. AS THE RUPTURE RATE INCREASES, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WILL ACTUATE A. REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP, SAFETY INJECTION WILL AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATE GENERATOR.AND FILL THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND AFFECTED STEAM i BEFORE THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR CAN BE ISOLATED l THE SYSTEM WILL HAVE TO BE COOLED DOWN BELOW SATURATION ' TEMPERATURE FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR RELIEF VALVE SETPOINT TO CONTROL THE RELEASE OF ACT1VITY TO THE ATMOSPHERE. REntORAtxON: I c RESET SIMULATOR TO THE DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 195 1 e _.,_.,_7 _ . . _ . , . ,.r_.,___ , ..w.,. _ _ ~ , . . _ ~ , .,,,___-,_._,,.y,~.,,,,__,_,_,._,_-__,.,,,-,___.w... ~,,-._,--.-,,w-r,.-#,,.,,em,m-- -
i ! MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS
- i l !
S101 j Q FYP2 Si ACCUMULATOR LEVEL INCREASES VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 5 - 50 GPM AT 2235 PSIG , CAUSA: BOTH ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES LEAK ASSC9dED INIFIAL CONDIFION: IN POWER RANGE ' j OFFIONS: SICIA: ACCUMULATOR #1 sIO1C: ACCUMULATOR 63 i ! SIO28: ACCUMULATOR 92 #202D: ACCUMULATOR #4 i i DRBCR29T10M: AS REACTOR COOLANT LEAKS THROUGH THE DISCHARGE CHECK V.TLVES FOR J THE SELECTED ACCUMULATOR THE PRESSURE AND LEVEL WILL IhCLASE { ACCORDING Tt SELECTED SEVERITY. THE ACCUMULATOR HIGH PhESSURE i 1 AND HIGH LESEL ALARMS WILL ACTUATE WHEN THEIR RESPECTIVE - 4 SETPOINTS ARE REACHED. WHEN THE ACCUMULATOR TANK PRESSURE i REACHES 700 >SIG THE RELIEF VALVE WILL ACTUATE CAUSING PRESSURE
; TO RAPIDLY DLCREASE UNTIL THE RELIEF VALVE RESETS. l
- ' THE LOSS OF RFiCTOR COOLANT WILL DE COMPENSATED FOR BY THE VOLUME CONTROL JYSTEM WHICH WILL MAINTAIN PRESSURIZER LEVEL. .
7.5 SEVERITY AND TIME INCREASE THE ACCUMULATOR WILL BECOME SOLID 4 AND PRESSURE CHANGES WILL BE VERY RAPID AS THE RELIEF VALVE , , CONTROLS ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. THE RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE TO " THE CONTAINMfNT WILL CAUSE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FRCM CONTAINMENT PARAMETER MONITORS. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY,
- t RE&TORAt2OM:
MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE LEAKING CHECK VALVES. iE A O Page 196
.._._.,._o_ . . _ _ . , - . . , . . , - _ , _ . . , . , . , , .,_,,_....-,___,...~.-_..,._...__.,_._~._,,.m .__~._e .. ..-m,......_ . . . - . _ , . .
- l MA'.! UNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1
5102 51 ACCUMULATOR TANK WATER LEAK )Q FYFS: VARIABLE: 1 - 100% = 2 - 200 GPM AT 650 PSIG CAUS2: - DISCHARGE PIPE WELD FAILURE (UNISOLABLE) ASSDMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER OFFZOM8: SIO2A: ACCUMULkTOR 61 SIQ2C: ACCUMULATOR 63 j SIO28: ACCUMULATOR 62 SIO2D: ACCUMULATOR #4 nummmme-1 Dancnzptgan: THE SELECTED ACCUMULATOR WATER LEVEL AND TANK PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AT A RATE CONSISTENT WITH SELECTED MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. LOW LEVEL AND LO'I "RESSURE ALARMS WILL ANNUNCIATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT. WITH NO OPERATOR ACTION THE AFFECTED ACCUMULATOR WILL DRAIN COMPI.ETELY AND CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVELS MILL REPLECT THZ LOSS OF WATER FROM THE ACCUMULATOR. ACCUMULATOR TANK PRESSURE WILL DROP TO "0" CONSISTENT WITH TANK VOLUME LOSS. ANNUNCIA'1 ION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. 1 OPERATOR ACTION TO MAINTAIN ACCUMULATOR TANK LEVEL AND PRESSURE THROUGH MANIPULATION OF THE NORMAL FILL LINE AND N2 GAS SUPPLY SYSTEM WILL TEMPORARILY RETAIN SYSTEM RELIABILITY. ,O = agstonnexon: MALTUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WELD FAILURE. l j l i i O Page 197 i
l j MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 1 SIO3 l 0 SI ACCUMULATOR TANK PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE l I. j FYPS: VARIABLE: 0 - 700 PSIG l CAUSB: PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE l ASSUNED ZNETEAL CONDZTION: 100% POWER 0FFZONS: SIO3A: PT-9601 ACCUMULATOR #1 82035: PT-961; ACCUMULATOR $1 l #IOJC: PT-962/ ACCUMULATOR 92
*IO3D: PT-9631 ACCUMULATOR $2
#I035: PT-9641 ACCUMULATOR 93 SIO3F: PT-D651 ACCUMULATOR 63 SIO3G: PT-966; ACCUMULATOR $4 8I035: PT-967i ACCUMULATOR #4 DESCR19TXQM: '
THE SELECTED SI ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER WILL FAIL TO l O THE SELECTED SEVERITY. THE APPROPRIATE CHANNEL PRESSURE INDICATION WILL RESPOND TO THE MALFUNCTIONING PRESSURE TRANSMITTER OUTPUT. AT THE PROPER SETPOINT(S) THE ACCUMULATOR l i HI/LO PRESSURE ALARMS WILL ACTUATE. ANNUNcTATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. RERTORAt20M: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE FAILED ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. O ' l Page 198 i l l
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS S104 0 FYPR: LOSS OF SAFETY INJECTION PUMP (S) DOOLEAN CADSB: - FAULTY OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICE ASSONED ENETEAL CCNDEt%CN: PUMP RUNNING OPTIONS: SIO4A: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP $1 )
#204B: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP $2 meer DRRCRZHZslE:
THE OPEN.SI PUMP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT THE SI PUMP BREAKER IS MINIMUM.THE EFFECTED SI HEADER PRESSURE FLOW WILL DECREASE TO
'tHE LOSS OF ONE SI PUMP WILL NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING CAPACITY AS ONE PUMP MAS 100% CAPACITY FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AP P ROPRI ATELY .
ARBTORAE2QM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE SI PUMP BREAL.. . O I e i 9 O Page 199
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS S W01 Q FYFK: EOOLEAN FAILURE OF SERVICE WATER PUMP CAUS5: SMATT SEIZURE I ASSOBSD INIFIA& CONDIFION: ANY PLANT CONDITION OFFIONS: #NO2A: SERVICE WATER PUMP $1 Sw023: SERVICE WATER PUMP $2 l 1 DRACREREZOM: l l THE SELECTED SERVICE WATER PUMP HANDSWITCH WILL INDICATE THAT l THE MOTOR SUPPLY BREAKER IS OPEN. THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE WATER HEADER FLOW AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM. IF THE 4 STANDBY SERVICE WATER PUMP IS IN AUTOMATIC, IT WILL START AND IT'S ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP WILL START d AUTOMATICALLY AND ALL ASSOCIATED VALVING WILL OPERATE AS REQUIRED. ONE TRAIN RAS 100% PLANT COOLING SYSTEM CAPACITY. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. t ARRFOAAEZOM: i RESET SIMULATOR TO THE DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. O Page 200 r,..- - . - , - - - -,,-,w-- - - - - - , - --~-r +,-,-.a w , w-~ = -~- - ' ~ ~'-**'*~~'#'"'"" ' " " ' ' ' " ' ' " ~ " ' ' ' ~ ^ * ~ ' ' " ' * " " ' ' ' " ~ ~ ~ * ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ~ " ' " ' ' ' ~ ' ' " ' * ~ ~ ~
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TC01 LOSS OF CONTROL FLUID CAUSB: - LOW PRESSURE CONTROL OIL HEADER RUPTURE ASSORSD INIFIA& CONDIFION: CONTROL FLUID PUMP (S) RUNNING OPTIONS: nons cADTIOM: ACTZ7& TION or TC01 IN CONJUNCTION w2Ts RPO1 (FAILURs OF ALL AUTCORATIC RsACTOR TRIPS) AND TP01 (Loss or TPcw) can cAUsa Tas LIMITS or Tas TPcw necost To as axCascap (w!Ts mashmo To TPCw
- Taaesmarckss), sas TML causs Awe arraCTs.
nnsenzarzag: THE LOSS OF CONTROL FLUID WILL CAUSE TRIP FLUID PRESSURE TO DECREASE WITH RESULTANT CLOSURE OF THE TURBINE STOP AND CONTROL VALVES. PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE WILL REMAIN APPROXIMATELY NORMAL UNTIL THE TANK COMPLETELY EMPTIES. WHEN THE TANK EMPTIES, EHC HEADER PRESSURE WILL DECREASE, THE STANDBY PUMP WILL START, AND ANNUNCIATION OF LOW PRESSURE WILL OCCUR. THE PUMPS, IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE RUNNING, WILL EVENTUALLY TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF SUCTION. t Annrannr1oua RESET THE SIMULATOR TO THE DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. 1 9/M O l Page 201 v.s g
. - - - + - , - - - , . . - -- . , - - - - - - - . . - - . . , . - - . . -.---...-.-__....~.-,,~.--.,-,,-,.-,_,.n,,,,,,-- -.---e.n,n,-n---,, . , , - -
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i i TC02 Q FYPR LOSS OF AUTOMATIC EHC SYSTEM CONTROL VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 50 MW LOAD OSCILLATION EVERY _ 5 SECONDS CAUSB: EHC OUTPUT OSCILLATION ASSONED INTFIAL CONDIFION: >3% POWER OPTIONS: nonE DERCRERTION: THE EHC AUTOMATIC OUTPUT WILL OSCILLATE AT THE SELECTED VALUE WHEN THE MALFUNCTION BECOMES ACTIVE. THE TURBINE CONTROL VALVES WILL OSCILLATE AND SYSTEM PARAMETERS WILL FOLLOW THE VARYING STEAM SUPPLY. THE OPORATOR CAN SELECT MANUAL CONTROL TO STOP THE LOAD OSCILLATION. RRRTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL STOPS THE LOAD OSCILLATION. O i l O - Page 202
1 MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TC03 0 FYF5: BOOLEAN FMLURE OF MANUAL TURBINE TRIP l CAUSB: . MANUAL TRIP WIRING FAILURE ASSUNED ENETZAE, CONDETECN: 1N POWER RANGE 09FZONS: nons DESCRZRTZOM: WHEN THE OPERATOR TRIPS THE TURBINE MANUALLY, THE TURBINE TRIP WILL NOT OCCUR. THE OPERATOR MUST ELIMINATE STEAM TO THE TURBINE THROUGH AN ALTERNATE METHOD. ARDTORATZOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE WIRING FAILURE. l O Page 203 i l i-
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TC04 0 FYPE: SPURIOUS TURBINE LOAD CHANGE VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 1275 MW CADSBt- EHC SIGNAL ERROR ASSOMED IN2FIAL COND2FION: IN POWER PANGE 09F20NB: nona DERCARM120M: THE EHC CONTROLLER WILL CAUSE THE TURBINE CONTROL VALVES TO RESPOND AND EITHER INCREASE OR DECREASE TURBINE LOAD TO THE SELECTED SEVERITY LEVEL AT A MAXIMUM RATE OF 100 MW/ MIN. AS TURBINE LOAD INCREASES THE STEAM FLOW WILL INCREASE AND STEAM PRESSURE WILL DECREASE. THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TC WILL DECREASE CAUSING TAVE TO DECREASE RESULTING IN ROD WITHDRAWAL TO MAINTAIN PROGRAM TAVE. PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AND ASSOCIATED CONTROL SYSTEMS WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. AS LOAD INCREASES THE OTN-16 AND/OR OP-U16 TURBINE REACHED. RUNBACK AND ROD BLOCK WILL ACTUATE IF THE SETPOINT IS O AS TURBINE LOAD DECREASES THE OPPOSITE EFFECT OF ABOVE WILL BE INDICATED. IF THE DECREASE CONTINUES THE GENERATOR WILL TRIP OU REVERSE POWER RESULTING IN A TURBINE TRIP. TRANSFERRING CHANGE. TO THE MANUAL MODE WILL STOP THE TURBINE LOAD BERRGRAEEDM: THE SPURIOUS SIGNAL CLEARS WHEN THE VARIABLE SELECTEP REACHED. !J i O Page 204
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TC05 MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAILUS6 FYPS: BOOLEAN i i CAUS5: - VALVE ACTUATOR FAILURE ASSONED INIFIA& CONDIFION: IN POWER RAME 0FFIONS: rc05A: CONTROL VALVE #1 FCOSC: CONTROL VALVE #3
- FC0&st CONTROL VALVE $2 FCOSDt CONTROL VALVE #4 DERCREDTZOM:
i { i i THE SELECTED CONTROL VALVE WILL DRIFT SHUT IN 30 SEC FROM IT'S 1 2 POSITION AT THE TIME OF ACTIVATION. THE UNAFFECTED CONTROL i VALVES LOAD. WILL MODULATE OPEN AUTOMATICALLY TO MAINTAIN TURBINE j IF THE UNAFFECTED CONTROL VALVES CANNOT OPEN SUFFICIENTLY j TO COMPENSATE THE TURBINE LOAD WILL DECREASE TO THE CAPACITY THE UNAFFECTED CONTROL VALVES. i ASSOCIATED INDICATION, CONTROL ! AND ALARM LOGIC WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE. i RER TORATZOM: , l ! MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE VALVE ACTUATOR FAILt1RL AND l' ALLOWS NORMAL SPEED.THE CONTROL VALVE TO RETURN TO THE PROPER POSITION l l i ? . I I I l i d O
- Page 205 j
4
- -.. . . - . . . . . . - , . - _ , . . _ _ , . _ _ , , , . _ ,,._,,..,m,....,_,._.___,-_......._.r
~
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TC06 Q FYPS: BOOLEAN SPURIOUS TURBINE TRIP CAUSB: - SPURIOUS EHC LOGIC fRIP SIGNAL A3809GD EMETZAb CONDETZON: IN POWER RANGE OPTZONS: nous ' DRBCR29EXOM: THE SPURIOUS TRIP SIGNAL CAUSES THE TRIP SOLENOID'S TO TRIP THE LOW PRESSURE OIL SYSTEM SHUTTING THE TURBINE STOP AND CONTROL VALVES. THE REACTOR WILL TRIP AND THE GENERATOR OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WILL TRIP OPEN. THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM WILL RESPOND APPRCPRIATELY TO THE TURBINE TRIP. THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND STEAM GENERATORS WILL RESPOND TO THE TURBINE TRIP AND STEAM ! DUMP SYSTEM VALVE MODULATION. ALL ASSOCIATED PLANT CONTROL LOGICS WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. ANNUNCIATION AND INDICATION WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. RERTQRAT2Qg: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REMOVES THE TRIP SIGNAL. i Page 206 1
, . . u
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS .
'n TC07 Q FYPS:
FMLURE OF AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIPS BOOLEAN CAUSB: - THIS MALFUNCTION HAS NO REALISTIC CAUSE, BUT IS MODEL'D SUCH THAT A MANUAL OR LOCAL TRIP IS NECESSARY TO STOP STEAM FLOW TO THE TURBINE. ASSC5dED INIFIAL CoarDIFION: TURBINE LATCHED OPTIONS: NONE DRACA19T10M: WHEN AN AUTO TURBINE TRIP SIGMAL IS RECEIVED (ELECTRICAL OR HYDPAULIC TRIP), OR MECHANICAL OVERSPEED, A TURBINE TRIP WILL NOT OCCUR. THE OPERATOR MUST MANUALLY OR LOCALLY TRIP THE I TURBINE OR THE CONTROL FLUID PUMPS IN ORDER TO TRIP THE TURBINE. AR s T0JtR TI O N: MALFUNCTION REMOM L WILL RESTORE THE TURBINE AUTO TRIP CIRCUITS. O l O Page 207
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TP01 Q TYF5: TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER FAILURE 5 VARIABLE: 500 - 50,000 GPM I CAUS5: - 30" DISCHARGE LINE RUPTURE AT XTW-048 ASSDMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: 100% POWER l oarrows: NONE CAUTIQB: ACTIVATION OF MALFUNCTION TP01 IN CONJUNCTION ; WITE RP01 AND TC01 (FAILURE OF ALL AUTOMATIC RX ' AND TUREINE TRIPS) CAN CAUSE TER LIMITS OF TEE j TPCW MODEL TO BE RECERDED. 25 TER ADOVE ' CONDITION, TPCW TE395RATURES (AS READ ON PPC) WILL TREND Up AT A RATE TO ACRIEVE GREATER TRAN 400 'F IN 10 MINUTES AND WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE OVER TIME. DSCEANICAL FAILURE DUE TO REGE TEMERRATURES ARE NOT MODELED WEICE ALLOW FOR MODELING LIMITS TO BE EXCEEDED. i DERCREDTZON: A RUPTURE IN THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER LINE WILL CAUSE THE i O PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE AND SYSTEM 1rLOW TO DECREASE WHILE ACTUAL 8 PUMP FLOW AND CURRENT INCREASE. WHEN THE SYSTEM FLOW AND RUPTURE FLOW EQUAL THE PUMP CAPACITY THE SYSTEM FLOW WILL i DECREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH RUPTURE SEVERITY. .T THE PROPER OVERFLOW CONDITION THE PUMP MOTOR AMPS WILL INCREASE t SUFFICIENTLY TO CAUSE THE BREAKER TO TRIP ON OVERCURRENT. THE ; STANDBY PUMP WILL START AND TEED THE RUPTURE AND WILL ALSO TRIP l ON OVERCURRENT. l l
- THE COOLING WATER HEAD TANK WILL DECRAASE RAPIDLY, DEPENDING ON SEVERITY, AND THE MAKEUP VALVE WILL OPEE AND THE LO LEVEL ALARM WILL ACTUATE. IF MAKE-UP CANNOT MAINTAIN LEVEL THE PUMPS WILL TRIP ON LO-LO LEVEL.
THE COMPONENTS COOLED BY TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER WILL HAVE INCREASED SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ACTUATE l SYSTEM CONTROL AND ALARM LOGIC AS APPROPRIATE. i RERTOAATZQE: ' t MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE 30" DISCHARGE LINE RUPTURE. O Page 208
, - , . ,._-yr..-,-. . .
. .....,-.,,..-,,.__.....-,,,.....,,.-..--_,,-,.,,,m.. ..._,..,....+.,-.-,.,..-_.-.-..m.......... ,...%.m . . . . - - . . ,
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ~ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TP02 O TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMP FAILURE ! i FYP5: BOOLEAN CAUS5: $/ 9 SHAFT SHEAR ' ASSONED liM2 TEAL CONDZt!ON: 100% POWER OFFIONS: FP02A TURBINE PLANT COOLING MATER PUMP #1 FF023: TURBINE PIANT COOLING MATER PUMP #2 l DESCRZRR M : l l MALTUNCTION ACTUATION FOR THE SELECTED PUMP WILL CAUSE THE SHAFT l TO SHEAR. SYSTEM PRESSURE AND FLOW WILL DECREASE TO MINIMUM. MOTOR AMPS WILL DECREASE TO LESS THAN NO LOAD CURRENT. THE l STANDBY PUMP WILL NOT START BECAUSE THE AFFECTED PUMP Mt'OR BREAKER DID NOT OPEN. THE COMPONENTS COOLED BY TURBINE tLANT ' COOLING WATER WILL HAVE INCREASED SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ACTUATE SYSTEM CONTROL AND ALARM LOGIC AS APPROPRIATE. OPERATOR ACTION TO START THE STANDBY PUMP WILL RESTORE FLOW.
- RR2TORAEZOM
MALFUNCTION REMOVAL WILL REPAIR THE SHEARED SHAFT. I i i O 4 Page 209 4
i i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l TP03 l' GENERATOR BYDROGEN TEMPERATURE HIGHILOW TYPR VARIABLE: 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION i CAD 82: TPCW TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE 1-TV-3110 FAILS ASSONBD INITIAL COND2FION: IN POWER RANGE , 09TZONS: nonx
\
DRSCARDTZOM: AS THE TURBINE COOLING WATER FLOW DECREASES THROUGH THE j GENERATOR H 2 COOLERS THE H 2 TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE l PROPORTIONATE TO HEAT BALANCE AND SEVERITt. THE GENERATOR ! STATOR TEMPERATURES WILL INCREASE SLOWLY. GENERATOR PARAMETER ANNUNCIATION INCREASES. WILL RESPOND TO ACTUATION SETPOINTS AS SEVERITY ] AND TURBINE A COMPLETE LOSS WILL RESULT IN A GENERATOR LOCKOUT TRIP. DECREASED H AS COOLING WATER FLOW GOES TO MAXIMUM THE 2 TEMPERATURE WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE j GENERATOR. i ACCORDINGLY. GENERATOR STATOR TEMPERATUh3S WILL RESPOND l ARS TORATZON: l O MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS 1-TV-3118.
)
l i k i i O Page 210
l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS \ TP04 0 FYPS: LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMP OIL COOLING 1 1 VARIABLE: 0 - 100% or COOLING WATER TLOW CAPABILITY ! CAUS5: OIL COOLER WATER TLOW RESTRICTION ASSONED ENETZAL CONDETEON: IN POWER RANGE OFFIONS: rF04A: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP fl FF043: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP #2 1 DRACRIPTION: THE REDUCED COOLING WATER FLOW THROUGH THE MFP OIL COOLERS WILL l PESULT IN AN OIL TEMPERATURE INCREASE PROPORTIONAL TO THE ; COOLING WATER FLOW DECREASE. THE LUBRICATING QUALITIES OF THE ' OIL WILL DEGRADE TO A POINT WHERE BEARING FAILURE WILL RESULT. i THE CONTINUED EFFECTS WILL BE THE SAME AS FWO4. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. l RRETQRRT. TOM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REMOVES THE OIL COOLER WATER FLOW RESTRICTION. O ( Page 211
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.l MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l i
TP05 ! Q TURBINE LUBE OIL SYSTEM \ FYFB TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE FAILURE VARIABLE: l CAUSB - 0 - 100% OF VALVE POSITION 1-TV-3094 CONTROL FAILURE ASSDBdBD INIFIAL CONDIFICIt: IN POWER RANGE O9TIONS: nonE
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\ i DRBCREDTioM. l 3 1 AS THE TURBIbd LUBE OIL COOLER COOLING WAT VALVE (1-TV-30 9 4 ) TURBINE LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE AND HEAT BALANCE. SEVERITY WILL C AND OUTLET TEMPERATURES WILL INCREASE ACCORDINGLY. THE BEARING TEMPEPATUPE,S TOOILINCREAS ING INLET { l INCREASE THE LUBRICATING PROPERTIES ND BEARING WILL D TEMPERATURES WILL CONTINUE TO BEARING VIBPATION. INCREASED INCREASE R O AN INCREASING COOLING WATER LFLOW OUTLET TEMPERATURES. INLET AND DECREASES - i VERY LOW OIL TEMPERATURESN WILL THE INCREASE. BEARING V AT maner - ANPUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE AS APPROPRIATE .
. N.i9.s h -
asAvomarrom: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE 1-TV-3094 C OL FAILURE. 9 i O Page 212 1 4
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MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TU01
- O MMN TURBINE THRUST BEARING FMLURE tras
- soOLEAN CAUS5: - THRUST BEARING METAL FAILURE I
ASSERIED INIFIAL CC0fDIFION: TURBINE ROLLING WITH STEAM OsFIONS: nons DERCAIDFIQM: UPON ACTUATION OF THIS MALFUNCTION, THE THRUST BEARING ; ,l TEMPERATURE WILL BEGIN TO TREND UP FROM THE NORMAL RUNNING 4 TEMPERATURE TO ALARM CONDITION. WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MINUTES THE l TEMPERATURE INCREASE WILL CAUSE BEARING VIBRATION ALAPRS. AS TEMPERATURE INCREASES, THE TURBINE WILL TRIP ON THRUST ' BEARING DISPLACEMENT. THE REACTOR COOLANT AND SECONDARY SYSTEMS l WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATE TO THE TURBINE / REACTOR TRIP, ARsFORAT10m: O RESET SIMULATOR TO THE DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. 1 l t l O Page 213
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I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS F TU02 O EXRAUST HOOD SPRAY FMLURE i FYPR: BOOLEAN CAUSB: EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER FAILS ASSDMED INIFIAL CONDIFION: STEAM PLANT STARTUP OFFIONS: 202A FAILS CLOSED N023: FAILS OPEN i DRACREETZOM: 1 THE LP TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER WILL CAUSE THIS SPRAY VALVE TO FAIL IN THE SELECTED POSITION. l CLOSED: DURING TURBINE STARTUP INSUFFICIENT STEAM FLOW THROUGH THE LP TURBINE WILL CAUSE EXCESSIVE EXHAUST HOOD TEMPERATURES FROM BLADE WINDAGE. THE ALARM WILL i ACTUATE AT THE PROPER SETPOINT AND THE HOOD SPPAY VALVE , WILL NOT OPEN CAUSING TEMPERATURES TO INCREASE FURTHER RESULTING INCREASED VIBRATION AND STRESS EVALUATOR RF.SPONSE. O OPEN: IF THE HOOD SPRAY VALVE FAILS OPEN THE LP TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD TEMPERATURES WILL STAY COOL WITH NO ADVERSE EFFECT. ARRTORATZON: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER. l 4 O 2 Page 214
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t MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS venam TU03 (MALFUNCTION DELETED) i i I 1 ll l .; l I l 4 i i i l l l l O t I i l 1 . 1 l l i l O Page 215
MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS I, , 4 TUO4 TURBINE BEARING HIGH VfBRATION TYPE: VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 1.5 - 15 MILS ABOVE NORMAL CA USE: LP2 REAR BEARING (#6 BEARING) FAILURE ASSUMED INITIAL CONDITION: TURBINE ROLLING WITH STEAM OPTIONS: NONE DESCRIPTION: LP2 REAR BEARING (#6 BEARING) WILL FAIL TO THE SEVERITY SELECTED AT THE SPECIFIED RAMP RATE. BEARING METAL TEMPERATURE FOR #6 BEARING WILL BEGIN TO INCREASE TO AN EQUILIBRIUM TEMPERATURE CONSISTENT WITH VIBRATION SEVERITY. ADJACENT BEARINGS AND TURBINE SHAFT 1 VIBRATIONS WILL HAVE CASCADED VIBRATION INDICATIONS CONSISTENT WITH MALFUNCTION SEVERITY. TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP IF SEVERITY IS GREATER THAN VIBRATION TRIP SETPOINT. TURBINE SPEED REDUCTION WILL CAUSE VIBRATIONS TO DECREASE. BEARING TEMPERATURE AND CASCADED VIBRATIONS WILL RESPOND TO THE DECREASED VIBRATION. j RESTORA TION: RESET SIMULATOR TO THE DESIRED INITIAL CONDITION. i l l l 0 - Page 216 l w.
m MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS TU05 FYPS: MAIN TURBINE BEARING OIL LOW PRESSURE VARIABLE: 0 - 100% = 0 - 150 PSIG CAD 88
- TURBINE LUBE OIL BOOSTER PUMP DRIVE CASING FAILURE ASBCSED INIFIAL COIIDIF200F: IN POWER PANGE 09t%ONS: nonE k
DRBCA2992DM: THE RAMP TURBINE TIME TO THEBEARING OIL PRESSURE DECREASES WITHIN THE SEL SELECTED SEVERITY. THE AUXILIARY OIL PUMPS WILL START AUTOMATICALLY AT TI:E PUMP START-PRESSURE SE LUBE OIL PRESSURE DECREASES BELOW THOSE SETPOINTS. EMERGENCY DC LUBE OIL PUMP STARTS, IF THE INCREASE DUE TO THE LUBE OIL COOLERS BEING BYPASSED.T VIBRATION DUE TO THE LUBE OIL TEMPEPATU ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. ARRTORAtXQM: MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE BOOSTER PUMP DRIVE CASI .
\
O Page 217 0
i i MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS i TU06 MAIN TURBINE ELECTRIC LUBE OIL PUMP (S) FAILURE , FYF5: BOOLEAN l CAUSB: - HOTOR CONTROLLER FAILURE l ASSUMED INIFIA2, CONDIFICW: ANY PLANT CONDITION OFFIONS: MOSA: LUBE OIL PUMP "A" N063: LUBE OIL PUMP "B" N06C: LUBE OIL PUMP "C" / l R N08D: N085: DC EMERGENCY LUBk OIL PUMP [ SMAFT LIFT OIL PUMP f an n. , . . DERCREDTZON: THE SELECTED ELECTRIC LUBE OIL PUMP FOR THE MAIN TURBINE WILL i NOT START AUTOMATICALLY OR MANUALLY, IF THE AUX LUBE PUMPS ARE IN AUTOMATIC AND PUMP "A" FAILS TO START, PUMP "B" WILL. ' t IF PUMPS "A" AND "B" FAIL TO START, PUMP "C" WILL. IF PUMPS "A", "B", AND "C" FAIL TO START, THE EMERGENCY PUMP ( WILL.
- IF PUMPS 'A", "B", "C",
AND THE DC EMERGENCY PUMP FAIL TO START l
- THE TURBINE WILL TRIP ON LOW PRESSURE AND THE SHAFT LIFT CIL PUMP WILL START AT THE PROPER TURBINE RPM SETPOINT.
t IF THE SHAFT LIFT OIL PUMP FAILS TO START THE TURBINE BEARINGS WILL NOT HAVE PROP' 4 R OIL LIFT PRESSURE AND BEARING FRICTION WILL j INCREASE. ANNUNCIATION WILL ACTUATE APPROPRIATELY. i { RERFOAkt2ON: 4 MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE MOTOR CONTROLLER FAILURE. i 1 0
;O I
Page 218 4 9
I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND EFFECTS l 1 1 I l TUO7 O FAILURE OF TURBINE STRESS EVALUATOR j l FY95: VARIABLE: 0 - 1004 OF DETECTOR SPAN = 32 - 660 'T l CAUS5: - HP CAf;NG TEMPERATURE DETECTOR FAILURE (SA11T015) ! i ASSONED INITIA& CONDIFION: TURBINE ROLLING j 09FIONS: nons i l 1 ; I DRBCRIDTIQM: ; i ( THE HP CASING TEMPERATURE DETECTOR OUTPUT WILL CAUSE STRESS 4 EVALUATOR TURBINE DISPLAY INDICATION TO INDICATE THE POSITION {
} SELECTED BY SEVERITY.
, l BEFORE THE GENERATOR IS SYNCHRONIZED THE " ADMISSION" SECTION f ' WILL BE DISPLAYED AND IS USED FOR A CONTROLLED TURBINE WARMUP ! AND SPEED INDICATION.
/
ATTER SYNCHRONIZATION TO THE GRID, THE ST*FSS EVALUATOR IS ) i AUTOMATICALLY SHIFTED TO THE " TURBINE" SECTION AND THE ACTUAL LOAD AND PERMISSIBLE LOAD MARGIN WILL BE INDICATED. IF THE SE ] IS SELECTED FOR INPUT INTO THE TURBINE EHC SYSTEM, THE COMPUTED : LIMITS WILL CONTROL THE TURBINE SPEED AND LOAD RATES, THE l , O' ERRONEOUS TSE COMPUTER OUTPUT CAN CAUSE THE TURBINE TO BE CONTROLLED TO EXCEED LIMITING STRESS VALUES OR THE OPERATOR CAN i ( REMOVE THE TSE FROM EHC TURBINE CONTROL AND MANUALLY MAINTAIN t THE TURBINE WITHIN LIMITING VALUES. j i RESTORATIQM: i MALFUNCTION REMOVAL REPAIRS THE HP CASING TEMPERATUAE DETECTOR, I
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I MALFUNCTION CAUSES AND OFFECTS WD01 (MALFUNCTION DELETED) O l 0 - Page 220 i e w
O , r -memm. ammmmme L' l& + 1UE E GlRfC SECTION- 7 < E O simetiron DisCaEr4Ncv aEsoturIon , AND' MODIFICATION- SCHEDULE
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CPEES STEADY PERFORMMICE TEST LIST , 25% RATED TEEmbEL PONER REAT BALANCE 75% RATED M PONER EEAT BALANCE i 100,% RATED TEERamL PONER REAT BALANCE AND 60 MINUTE STABILTY SIMULATOR REAL TIME TEST s i O ; l 5 i O t ( l-
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CPSES:AdNUAL TRANSIENT PERFORMhMCE TEST LIST' L MhMUAL REACTOR TRIP. SIMULTANEOUS TRIP OF ALL FEEDWATER PUMPS SIMULTANEOUS CLOSURE OF ALL MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIV)-
'SIMULTANDOUS TRIP OF ALL REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS'- +
TRIP OF ANY-SINGLE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP r MAIW TURBINE TRIP (MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL WEICE DOES NOT' RESULT-IN ' IledEDIATE MEACTOR TRIP. L MAXIMUM RATE POWER RAMP (100% DOWN TO APPROXIMhTELY 75% AND-EACK UP TO 100% MhAIMUM. SIEE REACTOR COOLANT SYS1EM RUPTURE COMBINED WITH LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER MhXIMUM SIEE UNISOLhBLE~ MAIN' STEAM LINE' RUPTURE SLON PRIMARY SYSTEM DEPRESSUKIEATION TO SATURATED CONDITION USING PRESSURIEER RELIEF OR. SAFETY' VALVE STUCK'OPEN i s i e l 0 LO
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l SAR # DESCRIPTION l PRIORITil SYSTEM l COMPLETION SCHEDULE 87SA1149 ,Fl-619 SAS POINT 2 SS j 9/15/90-87SA1151- FI-618 SAS POINT 2 I SS 9/15/90 l 87SA1411 HS-5382/3 LABELING 3 HW ! 8?1/91 87SA1422 : SAS RESPONSE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PT _2 SS- 9/15/90 88SA0258 INCORE TEMP IND DIFFERENCES j 2 SS 12/31/90 88SA0386 MALFUNCTION CONTROL i 3 YP 12/31/90 88SA0865 At#4 TEST PB RESPONSE I 2 AN 10/1/90- 'I 88SA1109 14DS LABELING '3 HW 8/1/91 68SA1240 TUO7 ENGR UNITS j 3 YP 12/31/90 - 89SA0282- RX VSL HD LIOLID TEMP SAS POINTS l 2 SS 9/15/90 89SA0304 WW LUBE WATER FOR CIRC WATER PUEFS 2 - CW ~ 9/15/90 89sA0352 CV23 MALF PRESSURE j 2 CV 12/15/90-09SA0357 UPDATE C/R FIRE EVAC ALM AS PER DMRC-87-1-0691 2 HW/YP 12/15/90-89SA0358 TDAFWPP MODIFeCATION DIARC 88-1-205 2 FW' :11/1/90 I 89SA0430 PZR. VAPOR SPACE LEAK ENHANCElENT 3 RC 9/15/91
- j 89SA0467 lA01 NEEDS REMODELING REVIEW BOARD } 3 !A 8/31/91 29SA0472 DimC OFFSITE POWER SYS MOBS - -l 2 ED 9/15/90
- i. 89SA0606 CHANGE MCR CONTROLLER PUSteUTTONS (ENGR) l 2 HW- 12/15/90 f 89SA0613 PUT IN PROCESS IRREGU-. REVIEW CORASTTEE 3 RX 8/1/91
[ _89SA0656 - AUTO SYNC RELAYS AND LOST 88SA1192 3 ED '3/1/91 j 89SA0754 ADedUNC8ATOR PUStBUTTON RESPONSE 2 AN '10/1/90 89SA0781 AUDIBLE ALARM RESPONSE 2 AN 10/1/90 69SA0789 CHECK RECORDERS FOR PAPER SCALE & REPLACE - 3 -HW. 8/1/91 89SA0792 AD SEO PUStBUTTONS TO RM-23 PNL-IDA 2 HW/YP 10/1/90 -i , 89SA0819 CHANGE FV-2456/57 TO FAIL CLSD DMRC 89-1-005 '3 ' FW ' 8/1/91 i 89SA0820 INIT CLOSURE OF FSBV UPON AUTO DMRC89-1-009 3- 'FW 8/1/91 t 89SA0821 MOVE CCP ASNI FLOW LINES DfMAR-89-1-017 2. CV 8/1/91 ~ . 89SA0822 RM UPDATE PROJECT ' 2 RM 12/1/90 l- 89SA0823' PPC UPDATE PROJ NOT APPR TE. PLANT C GS COhr j 3 PP 8/1/91 89SA0825 l ADD B/U PWR SPLY/INV STATIC BYPASS SWITCH l 2 ED 8/1/91 89SA0838- MSIV HYD SYS TRBL ALM NOT YET InFLE IN PLNT -l -3 MS - 8/1/91 89SA0840 i UPGRADE C.R. RAD MONITORS 5895 - ! '2 RM 12/1/90 1 l 5 1 ' 08/03/90-A. , m -, y... ,N . -
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W ~ ' ~ O C) , SAR8 DESCRIPTION PRIORfT)l SYSTEM l COMPLETION SCHEDULE 89SA0849 REF DM 89-101 SGBD EX OUTLET TEMP 2 SG 9/1590 89SA0855 RM ALARMS ON MALF RC-10 I 2 RM 12/1/90 89SA0874 St ACCUM LO LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT 2 SI 9/1590 89SAb887 ICREATE ABILITY TO PROV SM SG TUBE LEAKAGE 2 l SG/YP 9/30/90
'89SA0893 ALT PWR FROM 1A2 TO XA1 DM89-026 2 I ED 12/15/90
{ 893A0902 ADD NEW IDA FOR CO-149 2 FW 11/15/90 89SA1383 CORE RADIAL PROFILF 3 CR 12/31/90 3 90SA0008 IDA RCS LEAKAGE PUTS WTR N WRONG SUMP 2 WD 12/1/90 90SA0017- CNTMT SUMP DM-90031 2 .CH 8/1/91-90SA0021 CCW TERMAL BARRIER RET TEMP 2 CC 12/15/90' i 90SA0023 REM RSSCU INFO ON IDAS FROM YP 3 'T
. 11/31/90 I SOSA0024 INABILITY TO NCREASE TPCW TERF VIA CW IDA 2 TP l :SI/90 90SA0026 DRMS SETPT/ DATABASE 1000 DM 89-412 2 RM 8/1/91 l 90SACO30 SCENARIO LO24 SL2 AEH QUESTIONS 3 RS* *2;it90 90SA0040 DROPPED ROD RESPONSE - 3 CR' 10/15/90-
! 90SA0042 CORE DESIGN DATA CHANGE 2 CR- '12/31/90 90SA0047 UPDATE DESIGN DATABASE - 2 RC- 9/15/90 - l 90SA0056 RCS WR PRES NSTRUMENT DhEC891072 2 HW/RC 10/15/90 -J 90SA0058 EST AS RESET TO COMPONENTS DRMS89-1-4,09 - 2 RP 8/1/91 90SA0083 NVESTIGATE EW AUX BOILER NPACT 3 MS 8/1/91 . 90SA0065 INADVERTENT BORATIONIDE.UTION MALF RESP /RB 3 CV 8/141 90SA0072 PDP STARTING CRCUlT REVIEW BOARD 3 CV 12/1/90 1 90SA0077 VERIFY RCP CURRENT CALCS 2 RC. 10/140 90SA0078 DRMS CNTMT AIR MONITOR SETPTIN BOOK 2- 8/1/91
%;a 90SA0081 Rtm OSCLLATIONS 2 Mi 9/1/90 90SA0082 CNTMT FAN /RCS LEAK /COND FLOW 2 CH 10/15/90 j 00SA0083 CNTMT FANS / CONDENSATE 2 'CH' 10/15/90 90SA0085 SPLIT IDA MS1C 13 WTO 2 IDAS '2 MS 9/1/90 90SA0089 PROVIDE ABE.ITY TO DISABLE "HIGH ALARM" 2 RM 8/1/91- l 90SA0093 MSR CONTRCLI ER RED LEDINDICATION 2 MS/HW 10/15/90 90SA0096- UPDATE RCS GEOMETRIC DATA .! 2 IC/RC 1/31/91 j- 90SA2098 ERF S/W MOD DM 89-392 l 2 SS 8/1/91 2 08/03/90
'l t .. . c m,. _ _ _. _ , , _ _ _ _
>em o o' SAR# DESCRIPTION l PRIORIT)l SYSTEM l COf.'.PLETf0N SCHEDULE
' 90SA0111 CONTAINMENT SUMP RFSPONSE 2 WD i 12/1/90 90SA0117 RSD SWITCH CHECK 2 YP I 10/1/90 90SA0118 ELECTRICAL LIMIT SWITCHES 2 1~~ ALL 8/1/91 90SA0125 AFFW PMP CAVITATION SEIZURE 2 FW 9/15/90
- . 90SA0136 DISABLE BORIC ACID BATCH TK TO LVL ALM DM90 3 CV 12/15/90 90SA0140 AUXILIARY CONDENSER VACUUM TEST 2 FW 11/15/90 '
90SA0143 MALFUNCTION OF RCOS AND MALF RESET , 2 RC 10/15/90 90SA0145- DELETE IDA'S 3 SG '4/1/91 90SA0149 EW LABELNG ON TE MSR CONTROLLERS 2 HW 12/1/90 - 90SA0152 MALF MS01 PESPONSE 2- MS 10/15/90 4 90SA0153 MALF MS03 PRESSURE 2 'MS 10/15/90 90SA0155 IDA COND TUBE PLUGGNG RESPONSE 2 FW 2/15/91 90SA0180- FWo4 PROBLEM 2 FW '2/15/91 90SA0161- SAS FOR HV-2188 INDICATES WRONG 2 SS/FW : 9/15/90 90SA0162 HD PUMP O/C TRIPS 2 FW 2/15/91
- 90SA0168 MODIFY ACTIVE I/O OVERRIDE ! 3 YP "12/31/90 90SA0170 STAGGER PUMP TRIPS . 3 FW- 8/1/91
, 90SA0176 INVESTIGATE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING 3 HW 8/1/91- , j 90SA0180 MODIFY FRBV FEED FWD GAIN SIG DRMC89-1-002 2 FW . 8/1/91 i
,90SA0181 REVISE CNTMT HIGH SETPOINTS DCA87-785 - 2 RP 8/1/91 90SA0182 ADD ALARM TO GAC D041C-87-1-027. - 1- 2 EG 8/1/91
. 90SA0183. CHG St CC -)N VENT CHL WTR PMP DWC-89-1-080 2 RP 8/1/91 ! 90SA0192 HS-6555 BEZEL ENGRAVNG OUESTIONS '2- HW -12/1/90
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90SA0195- REMOVE AFW AUTO PRES CONTROL 3 FW 12/31/90 l 90SA0198 CEATE TPCW IDA FOR MFW PP*S REVIEW BRD , 3 FW ' 8/1/91' 90SA0199 REVIEW BOARD - MDA DISCH. VALVES 3 FW/YP ' 8/1/91 -
- 90SA0200 REVIEW BOARD FWR 16/17 - DELETE K)A*S 3' FW 8/1/91
, 90SA0202 ACK DErS ON VENT PANELS. I 2 AN 10/1/90 90SA0203 FW ALARMS i 2 FW 11/1/90 90SA0211 ~ MALF RAMPS ' 1 IA 9/15/90 90S Y M4 MS VLV STROKE TIMES 2 MS 12/31/90 90 SAL QS l DROPPED ROD /CONV RESET 2 RD 12/31/90 i 3 ! 08/03/90' i- - .. _ . _ , - . . .a _ _ - - , _ . - ~ _ . - . . . _ _ _
,y -
o o SARS- DESCRIPTION PRIORITYSYSTEM COMPLETRON SCHEDULE ~ 90SA0216 t/A IDAR01 DELETION REVIEW BOARD . 3 IA ' 8/1/91 90SA0220 FW ALARMS 2 FW 11/1/90 90SA0222 S/A COMPRESSOR PRESS INDICATION 2 IA 10/15/90 90SA0223 t/A PRESS. l.C. VRS O.C. W/l/Al-01 ACTIVE l 1 IA 10/15/90 90SA0229 CHGS SSW SCREENWASH PRES SE1PT DM-90-54 l 2 SW 8/1/91 90SA0233 CLEANUP IDA CWR13 IN CODE 2 CW 10/1/90 90SA0234 LOSS OF LP N2 2 IA' 10/15/90 90SA0235 17160 OPENS WEN PUWWeG DOWN PRT I 2 WD 9/30/90 90SA0240 FCV-110A MAX FLOW 2 CV 12/31/90 SOSA0242 UNABLE TO RESTART COMP 1-02 2 lA 10/15/90 90SA0243 IA COW 1-02 DQMMENTATION PERFORMANCE 2 1A 10/15/90 SOSA0245 IA COWH #1 STOPPED '2 1A 10/15/90
%# !!?80 MODIFY FWP MS1R SPD CONTROLLER DM-90-96 2 FW 8/1/91-90SAW7 MOD TO AUX STM ELB DM-89446 "2 MS 8/1/91 190SA027 PUSiSUTTON COVERS CB07,8,10 2 HW 12/31/90 9: 4 '926; [4G ALM SETPT DM-172 NOT APR FOR PLANT I 2 CH 8/1/91 90SA0269 MALF 1A01 RESPONSE 2 lA 10/15/90 90SA0271 IDA'S FOR RECIPROCATNG IA COMPS 3 IA '10/15/90 90SA0283 IA04 MALF RESPONSES ) 2 IA 10/15/90 90SA0209 REV STACK EFFLUENT ROD RESPONSE l 3 .RM < 12/1/90 90SA0292- IDA CH4R1 EFFECT ON CONT SUWS l .- 2 CH1 10/15/90 '
90SA0295 IDA CMI 11 N/S CH WTR LK IC - 2- 'CH 10/15/90 90SA0297 RESPONSE OF PIAF BEARNG TBFS TO ROOM TEW 3 ALL 9/1/90-90SA0300 DELETE ABILITY TO X-TIE SFP HX TO UN.' T 1 i~ 2 .CC 12/31/90 90SA0302 ADD PW PERMSSIVE ALB-3B-3.5,4.5 - .l. -2 CC 9/15/90 90SA0303 SPARE ALB-4A 1.1,2.1.4.1.1.3.2.382.14,2.16 l 2 CC 9/1/90 : 90SA0304 SNULATE 381.15.2.15,3.15 lJ 2 CC 9/15/90 ~ 90SA0310 OVERFEL SFTY Cit.WTR SGR TK RESPONSE ! 2 CH 10/15/90 ' 90SA0311 ADD SAS POINT l -- 2 St- 12/31/90 90SA0314 VERIFY REFERENCE l 3 RH 9/1/90 90SA0327 REDO RECORDER SCALES 3 HW 8/1/91 90SA0330 VERIFY HW/SW FOR XST 2 AND 1ST 1 , E". 9/15/90 - 4 08/03/90 U - . _ - - _ --. -.= - - _ . .. ._ --- - - . _ .-- -- - L --
- ~
l l l l- SAR#- DESCRIPTION l PRIORIT)l SYSTEM l COMPLETION SCHEDULE 90SA0331 8052 AN SWITCH OPERATES BACKWARDS I 1 ED l' 9/15/90 ~ ~ 90SA0333 SAS PT T5404A IS NOT MODELED I 2 CH I 8/1/91 90SA0338 VERIFY SIGiAA THETA MODEL 3 CH 8/1/91 90SA0339 IPDATE IET PANEL IDA*S 3 CH I 8/1/91' 90SA0340 MODEL BA it-RY CHARGE DISCHARGE 3 ED 8/1/91 90SA0346 M/S CHILL WTR SRG TK LVL 3 , CH 10/15/90 90SA0348 1-8100 IDA MOCFICATION . 2 ' CV/YP 10/15/90 1 90SA0364 UPDA7E DESIGN DATABASE 2 SI 9/1/90 90SA0386 SI ACCUMULATOR FILL WITH RHRP i. 1 SI 9/1/90 90SA0367 TPCW B/S AND ALARM MODELING 2 ~TP 9/1/90 . ,
,90SA0373- MOAS 8052/8012 WIRING 2 HW l 9/1/90 90SA0377 SAS PT HV 5365 INDICATION I 2 CV/SS 10/15/90
, 90SA0379 RrVISE CHATP FOR CRHVAC MOf'E TEST . l 2 CH 10/15/90 1 90SA0383 CCP BEARING TEMPERATURE i 2 CV .1/31/91 t {. 90SA0391 ROOM TEMP PROBLEM 3 CH 6/15/91-
- 90SA0393 FWIV ACTUATION LOGIC CHANGES 2 FW 8,l/91 j 90SA0395 WITH MALF CV 12A.B.C.D ACTUATED, THE CONTA94 l 2 CV/YP 10/15/90 90SA0396 CAfMOT ATTAIN TEMP FOR BTRS ' BORATE" - l 3 CV 8/1/91-90SA0398 SAKE OF REALISM. STAGGER TRIP FOR 86 LOCKOUT l -3 ALL 8/1/91
, 90SA0399 ALB-3B W94DOW 4.1 SHOULD AfWUNCIATE 2- RM :10/1/90 90SA0400 TP01 LOW SEVERITY RESPONSE 1 TP 9/1/90 90SA0401' Ah8 ENVIROfGENTAL TEMP PG 1 LN 1 ! 3 .ALL-9/1/90 90SA0402 MALF CV-12A4) ACTUATES 1-ALB-038 l 3 CV/RM 5/21/91 . 90SA0403 UPON LOSS OF POWER 1-TV-9A. 90 SLD Fall ! 1 TP- 9/1/90 90SA0408 TUD5 RAMP TIME ' l TU/YP. 1 9/1/90 ~ l 90SA0409 MALF TUD4 RESPONSE TURB VIB I TU 1 9/1/90 90SA0418 DM 90-89 REV O . 2 CH/HW 8/1/91 5 90SA0420 N PPC PC VALVES / UNITS 6-10-90 : !- 2 NI' 6/10/91 90SA0421 VERIFY PWR FAILURE. l- 3 FW 6/20/91 90SA0432 CV IPjS l 2' CV 12/31/90 ' 905M439 lRM STANDPIPE FILL VALVES CYCLE 2 CV 12/31/90 90SA044C (F 'P SEAL FAILURE 3 CC ' 12/31/90 i 5 08/03/90 l-
= - . - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SAR3- DESCRIPTION l PRIORIT) SYSTEM COMPLETION SCHEDULE 90SA0447 C/R A-C . 3FDiG- TO LOSS N CCW 12/90 i 3 CC =- 12/1/50-
^
90SA0448 IDA FOR C.5 N '.K TO CO-CURRENT WASTE I 3 CC 8/1/91 90SA0450 ; RESPONSE TO EG-04 6/6/91 i 3 EG l 6/6/91 90SA0451 RESPONSE TO EG-04 6/6/91 3 EG 6/6/91 90SA0452 EG-04 MALF RESPONSE 6/6/91 t 3 EG 6/6/91 90SA0457 PZR SPRAY LNE TEMPSETPOINT DM 90-183 -2 RC 9/15/90 90SA0471' WD LOGIC CHANGES 1 WD 9/1590 90SA0476 RP SETPOINTS 2 RP 9/15/90 l 90SA0478 CCW HT EXCH CAPACITIES 3 CC 2/1/91 90SA0480 SEAL BRG RESPONSE TO LOSS OF CC 3 CC - 12/31/90 90SA0481 CCW TEMP EFFECTON SRG TK LEVEL 3 CC 12/31/90
- 90SA0482 RESPONSE TO EG01 2 EG 11/1050
. 90SA0483 MANUAL CRMACT SAS RESPONSE 2 RP/CH 9/15/90 90SA0484 MANUAL MSLISO SAS PT RESPONSE 2 RP - 9/15/90 90SA0486 RD PPC PT C0043/44 1 2 RD 8/1/91 90SA0489 ENGRAVING CV-05 FIRE PROTECTION - 3 HW IV1/91 90SA0490 N1 RATE TRIPS 2 NI 10/1/90 90SA9491 '1-HV-4175 2 9 .5/90 { WD _ !, 90SA0493- TC TRIP POINTS 3 TC 12/31/90 90SA0494 WD SAMPLE VLVS 2 WD 9/30/90 90SA0495 WD VLV STATUS '2 SAS 9/30/90 i 90SA0496 PRT TEWP AFTER LOCA- 2 RC' 9/15/90 90SA0499 AFWPT STM VLV LIGHTS ' 2 HW 10/1/90 i 90SA0505 MOD OF CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR UV RELAYHG l 2 EG 12/1/90 l 90SA0516 PRT LVL IESPONSE TO SATURATION COlOITIONS 3 RC- - 11/1/90 90SA0519 ENHANCE RCID RESPONSE 3' RC 4/1/91 i 90SA0521 RCP VER ALARMS 2' -RC - 10/1/90 l 90SA0527 PORV WATER FLOWS 2 RC. - 9/15/90 l 90SA0528 vCT PZR INTERFACE 1 CV/RC 9/15/90 - ! 90SA0529 IC PROTECTION CODES 1 ~YP- ' 8/15/90 90SA0530. FR-121A.B RESETS 2 CV - 9/15/90 - _ i l 90SA0548 NC-206 SETPOINTS 2 NI 9/1/90 1 - 4 i t 6 -08/03/90 ' 4 1
.- ~-@wn ,iw,.m, 4 ,. y s-p-- < , - - - , - .A,. ,v..,,m _ _ _ _ _ _, ,
SAR#- DESCRIPTtOH - PRIORITi SYSTEM COMPLETRON SCHEDULE 1' 90SA0549 OBTAIN PLANT DATA TO SUPPORT ANSI-ANS-3.5 3 PD
~
12/31/90 90SA0550 OT2 LEGEND PLATES 2 HW 'I/31/91 90SA0551 ' CB12 hETAL MIMIC 2 HW 12/1/90 90SA0552- FIRE PANEL ENGRAVING 2 HW 3/t/91 90SA0553 SIMULATOR ROOM LIGHTING 1 HW- 4/15/91 j 90SA0554 J-HANDLE SW. HUMAN FACTOR 2 HW 12/1/90 ' 90SA0555 INDIREC SCALE .- 2 HW' 2/15/91 00SA0556 ADD ZL TO CV01 2 HW 9/1/90' 90SA0560 CSP BRG CLR ALARM 2 CS 3/15/91-
~
90SA0561 HV-4776 STROKE TBE 2 CS 2/15/91 90SA0562 EnERG START SIG - 2 EG 4/15/91 90SA0563 GRID SHARING ~2 ED 2/1/91
- 90SA0564 HS-5846 CONTACTS- 2 HW 8/15/90-90SA0565 MALF: TU-04 3 -TU 3/15/91 90SA0566 WSOTK RUPTURE , 3 WD 7/15/91 90SA0569 TP PID CONTROLLERS . l 3' TP 7/15/91 I- 90SA0572 TSE TEbF RECORDER l 3 TU '3/15/91-90SA0573 PLANT DATA OUESTIONS l 3 PD 12/31/91 I. '
4 + i-i l 7 08/03/90 A. -, .. ,a. . ,. - - ,. p , .- : . , - . , __
. ~ . . _ . . -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ ,.. . __
t.- , o 1 o m i h - A u _ _ I 1UELEClRIC SECTION 8 . j l
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LO roua-vsia rssr scusouts E .
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1 CPSES SimulDtor M Ifunction Test Schedulo L i Meh Year _1 Xsatl Year 3 i Year.4 CCol X
'~'
CCO2 i X Chol x-
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CH02 '~ x CH. 6_3. ._.. x ~ ~ C#04 x
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CR01 x Cs01 x Cs02 x _.
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C Cs03 x
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Cs05. . - x f._ s06 x - CV01A _ x ~ ~ ~ ^ ~~ C_VolB x CV02 ~~ x
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Cvg3
~x Cv04 x ~ ~ ~
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Cvos _ x ) Cv06 '~ x . > CV07 ~ ~~ x C.V08 ^x CV09 x ~' CJ'10. ._ x ; C. Vi. l
.s CVl2 x ~ !
x
^
CV14 ~ CVis .x
~ ~ ^
CV17 (y,g x .....- CVl9 x ~ y CV21A x CV21B ~ x CV22 x ~~ ~~ CV23 x ~ ~ ~ ' ~
~~
QV24A x CV24B ~ yy, --
._x .
.Cv26 x -
Page 1 ry
l CPSES Simulator M:Ifunction Tcst Schedul) l l MaNanch X..gagJ. 18AE3 _. XsR.E.l 188f.3.--- .
\J CWO2 ~X 1 CWO3 X E...D. . OI X _
EDG2 X ED03A. . .. X -. ED03B X .\ ED04A X. . _ . . EDO4B X !_..-_ - ED04C X ' ED04D X .. . _ _ _ . . ED04F ' X . . - ED04G X . - .... ED04H X E.D_041 X t EDOSA X EDOSB . X f E.D.0.5. C.- _ X
, ED05D X ED05E X EDOSF X v . _
EDQ6A X . ED068 X ED06C X __ ,.; ED06D. . -.. X. EDO6E X^ ED06F X. +e6e ED06G X _ .. ED07A- X ED07B X ED07C
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; ED07E X ED07F X ED07G ED07H
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X ED08A -.. X
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ED08B X
- . .- 1 EDO__8C
. . X '
ED08D X - ' \
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CPSES Simulator M:Ifunction Test Schedul2 MMM X*1 i ED08E
%ARLE W- X XSAL4 'i i-ED08F X . . _ .
EDO8G X _ ED08H X ED09 X ED10' X I ED.il . X - EG01.- X EG02 _..
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EGO 3 X EGO 4 X EG0$ X iy EG06 X
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EG07. -- X EG08 K EG09 X EG10 X EGil X EGl2 X ' EGl3A X.- , gg,33 .g FWOI -X
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FWO7 X yg,, _ _ _ . _ FWOBB ~ ' ~ FWO9 ~ }~X X
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FW10C
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X ~~ ~ FW10D X __. _ FW11B X FW11C X FWIID X FW12A X Page 3 m
' CPSES Simul:, tor M:lfunction Test Scheduly MmNunction Igggj Yearl Xsarl XsaL4 .- 1 1 \ ) FW128 X
[Y(s l FW12C X -- FW12D X \ FW14A X FW148 X FWl5A . ~ X FW15B~ X _ . . . _ FWISC X _. _. FW15D X ' Fwi._6 _x F. W. 17-X , FW18 X __. FW19 X - . . - FW20 .. X-r FW21 X. FW
.___.22 ' X nV23 .
'X FW24 Y
'X FW25 -- --
K^ p IA01 X N); IA02 X IA03 X IA04A ' X IA04B X MS01 .X MSO2 X MSO3.. X MSO4 X M505 ~ X MS06A X [ MS06B X . . . MS07 MS08 X- _X MSO9 X MS10Al X . . _ , ._ MS10A2 X . . . . l , MS10. A3.. X [ MS10A4 X MS10As_ _ , _
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- V Page 4
CPSES Simulator Mcitunction Tcst Schedula h ihlB IJIBLA Y**E2 g) M O MSilB Msl2 X
.X_
MsnA X MS13B X M55C. X MSl3D X N101A X e
.X 4.s N101B; N102A X N102B . , . X N103A_ _ _ X N103B X-m03C X N103D X N103E X N104A
_X N10. 4B X N104C.- X NIO4D X N104E X N105A X. N105B X N105C ___ X 5105D X NIOSE X NIO6A N106B
.X X . _ _ _
.g N106D ._ h =~
N X N106E _X __ N107A.- . X N107B - , X N109A _,_ _. N109B _._X - X N110A
- - - - X Nil 0B X Nil 1 X N112A _._
X N. ._i.l2B X Nin . . _ . 9 x Page5 Ib
1 CPSES Simulat:r M:ltunction Test Schedule WWb W M W' _ W' f) RCO2 X V_ RCO2 X AC9.3_ . - - -
.X .
RC04 X~ RC05 X - _ _ RC07A ' , X
~ ~
RC078 I X
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RCO8Al X l RC08. A2 X -- RSO9Al' X , _ _ . ._ RC09A2 _ .. - .._ _ _. - . _ . . . . - _ . . - - X. . . , . ; RC10 X. RC11 _X RQl3 _ X RCl4 X ' RD01A X
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RD01B X-
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RDOIC .X
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RDOlD X f) R502A ' X
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U R5NB L RD02C X X
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RD02D X
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RD04 X
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RDOS X
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RD10 X RD12A x RD12B x RHQ1 X g, .. _ _
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- - . - - - y - - I
CPSES Simul: tor M:Ituncti:n Test Scheduti . MmWaneden '- M Xggj h M
- p. Rjjo6~ [
0 RM01A [_. X _ . _ .
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RM01B . ..- . X ' _ .- - . . Rhf02Al X. RM_02A2 X RM02A3
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RM..02. A4 RM02A5 X
, ._X RM02A6
--- X RM02A7 X RM02A8 X RM02A9 X
RM02B1 X RMO282 X RM02B3 X RM_O_.2.B4 X ' RMO2B5 X RM02Cl X
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RM02C3 X ~ ~ ~ ~ NM02C.4
~~~
; . . - - X RM02C5 X
NM02C6
~'X RM02C7 X ~~
RM02C8 X
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RM02C9 ~ ~~ X , . . .
. RM02D2 X ~~~~ ~
RM02D3 .X
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RM02D4 '~ X ; RMO2D5 ~ X RMOTE1 X
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RMO2E2 X
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X RM03Al ~'~ X RM03A2. X
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Page 7 - l ,
7 ,= .- t CPSGS Simul:t:r M:Itunction Test Schedul2' Asa j MaNuesution - Year 1 - Xsgj Xsg) i RM03C X . J Xsat.d
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R. M. 03D X' ' RM03E -. .. X RM.03.F, X ,
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RM._03.G. X. RM03Q RM03R X l__X _
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RM03UI X ' RM03U2 --- X RM03U4 .
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RM.03V .-. X ' RM03H ' X .. RM031 - - - - . - X RM03Ji . _ _ _ . X RM03J2 X R_M0313 X RMO3K1. . _ . _ X R_M03K2 RM03L ...X X RM03M X
~ ,
R_MO3N . X RM030 . _ _ . . _ . RM03Pi X .X RM03P2
~ X RMO3P3 _ . - .
X RM035 . _ _ _ - . _ X RM03T_ X ~ RM04 X RP01 ._ X RP02 X RP. 03 - K _ . _
~
R_PO4 X RP05 ~ X ' RP06 _ X RP07 K ~ RP08.- X RP09..
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X RPIO .. X RPl1 X_ O. Page8
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,1 CPSES Simulator Milfunction Test Schedul2.
o , . .. m. M~ M M M O.
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RP12 ~ X' O RP13A X l RP13B X RP14 X .. RP15 X '~ RX01. X . . _ _ . _ RXO2 X
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RXO3. . . - X-RXO4 X . _ . . RXO5A X RXO58 W _ _[_ RXO5C X ' RXO5D' _ _-X __. RXO6;,___ X _. _ .. RXO7 X , _ RXO8A X RXO8D X RXO9A X gxogg ~ RX1._0 y X
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RX_11 X RX12 X gg,3 g -- --
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1 RX16 X
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RX17 X _ . stol
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x S102 X . i
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5104 x SWO1A X SWO1B x
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TC01 X' - TCO2 ~~
^ ' ' ~ ~
x ~ ~~ TCO3 X. 1 1
~~
TC04 (:. X l Page 9 1
CPSES Simulitor M:ltunction Test Scheduly i _Y M M M -$ 0 Tc05 TC06 X X. TC07 X . - X= ; TP01.- - TPO2 X l i T703 ~X'
.t TP. .O4 X ~
TP05 X i TUO1 X ; TUO2A X ._. -,. , TUO2B- .x TUO4 X. _ TUO3 X TUO6A x TUO6D X ~~ TUO6E _ X ,
~~~~
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