ML20058L984
| ML20058L984 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1993 |
| From: | Studds G HOUSE OF REP. |
| To: | Rathbun D NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058L986 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9309100110 | |
| Download: ML20058L984 (7) | |
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- July 27, 1993
Dear Mr. Rathbun:
I am contacting you on behalf of my constituent, Mary Elizabeth Lampert, whose correspondence is attached.-
Ms. Lampert raises questions about the safety of the fuel pool cooling system when the plant experiences loss of power, faulty motor operated valves, and Boston Edison's reports to the Massachusetts Department of=Public Health following the last two emergency drills.
I would very much appreciate your attention to these issues and your response to my district office at 1212 Hancock Street, Quincy, MA 02169, att'n:
Mary Lou Butler.
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}.E Studds Mr. Dennis K.-Rathbun Director
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office of. Congressional Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC~ 20515 Enclosure pW
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Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee Town Hall, 300 Tremont Street Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332 July 8, 1993 Congressman Gerry Studds 1212 Hancock Street Quincy, MA 02169 Re:
Problems at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station:
Condensate Pot; Turbine Cracks; Loss of off-Site Power and Fuel Pool Coolant; Motor Operated Valves; and, Inadequate Emergency Plans Dear Congressman Studds; We are writing to thank you for your actions regarding two problems recently identified at Pilgrim -inaccurate readings from the key safety device that measures water levels in the reactor (condensate pot) and cracks in two turbines; and to alert'you regarding three others.
Water Level Measuring 0cvice - Condensate Pot We appreciate the fact the NRC has directed the licencees to address this potentially dangerous problem at the next " cold shutdown". However, like you, we are very concerned the repair will not be made immediately
_ pilgrim may not shut down again until April 1994; and this is too long for us to be forced to live with the clear risk, for at least two reasons..
1.
Quite clearly, if_the problem is serious enough to require another plant that is shutdown next month to fix it, why should Pilgrim be allowed almost a year before-it takes action?
The delay is particularly inappropriate at Pilgrim since there is clear documentation showing that Pilgrim was aware of the problem long ago, and well before it restarted after a " cold shutdown" a few months ago.
- 2. Additionally, this recent NRC water level directive requires BECO only to fix the problem at the next outage.
This is an incentive to avoid shutting down to fix anything.
Anything which comes up (which may well be of significant safety concern) will be ignored to avoid having to spend the time and money to fix the condensate pot issue.
P
e l
l "Mahana" is an established philosophy at Pilgrim, reinforced on the state level by the " rate case agreement" DPU and BECO signed a few years ago.
This agreement monetarily rewards BECO for days operating and nonetarily punishes BECO for days shut, even though every safety consideration nandates the latter.
The result is that Pilgrim how has two very strong incentives to stay operating at any cost.
As neighbors of the power plant, we want the opposite - to be. assured Pilgrim is required and encouraged to err on the side of caution at all times.
Turbine Cracks We appreciate your concern questioning the NRC's reasons for dismissing an analysis by General Electric, the manufacturer of the Pilgrim turbines.
GE found that the turbine could break apart within a year and a half.
- Pilgrim, not surprisingly, asked for (and found) a second opinion.
Structural Integrity Associates, in a 'eport now relied on by both Pilgrim and the NRC, dismissed the manufacturer's report and said that the' turbines would not fail for at least four and a half yearr.
The natural result - BECO does not plan to repair the turbines until spring, 1995.
We can not understand why the NRC would dismiss the manufacturer's analysis especially when the NRC's own regulations, e.g.,
NUREG 800, are based on G.E.'s'research.
The NRC obviously recognizes G.E.
as expert in-the field.
Perhaps, more importantly, we understand from reading a late June article in, Inside ths HEC that the NRC had not even been " allowed" to see the GE Report.
How could it dismiss GE's conclusions when Boston Edison wouldn't even allow them to read the report?.How can the NRC claim to regulate when it fails to exercise the authority to1 insure it has important information?-
Clearly, " games are being played" at the public's expense.
Let me now turn to three other problems, of which you may well be aware but which were not mentioned in recent newspaper reports.
1
o Loss Off-Site Power and Fuel Pool Coolant According to the Lochbaum and Prevatte study done under contract to Pennsylvania Power and Light, there is a major, previously unidentified, meltdown threat at all the nation's Boiling Water Reactors.
Pilgrim is a BWR.
The problem occurs if the reactor loses off-site power for an extended period.
Emergency diesel generators may protect the reactor's cooling systems if power is lost, but there is virtually nothing to protect the reactor's irradiated fuel pool.
The cooling pumps vital to keeping the fuel pool from overheating and perhaps reaching inadvertent criticality would not function during a loss-of-power event.
Worse, the back-up cooling systems would be useless.
According to the engineers' calculations, recently reported in Newsday, attempts to manually initiate the first back-up system would result in death to plant employees within 16.
seconds because of high radiation exposures.
The second, back-up system, the engineers predict would fail within one minute.
The study was directed principally at PP&L's Susquehanna complex, but the problem is probably generic.
The Lochbaum &
Prevatte engineers told the'NRC about the problem last March.
The NRC has not warned other utilities of the problem but, more critically, has allowed all BWR's to continue to operate without ensuring whether their fuel pool cooling systems are adequate to withstand a loss-of-power situation.
This is not an academic issue at Pilgrim.
Pilgrim is a BWR.
Pilgrim is located on the coast. Recent coastal storms have repeatedly resulted in loss-of-power.
Has the NRC warned Pilgrim about this problem?
If so,owhen?
What has been done about it?
Motor Operated Valves At the last NRC meeting in Plymouth concerning the Condensate Pot, Ashok Thadani (NRC, NRR Division) commented that faulty motor operated valves posed an even more serious safety concern than did the inaccurate condensate pot.
What has happened to the issue?
If it is serious, why has the NRC given the Licencees 5 years to study it?
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l Emergency Planning
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We have an aging reactor that has identified flaws.
The NRC reluctantly has recognized some of these flaws.
- However, instead of demanding immediate " fixes", the NRC has allowed the industry to "take its sweet time" in taking corrective actions.
Meanwhile, we live in the shadow.
Effective plans of how the neighboring towns will be prctected in the event of an emergency are supposed to be a pre-requisite to nuclear power plant operation.
Approval by the town is the first, and probably most critical, step in the approval process.
Pilgrim's emergency plans are seriously flawed, and thus have not been approved by our
+,
town.
The major flaws have repeatedly been identified to the NRC, MEMA and FEMA.
For example, a member of our committee, Jane Fleming, has a petition before the NRC concerning the inadequacy of planning in the Pilgrim EPZ.
If an accident occurred tomorrow, our population would not be adequately.
protected.
Again the NRC refuses to acknowledge a problem.
For example, during the last two major emergency drills, Pilgrim gave incomplete information to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and, as a result, DPH instructed the wrong protective action.
Fortunately, it was not a real emergency.
Howev'er, iespite the licencee's failings, the NRC gave~the utility a glowing report card " grade" in emergency planning in their last SALP report.
Who are they kidding?
What is the message here?
Whether it's water level measuring devices, turbine cracks, loss-of-power, motor operated valves, emergency plans, the NRC gives BECO (the-licensee) not an inch but a mile!
We, the public, remain tt risk - unprotected.
Aging reactors, such as Pilgrim, require constant' maintenance.
I, too, have an antique house.
It requires continuous attention to all the little problems as they come up to maintain.the integrity of the property.
If they are allowed to pile up, one feeding on the other, you can have a real problem on your hands.
A house is one thing, a nuclear reactor quite another.
The nuclear industry claims that " redundancy in back-up systems" is its key to safety.
At Pilgrim, the only. apparent
" redundancy" is in the failure of critical safety systems: a
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failure made more dangerous by Boston Edison's arrogant nind-set that refuses to admit the possibility of any problem.
Far too often, this attitude is only reinforced by the KRC, which continues to be far more interested in protecting the industry than those who are really at risk.
We rely on you, Congressman, to tip the scales on the side of the public.
The NRC must be made accountable. Do you think the time is ripe for a special hearing within the Commonwealth examining both the NRC's role as regulator and the actual status and integrity of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power station?
We feel we now have an exceptionally strong and dedicated congressional delegation in Washington and Beacon Hill. Would your office be willing to take the initiative and enlist Senator Kennedy and Kerry, and State Senator Mcdonald and Murray?
We thank you for all your past efforts on our behalf.
We hope the additional points we have raised today will be passed through your office to the NRC, and will finally be resolved.
Sincerely, g
[YlhL M bII2-d e p,'
Mary Elizabeth Lampert Chairman ammme
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M.RSS. esn9TesSDIGE Sees.s.L,,Oresuosise on Pilgrim r,s.a.. pairs By Dianne Dumanmki hv etmeswr "
- y Three memben of the Muwbu.
,setta congressional delegation have An Eillson asked the Nuclear Regulatory Com-Sp0keSWOman Said miss2cn to justify i+m =ahedala for
.cor e w m w,i g.7- %
the company at * *1;--
~% me-elant in WOuld have repairs 8~^"'U"""
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A June 29 letter from Sens. Ed.
to the water level ward nnnaay and John Kerry a:fa device In place no Rep. Gerry' Studds f6cuses' ong
]g{gy {gg gpg proMa~a identmed
- rm mac-eratereasm.,<mn.iroe saty 1994.
devica tw m - -- evels in the r=*w-br-w MQow ~
- pressov' +"*hhes. Crities of the
. plant, operated by Boston' Edison, numanummusumet have wamed that failure of the wa.
'ter level device in an aci:ident eculd shut down on August 1.1993, t lead to a catastrophic irieltdown'af make modi 5 cations, why are othe the reactor ' core and'that flying phts anowed almost a year befor-
. pieces of metal fnxn ifT2roken tur-they take the same action?"
i
.bine could damh theimment'.
The letter also questions thi l
structure arUuiuf the reactor. '~. NRCs reasons fa-4%sg ar An Edison spokeswomas, Anita' anaps by_ Gene sr Electric, the Flanagan, said the company is tak-rnanufacturer of the Pilgrim tur ing steps to address both problems bines, which found that the tudi:a and'would'have repairs to the water could break apart within a year anc leye] device in place no later than a half.PDgrim and the NRC have re-
. spring 19M. 'Ihe NRC recently or, lied on a second opinion, by Stmc.
dered ofHeials at.PUgrim'ang tural Integrity Associates, that the
.bo n- = '--
-." to ax "tudices would not fail for at least m
the doblem <hn4a 4 "--t shut- ' four and a half years.-
des after Jniv 'tfUn which Azel is ince we must attribute a fair temoved.
.ount of credibility to the a,ssess.
. t..
.. In the case 01 PDgrim, the g ent of the equipm'ent's own manu.
" cold _ h"' dan is achadnM for
, we are at a loss to under.
. April 1994. For other plants, the d' e.
stand how the NRC can denigrate
~
. lay belore repairs are made could be this analysis. labeling it overly pessi-longer.
umstre." the letter noted.
"Whilese are nian=ad *a NRC Flanagan said that WM" '-u!
is dW :'" mC+ address this make a dMMan shavt replacin_r the problam r* = mncerned tee re-turhi-- * -h If they approve
. paigwill en, u w e,. "^Wtime,"
the repheament; which would cost
' Kennedy, Kerry and Studds state in $20 ciHion, new low-pressue tur their letter. "If a problem is serious bines will be instaHed in the sprins enough to require a plant that is of 1995, she said.
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September 19, 1993 The Honorable Gerry E. Studds
-2 for this postulated event.
The staff will make its findings public when the reevaluation is completed.
I hope the information we are providing is responsive to your needs.
Sincerely, original signed by JamesILTay!or James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Ltrs. dtd. 8/4/93 to Congressmur, Studds, and Senator.; Kennedy and Kerry 2.
Ltr. dtd. 3/26/93 to Ms. Lampert 3.
Ltr. dtd 8/11/93 to J. Fleming
- See previous concurrence
,,a PDbNf6 h:0, j 0FFICE PDIA: LA
- TECH Ed
- ADRI NAME Sb REat$n:dt lWButIpf JCalvo DATE 9 / 7 /93 h/k/93 bk/93 08/30 /93 08/30/93
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0FFICE
- DRPE:D
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NAME SVarga JPartlow TEMurley JTa or DATE 08/30/93 08/30/93 09/02/93 t//h/93 9 //o /93 0FFICIAL RECOPY COPY A:\\GT009282.RES
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