ML20058L678
| ML20058L678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058L675 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-90-16, 50-425-90-16, NUDOCS 9008080005 | |
| Download: ML20058L678 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1990016
Text
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p* 08:g'g UNITED $TATES ' ' . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f' , . ,e ~[' g REGION li ! ' ' s[ . , 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W. t = y.
ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323 %...../ jlJL201990 - m
Report Nos.: 50-424/90-16 and 50-425/90-16 Licensee: Georgia-Power Company I P.'O. Box 1295 i
Birmingham, AL 35201 l e . - L Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:= NPF-68 and NPF-81 i Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
p Inspection Conducted: July 9-13, 1990 Inspector: Ni h__ //4.f/// ' v' E. D. Testa Date Signeif~
Approved ty: . , ,. Emergency Preparedness Section ~ .t b Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards i ' SUMMARY Scope: , i This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in 'the area of emergency ' paredness, and included review of the following programmatic _ elements: ' Radiological ; Emergency Response Plan and its implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies; (3) independent reviews / audits; and (4) followup'to the March 20, 1990, Site Area 4 ~ Emergency declaration. Results:- .
t .In the areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified: failure to . 4 promptly notify (within 15 minutes) Burke County and the State of Georgia upon declaration of a Site' Area Emergency on March 20, 1990 (Paragraph 2). This' failure to notify offsite officials resulted because.of loss of the primary notification system when electrical power to the system was lost. The licensee !had taken corrective action to assure that if power were lost, such notifications could be made, t a 9008090005 900726 {DR ADOCK 05000474 J PDC .- . - -
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Emergency response. facilities, equipment, and supplies - were properly 7 maintained.: TN independent audit of the plan identified continuing problems associated with maintenance and distribution of Emergency Plan; documents: ,(Paragraph 4'. f if 'The findings of this. inspection indicated that, if required. the licensee was - preparad to respond to a radiological emergency.at the Vogtle facility.. . 4 [' t; !.;; :p . i t I < l -1- i ' ' ,, - . .'i-. - ! T: , s .a y .I L i - I 4 L . ' ~ , . . ' r ' ....~_.;~ . , .n- _ _ J.. . - - . . . . . , _ , . . . _ . + ,, . . . , ,
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' c . . . f REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees !
- J. Aufdenkampe, Manager, Technical Support
- H. Beacher, Senior Plant Engineer
- G. Bockhold, General Manager
W. Burmeister, Unit Supervisor
- E. Dannemiller III, Nuclear Security Manager
- G. Fredrick, Supervisor Safety Analyses and Engineering P.eview
- T. Green, Assistant General Manager - Support
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- K. Holmes, Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness
- M. Horton, Manager, Engineer Support
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- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager - Operations
- R. LeGrand, Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry
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- L. Mayo, Nuclear Specialist I
- G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor
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- A. Mosbaugh, Assistant Gener61 Manager - Plant Support
- J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- G. Stinespring, Manager Plant Administration
s J. Swartzwelder, Operations Manager _
Other . licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craf tsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, -technicians, and administrative personnel. Nuclear Regulatory Comission -)
- R. Aiello, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
fM. Hunt, Reactor Inspector, Region II
- Attended exit interview
- Attended part of the exit interview
l 2. Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16),10 CFR S0.54(q), and Appendix E tc 10 CFR Part 50, this area was reviewed to determine whether chann ! madetotheprogramsincethelastroutineinspection(April 1989)eso1 ,'an: to address the impact of these changes on the overall state.of emergent- preparedness at the facility. _! ! l
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2 L i l, The inspector reviewed the licensee's action in response to the following / Information Notices (ins) and found the licensee had appropriately considered the epplicability of the IN to their facility and had taken appropriate action. IN No. Topic IN 90-34 Response to false Siren Activations IN 90-08 Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed fuel IN 89-89 Event Notification Worksheets IN 89-72 Failure of Licensed Senior Operators to Classify i Emergency Events Properly IN 89-46 Confidentiality of Exercise Scenarios IN 89-19 Health Physics Network Controlled copies of the Emergency Telephone Directory, Radiological Emergency Plan, and EPIPs were audited in the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations facility (EOF). The , documents examined were found to be a current revision. The inspector reviewed the March 20, 1990, Site Area Emergency Declaration made by the licensee. The sequece of events from the Site Area Emergency that follows is quoted from NUREG-1410. t "This incident occurred on March 20, 1990, with Unit I shut down and in a
refueling outage and Unit 2 operating at full power. Unit I had been shut ' down for 25 days, refueling had been completed, and the water level in the reactor vessel had been lowered to mid-loop to perform various maintenance tasks. The head was on the rector vessel, and the first pass to tension t' e head bolts had been completed. All steam generator manways were in n place but not all were fully closed. The pressurizer manway was open. Both ' the personnel hatch and the equipment hatch of the containment building were open. One emergency diesel generator and one reserve auxiliary transformer had been removed from service for maintenance. The remaining reserve auxiliary transformer was supplying both Unit I safety buses. At 9:20 a.m., a truck in the 230-kV switchyard backed into a support column for an offsite power feed to the reserve auxiliary transformer. A phase-to-ground fault occurred, and the feeder breakers for the safety buses opened. The operable emergency diesel generator started automatically. The diesel generator energized its safety bus for about one minute and tripped. Eighteen minutes later, after the diesel generator load sequencer was reset, the diesel generator started a second time, operated for about 1 minute, and tripped again. These first two undervoltare starts placed the diesel generator in its " normal mode" where all trip functions are active. Thirty-six minutes after the loss of power. operations personnel manually restarted the diesel generator in the emergency mode. Many of the diesel generator protective trip functions are bypassed in this mode.
_ l S . ' o . 3 o f Following the third start, the diesel generator continued to operate and provide power to its safety bus. Had the diesel generator not started, non-routine actions would have been necessary to defeat interlocks so that a safety bus could be powered either from a Unit I nonsafety bus or from a Unit 2 bus. During the 36 minutes without all safety bus ac power, the temperature of the reactor coolant system increased from about 90*F to 136'F and water level remained at mid-loop. While attempting to restore power, the licensee initiated activities to close the containment building and reactor coolant system. These activities were completed about 2 hours following the initial loss of power. Two hours and 20 minutes after the loss of power, the undamaged { reserve euxiliary transformer, which had been out of service for ' maintenance, was returned to service and power was restored to its safety l bus. A Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:40 a.m., 20 minutes into the incident, because Vogtle management interpreted the loss of all offsite and onsite ac power to the safety buses for more than 15 minutes to be equivalent to the emergency action level in the Vogtle procedure which indicates that loss of all offsite and onsite power for greater than 15 minutes is a Site Area Emergency. The emergency director signed the i notification form used to inform offsite governmental agencies of the ! emergency at 9:48 a.m., 28 minutes into the incident, The Emergency ' Notification Network communicator then attempted to notify offsite ! agencies, using the control room primary Emergency Notification Network to l State officials in Georgia and South Caroline. The control room primary { En.ergency Notification Network was inoperable beceuse of the loss cf I safety power. The primary Emergency Notification Network receives power from the B train safety bus, which was deenergized until 11:40 a.m. The Emergency Notification Network communicator shif ted to the South 1 Carolina backup Emergency Notification Network and established l communications with the South Carolina Encrgency Preparedness Division, and the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site and Aiken, Allendale, i and Barnwell Counties at approximately 9:57 a.m., 37 minutes into the incident and 17 minutes after the Site Area Emergency was declared.
Transfer of information to these agencies was completed at approximately
10:13 a.m., 53 minutes into the incident.
The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) was contacted using the Unit 2 comn.ercial telephone, which is the designated backup means of I communication to GEMA and the Burke County Emergency Management Agency, at
approximately 10:15 a.m., 55 minutes into the incident. However, no ' notification n.essage was transmitted during this contact because of communicator confusion. When the control room Emergency Notification l Network connunicator contacted GEMA on the connercial telephone, the i ' technical support center Emergency Notification Network was confirming the operability of the primary Emergency Notification Network to Georgia and South Carolina as part of its role in activating the TSC. The Emergency Notification Network in the TSC was operable because it received power i I
o - I [ 1, ' . . ' 4 , {{[ from the security diesel generator, which was operating properly. The . comercial telephone contact between the control room and GEMA was terminated because both parties did not have the notification form and .could not pass on the required informat on. Attempts by.GEMA to obtain i L the notification information were successful at 10:35 a.m., I hour and 15 minutes into the incident, when the South Carolina Emergency. !. . Preparedness Division sent GEMA the completed notification form by i facsimile. Vogtle established comunications with GEMA at 10:40 a.m. and passed the notification information successfully by commercial telephone. Subsequent notifications were made without difficulty. The primary Emergency Notification Network in the technical support center was used to transmit messages after the fourth message was sent to offsite agencies. The event was downgraded to an Alert at 10:15 based on restoration of power to the safety bus from the 1A emergency diesel generator and the establishment of decay heat removal tapability by the 1A residual heat removal loop. The event was terminated after discussions with the Nuclear Regulatory Comission and local governmental agencies based on restorations of offsite power and stabilized conditions." (NUREG-1410 Loss of AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Locp Operations at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20,1990,pages1-1and1-2). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and 10 CFR Appendix E D.3 states'that a licensee shall .i have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental ' agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. . Section E.2 of the Vogtle Energency Plan states that the Emergency Director is responsible for the completion of the Initial Message Form and for the notification of the State and local governmental agencies: GeorgiaEmergencyManagementAgencyEmergencyOperationsCenter(E00)
Comunicator . Burke County E0C Comunicator South Carolina highway patrol dispatcher
Aiken County Law Enforcement Center dispatcher Allendale County sheriff dispatcher , Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR) E0C Comunicator
The inspector also reviewed Emergency Plan Procedure 91002-C Revision 15, " Emergency Notifications" which implements the Plan. This procedure further comits to the notification of the State and local governmental , agencies within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency. The failure to complete initial notification to Burke County and the State of Georgia within 15 minutes from the emergency declarations was identified as an apparent violation.
. _ _ V .. 'b e 5 f The inspector discussed the availability, if needed, of meteorological information during the event since the onsite meteorological system information was not available in the Control Room during the event (NUREG-1410, Sections 3.7.1.7and3.7.1.8). Review of the Dose Assessment ' Manager's Log revealed that backup meteorological information had been obtained from Bush Field per. procedure at 10:20 a.m. and from the onsite meteorological tower at about 13 08 a.m. from a team dispatched to and located at the base of the meteorological tower in the instrument - building.
' L Apparent Violetion (50-424/90-16-01, 50-425/90-16-01) Failure to make the required 15 minute initial notifications following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. One violation and no deviations was identified. , 5 3. Emergency facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82701) ' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and (9), 10 CFR 50.54(q), and Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's emergency response facilities (ERFs) and other essential emergency equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were .j maintained in a state of operational readiness, and to assest the_ impact ' of any changes in this area upon the emergency preparedness program. The inspector toured the licensec's ERFs, including the Control Room, TSC, , ' and Operational Support Center (050) and EOF. During the tour, the TSC Managcr's telephcne appeared to be inoperable. Tre licensee took prcmpt corrective action to report and initiate its repair. The facilities and emergency equipment except for the TSC Manager Telephone therein appeared to be maintained in on appropriate state of readiness. According to observations ty the int,pector and statements by licensee representatives. l no significant changes in the facilities were 'made since the last inspection. The inspector observed a drill ("..a supervised instruction period , aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular ! operation," Vogtle Emergency plan Section N 2) conducted by the licensee on July 11, 1990.- The drill included the activations of the ERFs, offsite notifications, and personnel accountability. The critique following the drill was detailed and revealed several improvement areas. The inspector- noted that the Control Room simulator computer that was i being used to simulate emergency events for the drill experienced at least , three unexpected shutdowns early in the drill causing drill continuity problems. The inspector also noted that the offsite conn:unication notifications to the NRC Operations Center was in excess of the nornially expected time. Difficulties in the timely completion of the accountability portion of the drill were observed by the inspector and a redrill for accountability was scheduled.
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U ~ d- e ' . ! 6 These noted items will be evaluated during the August 1, 1990, exercise. No violations or deviations were identified. 4. IndependentReview/ Audits-(82701) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area was ' inspected to determine whether the licensea had performed an independent review of the audit of the emergency preparedness program, and , whether the licensee had a corrective action system for deficiencies and ! weaknesses identified during exercises and drills. L
The inspector reviewed the independent audit conducted by the Safety Analysis and Engineering Review (SAER) group. The audit report was documented in report No. VSAER-90-162 dated July 6,1990, and was made to ( verify compliance with and the effectiveness of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plan Quality Assurance Program as it pertained to the Emergency Plan and procedures. The report identified four problem areas: Copies of the Emergency Response Organization telephone directory and
the site telephone directory used by the Field Monitoring Team were out-of-date.
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Some procedures in Emergency Response Fa::ilities were not the current revision. '- Vendor manuals at the meteorological . tower instrumentation building were unapproved and had not been processed by Document Control.
Procedures 91104-C and 91403-0 do not agree in the number of Health Physics personnel to be sent to the Relocation Center. The inspector noted the contint:ed problems associated with the maintenance < and distribution of Emergency Plan docuents. These problems have been ' noted in previous QA audits and past NRC inspection. reports. A limiteo , spot check in the EOF and CR did not reveal any non-conforming with i Emergency Plan procedures. This area will continue to be reviewed by the , NRC at future inspections. . -No violations or deviations were identified. 5. ActiononPreviousInspectionFindings(92701) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/89-18-03, 50-425/89-21-03: Included an acceptance criteria in the ANS Test Procedure for 10 CFR 50.72 reporting. j The inspector _ reviewed the new revision to Emergency Procedure 91706-C, Revision 2, Section 5.6 which lists acceptance criteria in the ANS Test Procedures. . - - -
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i J- 6. Exit Interview ! , L ,' The inspection-scope and results were sunnarized on July 13, 1990, with j l' . s, those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. - Although some proprietary < 0 infomation nay have been reviewed 'during the inspection, none is ' contained in this report. Licensee n.anagement was informed that one IFl i < n was considered closed. , ,-
Dissenting correents were not received from the licensee. I j. Item Number- Description and Response . l - - 50-424,425/90-16-01 Apparent violation - Failure to make the required 15 minute initial notification to ..
Burke County and the State of Georgia F following (the declaration of a Site Area y Emergency Paragraph 2).
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