ML20058K108

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Provides Guidance on Licensee Actions That Should Be Taken When Equipment Discovered to Be Potentially Nonconforming
ML20058K108
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 08/09/1989
From: Partlow J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19311B205 List:
References
NUDOCS 8910200200
Download: ML20058K108 (5)
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UNITS 0 sTATis

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'su1A!1 CEGULATORY COMMIS53CN

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"EMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Directors

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Prosect otreeters

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Prosect Managers i

Prosect Engineers i

i FROM:

James G. Partlow i

Associate Directer for Projects i

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatton i

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SU1 JECT:

GUICAeCE ON LICENSEE ACTIOK5 THAT SHOULD BE TAtEM WHEM l

EQU1PMENT IS DISCOVERED TO BE POTENTIALLY MORCCMFORMING Ouring the cast year efforts have been unserway to clearly cefine licensee actions wnen confrontee wita eeuipment that is negranes or in nonconformance with regulattons, comes ane staneares, or tne licensing anster assign tasts, i

The enclosee guteance.is provices for your inforustion ene use. We also tatene the use of the enclosee material for a trial perios ans expect your feestatt on preolems or suggestions for improvement.

The caart has been serives froun a nummer of sources. Guidance on the promet deterstnatton of osarantitty nat been issues as a amme to the Regions catee July 19, 1999. A revises esmera asus entitled " Relief From fettatcal Specification LCOs* concernthq emergency technical spectf tcations, waiver of i

compliance, ans enforcement dir4wton should be issues in the near future.

1 The guidance on JCO was suggest.d by 0GC. Finally, the overell process, with correcttre actions reeutres hy 10 PTM Part 50, Apqpenett 8, was presentes at the Regulatory Information Conference fr. April 1989.

j Dave Wiggtnton (x23027) and John Int (x21401) are available to discuss the gutaance with you ane to tasa suggesi.iuns or recomeneations for tuerovement.

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We exsect to hold discuss 13ns with atm of the Regtens on this subject in the near future.

J G. Partlow As tate Otrector for Projects Of ice of Nuclear Reactar Regulatten 3

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

T. Murley J. Sateret F. Miraglia G. Helahan J. Calvo

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OEERACED AND NCN-CCMF0eMING COMDIT**M5 j

GENE 8AL SUltaNCE

ntrecuetten Safety or safety-relates consonants er systems must meet tne reoutrements of tne regulations, sattsfy tne licensing ane/or cesign casts, ans conform to j

apolicaole cosas ano staneares. For cegrease or non-conforming conetttons of tasse camoonents or systems, the licensee-is quides by the Technical Specif t.

cation ane tne previsions of 10 CTR Part 50 Appenetz 8 Section IV1, to premstly identify ans correct consitions asterse to safety or euality. Resorting is i

reoutree ef 50.72, 50.73, 50.9(b), Part-21 ans;tne, Technical Spectf tcationsa i

all of tasse reentre eocumentation as well as 50.71 for F5AR useate. When taten togesner, tne overall process forms ne easts for licensees to continue l

t operetton or place tne plant in a safe conettton, and to take oraust correcstve action (returning tne plant to its licensing easts). For the process to be-commtete, enantes to tne f actitty pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 may se uses in lieu of or in conJunctton wita the correcstve action as reestree by Appenetz 8.

The process displayee by the enart in Attacament i recogas:ss these and oteer provisions waten a licensee may follow to restors or estaaltsh accostable conetttons. These are success patas for continues safe cperatton ny comformance to the regulattons.

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l Metable Provisions J

public Health and Safety J

.j All succast paths, whec er specifically stated or not, are first directed to assuring the public naalth ans safety and secone, to successfully restering the plant to an acceptaale level of quality. Identification of a degraced or non-conforatng conettton unich any-pose an tummetate thrust to public health ans safety reeutres tne plant to be places in a safe comettion. Tecastcal j

Spectficattons address the important safety systems and provide limitee comettions of-operation and acties times consistent with assaring pustic health j

ano safety. Eosiement or systems determined to be not opersale* will, if not alreasy coverse by Teck Speca, reestre a licenses deterstention of reasemaale assuranca of safety. If it does not saist, the plaat is placed in a safe j

condition.

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-10 CFR 50.5 Chanees, Tests, and Expertsents i

Plant design and operstion is reesired to be an accostante level of safety and quality. Wirk degraced or non. conforming conditions,10 CFR Part 50, Appenetz 8 reemires grewet corrective action. In ltou of preest correcttu ution, licensees any invese 50.59 at aar time to change the facility to a cousarsele level of safety or to extend the stealiness of the corrective actioR.

However, failing tne unreviewee safety question criteria may neutre a 50.90 j

license amenement, 50.12 exameston, or 50.55a coes relief if the licensee s

The destres to procees with tne plant change or delay the w..ative action.

MLBERC/RSAC guidance document en 50.59 provides additiona) informatton.

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  • Follow tne STS definition of CPERA8LE if specific guidance is not avadakk.

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~he unreviewee safety cuestten criteria coes not allcw a enance snat creates j

ne coss10111ty for any accicent er malfuncticn of a atfferent type tnan any evaluates creetously in tne SAR. 'isenvery of an existing cut creviously ananalyzes cenettien unien ceos create tne cesstellity of an accicent er alfunctten of a atfferent type ano is aaverse to safety ano cuality, snould ce reporten at least :y 50.9(b) ano ccrrecrea ey 10 CyR Part 50. Apoeceir 8 -

.;romet ccrrective acttens or tnreugn a 50.59 analysis ans mostfication.

.Justificatten for Ccatinuee Oceratien (JC01 The reporting and documentation with esca of the success patas is to prev 14e a t

casts fer continues safe operetton (not to be confuses with JCD). The licensee's autnerization to operate the plant is providea by the licasse ans any coattasse i

operation, counter-to the Itcense provistons-or Teck-5poca, reestres a prier-licensee analysts and NRC acceetance of the analysis. (See watver of Coseltance ans Enforcement Otscretion). This licensee analysts or Justification For continuea Operetten covers the perios from teentificattom of the comettson severse to saraty or cuality untti either MRC approval to continue operatton er, if l

accostan te ey Enforcement Otscretten, correctton of the conettton. As suca, the JC0 as now definee may not te sufficient by itself for NRC approval to continue operation eeyone the JC0 perios. A safety analysis by tne licensee,

ne JCO, and otner 50.90 license amensment informatton constitutes an appropriate l

basis for a ressent to the NRC to estene operation auther12ation beyees the JCS yerios.

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.Watver of CommitaneetEnforcement Otscretion i

To ontain relief from a Limiting Condition of Operation in the Tech Specs, a i

licensee may reevest an emergency Tech spec change. When the ressest cammet be processes within tne LCO time allowed by the Tech Spot the licassee may suestt a JC0 and reeuest a Watver of Consitance from NRR. When the ressest is for I

suca a snort pertos tnat a Teca Seet change is clearly not warranted, the

  • licensee may substt a JC0 and reeuest Enforcement Olscretton from the Regios.

i Elther process reselts in a written NAC acceptance of the JC0 suhettted by the licassee or the plant must be placne in a cometties regetree by license. The -

NRC accostance of the JC0 does not authorire a caange in the license, but rather, establishes an agrose upon appresca, without the threat of enforcommet.

l for the licenses te castione operation and to restorie operaktitty in the ses't t

ters by Esferessant 01screttom or eventually by Watver of Cassitance and Tech j

Spec a

.aeasonable Asserence of Safety l

t For non-Tech Spec equipment or systems wnich are detetistnes to be not operati?,

j the licensee any assess the reasonaale assurance of safety and if sucesssful, l

any coattnee to operate watte promet carrective action 1s takas. Items to be consteeree for such an assessment includet I

' Availability of reeunaant or eaczaga equipment

' Compensatory Messers

' Safety Function and events protected against

'Cosservatism ane margin i

  • Prenantlity of neeeing the safety function.

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Docket No. 50-245 1

B14692

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i i - Exhibit 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit-No. 1 J

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December 1993

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4 UMTeD STATES

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Acrt1 25, '.39C

'dEMORA!.CL'M rCR : 'homas T. Martin, Regicnal Acministrater. R:

Stewart D. Ecneter, Regtorial Actinistrater. RII A. Bert Davis, Regicnal Acministrater, R!!!

Recert O. Martin, Regional Acetnistrater, RIV Jonn 5. Martin, Reglenal Acministrator, RV FROM:

James G. Partlow Associate Directer for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF WORKING MEETING AND DISCUSSION; GUICANCE FOR OPERABIL!~Y OETERMINATICNS IN CURRENT AND IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPEC *F* CATION FROGRAM Sy memcrancum catec Novemcer 20, 1989, NRR initiatte t working meeting anc ciscussion with regional representatives on existing guicance en OPERABILITY, cuestiens that remain open or are perceivec to remain ecen en tne issue, anc tne neen te succiement guicance to tne licensees. On Decemoer 14, 1989, cancers of MRR ret with R6gtonal recresentatives anc meneers of the Office cf the General Counsel anc tne Office of Enfercement. The attencance list is enciosac as Enclosure 1.

As a result of the meeting, Enclosure 2 entitlec "0PERABILI Y - Assuring The Ca:tbility To Perform A Safety Function" has teen cevelocee as an initial stec to acnieve consistency in apercaen to applying CPERABILITY guidance tc 11censees. The inclosure may te usec as interim guicance cending the ceveien.

ment anc ferr.a1 issuance cf guicar.ce en tne ovsrall subject cf CPERABILITY.

Our current clans are to crepare tnis as a revisten to tne Inscettien Manua'.

Part 990C, leennical Guicance..

The meetir.g presentations inclucec five tectes. These were listec in the Novemcer 22 memorancum as:

Licensee Actions en Degracec/Noncenferming Concitions.

System Ocerability Status with Inoceranle support Systems.

Technical Specification Ir.orevement Prcgrar.,

Current OPERABLE Gutcance, ane Supolemental Guicance and CPERABILITY tetermination Develocec by Region III Gary M. Holanan discussac licensee acticns en cegracec/nenconferming concitions. The focus cf tne ciscussten coalt with eight crincicals fer coaling with OPERABILITY cuestions. Tnese crincicals are inclucac in its

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Jose Caive with staff memcers Rich Emen, Chris Moxte, and Marr Reinnart cresentec interratien en existine CPERABILIN guicance; tne curecse et, Tacnnical Specificatten limiting cencittens f er operattens (LCOs), allowec CONTACT:

C. Wigginton, NR*

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c:.tage it:nes ( ACTS), ana OPERABILITY: support ano indirect succert systems:

cascactrg Tecnnical Specificattens as reautree by the definttten cf CPERABLE:

j ano surveillances recuirec fcr supscrtt: systems resterea to operable. Puen cf this ciscussion led to tne resolutions included in Enclosure 2 regarding Ciscussice Tcptes Surrcuncing CPERABILITY Oecisions.

Hubert Mitler of Region III presentee a proposed supplemental guidarce te licensees wnien descriten a process for operability esterminations. Subsecuent i

to the meeting, CR responsec, by eemoranous dated Deceseer 25, 1989, to the l

Regien III request with NRR concerns with the proposal.

The r.eeting representatives were very responsive to engcing CPERABILITY cuestions and actively participated in seveicping acceptable resolutions. The regional l

particintion is viewee as esential as we centinue worttng on these issues.

i Dur next stas will be te crepare a revised sectien on 0FERA61LITY to be includee in Part 9900' of

'Inspecticn ano Enforcement P.anual (see Reference 4 l

of Enclosura 2). If you have any suggestions in this regare, please let i

us know.

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original signac ey:

James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office cf Nuclear Reactor Regulatien Er. closures:

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Meeting Attendance 2)

CFERASILI*Y - Assuring Safety capability cc w/ enclosures:

T. Murley J. Snierak F. Miraglia P

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bgicnai Acministrators i cuta;t tres ( ACis), anc CPERASIL:TY; succert aric incirect succort systems; cascacing Tecnnical Specificatteris as recutrec ey tne cefinitten of CPERABLE; anc surve111ances recuired fer succerted syster.s restored to eceracle. Fuen cf this ciscussien led to the resciutions includec in Enclosure 2 regarcing Discussien icpics Surrouncing 0PERABILITY Dectsicos.

I Huter: Miller cf Regier I!! presented a proposed supplemental guicance to licensees which cescribed a process for operacility ceterminations. Subsecuent te tbk meeting, NRR respencec, by temerandum dated December 25, 1969, to the i

Regicn III request with NRR concerns with the proposal.

The meeting recresentativas were very responsive te engeing OPERABILITY questtens i

and actively participated in developing accectable resciuttens. The regieral

artic1Laticri is viewee as essential as wt centinue werking cn these tssues.

1 Cur rext sitt sill be te prepare a revistc section on OPERAEILITY to tu l

inclucac in Part 9900 cf the Itispectice and Enforcernent Panual (see Refersnce e cf Enclcsure ?).

f you t. ave arty suggestiens ir. this regare, please let us knew.

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1(wNL-James C. Partlew Associatt Directer for Projects Cffict cf Nuclear Reacter Regulattu.

Enclosures:

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Feetir.f, t,ttencar.ct 2)

OPERAEILITY - Assurirg Safety Capacility cc w/encicsures:

T. Purley J. Sniszek F. Miraglia

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i Enciesure '.

ATTENCEES CR CFERAEILITv MEETINC CECEMBER 14, 1555 C#te t# kutlear React:r Eeculatien Office of General Counsel

!!~Iciate LR5F I'. Lewis F. Reinnart, CCEA J. Zwc11nst1, DRSP Cf# ice of Enforcement F. Heocen, CRSP-J. Luenman R. Dudley, DRSP R. Perfetti L. Wier.3, DRP G. Imerc, CRIS Office cf EDO L. Plisce, DONRR

5. Berenarct~

K. Slossen, DRP A. Mencicia, CRP Recienal Officet F. Milanc, DRSc F. swetlanc. A

h. Swenser., DRSF J. Partlew, ADP
0. Kirscr., RV M. Lesser, RII S. Varga. CRP L. Reyes, RII E. Ross:, DOEA G. Holahar, DRSP W. Forney, R111 i

J. Calvo, 00EA J. Wiggins, RI J. Callan, RIY C. Hosit DOEA H. Miller, RIII i

R. Emen, 00EA R. Knog, Rill T. Ross, CR$P L. Kolonauski, EI S. Hoffman, DRP G. Laines, CRP D. Wigginten. DRSP R. Bertow, CRP J. Thoma, DRSF P.. Reger, CRP C. Grimes, TRIS t

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":Ec)?!LITY as$URING t' E CAcabiL*TV 7 DEDF0FP i SAFETV FUNCT!ON 9t ceu:: 1:

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Issues surrcuncine tre eefi were ciscussec in Decemcer 1985.ritler. ir.c acclicaticn cf CPER Scacific issues as tney relate to CPERABIL T

are cresentec nerem anc wnen taken tegetner with the crier gui rs (see ee'erences), recrtsent tre NRC co ts tion.

cance tc licensees to mate the OPERABILITY catermination in a rannIt is the licensee's resecesib

is tre NRC's rescensibility witn questionacle cases er prc:;te aucit the ceteminatiens anc cnalleng tness.

To tne extent snat relatec gutcance is uncer cevelec cccucent sncule also ce censicerec prelimtnary.

rent or in triti use, tnis Geneca ' S ta tetw.

Tne Stancarc keennical Scetificatitns cefine OPERABLE felicus:

or CPERAE:L:7Y as GPERAEILIT'f weer it is capabit of performing LE er nave anc wher, all recessary att.6ncant instrumentation, ccrtrols e

unction (s),

power, cccline or seal water, lubricatien er einer auxili

, electrical tnat nrt recuired fer the syster, sucsystec ary ecuipeent succert functien(s,."tc cerfere its funct1cn(s) are also capable of p, train, cc erterring their relatec The curecse cf the tecnnicai sc6cificatiens (TI) is t 5&fety ascetts c' tne cesign casts anc te preseo reflect tne significant ane iyses.

the cr6ventice are citigatien* cf accicentsThe casign casts anc tn tnerefort, with preventien and/cr mitigation whienatnat O with Loth capability anc coal, furtner fellows that since prcartituiar system, subsystem, train, comp ver is specified for the cust ce centinuously assurec,evention is ongoing and the stility to mitigate It safety su;ccrt systems is engcing anc ccatinuous.the crecess of determining CP E*ecesses T*t,t_ Involve CPERABIL TY De tistens CPERABIL:~Y cectsien maeing process cy the licen nuous/engeing cceratten of the f acility, cerformante of surveillance recuiree e the cay-tc cay tnese recutrec cy tecnnical scacificatitr.s wnts esoscially f rcm sne ccr.trei rocc.. inservice testin; anc inscettien, clart walkcowns er teu Insse are all

, anc ceservations ctractly relat6c tt, assurino ine I

'For generai c}rcoses nere" as sa,1 gly ano ; systems, sucsyster.:, train, ccmoonent er cevice macre

., in the saf ety centen, as saf arv --.<--- - -

y ce rehe-*-

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  • ecessary c'.ality cf systers is maintairec, inat f acd ty cceration will ce witn't *rt safety -its, anc that 11mitir.c cenci:1 cts cf coeratich will et net. 4.1r.citatien *nat any cf inese may ret ce ret is inc1cative ci a oc-ter.tta' deficiency er icss of cuality wnsen licensees sneuld prcrctly resoivt er confirm. Ciner crcr.1nant anc engeing exaroles et cualification intensive efferts trcluce cesign casis recenstitution anc Safety System Functicr.a1 Inscacticns,1.s., their curccse sncuic ce te establish or reestaclism tre cuality casts se ttat, ancap ctner things, future tecnnical assessments cf CPE9AEILITY are sounc. These efforts, sowever, may reveal deficiencies anc te assure saf e cceratien wnile the ccrrective action is pursued, a preect ceter-mination cf CPERABILITY is necessary.. Here, as in any operation er crograr.

wrere cuestions may arise, the safety of tne public is assurec througn :ne timely ceterrir.ation ci OPERABIL TY.

r. tte ccurse cf activities suen as review ci ocerattenal everts, cesign recifications to f acilities, examinaticns c# receres, accittens te f actittie
,

cr pernaps as a result cf vencer reviews or inspections, a licensee may erecce eware cf a cctantial ceficiency er icss et cuality relatec te safety or safety suppcrt systers. These anc cther caths cf deficiency identificaticns inclucing reports from ircustry anc ether utilities, result in the licensee cror. tly identifying ar.c correcting tre deficiency in accorcance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appenc1x 5. Criterten XY1 " Corrective Actions". The following circumstances recuire a fert.a! CFEkABIL!TY deterr.ination and fellcw-on corrective actions:

1.

Oiscovery cf degraded ccncitions cf ecutprert where pericrmance er potential fer perf ormanct is called into question.

I.

Discovery of ncncenferming ccnditiens wnere the cualificatter (cenferr.ance tc coces anc starcarcs, etc.' is callec into cuestler.,

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3.

Discovery cf an unanalyzec cceditico asscc1atec with tne current design cas1s (1.6., an unaralytec concitten whien secult nave oest analyzec).'

ihe ateve circuestances anc ctter relatec concerns are displayec in cetti". L) ne enciesec enart.

Printicles For Dealine With OPERAEIt!*Y 1ssues Free guidance issued tc licensets anc in6 acove crecesses cec 1cting recuitec OPERASILITY caterminaticns, the f elicwing princ1ples are cerived fer cealine witn OPERABILITY issues.

l Fecus en safety.

Deal with OPERABILITY anc cualificatien secarateil.

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  • An ' nanaiyzec cer.c1 tion that significantly comercetses :lart safety' is to ts rencrtec cy 10 CFE EC.7;.

If tne ur.analytec cencitton is net car cf int current testre casts, the litansae may ce recutree tc ccrrect tre ceficiency inreuen the cackfit trecess (see 10 CFR 50.109(a)(5)',.

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L 0:EcaBIL:", 's tne cacte11ity to cerfem its spectt3ee fung gen, 4

Cualificatien constitutes confeming tc ali ascacts cf tne cesign casts j

int acing ceces anc stancarcs, cesign criteria, regulations, etc.

i 5.

Determining CFEUB*L anc plant safety s a centinuous cecister-cattn; j

l peccess.

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Timeliness of OPERABIL!TY determinattens should be cceInensurate witn tre safety sienificance ci the issue.

Timeliness of'cerrective acticn (i.e.,-10 CFR Part 50, Appencix E, t

7.

Criteria XVI reouirement f or "promot" corrective action) snould ce casunensurate witn tne safety significance of the corrective actien.

.i 6.

" Justifications fer Continute Operattens (JCDs)* are tne licensee'e I

tecnnical casts for ccerating in an otnerwise preniciten manner (e.g.,

cuisice is, regulatices, license).*

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Waivers cf compliance are NRC's temocrary response tc JCCs.

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i 0,,is.cyssien Tecies surr,cundine CPERt.BILITY Decisions

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- indeteminata A safety system is OPERABLE ween it is capable of performing its specified function (s) anc weer all its support systems, etc. are also canable of per-forming their relatec supcert functions (see definition). Otherwise tne system 1s INOPERABLE. Waer a licensee has cause te cuestion tne OPERABILITY state of a syster, tne crecess of deteminatien is. to ce crostt: tne timeliness of the cetertainatten comunensurate with tne potential safety significance cf tne issut.

1 eeeents auring this time must, newever, be cased en tne

-l The catermins*Je*

licensee's reasona01e expectatichst tne ecuipment er system is OPERABLE anc that the cromot setermination process will support that er,pectation. If, as a result of tne senmot detem1 nation crocess, the eouisment er system is ceter.

minec to be IN0PERA8LE-the licensee's acticas are guided by tne regulations, In additten, j

Technical Specifications (enter the LCD). plant procesures, etc.

tne licensee should detemine when anc uneer what circumstances tne envieren*

cr system became INOPERABLE so that reporting reoutrements may be met anc

.l HRC followuc actions may procerly reflect tne circumstances and iteensees l

efferts to correct and prevent reoccurrences. With tnese ceterminations, tne j

I ecuipment er system is either OPERABLE cr IMOPERABLE at all tiras. Indete -

minate is net a recognizen state in these ceterminations.

'A licensee analysts anc cetermination tnat operation is acceptable because M remains within the aesign easts (e.g., because reevirea ecuipment is OPERABLE cr where allowec, reasonable assurance cf safety is assured) is sometimes referred to as a JCC. This otner type cf JC0 coes not recuire any IIRC actict..

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- Use of Dca Precacilistic risr. assessment IPP.A) crevices a valuacle teci fer relat%t t

evaluatien of accicent scenaries wnile censicering, among ctner inings, tne

recacilities cf occurrence of acctcents and/or external-events. The OPERABIL
Tv cefinitten states, newever, inat tne safety er safety sunnart system seust te i

cac_aole ci cerforming its scacifiec functier The innerent assumstten is tnat-the occurrence TeridTtiens or event exists anc the safety function (crevent1ct, riticatien, cr octh) can ce cerfermee. Tfm use of PRA or procaot tities is not i

etnerWise acceptacle fer CPERABILITT cecisions. However,ER_constoerations may crevice valid and useful information in dealing with continues operation with IMOPERABLE ecuipment (i.e., in JCOs anc NRC resp _pnses to_tnem) anc in

re1lrtumining the safety significance of components and systems.

This latter information is useful in tne licensen's defense of the timeliness of OPERABIL:TY ceterminatiens.

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-JCCs By tne NRC's preferrec definitien, " Justifications for Continuec Operation" 1

(JCOs) are tne licensee's tecnnical basis for operating in ar. etherwise pro-hibiten manner anc, as sucn, are suomitted to tne NRC as a recuest for waiver of compliance'.

It may be acceptable to use PRA or probabilities in this JCD.

There is anotner licensee application cf the term "JC0" commionly usea to document site cecisions and information., A licensee may constaar all er a part i

of the crocess cecicted in the attacnec enart as a "JC0" to incivet sven things as tne oasis f or OPERABLITL piUiprooabi1 Tty orcasttanne. *arenetiWacti5n ~ ~

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etnients, aTurnItive' operations, etc. The ' OPERABILITY basis portion of thTs "XD" iEust be cTear and difinsibTe anc meet all the stancares for an aceeotable CPERABIL:TY determination. There should be no ob,1ection to the licensee's use of tne term "JC0* in any of these cases as long as the process is appropriate.

-Smemanpy,, igg,ino,3,5afyty,gogg Many systems are designed to ocerate in tcin a normal mock and accicer.:

response or safety mose. It is prefersole inat ne specified function (prevention, mitigation, or both) be comonstrated ty testing in the safety moce of operatier..

However, testing in tne normal moes of operation may be recuires for systees where testing in the safety anse will result in unwarranten safety concerns or transients. Conversely for these latter systems, failure in the normal mace of operation may imply loss of function in tne safety mode anc licensees should proceec with a promet deterirtnatten of CPERABILITY.

' Temporary naiver cf Compliance may ce mvided by the Regtonal Administrater (previously *eferrte te as Enforcement Discretion; er ey NRR in nevance of an Energency Tecnnical Specificatien amentmen.

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Tectr,cci Scecificaticn CPEclBIL:*v vs. a!FE Secticn 1: Ocerative Criteria The Tecnnical Scettficatters scr.etimes centate licitle; values fer ccmcenents cerformance wnien. if met, will valicate tne ces1gn casts anc/er safety anaiysts.

Where cresent, tnese values e.g., cume flew, valve closure time, etc., are OPERA.31L:Tv criteria. Ccces anc stancarcs fer tnese same ecmcenents, carticularly A5FE Sect 1cn Iffc7 oumos anc valves, may incluce ciff erent limits on tnese values wnsen, if met, will assure the operational reaciness cf tne cceconent.

The cece limits on these values cetemine the inservice lif e of the cume er valve anc wnen not met (see Articles IWP anc IWV of Sectten 10 the cumo er valve is ceclarec *incoerative" anc not returnec te service until correctec.

The imcact of the cume er valve ceing "not in service and the ccrrection allcwee my tne Coce are facters in cetemining OPERABILITY cf the system.

- Lugee*t Ecuiement Oceracilitv The cefinitier cf CPERAB;L:TY establisnes the crincicle that a system is CPERABLE wnen it is cacable of perfeming its scecifiec function anc when all recessary suctort systees are also cacaele of perfeming tneir reIatec suctort functions. The cerollary is that a system is IN0FERABLE unen it is not capaDie of cerferming its specified function whien may et tne result cf a necessary supccrt system not ceing catable of performing its relatec support functien. A licensee, ucon catemining inat a system is INOPERABLE, must aise examine that system s support functions, if any, to etner systems. The sucpert function may te acccmslisnec by other acceptable alternatives er under certain circumstances r.ny not be recuirec. It is the licensee's responsibility te rate tne suppcrt functicn findings anc if alternatives are involvec, to assure that the support function as accomplished by the alternative reenins within tne cesign tasts er tnat a 10 CFR 50.59 review is perfornec.

The erfinitien of OPERABILITY aff ects the manner in wnich :ne recuirements for a Limiting Cencitlen ter Operation (LCO) anc its asscciatec remedial actions are appliec when a succort system ts INOPERABLE.

If sne licensee cetermines that a T5 system could not cerfem its intancec safety function with an IKOPERAELE succert system, tnen tne T5 LC0 seust be entered anc apprecriate remecial actions taten. This action shall occur regardless cf whetner er not the support system 1s coverec by T5. If the licensee deteretres that a T5 system is cacable of perfeming its intenced function with an INOFERABLE suppert system, then the TS system may ce censidered CPERABLE. However, apprcpriate corrective action would need to be taken to ceal with the support systems INOFERABIL*TY cn a senecule cemenensurate with tne neec cf sne suppcrt system.

Forecver, all etner T5 systems affected by an IMOFERABLE support system rust te accressac. Thougn the ecst limiting or restrictive action would influence tne licensee's action, all T5 system LCO's must ce reviewed for acclicability enc enterec. nee-inte ane necessary remectal actions tatarr fur s ie systers affect c.

This may incluce entersg TS 3.0.3 as coesised~necastTTT-TMs crbcess cf ene T5 er succort system teing INOPERABLE anc affect 1ng the CEERABILIT' status ci another T5 system resulting in entering tne LCD actlen statements for botn er mere systers t somattmas referrec to as cascacing) is cerivec Cirectb frem tne cefinttten cf CPERABLE. The cccumentation anc recerting recu1rerenti cecano ucon tne licensee's recutrec acticns and tne recuirements cf his license anc tne regulation:.

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In accitien, if a sucperten syster is declarec IMOPERABL' due solely tc the support system r.ot cetng CPERABLE anc the support functic.. can ce asseuately i

testen upon return-to-service, licensees may forego the supportee systern return-to-service surveillances unless they are actually necced to mate an scecuate technical assessment of the supporten system's capanility.

6 Enciesures: 1) References

2) Chart en
  • Licensee Actions for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Ccnditions" i

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References OPERABLE see JCOs 1.

Acril 10,1950 Genert: Letter en use cf the term OPERABLE as it applies to tne Single Failure Criteria.

2.

August 26, 1983 IE Information hetice No. 83-56 " Operability cf Recu1ree Auxiliary Ecuipment*; Indirect Support Eculpment 0;eracility.

2.

July 8,1985 D. Crutenfield memo en "Tecnnical' Specificatien Operacility Recutrements*

a.

May 12, 1986 Inscectten anc Enforcement Manual Part 990c: Technical Gutcance on "Stancarc Tecnnical Specifications STS Section 1, OPERABILITY" 5.

April 7,1988 Generic Letter 88-07 modified enforcement policy relating to 10 CFR 50.a9, ' Environmental Qualification of Electrical Ecuipment Impertant to Safety For Nuclear Power Plants".

6.

April 3,1989 Generic Letter 89 04 " Guidance en Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs.

7.

April 18 2C,1989 G. Holahan presentatica at Regulatory Informatter Conference "Ecuipment Operacility; Procotly Determining Operacility and Establist.ir.g Corrective Acticn Plans For Degracea er honeenferming Safety Ecuipeent" 8.

July 19,1989 T. Murley memoranoum en " Guidance en Act1on to ce Taker Follewteg Discovery of Potentially Nonconforming Ecuipment"; Definitien of Promet fer Otterminatten of Operable.

9.

August 9,1969 J. Partlow memorancum on " Guidance en Licensee Actions That Should Be Taken When Ecuipment Is 01scoverte to be Potentially Ncncenferming"; Basic Feuncation Princt;al is Prompt Determination of Operacle. (Issued for Trial use and Develernent.)

10.

August 21, 1989 T. Murley letter to Illinois Power Comcany (Clinten) cn "Tecnnical $cecification Recuirements"; Technical Specificatien Interpretatien of Direct anc Indirect Support Ecuicment Operacility.

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Docket No. 50-245 B14692 i

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 i

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