ML20058K107
| ML20058K107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/18/1993 |
| From: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Jeanne Johnston SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058K110 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9312140407 | |
| Download: ML20058K107 (8) | |
Text
. -..
Y f l~
p nn, L
- 4, UNITED STATES
~~
f vi NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
I Af i ~
WASHINGTON D. C. 20555
( Sg.o j
...../
?lovember 13. '.993
- HAlHMAN The Honorable J.
Bennett Johnston, Chairman Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your letter of November 2, 1993, which included a series.of post-hearing questions concerning safety assistance to Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, I am pleased to provide my answers to the three questions addressed specifically to me.
With your indulgence, I sent the remaining questions (your questions 1, 2,
3, and 4) to the other agencies who are in a better position to answer them.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely,
_kr Ivan Selin
Enclosure:
Responses to Questions cc:
Senator Malcolm Wallop f
n 9312140407 931118 C
PDR COMMS NRCC p
-l, CORRESPONDENCE PDR g
e<
l~.
- Questions # rom Senator Vallon j
i OVEST10N 1.
I am concerned about your statement that improvements in this situation are being made slower than you had hoped.
i a.
What do you think is the principal cause for this slow pace:
l I
Answer:
l My statement included both optimism and pessimism, and I would not want to i
focus exclusively on the pessimism.
I noted that significant progress had f
taken place on the ground, in the physical condition of many of the plants-that were so seriously flawed as late as-just two years ago; in the sensitivity of the leaderships of these countries to the safety concerns of-i the West; and, most importantly from my point of view, in the growth of l
l independent regulatory bodies that will eventually be capable of exercising i
the same kind-of authority over safe operations Lthat the NRC does in the United States.
As you know, it is on these regulatory bodies that NRC's program has its greatest impact.
So we feel that we are accomplishing a great deal in training and reinforcing the authority of the nuclear regulators with a minimum investment of the taxpayers' dollars.
Without a doubt, the slow' pace in upgrades 'to nuclear power plants is a direct result of the inability to reach agreement on liability provisions of an
]
assistance agreement with the Russian Government on nuclear reactor safety.
I
I i
t l
OUEST:0N 1.4 Continuea) 2 U.S. and other Western companies are simply unwilling to take the risk of being held liable for a nuclear accident at a power plant they have helped upgrade.
To make matters worse, the Russian side has taken the position that the newer RBMK reactors, which we consider to be unsafe, will continue to be operated until the end of their design lifetimes.
1 t
J W
i J
j
h e
3 3
i OUESTION 1.
b.
Is insufficient funding a significant factor in this?
ANSWER:
In my opinion, at this point funding is not an issue.
The emphasis of the A
U.S. assistance program has been to implement a program in stages, beginning with short term risk reduction.
We have been working on improving operational safety at Russian and Ukrainian nuclear power plants. As I have noted, we have a very active program to improve regulatory authority and competence, although there is not much we can do about the resources the Russian Government makes available to its regulatory bcdy.
The Department of Energy will be implementing a major effort to improve the physical conditions of the Russian nuclear power plants, making use of part of the $100 million appropriated for this purpose in the FY93 supplemental approved by the Congress on September 30.
In addition to these resources, as soon as liability agreements can be put into place with Western European governments, assistance will also begin to flow from this source. Already the Swedes have provided considerable assistance to Lithuania, France is aiding Bulgaria, the Finns are assisting at Kola, and the European Community, partit.alarly the Germans, has considerable resources in the pipeline to Russia j
and Ukraine.
The two principal difficulties are adequate coordination and
]
timing of assistance, and the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries.
1 4
\\
c..
1 1
4 OVESTION 2.
You note that too much of the available funding is spent in donor countries.
It has been over a year since our last hearing at which there seemed to be unanimity of opinion _
I that studies should cease and work should get uiiderway..You observe in today's testimony that most of the studies have been completed.
a.
On what, then, are the funds'being spent in the donor countries?
1 ANSWER:
The U.S. is waiting for resolution of the liability problems to begin to make 4
major hardware assistance available at the plant level.
Some training and fire safety equipment have been delivered.
NRC assistance is primarily in training and procedures, and most of our assistance is performed in-house.
I understand most DOE assistance is through contractors who are concerned about liability problems.
Both NRC and 00E consider that we have enough information to go ahead with our assistance efforts without further studies.
I I cannot speak for the European donor community except that our information through the G-24 in Brussels is that liability problems have also held up l
provision of direct assistance from these donors, and most of the funds they have expended have been on their own contractors rather than in the recipient countries.
4
'i
l w.
b r
5 OVESTION 2.
b.
Is this the principal reason for the Russian complaint that not enough assistance is getting through to the plant and operator level.
t ANSWER:
Russian complaints should be taken with some skepticism for a number of reasons.
Nevertheless, their complaints are a combination of their frustration with Western comments that their RBMK and VVER 440/230 reactors are unsafe and the absence, until recently, of resources from the West to upgrade these plants.
The reason they have not been able to get such resources is Western concerns about the lack of agreement on the liability issue and the strongly held position of the major donors, including the U.S.,
that these plants should be shut down. Our assistance to the less safe plants is only for short-term risk reduction.
The Russians fundrientally disagree
)
l with this policy orientation.
These issues will continue to divide the two sides until they are resolved at the political level, hopefully in the Gore-Chernomyrdin process.
l i
l
l 6
00ESTION 3.
You stated that economic conditions and decisions in many of the recipient countries today do not favor improved nuclear safety.
What reason is there to believe that the recipient countries will devote sufficient economic resources to keep in place the type of aggressive regulatory authority you have indicated is so crucial to increasing and maintaining safety of these nuclear plants?
ANSWER:
There is no guarantee that they will do so, but there are grounds for some optimise.
Regulatory bodies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are, for the.
most part, authorized by their governments to monitor nuclear safety. Only in:
Bulgaria are there remnants of the former Soviet attitude regarding the role of the regulator, but our assistance efforts and those of our counterparts in western Europe are trying to change this.
1 In Russia, we have raised the issue of regulatory authority to the highest levels of the Russian Government. My most recent discussions with the-1 Chairman of Russia's Gosatomnadzor indicate that GAN has expanded authority,-
but they are not certain their resources are going to be adequate to carry out
]
all their tasks, especially the materials control and accounting tasks that
l l
QUESTION 3.
(Continued) 7 emerge from the weapons dismantlement process.
I indicated that this question should be on the agenda of the second Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in December.
In addition, we have encouraged GAN to consider other forms of financing through its legislative body.
With respect to Ukraine, not only the regulatory body, but also the entire government of Ukraine is in dire financial straits. Once again, NRC's program of assistance is going ahead with great cooperation from Ukrainian officials, but there is no assurance that this body will be fully funded to carry out its tasks.
In this regard, U.S. assistance covers training and equipment, but cannot cover salaries and expenses of Ukrainian regulatory officials. We are therefore continuing to press the Ukrainian Government at all levels for continued support for the Ukrainian regulator.
I will visit Ukraine during my trip to Russia for the second Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, and this will be one of my highest priorities.
r h
l I
1 l