ML20058J532
| ML20058J532 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1982 |
| From: | Carter L, Paris O, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8208110079 | |
| Download: ML20058J532 (6) | |
Text
_____ __ __
1 00CKETED U5::AC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E.'" -P P A ATOMIC SAFETY AND LI, CENSING BOARD
-,--c-e-..
^
' ' ~ ~
Before Administrative Judges:
du NCH Louis J. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick J. Shon DM M In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-247-SP CONSOLIDATED EDIS N COMPANY 50-286-SP 0F NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)
)
~
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK August 9, 1982 (IndianPoint,.UnitNo.3)
,s MEMORANDUIi AND CERTIFICATION
'~
(Seeking Further Comission Guidance)
In a Memorandum and Order issued July 27, 1982, the Comission directed this Board to reconsider "its rulings as to the admissibility of all the contentions admitted to the Special Proceeding."
(CL1-82-15, q-Slip Op. at 17). The Comission's directive addressed our April 23, 1982, order formul'ating and admitting 22 contentions (including one Boa-d question) based on 57 contentions that had been filed by intervenors.1/
The 57 contentions from which we formulated 22 contentions to be
-1/
litigated included only those intervenors' contentions which we deemed to focus adequately on the six Comission Questions set forth in Commission orders dated January 8,1981,and Septeniber 18, 1981.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., et al_.,13 NRC 1 The inter-(CLI-81-1, 1981) and.14 HRC 610 (CLI-81-23, 1981).
venors' contentions which we deemed irrelevant and/or unimportant have not been discussed and enumerated by us; because the Com-mission directed us to formulate contentions after consulting with the parties, we did not consider it necessary to burden the record with a discussion of rejected contentions.
/)
O 8208110079 820809 PDR ADOCK 05000247 G
. Its concerns addressed three areas:
(1) the admissibility of issues, (2) the applicability of 10 CFR 12.758;to contentions in this pro-ceeding, and (3) the treatment of accident probability and consequences f
in testimony.
Pursuant to the Commission's directive, the Board promptly began its reconsideration of the admitted contentions and its review of the bases proffered by the intervenors.
Two important developments, however, now cause us to seek further guidance from the Commission.
1.
Probability and Consequence Testimony The first development arose in our reconsideration of the contentions and their bases. We have encountered an important problem relating to the Commission's directive that "[a]ny testimony en accident consequences for Indian Point must include a discussion of the probability oE the accidents
~~
leading to the proposed consequences."
(CLI-82-15, Slip Op. at 16). Our original interpretation of the instruction / was that this investiga-2 tion, as a whole, should give approximately equal attention to the proba-bility of occurrence of accidents and to the proposed consequences. We did not require that all testimony treat both the consequences and the probability cf accidents because most witnesses, particularly those
-2/ The relevant instruction in n. 5 said, " Attention shall be given both to the probability of occurrences of releases and to the environmental consequences of such releases." We thought the Commission meant that we should give attention to both factors, not that every witness should be required to do so. CLI-81-23, 14 NRC 610, n. 5 at 612.
0 available to intervenors and local governments, do not have the inter-disciplinary expertise required for analyzing both the probability of accidents and the consequences of accidents. The expertise that would be required for such testimony would encompass statistics, nuclear and/or mechanical engineering, meteorology, health physics, and traffic engineering.
Such broad technical talent is usually available only to the most well-funded of parties.
A narrow reading of footnote 5 would preclude our hearing much of the testimony of intervenor, state, and county witnesses.
If we reject this testimony we believe we will deny this Board and the Commission access to an important source of information about local c'onditions that could affect the consequences of an accident.
We should not blind our-selves to relevant evidence simply because the party presenting it lacks the expertise to perform a probability analysis, s
An example of the kind of testimony which a narrow interpretation of the instruction in footnote 5 would require us to reject is the testimony.of Dr. Jan Beyea and Mr. Brian Palenik (Tr. 2900ff.). That testimony was offered jointly by the New York State Attorney General, UCS/NYPIRG,'and the New York Audubon Society. Although offered with respect to Commission Questions 3 and 4 (Contentions 3.6 and 4.3), it arguably concerns consequences by virtue of the fact that it presents calculations of health effects that would result from accidents with evacuation proceeding according to plan.
It does not address the probability of occurrence of the assumed accidents, although one of e
. the witnesses offered some coment on the probabilities under cross-examination (Tr. 3248 ff.).
At the hearing the Licensees moved to strike this testimony on the grounds that it did not deal with probability (Tr.
33D6). We denied the motion because we believed that the Commission's instructions did not require each witness or panel of witnesses to give attention both to the probabilities of accidents as well as to their con-sequences.
Moreover, the testimony of Beyea and Palenik, which withstood probing cross examination, focuses squarely on the " individual risks" and
" societal risks" about which the Commission expressed interest in its January 8, 1981, order.
CLI-81-1, 13 NRC 1, 7.
In reconsidering the contentions and their bases pursuant to the Commission's July 27, 1982, directive, we find little mentiSn,of probability.,
Indeed, the stress in the bases is almost entirely on consequences, with no attention given to the probability of specific accidents or the probabi-lity of effectiveness of countenneasures.
If we are to admit only testi-many which discusses both probability and consequences, the testimony, perforce, will consist almost entirely of that offered by the Licnesees and the NRC Staff, a result that do not believe the Comission intended. There-fore w'e seek Commission guidance by certifying the following questions:
la. Must each witness's testimony address both consequences and probabilities, or must each party address both factors in its direct case?
lb. Alternatively, may we hear a combination of consequence and probability testimony taken from different sources, eg.,fromthetestimonyofwitnessegIpresentedbydifferent parties, or from cross-examination? -
-3/
See Public Service Electric and Gas Co., et al., 7 NRC 642, 674 ff.
(LBP-78-15, 1978), aff'd, 9 NRC 14 (ALAB-518, 1979).
2.
Regional Administrator's Action on FEMA Findings The second development which causes us to seek guidance is the action taken on August 3, 1982, by the Regional Administrator of NRC Region I in response to the issuance by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of its July 30, 1982, report, " Interim Findings on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparation of State and Local Governments at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station".
FEMA set forth in the report findings of significant deficiencies with respect to five of the planning standards of 10 CFR f 50.47(b).
As a result, i
the Regional Administrator started the "120-day clock" pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.54(s)(2)(ii)4/ and required Licensees to submit to the NRC within 30 days their plans for curing the deficiencies. SiNceCommission Questions 3 and 4 relate to the conformance of emergency plans with NRC/ FEMA guidelines and to improvements in the emergency plans that can l
be expected in the near future, we certify to the Commission the following questions:
t 2a. Shall we continue to hear evidence on the " status and degree of conformance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines" aspect of Question 3 and the "impr.ovements in the level of emergency planning" and " time schedule" aspects of Commission Question 4?
4_/
50.54(s)(2)(fi) states in part as follows:
If after April 1, 1982, the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (including findings based on requirements of Appendix E,Section IV.D.3) and if the deficiencies (including deficiencies based on require-ments of Appendix E,Section IV.D.3) are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate.
Or
. 2b.
If we limit our proceeding to the " minimum hcurs warning" aspect of Question 3 and the "other specific offsite emergency procedures" aspect of Question 4, should we investigatethosemattersastheyprenoworastheyare expected to be in four months?
Finally, the Board wishes to advise the Commission and the parties that it will continue to review and reconsider the contentions pending receipt of the Comission's answers to the foregoing questions. Meanwhile, previously scheduled hearings, discovery, and filing dates are suspended.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD f
. ntaa Louis J. f4 tei, Chaiman f
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
~
~
Oscar H. Paris ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Bethesda, Maryland l et V
Frederick J.
on '
August 9, 1982 ADMINI E JUDGE
-5/ The Commission's Questions 3 and 4 from it / January 18, 1981, and September 18, 1981, orders read as follows:
3.
What is the current status and degree of confonnance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines of state and local emergency planning within a 10-mile radius of the site and, of the extent that it is relevant to risks posed by the two plants, beyond a 10-mile radius? In this context, an effort should be made to establish what the minimum number of hours warning for an effective evacuation of a 10-mile quadrant at Indian Point would be.
The FEMA position should be taken as a rebuttable presumption for this. estimate.
4.
What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency procedures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the public?
i