ML20058H103

Responds to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/93-31. Corrective Actions:Security Officer Involved in Incident Suspended & Debriefed & Security Force Personnel Given Refresher Training

ML20058H103
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	12/03/1993
From:	Burski R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
W3F1-93-0367, W3F1-93-367, NUDOCS 9312100289
Download: ML20058H103 (3)

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9 ENTERGY E'I'5 """" "*""*'

?2lll R. F. Burski m.

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W3F1-93-0367 A4.05 PR December 3, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 NRC Inspection Report 93-31 Reply to Notice of Violation Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits in the response to the violation identified in Appendix A of the subject Inspection Report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact T.S. Becker at (504) 739-6693.

Very truly yours, 080000 p

R.F. Burski l

Director Nuclear Safety RFB/TSB/ssf Attachment cc:

J.L. Milhoan (NRC Region IV), D.L. Wigginton (NRC-NRR),

R.B. McGehee, N.S. Reynolds, NRC Resident inspectors Office ll l

9312100289 931203 I

PDR ADOCK 05000382 G

PDR i

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Attachment to W3F1-93-0367 i

Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC. RESPONSE TO THE VIOLATION IDENTIFIED IN APPENDIX A 0F INSPECTION REPORT 93-31 VIOLATION NO. 9331-01 i

License Condition E of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Operating License NPF-38, dated March 16, 1985, requires that the licensee i

fully implement and maintain in effect the Commission approved Physical l

Security Plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CRF 50.54 (p).

i Paragraph 5.6.1.3 of the Physical Security Plan requires, in part, that prior to entering the protected area, hand-carried packages are inspected by visual means or through the use of X-ray package examination equipment.

Paragraph 5.3.9.1 of Security Procedure PS-011-102, Revision 13, " Personnel i

Access and Exit," dated September 28, 1992, requires, in part, that prior to entering the protected area the individual's hand-carried items should be placed on _the conveyor belt for purposes of having them searched by means of the package X-ray examination device.

Items that are too large or I

otherwise cannot be searched by the X-ray examination device shall be l

physically searched by security personnel.

Contrary to the above, the inspector determined by observation on October 14, 1993, that a hand-carried item entered the protected area without being searched by the X-ray examination device or being physically searched by a security officer.

RESPONSE

(1)

Reason for the Violation Entergy Operation, Inc. admits this violation and believes that the root cause is personnel error in that the required procedure was not j

followed.

PS-011-102 requires that hand-carried items be searched prior to entering the protected area.

However, a Security Officer assigned to search duties (Personnel Search Officer) failed to search

.a coffee cup that was passed around the portal metal detector.

The off'cer was distracted by another individual and did not notice a

aterford 3 badged employee place the coffee cup on the inspection tray beside the metal detector. The employee walked through the detector, picked up the cup, and proceded_through the explosives l

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Attachment'to W3F1-il3-0367 Page 2 of 2 l

1 detector, after which, the employee entered the protected area I

without having the coffee cup searched.

During this time'the Personnel Search Officer became involved with other employees entering the metal detector and failed to notice the coffee cup being taken into the protected area.

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(2)

Corrective Steos That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved i

The Security Officer involved in the incident was suspended in accordance with the Contractor Security Disciplinary Standards.

l Additionally, the Officer was debriefed in accordance with the Improving Human Performance program.

j (3)

Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations This incident appears to be an isolated case of an inadequate search.

However, in an effort to prevent recurrence and heighten the awareness of this incident, Security force personnel were given refresher training on the processing of personnel through the Primary Access Point.

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l (4)

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved i

i Waterford 3 was in full compliance on October 27, 1993.

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