ML20058D551
| ML20058D551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1982 |
| From: | Shotwell J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207270198 | |
| Download: ML20058D551 (32) | |
Text
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OW 953 3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ~
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Docket Nos.
In the Matter of
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50-443,0k and
"^*.;-
2 50 4440L PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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NEW HAMPSHIRE, el al.
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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2
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BRIEF OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS CONTENTIONS Pursuant to the leave granted by the Board at the prehearing conference held on July 16, 1982, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts submits this brief in support of the contentions set forth in the Supplement to the Petition to Intervene of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, dated April 20, 1982 [ hereinafter, " Supplement"].
For the reasons discussed below, the Commonwealth believes that its contentions as drafted in its Supplement have the necessary regulatory basis and specificity to satisfy the Commission's requirements for admissibility.
However, as counsel for the Commonwealth indicated at the prehearing conference, the Commonwealth is agreeable to having its four contentions incorporated into one emergency planning contention in accordance with the terms set f~~)D 8207270198 820722
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PDR ADOCK 05000443 O
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f forth in " Counsel's Exhibit A".1!
The Commonwealth has further offered to redraft its contentions.so as to incorporate therein the detailed bases set forth in its Supplement.E!
The Commonwealth's second through fourth contentions, redrafted in this manner, are attached hereto as Exhibits A, B and C for the Board's use.d!
As the Board is aware, the Commonwealth has' submitted four contentions, all of which relate to the issue of emergency planning.
The Applicants have not objected to any of the Commonwealth's contentions -- either on the ground of basis or specificity -- and have merely proposed that, for purposes of simplicity, these four contentions and other admissible contentions on the issue of emergency planning be incorporated into one general contention.
See Applicants' Response to the Supplement to the petition to Intervene of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (hereinafter, " Applicants' Response"), at 2; 1/
As Counsel for the Commonwealth explained at the conference, the Commonwealth is in agreement with the terms of l
" Counsel's Exhibit A",
with the sole exception of those set forth in paragraph 5 thereof.
2/
It would seem-that the Board could accomplish the same result by accepting the Commonwealth's contenticns as drafted and limiting discovery to the areas discussed in its Supplement.
The Commonwealth has already indicated its willingness to be so limited.
l 3/
The Commonwealth is offering to withdraw its first contention.
See discussion infra, at 4.
9 i
Transcript of the July 16, 1982 prehearing conference,
" Counsel's Exhibit A".
The Applicants and the Commonwealth do appear to have differing views as to the requirements imposed' on the Applicants by certain provisions of the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
Thus, on the basis of certain brief statements in their Response to the Commonwealth's contentions, the Applicants appear to contend th'at, on the matter of 6vacuability, their only burden is to demonstrate that persons can be physically moved from one location to another in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station without reference to whether that relocation can be accomplished with sufficient speed to prevent exposure to harmful levels of radiation.
See Applicants' Response, at 2.
If that were all the Commission required its regulations would be totally unnecessary and meaningless, since persons can always be moved from one location to another in some amount of time.
But, in any event, the Applicants have improperly raised this issue in l
their Response, for it addresses the merits of the Commonwealth's contentions, and not their admissibility.
As Judga Hoyt observed on several occasions during the recent prehearing conference, the merits of parties' contentions are not before the, Board at this time.
Unlike the Applicants, the NRC Staff has made certain objections to the Commonwealth's contentions.
Those objections cre addressed below.
0 f
CONTENTION I The Commonwealth's first contention, which challenges the Applicants' failure as of this date to submit off-site emergency plans as required by the Commission's regulations,
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was discussed at the prehearing conference.
At least one member of the Board and the Staff have indicated to the Commonwealth that they would prefer that the contention be withdrawn at this time and resubmitted later if off-site plans have still not been submitted.A/
Provided the Commonwealth receives assurance from the Board that this contention will not be treated as having been late-filed should the Commonwealth need to resubmit it at a later date, the Commonwealth will agree to withdraw the contention at this time.
CONTENTION II The Commonwealth's second contention reads as follows:
The Applicants have failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's for Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.33(g) and S50.47(c)(2).
As we have said, the Applicants have not objected to this contention, ei,ther on the ground of basis or specificity.
The 4/
Given the refusal of various municipalities to assist in the preparation of plans, this must be viewed as a realistic possibility.
_4-1
s Staff has misread this contention as an allegation that the 10-mile and 50-mile emergency planning' zones established by the Applicants in their FSAR are inappropriate. 'See Response of the NRC Staff to Contentions filed by New Englar.d Coalition on Nuclear Pollution and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, May 19, 1982 [ hereinafter, "Ste f's Response"), at 24.
Having thus miscontrued the nature of the Commonwealth's contention, the Staff then objects to the Commonwealth's failure to specify
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s.
reasons for its " apparent belief" that the boundaries are inappropriate.
Ibid.
With its second contention the Commonwealth does not allege.
that the EPZ boundaries established by the Applicants are necessarily inappropriate.
Rather, the Commonwealth challenges the Applicants' failure to consider local emergency response, needs and capabilities in arriving at those boundaries.
Commission regulations clearly provide 'that the size and-configuration of the zones within which emergency plans will be prepared "shall be determined in relation td local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography,' land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdict'ional boundaries."
10 C.F.R.
S50.33(g); 5 0.,4 7 ( c ) ( 2 ).
[ Emphasis supplied].
Applicants are entitled to use as a starting point the guidance of the Commission's regulations that " generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall' consist of an are~a
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I sabout 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ'shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
Id. [ Emphasis supplied]
However, they must then, in consultation with state and local emergency planning officials, adjust these generic boundaries to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing the emergency planning zones for this particular site.
The
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Applicants have made no attempt to examine the effect of local fa'etors on the size or configuration of the EPZ's for the Seabrook facility, but have ended their analysis at the point s
where it is supposed to begin -- namely, with the drawing of circular zones having exactly 10 and 50-mile radii.
It is this
_A failure to comply with Commission regulations which is the subject of the Commonwealth's second contention.
The adjustments which must be made to the 10 and 50-mile boundaries in any given case to account for local factors may be quite minimal, amounting for instance to the mere inclusion in the plume exposure zone of the remainder of a municipality divided by the 10-mile boundary.
Or the necessary adjustments may be fairly significant.
If, for example, the location and characteristics of a particular site indicate that there will be rapid travel of radionuclides through a liquid pathway in the event of a reactor meltdown accident, the ingestion pathway zone may need to be expanded well beyond the 50-mile boundary. -
It may be that examination of all local factors relevant to emergency response needs and capabilitiec in the Seabrook vicinity will lead to the conclusion that no adjustments need be made in this case to the generic 10 and 50-mile zones.
Thus, it is not clear from the Commission's regulations that the 10 and 50-mile radii are necessarily inappropriate and no such allegation has been made by the Commonwealdh.
What is clear is that the Applicants must study all relevant local factors before they, intervenors, or the Board can be in a position to judge the acceptability for this site of zones having exactly 10 and 50-mile radii.
The Staff's misinterpretation of the Commonwealth's contention (and similar contentions submitted by other parties) amounts to an attempt to place upon intervenors the burden of conducting the necessary studies of the impact of local conditions on EPZ boundaries and of suggesting appropriate boundaries.
That burden clearly belongs to the Applicants, since no license can be issued until local conditions have been studied, EPZ boundaries have been drawn in light thereof, and adequate emergency plans have been submitted for the zones so drawn.
See 10 C.F.R. 550.33(g); S50.47(bh(
5/
Applicants may argue that it is off-site officials who bear the burden of studying local conditions.
While it is clear that any adjustments to EPZ boundaries must be made in cooperation with state and local emergency planning officials, it is equally clear that it is the Applicants who must demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations before this license may be grcuted and that the NRC has no authority to require state and local officials to conduct this study. _ _.
The Staff's objection to this contention also amounts to a request that the Commonwealth make a far mo.re serious challenge to this license application than the Commonwealth has made in its second contention or is prepared to make at this time.
It may be that the Commonwealth will ultimately agree with the size and configuration of the EPZ's established by the Applicants - - either because the Commonwealth agrees with the effect given local factors after the necessary examination thereof has been undertaken, or because the Commonwealth agrees on the basis of that examination that local factors should have nct effect on EPZ boundaries.
The Staff is incorrect in its assertion that intervenors can readily conduct their own studies of all relevant local factors and suggest appropriate EPd boundaries for this site.
The Commonwealth does not at this time have knowledge of or access to studies describing the effect which should be given to various local factors.
If such studies exist, they are presumably known to the Staff and the Applicants and will be identified in the course of discovery if this contention is admitted.
Thus, while the Commonwealth certainly does have 1
access to a map of the Seabrook vicinity and can assess whether the 10 and 50-mile EPZ boundaries dissect particular municipalities, the Commonwealth cannot know without conducting discovery whether there are any studies or Staff documents
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which describe the proper effect to be given jurisdictional -
boundaries and the potential problems associated with planning to evacuate only portions of certain municipalities.5/
Similarly, the Commonwealth does not at this time have knowledge of or access to all studies of the Seabrook site and surrounding areas which may be relevant to the effect which should be given local factors.
The Commonwealth is, for example, aware that the Staff has undertaken a study of the liquid pathway situation at this particular site, but does not have the detailed results of that study so that it can assess their implications for the size and configuration of the Seabrook ingestion pathway EPZ.
In any event, even if possible, compliance with the Staff's request for greater specificity would amount to submission of a different -- and far more serious -- allegation than has been made here.
The Commonwealth's contention as submitted alleges a clear violation of a Commission regulation and, therefore, has adequate basis.
No specification can be given for this contention other than that which has been provided in the Supplement -- namely, that the Applicants are required to examine local factors and have not done so.
We have also identified the particular local factors which, in our view, must be examin,ed.
See Supplement, at 5-6.
6/
The Commonwealth conducted discovery on this and other emergency planning issues in connection with the Pilgrim'II construction permit proceeding, but cannot now knos whether relevant studies have been conducted since the close of that proceeding.
_9_
In its response to this contention the Staff relies upon an order of the Shoreham Licensing Board rejecting a proferred emergency planning contention as inconsistent with the Commission's regulations.
See Staff's Response, at 24.1!
However, that proferred contention bears no resemblance to the Commonwealth's second contention.
Having been submitted prior to promulgation of the Commission's emergency p anning regulation ~s, the contention at issue in the Shoreham case suggested that all applicants should be required to conduct risk assessment studies to determine appropriate emergency planning zones.
The contention gave no effect whatsoever to the 10 and 50-mile generic boundaries and would have required that the applicants start with a " clean slate" in determining appropriate zones for that reactor.
See Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Station Unit 1), " Memorandum and Order Confirming Rulings Made at the Conference of Parties" (unpublished), March 15, 1982, at 24-25.
The Shoreham Board expressly acknowledged that the 10 and 50-mile boundaries are l
flexible and that adjustments may be necessary to account for local conditions.
Id.. at 25.
The Board was not faced with, and did not address, the question of who bears the burden of assessing the impact of local factors.
The Shoreham Board did note that its dismissal of the contention before it was without prejudice to the submission of l
contentions that adjustments must be made to the " approximate 7/
It is notable that the Staff here relies on a decision of a licensing board which it and the Applicants have roundly criticized for its decisions on other matters.
zones" due to particular local conditions.
Ibid.
The Staff attempts to read into this sentence a decision by the Board that it is not permissible, in a case where the applicants fail to give any consideration at all to local factors, to submit a contention challenging that failure.
It is clear that the Shoreham Board was not presented with, and did not decide, that question.8/
/
The question of whether this contention is in any way premature due to the unavailability of off-site emergency plans was raised at the prehearing conference.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, this contention relates to the EPZ boundaries drawn in the FSAR and has no relationship to the details of off-site plans.
The Commonwealth is in a position to conduct discovery in connection with this contention at this time.A!
8/
The Staff also relied in its oral argument on a decision of the TMI Licensing Board.
The inapplicability of that Board's decision to this contention was discussed at the prehearing conference.
9/
The Staff expressed some concern at the conference about the fact that the Commonwealth, in the Pilgrim II construction permit proceeding, filed all of its discovery on emergency planning on the first day of the discovery period. -The Commonwealth is at a loss to appreciate what it is that the Staff finds disturbing about that fact.
The record should reflect that the Pilgrim Licensing Board applauded the Commonwealth for filing its discovery requests so p.omptly and upheld those requests in virtually all particulars.
See Boston Edison Company, et al. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2),
Docket No. 50-471, August 20, 1981, " Board Ruling on Discovery."
Contrary to the suggestion made by counsel for the NRC Staff at the prehearing conference (who was not personally involved in the Pilgrim II proceeding), the Pilgrim Board never ruled or intimated that the Commonwealth's discovery requests were overly broad or numerous.
- LL -
CONTENTION III The Commonwealth's third contention reads as follows:
There is no basis for the NRC to find, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(a)(1), that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness for the Seabrook Station provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Again, the Applicants have not objected to this' contention, either on the ground of basis or specificity.
The Staff indicates in its Response that, to the extent this contention challenges off-site emergency plans, it is premature.
See Staff's Response, at 25.
However, this contention does not challenge off-site emergency plans, but rather questions the sufficiency of the evidence which currently exists as to the feasibility of any emergency action in the event of a severe accident at this facility.
Commission regulations require this Board to determine that there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can.
. be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" before licensing this plant.
See 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(a)(1).
With its third contention, the Commonwealth i
submits, on the basis of evidence available at this time, that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can in fact be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
As a review of the detailed bases for this contention set forth in the Commonwealth's
Supplement (at pages 6-18) will reveal, this conclusion is in no way dependent on the details of off-site emergency plans and, therefore, is in no way premature because those plans are not yet available.
The Commonwealth is in a position at this time to conduct virtually all of the discovery which it will need to conduct with respect to this contention.
Very little, if any, additional discovery will be necessary relative to this contention ~after off-site plans are made available.
The only other objection made by the Staff in its Response to the Commonwealth's third contention is in direct conflict with the proposal memorialized in Counsel's Exhibit A that all parties' emergency planning contentions be incorporated into one general contention.
Thus, while the Applicants have called for greater generality in the framing of this contention, the Staff has called for greater specificity.
See Staff's Response, at 25.
At the prehearing conference, the Commonwealth offered to revise its third contention to reflect the greater specificity provided at pages 6-18 of its Supplement.
The Staff indicated that, at least in certain respects, it would like to see an even greater degree of specificity than that provided in the Supplement.
The Staff's Response to the Commonwealth's contentions provides no indication of the additional specificity which the Staff desires.
See Staff,'s Response, at 25.
Counsel for the Staff did give the Commonwealth some t
examples of additional details desired in a telephone conversation on Tuesday, July 20.10/
Attached to this brief as Exhibit B is a revised version of the Commonwealth's third contention, incorporating the detailed specification provided in the Commonwealth's Supplement and, to the extent possible in the forty-eight hours since the telephone communication with the Staff, details'further specifying the Commonwealth's concerns.
The Commonwealth submits this revised contention for the Board's review should it decide not to adopt the proposal set forth in Counsel's Exhibit A and should it find that the Commonwealth's third contention, as originally framed, lacks sufficient specificity.
The Board might reasonably determine,that the Commonwealth's contentions, as originally drafted, represent the perfect compromise between the Staff's and Applicants' opposing demands with respect to specificity.
CONTENTION IV The Commonwealth's fourth contention provides that "The Applicants' Emergency Plan does not satisfy the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b) or provide the information 10/
The Commonwealth attempted to obtain this information in its negotiations with the Staff during the course of the prehearing conference and, again, by telephone communication on Monday, July 19.
The Staff was unable to provide the requested
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information before mid-afternoon on July 20. I
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required by 10 C.F.R.,
(Part 50], Appendix E."E1!
At pages 18-24 of its Supplement, the Commonwealth t. hen details the particular provisions of the Commission's regulations which are not satisfied by the Applicants' Radiological Emergency Plan.
The Applicants, again, have not objected to this contention.
The Staff stated in its Response that, to the thecontentionaddressesoff-siteemergedcyplans,it is extent premature.~ Again, the contention does not address off-site emergency plans; it challenges certain aspects of the Applicants' emergency plan as set forth in an unnumbered volume of the FSAR entitled "Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan."
It may be that Applicants are awaiting development of off-site plans before preparing those aspects of their plan which involve some interface with off-site authorities.
However, many of the deficiencies in Applicants' Plan noted at pages 19-24 of the Supplement have no relationship to and require no consultation with off-site authorities.
Since discovery can now commence on these matters, the Commonwealth urges acceptance of its fourth contention at this time.
As in the case of the Commonwealth's third contention, the l
f Staff has taken a position in connection with Contention IV I
which is diame,trically opposed to that of the Applicants on the I
j 11/
The reference to "Part 50" was unintentionally omitted from the contention as drafted in the Supplement.
We would ask j
that it be deemed incorporated therein.
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question of the degree of specificity which should be required.
See Staff's Response, at 25.
The Staff's Response is again thoroughly uninstructive as to the nature of the additional specificity sought by the Staff.
Ibid.
The Commonwealth is submitting in Exhibit C hereto a revised draft of its fourth contention which incorporates therein the details set forth in the Supplement and again seeks, within the limits imposed by the deadline for submission of this document, to address the types of concerns noted by counsel for the Staff in tne July 20 telephone conversation referenced above.
Like Exhibit B, this Exhibit is provided for the Board's use in the event that it rejects the proposal outlined in Counsel's Exhibit A and accepts the Staff's position that this contention, as originally drafted, lacks necessary specificity.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS By:
@istant Attorney General NN SHOTWELL Ms Environmental Protection Division Public Protection ~ Bureau One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 Dated:
July 22, 1982 l
l 1 Q-
EXHIBIT A Contention II:
The Applicants have failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's for Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S50.33(g) and 550.47(c)(2).
Specifically, the Applicants have failed to consider the effect on EPZ boundaries of the following local factors:
a.
jurisdictional boundaries and the problems associated with planning to evacuate only portions of certain municipalities; b.
the difficulties associated with evacuating large, densely populated communities (such as the City of Haverhill) which lie outside the 10-mile boundary without pre-planning; c.
the difficulties associated with sheltering or
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evacuating persons at coastal beaches outside the l
l 10-mile boundary without pre-planning, given dense l
summer populations, inadequate sheltering facilities, l
and limited access routes; l
d.
the heightened sensitivity to radiation (over that of the healthy adult male) of the large numbers of l
children and pregnant women who frequent the coastal,
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beaches outside the 10-mile boundary in the summer months; the proximity of the Seabrook site to the Atlantic e.
Ocean and the groundwater and soil conditions on the site, with their resulting implications for travel of radionuclides through a liquid pathway in the event of a reactor meltdown accident; f.
local meteorological conditions; and g.
radionuclides which will be significant contributors to dominant exposure modes for prompt and latent effects in the event of a PWR-1 to PWR-7 accidental release as described in the NRC's Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), or its equivalent, at the Seabrook Station.
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EXHIBIT B l
Contention III:
There is no reasonable assurance, as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1) that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station.
This is true for the following reasons:
A.
Th'e FSAR and ER-OL contain insufficient evidence of the feasibility of evacuation as a protective action because no data is provided as to the numbers of early fatalities, early injuries, delayed fatalities, delayed injuries (including latent cancers), or genetic or developmental defects which will result in the event of any given accident scenario, even assuming that evacuation is accomplished within the times estimated in Appendix C to the Applicants' Radiological Emergency Plan.
Such data must be provided for PWR-1 to PWR-9 releases, or their equivalents [such as the "rebaselined" accident sequences set forth in NUREG-0715], and must properly reflect the following factors before there can be any assurance that the protective action of evacuation will adequately protect the public,,in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station:
1.
The medical treatment which will actually be available to the public in the event of an accident at i 1
Seabrook Station, as opposed to the general assumptions with respect to medical treatment used in connection with'the WASH-1400 consequence analysis and relied upon by the Applicants in Chapter 7 of the ER-OL.
2.
The dose effects which will actually be experienced by the public in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station during the summer months, given
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the heightened sensitivity to radiation (over that of the healthy adult male used as the reference point in the WASH-1400 consequence analysis and Chapter 7 of the ER-OL) of the large numbers of children and pregnant women who frequent the beaches in the vicinity of the Seabrook site.
3.
The degree of protection which will actually be afforded by the protective action of sheltering to persons outside the evacuation zone in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station, as opposed to the shielding factors assumed in the WASH-1400 consequence analysis and relied upon by the Applicants in Chapter 7 of the ER-OL.
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4.
The projected population distribution in the vicinity of the Seabrook site over the life of the plant, as opposed to the 1980 population figures relied upon by the Applicants in Chapter 7 of the ER-OL. (See ER-OL, Section 7.4.2).
i - _ _ _ _
5.
The peak weekend transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, as opposed to the weekday population relied upon by the Applicants in Chapter 7 of the ER-OL.
(See ER-OL, Section 7.4.2.2.2).
6.
The time which will actually be required to evacuate persons within the plume exposure pathway EPZ in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station, as 6pposed to the evacuation time estimates relied upon by the Applicants in Chapter 7 of the ER-OL. (See t
ER-OL, Section 7.4.2.5).
B.
The FSAR contains insufficient evidence of the feasibility of evacuation as a protective action because the evacuation time estimates contained in Appendix C to the Applicants' Radiological Emergency Plan have not been properly calculated so as to estimate accurately the time required to evacuate the population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ proposed by the Applicants in Section 4.3 and Figures 4.7 and 4.8 of the Applicants' Radiological Emergency Plan.
Specifical]y, those evacuation time estimates fail to:
1.
Account for the time required for protective actio,n decision-making, notification of off-site agencies and the public, preparation and mobilization, and confirmation of evacuation;
2.
Account for simultaneous evacuation of the peak summer population on the beach areas lying from NE to SSE of the site, or even for simultaneous evacuation of Hampton Beach and either of Seabrook Beach or Salisbury State Beach.
3.
Provide an estimate for evacuation of the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ, as required'by NUREG-0654, App. 4, at 4-4.
4.
Employ a reasonable estimate of the number of automobiles being evacuated; 5.
Account for evacuation of schools, hospitals and other institutions located within the EPZ; 6.
Account for the public transportation-dependent population; 7.
Include major employers in the estimates of summer transient automobile demand; 8.
Account for voluntary evacuation beyond the EPZ; 9.
Account properly for the population in the vicinity of the Seabrook site or for population growth over the life of the plant; 10.
Account properly for the effect on evacuation times,of adverse weather conditions; 11.
Account for other than home-based evacuation traffic; -
12.
Use realistic assumptions with respect to the information available to evacuees.when choosing evacuation routes; 13.
Use evacuation routes consistent with those actually planned by state and local officials; or 14.
Account for any of the following possibilities:
a.
vehicles breaking down or run ing out of fuel;
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b.
traffic accidents; c.
abandoned vehicles; d.
disregard of traffic control devices; and e.
evacuees using inbound traffic lanes for outbound travel.
C.
The FSAR contains insufficient evidence of the feasibility of evacuation as a protective action because the evacuation time estimates contained in Appendix C to the Applicants' Radiological Emergency Response Plan exceed the time period during which early fatalities and injuries will result from exposure to radionuclides in the event of an " atmospheric" Class 9 accident, according to NUREG-0396.
See NUREG-0396, Figures I-17 and I-18.
D.
The FSAR and ER-OL contain insufficient evidence of the feasibility of sheltering as a protective action because no data is provided as to the availability or adequacy of local she,ltering facilities or the numbers of early fatalities, early injuries, delayed fatalities, delayed l
injuries (including latent cancers), or genetic or developmental defects which will result in the event of any given accident scenario, given available shelters in the vicinity of the Seabrook site and the shielding factors associated therewith.
Such data must be provided for PWR-1 to PWR-9 accidental releases, or their equivalents [such as the "rebaselined" accident sequences set forth in NUREG-0715] and must properly reflect the factors set forth in A.1, A.2, A.4, and A.5 above before there can be any assurance that the protective action of sheltering will adequately protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
E.
The Applicants' Radiological Emergency Response Plan contains insufficient evidence that any protective action will be feasible in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station because the Plan does not demonstrate, as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV. E.3, that state and local officials have the capability to make prompt (15 minutes) protective action decisions.
F.
The NRC has not established any quantitative or qualitative standards by which this Board can assess the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by the protective actions of evacuation or sheltering in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station. _
EXHIBIT C Contention IV:
The Applicants' Emergency Plan does not satisfy the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b) or the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
A.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards'of 10 C.F.R. 550.47Tb)(1) in that no written agreements referring to the concept of operations developed among federal, state and local emergency response agencies and other support organizations have been provided, as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion A.3, and the Plan does not otherwise demonstrate that emergency responsibilities have been established and assigned.
B.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1) and (b)(2) in that Chapter 8 of the Plan ddes not demonstrate compliance with NUREG-0654, Table B-1,
" Minimum Staffing Requirements for NRC Licensees for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies," or otherwise demonstrate that Seabrook Station will have sufficient staff to respond' to an emergency on a continuous basis.
The Plan'further fails to satisfy these standards in that it provides no information regarding the staffing of other principal response organizations.
C.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(2) in that Section 8.2.1.1 does not define the circumstances under which the Near-Term Emergency Director will relieve the Shift Superintendent of the Emergency Director responsibilities or identify, as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion B.3, the specific conditions under
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which higher level utility officials will assume the Emergency Director position, or otherwise clearly designate the person who will have overall responsibility to direct the emergency response efforts at the facility at any point during the emergency.
The Plan further fails to satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(2) in that it contains no evidence that the persons who would be allowed to direct accident response at the facility (See Applicants' Radiological Emergency Plan, Table 3.1) have the necessary l
background and experience to do so effectively.
l D.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b)(2) in that it does not provide, as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion B.2, that the Emergency Director shall have the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally provide protective action recommendations to offsite authorities.
Nor does the Plan provide, as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion B.4, that this responsibility cannot be delegated, or otherwise provide an unambiguous definition of the responsibility of the Emergency Director to make protective action decisions.
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E.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(2) in that it does not contain letters of agreement with local support agencies as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion B.9, or otherwise specify the interface among onsite and local offsite response activities.
il F.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(3) in that it fails to provide the information regarding federal assistance required by NUREG-0654, Criteria C.1.a.,
- b. and c.,
or otherwise ensure that arrangements,have been made for requesting and effectively using federal assistance.
G.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(4) or the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV, B and C, in that it fails to specify emergency action levels.
H.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(5) or the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.D in that it fails to establish the means for providing early notification and clear instructiontothepopulacewithintheplumeexhosure pathway EP" and the contents of initial and followup messages to response organizations and the public.
The Plan does not satisfy 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item II.D in that it fails to describe the provisions for prompt l
(15 minutes) notification of the offsite authorities responsible for protective action decision-making.
I.
Chapters 9 and 10 of the Plan do not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(6) in that they fail to provide for primary and backup means of communication to the offsite authorities responsible for protective action decision-making and implementation on a 24-hour basis, as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion F.1., or otherwise to ensure that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations.
J.
Chapter 11 of the Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(7) in that it fails to provide the information required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.D.2, regarding public education.
K.
The Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(8) or the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.
E.,
because it does not demonstrate that the Station's permanent Emergency Response Facilities
(
will meet the criteria of NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria I
l for Emergency Response Facilities" (February, 1981) or provide the descriptions of emergency equipment nd supplies required by NUREG-0654, Criteria H.5, H.6, H.7, l
H.9, H.ll, and Appendix 2, or otherwise ensure that l
adequate provisions have been made for equipment to determine the magnitude of and for continuously assessing l
-4_
.o the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment or for an onsite technical support center and near-site emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control exercised during an emergency.
L.
Chapter 10 of the Plan does not satisfy //the standards of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(9) in that it does not provide a sufficient description of the proposed methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring accidents to demonstrate compliance with NUREG-0654, Criterion I.
and Appendix 2, or R.G.
1.97, Rev. 2, or otherwise to ensure that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition will be in use.
M.
Chapter 10 of the Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(10) in that it fails to provide guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency or the information required by NUREG-0654, Criterion J.10, or otherwise to ensure that a range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
N.
Appendix C of the Plan fails to satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV, in that it fails to provide accurate evacuation time estimates.
. ~.
O.
The Plan does not satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.H, in that it fails to describe the criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed.
P.
Chapter 12 of the Plan does not satisfy the standards of 10 C.F.2. 550.47(b)(14) in that it does not demonstrate compliance with NUREG-0654, Criterion I, or otherwise ensure that periodic exercises will be conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, that periodic drills will be conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and that deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills will be corrected.
Q.
The Plan does not statisy the standards of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(15) and (16) or the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.
F, in that it does not assure that all necessary emergency response training will be provided in advance of the onset of an emergency and because it does not provide for training of offsite officials responsible for protective action decisionmaking on protective actions to be recommended or for Ehdependent audits of the Applicants' emergency preparedness program.
R.
The Plan does not demonstrate, as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.E.3.,
that state and local officials have the capability to make prompt (15 minutes) protective action decisions.
W W
r CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief has been mailed this 22nd day of July, 1982, by first class mail, postage' prepaid, to:
- Helen Hoyt, Chairwoman
- Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety' eland Licensing Board Panel Board Pan U.S. NRC U.S. NRC Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
- Dr. Oscar H.
Paris-E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Attorney General Board Panel 208 State House Annex 0.S. NRC Concord, NH 03301 Washington, D.C.
20555 Rep. Nicholas J. Costello Lynn Chong ist Essex District Bill Corkum Whitehall Road Gary McCool Amesbury, MA 01913 Box 65 Plymouth, NH 03264 Tomlin P.
Kendrick 822 Lafayette Road
- Roy P.
Lessy, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 596 Office of the Executive Legal Hampton, NH 03842 Director, 10205 MNBB U.S. NRC William S. Jordan, II, Esquire Washington, D.C.
20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Harmon & Weiss Robert A. Backus, Esquire 1725 I Street, N.W.
116 Lowell Street Suite 506 P.O. Box 516 Washington, D.C.
20006 Manchester, NH 03105 Phillip Ahrens, Esquire Rep. Arnie Wight Assistant Attorney General State of New Hampshire State House, Station #6 House of Representatives Augusta, ME 04333 Concord, NH 03301 Donald L.
Herzberger, M.D.
Paul A. Frit:che, Esquire George Margolis, M.D.
Public Advocate Hitchcock Hospital State House, Station #12 Hanover, NH 03755 Augusta, ME 04333
- By Express Mail, 7/22/82
3
, = >. Wilfred L. Sanders, Esquire Edward J. McDermott, Esquire Sanders and McDermott Sanders and McCermott 408 Lafayette Road 408 Lafayette Road Hampton, NH 03842 Hampton, NH 03842
- Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esquire Senator Robert L. Preston Ropes and Gray State of New Hampshire 225 Franklin Street Senate Ch' ambers Boston, MA 02110
' Concord, NH 03301 Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel U.S. NRC U.S. NRC Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing and Service Sec.
Robert L. Chiesa, Esquire Office of the Secretary Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, U.S. NRC Dunn & Kohls Washington, D.C.
20555 95 Market Street Manchester, NH 03101' Ms. Patti Jacobson 3 Orange Street David A.
Repka, Esquire Newburyport, MA 01950 Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. NRC Cooperative Members for Washington, D.C.
20555 Responsible Investment Box 65 Beverly Hollingworth Plymouth, NH 03264 7 A Street Hampton Beach, NH 03842
- Robert G. Perlis Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. NRC Washington, D.C.
20555 h-8
.q O ANN SHOTWELL
~
~
Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 l
- By Hand, 7/23/82
.