ML20058D548
| ML20058D548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1982 |
| From: | Curran D, Jordan W HARMON & WEISS, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207270195 | |
| Download: ML20058D548 (33) | |
Text
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July 23, 1982 o
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING'u..L a BOARD
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In the Matter of
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.,
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50-444 OL
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(Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)
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NECNP SUPPLEMENTAL FILING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS During the Special Prehearing Conference of July 15-16, 1982, the Board directed NECNP to file any redrafted emergency planning contentions and any argument that it may have with respect to those contentions in the place of oral argument by Friday, July 23, 1982.
NECNP submits those contentions and arguments below.
As we indicated at the Special Prehearing Conference, we have redrafted each of the 16 subparts of our emergency planning l
contentions into proper contention form.
Where the Staff has objected, we have responded as we would do on oral argument.
The Applicants not having objected to any specific points, we do not respond to any Applicant arguments.
In redrafting, it became apparent that our previous subcontention 2 should be incorporated into subcontention 1.
This has been done, and all have been renumbered accordingly, 1-15.
8207270195 820723 3%D-,
PDR ADOCK 05000443 0
2 s
s Although we have put considerable effort into this redrafting and argument, we continue to believe that the all-encompassing proposal discussed at the conference is a far better approach.
It may take somewhat more time for the parties to deal with the discovery, but it will allow the discovery to proceed quickly, and it will not demand unnecessary consideration by the Board at this stage.
Since a new round of contentions will be posed once emergency planning documents become available, we see no point to wasting time on these matters now.
Our reworded and argued emergency planning contentions 1
follow:
III.
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS NECNP contends that the emergency plan submitted by the Applicants for Seabrook is seriously deficient in a number of respects and fails to provide all of the information required by Appendix E to Part 50.
In its present form, the plan is incapable of being implemented or providing any assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency, and therefore it cannot be accepted as fulfillment of licensing requirements under 10 CFR 50.47.
f Specifically, the Applicants' emergency plan is deficient in the following areas:
1.
The emergency plan does not contain an adequate emergency classification and action level scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50. 47 (b) (4) and NUREG-0654, in that
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(a)
No justification is given for the classification of various system failures as unusual events, alerts, site area emergencies, or general emergencies.
(b)
The classification scheme minimizes the potential significance of transients.
(c)
The Applicants' classification scheme fails to include consideration of specific plant circumstances, such as the anticipated time lag for evacuation due to local problems.
(d)
The classification scheme fails to provide a reasonable assurance that Seabrook onsite and offsite emergency response apparatus and personnel can be brought to an adequate state of readiness quickly enough to respond to an accident.
(e)
The emergency action level scheme fails to identify emergency action levels or classify them according to the required responses.
(f)
The scheme is incapable of being implemented effectively to protect the public health and safety because it provides no systematic means of identifying, monitoring, analyzing, and responding to the symptoms of transients and other indicators that transients may occur.
Basis:
NECNP has redrafted this contention to include its former related contentions, Nos. 1 (subparts (a) - (d) ) and 2 (subparts (e), (f)).
For greater clarity, the contention is presented in outline form.
i
4 The basis for subparts (a)-(d) is stated in NECNP's filing i
of April 21, 1982.
These subparts restate NECNP's former contention No. 1, to which the Staff did not object.
The basis for (e) and (f) are as-follows:
(e)
Although Appendix A to the Applicants' emergency plan describes categories of accident events, it does not identify the symptoms which would lead to the diagnosis of those events.
Emergency plan at A-1.
This viola'tes the requirement of Appendix E to Part 50 that the Applicants identify emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission and other Federal agencies and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety.
The emergency plan indicates that emergency action levels (EALs) "will be developed and provided as a supplement" to Appendix A.
Emergency plan at A-1.
The plan will remain incomplete and invalid until satisfactory EALs are submitted.
(f)
The emergency plan's concededly "brief" description of " assessment capability" does not show that each EAL can be identified, correctly analyzed, and responded to.
Emergency plan at 6-4.
The failure to do so violates the emergency planning criteria of NUREG-0654 iwhich require that The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class both in the in-plant emergency procedures and the plan itself.
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NUREG-0654 requires more than the general description of monitoring equipment offered in the Applicants' emergency plan.
The Applicant must show that its equipment and procedures can identify EALs, analyze their significance, and respond to them in order to establish each emergency class.
2.
The emergency plan does not demonstrate the Applicants' ability to respond to failures at both units of the Seabrook reactor, or,a failure at one unit which affects the other's capacity to-operate safely.
Events that-could cause a simultaneous emergency at both units include earthquakes, severe storms, loss of offsite power, or degraded grid voltage.
This constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (1),
(2), (3), (4), (6)
(8), (9), (10), (11), (13) and (15),
each of which would involve different actions for a simultaneous event than for an event at a single reactor.
Basis:
Accidents at Seabrook could be caused by a number of events which would be equally likely to affect both units as they would a single unit.
They include natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, and severe storms.
In addition, loss of offsite power or degraded grid voltage could affect the ability of onsite safety equipment to perform its functions.
The consideration of such events in the safety design of nuclear plants is required by GDCs 2 and 17 of Appendix A to Part 50.
The Applicants' emergency plan does not provide for the consequences of an accident at both units of the reactor.
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l It therefore violates the above-mentioned provisions of 10.CFR s
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f 50.47 in the following'~ respects:
l 50.47 (b) (1).
The emergency.' plan does not provide for or r
evendiscussthefebessarycoordinationofresponsesandidentifi-J cation of sufficient personnel and off-site organizational
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capacity to respond tc.am accident at both units.
i The embrgency p'gn identifies only one
- 50. 47 (b) (2).
l Shift Superintendent who' cis responsible for both units.
This constitutes inadequate personnel to deal with an accident at both plants, as the Shift Superintendent cannot carry out his or hea. responsibility for tre classification of accidents
,s atbothplantsatthesametime.lThecaergencyplan's discussion of the Emergency Response Organization does not indicate whether the various pers nnel fugetions are duplicated to provide independent response capability for each unit of the reactor.'
Duplicate response capability should-be clearly identified.
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- 50. 47 (b) (3).
Arrangement for the " effective" use of
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assistanct resources has not been made, because th~e coordination of responses necessary to deal with an accident at'both plants i
has not been provided for.
For instance, the technical capacity of assistance groups to respond to'an' accident,at more than one
-plant should be demonstrated.
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50.47 (b) (4).
The emergency classification scheme does not include any discussion of how even minor impairment of one plant would affect the emergency response if an event occurred at the other plant.
Presumably, a simultaneous occurrence of
7 events at both plants would raise the level of emergency response.
The classification scheme should deal with the range of events listed there as they might occur in any combination.
50.47(b)(6).
The emergency plan describes communication networks, but does not indicate how they would be used in the event of an occurrence at both plants.
For example, the emergency plan states that a direct telephone connenction from each control room to the state police is provided.
Emergency plan at 7-1.
However, the plan does not indicate how such communication would be coordinated between the units if an accident affected both of them.
The plan allows operators in each control room to make separate communications to off-site response organizations without knowing what outside communications the other control room personnel are making.
- 50. 47 (b) (7).
As long as an accident or other event is being handled from the Technical Support Center of each reactor, each unit will be disseminating information independently to the public.
In the event of an accident at both plants, inconsistent information or instructions could be provided by l
l each unit.
The emergency plan should provide for coordination of these functions.
50.47 (b) (8).
The emergency plan's description of emergency facilities and equipment, Section 6.0, does not indicate whether those facilities and equipment are designed to respond simultaneously to accident conditions at both plants.
In the absence of a clearly
8 indicated technical capability to respond to accidents at both units, the plan violates this regulation.
50.47 (b) (9).
The Applicants' emergency plan does not provide for radiological monitoring equipment with a sufficient range of measurement to identify the full amount of radiation which could be released by a core melt at both units of the Seabrook reactor.
5 0. 4 7 (b) (10).
The boundaries of the Emergency Planning Zone and ingestion exposure pathway have not been based on the possible consequences of an accident at both units of the Seabrook reactor.
A full-scale release of radioactivity from both Units 1 1
and 2 would greatly enlarge the radius of f atalities and early injuries beyond the 10-mile minimum radius suggested by the Commission for the EPZ and thereby affect the demographics and other local conditions to be considered in establishing the precise plume exposure EPZ boundaries.
It would also enlarge the scope of the ingestion exposure pathway.
Because these zones are designed to minimize risk to the public, their boundaries should reflect consideration of the total potential radiological risk which would result from a radiation release from both units of the plant.
5 0. 4 7 (b) (11).
The emergency plan does not indicate whether protection for emergency personnel will be adequate if there is an accident at both units of the reactor.
For instance, l
Sec. 10.4.4 describes radiation protection equipment without indicating whether each unit of the reactor is fully equipped, t
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or whetbar a pool of equipment sufficient to respond to only one e.ccident is previded.
The emergency plan should provide for cdequate protection equipment for all personnel at both units.
- 50. 4 7 (b) (13).
The section of the emergency plan entitled
" Recovery Organization" does not describe the makeup, function, or procedures of the recovery organization or how re-entry will be accomplished for one reactor, let alone for two.
Sec.
12.2.4.
The emergency plan should identify the members of the recovery organization, the function of each individual, and the procedures to be followed to accomplish re-entry and restoration to normal operation.
The emergency plan does not given the bs_es.
.n.:ication that the recovery organization has the adequate personnel to handle recovery of both units; nor that it has considered the problems inherent in restoring one disabled unit while the other remains contaminated or otherwise dangerous.
5 0. 47 (b) (IS).
The emergency plan does not provide for the training of an adequate number of personnel to respond to an accident at both Seabrook Units, nor does it provide training for the special responses necessary for an accident at both units.
As we discussed with regard to 50. 47 (b) (2), the plan does not provide for sufficient duplication of emergency response roles to deal adequately with an accident at both units.
With regard to training personnel to respond to an accident at both plants, the emergency plan is silent.
For example,
10 there is no indicatbn that plant personnel will be informed of proper procedures for coordinating their responses to both accidents.
3.
The emergency plan fails to conform to Part IV(F) of Appendix E to Part 50 in that it does not provide for the training of unit shift supervisors to enable them to deal with special problems involved in emergencies, including making choices among alternative responses under stress.
Basis:
The basis for this contention, which has been accepted by the NRC Staff, is stated in Contention 4 of NECNP's April 21, 1982, filing.
4.
The Applicants' emergency plan violates 10 CFR 50.47(c) (2) in that local conditions were not taken into account in establishing the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone.
As a result, the Applicants have failed to demonstrate that the plume EPZ is adequate to protect the public health and safety in light of local conditions, including, but not limited to meteorology, restricted access routes, evacuee directional bias, evacuation shadow, and the seasonal congestion of the area with summer tourists.
Basis:
This contention is based primarily on the requirement of 10 CFR 50. 47 (c) (2) that the plume exposure F.PZ be developed in light of local conditions to a radius of "about 10 miles."
We first address that requirement.
We then demonstrate that the Applicants have given no indication that they have considered 1
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11 local conditions in any way whatsoever and that in at least one instance the Applicants have ignored local conditions.
Finally, we provide factual bases for the specific allegations with respect to meteorology, restricted access routes, evacuee directional bias, evacuation shadow, and seasonal tourist congestion.
The governing regulation is 10 CFR 50.47(c) (2), which states, in pertinent part, that Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The regulation establishes a 10-mile radius only as a starting point for the development of more " exact" boundaries.
There is nothing in the regulation to support the Applicants' suggestion, if we recall it correctly from argument at the prehearing conference, that the perfect 10-mile radius stands unless there is a good reason to deviate from it.
On the contrary, common sense dictates that local conditions would result in at least some deviation from a perfect circle.*
- Just as the regulation itself refers to an area of "about 10 miles," so too do the Statement of Consideration issued when the regulation was published in the Federal Register, 45 F.R.
55402, and NUREG-0654: FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment," January 1980.
In fact, NUREG-0654 states that Although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site.
12 O
Based on the language of the regulation and its history, any plume exposure EPZ that is perfectly round should be viewed with extreme skepticism.
Presumably it could occur only in very few places in the middle of the country where local conditions are the same in all directions and jurisdictional boundaries were drawn as part of a circle that by coincidence is the same as the 10 mile radius.
Unless that situation exists, a perfect 10-mile circle plume exposure EPZ must be presumed to violate the regulation.
The Applicants' discussion of the plume exposure EPZ appears at Section 4.3 and Figure 4.7 of its Radiological Emergency Plan.
There is absolutely nothing in the discussion to indicate whether or how the Applicants took local conditions into account in any way.
The Applicants do provide various population and facility figures, but they fail to indicate how, if at all, the different characteristics of the areas surrounding the plant were considered in developing the plume exposure EPZ.
This is hardly surprising since the Applicants have given us, in Figure 4.7, a perfect circle for their plume exposure EPZ.
Indeed, Figure 4.7 itself constitutes clear proof that the Applicants failed to account for local conditions, in this case j urisdictional boundaries.
Following the circle from SSE at the lower right, the Town of Newbury lies almost entirely inside the EPZ, with its boundary almost on the circle in some places and deviating slightly to the SSW.
Any rational attempt to comply with the mandate to consider jurisdictional boundaries would have chosen the boundary of the Town of Newbury
13 as part of the boundary of the EPZ.
Continuing around the circle, the same is true of the Towns of West Newbury, Merrimack, Newton, Exeter, Stratham, Greenland, and Rye.
Following those boundaries would have resulted in only minor deviations from the perfect 10-mile circle and would have resulted in a boundary of "about 10 miles" in radius.
Those are the simple examples about which there can be no reasonable dispute.
We contend that on the basis of the jurisdictional boundary criterion alone the EPZ should also encompass at least the Towns of Portsmouth, Newfields, Brentwood, Kingston, and Haverhill.
At this point, however, the question is not which Towns should be included and which jurisdictional boundaries followed, but whether the Applicants have complied with the regulation at all.
They have not done so.
Once the Applicants have at least made the attempt to meet 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (2), it will be timely to file contentions arguing that the Applicants did not succeed.
It is a waste of time for the Board and the Parties at this point to require specific arguments from Intervenors on which boundaries should be followed when the Applicants may meet such arguments when they attempt threshold compliance.
The Staff argues that this contention constitutes a generic attack on the Commission's regulation.
The Staff is incorrect.
There is absolutely no basis for such an assertion.
The contention is written and argued directly in light of the regulation.
Indeed, it appears that the Applicants are the ones challenging
14 the regulation when they submit a perfect circle plume exposure EPZ that the regulation clearly does not intend.
For these reasons, the first sentence of this contention would by itself constitute a valid contention.
The violation exists today.
The Applicants' material in the Radiological Emergency Plan is inadequate.
Intervenors cannot be expected to develop more specific contentions until the Applicants have complied with the threshold requirements.
Nonetheless, NECNP provides bases for the five specific areas that we have identified in the second sentence of the contention in order to expedite matters once the Applicants have provided a plan that is not on its face in violation of the regulation:
1.
Meteorology.
At Section 2.3 of the FSAR, the Applicants have provided a limited amount of information concerning meteorological conditions.
For example, Figures 2.3 2.3-6 show the wind directions and speeds in the area of the plant.
It is clear from these figures that the winds do noc blow in a uniform manner such that the plume distribution would likely be the same on all sides of the plant.
If anything, it appears from Figure 2.3-6 that in the summer months, the plume would probably be blown in a NE to SE direction, toward the beaches that would be crowded with hundreds of thousands of people.
Although some beaches and populated areas to the northeast lie outside a 10-mile radius 1
15 from the plant, the Applicants have not adjusted their perfect circle at all to take this into account.
Nor have they done any analysis to justify their failure to adjust their perfect circle.
Similarly, the inland bounds of the EPZ do not reflect the FSAR's finding that "in spring and summer, a sea breeze is usually established along coastal New Hampshire, often penetrating inland well past the site."
FSAR at 2.3-1.*
Other weather conditions such as fog, heavy snows, severe storms and hurricanes should also affect the bounds of the EPZ because they retard evacuation.
Fog conditions occur "with fairly consistent frequency" during all months of the year in the Seabrook area.
FSAR at 2.3-10.
Yet the emergency plan gives no consideration to the effect of this potential i
evacuation hazard on the bounds of the EPZ.
The plant's location on the northern coast presents other unique hazards, such as heavy precipitation, including ice storms and snowfall, during six months of the year; frequent summer thunderstorms; and strong winds.
FSAR at 2.3 2.3-6.
The characteristics and effects of weather conditions in the Seabrook area should have at least some effect on the determination o the plume exposure EPZ under the regulation, but the Applicants appear to have ignored them.
- See, also our discussion at page 68 of our filing of April 21, 1982, particularly the reference to the California study which emphasizes the importance of wind patterns.
16 With the above examples, we have demonstrated how the plume exposure EPZ must be altered in some areas based on local conditions.
These are not all inclusive, and we are not required at this point to identify all areas in which meteorology would cause alterations in the EPZ.
Only after the Applicants have fulfilled their responsibilities in this regard does this burden of further specificity fall on the Intervenors.
i 2.
Access routes and directional biases of potential evacuees.
The access and escape routes in the area of Seabrook are severely limited.
Close to the plant 'chey consist almost entirely of two small, crowded, two-lane roads, Routes lA and 1B, which twist through small beach towns and marshes, relying upon small narrow bridges along the way.
People on the beaches must follow these roads for several miles north or south in order to reach roads that will take them west to Interstate 95 or U.S.
Route 1.
In the event of an accident, some of the east-west routes will probably also be undesirable because they will require passing by or near the plant.
This is particularly true in the towns of Hampton and Salisbury.
As a result, evacuees will be forced to depend upon Routes lA and 1B for even longer distances than is apparent from the roadmap.
This route configuration makes it extremely important that blockage be prevented even at considerable distance from the plant since blockage even at 10 or 20 miles distance could have a significant delaying effect.
This unusually restricted access and escape route configuration was undoubtedly not the basis for
17 the 10-mile radius adopted by the Commission as a starting point for developing the EPZ.
However, The Applicants have given no indication that the plume exposure EPZ should be altered in any way to take this into account.
In fact, there is no indication that they are even aware of the situation.
NECNP contends that access route considerations coupled with directional biases of potential evacuees as discussed at page 69 of our filing of April 21, 1982, require modification of the EPZ at least to the north and south along Routes lA and 1B.
Once again, however, it is not NECNP's burden to specify such changes until the initial required analysis is provided by the Applicants.
3.
Population characteristics.
The Staff suggests that population characteristics have "nothing to do with the size of the EPZ."
They have ignored the regulatory requirement to consider " demography."
The numbers of people in the area and their characteristics, including their locations and likely actions, will have a profound effect on the speed with which the area can be evacuated, and therefore on the risk to the public within the EPZ.
The bounds of the EPZ accordingly must reflect consideration of that relationship between population and risk.
The Applicants have estimated the peak transient population within the 10-mile radius at 116,988 within the 0-10 mile zone.
Between 0 and 5 miles from the plant, the Applicants estimate a peak transient population of 84,366.
Emergency plan, Table 4.1.
However, these figures appear to be unrealistically n
18 low.
According to a recent estimate by the Hampton Police Department, in llampton alone the beach population on a sunny summer day swells to about 100,000.
Ilampton is only one of a number of beach resorts within only five miles of the plant, including Salisbury Beach, Seabrook Beach, and North Beach.
The Applicants' transient population statistics for the 10-mile EPZ, therefore, appear to underestimate the acutal summer population.
In any event, the Applicants have failed to satisfy the Commission's requirement to take population characteristics into account in delineating the EPZ.
At a minimum these character-istics require extension of the boundaries to both the north and south.
4.
Evacuation shadow.
The concept of evacuation shadow was discussed at page 70 of our April 21, 1982, filing.
It involves the fact that when an evacuation is suggested or ordered people will leave the area surrounding the evacuation zone, thus clogging the roads, increasing logistical difficulties, and delaying the evacuation.
This would have a particularly detrimental effect at Seabrook due to the severely limited access routes.
NECNP contends that it requires expansion of the EPZ at least along Routes lA and 1B and all of the east-west routes that would be used to leave the coast.
The phenomenon of evacuation shadow is a condition similar to those referenced in the regulation and therefore must be addressed by the Applicants.
In addition, it is directly related to demography, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries, all of which are specifically included in the regulation.
19 S.
NECNP contends that the Seabrook radiological emergency plan does not provide adequate assurance that the public health and safety will be protected, that 10 CPR 50.47 has been complied with, or that the emergency response plan can be implemented effectively because it has not taken into account beyond design basis accidents in establishment of the EPZ or in the design, establishment, and evaluation of local emergency response capabilities.
Basis:
The factual basis for this contention is the fact that such beyond design basis accidents were considered in developing the emergency planning regulations, and particularly in developing the 10 and 50 mile starting points for developing EPZ boundaries.
See NUREG-0396, NUREG-0654.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that beyond design basis accidents should be anticipated in emergency planning.
In addition, there is nothing in the Applicants' radiological emergency plan to indicate that such accidents have been considered at all in developing the EPZ boundaries in light of local conditions or l
in developing local emergency response capabilities.
Once again, it is not NECNP's burden to specify how consideration of beyond design basis accidents would affect l
emergency planning.
That is the Applicants' responsibility in the first instance.
However, we can specify at this time that such an accident would severely hamper local emergency response capabilities in at least the following ways:
(1) they would render evacuation routes impassable due either to actual exposure or to public refusal to use the routes for fear of
20 exposure, (2) they would devastate local police forces and other official bodies responsible for assuring safe and complete evacuations because unknown numbers of responsible personnel would leave their posts and act to assure the safety of their own families first,* (3) immediate injuries and fatalities would overwhelm local medical capabilities and further delay evacuation.
The likelihood that a beyond design accident will occur and cause such devastating effects to hinder emergency evacuation now appears to be even greater than previously thought.
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has recently published a study identifying the actual occurrence of 169 precursors to core melt between 1969 and 1979, and estimating a probability
-3 of a core melt accident at between 1.7 and 4.5 x 10 per reactor year, which is two orders of magnitude greater than the predictions of the Reactor Safety Study, upon which the Applicants' risk predictions are based.
Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents:
1969-1979, a Status Report, NUREG/CR-2497 (June, 1982).
The Staff contends that this is a challenge to the regulatory delineation of an EPZ.
It is no such thing.
- Rather, it is an assertion that planning must proceed rationally in light of all of th relevant factors given the starting points established by the regulations.
This contention calls for appropriate alteration of EPZ boundaries, not rejection of
- This is based on a conversation with one such local official.
p 21 of the 10 and 50 mile initial estimates.
In addition, it calls for consideration of the effects of beyond design basis accidents on local emergency response conditions and capabilities so that preparation within the EPZs is complete.
There is no restriction on such a requirement.
Indeed, the requirement is contained in the 10 CFR 50.47 references to emergency action level schemes and actions to be taken to prepare for an emergency.
6.
The Applicants fail to comply with 10 CFR 50. 47 (b) (1),
(3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (12), (14), (15), and (16) in that the off-site emergency plans of state and local governments have not been provided, nor has it been demonstrated how the Applicants will coordinate with and assure necessary action by state and local governments in the event of an emergency, as required by those regulatory provisions.
Basis:
The basis is the fact that the state and local plans have not yet been developed or submitted, as all parties acknowledge.
For that reason the regulations have not yet been complied with.
The Staff argues that the contention is premature.
The argument is incorrect.
Under the facts as they stand today, the contention is valid and timely.
If the facts as alleged remain true, the Applicants may not be granted an operating license.
Accordingly, this contention is not legally premature.
The fact that it may be superseded as a practical matter when the plans are provided does not render it invalid today.
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22 There is no legal reason that this contention should be denied simply because there is a general expectation that U:
plans will be provided.
If they are provided, the contention is obsolete, and new contentions will be filed.
However, if the plans are unaccountably delayed and are never provided, the contention becomes extremely significant.
The Staff was correct to a certain extent in characterizing our seventh subcontention as premature.
Arguments that particulars of the plans of local arrangements are inadequate are premature when the plans have not been provided.
We have withdrawn those points.
7.
The Applicants' radiological emergency plan fails to assure protection of the public health and safety or to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) because the Applicants have failed to demonstrate that all possible accident sequences can be monitored in order to take the necessary steps in responding to an emergency.
In particular, there is no indication that process monitors comply with GDC 13, 19, or 64, or that they are environmentally qualified as required by GDC 4.
Basis:
The basis for this contention is primarily the fact that the success of any emergency plan depends upon the i
ability to detect the potential accident and take necessary action before a radiation release occurs.
This is particularly i
important to the implementation of the emergency action level and classification scheme required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4), and more generally to the initiation of emergency response under all provisions of 10 CFR 50.47.
For the same reason, any equipment needed to monitor potential accidents and provide i
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23 essential information is "important to safety" in the context of emergency planning and must be environmentally qualified to assure that it serves its function.
The process monitors at Seabrook monitor such parameters as pressure, temperature, flow level, and equipment operating status.
Emergency plan at 6.2.1.
According to the Applicants, they are "the essential monitoring systems needed to allow recognition of abnormal events" and "will be used in the techniques developed for accident classification."
Emergency plan at 6.2.
The emergency plan says no more about the conformance of these monitors to NRC standards than that they " address" the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97.
Emergency plan at 6.2.1.
The fact that the Applicants cannot say the process monitors " meet" Reg. Guide 1.97 establishes a prima facie case that the Applicants have not satisfied GDCs 13, 19, or 64, which are implemented by the Reg. Guide.
The NRC Staff responded to our former contention on this subject that it was covered by our contention I.K., " Instrumentation for Monitoring Accidents," which has been withdrawn pending Applicants' submission of a Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) plan.
If the process monitors and the PAM are actually the same systems, this cannot be ascertained from the FSAR.
The emergency plan discusses process monitors as if they already exist, and is therefore inconsistent with the FSAR's statement at page 1.8-36 that "PSNH is in the process of selecting the Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation.
In any case, because the Applicants' emergency plan makes assertions regarding
24 the qualifications of the equipment, NECNP's contention challenging their adequacy is valid and ripe for litigation.
8.
The Applicants' radiological emergency plan does not comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (9) in that it does not provide for permanent radiological monitoring equipment at locations surrounding the plant with an automatic information relay to a computer in the plant which can plot radiation levels and estimate the location and intensity of the plume.
The monitoring equipment must be provided with independent backup power to meet the single failure criterion, and it must be designed and constructed to withstand all severe adverse weather conditions while operating effectively.
Basis:
The regulatory basis for this contention is 10 CFR 50. 47 (b) (9), which requires " adequate" methods and equipment for monitoring off-site consequences of a radiological emergency.
The Applicants' emergency plan identifies the existence of an "off-site radiological environmental surveillance program" at page 6-7, but gives little more detail on this critical topic.
The plan refers to the Technical Specifications, which merely indicate that a number of dosimeters will be placed around the plant to monitor airborne and direct radiation, and the frequency at which samples will be taken, but not how they will be taken.
Tech. specs, at 3/4 12-3.
The emergency plan also indicates that the Applicants will rely on the " Nuclear Services Division Mobile Environmental Laboratory" and the " Yankee Environmental Lab in Westboro, Massachusetts",
l
25 for " emergency environmental sample and personnel dosimetry analyses."
Emergency plan at 6-7.
These laboratories will provide a 4-wheel drive vehicle which will be outfitted with monitoring equipment.
The Applicants' vague description of a monitoring program which appears to rely on the use of personnel for field monitoring during an accident contains the seeds of the very same failures which plagued the radiation monitoring program during the Three Mile Island accident.
As discussed in NUREG-0600, the assessment of radiological conditions surrounding Three Mile Island was " inadequate", in large part because of human error and confusion as to the actual procedures to be followed.
Monitoring personnel were uncertain as to when and where they should go; they improperly discarded monitoring records after phoning in results; they failed to record the type of instruments used to take surveys, the orientation of the instruments to the radiation source, the duration of the measurements, or the names of the individuals recording the surveys.
These errors resulted in the misreporting of radiation levels to state officials and difficulty in finally determining what the actual radiation levels were.
See NUREG-0600 at II-3-71 -- -79,
-97.
Aside from the problems experienced at Three Mile Island, any number of adverse weather conditions, not to mention high levels of radiation, could hinder plant personnel from taking field samples.
In addition, the above-documented level of human error makes calibration of monitoring results by computer a necessity.
26 Because monitoring equipment is important to safety, it must meet the single failure criterion and must be able to perform its safety function without being hindered by adverse conditions.
This is required both by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9) and GDC 4.
9.
The Applicant must submit and justify a dose assessment model.
App. E to Part 50.
This model must not be limited to a straight diffusion model, but must take into account the behavior of heated releases and other " source characteristics."
NUREG-0654, App. 2 at 2-3.
In compliance with 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (9),
the computer used for making dose assessments should have an independent backup power source to assure that it will continue to operate if normal power fails.
Basis:
We have not reworded the first two sentences of this contention.
The Staff did not object to the first two sentences as a contention, so they presumably are acceptable.
The Staff objected to the third sentence as without basis.
Accordingly, we have reworded it to reflect the regulatory requirement that " adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential off-site consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use."
In order to satisfy this requirements, the computer used to analyze radiation levels and make dose assessments should be hooked up to a backup power source.
Otherwise, in the event of a power failure, the Applicants will be forced to perform tedious and unreliable manual calculations, which will be all the more undependable if made under the stress conditions of an accident.
n 27 10.
The emergency plan does not provide for early notification and clear instructions to the local populace, as required by 10 CPR 50.47 (b) (5).
Detailed criteria for providing notification to the public, set forth in NUREG-0654, App. 3, must be met before the Applicants may be licensed.
The Applicants must demonstrate the existence of a means by which all people within the EPZ will be able to hear a warning of a radiological emergency, and they must be trained to understand the warning.
Special provision must be made for educating the thousands of transients who move through the area in the summer months.
In particular, they should be apprised in advance of what their initial actions should be in an emergency, including the location of shelters, evacuation routes, and congregation areas.
Basis:
The first two sentences, to which the Staff has not objected, have not been reworded.
The third sentence has been reworded slightly to require a demonstration by the Applicants to conform more closely to 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5).
The fourth sentence has been reworded to drop an unnecessary i
redundant reference to the Seabrook area, and the last sentence has been reworded to include the language "of what their initial l
actions should be, including."
The Staff argues that all but the first sentence lacks basis.
The third sentence is based on 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (5), which requires early notification and clear inctruction.
Notification i
that cannot be heard is no notification at all, and any warning signal such as a siren or horn that does not by itself provide l
28 detailed information also does not provide clear instruction.
Such instruction would have to derive from prior information or training provided to the population.
The Applicants have provided none of these to this point.
The fourth and fifth sentences are based on 10 CPR 50.47 (b) (7),
which requires that information be made available to the public periodically concerning initial actions in the event of an emergency.
At Seabrook, the large transient population in the summer must be considered to be part of the "public" to which such information must be provided, and in the case of the thousands of people on the beaches, departure by way of the evacuation routes or locating shelters so they can stay indoors will be among the initial actions required in the event of an emergency.
Accordingly, this contention is fully supported by the regulations.
11.
The Applicants have failed to demonstrate the existence of offsite emergency plans with adequate provision for the sheltering of the large numbers of people who may be on the beaches during a radiological emergency in the summer, and who will not be close to their own homes, hotels, or public buildings.
Basis:
The basis for this contention is the lack of any plans with such provisions, in violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10).
The Staff objects that the contention is premature.
As reworded, the I
contention is similar to contention III.6, supra, in that it is a valid contention today.
If no such plans are provided, the license may not be granted.
If plans are eventually provided, the contention will be revised or a new one will be raised based on the new i
iformation, but this contention is valid as of now.
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29 12.
The evacuation time estimates provided by the Applicants in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan are inaccurate in that they provide unreasonably optimistic estimates of the time required for evacuation.
In addition, the estimates provided in the radiological emergency plan are useless to emergency planning because they fail to include bounds of error, to indicate the basis for codes or assumptions used for the time estimates, to indicate whether the model used is static or dynamic, to provide a sensitivity analysis of the estimates, or to reveal the underlying assumptions.
Basis:
This contention has been substantially reworded to proper form.
The basis for the contention is the common knowledge of the difficulties of leaving the beach area on a crowded weekend and an estimate given to NECNP in conversation with the Hampton Police Department that it would take at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to evacuate the Town of Hampton alone on a busy summer weekend.
According to the Hampton Police Department, during a hurricane several summers ago, evacuation of only 7,300 people from Hampton beach on a weekday night to nearby schools and churches took 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The Applicants' estimate is a maximum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes for the evacuation of the entire EPZ.
See Table 4, Appendix C to the Radiological Emergency Plan.
The Staff argues that this contention is premature, but gives no reason for its position.
As drafted, the contention does not address the state and local plans that have not yet been provided, but Applicants' estimates on which future planning l
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30 and ultimate conclusions of adequacy would be based.
As a result, the contention is not premature, although it may be supplemented if use is made of these incorrect estimates in later planning and related documents.
13.
The preliminary evacuation time estimates submitted by the Applicants assume favorable weather conditions and thus fail to account for the worst case situation of adverse weather conditions developing on a busy summer weekend afternoon.
Nor do they take into account evacuee directional bias, evacuation shadow, or reasonably expected vehicle mix.
As a result, the estimates are unduly optimistic and useless to future planning.
Basis:
The Staff asserts that there is no basis for this contention. They are incorrect.
There is no question that severe summer storms and fog arise on hot summer days, yet the Applicants did not consider these situations.
Rather, they chose to analyze a fairly busy summer weekend.
With respect to the second sentence of the contention, we have provided sufficient basis i
l under Contention III.4.
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31 14.
The Applicants have not demonstrated that their radiological emergency plan, coupled with those of state and local governments, will protect the public from unacceptable radiation doses in that (1) the Applicants' estimate for evacuation of Hampton and Salisbury would allow extensive radiation exposure, and (2) even if shelters were provided on the beaches, they would not protect against excessive inhalation of radionuclides.
Basis:
NECNP restates the basis for its former contention 15, i.e., that The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has calculated that under conditions postulated by the NRC/ EPA Task Force Report (which has been endorsed by the Commission), a radioactive plume travelling at a speed of 10 mph over the two miles between the beach and the plant could reach Hampton Beach within 15 minutes of a release.
Furthermore, a plume travelling to Salisbury Beach at the same speed could reach the beach in about 30 minutes.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Memorandum in Support of SAPL's Request for an Order to Show Cause (May 2, 1979),
at 11, citing NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, NUREG-0396 at 20, App.
I.
Since the Applicants' evacuation time estimate for Hampton Beach is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes, and for Salisbury Beach is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 50 minutes, people in those locations could be exposed to extremely high levels of radiation before they could be evacuated.
Furthermore, an NRC-sponsored study has cast grave doubt on the ability of shelters to provide adequate protection from
32 radiation.
See NUREG/CR-1311, " Examination of Off-site Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving Core Melt," Sandia Laboratories, June, 1978.
(" Sheltering by itself, t
1 unless the quantity of radionuclides inhaled can be substantially reduced, will also not provide much protection.")
Id. at 92.
- 15. The Applicants have failed to comply with the requirement of 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (9) to be prepared to monitor " actual or potenital off-site consequences of a radiological emergency condition" in that they have not developed baseline data on local health conditions so that it will be possible to determine the immediate and long-term health effects of radiation exposure.
Basis:
We provided substantial factual basis for this contention in the reference to an American Journal of Public IIcalth Article in our filing of April 21, 1982, contention III.16.
The regulatory basis is 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9).
Specificity is also provided by the article and discussed in our contention.
The point is that it is not possible to monitor the effects of an event unless one knows what the status quo was before the event
~
occurred.
In the particular case of radiation effects, which include diseases already occurring in the populace, the impacts of radiation on health simply cannot be measured unless post-release statistics can be compared to pre-release statistics.
Respectfully submitted, DM W
(
William S. Jordan, III 1
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s.L 0-E Diane Curran Date:
July 23, 1982 IIARMON & WEISS 1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
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