ML20058D526
| ML20058D526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109186 |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1990 |
| From: | Lee H NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Osgood N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9011060147 | |
| Download: ML20058D526 (1) | |
Text
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i t
OCT 3 01990 SGTB:HWL 71-9186 I
t MEMORANDUM FOR:
Nancy Osgood, SGTB, NMSS Distribution:
inn. F(5 g NMSS r/f 1
FROM:
Henry W. Lee, SGTB, NMSS SGTB r/l CJWithee
SUBJECT:
/AENDMENT FOR C. OF C. NO. 9186 i
By the letter dated September 5,1990, Naval Reactors requested that Certificate of Compliance No. 9186 for the S-6213 PUSC be amended to include the 56W shipboard power unit as authorized contents.
l The S6W shipboard power unit is very similar to the S6W 3rototype power unit, which is presently an authorized content of the S-6213 slipping container.
1 The nominal total weight of the shipboard package is slightly less than theweightoftheprototypepackage(approx.1%less).
Because of the close similarity between the two packages, many of the prototype package analyses are applicable to the shipboard package and they are not repeated in the application. The application, however, provided additional analyses to address the structural difference between the two packages which includes the smaller diameter closure head and core barrel for the shipboard power unit.
Based on the analyses, the only significant damage to the container results from the 30 foot side drop accident. Some localized yielding occurs but the i
power unit remains intact and that the fuel configuration remains unchanged. During the thirty foot side drop, the inert atmosphere within the S-6213 container could be lost due to the localized main flange deformation.
But loss of seal of the container would have no effects on the safety of the shipment. The criticality evaluation was based on no container (e.g. complete immersion) and fully flooded and reflected conditions, assuming optimum hydrogenous moderation, and with the control rods withdrawing a larger distance than maximum possible control rod withdrawal resulting from the 30-ft side drop analysis.
Damage to the package due to the puncture accident was limited te slight f
deformation of the core barrel and no contact with the fuel modules was expected.
Penetration of the core barrel nozzles by the puncture' pin was prohibited by the protective plates welded to the container at the locations of the nozzles.
The prototype power unit components were evaluated for brittle fracture due to the worst case stresses occurring in any thirty foot drop.- The same acceptable design niargins also exist against the possibility of brittle fracture for the shipboard power unit.
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l Approval of the amendment request is recommended
~ odginal signed by l
Henry W. Lee
~y Transportation Branch SGTR/NMSS 903'060147 901030 M
ADOCK 071 6'
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