ML20057F315
| ML20057F315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1993 |
| From: | Matthews D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057F316 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310150125 | |
| Download: ML20057F315 (9) | |
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E UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b
WASHINGTON, D C. 2055!KX)01 g*v j GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA t
DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 189 License No. DPR-57 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 28, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission, C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; l
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
9310150125 931006 PDR ADOCK 05000321 p
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Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical. Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license j
amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 t
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Technical Specifications f
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.189, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than 60 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
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vd a t'th Project Directorate 11-3 J
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes j
f Date of Issuance:
October 6,1993 1
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 128 License No. NPF-5 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by the Georgia Pwer Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 28, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I-B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the i
Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.
Tiv csuance of this amendmsnt will not be inimical to the common er u t, and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
Tra iance of this nendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of
- ommission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been s&tisfied.
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Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the i
Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amendad to read as follows:
i Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.128, are hereby incorporated in the j
license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than 60 days from the date of issuance.
1 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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ll},. O y(Da.:.9.Matthews, Director
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Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: October 6, 1993 L
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.
189 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 i
DOCKET NO. 50-321 AND j
TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 128 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Paaes Insert Paael Unit 1 3.7-8 3.7-8 3.7-31 3.7-31 Unit 2 3/4 6-33 3/4 6-33 B 3/4 6-5 B 3/4 6-5 4
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P LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPEP.ATION SURVEllLANCL f QilPEM NIS 3.7.A.4.
Pressure Sucoression ChaNer to Drywell 4.7.A.4 Pressure SueDression Chamber to Vacum Breakers Qeywell Vacuum B*eakers a.
When primary containnent is reouired, a.
The pressure suppression all pressure suppression cnauer to chamber drywell vacuum drywell vacum breakers shall be breakers shall be visually operable and positioned in the fully inspected each refueling closed position
- except that up l
outage and checked for to three vacum breakers may be operability monthly.
inoperable for opening provided that they are known to be in the closed position.
b.
If either of the closed position b.
Closed position is indicated indicating lights for a pressure by redundant lights in the suppression charber to drywell vacum main control room which are breaker is inoperable, continued operated by two separate reactor operation is pemissible closed position switches and only if: (1) the operability of circuits for each vacuum the redundant closed position breaker. If either indicating circuit is verified, redundant position indicating and (2) a leakage test of the light is inoperable or shows pressure suppression chamber to that the vacuum breaker is drywell vacuum breaker system is stuck open, the affected satisfactorily perfomed within 24 vacuum breaker shall be
- hours, exercised within two hours to-demonstrate cperability of If either of these requirements the remaining position cannot be met, the reatter must indicating circuit, and every be in the cold shutdown condition 15 days thereafter until within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
the redundant circuit is repaired.
l c.
The differential pressure dich actuates c.
Each pressure suppression the pressure suppt2ssion chanber to dry-chamber to drywell vacuum t
well vacum brtakers shall be 0.5 psid breaker shall be tested or less.
for proper opening differen-tial pressure each refueling d.
The total leakage between tie drywell outage.
and pressure supprtssion chanber shall be less than the equivalent leakage d.
A leak test of the pressure throtgh a one-inch diamter orifice suppression chamber to at a differential pressure of one psi.
drywell vacuum breaker system shall be conducted at the end of each refueling outage and every 15 days when reactor operation is continued under the require-ments of 3.7.A.4.b.
F
+0ne or more vacuum breakers may be open during surveillarites or when perfeming their intended function.
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HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-8 Amendment No.189 (Unit 1) i i
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EASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPE;ATION 3.7.A.4.
Pressure Sureression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Ereakers The purpose of the pressure suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers is to epualize pressure in order to maintain structural integrity of the containment. Dif ferential pressure between the suppression chamber and the drywell can be due to depressurization of the drywell caused by events such as cooling cycles, inadvertent drywell spray actuation, and steam condensation from sprays or subcooled water reflood of a break in the event of a primary system rupture. Operations which add gas to the suppression chamber and/or remove gas from the drywell can also increase the differential pressure. For example, such operations may include inerting or deinerting of the primary containment.
The twelve pressure suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during post-accident drywell cooling operations. They are sized on the basis of the Bodega Bay pressure suppression system t w i. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill, Suosection B, allows a 2 psig vacuum for the drywell. With three vacuum relief valves secured in the closed position and nine operable valves, containment integrity is not impaired.
The Bodega Bay pressure suppression tests provided the most limiting requirements for sizing these vacuum breakers; a minimum vacuum breaker flow area equal to 1/16 the downtomer vent area was established by the test to minimize the water oscillations in the downtomer. The downcomer vent area for Hatch is approximately 214 ft' which results in a minimum total vacuum breaker area of 13.4 ft' and translates into nine 18-inch vacuum breakers.
The 12 vacuum breakers actually provide more than the minimum re-quired area even considering the single failure of one vacuua breaker. Suppression chamber to drywell differential pressure resulting from vacuum breaker sizing of 1/16 the downcomer vent area is well below the design requi mnt of approximately 2 psid.
Reference Section 5.2.3.6.1 of the FSAR.
The position indication system for the Hatch pressure suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers consists of three position switches, two of which are highly sensitive closed position indicating switches which are physically separated from each other. Due to the
" snap" action of the magnetic latch provided, the "not closed" position would be indicated immediately upon opening. The closed position switches will indicate the valve to be open when the pallet is approximately.015 to.035 inches away from the seat at the location of the switches; the pallet would be at an angle of approximately 3 to 7 minutes open, respectively, at that time.
Reference Section 5.2.3.6.1 of the FSAR.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-31 Amendment No.189 (Unit 1)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 YACUUM F7Uff SUPPRESSION CHAMBER - DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 All suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE and closed
- with:
I a.
A total leakage between the suppression chamber and the drywell or less than the equivalent leakage through a 1 inch diameter orifice at a differential pressure of 1 psi, b.
The redundant position indicators OPERABLE, and c.
An opening set point of f 0.5 psid.
APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With up to two suppression chamber - drywell vacuum brerkers inoperable for opening but known to be closed, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue provided Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1.a is performed on the OPERABLE vacuum breakers within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 15 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ano in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
With three suppression chamber - drywell vactum breakers insperable for opening but known to be closed, operation may continue provided Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1.a is performe:! on the OPERABLE vacuum breakers within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 15 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
With four suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers inoperable for opening but known to be closed, restore at least one inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- 0ne or more vacuum breakers may be open during surveillances or when performing their intended function.
HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-33 Amendment No. 128 (Unit 2)
1, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell and between the reactor building and suppression chamber. This system will maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.
Differential pressure between the suppression chamber and the drywell can be due to depressurization of the drywell caused by events such as cooling cycles, inadvertent drywell spray actuation, and steam condensation fro:a sprays or subcooled water reflood of a break in the event of a primary system rupture. Operations which add gas to the suppression chamber and gas from the drywell can also increase the differential pressure./or remove For example, such operations may include functional testing of the primary containment hydrogen recombiners and inerting/deinerting of the primary containment.
The vacuum breakers between the suppression chamber and the drywell must not be inoperable in the open position since this would allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are an adequate number of valves to provide some redundance so that operation may continue with no more than three vacuum breakers inoperable in the closed position.
Each set of vacuum breakers between the reactor building and the suppression chamber provides 100% relief, so operation may continue with one valve out-of-service for 7 days.
3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. When the reactor is shutdown or during refueling the drywell may be open and the reactor building then becomes the primary containment.
Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches and dampers, is adequate to ensure tnat there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. Only one closed j
damper in each penetration line is required to maintain the integrity of the secondary containment.
3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the containment iodine filter trains ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removali capacity are consis-tent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.
HATCH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-5 Amendment No. 08 (Unit 2)