ML20057B368
| ML20057B368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1993 |
| From: | Fenech R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309210252 | |
| Download: ML20057B368 (5) | |
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A Tennessee Vauey AuPony Post Oft ce Box ?orn saaceD+sy. Tennessee 37379-2000 1
l Robert A. Fenech i
v ce P<es: cent. Sewoyan facear Piant j
September 13, 1993 l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 l
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Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-328 i
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327, 328/93 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV) 50-327, 328/93-34-07 Enclosed is TVA's response to Douglas M. Collins' letter to Mark 0. Medford dated August 12, 1993, which transmitted the subject j
NOV. The violation is associated with 80 individuals who were granted unescorted access without an FBI fingerprint check being conducted and i
TVA's failure to refingerprint 12 individuals whose fingerprints were deemed nonclassifiable by the FBI. of this submittal contains all commitments associated with the violation.
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone I
Percy Hammons at (615) 751-2736.
Sincerely, hh W W
Robert A. Fenech r
i Enclosures cc: See page 2
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Page 2 September 13, 1993 cc (Enclosures):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 i
Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 1
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r ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/93-34 AND 50-328/93-34 DOUGLAS M. COLLINS' LETTER TO MARK 0. MEDFORD DATED AUGUST 12, 1993 Violation 50-327. 328/93-05-07 "10 CFR 73.57(b)(7), states, 'The licensee shall review the information received f rom the Attorney General and consider it in making a determination for granting unescorted access to the individual or access to Safeguards Information.'
"10 CFR 73.57(b)(8), states in part,
'A licensee shall use the information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an individual's suitability for unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.'
"10 CFR 73.57(d)(1), states in part, ' Procedures for processing of fingerprint checks for the purpose of complying with this section, licensees shall submit one completed, legible standard fingerprint card...'
" Contrary to the above, the licensee granted 80 individuals unescorted access without a FBI fingerprint check being conducted. Additionally, the licensee failed to re-fingerprint 12 individuals' after their fingerprints were deemed non-classifiable by the FBI on two occasions.
"This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement III)."
Reason for the Violation The example regarding the failure to conduct FBI fingerprint checks occurred because of an inadequate procedure. The utilization of obsolete forms resulted in the fingerprint cards being submitted to the Office of i
Personnel Management, which requested a check of the FBI files by subject's name and not by fingerprint classification. When TVA learned that fingerprint checks had not been performed, the security file was evaluated; and, based on having performed an FBI record check by name, a local criminal history check, a National Crime Information Center check -
and a special check of the Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Index, the determination was made that the intent of 10 CFR 73.57(d)(1) had been met.
The example regarding the f ailure to reprint 12 individuals was caused by a misunderstanding of NRC guidance, which resulted in an inadequate procedure. They were granted clearances following two attempts to obtain classifiable fingerprints. This was done based on an incorrect interpretation of an NRC guidance provided at the 1991 NUMARC Workshop on Access Authorization.
In addition, the TVA procedure and practices permitted closure after two attempts.
Carnetive Steps _Ihat_Bave Been Taken_and_Braulta_Anhieved With respect to the first example, immediately upon identification of the problem by TVA, corrective actions were taken to destroy all obsolete forms that had been incorrectly coded to ensure that all fingerprint cards already in the process received an FBI fingerprint classification check and to evaluate the case file of the 80 individuals that had not received a criminal history check based on fingerprint classification.
Of the 80 individuals in question, 77 were reprinted. The remaining 3 persons are no longer employed by Nuclear Power. The results have been received on 65 of the 77 reprinted, with no new information received as a result of this corrective action.
TVA is awaiting receipt of the remaining 12 fingerprint classification checks from the FBI.
Appropriate TVA procedures have been changed to specifically require that fingerprint card (s) shall be submitted for an FBI identification records check (fingerprint classification) and not for a name search only.
With respect to the second example, 8 of the 12 individuals have been reprinted. Of the remaining four, three are no longer employed by TVA and one is on extended leave. The individual on extended leave does not have a protected area badge.
Procedures have also been changed to state that an FBI criminal history record check may not be considered closed based on unclassifiable fingerprints unless three or more attempts have been made to obtain classifiable prints with the last attempt being conducted by a i
higher-qualified fingerprint specialist.
The case closure is approved by i
the Manager, Personnel Security. Performance on the third attempt will be tracked quarterly and the results will be reported to the Manager, Personnel Security.
This change is consistent with guidance provided at the 1991 NUMARC Workshop on Access Authorization.
All badges will be pulled for individuals whose fingerprint classification checks have not been received from the FBI.
Corrective Steos That Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations 1
No additional corrective actions beyond those described above are required to prevent recurrence.
Dain_Rhen Full Compliance Will be Achieved Full compliance will be achieved by October 30, 1993.
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ENCLOSURE 2 Conunitmeni 1.
All badges will be pulled for individuals whose' fingerprint l
classification checks have not been received from the FBI by t
October 30, 1993.
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