ML20057B167

NRC Nuclear Safety Cooperation W/Former Soviet Union & Central/Eastern Europe:Record of Accomplishments

ML20057B167
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Issue date:	08/31/1993
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i NRC'S NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND CENTRAL / EASTERN EUROPE:

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS F

Office of International Programs U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission -

August 1993 1

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SUMMARY

Juring the past seven years extensive efforts have been devotec.by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to nuclear safety cocoeration with, anc assistance to, countries with Soviet-designed reactors in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central / Eastern Europe (CEE) and there nave been a numcer of significant accomplishments.

These efforts have ceen in three chases:

1) the early post-Chernobyl phase (1986-1988),

2) development of coocerative activities unacr che Joint Coordinating Committee en Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, or JCCCNRS (1988-present), and 3) technical assistance uncer the Lisbon Initiative on Nuclear Safety from May 1992 until the present.'

COOPERATION WITH, AND ASSISTANCE T0, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Preliminary interchange directed at understanding Soviet nuclear reactor design and operation characterized the first phase, in which the U.S. and other countries tried to cetermine the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident of April 26, 1986.

The Soviets were naturally somewhat reticent as hundreds of foreigners sought access to what had been their highly secret nuclear establishment.

The major accomolishment of this stage was to gain the Soviets' trust and to show them that the West had much to provide about nuclear safety, and perhaps also had something to learn.

The second, more substantive phase began with the signing of a U.S.-USSR Memorandum of Cooperation on Nuclear Safety, on the second anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, April 26, 1988.

Interactions took the form of ten (later to grow to twelve) working groups on technical aspects of civilian nuclear power reactor safety.

These exchanges were of value to the NRC and to the nuclear establishment of the former Soviet Union, both regulators and nuclear power planners.

Some of the benefits of these exchanges are:

Information Exchange:

Through 1992, about 50 technical meetings in the FSU and the U.S. led to a deeper understanding by the FSU of the technical, legal and organizational approaches to safety employed in the West and had a positive influence on Russian and Ukrainian safety culture, making them better able to help themselves improve safety.

Inspector Exchanges: An unprecedented series of exchanges of inspection personnel for extended periods at nuclear facilities has benefitted regulatory authorities in the USSR, broadened U.S. understanding of the Soviet regulatory infrastructure, and led to efforts to change some Soviet policies and practices.

'This paper discusses NRC cooperation and assistance in the area of civilian nuclear reacter safety.

Other areas of NRC cooperation, such as safeguarding nuclear materials against theft or misuse and anysical protection of nuclear f acilities anc materials, are not included, nor are cooperative nuclear activities of other U.S. agencies.

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2 Severe accident researcn.

The Russian Kurenatov Inst::.:e.

y working witn NRC using Russian facilities wnose tecnnical.equ:.a ents are not available in the U.S., is contributing to the NRC miss::n. As a significant milestone in this work, Kurchatov's safety -ssearch director scent several months at NRC in 1990 to learn how safe j esearch is done

n tne U.S. so this knowledge could be applied in Russ:a.

!n addition 4 the NRC provided to Kurchatov U.S. codes for analysis :# :evere reactor accidents.

Involvement in Western technical organizations:

In excnange for access to the accident codes, Russia has become a member of tne International Code Assessment Program, an association of Western countries interested in simulating reactor accidents.

Russian annealing technology:

Through the exchanges t e J.S. has learned much about Russian annealing technology.

For examoie. NRC learned that the Soviets had annealed (heat-treated) reactor pressure,

sessels that had become emorittled by radiation and tney 9ad -obtained almost complete ductile recovery.

Because of similar :r:clems of embrittlement being encountered in U.S. reactors, the NRC is interested in this technology, and some utilities with older plants are also investigating its promise.

Russian materiais technology:

During their tours througn nuclear power L

plants of Soviet design, U.S. officials noticed that raciation levels were considerably below those of U.S. plants.

Scientists on both sides began working together to evaluate factors such as the alloy steels used in reactor construction to explain these differences. The outcome may influence the choice of materials to be used in the future.

The U.S. has also learned about unsatisfactory conditions in nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union and weaknesses in nuclear safety regulation there.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the NRC was instrumental in U.S. efforts to assist in nuclear reactor safety and regulatory improvements in Russia and Ukraine.

The programs cf assistance that were developed drew extensively on previous years' cooperative activities.

The Lisbon Initiative began the third phase of U.S. nuclear safety cooperation with the former Soviet Union. This phase emphasized direct assistance and building upon the program of technical cooperation.

When the Secretary of State announced a $25 Million U.S. nuclear safety assistance ;r gram for the

SU in Lisbon in May 1992, he included assistance to nuclear regulators in toth countries as a vital element of the program.

~ao conths af ter the Lisbon program was announced. NRC offictais met with Russian and Ukrainian regulators to solicit their ideas for ennancing their reguiatory capabilities.

The programs developed for regulat:ry assistance are mainly oriented toward training in licensing, inspection, researcn, and emergency response: but they also include provision of anal,. ::ai and

mmunications equipment.

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Program training is conducted during group visits of Russian ano Ukrainian regulators at NRC headouarters, regional offices, and the NRC lecnnical Training Center (TTC) in Chattanooga, Tennessee, or when NRC staff provide briefings cr seminars in Russia or Ukraine.

Of the 60 visits clanned. 23 will have ceen underway or completed by the end of July 1993. involving about 50 people from these countries trained for an average of three weeks, with some staying for as long as three months.

The assignees report the training is very effective because it is specific and technical; and because it is outside their homeland, it offers a different cultural perspective as well., Meetings of the JCCCNRS occur annually to set the future direction of the program.

The latest, in March 1993, successfully combined nuclear safety programs (cooperation & assistance) for both Russia and Ukraine for the first time since the breakup of the USSR.

This will help the Russians and Ukrainians continue to work together on vital nuclear safety matters and help the U.S.

husband its scarce assistance resources.

s COOPERATION WITH, AND ASSISTANCE TO, THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL / EASTERN EUROP,E Beginning in April 1989, with the signing of an NRC bilateral information excnange arrangement with the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission, NRC's cooperation with Central / Eastern Europe (CEE) took on some of the intensity of the Soviet program.

In September 1990, NRC signed an information exchange arrangement with the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission, which covered topics similar to those in the arrangement with the Czechs.

In late 1990, NRC sought funding for assistance to Central / Eastern European countries from the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), and in September 1991 concluded an agreement with that Agency whereby NRC would be provided with 5575,000 in funds during fiscal year 1991 in support of nuclear safety assistance to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR).

On January 31, 1992, this agreement was amended to provide an additional 5150,000 for technical assistance to Bulgaria, bringing the total for fiscal year 1991 for the three countries to 5725,000, for such tasks as nuclear safety orientation training, an NRC Fellowship Program for on the job training clongside NRC staff, training at the NRC Technical Training Center and membership fees in the " Severe Accident and Risk and Accident Management Programs" and the " International Code Assessment Program."

In 1992, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic were added to the Central / Eastern 4

European countries receiving regulatory assistance from the NRC.

NRC asked for and received an additional 5900,000 for fiscal year 1992 from A.I.D. in support of continued and expanded nuclear safety assistance to the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania.

By the eno of July 1993, 34 regulatory personnel from Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary will have been trained by NRC for an average of 1-1/2 wee (s; two assignees, one from Hungary and one from the Czech and Slovak Feceral Pecublic, also participated in NRC's Fellowship Program for six months; the CSFR representative returned to become head of the nuclear regulatory organization in the newly formed Czech Republic.

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The technical exchanges and training conducted under NRC's cooperative programs are helping to encourage an enhanced safety culture in Central and Easterr. Europe.

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NRC'S NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND CENTRAL / EASTERN EUROPE:

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1.

NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION WITH, AND ASSISTANCE T0, THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION The Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Nuclear Safety Cooperation As early as the summer of 1984, before liberalization had begun in the USSR, the President of the United States proposed a new policy on scientific and cultural exchanges with the Soviets, encouraging Federal agencies to consider expanding their activities that had been curtailed as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

These included discussions of nuclear safety cooperation and an exchange of visits between the NRC and the USSR that had taken place shortly before the invasion.

The new policy was to support imoroveo communications with the Soviets, and it was a major snift in the U,S.

approach to relations with the Soviets.

As one element of this policy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated contact with the Soviets in late 1985 in order to open discussions on nuclear safety matters.

By early 1986, the Soviets had approved "in principle" a U.S. NRC delegation traveling to the USSR, but little progress was made on scheduling a visit.

The Department of State at the time believed that the Soviets were holding the U.S. at arms length on any substantive excnanges in this area of advanced technology, about which the Soviets had provided only limited information.

Separate from the NRC initiative, the Soviet Embassy in Washington formally proposed, in February 1986, convening a sixth Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) in the USSR under the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, an agreement signed at the height of detente in 1973 by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev.

Shortly before Chernobyl, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which administers that Agreement for the U.S., accepted the Soviet proposal and suggested an agenda covering fusion, breeder reactors, and high energy physics, the three original topics, but not civilian nuclear reactor safety.

The Chernobyl accident on April 26 halted plans for an NRC trip in the period immediately following, but it did not affect planning for the JCM.

As a result of the accident, though, the U.S. proposed adding light-water reactor safety to the discussions at the JCM.

The Soviets accepted this proposal, and the parties met in Moscow in August 1986, where the U.S.

outlined areas of possible safety cooperation.

j Also in August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held a major international conference on the Chernobyl accident.

This " Post-Chernobyl Review" turned out to be one of the most significant events in turning the Soviets toward international cooperation on nuclear safety and away from a

urely national approach to this problem.

The United States sent a delegation of 21 experts. led by senior officials of the U.S. Departments of Energy and

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A number of private industry and academic ex erts also

art cipated.

U.S. celegation members reported surprisingly frank and open excnanges of infnemation with their Soviet counterparts, including private sessions of U.S.

j ano iviet technical experts, and ootained their commitment : answer as many i

questions as the U.S. side wished to propose following the meeting.

It became clear that the large Soviet delegation, many of wnose members aere scientists who nad not previously been allowed to travel to international conferences, was operating under instructions to ce open and candid about ine causes and effects of tne accident with their scientific peers, includino the American delegation.

t Upon their return from Vienna, U.S. delegation leaders recommended expanded cooperation with the Soviets, both in bilateral exchanges ano inrough the MEA.

They recommended joint work leading to enhanced safety 9 the following l

3reas:

- improving operational safety through operator training, emergency t

procedures, use of full scope replica simulators, and safety regulation; l

-- decontamination, decommissioning, clean-up, entombment, and any other actions that proved necessary to rehabilitate the area around the reactor that was affected by the accident; and

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-- detailed epidemiological studies to improve common knowledge of low-level radiation health effects.

At the same time, the U.S. urged the Soviets to undertake additional safety studies using computer-based probabilistic risk assessment tecnniques (pioneered in the U.S.) in order to assure a comprehensive identification of their reactors' safety vulnerabilities.

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While the Soviets had refused to accept U.S. offers of assistance in the weeks

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immediately following Chernobyl, the stress of coping with the aftermath of the accident and the extreme interest expressed by participants at the Vienna

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i conference appeared to heighten their sensitivity to cooperation in nuclear i

reactor safety.

The U.S. indicated that it wished to share its experience in implementing safety improvements during the years following the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, the effect of that experlence on the development of current safety technology, and U.S. safety philosophy and standards.

The NRC representative at the August 1986 JCM (J. Shea of the Office of International Programs) outlined NRC's role and responsibilities, and its programs of international cooperation in nuclear safety.

He also restated NRC's interest in leading a delegation to the USSR to visit Soviet f acilities and to discuss safety matters, and the Soviets agreec to extend an l

invitation.

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rcingly, in March 1987, the first U.S. nuclear safety team ied by NRC Cc:missioner Frederick Bernthal visited the USSR and toured a numcer of Soviet f ac11ities, including Chernobyl Units 1 and 2, the Izhora large reactor

=;cnents production plant near Leningrad, the Zaporozhye Atomic Power

3 Station, sna the fast breecer reactor near Beloyarsk.

They c:n:luded their tr1; in *: scow with discussions on the safety and economics of uclear ciant ocerations.

Each site visit was valuable in revealing the levei of safety standaras and practices in the USSR at the time of Chernooyl.

At each stcp the deisgavon discussed four broaa technical areas of concern :D the U.S..

namely:

nuclear safety regulation, policy, and practices: safe acerations:

safety research: and radiation protection and health effects.

These items were later to become the basis for more specific agreements on safety excnanges and cooperation.

4 The_ NRC 1) emphasized that the Soviet approach to safety in their latest Pressurizea Water Reactors (PWRs) called VVERs was comparable to those in other countries, but 2) criticized the level of nuclear safety in their older reactors, particularly the early VVERs and the RBMKs.

The team also stressed that the health effects of the accident on the victims were of great interest to the U.S.

In this regard, seven of the U.S. officials who traveled to Kiev cut aere rot invited to Chernobyl, instead held a two-hour discussion with eleven Soviet radiation health specialists, including the Deputy Minister o'f' Heaith Care at the Ukrainian Ministry of Healtn neadquarters.

The Soviets at the Kiev meeting responded openly to U.S. questions, but did not seem eager to enter into extensive discussions about cooperation.

They describec the very difficult situation after Chernobyl, with health care people working day and night to cope with the senere health problems of the victims. They described the immediate actions taken to prevent infectious diseases.

They said extensive food and water monitoring was implemented. All food products outside the 30-kilometer exclusion zone around the plant were suitable for consumption, they reported, except for some dairy products and certain berries.

Special attention had been paid to pregnant women and to children; all of the former were evacuated the first day.

A Protocci was signed at the end of the visit that stressed the possibility of mutual interest in the four broad technical areas mentioned above and promised a return visit by the Soviets to the United States.

The reciprocal visit would, in the words of the Protocol:

... provide an opportunity for further excnanges of views and safety experiences by the two sides, and allow the Soviet delegation to visit several corresponding nuclear facilities and institutions in the U.S."

In late September 1987, the IAEA hosted another meeting in Vienna on severe accidents. This meeting provided important evidence that the Soviet Union and countries of Central / Eastern Europe were beginning to open doors for their scientists to participate in international conferences, particularly on nuclear safety matters.

Nearly 40 Soviet scientists and nuclear officials attended, most of whom delivered papers.

Less than two weeks after the U.S.

delegation returned from this meeting,14 Soviet safety experts and officials, some of ancm had also participated in the Vienna meeting, arrived in Wasnington for a two-week stay in the U.S. to visit U.S. nuclear facilities.

The Soviet delegation included the Deputy Minister of Atomic Power, recresentatives of two major State Committees and the Kurchatcv Institute, and seterans of the Chernobyl cleanup.

The U.S. host was NRC Chairman Lando Zecn.

One measure of the significance of this reciprocal Soviet trip to the U.S. was

4 that the joint U.S.-Soviet Summit statement issued by President Reagan ana General Secretary Gorbachev on December 10, 1987 at the conclusion of Gorbachev's first visit to the U.S. included a reference to nuclear safety cooperation, namely:

"The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing i

a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area."

l The head of the Soviet delegation, Deputy Minister of Atomic Power Alexander Lapshin, offered a far-reaching proposal for a 10-year agreement on cooperation in nuclear safety regulation; research and methodology; and reactor design, construction, and operation. Health and environmental effects were not mentioned.

The U.S. responded with a counter-draft in January 1988.

It designated the NRC as lead agency for the U.S. on nuclear safety cooperation under the U.S.-USSR Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and it proposed setting up a separate Joint Cooroinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) under this Agreement.

U.S. objectives entering the negotiations were, first, to obtain Soviet agreement to cooperate on nuclear reactor safety as a means to enhance the safety of Soviet reactors.

Second, the U.S. wanted to explain Western nuclear safety philosophy to assure the Soviets were adopting a " defense in depth" i

approach to the design and operational safety of their nuclear power plants.

Third, the U.S. wanted cooperation that could help obtain critical information about the Chernobyl accident itself and its environmental consequences and health effects.

Fourth, the U.S. sought to involve the U.S. nuclear industry in the hoped-for market for nuclear technologies and safety-related services e

in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

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The U.S.-USSR Memorandum of Cooperation was signed in Washington on April 26, 1988, exactly two years after the accident.

It established a joint I

coordinating committee (the JCCCNRS), to facilitate technical exchanges in the same four basic technical areas that were discussed during the U.S. March 1987 trip.

The Soviets agreed that the JCCCNRS would first meet in the USSR to begin cooperation, and Chairman Zech accepted a Soviet invitation to lead the U.S. delegation.

He directed his top civil servant, the Executive Director for Operations (ED0), to make resources available for expanded cooperation with the Soviets, and the Deputy EDO, Mr. James Taylor, was appointed the U.S.

co-chairman of the JCCCNRS.

In all, seventeen persons made the trip in August 1988, including NRC, State and Energy Department officials.

They were the first non-Soviets to visit the entombed Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor and sarcophagus.

The ensuing Protocol of this visit said both sides

"... look forward to continued enhancements of safety through greater understanding of each other's approaches and to making further improvements in the safety of their respective plants." Chairman Zech also met with the leaders and other senior officials from the Soviet organizations working on ensuring nuclear power safety, in particular Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) and Minister Nikolai Lukonin of the Ministry of Atomic Power.

Also in I

August 1988 the Protocol of the First Meeting of the JCCCNRS laid out plans.,

which had been negotiated over the summer, for cooperation in ten technical

5 areas resulting in ten Working Groups (WG).

The topics were:

1. Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices; 2. Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the USSR and the US: 3. Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structures ano Annealing of the Housings; 4. Fire Safety;

5. Modernization / Backfitting; 6. Severe Accidents; 7. Health Effects and

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Environmental Considerations; 8. Exchange of Operational Experience; 9.

Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment. and Systems for Supporting Operators;

10. Erosion / Corrosion of Piping and Components.

The Technical Problems with Soviet-Designed Reactors The United States has been engaged in providing technical assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors for a number of years.

The near term objective is to help reduce the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident; in the long term the objective is to assist these countries in strengthening their nuclear regulatory infrastructures and overall nuclear industry approach to safety.

Early analyses of Soviet-designed reactors generally found poor operational safety practices resulting from a culture

oriented toward production (rather than safety) throughout the Soviet Union.

In addition, significant design and construction deficiencies were found in most models, indicating that they would not meet Western standards.

The Operational Safety Initiative which began in 1990 was intended to have an impact on safety culture and thereby enhance safe operations.

This initiative focussed on improved operating procedures, training, and management at the Novovoronezh VVER 440/230 plant in Russia.

t Except for two fast breeder reactors, all nuclear power reactors in the former Soviet Union are of two basic designs, namely the VVER pressurized water reactor design and the RBMK light water, pressure tube, graphite moderated boiling water (e.g., Chernobyl) design.

For each design there are early prototype units that led to standardized designs.

There are 59 reactors in the former Soviet Union: 10 VVER 440/230s, 16 VVER 440/213s, and 18 VVER 1000s; 13 RBMK 1000s, and 2 RBMK 1500s.

(Other VVERs, operating in Central / Eastern Europe, are discussed in a later section of this report.)

The RBMK reactor design evolved from a military reactor originally used for producing plutonium but which could also produce electricity, and has been designed and operated with safety standards which would be unacceptable in the West.

While there have been improvements in each subsequent generation, the basic design still raises questions whether the plant could meet western safety standards.

The major design deficiencies are:

Fundamentally unstable reactor core design and poorly designed o

systems for reactor shutdown -- probably the cause of the Chernobyl incident.

Some design changes have been made to reduce this deficiency.

Lack of separation and redundancy in critical electrical and fluid systems and general susceptibility of systems important to safety to common-cause failures.

Inadequate fire protection (numerous fires have occurred in these reactors since the Chernobyl accident).

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6 No containment system and a confinement system tr.a: does not enclose the entire primary coolant system and has imited pressure retention capability.

~ 5 VVER 440/230 is the first production model of the VVER c:"csot and was a.so designed in a manner that does not conform to Western nuf. ear safety re:uirements.

While there are some inherent positive feature f the design

ucn as a large water inventory and low power density of the Sel), major cesign deficiencies include:

Lack of separation and redundancy in critical electrical and fluid systems and general susceptibility of systems important to safety to common-cause failures.

Inadequate fire protection.

Insufficient safety systems to cope with primary :jstem leaks.

l Lack of an effective containment or confinement :. stem.

Wnile international awareness of design and operational problems associated alth RBMK and VVER reactors has increased since Chernobyl, the actual extent i

of the problem did not become fully known until the breakup of the Soviet-led alliance and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself into independent states.

The IAEA, for example, conducted safety review missions to VVER r

440/230 reactors in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Russia in 1990 and 1991 and confirmed earlier suspicions about the VVER 440/230 Kozloduy reactors.

International concern remains substantial.

The plants appear to have i

significant weaknesses in the areas of operational safety and design.

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is a growing' view in the West that particularly the earlier reactors cannot be uograded to meet contemporary standards for safety and should not be. operated any longer than absolutely necessary, because of the likelihood of a severe accident.

Analysis of the newer Soviet designs, namely the VVER 440/213s and VVER 1000s, indicates that they are superior to the RBMKs ano VVER 440/230s, although they still do not meet western standards.

However, we believe modifications can be made to the newer designs to make their Operation more acceptable.

The breakup of the Soviet Union also had a serious effect on the distribution of scarce financial and technical resources.

While each country in the New f

rdependent States and in Central / Eastern Europe has a different level of indigenous technical expertise, some fundamental aspects of reactor operations aere maintained solely by Russia under the old regime, such as fuel anuf acturing, long term spent fuel storage, reactor testing, design

" formation, and nuclear related research and analysis.

While each country as begun to develop its own nuclear power and regulatory infrastructure, each as limitations in its ability to implement needed changes.

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Progress under the JCCCNRS During The Early Years: 1988 through 1990 The first meeting of working groups for the JCCCNRS was held in Moscow in Decemoer 1988.

It covered the topics of safety research, fire safety, development of exchange proposals for erosion-corrosion, and a cresentation ano discussion of a Department of Energy study of VVER reactors.

The U.S.

delegation was led by Dr. Denwood Ross of the NRC's Office of Researcn, and includea seven persons.

The meetings were well attended by Soviet researchers, but not by Soviet regulatory officials.

The NRC therefore decided to request that Soviet regulators be invited to future meetings.

Despite the gap, both sides believed that the exchange of information and seminars was worthwhile.

Among the acccmplishments of the first meeting were:

The two sides exchanged completed analyses of the level of design of o

power units at the Zaporozhe and South Texas plants.

A seminar was held on the U.S. Decartment of Enerov's anaivsis of

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features of Soviet-designed VVER's.

Descriptions of research programs were exchanged in order to identify gaps and overlaps and identify research proposals.

Topics mentioned in the Protocol (pressure vessel integrity, Probabilistic Risk Assessment methods, and severe accident code verification) were discussed. Topics not mentioned in the protocol were thermal-hydraulic research, cost sharing on Chernobyl, plant aging and safety concepts for the next generation of nuclear power plants, although these were considered important issues by both sides.

Both sides provided information related to pressure vessel integrity and identified areas of special interest.

The NRC identified Soviet annealing technology to be of interest to the U.S.

The Soviets showed interest in improving their methods for containment response, as an outgrowth of discussion on the uses of PRA.

The USSR sought access to NRC code RELAP-5 for thermal-hydraulic research, and in return suggested that they provide results from their analysis of the integral facility at Electrogorsk.

Fire safety was identified as a serious precursor of accidents; capabilities of electrical cable to withstand fire were discussed, as was the design of cable penetration througn bulkheads; information was exchanged on methods for fighting large fires under high radiation conditions for extended periods, fire suppression systems, ventilation systems, fire protection coatings for structural steel, use of procabilistic techniques in fire risk assessment and hycrogen accumulation as it relates to fire safety.

They agreed that working sessions should ciscuss researcn related to fires involving electrical equipment and odeling temperatures within fires-and within compartments, as well as risks associated with cc:cuters.

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8 Erosion /corresion degradation of piping and components was also discussed and the group adopted a plan for cooperation in this area from 1989 through 1991 that provided for holding annual seminars.

The Soviet co-chairman of the JCCCNRS, Dr. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, visited the United States in January 1989 and met with the NRC Chairman (Adm. L. Zech) as well as the American co-chairman, Mr. Taylor.

The purpose of these meetings was to review the work of the December meetings in Moscow and plan the next iarge working group meeting in the U.S. in June 1989, at which seven of the ten working groups planned to meet, as well as to plan the exchange of inspectors which was to take place during the summer of 1989.

Dr. Ponomarev-Stepnoi also visited the Department of Energy, Nuclear Management and Resources Council, and the Electric Power Research Institute to discuss possible U.S. industry interest in Soviet annealing technology.

(U.S.

procedures for working group activities allow participation in the working groups by non-governmental persons.)

Project Milestones:

The Visit of Vadim Malyshev and the Inspector Exchange.

Two milestones in developing confidence between the two sides occurred in 1989 when Vadim Malyshev, then Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN), visited the United States at the invitation.of NRC Chairman Zech and two U S. NRC resident nuclear power plant inspectors " traded places" with two Soviet inspectors for seven week tours at reactors in the other country.

Advance planning for the Malyshev visit called for discussions of decommissioning, safety aspects of first generation plants, seismology (the recent earthquake in Armenia was on everyone's mind),

diagnostics and controls (advanced technology, or computerized control rooms),

the handling of public opinion, perfecting regulatory techniques and practices, and details of the proposed inspector exchange.

NRC took Mr.

Malyshev to the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Washington; to NRC Region II Headquarters in Atlanta, which gave a presentation of their regional activities; to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, also in Atlanta; and to the Indian Point NucleF Power Plant and Brookhaven National Laboratory, both outside of New York City.

t Malyshev learned from top NRC officials that U.S. plants are safer than they were ten years ago, at the time of the Three Mile Island accident, largely due to improved operator training, the widespread use of simulators, and increased management involvement in plant operations.

Each side touched on the difficulties in bringing new reactors on line.

As a result of the December 1988 Armenian earthquake, a team of reactor safety experts from the U.S. had examined a Soviet nuclear reactor located in Armenia.

Malyshev indicated that the Soviet public not only appreciated the assistance, but had also demanded that many of the improvements recommended by the western experts in seismic safety be implemented within two years.

He said that several other reactors in the Soviet Union and in Hungary and Bulgaria would undergo some seismic redesign as a result of the earthquake.

In the end, both sides agreed on the importance of cooperation for improving reactor safety throughout the world.

The informality of his trip to NRC Regional HQ in Atlanta gave Malyshev the opportunity to reflect on the problems nuclear energy regulators faced in the

9 Soviet Union, particularly af ter the accident.

He noted that not only are most Soviet citizens poorly informed aoout global nuclear power development, but the Soviet government faces such severe shortages that important commodities like fire resistant materials and needed equipment for fire-fighting are unavailable for installation in Soviet reactors. Malyshev reportedly left the Atlanta regional office with a new appreciation for the applications of advanced technology to public safety in the U.S. -- including

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on-line status reports of all U.S. reactors, personal dosimetry, and emergency response capabilities -- and particularly the decentralized authority represented by the NRC regional offices.

In Washington, the top Soviet regulatory official met with the NRC Executive Director for Operations and other key NRC officials in public affairs, reactor regulation, safety research, nuclear materials regulation and waste management, and operating data and emergency preparedness.

He also signed the agreement for the exchange of inspectors, and seemed genuinely impressed with U.S. openness as he commented on prospects for a mutually successful partnership.

This presentation was so favorable that Malyshev, upon his return, sought to fashion his own headquarters / regional regulatory structure after the U.S. model.

Following meetings with the New York Power Authority and with Consolidated Edison in New York, Malyshev conducted a press briefing. He said he was impressed by the extent of the NRC's authority and technical competence.

He hoped to develop cooperation for establishing safety standards and to look into the possibility of acquiring equipment, particularly nuclear power plant simulators, to improve training of Soviet operators.

And he said he hoped reactor safety could be enhanced through cooperation based on openness and trust.

He admitted that prior to Chernobyl, the Soviets had placed too much confidence in the safety of their own nuclear plants.

The accident led to a reorganization of the Soviet regulatory apparstus, analysis of its legal basis, and enhanced personnel training; but more importantly, it had led to a change in attitude in GAEN which now placed greater emphasis on safety.

Shortly after Malyshev's return to the Soviet Union, his U.S. visit took on added significance, when he was promoted by the Supreme Soviet to be Chairman of a newly created safety regulatory body (the "GPAN") which covered all industrial safety matters, including nuclear.

In conversations with U.S.

officials almost a year later, in March 1990, Malyshev said that his greatest challenge was to define an appropriate role for the Republics in the supervision of nuclear energy.

He said he hoped to adopt for the USSR the U.S. regulatory model and asked for copies of agreements the NRC has with the local governments of States such as Florida and Illinois, under which the central regulatory bcdy, the NRC, grants regulatory rights to these States for supervision of medical and industrial applications of nuclear materials.

In July 1989, as a follow-up to the Malyshev visit, two U.S. NRC resident safety inspectors spent seven weeks in the Soviet Union learning all they could aoout approaches to safety at a Soviet nuclear power plant.

Later that fall, two Soviet inspectors took up similar duties at the Catawba nuclear plant in South Carolina.

The purpose of this exchange under the JCCCNRS was to develop an understanding of the methods used by the Soviets to ensure

10 acnerence to design and operational requirements and specificar:ns for their pressurized water reactors.

The NRC inspectors reportea " exceptionally frank and candid" ::nversations with their Soviet counterparts, and noted that the exchange was saluable in gaining insight into how the Soviet regulatory accaratus (GAEM functions.

Soviet inspectors they said, while cuite similar to their NRC ::unterparts in the subject matter of their work, i

have much greater authority than NRC resident instectors, as they can issue fines and stop work on their own authority.

They are heavily involved in the line process of running the power plant and approving procedures and authorizing maintenance activities.

They are involved in post-event critiques and make recommendations for corrective actions."

Differences increase as one goes up the chain of authority.

In the Soviet Union, enforcement is based primarily on personal responsibility as opposed.,to corcorate accountability as in the U.S.

As a result, while incividuals are punished for errors, "

. investigations conducted by GAEN into technical proolems and operational events typically do not address programmatic weaknesses such as inadequate procedures, training, or management oversight."

At the local level, the NRC inspectors reported, the effectiveness of GAEN inspectors in resolving site-specific problems is diminished "

. as identified problems become more systemic or generic, requiring corrective actions to be implemented from the regional cr national level."

Inspectors, and some of their superiors, were often frustrated regarding their inability to correct design weaknesses or influence the design agencies (reactor designers and production facilities in the USSR) regarding the need for greater attention to safety concerns.

The U.S. inspectors' report added essential information on some of the generic weaknesses in the Soviet nuclear safety infrastructure that neeoed correction.

The insights of the two U.S. inspectors proved extremely valuable in assessing the need for development of a " safety culture" in the Soviet nuclear power program, from shift operators and maintenance personnel all the way up through top management.

They also put into perspective Soviet claims that their

" safety culture" has changed as a result of Chernobyl.

Such deep attitudes, nourished over 25 years of reactor operation, could not be changed overnight.

The inspector exchange was therefore one of the most valuable, close-up, ~ looks the U.S. has had into the way Soviet technical organizations operate.

It demonstrated how far the Soviets must go to bring public accountability to their enterprises.

But it also showed that both sides can learn lessons about how to improve their own functions by observing themselves in the mirror of their opposite numbers.

It was this opportunity for mutual benefit that i

helped the exchange program succeed.

Cooperation in Environmental and Health Effects and in Operati:nal Safety The remainder of 1989 saw a number Of working group meetings, two of which were particularly noteworthy.

The first was the first meeting of Working Group 7. held in the USSR in Septemoer, focusing on the environmental and i

i i

i

?

h 11 neaitn effects of Chernobyl.

There was an open and candid discussion, and the l

outcre acceared to offer unioue opportunities for croad U.S. ;articipation on joint researcn on these subjects, although in fact this took several years to i

tear fruit.

The second was the annual JCCCNRS meeting, held at NRC in I

Oct;;er.

"he resulting Protocol served as the planning document for future activities. At this meeting the United States Department of Energy initiated its ;rocosai to the Soviets on a program of activities to support safer operation of Soviet reactors and received a positive response.

~his activity became the subject matter for a new working group, 811, which nas largely been a CCE effort.

The topics covereo in Working Group 7 are among the cornerstones of U.S.

i interest in the cooperative exchange program with the USSR, because they concern possible U.S. participation in an integrated and long-term study of i

the 1Toact of the Chernobyl accident.

While the Department of Energy was given the lead in this WG. the NRC has remained actively involvec.

In brief.

Wor <ing Grcuo 7.1 covered Environmental Transport. and set up :uo-group i

discussions on: Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling and Radiological Measuremerrts; F

Environmental Monitoring and Modeling; and Radioactivity Instrumentation.

Working Group 7.2 covered Health Effects and set up sub-groups on Physical ~

Dosimetry of Exposed Individuals: Epidemiology: Population Stuotes and Stochastic Effects: Medical Effects and Clinical Monitoring; Biological Inoicators of Radiation Exposure; and Studies of Non-Stochastic Effects.

JCCCNRS Developments in 1990-1991 The JCCCNRS met for the third time in Moscow in October 1990 and agreed on a plan of work for the following year.

All the working groups met at least once in late 1989 or early 1990, their outcomes moving beyond exchanges of information to more active cooperative pursuits.

The exchanges of inspection personnel for extended pericos at nuclear facilities (under Working Group 1) have been of benefit to regulatory authorities in the USSR, have broadened U.S. understandir.g of the Soviet regulatory infrastructure, and have led to efforts to cnange some Soviet policies and practices; The visit by a U.S. team to witness the annealing of a Soviet reactor pressure vessel (Working Group 3) has resulted in potential U.S.

interest in utilizing Soviet experts to apply the technicue in the U.S.;

Discussions on severe nuclear accidents (Working Group 6) led to Soviet o

participation in international groups sponsored by the 0.5. and created to snare information on severe accident research; j

Discussions on environmental and health effects of the Sernobyl accident (under Working Group 7) resulted in agreement en numerous joint scientific projects; The sisit of a delegation from U.S. government and private industry to several important Soviet laboratory facilities and instnutes to discuss l

4 12 i

i the possibility of future bilateral research work at these Soviet facilities turned out to be a very positive development, resulting in NRC placing some work at these installations:

In September the NRC approved the assignment of a Soviet national (Dr.

Vladimir Asmolov, from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy) to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research for approximately three months.

This was the first Soviet national assigned to work at the NRC, a graphic indication of how far the cooperation had come.

Underlying all these activities has been a broadening of involvement of other groups in the work of the JCCCNRS.

On the Soviet side, organizations that had been largely unaware of similar activities in other organizations have been brought together. On the U.S. side, the industrial and (on the Chernobyl issue) academic communities have been introduced to information and technical capabilities of the USSR to which they would otherwise not have had access.

The Joint Committee has therefore facilitated contacts involving organizations i

outside, as well as within, the context of the original Memorandum of Cooperation.

A synergism has developed between the Soviet nuclear industry and counterparts in the U.S. private sector.

Soviets often visited U.S. firms when they have come to the United States for Working Group meetings.

U.S.

industry representatives were on the team that witnessed the Soviet reactor annealing, and industry people accompanied NRC officials on a tour of important Soviet nuclear research facilities.

This synergy was the result of both the Soviets' need to find international markets for their research, given the economic and political changes that have taken place, and the U.S. desire to use Soviet capabilities.

The continued cooperation reflected the high priority this work held for the Commissioners, but it also reflected the vigorous support and encouragement the NRC had received all along from both the Department of State and DOE.

Effects of the Break-up of the Soviet Union The breakup of the USSR in late 1991, along with the independence movement in Central / Eastern Europe, while of earthquake proportions on the political Richter scale, did not interfere greatly with progress under the JCCCNRS Memorandum of Cooperation.

It did, however, bring about new operational and regulatory organizations in the New Independent States, and economic problems faced throughout these new states made keeping the nuclear power plants safe 1

all the more difficult and challenging:

for example, shortages of spare parts for plants, lack of money for plant maintenance, and dissemination and availability of design and technical information.

And while progress had been made in achieving a good exchange of information and techniques that could

~

benefit safety in both the U.S. and the USSR, the problem of translating the needed information to the plant level persisted.

j The fourth meeting of the JCCCNRS took place in Washington in December 1991.

only four months after the abortive coup attempt in Moscow had brought Boris (eitsin to international prominence.

NRC Executive Director for Operations l

James Taylor again chaired the U.S. delegation Nikolai Ermakov, Head of the Main Scientific Department in the Ministry for Atomic Power and Industry

^

(MAPI) was in the chair for the FSU.

NRC Chairman Ivan Selin welcomed the

13 delegation and said the meeting would be important for at least two reasons.

First, he noted that cnanging relations between Moscow and the repuolics on nuclear safety cooperation would begin to be seen.

He offered U.S. assistance with regard to strengthening the regulatory roles of the republics, in accordance with foreign oolicy guidance provided by the Department of State.

Second, he said it appeared timely for the JCCCNRS to shif t its focus from top-level exchanges of safety information to application of this information at the plant level.

He acced that he was pleased to note there would be an arrangement for their crganizations to perform research work on severe accidents for the NRC.

Dr. Ermakov noted in reply that on November 23 the State Council had decided that MAPI would continue to perform its functions, but that economic conditions in the country dictated curtailment of expenditures for nuclear programs.

He said it was important to provide productive employment for nuclear scientists and engineers, making it necessary to deepen and partially commercialize nuclear safety cooperation.

In this regard the research agreement that was to te signed at this meeting took on added significance,.

The U.S. co-chairman, Mr. Taylor, noted that Working Group 10 (Erosion / Corrosion) had completed its assignment and suggested that Working Group 4 (Fire Safety) would also complete its work by the next meeting.

A shif t of operator support topics was foreseen, from Working Group 9 (Systems for Supporting Operations) to Working Group 11 (0perational Safety).

Work ongoing in WG-5 (Backfitting), WG-7 (Chernobyl Effects), and WG-8 (Operational Data) would continue as planned.

The Russian co-chairman, Dr. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, said the joint work of the Committee had brought measurable benefits to the USSR, particularly in thermal hydraulic research and membership in the International Code Assessment Program.

He invited U.S. participation in employing these benefits and suggested that Soviet engineers could be used to verify U.S. codes.

At that time he was able to observe that the Soviet nuclear power industry could serve as a stabilizing force, since it was centrally managed, and its requirements for supply, processing and distribution were low.

He also mentioned plans to restart the Armenian reactors and begin new nuclear plant construction in northwest Russia and in Kazakhstan, reflecting that it was important to assure responsible decision-making on technical matters during the movement toward political independence.

The following six months witnessed a dramatic intensification of NRC's participation in U.S. technical assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The NRC staff began working in support of safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons with the Departments of Energy and State and with the National Security Council.

It provided project proposals for the International Science and Technology-Centers in Russia and Ukraine to employ former weapons scientists, and it worked with the chief regulators of Russia and Ukraine in lanning conferences in Washington in late July 1992 which would lead to restructuring of the JCCCNRS to accommodate the new political structures in those countries.

i

b 14 One scientific benefit coming after the breakup of the Soviet ;nion appeared n :ne health effects area (WG#7).

For years. projects in tr s area moved

lowly, as the Moscow center did not seem willing to share cata inat could ave ceen embarrassing and sought compensation for the data.

W1tn the

evelopment of independent countries, each Health Ministry ce:ame free to come crward with data on their own population, and to suggest botr causes and 3

etnoos of analysis.

The result was a dramatic upsurge of i-:erest in

coperation that is mutual and scientifically rewarding.

A WG:7 delegation

<isited Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in May 1992 for discuss 1:ns wnich esulted in vercal agreements to continue this cooperation witn the new republics.

In late September 1992, the Chairman of the NRC, Ivan Selin, #cilowing up on his fall 1991 trip to the former Soviet Union, visited Russia and met with government and utility representatives, including people from the newly-formed

tility operating the nuclear power plants (Rosenergoatom),

Se regulatory

ocy (now Gosatomnadzor - or GAN), the Academy of Sciences, anc the Nuclear Safety Institute.

In Ukraine he also met with the president :f the new

.tility operating their nuclear power plants (Ukratomenergopr:ml. the Chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SCNR5), and the Minister of Chernobyl.

In both countries he discussed various safety issues, including assistance to their regulatory programs.

Restructuring the JCCCNRS and the Lisbon Initiative of May 1992 A major change in the relationship between the NRC and the countries of the former Soviet Union began in July 1992 with a meeting involving senior nuclear regulators of Russia (GAN), Ukraine (SCNRS), and the NRC, the first in which I

the U.S. regulatory body dealt with the two countries independently.

The purpose of the meeting was to define projects for Russia and Ukraine as part of a U.S. offer of nuclear safety assistance under the Lisbon Initiative announced in May 1992 by Secretary of State Baker.

This initiative outlined new U.S. Government assistance to the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

Prominent among the new programs was a nuclear safety initiative to provide $25 million worth of assistance.

For the first time Presidential level attention was focused cn safety problems in Soviet-designed reactors, and major funding was being provided for nuclear safety assistance to these countries, whereas information excnange had been the focus in the past.

NRC's July 1992 meetings with the Russian and Ukrainian regulators took place to define projects to assist the regulators in developing consistent and effective safety standards and protecures, in training, and in developing an improved regulatory structure.

The initiative includes computer hardware and software to enable the regulators to perform independent safety analyses and to modernize their basic administrative cacaoilities.

The proposals were later approved for funding Oy the U.S.

Agency for International Development (AID) under an interagency agreement signed September 30, 1992.

Implementation began immediately, and the JCCCNRS

tructure was modified to acknowledge the presence of more t an one country as weil as to accommodate the nuclear assistance program.

15 A numoer of Working Groups either c mpleted their work and dis:andec or were suosumed by the Lisbon assistance program.

Of these working groups, which haa grown to twelve with the addition of WG#12 on Plant Aging anc Life Extension, only four continued their work as in the past.

These are WG*3 on Radiation E.Torittlement and Annealing; WG#6 on Severe Accidents: WG77 on mealth and Environmental Effects; and WG412.

Working groups that completed their tasks or have been discontinued are: WG#2.

Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the USSR ano the US: WGs4, Fire Safety; WG#5, Modernization and Backfitting; and WG#10. Erosion / Corrosion of Piping and Components.

Working groups for which activities have been subsumed by the U.S. Nuclear Reactor Safety Initiative (the Lisbon Initiative) are: WG#1, Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices: WG#8, Excnange of Operational Experience; WG#9, Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment and Systems for Supporting Operators; and WG=ll, Operational Safety.

The usbon Initiative -- which is an assistance program -- comes under the overall operations of the JCCCNRS, along with the continuation of the i

cooperative exchange program.

Inasmuch as the Lisbon direct assistance program and the scientific exchanges involve both nuclear safety regulation and nuclear power plant operations, it was agreed that each country would appoint co-chairmen of the JCCCNRS, as follows:

Russia appointed the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy for Nuclear o

Power, Victor Sidorenko, and the First Deputy Chairman of the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority (GAN), Alexander Gutsalov.

Ukraine appointed the First Deputy Chairman of Goskomatom Nur o

Nigmatulin and the Chairman of the State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Nikolai Shteynberg.

The U.S. appointed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Energy, Frank Cole, and the Executive Director for Operations of the NRC, James Taylor.

The parties also have agreed that each could appoint a scientific advisor to evaluate technical aspects of the program.

The function of the advisor is to provide independent advice to his or her respective JCCCNRS co-chairmen regarding overall effectiveness of the cooperative and direct assistance efforts.

Should the co-chairmen of a country wish to provide information received from a scientific advisor to another country, the information will be sent by these co-chairmen to the co-chairmen of the other countries.

Because the U.S. effort involves several agencies a U.S. coordinating committee has been formed.

It is chaired by the State Department and incluces AID, the Department of Energy and the NRC.

=

16 The Current Program of Cooperation The 'annuai' meeting of the JCCCNRS was held in Kiev, Ukraine March 30-31.

1993.

The meeting was the successful culmination of a number of discussions botn within the U.S. government (NRC/ DOE / DOS) and with the nuclear power leacersnip of Russia and Ukraine.

The issues addressed in these discussions concerned tne restructuring of the JCCCNRS in light of the new Lisoon Initiative activities, the role of the regulator in the JCCCNRS, the future of the cooperative exchange program, and the renewal of the Memorandum of Cooperation which authorized the JCCCNRS in 1988.

An important adjunct to this meeting was an introductory session between James Taylor, Terry Thomas (00E and U.S. Working Group 7 co-leader), and Yuri Spizhenko, Minister of Health of Ukraine.

This was particularly significant because Minister Spizhenko demonstrated an openness to working with the U.S., thereby representing a change of policy, and appointed himself Chairman for Ukraine of Working Group 7, which is focused on Chernobyl health and environmental effects.

There is also agreement on the importance of implementing the Emergency Coerating Instructions (E01's) at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power * -

Plant as soon as practical, with this objective mutually supported by GAN and MINATOM.

This is the first set of E01's to be completed and will be the basis for those being developed for the VVER 440/213, VVER 1000, and RBMK designs under the Lisbon Initiative.

As the result of the restructuring approved at the March JCCCNRS meeting, there are now two Joint Coordinating Committees, one between the U.S. and Russia and one between the U.S. and Ukraine.

The three parties agree that there sill be joint participation in cooperative and other selected activities. as well as jointly conducted annual meetings, co-chaired by the three parties.

For example, since the regulatory bodies are not responsible for implementing those portions of the Lisbon Initiative on operational safety, risk reduction, and the establishment of training centers, there was some concern about their role in the assistance process.

All three countries agreed that the responsible operating organizations for these programs will involve their respective regulatory authorities in the process at appropriate times.

GAN, SCNRS and the NRC approved the priorities developed by the three parties in July 1992.

The 525 Million interagency agreement signed.with the Agency for International Development in September 1992 committed $3.1 million to NRC for a substantial portion of these priorities, with the rest being handled by DOE.

NRC met with the Russian regulatory representatives in December 1992 to agree on the implementation schedules for the Russian priorities and with the Ukrainian representatives in March 1993 to agree on the schedules for the Ukrainian priorities and to review the work already completed. NRC also worked with GAN and SCNRS to establish the structure and procedures for implementation.

A major feature of this effort was scheduling about 60 visits over eighteen months by Russian and Ukrainian regulators to the U.S and finding innovative ways to complete them.

In June 1993, a second interagency agreement aas signed committing an additional 55 million to complete the funding of the July 1992 projects and several others which had subsequently been suggested.

17 Appendix I describes the current programs and accomplishments of the NRC Lisbon Initiative assistance to Russia and Ukraine.

Appendix Il lists official travelers to and from the USSR and (after the breakup of the Soviet Union) Russia and Ukraine for discussions / meetings under the NRC program of technical exchanges and cooperation from 1989 to date.

Appendix III lists visitors from Russia and Ukraine to the U.S. for NRC projects under the Lisbon Initiative (1992-93).

II.

NUCLEAR SAFETY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL / EASTERN EUROPE In April 1989, NRC signed a bilateral information exchange arrangement with the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission.

This was NRC's first such arrangement with a Central / Eastern European (CEE) country.

The arrangement covered such topics as personnel training, emergency planning, licensing and enforcement procedures. and probabilistic safety assessment.

Since the signing of the arrangement, a number of high-level visits have been made to Czecnoslovakian nuclear facilities by senior NRC personnel, including visits to the SK0DA heavy machinery plant and the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant.

At that time, several efforts were made to bring a Czechoslovakian technical team to the U.S.,

but their domestic economic situation prevented this until late 1991 when AID funds became available for this purpose.

In September 1990, NRC signed a second information exchange arrangement with a Central / Eastern European country.

This arrangement, with the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission (HAEC), covered topics similar to those in the arrangement with the Czechoslovakians.

In late 1990, NRC made efforts to obtain funding for assistance to Central / Eastern European countries from the Agency for International Development, and in September 1991, con:luded an agreement with that Agency whereby NRC would be provided with $575,000 in funds under a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) during fiscal year 1991 in support of nuclear safety assistance to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

On January 31, 1992 the PASA was amended to provide an additional $150,000 to include technical assistance to Bulgaria, bringing the total of funds for FY 91 to 5725,000.

Funding for the PASA was earmarked to provide technical cooperation activities with the countries of Central / Eastern Europe in areas of nuclear safety in which the NRC has a unique or predominant capability. This includes such tasks as nuclear safety orientation training, an NRC fellowship program, training at the NRC Technical Training Center (TTC) and membership fees in NRC-sponsored computer code users groups such as the " Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program" (CSARP) and the " International Code Assessment Program" (ICAP).

In March 1992, the President of Lithuania requested U.S. assistance in maintaining and improving the safety of the two-unit Ignalina RBMK-1500 Nuclear Power Plant.

The U.S. agreed in principle to work in coordination with Swedish efforts with Lithuania on urgent nuclear safety matters but there has been only limited activity to date in this effort, as noted below.

18 During-the summer of 1992, the Chairman of the Czech and Slova< Federal Repuolic (CSFR) Atomic Energy Commission requested NRC assistance in helping his agency perform a safety evaluation of the Westinghouse-suopiied instrumentation and control systems and fuel for the VVER-1000 reactors under construction at Temelin.

This evaluation would serve as a basis for the licensing of the plant by the Czecn regulators in accordance ath NRC procedures.

NRC received an additional 5900,000 for fiscal year 1992 frcr AID under an Interagency Agreement (IAA) in support of continued and expanced nuclear safety assistance to.the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Funding for this IAA was earmarked to provide for technical cooperation.

In addition to the activities earmarked in the FY 1991 PASA, the IAA also included membership fees for participation by each country in the

" International Piping Integrity Research Group" (IPRG).

NRC anticipates providing continued assistance in FY 93 (funcs have not yet,

been made available) for the specific tasks identified in the ?ASA and IAA for the five Central / Eastern European countries.

Assistance will te expanded by providing two additional specific tasks, one.for the Temelin Safety Evaluation and a second for a formalized Inspector Training Program, as well as membership fees for all five countries in the principal computer code users groups, i.e., CSARP, CAMP, (Thermal-hydraulics Code Assessment Maintenance Program, the successor to ICAP), IPIRG, and membership in the "SAPHIRE PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) Users Group".

Support for the Temelin review will be in the form of NRC staff guidance and contractor support by a U.S.

National Laboratory.

Accomplishments under the Specific Tasks The Nuclear Safety Orientation Prooram includes discussions on a wide range of regulatory and safety issues proposed either by the recipient country or by the NRC as well as familiarization visits to U.S. nuclear safety training facilities.

One Bulgarian, fourteen Czechs, eleven Hungarians and two Slovaks have visited the U.S. for periods of several weeks under this task.

Trilateral discussions were held in Prague and Budapest in early summer 1992 on a number of topics, including embrittlement and annealing, primary pipe-line integrity, leak before break and major reconstruction of the VVER 440/230, with particular focus on major safety systems.

NRC provided technical support to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission by sending an NRC expert on regulatory issues from the Office of Research -to Hungary as well as to the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Discussions were held in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary by the NRC program manager for Central / Eastern Europe and two representatives from NRC's regional office to discuss the participation, curriculum and specific country needs for the Inspector Training Program.

The NRC Fellowship Procram allows fe'llows to work alongside NRC staff.

Senior NRC personnel are designated to provide supervision and guidance and develop l

l

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l 19 wor ( programs that assign the fellows to projects appropriate : tneir i

interests as well as the needs of the host organization.

The assignments will generally ce made for periods of no less than six months.

NRC 1:cepted its f'rst assignees in June 1992, one from Hungary and one from the.SFR, for six

^

montns in the areas of Evaluation of Licensee In-Service Testi ; r.nd Primary System Integrity, respectively.

The NRC Technical Trainino Center in Chattanooga. Tennessee nas :rovided training for two Bulgarians, two Czechs and two Hungarians.

Leoal/Reculatory Assistance:

Two Hungarians spent two weeks in February 1993 in the office of the General Counsel (0GC) learning about the U.S. Atomic Energy Law and getting briefed on key regulatory issues such as NRC's legal framework; rulemaking issues, including public participation 'in rulemaking; enforcement issues: nuclear materials regulation: and others.

~he visitors also attended a two-day NRC training course on the Regulatory ;-ocess.

In June 1993, the Deputy Chairman of the Slovak Republic regulatory agency was given the same training course by the OGC.

Corouter Code Trainina for Lithuania:

In January 1993, Dr. Almenas, a professor of nuclear engineering at the University of Marylanc. was contracted to teach a two-week course to Lithuanian regulators on the structure and application of the Relap 5 thermal-hydraulics computer code anc the Contain coce for calculations of accident conditions in containment.

Melcor Users Workshoo:

A representative of the Czech Republic's Nuclear Research Institute at Rez, and one from the Hungarian Central Research Institute for Physics, were brought to the U.S. in January 1993 to attend a two-week Melcor Users Workshop at Sandia National Laboratory. The course provided hands-on training in use of this tool for severe accident analysis.

ASPE Codes and Standards:

Training of CEE representatives in the ASME

( American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes anc Standards will be conducted by ASME committee members during the week of Sectember 13, 1993 at ASME Headquarters in New York City.

This training _will allow CEE specialists to compare their Soviet code requirements to those used in the West, and to participate in ASME code development committee meetings i

scheduled for that week.

Nuclear inspector Trainina Proaram:

The program goal is to familiarize nuclear safety inspectors of four CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czecn Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary) with NRC inspection procedures anc techniques, wnich could then be adapted by them to their own needs and concitions.

Secarate training courses have been developed for four chief inscectors (two weer.s -- June 5-19, 1993) and a two-month course for four resicent inspectors j

(starting August 1993).

The program was designed to give the cnief inspectors a ;ood understanding of NRC inspection philosopny, principles. and rationales, anc to offer the resident inspectors an opportunity to work alcngside NRC regional or site inspectors, receive on-the-job training on kej ispects of inscettion, as well as attend one or two relevant courses at tne TTC.

Region 3

aas selected to host the training for both groups.

1

20 Assistance with Reaulatory Rules and Guides.

From April 7 until May 6.1993, at the request of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Zoltan Rosztoczy i

(RES) visited Budapest to assist in their effort to modify Hungary's existing nuclear regulations, and to explain NRC's approach on several regulatory issues.

Subjects covered included: a) review of the structure and bases of Hungarian nuclear power plant regulations; b) review of existing Hungarian nuclear safety requirements (rules and guides); and c) development of new nuclear safety rules and regulatory guides.

HAEC staff was also informed of the process used in the US for establishing and implementing regulations (including public involvement in rulemaking), inspection methods, and training and qualification of inspectors. While in Hungary, Dr. Rosztoczy also made side trips to Prague and Bratislava, for discussions with Czech and Slovak regulatory staff on related matters and to assist in ongoing efforts to modernize their-regulatory systems.

Appendices IV and V list official travelers to and from Central / Eastern Europe l

for NRC cooperative nuclear safety projects in this region under U.S. AID funding.

i I

t i

t

APPENDIX I PROGRAMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NRC LISBON INITIATIVE ASSISTANCE TO 2

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE RUSSIAN PROJECTS 1.

Licensino Basis and Safety Analysis To provide on-the-job training and technical assistance on NRC's practices and process for licensing nuclear power plants (NPPs), research reactors, and f acilities utilizing radioactive materials.

Under Russian Priority 1, nine teams of GAN representatives are scheduled to visit the United States from March 1993 through FY 1994 (six groups in 1993 and three in 1994). Activities include:

studying reactor, fuel cycle and material licensing processes, licensing fees collection, NRC licensing information software and hardware, reactor license renewal, and visiting the Watts Bar nuclear reactor site.

2.

Inspection Program Activities To provide training and technical assistance on the NRC's inspection program.

The NRC and GAN have agreed to four training team visits, three in 1993 and a fourth in early 1994.

The 1994 visit will involve joint participation in a pilot team inspection at a Russian nuclear power plant.

Two teams of GAN representatives are scheduled to visit the U.S. from June through December 1993 and two teams of NRC representatives are scheduled to visit Russia in FY 1994.

While in the United States, GAN representatives will study the NRC inspection process and participate in inspections at commercial power and research reactor sites, fuel facilities, material licensees, and vendor companies. While in Russia, NRC representatives will consult with GAN on development of the Russian inspection program and participate in a joint inspection of a Russian nuclear power plant.

3.

Creation of an Emeroency Succort Center in Russia To provide assistance in establisning incident response programs over a period of 3 years.

A U.S. team is tentatively scheduled to visit Russia during the last quarter of FY 1993 to study potential infrastructure issues and observe incident response operations related to the emergency support center development.

An additional Russian team visit is scheduled for late 1993 to observe NRC exercises.

4.

Analytical Sucoort Activities To provide assistance in implementing and applying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses.

The NRC has solicited technical contractor support for the procurement and installation of engineering / scientific workstations.

The workstations will be The following are the projects agreed in discussions with the Russian and 2

Ukrainian regulators to be the highest priority.

These are underway and are expected to be completed in two years. beginning in October 1992.

21

22 used by the regulator to perform severe accident analyses us:ng the U.S.

computer codes that will be modified for the Russian nuclear cwer plants.

In addition, an agreement has been reached with a national labcratory to provide some of the analytical code training.

5.

Establishment of a Reaulatory Trainina Prcaram Assistance will be provided to Russia in establishing a regulatory training program in Russia over' a period of three years.

A planning meeting was conducted in Moscow, Russia in Novemcer 1992 to develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to the establishment of a regulatory training program. There was agreement that technical assistance would be provided to address the highest priority training needs in 1993 as identified in the memorandum of the Meeting.

A meeting between GAN of Russia and NRC in December 1992 resulted in some changes in the Memorandum of the Meeting previously negotiated.

These changes, requested by GAN, reduced the length of time for the various Russian assignments at the TTC to three weeks maximum.

A revised Memorandum of the Meeting was issued.

Subsequent to this December meeting, the dates for all GAN assignments to the NRC Technical Training Center were slipped as requested by GAN.

A contract. with an effective date of June 21, 1993, was awarded for the purchase, installation, burn-in, maintenance, and warranty service for nine microcomputer systems and associated peripherals and supplies. The microcomputer equipment, although expected to be used for a variety of purposes by the GAN staff, was acquired to support computer-based training in the RBMK-1000, VVER-440, and VVER-1000 designs.

The microccmputer equipment was delivered to Moscow, Russia in July 1993.

A group of four personnel from GAN of Russia completed a three week assignment at the NRC Technical Training Center in July 1993. These personnel are typical of the technical managers who are or will be responsible for implementing the programs that were discussed.

They receivea technical training and briefings on subjects that included the ideology and methodology of technical training conducted for NRC personnel and teaching methods and course materials that may be used for training of GAN specialists.

A group of four personnel from GAN of Russia will have a two week assignment at the NRC Technical Training Center in August 1993. These personnel will typically be among the technical managers who are responsible for implementing the programs that will be discussed and will receive technical training and

+

briefings on subjects that include the use of training aids such as simulators and the use of equipment necessary to suitably equip a training facility for developing, reproducing, and presenting course materials.

Work is continuing on acquisition and delivery of microcomputer equipment and peripherals necessary to support computer-based training of Oussian personnel.

When supplementary funding of the appropriate amount is mace available for this priority (and Ukrainian priority 2), the formal process of establishing m

23 an agreement to acquire and celiver an Analytical Simulator :: iAN of Russia 4

(ana SCNRS of Ukraine) will begin.

The Analytical Simulator *as developed tr.rcugh a joint venture between U.S. and Russian organizations.

A group of ten to twelve personnel from GAN of Russia and two mterpreters aili have a two week assignment at the NRC Technical Training : enter in November 1993.

The personnel will include radiation protecti n specialists, engineering support specialists and operator licensing examination personnel.

These personnel are typically those who are responsible for i ciementing the programs that will be discussed.

A planning meeting will be conducted in Moscow, Russia in Decemoer 1993 to develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to the establishment of a regulatory training program for the second ear of the pro;ect.

The technical assistance that will be provided af ter the first project year will be documented in a Memorandum of the Meeting.

6.

Creation and Deveicoment of a Materials Control and Accountino System Under the program for Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, the United States has offered Russia an assistance program in nuclear materials accounting and control as requested by GAN.

This is not covered under the JCCCNRS.

7.

Fire Protection Suocort To provide technical assistance for development and review of fire protection inspection methodology anc the implementation of this methodology at Russian power reactors.

NRC will develop an historical fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown licensing analysis document, reflecting U.S. approaches to fire protection, to be used by GAN in preparation for future activities.

After completion of the fire protection / safe shutdown licensing document, GAN specialists will come to the United States to work with NRC and regional fire protection specialists to learn about NRC fire protection regulations, fire protection and safe shutdown licensing practices and procedures, and NRC fire protection and safe shutdown i

inspection methodologies.

GAN representatives will be briefed on the training sessions and experiences available from various U.S. sources. GAN will then propose further training, experiences and regulatory document developmental activities, and pilot fire protection and post-fire safe shute:wn licensing and inspection activities to be conducted under this Russian ;riority, both in the United States and Russia.

UKRAINIAN PROJECTS 1.

General Proaram on the Develcoment of SCNRS of Ukraine

~o provide assistance in development of Ukrainian State Committee # r Nuclear and Radiation Safety.

The SCNRS Chairman visited NRC in March 1993 to discuss Ukrainian direct assistance efforts.

The Chairman requested an NRC presence at 3CNRS to assist in the overall direction of USNRC efforts to develop the appr::riate regulatory organization and to provide recommendations where further b

24 assistance may be needed in the development and structuring of SCNRS.

NRC and SCNRS will jointly identify the appropriate levei of expertise needed.

2.

Establishment of a Reaulatory Trainina Program Assistance is being proviced to Ukraine in establishing a regulatory training program in Russia over a period of three years.

A planning meeting was conducted in Kiev, Ukraine in November 1992 to develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to the establishment of a regulatory training program.

There was agreement that technical assistance would be provided to address the highest priority training needs in 1993 as identified in the Memorandum of the Meeting.

A group of six people from SCNRS of Ukraine completed a six week assignment at the NRC Tecnnical Training Center in March 1993.

The subject matter discussed during training and briefings of the first delegation included training and qualification programs for NPP personnel, recruitment and development programs for NRC tecnnical staff, methodology of NRC technical training programs, content of major elements of the NRC technical training program, fundamentals of inspection, and a description of the operator licensing program.

Two people from SCNRS of Ukraine attended a Nondestructive Examination Course and an Eddy Current Testing Course arranged through the NRC Technical Training Center in May 1993 and July 1993 respectively.

A group of seven people from SCNRS of Ukraine completed a four week assignment at the NRC Technical Training Center in June 1993.

These included technical managers and key staff who will be responsible for implementing the programs that were discussed.

They received technical training and briefings on subjects that included training and qualification programs of NRC personnel, recruitment and development programs for NRC technical staff, methodology of NRC technical training programs, major elements of the NRC technical training program, use of training aids in the technical training program, fundamentals of inspection training, qualification programs for NPP personnel, and a description of the operator licensing program.

A contract was awarded in June 1993 for the purchase, installation, burn-in, maintenance, and warranty service for nine microcomputer systems and associated peripherals and supplies.

The microcomputer equipment, although expected to be used for a variety of purposes by the SCNRS staff, was acquired to support computer-based training in the RBMK-1000, VVER-440, and VVER-1000 designs.

The microcomputer equipment was delivered to Kiev, Ukraine in July i

1993.

I d

Work continues on acquisition and delivery of microcomputer equipment and 1

peripherals necessary to support computer-based training of Ukrainian

)

personnel.

Once sufficient FY 1993 funding is made available to this priority, the formal process will begin to establish an agreement for acquisition and delivery of

.i completed computer-based training and development of additional computer-based training to be used for training of Ukrainian SCNRS inspectors and operator

a 25 licensing examiners.

This computer-based training covers RBMK-1000, VVER-440, and VVER-1000 technology.

The computer-based training will be acauired from a Ukrainian cooperative.

When supplementary funding of the appropriate amount is made available for this priority (and Russian Priority 5), the formal process of establishina an i

agreement to acquire and deliver an Analytical Simulator to SCNRS of Ukraine (and GAN of Russia) will begin.

The Analytical Simulator is a product that was developed through a joint venture between U.S. and Russian organizations.

A planning meeting will be conducted in Kiev, Ukraine in September 1993 to I

develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to the establishment of a regulatory training program for the second year of the project.

The technical assistance that will be provided after the first i

project year will be documented in a Memorandum of the Meeting.

At this same time, there will be a week of technical briefings and training for SCNRS technical personnel.

3.1.

Development of a System for Safety and Licensino of Nuclear Power Plants To provide training and technical assistance on the NRC's process for l

licensing nuclear power plants, with particular emphasis on the NRC's safety analysis process.

An SCNRS representative visited NRC January-March 1993 to study NRC's organization and Part 50 and 52 licensing processes, and to tour the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.

The visit included the use of regulatory requirements, codes and standards, regulatory guides, bulletins, generic letters, and the standard review plan.

The NRC is hosting SCNRS representatives for a couple of months each to provide experience in the responsibilities and activities of a licensing project manager and information on Reactor Systems and Containment.

The NRC has also agreed to consider the feasibility of i

A 2-month continuation of the licensing project manager visit in FY94; o

Hosting 8 SCNRS technical specialists for 1-1/2 months each beginning in o

fall 1993.

The specialties include:

construction, instrumentetinn and a

i control, electrical engineering, plant systems / balance of plant, nuclear fuel core / spent fuel, radioactive waste management, radiation protection, mechanical engineering / materials.

A 2-to 2-1/2 month duration visit to Kiev early in CY 1994 by an NRC o

licensing project manager to consult on the completeness and implementation practices of the Ukrainian Nuclear Power Reactor Licensing System.

3.2.

Development of a System for Safety Analysis and licensino of Nuclear Power Plants To provide assistance in implementing and applying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses.

25 The objective of this project is to provide the Ukrainian regulatory organization, the SCNRS, assistance in:

1) implementing ano aoplying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses, and 2) the development of research support for regulatory activities.

More specifically, this assistance will include:

training and technical assistance in analytical methocology, computer codes and safety analysis, and the regulatory process.

computer codes and the necessary manuals and related literature for:

thermal hydraulic analysis; severe accident analysis (with core melt);

and consequence analysis (dispersion of radioactivity); and a workstation and personal computers needed to implement the program.

~

The NRC has solicited technical contractor support for the procurement and installation of engineering / scientific workstations.

The workstations will be used by the regulator to perform severe accident analyses using the U.S.

computer codes, which will be modified for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

In order for the NRC to meet the objectives of this project within a reasonable time frame, and since the NRC's own staff resources are limited, it is planned to use technical organizations in Russia, and also organizations in the United States, to provide some of the support needed to implement the program.

NRC will provide SCNRS with the following computer codes and related documentation:

ORIGEN-2, RELAPS/ MOD 3, CONTAIN 1.11, CORCON/M003, MACCS, and VICTORIA.

NRC also plans to provide basic training on fundamentals of safety philosophy / analyses in such areas as:

safety criteria [ fuel cladding, fuel enthalpy, vessel / primary system pressure limits, etc.]; accidents / transients selected for analyses and selection basis; codes utilized for different analyses, and the basis and limitations of the various models in these codes; system ESF modeling; single failure; the parameters to be varied, interpreting the results and identifying and understanding the significance of uncertainties.

In order to accomplish the above, NRC will provide support to SCNRS for its technical staff to train in the United States during 1993.

It is projected that two teams made up of 2-4 technical specialists will visit NRC headquarters and various laboratory sites for this purpose.

A team comprised of SCNRS technical specialists was in training for two weeks on fundamentals of safety philosophy as indicated above. During this assignment, code training was provided on CORCON/M003.

The second team of SCNRS technical specialists will be assigned for 2-3 weeks to receive basic training on fundamentals of safety philosophy as indicated in the above paragraph and code training on RELAP5/ MOD 3, CONTAIN 1.11, and VICTORIA.

In addition to the technical issues discussed above, NRC will provide information and assistance to the SCNRS staff in the use and management of technical assistance contractors by NRC to perform technical reviews and related audit. calculations, including the use of NRC developeo computer codes.

A senior technical SCNRS manager will study NRC management practices in the development of regulatory research~neeos and priorities, and will become 1

-~

27

1. 111iar with computer codes used by NRC to concuct audit eva sati:ns and NRC a::roacnes to utilizing technical assistance contracts.

4 Joint Inscection of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants for assessment and Deveicoment of Inspection Procedures of SCNRS T e objective of this project is for the NRC, through partic :ation in joint team inspections with the Ukrainians, to assess and provide sccmmendations f:r improvements to Ukrainian nuclear power plant inspection :ractices.

In October 1992, the NRC participated in the preparation for. conduct of, and cocumentation of a team inspection with the Ukrainian SCNRS at the Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant.

The purpose of this trip was to assess SCNRS inspection cractices and identify areas which may need increased inspection emphasis, and t; identify inspection techniques and procedures which may be used to enhance

eam and individual inspector effectiveness.

The NRC representatives met both a :n SCNRS managers in their national headquarters in Kiev ar.c alth SCNRS

nsoectors at the Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant.

The NRC team report served as a basis for Ukraine 5, Development of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants Inspection Activities Based on the Resuits of Joint Ins ections.

Under this Ukrainian priority, the NRC agreed i: a visit to Ukraine by NRC representatives for 1-1/2 months in March 1994 to observe and consult on the implementation of the Ukrainian inspection prcgram.

5.

Development of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant Inspection a tivities Based c

on the Results of Joint Inspections The NRC is assisting Ukraine in applying the information gained from the joint team inspection efforts under Ukraine 4 in the development and planning of Ukrainian nuclear power plant inspection activities.

Specific recommendations apply to the development of a reactor facility performance assessment process (similar to the USNRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process) and methods to incorporate the results into inspection planning.

Under this project, one SCNRS representative studied the inscection results frcm Priority 4, the NRC inspection program, the SALP, plant ;erformance reviews, and NRC's enforcement program, in beginning to formulate the Ukrainian inspection program (January-March 1993).

Two SCNRS teams visited NRC in May and July 1993 for familiarization with NRC regional inspection planning and conduct.

An experienced NRC regional

!ns;ector will visit Ukraine in 1994 for about two months to censult on the

evelopment of the Ukraine inspection program.

Four SCNRS teams will visit NRC at the end of 1993 to participate in the NRC core reactor inspection

r gram at reactor sites.

5.

Enforcement Reaulations The objective of this project :s to provide assistance in the develcoment of enforcement legislat1:n to support the ability of the SCNRS to take appropriate enforcement action and develop severity levels to characterize the safety and regulat:ry significance of inspection findings for the purpose of developing enforcement actions.

j m

y 28 Initial efforts were begun to provide pertinent legal guidance that may be significant in the development of nuclear legislation, currently being considerec by the Ukrainian parliament.

idditional practical gid::nce cn NRC enforcement issues will be provided in the future.

During Decemoer 1992, NRC representatives met with the Chairman of the SCNRS and its legal and inspection staff in Kiev, Ukraine.

This was a joint meeting on Jkraine 6 and Ukraine 13 (Legal Framework); the Assistant General Counsel for RulemaKing and Fuel Cycle, NRC, participated in this meeting to discuss issues associated with Ukraine 13.

A significant issue was how to establish a legal foundation for the SCNRS in Ukraine.

The NRC has provided comments on Article 79 of the Draft Ukrainian Nuclear Law.

In addition, discussions and training on enforcement systems in the U.S. and Ukraine, and on NRC's severity levels, were conducted in December 1992. January 1993 and March 1993.

Discussions will continue on severity levels as the NRC continues to provide assistance in this area.

Near-term future support consists of weekly teleonone calls to address legal-questions pertaining to the legislation, translation of NRC enforcement policy, and briefing of Ukrainian personnel visiting the United States.

Arrangements for future meetings will be developed and, if possible, held in Kiev.

Af ter the implementation of the Ukrainian law on the utilization of atomic energy and during the process of developing regulatory requirements, the NRC will provide assistance in the development of a program on enforcement regulations.

In March 1993, SCNRS representatives came to NRC for further training and discussions. The SCNRS is developing severity levels for their violations as well as cnanges to their legislation to be able to issue civil penalties against the license holders.

A visit by SCNRS staff to the United States is expected in August and NRC is expected to visit Kiev in October.

Future plans are to:

review the draft national law (Ukrainian Nuclear Law) to determine what changes are needed to permit the SCNRS to take appropriate enforcement action (article 79 of the Draft Ukrainian Nuclear Law); provide assistance in support of the determination of the enforcement philosophy for the SCNRS-type of sanctions, amounts of penalties, process to impose penalties and appeals; support a review of existing administrative, civil and criminal codes to see where changes are needed in establishing Ukrainian Nuclear Law; and assist SCNRS in the development of changes in the codes in coordination with other interested parties to achieve the enforcement philosophy of the SCNRS.

7 & 8 physical Protection Regulation and Program on Safeauards and Nonoroliferation Regulation Under the Safe and Secure Dismantlement program, the United States has offered Ukraine an assistance program in these areas. (This is not covered under the JCCCNRS.)

9.

Waste, Snent Fuel, and Nuclear Materials Manaaement To provide the Ukrainian SCNRS with the information to establish regulatory control over radioactive wastes and spent fuel.

f i

I 29 This effort focuses on management and disposal of radioactive waste and scent fuel.

The objective of the activity is to provide the Ukrainian SCNRS with the information it needs to establish regulatory control over radioactive wastes and scent fuel within its territory.

This work will provide an expert review ar.o assessment of the past and current regulatory program in Ukraine, and will then offer specific recommendations to the SCNRS on how best to improve regulatory control Of particular importance in this work will be identifying measures that can be implemented within the fiscal and technical constraints under wnich the SCNRS necessarily operates.

Work on this project was initiated during the fall of 1992.

The principal

, activities and accomplishments involved efforts necessary to obtain contractor support.

Early in February 1993, initial discussions were held with the Ukrainian SCNRS, including an exchange of views regarding the scope of work to be undertaken by NRC and its contractor and the Ukrainian SCNRS.

A meeting to formalize the action plan was held in Washington, D.C. during March 1993.

SCNRS input will be particularly important for determining the regulatory

environment, regulatory resources, radwaste inventory and effects of past practices in Ukraine.

The NRC agreed to develop a draft radwaste survey questionnaire and provide computers and software for radwaste inventory.

The SCNRS Scientific and Technical Center agreed to initiate the radwaste and regulatory survey.

SCNRS and the NRC will jointly develop a statement of work for 5CNRS support of the activities above and a draft regulatory questionnaire.

3 10.

Fire Protection Sucoort To provide technical assistance for development and review of fire protection inspection methodology and the implementation of this methodology at Ukrainian power reactors.

In March 1993, the NRC met with the Ukrainian SCNRS to outline implementation plans.

The NRC proposed to provide technical assistance to SCNRS in their development and review of fire hazard methodology and the implementation of this methodology at Ukrainian power reactors.

The NRC will review the fire protection / safe shutdown licensing process for all of the nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC.

The results of this review will be used to develop and deliver a detailed and comprehensive historical NRC fire protection and safe shutdown licensing analysis document which describes the typical approved U.S.

licensing approaches to fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown, the bases for licensing decisions, the regulatory documents under which the NRC reviews were conducted, and the unique approaches which the NRC found acceptable and for which the NRC staff granted licensing exemptions.

i 11.

Creation of an incident Response Center in Ukraine To provide assistance in developing an Incident Response Center and essential support capabilities in Ukraine.

10,11. sad 12 u di be rbnded by the July N93 Interagency Agreement

30 A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in Marcn 1993.

The next meetings will take place alternatively in " raine and the U.S. in late 1993 or early 1994 Two major steps are envision :

The first woulc be to develop general response concepts with the Stat.

,mmittee for Emergency Preparedness, including identifying the role of SCNR'

-,d agreements with other organizations.

The second step involv the development of :ne necessary support and communications to complete :he system in a phaseo approach for adequate testing at each phase.

Initially, development will begin with Zaporozhye and SCNRS Headouarters and then progress concurrently at nuclear power plant sites and SCNRS Headquarters.

The NRC plans to provide planning and related documents for translation in Ukraine and the SCNRS intends to translate and provide similar documents to NRC.

12.

Developino an Incident Reportina System To develop an operating experience closed loop feedback system for the improvement of nuclear power plant safety.

A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in Marcn 1993 to begin'~

formulating implementation plans.

Systems, standards, and methods for the reporting, collection, analysis, and evaluation of operating experience, utilization of results in probabilistic safety assessment, and feedback to power plants will be developed.

The first priority will be the reporting and collection of information.

This aspect will be to provide electronic means of communication, collection, storage, and analysis of data.

Questions and answers are being exchanged in preparation for a fall 1993 meeting.

During this meeting, the NRC will identify specific information needs and propose information systems.

It is anticipated that information j

systems will be needed for:

(1) component system reliability and failure modes; (2) event descriptions and sequences; and (3) human performance.

Use of international information will also be considered.

It is anticipated that training of Ukrainian specialists will begin in the winter of 1993.

13.

Creation of a Leaal Framework To provide assistance in developing a legal basis and in drafting legislation to establish the legal framework for the SCNRS.

The NRC's Office of General Counsel is assisting the Ukrainian SCNRS in developing a legal basis for its regulatory authority,. including providing comments on legislation to establish the legal foundation for the State Committee.

In December 1992, NRC's Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle met with the Chairman of the SCNRS and its legal and inspection staff in Kiev, Ukraine. The SCNRS provided detailed discussions on the current status of the Ukraine legal system, current legal basis of the SCNRS, the status of the draft law and the relationship between SCNRS and other Ukrainian ministries and committees.

Specific statutory concepts and provisions were reviewed.

The NRC representatives explained the legislative and regulatory system in the U.S., the legal basis of the NRC and the process for developing regulatory requirements and for licensing nuclear facilities and nuclear material in the U.S.

While in Kiev, Ukraine, NRC representatives met with and briefed a Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission on fundamental requirements for a regulatory agency.

31 NRC and SCNRS points of contact have been identified and a s:neaule of weekly

nene calls established to excnange information regarding eng:1ng activities.

In March 1993, representatives of the SCNRS came to NRC for Srther training on NRC legal processes and procecures and discussions on the : raft Ukrainian national law establishing the legal framework for the SCNRS.

An NRC legal representative intends to visit Kiev in the fall of 1993 after the Ukrainian Parliament provides its comments on the draft law.

The current plan is to develop the regulatory philosophy and mission of tne SCNRS; review the draft national law and provide comments and assistance in developing the law's provisions; and provide comments and assistance in developing further revisions to the national law after the first reading in the Ukrainian Parliament.

An SCNRS legal representative is scheduled to come to the United States for training on NRC's legal program and will be assignec for training ethin the NRC Office of General Counsel for approximately one month.

Assistance will also be provided SCNRS in developing the reguiatory philosop,hy for supplemental laws. in reviewing the relevant administrative laws and codes anc in drafting appropriate statutory language in coordination with other appropriate Ukrainian organizations and ministries.

In addition, SCNRS plans to identify legal material relevant to nuclear j

materials and facilities and to construct a computer data base for legal materials.

NRC will assist by providing net.essary computer hardware and software.

14.

Develooment of Research Succort for Reaulatory Activities (Phase 1)

To develop research support for regulatory activities.

A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in March 1993 to begin formulating implementation plans.

The initial phase of this project will begin with Ukraine Priority 3.2.

During this period, a senior technical manager from SCNRS will develop, in conjunction with the NRC. future activities to be accomplished under this priority.

15.

Reculatino Radioactive Sources Utilized in industry and Medicine The objective of this program is to assist the Ukrainian SCNRS in developing an appropriate regulatory program for the use of radioactive sources within its territory.

This work will include a review of the extent of use of radioactive sources used in industry and medicine, an assessment of the past and current regulatory program for such sources and development of recommendations for an efficient and effective regulatory program to control such sources, 'taking into account the resources available to cperate the

rogram.

15.

Creation of a Competent Oroan of Ukraine and of Reaulat ons Governino the Transportation of Pacioactive Mater,als

'he purpose of this program is to provide the Ukrainian SCNRS the information it needs to establish regulatory control over the transportation of racioactive material, anc to provide technical assistance to f acilitate

• • c 32 implementation of this regulatory program.

Ukraine does not have its own system for regulating the transportation of radioactive materiais, but rather relies en the system developed by the FSU.

This initiative would assist Ukraine in developing its own regulatory system for transportation, and in ceveloping technical resources to replace those that are no longer available to Jkraine since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Because of the lack of tecnnical resources, and the complexities involved in creating a regulatory system for transportation, the Ukrainian SCNRS-has suggested tnat the initiative ce undertaken in a staged approach over a 2-year period.

The Ukrainian SCNRS stressed that one of their top priorities is the training of personnel to enable them to evaluate independently the safety of radioactive material shipping containers.

The NRC and the Ukrainian SCNRS agreed that it would be desirable to have a Ukrainian designee attend a-2-week training c:urse on radioactive material shipping containers as soon as practicaole.

In addition, the parties agreed that the designee should.be assigned to the NRC for a minimum of two months to observe the NRC's regulatory orogram for transportation.

It is anticipated that a detailed

statement :f work would be completed by the end of 1993.

r I

i I

-c

I APPENDIX II 0FFICIAL TRAVELERS TO AND FROM THE USSR AND ITS DERIVATIVE REPUBLICS FOR TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AND/0R MEETINGS UNDER THE NRC PROGRAM 0F COOPERATION.*

SOVIET AND FSU VISITORS TO THE UNITED STATES WORKING GROUP 1988 1989 1990 l1991 1992 1993 TOT.L l

l l

l 24 l JCCCNRS 17 7

1 0l t

1 3

3 I

,I 2

4 3

It l 3

4 7

4 4

3 7

5 20 l 6

6 1

4 4

l I

I ol i

e 3

3

'6 I

Q 3

I k

T 10 4

5 4I 12 6

6 l

TOTAT.

46

!S

'S 14 111

'The JCCCNRS program was designed on the basis of reciprocity, where each working group would meet annually or slightly more often, alternately in the U.S. and the USSR.

This reciprocity was sustained through 1991, when due to the break-up of the USSR our partners found it impossible to support their i

share of the effort financially.

To maintain the dialogue, the U.S. did most l

of the traveling in 1992.

The host country usually had about ten attendees at a meeting.

The activities represented by the numbers in the table range from formal meetings to facility visits to joint research.

The figures for the U.S. visitors include NRC contractors and industry representatives.

The table includes no figures for WG 11, which was managed by DOE without NRC participation. The WGs are as follows:

WG 1 SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES WG 2 ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WG 3 RADIATION EMBRITTLEMENT, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND LIFE EXTENSION OF REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS AND SUPPORTS WG 4 FIRE SAFETY WG 5 MODERNIZATION /BACKFIITTING WG 6 SEVERE ACCIDENTS WG 7 HEALTH EFFECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS WG 8 EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WG 9 DIAGNOSTICS. ANALYSIS EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS FOR SUPPORTING OPERATIONS WG 10 EROSION / CORROSION OF PIPING AND COMPONENTS WG 11 INITIATIVE ON OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WG 12 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AGING AND PLANT LIFE EXTENSION L

l

U.S. VISITORS TO TIIE USSR AND FSU JCCCNRS-l l

l 10 6

l 12 34 l 6

1 l

l ol 1

3 1

l 3

3 2

6 3

1 3

15 5

I

. 24 4

2 3

4 2

l 11 l

l 5

2 3

1 5t 6

2 4

6 i

_-_ 7 20 2

4 4

lo 5t 6

3 3

12 i

i l

3 3

6 l

O l

l l

2 2

10 I

Y3 l l

I l

i i2 i2 l

TOTAL l

9 31 34 39 36 l

12 161l 1

r T

i l

I b

t a

1 e

6

,e v,

,s t

APPENDIX III LISBON INITIATIVE VISITORS 5 VicITORS TO U.S. FOR NRC PROIECTS UNDER THE IISBON INITIATIVE Program l1992 1993 General ILnning for Russian Projects l

7 R1 Licensine Basis and Safety Analysis l

13

! R' Inspection Program Activities l

6 R3 Creation of an Emergency Support Center in Russia l

4 R4 Analytic Support Activities R5 Establishment of a Regulatory Trainine Procram (FY92 partially fundedi l

R6 Materials Control and Accounting (MC&A) - Not under Lisbon Initiative l

R7 Fire Protection Support (FY92 partially funded) l l TOTAL l

7 23 i

General Plannine l

3 7

UI General Program on the Development of the Ukraine SCNRS l

U2 Establishment of a Regulatory Training Program 15 C3.1 Development of a System for Safety and Licensing of NPPs l

3 U3.2 Development of a System for NPP Safety Analysis and Licensing 2

C4 Joint Inspection of Ukrainian NPPs for Assessment and Developmer.1 et inspection Procedures

! U5 Development of Ukrainian NPP inspection Activities based on Joint 6

I Inspections U6 Enforcement Regulations WY92 partially funded) 1 C7 & US Physical Protection. Safeguards, and Nonproliferation - Under SSD program, not under Lisbon Initiative SNRC's program implementing the Lisbon Initiative on nuclear reactor safety is fundamentally one of training Russian and Ukrainian regulatory personnel and familiarizing the regulatory bodies of Ru;sia anc Ukraine with NRC ;ractices, although NRC is also providing computational anc emergency cc.Taunications equipment to these entities.

The visit:; reported in the chart re: resent about the first half year of a two-year program.

'e " General Planning" line reflects the visits of the top officials from ;ussia and Ukraine with whom NRC negotiated the projects to be done.

,, e t

U9 Waste Spent Fuel, and Nuclear hiaterials hianacement l

1 i

'CIO Fire Protection Support i

Ull Creation of an Incident Response Center in Ukraine l

l Cl2 Develocing an Incident Reponing System C13 Creation of a Legal Framework l

1 C14 Development of Research Support for Reculatory Activities l

CIS Reculating Radioactive Sources in Industry and Niedicine l

U16 Creation of a Competent Organ of Ukraine and Regulations governing the Transportation of Radioactive hiaterials TOTAL 3

36 l

1 1

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Ukrair.4 projects 10-12 and 15-16 will be funded from the FY93 Interagene Agreement

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'D Al'I'ENI)lX Y UNITEI) STATES VISITORS TO CENTR AIJEANI ERN EUROl'E UNDElt A.I.D.17 UNI) LNG ltOR NRC l'ItOJECTS I~

FY 1991 IlUI.GARIA IIUNGARY CSFR Fellowship 0

0 0

t )rientation 0

0 0

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0 0

TOTAL 0

0 0

FY 1992 IlUI.G A RI A IIUNGARY 1.lTIIUANI A CSFR Fellowship 0

0 0

0 Orientation 0

2 1

4 Training 0

0 0

0 TOTAL 0

2 1

4 FY 1993 IlUI.G A RI A IlUNGARY LITIIUANI A CZECil SI.OVAK R El'Ullt.lO R EI'lilll.lO Fellowship 0

0 0

0 0

Orientation 3

5 0

4 4

Training 0

0 0

0 0

TOTAL, 3

5 0

4 4

GRAND 3

7 1

4 4

4 TOTAI.

4

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